PRESERVING THE AMERICAN DREAM RECOVERING FROM SMART GROWTH SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA THOMAS A. RUBIN MISINVESTMENT IN TRANSIT IN LOS ANGELES November 11, 2007.

PRESERVING THE AMERICAN DREAMRECOVERING FROM SMART GROWTH

SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA

THOMAS A. RUBIN

MISINVESTMENT IN TRANSITIN LOS ANGELES

November 11, 2007

OVERVIEW

• Failure of the MTA Grand Strategy

• Bus vs. Rail, Costs, Value, and Budget

• Bus Works in Los Angeles, Guideway Transit Doesn’t, so Strengthen What Works – and Abandon What Doesn’t

Bus vs. Rail, Costs, Value, and Budget

• Productivity, Cost-Efficiency, and Cost-Effectiveness of MTA Bus and Rail Transit– Peer Analysis– MTA Internal Comparisons

• MTA Bus and Rail Subsidies

• Allocations of MTA Budget to Bus and Rail

Greater Los Angeles Transportation Reality Check

“Southern California, the land of low-density, single-family detached homes on large lots connected by endless freeways, where driving is king.”

Not.

SoCal TRANSPORTATION REALITY I

• Of the 69 U.S. Urbanized Areas with Populations of 500,000 or More, Greater Los Angles:– Has by far the highest population per square

mile, over 50% more than Greater NYC– Is second to last in both freeway centerline

miles and and total roadway miles per capita– Is 45th in daily vehicle miles traveled per

capita

SoCal TRANSPORTATION REALITY II

– SoCal has third best “homes-jobs” balance– Average vehicle miles per freeway lane mile is

by far the highest in the nation– LA has by far the “widest” freeways in the

U.S.– MTA buses and trains are among the most

crowded in the U.S.

Why do we have congestion? Too many people, not enough road capacity – and transit is not a congestion relief tool.

TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE 69 LARGEST URBANIZED AREAS

VMT/Freeway Lane vs. TTI

LA

NYC

CHI

DCSFO

ATL

RSB

OMA

TULROCSPI

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

1.8

8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 22,000 24,000

VMT/Freeway Lane

Tra

vel T

ime

Ind

ex

r-squared = .76 (VMT/Freeway Lane Independent)

Peer Analysis I

• Source: National Transit Database, Federal Transit Administration, Report year 2005 Transit Profiles, Top 50 Reporting Agencies

• All 12 Heavy Rail Systems (MTA Red Line)

• All 19 Light Rail Systems (MTA Blue, Gold, and Green Lines)

• 20 Largest Bus Systems (out of 44)

(Agency acronyms at end of paper.)

Peer Analysis II

• Metrics (Not Considering Capital Costs):–Productivity (consumption per unit of service): Average Passenger Load

–Cost-Efficiency (cost per unit of service): Cost and Subsidy/ Vehicle Revenue Hour

–Cost-Effectiveness (taxpayer cost per service consumed: Subsidy/Passenger and Subsidy/Passenger-Mile

–MTA-Preferred Metric: Farebox Recovery Ratio

Heavy Rail ProductivityFTA "TOP 50" HEAVY RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (12)

Average Passenger Load

29.6

25.0 24.5 24.2 23.7 23.5 23.0 22.521.0 20.9 20.9

16.5 15.614.4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Agency

LA-MTA has the highest Average Passenger Load of the twelve.

Heavy Rail Cost-EfficiencyFTA "TOP 50" HEAVY RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (12)

Cost, Revenue, and Subsidy per Revenue Vehicle Hour

$295$276

$233 $232$217 $214 $213

$182$170 $162 $161 $152 $148

$118

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

Agency

Subsidy/Revenue Vehicle Hour Fare Revenue/Revenue Vehicle Hour" Cost/Vehicle Revenue Hour

MTA has the highest cost per hour and the highest subsidy per hour of the twelve operators.

Heavy Rail Cost-EffectivenessFTA "TOP 50" HEAVY RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (12)

Subsidy/Passenger & Subsidy/Passenger Mile

NYCT

WMATA

CTAMBTA

BARTSEPTA

MARTA

PATH

LA-MTA

MDT

M-MTA GCRTA

Weighted Ave.

Simple Ave.

$0.05

$0.10

$0.15

$0.20

$0.25

$0.30

$0.35

$0.40

$0.45

$0.50

$0.00 $0.50 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 $2.50 $3.00 $3.50 $4.00

Subsidy/Passenger

Subs

idy/

Pass

enge

r Mile

LA-MTA performs very poorly, beating only three heavy rail systems widely acknowledged as failures.

Heavy Rail Farebox Recovery RatioFTA "TOP 50" HEAVY RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (12)

Farebox Recover Ratio

68.3%65.2%

59.2%56.6%

52.2%46.5% 45.0%

41.0% 38.6%

32.1% 30.9%

21.3% 18.9%15.9%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Agency

LA-MTA is third lowest of the dozen.

Heavy Rail – Conclusion

• The Red Line is very productive – due, in part, to the discontinuance of some Bus lines and shifts of others to feed it.

• Cost-efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and farebox recovery ratio are all well below peer norms.

• While average passenger load is high, the Red Line has yet to achieve half of the 298,000 daily riders projected – for 2000.

Light Rail ProductivityFTA "TOP 50" LIGHT RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (19)

Average Passenger Load

39.7

34.733.1

31.7

27.926.8 26.6 26.5

25.3 24.823.6 23.3

21.9

19.2 19.2 18.2 17.715.9

13.1 12.7

9.8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Agency

LA-MTA has the third-highest Average Passenger Load of the nineteen.

Light Rail Cost-EfficiencyFTA "TOP 50" LIGHT RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (19)

Cost, Revenue, and Subsidy per Revenue Vehicle Hour

$404

$360 $350$324

$287 $286

$245 $243 $241 $229 $216 $207 $206 $198 $188$165 $163

$136 $130 $125

$89

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

$400

$450

Agency

Subsidy/Revenue Vehicle Hour Farebox Revenue/Revenue Vehicle Hour Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour

MTA has the second-highest cost per hour and the second-highest subsidy per hour of the nineteen.

Light Rail Cost-EffectivenessFTA "TOP 50" LIGHT RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (19)

Subsidy/Passenger & Subsidy/Passenger Mile

MBTA

MUNI

LA-MTA

Tri-Met

SDTI

SEPTA

DART

Bi-StUTA

NJTC

SacRT

RTDMTA-HC

MT

PAT

SCVTA

M-MTA

GCRTAWeighted Ave.

Simple Ave.

KC-DOT (Subsidy/Passenger Mile = $4.89)

$0.00

$0.20

$0.40

$0.60

$0.80

$1.00

$1.20

$1.40

$1.60

$0.00 $1.00 $2.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00 $6.00 $7.00

Subsidy/Passenger

Subs

idy/

Pass

enge

r Mile

La-MTA's performance is well below average.

Light Rail Farebox Recovery RatioFTA "TOP 50" LIGHT RAIL OPERATORS 2005 (19)

Farebox Recovery Ratio

53.9%

47.2%42.4%

34.4%32.2% 31.3% 30.5%

26.0% 25.7% 24.5%21.4% 21.2%

17.5% 15.8% 15.5% 14.4% 13.9% 13.1% 12.2% 12.2%10.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Agency

LA-MTA is eighth lowest of the nineteen.

Light Rail Conclusions

• Productivity is high

• Cost-efficiency is very low

• Cost-effectiveness is below major peers

• Farebox recovery ratio is low

• This is an expensive way to move people in Los Angeles

Bus ProductivityFTA "TOP 20" MOTOR BUS OPERATORS 2005

Average Passenger Load

19.3

15.314.3 13.9 13.6

13.0 12.612.0 11.8 11.7 11.4 11.3

10.6 10.5 10.29.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.0

8.4

2.4

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Agency

LA-MTA is second highest of the twenty. (NYC DOT Passenger Mile data appears to be very incorrect.)

Bus Cost-EfficiencyFTA "TOP 20" MOTOR BUS OPERATORS 2005

Cost, Revenue, and Subsidy per Revenue Vehicle Hour

$201

$140$132 $128 $123 $121 $119 $116 $113 $113 $110 $107 $107 $104 $100 $98 $98 $95 $95 $92 $92 $91

$0

$25

$50

$75

$100

$125

$150

$175

$200

$225

AgencySubsidy/Revenue Vehicle Hour Fare Revenue/Revenue Vehicle Hour Cost/Revenue Vehicle Hour

MTA has the ninth-lowest cost per hour and the sixth lowest subsidy per hour of the twenty.

Bus Cost-EffectivenessFTA "TOP 20" BUS OPERATORS 2005

Subsidy/Passenger & Subsidy/Passenger Mile

NYCT

LA-MTA

CTA

SEPTA

WMATA

MTA-HC

KC-DOT

MBTA

MDT

RTDM-MTA

PAT

MT

NYCDOT (Invalid Passenger Mile data)

DARTTri-Met

MARTA

AC

NJTC

Weighted Ave.

Simple Ave.

OCTA

$0.30

$0.40

$0.50

$0.60

$0.70

$0.80

$0.90

$1.00

$1.00 $1.25 $1.50 $1.75 $2.00 $2.25 $2.50 $2.75 $3.00 $3.25 $3.50 $3.75 $4.00

Subsidy/Passenger

Subs

idy/

Pass

enge

r Mile

LA-MTA is second on Subsidy/Passenger to NYCT, $1.44 to $1.09, but NYCT is ninth on Subsidy/Passenger-Mile. NJ TC edged out LA-MTA on Subsidy/Passenger-Mile, $.381 to $.386, but NJ TC was twelfth-lowest on Subsidy/Passenger. Overall, LA-MTA has the lowest subsidies of the "Top 20."

Bus Farebox Recovery RatioFTA "TOP 20" BUS OPERATORS 2005

Farebox Recovery Ratio

42.4%39.9%

34.2% 34.1%32.8%

31.2% 30.6% 30.0% 29.8%28.5% 28.1%

26.7%24.2% 23.8% 23.5%

22.0%20.5% 20.5%

18.9% 18.7% 17.9%

12.7%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Agency

LA-MTA is seventh highest of the twenty.

Bus Conclusions

• Productivity is very high – second highest of the 20 in the peer group.

• Cost-Efficiency and Farebox Recovery Ratio are above average.

• MTA Bus is number one in the peer group on Cost-Effectiveness

FTA "TOP 50" HEAVY RAIL, LIGHT RAIL, & MOTOR BUS OPERATORS 2005Comparative Farebox Recovery Ratio's

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Agency

Heavy Rail Light Rail Motor Bus

In most multi-modal agencies, the rail modes have farebox recovery ratios that are higher than those of bus. This is particularly true in those places where transit is most highly utilized, including New York (NYCT),Chicago (CTA), Boston (MBTA), and Philadephia (SEPTA). Many of the exceptions have only very minor railor it the rail system has significant issues, such as Seattle (KD-DOT), Houston (MTA-HC), and San J ose (SCVTA).In Los Angeles, however, the reason why the MTA rail farebox recovery ratios are lower than that of bus is thatrail is extremely expensive to operate, while bus is not.

Overall Peer Comparison Conclusions

• All MTA modes are very productive.• MTA Bus is above average in cost-

efficiency; MTA Rail is near or at the bottom.

• MTA Bus is above average in farebox recovery; MTA Rail does very poorly.

• MTA Bus is the most cost-effective of the nation’s larger bus operators, MTA Rail fares not very well.

Understanding the History of MTA Ridership is the Key to Transit Decisions

• The following graphs show the ridership of MTA and its predecessor, SCRTD, back to 1980. (Strike years ridership are adjusted.)

• The first graph shows the annual ridership by mode; the second shows the trend lines for the four key periods that followed major transit decisions regarding fare levels and the degree of priority given to rail.

• The facts behind each period are then presented.

SCRTD/L.A. Co. MTAUnlinked Passenger Trips by Mode FY80-FY07

397389

354

416

466

497

450

437

425

412401

413 414

390397

371364

386

404399

417

437445

430435

452

479

496

300

340

380

420

460

500

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Fiscal Year

Unlin

ked P

asse

nger

Trips

(m

illion

s)

Motor Bus Light Rail Heavy Rail Total

L.A. County MTAAnnual Ridership by Period and Trend Lines

397389

354

416

466

497

450

437425

412401

413 414

390397

371364

386

404399

417

437445

430435

452

479

496

350

375

400

425

450

475

500

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Fiscal Year

Unlin

ked P

asse

nger

Trips

(m

illion

s)

Unlinked Passenger Trips Pre-Fifty Cent Fare Fifty Cent Fare Rail Priority Consent Decree

L.A. Co. MTAAnnual Change in Ridership by Mode by Period

(21.3)

47.7

(14.6)

6.81.7 2.10.7

3.2

(21.3)

47.7

(12.1)

12.1

(30)

(20)

(10)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Pre-Fifty Cent Fare Fifty Cent Fare Rail Priority Consent Decree

Period

Avera

ge A

nnua

l Cha

nge I

n Ride

rship

(milli

ons)

Bus Light Rail Heavy Rail Total

Consent Decree Ridership Change

• During the Consent Decree period (FY96-FY07), note that over half of the total increase has been the increase in Bus. Considering that over half of the Rail riders are former Bus riders, this makes the Bus increase even more significant.

• Also, much of the Rail increase was due to the CD’s reduced fares and expansion of Bus service, which allowed Rail riders to access the Rail stations.

Understanding MTA Ridership History I

Pre-Fifty Cent Fare: From FY80 to FY82, fares increased from $.55 to $.65 to $.85 – and ridership fell 11%.

Fifty Cent Fare: When the fare was reduced to $.50 for FY83-FY85, ridership increased over 40%, with virtually no increase in transit service provided.

Understanding MTA Ridership History II

Rail Priority: From FY85 to FY96, the monies that funded the Fifty Cent Fare – slightly under 20% of the Proposition A .5¢ sales tax collections – shifted to rail. The Blue and Green Lines and the first two Red Line segments started service. Fares went to $.85, then $1.10, and finally to $1.35, as the level of bus service provided was reduced – & ridership dropped 27%.

Understanding MTA Ridership History III

Consent Decree: The Consent Decree that settled Labor/Community Strategy Center v MTA went into effect in mid-FY97. MTA completed the last two legs of the Red Line, the Gold and Orange Lines and started construction on the Gold Line Eastside and Expo. Ridership is projected to increase 37% through the end of FY07. However, MTA states that it cannot continue to fund both current transit operations and rail expansion.

Debunking a Misimpression I• Rail proponents often claimed that the high

capacity of Rail allows Rail operating costs per passenger and passenger-mile to be less than that of Bus. While there are cases where this can be correct, such as the NYC subway, the key to doing this test is performing the proper comparison.

• For example, on page IV-2 of the MTA Adopted Budget FY2007, we see the following:

Bus Rail Cost per Unlinked Trip $2.29 $2.84Cost per Passenger-Mile $ .61 $ .48

Debunking a Misimpression II

• These statistics makes it appear that Rail can be competitive with Bus in certain transit operating situations in Los Angeles; however, the problem is – these are system-wide average Bus numbers.

• Because of the high initial capital cost for new Rail lines, it is contra-indicated to build Rail in any alignment where there would not be high ridership; however, Bus capital costs are so low it can be, and is, effectively used in far more situations, as the following graph illustrates.

Debunking a Misimpression III

• The graph on the following page is from data from Subsidy/Passenger by Bus Line Family, MTA Quarterly Line Performance Trends Report, 12/31/97, showing the cumulative percentages.

• For example, 40% of the MTA Bus Lines at that time had subsidies/passenger of $.91 or less, 80% had subsidies/ passenger of $1.21 or less.

L.A. Co. Metro Transporation AuthoritySubsidy/Passenger By Line Family

$0.43$0.52 $0.59

$0.71$0.91 $0.96 $0.99 $1.04

$1.21

$1.66

$0.00

$0.50

$1.00

$1.50

$2.00

$2.50

$3.00

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percentile

Mean: $1.07 - 71st Percentile

$16.36

Median

Debunking a Misimpression IV• When system-wide Bus averages are used to

compare to Rail lines, then the mean value ($1.07 on this graph) is what is used.

• However, half of the Bus riders had a subsidy/ passenger of $.96 or less – and 30% had subsidies of $.71 or less, and 10% had subsidies of $.52 or less, under half of the mean value.

• Rail line costs should be compared to the values at the lower end of the curve, for the most utilized Bus lines, not the mean.

(The best Bus-vs.-Rail comparison is comparable service in the same or comparable corridors.)

Impacts of Capital Costs I

• In the preceding, we have shown that MTA Heavy and Light Rail compare poorly to MTA Bus in operating costs and subsidies.

• The next step is to add capital costs, which will resolve the issue of the utility of Rail in Los Angeles beyond any doubt.

(All data following is expressed in constant MTA FY2007 dollars, using data from the MTA FY2007 Budget and other MTA sources.)

Impacts of Capital Costs II

While it is, at best, extremely questionable if Urban Rail has any operating cost/subsidy advantage over Bus in Los Angeles, there is absolutely no doubt about capital subsidies – the capital subsidy per “Guideway Transit” passenger (Light and Heavy Rail plus Orange Line Bus Rapid Transit) in Los Angeles is dozens of times that for Bus passengers.

MTA FY2007 CAPITAL SUBSIDY, OPERATING SUBSIDY, AND OPERATING REVENUE PER PASSENGER

$6.98

$23.50

$12.16

$15.67

$12.90 $13.11 $12.91

$1.93 $1.34 $1.13

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

Blue Gold Green Red Rail Ave. Orange GuidewayAve.

Bus WilshirePre-Rapid

WilshireRapid

Mode/Line

Capital Subsidy Operating Subsidy Operating Revenue Subsidy/Passenger

MTA FY2007 OPERATING RATIO(INCLUDING CAPITAL COSTS)

7.8%

2.5%4.6% 3.9% 4.5% 4.4% 4.5%

24.8%

29.1%

34.1%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Blue Gold Green Red Rail Ave. Orange GuidewayAve.

Bus WilshirePre-Rapid

WilshireRapid

Mode/Line

Comparisons of Total Costs/Subsidies I

• In the preceding graphs, I have added markers for the Wilshire/Whittier family of bus lines, current the highest ridership family of bus lines in the nation, with ~100,000/working weekday.

• “Pre-Rapid” refers to Lines 18 and 20, and their limited stop variations, before Rapid Bus (Line 720) was introduced

• “Wilshire Rapid” is Line 18, 20, and the remaining limited stop lines, and Line 720, after Rapid Bus service began.

Comparisons of Total Costs/Subsidies II

• While cost and subsidy/passenger is important, cost and subsidy per new passenger is even more important for many key Los Angeles transit decisions.

• This metric was originally developed by the Federal government in response to research showing that many, often two-thirds or more, of passengers on new Rail lines were former Bus passengers.

MTA FY2007 CAPITAL SUBSIDY, OPERATING SUBSIDY,AND OPERATING REVENUE PER NEW PASSENGER TRIP

$13.96

$47.00

$24.31

$31.35

$25.79 $26.21 $25.82

$1.40 $0.95

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

Blue Gold Green Red Rail Ave. Orange GuidewayAve.

CD Bus WilshireRapid

Mode/Line

Capital Subsidy Operating Subsidy Operating Revenue Subsidy/New Passenger

MTA FY2007 NEW PASSENGER OPERATING RECOVERY RATIO (INCLUDING CAPITAL COSTS)

4.1%1.2% 2.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2% 2.2%

27.5%

51.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Blue Gold Green Red Rail Ave. Orange GuidewayAve.

CD Bus WilshireRapid

Mode/Line

Comparisons of Total Costs/Subsidies III

• The comparison of Guideway Transit to Bus in Los Angeles could not be clearer:– The taxpayer subsidy per passenger added

by the Consent Decree was 5.4% of that for Guideway Transit; for Wilshire Rapid Bus service, 3.7%

– New Guideway Transit passengers pay 2.2% of the costs of their rides; CD Bus new passengers, 27.5%, Wilshire Rapid new Bus passengers, 51.3%

Why The Orange Line Was A Mistake I

• The justification for the Orange Line was time savings – originally, in the DEIS/DEIR, 28.8 minutes between North Hollywood and Warner Center for BRT on the Orange Line vs. 50 minutes for Rapid Bus.

• It has now been extensive documented, and MTA has admitted, that both times were wildly inaccurate, even fraudulent, in favor of the Orange Line.

• The graph following shows the history of travel time projects to actual reality.

U.S. URBANIZED AREAS POPULATION >1,000,000 1980Population vs. Central Business District Commercial Square Feet

NYC

LA

CHI

PHIL

DET

SFDC

DALATL

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Urbanized Area Population (Millions)

Cent

ral B

usin

ess

Dist

rict S

quar

e Fe

et

(Tho

usan

ds)

Least Squares Line

r-squared = .97 (w/o Los Angeles)

Los Angeles "actual" was only 23% of prediction.

Why Rail Isn’t For Los Angeles

• To have any hope to work, Rail Transit must have high passenger loads.

• With very few exceptions in the U.S., high passenger loads means travel to the Central Business District during peaks.

• Los Angeles has, by far, the smallest CBD per million residents of any U.S. UZA.

• Data is from “Urban Rail in America,” for 1980 – The year LA voted to build rail.

L.A. County MTA - San Fernando ValleyOrange Line BRT vs. Rapid Bus Peak Hour Run Times

North Hollywood - Warner Center

28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8 28.8

42

44

28.8

40 40 40 40

45

50

50 50

41.7 41.7

34.4

50 50

45.6 45.6

38.7

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

DEIS/EIR FEIR DSEIR FSEIR Errata OriginalSchedule

LatestSchedule

MTA Document

Min

ute

s

BRT Low BRT High Rapid Bus Low Rapid Bus High

Why The Orange Line Was A Mistake II

• Instead of a 42% travel time advantage over Rapid Bus, by MTA’s own figures, the Orange Line is actually ~26% slower than Rapid Bus on Victory/Lankershim.

• MTA was repeatedly warned that operating BRT through at-grade intersections at 45 mph without LRT-style barriers was extremely unsafe, but refused to consider changes until it had no choice.

Why The Orange Line Was A Mistake III

• It is difficult to tell which MTA action to defend the “safety” of the Orange Line was more egregious:– Citing the Miami-South Busway as “proof” of

the safety of the Orange Line design, after all MSB buses were required to stop at all intersections, even when they had the green, due to its terrible safety record.

– Actually claiming before the Judge hearing the EIR challenge that traffic safety was not a proper subject for such a legal action.

Why The Orange Line Was A Mistake IV

• When MTA was required to compare the Orange Line to Rapid Bus line networks, even the very poor MTA Rapid Bus alternatives (one with six E-W Rapid Bus lines within 3.0 miles – four within 1.25 miles – and no N-S and none for the rest of the Valley) showed Rapid Bus producing more ridership in the Valley (despite MTA’s claims to the contrary).

Why The Orange Line Was A Mistake V

• The ~$350 million spent on Orange Line capital (not counting $159 million for the right-of-way it was built on, previously purchased for a subway never to be built), and its extremely high operating costs could have been much more productively spent on a true network – a rational one – of Rapid Bus lines in the Valley and other Bus improvements.

Lessons from the Orange Line Debacle• Many types of Bus Rapid Transit can be of great

use in many situations in LA, including:– Rapid Bus (when configured for ridership increase,

not cost reduction)– Express Bus on freeway, particularly when combined

with High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) and High Occupancy-Toll (HOV) lanes

• Orange-style BRT should only be considered with proper consideration of grade crossing safety, and only then when there is a meaningful advantage over Rapid Bus, which can generally provide 80% or more of the speed advantage of this type of BRT at 2% of the guideway capital cost.

MTA FY07 Budget - Bus/Guideway Split I

• Looking at FY07 budget allocations for MTA operated and contracted transit service only – backing out Municipal Bus service subsidies, Metrolink subsidies, local return funds, highway expenditures, etc. – the following graph shows the allocation of money to Bus and Guideway Transit and the transit service utilized for each.

L.A. MTA - Percentages of Subsidies,Unlinked Passenger Trips, and

Passenger-Miles by Mode - FY07 Budget

48.0%52.0%

81.3%

18.7%

73.5%

26.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Non-Guideway Bus Guideway

Mode

Taxpayer Subsidies Unlinked Passenger Trips Passenger-Miles

L.A. MTA - Taxpayer Subsidy per Passenger andper Passenger-Mile by Mode - FY07 Budget

$5.79

$2.21

$10.37

$1.41$0.60

$1.79

$0

$2

$4

$6

$8

$10

$12

Total Non-Guideway Bus Guideway

Mode

Subsidy per Unlinked Passenger Trip Subsidy per Passenger-Mile

Overall Conclusions I

• Guideway transit – Heavy Rail, Light Rail, and Orange Line-style Bus Rapid Transit – simply does not work very well in Los Angeles.

• Bus, including Rapid Bus where properly implemented (for ridership expansion, not cost reduction) works superbly.

• There is not sufficient funding to operate bus services as it is now while pursing rapid guideway transit expansion.

Overall Conclusions II

• Stop doing what isn’t working – expansion of Guideway Transit; it costs too much and does too little.

• Continue what is working very well – Bus transit.

• Lobby to change Federal and State funding sources for Bus use.

• Don’t raise fares, reduce them• Expand and improve bus service,

including certain types of Bus Rapid Transit.