INDUSE2-SAFETY Component fragility evaluation and seismic safety assessment of "special risk petrochemical plants under design basis and beyond design basis accidents, Grant No: RFS-PR-13056 Fabrizio Paolacci Roma Tre University Department of Engineering DRMKC workshop with FP7 and H2020 projects on Critical infrastructres – 16-17 March 2017, Bruxelles, Belgium
38
Embed
Presentazione di PowerPoint - UniTrento · i 2 (a) (b) m c 1 m c m 1 m i m i c m i k c 1 k i 1 c k c 2 i m c 1 m i k c 1 k i 1 c i k c c iso c iso (c) INDUSE2-SAFETY is subdivided
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
INDUSE2-SAFETY Component fragility evaluation and seismic safety
assessment of "special risk petrochemical plants under design basis and beyond design basis
accidents, Grant No: RFS-PR-13056
Fabrizio Paolacci
Roma Tre University
Department of Engineering
DRMKC workshop with FP7 and H2020 projects on Critical infrastructres – 16-17 March 2017, Bruxelles, Belgium
methodology for QsRA of process plants • Main aspects and criticisms
• PRIAMUS: a new tool for QsRA of process plants • Conclusions • What else?
In a world that has a continuous need of materials transformation industries, an important role is played by process plants and in particular Petrochemical Plants.
Once discovered, drilled and brought to the earth’s surface, crude oil is transported to a refinery by pipeline, ship or both. At the refinery, it is treated and converted into consumer and industrial products.
A petroleum refinery is a complex assembly of individual process plants interconnected with piping and tanks.
DRMKC workshop with FP7 and H2020 projects on Critical infrastructres – 16-17 March 2017, Bruxelles, Belgium
PROCESS PLANTS
Premises
Premises Several accidents (Na-Tech events) occurred in the last decades in industrial sites have evidenced that naturals phenomena may cause severe damages to equipment items, resulting in losses of containment, thus in multiple and extended releases of hazardous substances.
Database: MHIDAS
Past accidents analysis evidences that structural damage to the equipment directly struck by lightning is the more frequent cause of loss of containments accidents, but generally seismic events produces severe consequence because increases the likelihood of multiple and simultaneous failures of industrial components.
Tupras Refinery, Turkey 1999
Chiba Refinery, Japan, 2011
Kobe Earthquake, Japan, 1995
The Kocaeli earthquake caused significant structural damages to the Tupras refinery itself and associated tank farm with crude oil and product jetties and triggered multiple fires in the refinery’s naphtha tank farms.
Kocaeli earthquake (Turkey) -17 August 1999 - Magnitudes 7.4
- The majority of the floating roof tanks (30 out of 45) were damaged;
- 250.000 m3 crude oil and 100.000 m3 oil product having been exposed to the atmosphere and partially pouring out of the tanks;
- Evacuation order was issued by the crisis centre for a zone of 5 km around the refinery;
- Considerable oil pollution occurred during the incident;
- Total damage is estimated to be around US$ 350 million
Tupras refinery
Lession from the past: Extreme vulnerability of the tank farm, importance of the domino effect, damaging of the services and security systems.
Premises
2011 Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake
(Mw9.0), Japan
Premises
What about Europe?
European Union Law: DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU (amendments of 96/82/EC) on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances Annex II: Minimum data and information to be considered in the safety report referred to in Article 10 4. Identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods: (a) detailed description of the possible major-accident scenarios and their probability or the conditions under which they occur including a summary of the events which may play a role in triggering each of these scenarios, the causes being internal or external to the installation; including in particular:
(i) operational causes; (ii) external causes, such as those related to domino effects, sites that fall outside the scope of this Directive, areas and developments that could be the source of, or increase the risk or consequences of a major accident; (iii) natural causes, for example earthquakes or floods;
SEVESO III
Premises
What are the Actions in USA/EUROPE? PREVIOUS RELATED RESEARCH PROJECTS - Structural safety of industrial steel tanks, pressure vessels and piping
systems under seismic loading (INDUSE) - Development of INnovative DEvices for Seismic Protection of
PeTrocHemical Facilities (INDEPTH) - Integrated European industrial risk reduction system (IRIS) - Seismic-lnitiated events risk mitigation in LEad-cooled Reactors
(SILER) - Enhancing resilience of communities and territories facing natural
and na-tech hazards (ENSURE) - Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, Lifeline
Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain (SYNER-G)
Premises
What are the Actions in USA/EUROPE?
Country Importance Factor, g (for
special risk structures)
National Return Period
TR (Years)
Return Period calculated using Eurocode 8 based on TL (Years)
France 2.2 5000 5057
Germany 1.65 - 2133
Italy 2 1950 3800
Norway 1.8 2000 2770
Onshore structures inside the scope of EN1998. Target reliability that depends on consequences of failure. In operational terms one multiply the reference seismic action by the importance factor γI
Inconsistent Return Period values
Premises
What are the Actions in USA/EUROPE? The Seismic Task Committee of ASCE Energy Division issued specific Guidelines for Seismic Evaluation and Design of Petrochemical Facilities (1997, 2011), in order to provide practical guidance to engineers involved in seismic design and evaluation. Though these Guidelines are largely based on qualitative seismic risk concepts and deterministic approaches, no corresponding European technical document exists in this respect. In addition, also the requests to CEN/TC 250 for Eurocode amendments do not include specific issues for process plants (CEN/TC 250, 2013). - ASCE Task Committee on Seismic Evaluation and Design, Guidelines for Seismic Evaluation and Design of Petrochemical Facilities, 1997 1st Edition; 2011, 2nd Edition. - CEN/TC 250, Response to Mandate M515 EN, N_982 Report, May, 2013.
Seismic hazard
Geological structure data Historic earthquake data
Active fault data
Analysis on earthquakeincidence / seimic ground
motion propagation
Seismic hazard curve
Response spectrum
Fragility evaluation of support structures /
components
Seismic response evaluation
Structural strengthevaluation
Accident sequenceevaluation
Scenario analysis
System reliability evaluation
Fragility curves Accident SequenceOccurrence Frequency
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES AND SEISMIC DESIGN CATEGORIES
Premises
INDUSE2-SAFETY PROJECT: Origin
XP-Resilience: extreme loading analysis of
petrochemical plants and design of
metamaterial-based shields for enhanced
resilience
INDUSE Structural safety of industrial steel tanks, pressure
vessels and piping systems under seismic loading
….a clear (three steps) strategy COMPONENT LEVEL
PLANT LEVEL
COMMUNITY LEVEL
INDUSE2-SAFETY PROJECT: Partnership
1. UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI DI TRENTO, Prof. Oreste S. BURSI, Dr. Nicola TONDINI
2. CENTRO SVILUPPO MATERIALI SPA, Eng. Elisabetta Mecozzi
3. COMMISSARIAT Á L’ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE ET AUX ÉNERGIES ALTERNATIVES,
5. PANEPISTIMIO THESSALIAS (UNIVERSITY OF THESSALY), GREECE
Prof Spyros A Karamanos, Eng. Maria Vathi
6. UNIVERSITA DEGLI STUDI ROMA TRE, Dr. Fabrizio PAOLACCI
7. THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL, UK, Prof Alexander MOVCHAN
8. WALTER TOSTO SPA, ITALY, Eng. Patrizio DI LILLO
9. ING.-GES. DR.-ING. FISCHBACH MBH, GERMANY Dr. Gunter FISCHBACH
INDUSE2-SAFETY was conceived based on the above-mentioned framework with a multiplity of objectives:
1. Assessment of the actual risk of potentially dangerous onshore petrochemical plants, for seismic loss prevention and inside the scope of EN 1998.
2. Development of full a probabilistic QSRA using a consequence-based methodology (cascading effect fashion).
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Objectives
INDUSE2-SAFETY was conceived based on the above-mentioned framework with a multiplity of objectives:
3. Evaluation of fragility curves of main structures and components needed for the QSRA analysis based on numerical and experimental approaches
4. Issuing of quantitative risk assessment provisions for seismic loss prevention of onshore “special risk” petrochemical facilities within the scope of EN 1998
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Objectives
INDUSE2-SAFETY was conceived based on the above-mentioned framework with a multiplity of objectives:
5. Issue of enhanced design recommendations for the improvement of Eurocodes (EC8) and recognized standards for petrochemical components (EN13480)
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Objectives
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Architecture
WP4Experimental testing of piping
systems , storage tanks and welded connections
WP2FE models and simulations
systems involving complexity/uncertainties
WP1Analysis of chemical/oil and gas plants subject to seismic loads
WP6Seismic probabilistic risk assessment
of a petrochemical plant
WP7Guidelines for the seismic probabilistic
risk-based assessment/design of petrochemical plantsW
P8
C
oo
ord
inat
ion
and
man
agem
ent
pro
ced
ure
s
WP5Evaluation of fragility for piping systems and liquid
storage tanks
WP3Numerical evaluation of
component fragilities induced by seismic loads
kc1
kc2
ki1
ki2
(a) (b)
mc1
mc2
mi1
mi2
mi
mc1
mi
kc1
ki1
mc2kc2
kc1
kc2
ki1
ki2
(a) (b)
mc1
mc2
mi1
mi2
mi
mc1
mi
kc1
ki1
mc2kc2
mc1
mi
kc1
ki1
ci
cckiso
ciso
mc1
mi
kc1
ki1
ci
cckiso
ciso
(c)
INDUSE2-SAFETY is subdivided in 7 technical Work Packages. WP1 to WP5 are dedicated to the definition of the main ingredients of the QsRA fully developed in WP6. WP6 concerns the development of a new multi-level approach in which the domino effect is considered (cascading effect) WP7 is finally devoted to guidelines for risk-assessment of Petrochemical plants
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Motivations for a new QsRA procedure
Performance-based seismic analysis
Well recognized for civil structures
What are the performances for a process plant?
OBE SSE
operating
basis
earthquake
safe
shutdown
earthquake
Recognized Limit States for NPP
How to calculate the probability of occurrence of an
earthquake related to these two Limit States?
What are the main issues in the probabilistic risk calculation of a Petrochemical Plant?
NPP versus Non NPP
All possible scenarios, involving:
•A set of units damaged by the
earthquake•One or more chains of accidents
Units damaged byearthquake
Secondarydamaged units
Undamaged units
Propagation effects
NPP PP
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: Motivations for a new QsRA procedure
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: A novel Fragility-based method for QsRa
The proposal method is an extension of the classical QRA procedure, with the introduction of some fundamentals aspects: the seismic hazard of the site, the specific seismic vulnerability of the components, the Domino effect based on a multi-level approach.
Classical Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) methods cannot be applied to evaluate consequence in case of earthquakes, because of the presence of multi-damage conditions, simultaneously involving more than one equipment.
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
ABOVE GROUND ANCHORED & UNANCHORED TANKS
Improvement of numerical models
Solid
Lagrangian
ELEVATED TANKS
PRESSURE VESSELS
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
PIPING SYSTEMS
Improvement of numerical models
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
Experimental evaluation of the seismic response and damage states
STORAGE TANKS
STORAGE TANKS
PIPING SYSTEMS
SHAKING TABLE TESTS
SHAKING TABLE TESTS
REAL-TIME TESTING
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
Numerical and experimental evaluation of fragility curves for the QsRA
For PGA=0.25 g the probability of failure is
alsmot 1. This has
been confirmed by the real collapse happend
for a similar value of PGA
Different methods for Fragility analysis methods based in numerical and experimental analysis have been investigated along with an efficiency-sufficiency analysis for the determination of the best Intensity measure. Accordngly a collection of Fragillity curves has been provided for QsRA
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects Determination of loss of containment (LOC) events for each component damaged by theearthquake according to damage states (DS). this relationship is considered deterministic asillustrated in the DS/LOC matrix reported below, valid for anchored and unanchored tanks.
RE
LE
AS
E
DAMAGE-LOSSESCORRELATION
Of course, more than one LOC could be triggered by the same LS, but, conservatively, only themost severe is herein considered. A refinement of this relationship, in a probabilistic sense, isunder investigation, and will be object of further researches. Det
erm
inat
ion
of
loss
of
con
tain
me
nt
(LO
C)
eve
nts
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
Pool Fire
Bleve and Fire Ball
Jet Fire
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Physical Effects
(Yellow Book)
EVENT TREE
Estimation of source terms and physical effects (Consequences)
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: main aspects
Damage propagation effects (Domino effect)
For each seismically damaged unit, after the quantification of the physical effects (pressure, thermal radiation, etc..) due to a LOC event, the procedure includes the damage evaluation in the remaining undamaged units.
LOC: Energy/ m ater ial release
Mu ltiple scenar iosof Dom ino chains
Probabilistic target dam age on w eakened
structu res( Probit m odels)
SOURCE
UN I T
Fragm ent proj ection
Th erm al radiation
Overpressure
TARGET
UN I T
Fragm ent proj ection
Therm al radiation
Overpressure
Toxic release
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: A new multilevel approach
It is assumed that the accidents sequence may be represented with a multi-level approach based by a sequence of propagation “levels”. Each propagation level includes a subset of process units directly damaged by units belonging to the previous levels.
MCS approach represents one of the most suitable methodologies because of its capability to simulate step-by-step all critical phases of the damage propagation, with the identification of the main starting damage scenarios and the rate of occurrence of the most critical accidental chains.
- A propagation sequence, starts from“Level 0” where seismically damagedunits are presents;
- “Level 1” includes units directly damagedby the units seismically damaged at “level0”.;
- At a “Level 2” are presents the unitsdirectly damaged by the units damaged
at level “0” and “level 1” and so on.
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA PRIAMUS has been developed in MATLAB environment for a full probabilistic QsRA for petrochemicals plants based on Monte Carlo Simulations
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA PRIAMUS has been developed in MATLAB environment for a full probabilistic QsRA for petrochemicals plants based on Monte Carlo Simulations
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA
“Tank information” - This section is dedicated to the definition of the characteristics of the storage tank farm: number of tanks, locations, geometries, typology of content, economic value. The software allows the input of the data through prompt or excel files.
“Vulnerability of tanks”- in this section user can define the typology of each tank (anchored, unanchored or elevated, with fix or floating roof). For each structural damage typology that causes loss of containment, user must define the parameters of fragility curves (medium value and standard deviation).
“Plant information”- This part is dedicated to the definition of the vertex of obstructed area, the volume of components inside and the component maximum height inside the zone for the definition of VCE effects.
“Atmospheric information”: the statistics of atmospheric conditions are entered. Monthly mean value of air humidity, air temperature and wind velocity are needed. The wind direction is defined in terms of probability for each month
“Analysis information”: user can choose the typology of seismic analysis (risk analysis, scenario analysis, analysis for a range of intensity measure).
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA
CASE STUDY
The most likely seismic damage scenarios (Level 0) along with the relevant frequency of occurrence together to the more likely chain of accidents can be identified.
INDUSE2-SAFETY project: PRIAMUS a new tool for QsRA
CASE STUDY
The most likely seismic damage scenarios (Level 0) along with the relevant frequency of occurrence together to the more likely chain of accidents can be identified.
Conclusions
• The need to quantify the Seismic Risk of process plants has been recognized
• Specific actions have been identified in order to integrate the existing European codes on seismic risk of process plants
• The DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU (Seveso III) on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances imposes the quantification of the NaTech risk, and in particular the seismic risk
• Process plants, and more in particular Petrochemical plants, have been highly exposed in the past to seismic action resulting in a large amount of economic losses both direct and indirect.
Conclusions
• INDUSE2-SAFETY has been conceived on these premises and proposes a new tool for the QsRA of process plants based on fragility curves and domino effects (Cascading effects).
• This method fully integrate the structural and the industrial plants engineering knowledge.
• A new tool (PRIAMUS) has been proposed to expedite the QsRA of process plants in a simple manner but recognizing all the critical aspects that characterize this complex problem.
• The proposed methodology is easily extendable to other types of NaTech events.
What Else?
XP-Resilience: extreme loading analysis
of petrochemical plants and design of
metamaterial-based shields for
enhanced resilience XP-RESILIENCE is an inter/multi-disciplinary
programme including seven academic
partners, one Institute of Applied Science and
seven private companies from ten different
European countries.
XP-RESILIENCE intends to establish a
network of individual research projects
working towards Advanced Modelling and
Protection –via metamaterial based
isolators/layouts- of Complex Engineering
Systems for Disaster Reduction and Resilient
Communities.
What Else?
XP-Resilience: extreme loading analysis
of petrochemical plants and design of
metamaterial-based shields for
enhanced resilience The objective of XP-RESILIENCE is to train