Decreasing Vulnerability to Conflict in Arab Countries through Rural Development Clemens Breisinger, Jean-Francois Maystadt, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan Al-Riffai Development Strategy and Governance Division International Food Policy Research Institute IFPRI-IFAD Workshop International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome; January 19, 2012
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Decreasing Vulnerability to Conflict in Arab Countries through Rural
Development Clemens Breisinger, Jean-Francois Maystadt, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan Al-Riffai
Development Strategy and Governance DivisionInternational Food Policy Research Institute
IFPRI-IFAD Workshop
International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rome; January 19, 2012
“How is it that countries in the Middle East and North Africa could face explosions of popular grievances despite, in some cases,
sustained high growth and improvement in social indicators?” (World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development)
Arab world is the most conflict-affected region in the world
At least six key questions emerge…• Getting the baseline right– Did the social indicators in the Arab world really improve?– Did economic factors play a role in the Arab Awakening at
all?– Which policies and investments can improve those social
indicators, for example food security?• Linking conflict, rural development and food security– Is the Arab world “special” when it come to development
and conflict (Arab Exceptionalism)?– Are there specific links between conflict, rural development
and food security in the Arab world?– How can rural and agricultural interventions be leveraged
for improving the resilience of the rural poor to conflicts?
IFPRI runs two IFAD-supported projects to find answers to these questions
Decreasing vulnerability to conflict through rural development
• Descriptive: Conflict typology & narratives
• Quantitative: – Cross-country– Country-specific, using ACLED
and other geo-referenced data
– Project-level analysis• Fieldwork, Interviews and
Consultations
Workshop Agenda9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security (Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks? (Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward
Social indicators may not have improved to the extend official data suggest
The Arab growth-nutrition puzzle
Source: Breisinger et al. 2011. http://www.ifpri.org/publication/economics-arab-awakening
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
Risk of food insecurity (at the micro level)
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
Risk of food insecurity in Arab world (plus Iran and Turkey)
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
Economics did play a role in the Arab Awakening
Yemen
Iraq
Sudan
Djibouti
Morocco
Jordan Algeria
Syria
Tunisia Egypt
Mauritania Lebanon
Libya Bahrain
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Kuwait
Qatar
GDP per capita (PPP, current international $)
Source: Based on Gallup World Poll (2011) and WEO (2011) data.Note: Bubble size: Number of dissatisfied people. Color scale: Change in level of dissatisfaction (time period between first and last surveys undertaken in the country; last survey: 2010, first survey: 2005-2009): green: decrease; orange and red: increase, with red: increase at an annual growth rate of at least 2 percentage points.
Percentage of people dissatisfied with their standard of living
Which policies and investments can improve social indicators, food security?
1. ‘Child health production function’: )H = health status, I = health inputs, E = health environment factors, ψ = genetic health endowment of child k
2. Reduced-form child nutrition model: )N = nutritional status, Y = household income
=> Income elasticity wrt. nutritional status: , approx.: 3. Cross-country nutrition model (in first differences):
N = child nutrition situation, Y = national income of country i
4. Decomposition of growth by sectors: η = sector participation component, s = sector share component of sector x (Ag, non-Ag; Ag, Ma, In, Se value added)
5. Regression model (based on time series data):
N = prevalence of child undernutrition, Y = GDP per capita, t = time period, Z = trend effects
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Growth has to become more pro-poor in Arab countries, also in agriculture
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
Dep. var.: prevalence changein child stunting
Sector VA share (% of GDP)
Total GDP growth Agricultural and non-agricultural growth Sector value added
One reason why agriculture is not as pro-poor in Arab countries is because it’s no longer the
major source of income for the poor
Public spending in Arab countries is high compared to other world regions
Source: based on Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
But, there is scope for improving the efficiency of public spending, especially in social sectors
***, **, * statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Source: Breisinger et al. 2012. “Beyond the Arab Awakening.” IFPRI Food Policy Report 25.
Three focus areas for a food secure Arab world without poverty
• Improve data and capacity for evidence-based decision making
• Foster growth that enhances food security– At macro level– At household level
• Revisit the efficiency and allocation of public spending
Arab countries are heterogeneous and strategies have to be country specific
Conflict, food security, poverty and rural development: What are the linkages?
Workshop Agenda9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security (Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks? (Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward
Is There an Arab Exceptionalism When It Comes to Conflict?
Preliminary Findings from Cross-Country Analysis
Jean-Francois Maystadt, Clemens Breisinger, Jean-Francois Trinh Tan
Presented by
Jean-Francois Maystadt
Outline1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Framework
3. Is there an Arab exceptionalism? Applying the Collier-Hoeffler framework
4. Arab exceptionalism: A puzzle to be explained
5. Preliminary conclusions, discussion and further work
1. Introduction: The costs of conflict
• -2.2% GDP growth/year of conflict (Collier 2007)• 21 years to recover pre-war GDP level (Collier
2007)• ESCWA: -17.5% per capita GDP/year of conflict• ESCWA: Major backwards in MDGs• Micro : Health, education, assets, physical and
political capital, particularly for the most vulnerable (children, women, marginalized, etc)
The Arab World at a crossroad
• “Power vacuum” : Particularly at risk• But no determinism … also opportunities
Major causes of conflicts and which preventive measures?How best to accompany such
political transition?
2. Conceptual framework ‘Motivation’ Grievances, Inequality, Polarization, etc.
‘Opportunity’Opportunity cost to participate to violence depends on alternative sources of income, the potential loss and rewards (therefore capacity for leaders to finance)
‘Polity’Poor governance and lack of political inclusionState capacity to repress or “pay for peace”
Collier and Hoeffler (2004, OEP)
On a sample of 161 countries between 1960 and 2000 ‘Opportunity’ (‘greed’) matters, not ‘Motivation’
(‘grievance’) Per capita income, GDP growth rate, male secondary
education enrolment (-) Population (+), Primary export commodities (+, non-
monotonic) Inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and
religious fractionalization are not significant (only ethnic dominance)
The role of ‘Polity’ is not investigated and may be a source of bias
3. Arab Exceptionalism?Sorli et al. (2005, JCR) : 1960-2000• Log(GDP per capita), economic growth : <0• Ethnic dominance• No MENA specific effect : “Conflict is quite well
explained by a general model of civil war” (p.160)
Shortcomings:• Sample of 90 countries (excl. e.g. Libya, Somalia, Yemen)• No Fixed Effect (Djankov and Reynal-Querol,
forthcoming REStat)• Predictive power 30% lower compared to SSA
Applying the Collier-Hoeffler framework
Note: Including Collier-Hoeffler non-significant variables , i.e. Primary Commodity Exports , Primary Commodity Exports (squared), Ethnic Fragmentation, Geographical Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)Major Major Major Major
Conflict Conflict Conflict ConflictLog of GDP per capita -0.310*** -0.377*** -0.391*** -0.322***
[0.101] [0.101] [0.118] [0.0962]Log of GDP per capita*MENA 0.087 -0.490*
4. Arab exceptionalism: a puzzle Something specific to explain in the Arab world Collier and Hoeffler framework is inadequate Possible explanations?
Omitted variables: institutions inherited from the past, historical grievances, etc (country fixed effects)
Where the growth is coming from? (‘Opportunity’) Agricultural versus non-agricultural growth Youth bulges Better proxy for natural resource dependency (e.g. oil)
Where the growth is going to? (‘Motivation’) Inequality Micro and Macro Food Security Index (FSI)
Economic growth is the only robust finding in Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
Arab exceptionalism is confirmed! ‘Opportunity’
Sectoral growth does not matter Youth bulges (share of urban male aged 15-24 over the
urban (or male) population aged 15) : no region-specific effect
Oil, gas, ores and minerals exports to GDP or dependency (>40%) . Oil dependency increases conflict in a non-monotonic way but the effect is totally driven by the Arab world
Further works Robust to non-linear model, Lagging effects? Robust to the implementation of a dynamic model ? Dealing with missing values (unbalanced panel) … Preliminary results from 2SLS-FE model point to the
vulnerability of food net importers to changes in food international prices for food insecurity and in turn, to the risk of conflict
Preliminary conclusions on the main Arab-specific correlates of war
Food insecurity matters for conflicts in the Arab world Transition to democracy is welcomed but the
transition period is risky Oil dependency increases the risk of conflictLimits: Not a paper on the Arab Awakening : only valid for
major conflict events Cross-country analysis misses the heterogeneity (e.g.
the role of environmental factors in Somalia or Sudan)But what could these results mean for particular countries, at a particularly challenging time in history (risky but potentially providing new opportunities)?
Improving food security Avoid fiscally unsustainable and not well targeted
measures (e.g. subsidies) Smart mix of policies, investments and targeted
programs in the areas of trade, agriculture, water, health and education
Economic growth that generates export revenues and benefits the poor and investments in education are key
Country-level analysis and strategies are needed, in the case of Yemen for example a 7-Point action plan has been developed
How to use oil revenues? Oil revenues create fiscal space and should in principle
be wealth enhancing ‘Paying for peace’ has become unsustainable, given
increased repression (e.g. social media) and redistribution costs (e.g. youth and food prices)
But, many Arab countries show “Dutch disease” symptoms, including low economic diversification and governance issues
Oil rents should be directed to pro-poor growth enhancing investments, such as infrastructure and education, and to targeted transfers to the most food insecure populations
Workshop Agenda9:00-9:15 Welcoming remarks9:15-10:00 Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and investments
for poverty reduction and food security (Clemens Breisinger and Perrihan Al-Riffai)
10:00-10:30 Is there an Arab exceptionalism when it comes to conflict? Preliminary findings from cross-country analysis (Jean-Francois Maystadt)
10:30-11:00 Coffee break11:00-11:30 Atlas for rural development and conflict: An interactive
GIS-based tool for mapping and analysis (Olivier Ecker)11:30-12:00 Climate change and civil war in Somalia: Does drought
fuel conflict through livestock price shocks? (Olivier Ecker)
12:00-12:30 Discussion and ways forward
Towards a comprehensive spatial database:Atlas for Rural Development and Conflict: An
Interactive GIS-Based Tool for Mapping and Analysis
Jose Funes
Presented by
Olivier Ecker
Spatial Patterns of Rural Development and Conflict (Work in Progress)
1. Regional overview: a. Population & urbanizationb. Infrastructure & market accessc. Economic activityd. Vegetatione. Conflicts
No. of conflictsTemperature Drought Index (TDI) 0.969***
(0.289)F-value 2.03***R-squared 0.081Observations 2,340No. of regions 18
Reduced-form regression:
→ More droughts lead to more violent conflicts.
Effects of Droughts on Livestock Prices and Their Effects on Violent Conflicts
First stage Cattle price Goat price Camel priceTemperature Drought Index (TDI) -0.124*** -0.073*** 0.006
(0.035) (0.024) (0.033)Second stage No. of conflictsCattle price -11.13***
(4.984)Goat price -15.69***
(7.460)Camel price 186.9
(996.1)F-value (of the first stage) 5.62*** 5.01*** 6.87***R-squared 0.345 0.258 0.284Underidentification test 13.72*** 9.80*** 0.04Weak identification test 12.81 9.04 0.03Root mean square error 5.725 5.554 59.75Observations 1,289 1,585 1,560No. of regions 17 18 18
Two-stage regression
Livestock Price-Drought and Livestock Price-Conflict (Semi-)Elasticities
Temperature Drought Index (TDI) No. of conflicts
Increase of TDI by one standard deviationCattle price -3.7% 0.58Goat price -6.3% 0.70
Increase of TDI due to an additional drought month associated with a temperature rise of 0.63⁰CCattle price -8.2% 1.28Goat price -13.9% 1.55
IPCC A1B scenario: 1.8-4.3⁰C increase by 2100 Increase in drought months by 3-7 Increase in violent conflicts by 4-7
Robustness of Estimation Results are entirely driven by changes in temperature,
and the TDI is a good measure for identifying droughts. The model is robust to alternative specifications,
controlling for potential effects of time lags and leads, time sensitivity, and seasonality.
Neighborhood effects seem not to matter for conflict onsets (given the available data)
Normalization of livestock prices does not compromise our results.
Validity of Identifying Assumptions Test statistics (F-test, weak instrumental var. test) suggest
that the TDI is a strong instrument of livestock prices. Yet the possibility that droughts affect conflicts through
channels of transmission other than livestock prices (e.g., non-livestock income) cannot be ruled out completely.
However, tests of the validity of the exclusion restrictions do not reveal effects transmitted through other channels.
Possible violation: Effects of food aid on conflict→ Biases into both directions are conceivable.
But previous studies (Dorosh et al. 1995, Kirwan & McMillan 2007, Mabuza et al. 2009) suggest weak links between food aid and market price movements.
Conclusions and Policy Implications Droughts fuel civil conflicts through livestock price shocks in
Somalia. Climate change adaptation strategies contribute to conflict
prevention. Building resilience through establishing effective coping
mechanisms and generating and diversifying income earning opportunities is critical for both conflict prevention and climate change adaptation.
In the shorter run, income support, weather insurance schemes, market interventions, and investments along the livestock value chain can help to mitigate the impacts of droughts.
More research is particularly needed to analyze practical policy options and programs in terms of their effectiveness to strengthen resilience in (semi-)pastoralist livelihoods.
Discussion and Ways Forward
Moderated by
Clemens Breisinger
Next steps• Cross country analysis report• Expansion of case study countries to 5 – Sudan: natural resources and conflict– Lebanon: rural development and IDPs– Yemen: conflict impact and options for transition – Egypt: preventing conflict through subsidies?– Syria:…– Other:…
• ARC Atlas development – inclusion of IFAD data?• Field trips with interviews
Natural resources & conflict in South Kordofan and Sudan
1. How do changes in environmental conditions affect conflict?
Are pastoralist areas more vulnerable to clashes over the use of pasterland among settled communities and agro-pastoralist groups?
How may the development objectives of mechanized farming and local investment lead to tensions with pastoralist communities and rain-fed small farmers?
2. How do massive human and animal displacements affect environmental degradation and in turn, the risk of conflict?
Food policies for conflict prevention: The case of food subsidies in Egypt
Motivation: Food policies may reduce the risk of conflict but with a very high opportunity cost and with possible negative effects in terms of obesity and micronutrient malnutrition
Research Questions:(1) What is the impact of food policies on the risk of
conflict (violence)? (2) Which policies are suitable to reduce conflict, create
inclusive growth, and improve people’s nutrition and overall well-being?
Impacts of Conflict-induced Displacement on Inequality among Refugees and the Hosting Population and Policy
Options for Inclusive Development
Possible study country: Lebanon; refugees: Palestinians, Iraqis (Syrians) Exclusion is critical in terms of economic (e.g., markets, employment,
land), social (e.g., health, education, basic infrastructure), and political aspects.
Grievances occur among the refugee population, between refugees and the hosting population, and among the hosting population living near the camps (partly because of increased competition over resources).
So, what are the impacts of displacement among and within the populations? In particular, what are the effects on economic and social inequality (i.e. potential source of new conflicts)?
What are effective policy options for refugee integration and mutually beneficial development?