Precarious Alliances: The Cultural Politics and Structural ...

DOROTHY L. HODGSON

Precarious Alliances: The Cultural Politics andStructural Predicaments of the Indigenous RightsMovement in Tanzania

ABSTRACT Since 1990, over one hundred indigenous nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have emerged in predominantly

Maasai areas in Tanzania, attempting to organize people around diverse claims of a common "indigenous" identity based on ethnicity,

mode of production, and a long history of political and economic disenfranchisement. Despite attempts to foster unity and promote

common political agendas, the indigenous rights movement has been fractured by sometimes quite hostile disagreements over priori-

ties, competition over resources, and tensions over membership and representation. This article explores the complicated causes and

consequences of these tensions by focusing on the discussions, disagreements, and silences that occurred during a recent attempt to

reconcile indigenous groups in Tanzania. The workshop offers a unique window on the cultural, political, and historical dynamics of

the indigenous rights movement in northern Tanzania, the principles and practices of inclusion and exclusion that have defined and

shaped the movement, and the internal and external stresses that have made alliances within and among the INGOs, donors, and the

government precarious, at best. [Keywords: indigenous peoples, social movements, cultural politics, Maasai, Tanzania]

IN RECENT YEARS, scholars from political science, eco-nomics, anthropology, and other disciplines have

turned their critical gaze toward the ideologies, policies,and practices of development, including international de-velopment regimes such as the "modernization" efforts ofthe 1950s, state-sponsored development programs in thecolonial and postcolonial periods, and, more recently, thegrowing number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)operating within and across local, regional, national, andinternational boundaries. These NGOs, as Fisher (1997)and others recognize, not only vary tremendously in formand function but also work within increasingly compli-cated networks and coalitions of local and translocal linkageswith each other, donors, nation-states, and transnationalsocial movements. These overlapping and sometimes con-tradictory connections at once enable and constrain theagendas, institutional structures, programs, and possibili-ties of individual NGOs, their leaders, members, and con-stituencies. Moreover, since NGOs are dynamic institu-tions, their priorities and practices shift over time inresponse to the interplay of internal and external experi-ences, pressures, and opportunities.

One rapidly expanding category of NGOs includes thosethat link themselves in some way to the transnational in-digenous rights movement. Indigenous nongovernmental

organizations (INGOs) have emerged throughout theworld over the past few decades as a result of the articula-tion of global interests in empowering certain marginalgroups,1 and local efforts by some marginalized peoples togain greater visibility for their cultural, social, political,and economic agendas in the face of the active indiffer-ence of, and even disenfranchisement by, their respectivenation-states. The meaning of indigenous has varied ac-cording to place and historical moment: In the Americasand Australia it has been used to represent original inhabi-tants such as Native Americans who have become cultur-ally, economically, and politically marginalized by domi-nant, colonizing groups. In sub-Saharan Africa, however,where "black Africans" are the dominant population inthe postcolonial era, indigenous has been used by distinctcultural minorities such as Maasai who have been histori-cally repressed by majority populations of Africans whocontrol the state apparatus (Murumbi 1994).2

Ten years ago, the first Maasai INGO was formed inTanzania, partly in response to recent global campaignsfor the rights of "indigenous" peoples. Since 1990, over onehundred INGOs have emerged in predominantly Maasaiareas in northern Tanzania, attempting to organize peoplearound diverse claims of a common "indigenous" identitybased on ethnicity, mode of production (being a pastoralist

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 104(4): 1086-1097. COPYRIGHT © 2002, AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Hodgson • Indigenous Rights in Tanzania 1087

or hunter-gatherer), and a long history of political andeconomic disenfranchisement by first the colonial andnow the postcolonial nation-state. Despite attempts tofoster unity, promote common political agendas (such asthe protection of land rights), and coordinate their activi-ties through innumerable meetings and workshops andthe creation of at least two "umbrella" coordinating groups,the indigenous rights movement in Maasai areas has con-tinued to splinter into even more groups and to becomefractured by sometimes quite hostile disagreements overpriorities, competition over resources, and tensions overmembership and representation.

This article explores the complicated causes and con-sequences of these fractures and tensions by focusing onthe discussions, disagreements, and silences that occurredduring a recent attempt to reconcile these groups, a work-shop on the "The Future of Pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania"that took place in Arusha, Tanzania, in June 2000.3 Repre-sentatives from 96 INGOs attended the three-day work-shop, which OXFAM and VETAID, among other donors,sponsored. As participants assessed the problems that hadplagued them in the past in order to try to promote futurecollaborations and alliances, the topics of representationand accountability—between the INGOs and their con-stituencies, among coalitions of INGOs, and between IN-GOs and donors—became central to the discussion anddebate and invoked issues of cultural identity, power, andhistory. The workshop therefore offers a unique windowinto the cultural, political, and historical dynamics of theindigenous rights movement in northern Tanzania, theprinciples and practices of inclusion and exclusion thathave defined and shaped the movement, and the internaland external stresses that have made alliances among theINGOs, donors, and the government precarious, at best.While the issues and problems raised are obviously spe-cific to the time, place, agendas, and personalities of thismovement, I believe that they suggest larger structuralpredicaments that are intrinsic to the indigenous rightsmovement and INGOs everywhere. These include recentchanges in the contemporary political and economic land-scape in which they operate—specifically democratiza-tion, economic liberalization, and decentralization—thathave transformed their relationship with governments,the pressures and demands exerted by donors, and the cul-tural politics inherent in identifying their movement as"indigenous." This article is based on over 17 years of re-search on the cultural politics of Maasai development, par-ticipant observation of and detailed notes taken duringthe workshop (as well as several prior workshops andmeetings), and unstructured interviews and conversationswith participants and organizers.

BACKGROUND

Maasai do not claim to be "first people" as such, sincetheir migration approximately three centuries ago fromendigir e kerio (the Kerio Escarpment, presumed to be in the

north, most likely Sudan) to Kenya and Tanzania is centralto their history, mythology, and identity. Nonetheless,they believe that they share similar struggles with "firstpeoples" to protect their distinct cultural identity andtheir economic and political rights (Murumbi 1994). Likeother pastoralist-identified groups in Tanzania such as theParakuyo and Barabaig, and hunter-gatherer groups suchas Ndorobo and Hadzabe, Maasai have been subject to re-peated efforts by the colonial and then postcolonial stateto alienate their land for more "productive" enterprises(such as commercial agriculture), to isolate and excludethem from state-sponsored development (such as schoolsand health facilities), and, more recently, to promote andproject them as "primitive savages" in order to marketthem in the lucrative, expanding tourist industry.4 Theirmarginalization has been at once material and discursive-efforts by elites to disenfranchise Maasai and label them as"second-class citizens" have been buttressed by disparagingstereotypes of "the Maasai," and pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in general, as backwards, "traditional," and cul-turally conservative (Hodgson 2001). Despite these simi-larities, these ethnic groups also have differences in theirhistorical and contemporary relationships to the state, do-nors, and each other. To cite a few examples: Maasai,Parakuyo, and Ndorobo (as well as the agro-pastoralistArusha) all speak variations of a common language, Maa,while Barabaig and Hadzabe speak distinctly different lan-guages. Although they are both strongly identified as "pas-toralists," Maasai and Barabaig share a long history of hos-tility, fueled in part by competition over the same rangeresources (cf. Igoe 2000). Moreover, Maasai have had moresuccess, albeit still very limited, in accessing political powerwithin the nation-state. And, finally, in part because of along history of intense scrutiny and celebration in travel-ers' tales, coffee-table books, and now tourist propaganda,Maasai are by far the most visible and well-known of allthe groups. Maa-speaking groups such as Parakuyo andArusha who often previously sought to distinguish them-selves from Maasai, now, at least in the company of do-nors, assert that they are "Maasai." In sum, these variousgroups are at once joined and divided by similarities anddifferences of language, history, livelihood, visibility, andrelationship to the nation-state.

Against this backdrop of overlapping and sometimesconflicting allegiances and divisions, these groups formed,in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several INGOs. Somewere premised on shared ethnic and linguistic identity,others were organized along geographic lines at the vil-lage/community level, and a few claimed broad multieth-nic representation yet were in reality dominated by oneethnic group or rooted in one community.5 From the be-ginning, most of these INGOs described themselves insome ways as representative of "indigenous" peoples. A1991 document written to publicize the program andfunding needs of one INGO to international donors, forexample, constantly invokes the claims of "indigenouspeople," arguing that the Maasai struggle is "part of the

1088 American Anthropologist • Vol. 104, No. 4 • December 2002

global struggle of indigenous peoples to restore respect totheir rights, cultural identity and to the land of their birth"(Korongoro Integrated Peoples Oriented to Conservation[KIPOC] 1991.7).6 A 1993 workshop attended by represen-tatives from nine pastoralist development groups (includ-ing two from Kenya) contended that "indigenous rights"should be emphasized "in accordance with the UN Resolu-tion designating 1993 as the year of indigenous people"(Bulengo and Sheffer 1993:11). Such rhetorical moves werepolitically strategic; they enabled these INGOs to linktheir demands to international networks and institutionspreoccupied with ensuring and strengthening the rights of"indigenous peoples." Given their long history of griev-ances against the Tanzanian state, framing their demandsin terms of their rights as "indigenous" people provided aunique opportunity to challenge disparaging stereotypes,forge a collective identity, and mobilize disparate andoften dispirited groups. They gained greater visibility fortheir groups, increased legitimacy for their claims, and, in-evitably, improved donor support.

In fact, after a while, most of these organizations dem-onstrated an extraordinary ability to attract substantialfunds from governmental and nongovernmental sources.7

Their evident success in mobilizing donor funding—vis-ible in the new offices, vehicles, jobs, and national and in-ternational travel—encouraged Maasai and other leadersto form even more INGOs. As a result, the growth of IN-GOs has been tremendous: In 1994, there were ten regis-tered INGOs operating in northern Tanzania, by 2000there were over one hundred such organizations.

Their proliferation has been accompanied by a histori-cal shift in orientation and agendas. Most, at least initial-ly, were organized to advocate for broad political agendasof land rights and social justice in the face of heightenedlarge-scale land alienation produced by economic liberali-zation policies that encouraged large commercial farms,the often illegal "sale" of village lands to government offi-cials and nonresident entrepreneurs, and the increased,government-sanctioned immigration of agriculturalistsinto lands formerly used for livestock-herding, small-scalecultivation, hunting, and gathering (cf. Hodgson 2001;Hodgson and Schroeder 2002; Neumann 1995). Later or-ganizations were more oriented to economic programssuch as "development" or "service delivery" in the form ofwater projects, veterinary medicines, schools, and healthfacilities (cf. Cameron 2001).

During this period, several attempts were made to cre-ate an umbrella organization to coordinate the work ofthese INGOs and represent their interests in regional, na-tional, and international fora. The most enduring um-brella organization, Pastoralist Indigenous Peoples Non-Governmental Organisation (PINGOs), was established in1994 after a 1993 NGO/donor workshop on pastoralismand development (Bulengo and Scheffer 1993). Initially,PINGOs was comprised of six Maasai INGOs, but other IN-GOs could apply to join PINGOs, with the possibility of

being rejected (Igoe 2000:284). PINGOs' mission, accord-ing to its leader, was

to build solidarity among pastoral organisations, and tostrengthen their capacity in community developmentthrough training and the dissemination of information.PINGOs takes a holistic approach to development arguingthat economic development goes hand in hand with de-mocracy, constitutional law and human rights. [Bradburyet al. 1995:4; see also International Working Group on In-digenous Affairs 1996:227]

PINGOs received financing from donors in the United King-dom, Canada, and the Netherlands, among others.8

CONFRONTING REALITIES

Despite the initial enthusiasm and high expectations ofdonors, Maasai leaders, and others about the potential forthe indigenous rights movement in Tanzania (cf. Neumann1995), by the late 1990s the movement was in disarray.Each of the over one hundred INGOs had its own (some-times overlapping) agenda, leaders, constituencies, and,often, donors. Many had made positive contributions toimproving people's welfare, including delivering servicessuch as healthcare and water to remote areas avoided bygovernment workers; raising critical awareness amongtheir constituencies about the reasons for some of theirproblems and possible solutions; and facilitating collectiveconsideration of, and approaches to, community prob-lems (Ole Morindat 2000; Sangale 2000a, 2000b). Perhapsmost importantly, several INGOs were relentless advocatesfor pastoralist and indigenous rights, especially land rights.Despite these accomplishments, however, numerous in-stances of corruption, misuse of donor funds, and failureto implement promised projects had discouraged manydonors, who responded by withdrawing funds and spon-sorship. Local people themselves were increasingly trou-bled by the arrogance, lack of responsiveness and account-ability, and corruption they perceived in some INGO leaders(Igoe 2000). Moreover, several attempts to coordinate theassorted groups within the movement and instill a moretransparent, systematic relationship with donors had faileddismally. As a result, several donors and movement lead-ers decided to hold a workshop to debate and discuss theproblems of the movement and propose strategies for rec-tifying these problems in the future.

And so for three days in June 2000, leaders from al-most one hundred of these groups met together with eachother, donor representatives, and assorted researchers ("ex-perts" and observers such as myself). The "Future of Pas-toralist NGOs in Tanzania" workshop, as it was officiallycalled, was striking for several reasons. It revealed thefraught political landscape of the movement, and the will-ingness of most participants to engage in an honest ap-praisal of the key problems; it also exposed the enduringdifficulties of forging and maintaining political alliances un-der the broad rubric of "indigenous" or even the more nar-row platform of "pastoralist."


The primary language of the workshop was Swahili(the national language of Tanzania), followed by Englishand occasionally Maa. Its structure was straightforward:Prior to the meeting, the workshop organizers circulated aposition paper authored in English by a Maasai INGO leaderand a donor representative (Nangoro and Daborn 2000) toleaders of the invited INGOs for comment and then receivedand circulated written comments in English and Swahili(Anonymous 2000; Daborn 2000; Meitanga 2000; OleMwarabu 2000; Richard 2000). The workshop organizersalso commissioned two other keynote papers by Maasaileaders (Ole Morindat 2000; Sangale 2000b), which weredistributed to workshop participants, presented orally,and followed by a presentation of a "donor's perspective."Facilitators then worked with the participants to discussthe issues raised and identify the most pressing problemsand issues "facing pastoralists." Twenty-three issues werenoted during the period of discussion and brainstormingand were then grouped into one of three topics: politicalrepresentation, coordination among INGOs, or specificmatters such as land alienation and education. Membersthen split into groups to address each topic. They discussedthe causes of, and contributing factors to, the problem; ex-plored what the accomplishments, difficulties, and failureshad taken place; and made recommendations for how toovercome these problems and difficulties. Each group thenreported back to all of the participants and then engagedin a discussion of "the way forward."

Despite discussion of a broad array of issues, the cen-tral concern of the participants was to debate and decidethe complicated issue of political representation, that is,who was choosing to and being selected to speak on behalfof others; Who, exactly, was being represented? What wasthe mechanism for selecting representative people or organi-zations? What was the mandate for these representatives?How should these representatives be held accountable totheir constituents? Of course, issues of discursive repre-sentation were implicit in much of the discussion as well;"the cultural struggles of social movements over meaningsand representations are deeply entangled with their strug-gles for rights and economic and political institutionalpower" (Alvarez et al. 1998:xi; cf. Brosius et al. 1998).

DEBATING REPRESENTATION

The main agenda for the workshop was to deliberate howbest to form an organization to coordinate and representthe interests of relevant INGOs. The first position paperclearly set forth the workshop's agenda. Claiming that"there is a lack of effective co-ordination and co-operationwithin and between these various organisations, technicalservices and donors," the authors proposed a series of in-itiatives "to effect full and sustainable coordination andcooperation between all the concerned parties" (Nangoroand Daborn 2000:2). Their main proposal was to create anational umbrella pastoralist organization to which all pas-toralist representative organizations would belong (Nangoro

and Daborn 2000:2). They referred specifically to the failureof PINGOs to adequately include and therefore represent"all pastoralist representative organisations." The choice,to them, was clear: "Either strengthen PINGOs to achieveits stated mission and objectives to properly and effec-tively represent the pastoralist community or create a neworganisation to take over this vital function" (Nangoro andDaborn 2000:2). This decision became the key issue thatframed the workshop, as participants analyzed the reasonsfor PINGOs' failure, debated whether these problems couldbest be addressed through rehabilitating PINGOs or form-ing a new organization that would not be burdened byPINGOs' history, and discussed the content and structure ofthe umbrella group they wanted to institute (whether itturned out to be PINGOs or a new organization).

Discussion was long and heated, both in the formalworkshop sessions and in the innumerable informal con-versations and debates that took place over meals, in hushed(and not-so-hushed) whispers outside the workshop room,and late into the night at the restaurant and bar. The PIN-GOs leadership felt (rightly so) under attack and held hurriedmeetings amongst themselves to discuss the accusationsand to consider their response. During the workshop, theirposition changed from one of accepting the legitimacy ofthe workshop participants to determine the fate of PINGOs(since a quorum of PINGOs membership was present) tochallenging the right of participants to intervene in PINGOsmatters (since the workshop was not formally called as ageneral assembly meeting of the PINGOs membership,and many non-PINGOs members were in attendance).

The ensuing debates focused on three levels of repre-sentation:

(1) Representation of Local People by INCOs

First, many workshop participants discussed the personaland structural problems of some INGOs that preventedthem from being reliable representatives, reiterating com-ments made in the position papers (Ole Morindat 2000;Sangale 2000b): a lack of a clearly defined vision, includ-ing short- and long-term objectives; poor leadership quali-ties, especially a lack of commitment or spirit of volunta-rism; the selection of weak or ineffective governing boardscomprised of "handpicked stooges" or members elected forpopularity rather than ability; poor administrative, man-agement, and financial reporting systems that resulted inthe misuse of funds and resources; and a lack of transpar-ency and communication in relations with communitymembers (cf. Sangale 2000a). A key problem was the fail-ure to ensure proper (or any) transition of leadership, sothat community members saw some INGOs as the "prop-erty" (mali) of one person or a small group in the name ofthe community. Often these INGOs were perceived as justplatforms to advance the political motives and ambitionsof their leaders or for leaders to use donor funds for personalends. Several participants even accused INGO leaders ofneglecting to visit the communities they were suppose to


represent: "Some just want to stay in their nice office intown and never go to the bush." Here it is important to re-member that these accusations were not made about allINGOs or even most, but the problems of certain organiza-tions contributed to a composite picture.

At a broader level, some participants speculated aboutthe cultural politics and identity claims of certain INGOsand their leaders. Who, exactly, is "indigenous"? Who, forthat matter, is a "pastoralist"? Few families, even Maasaifamilies, subsist on pastoralism alone anymore; most havediversified into small-scale cultivation, foraging, wage-labor, and other economic activities. Nonetheless, someparticipants challenged the "authenticity" of some INGOsand their leaders as merely "pretending" to be pastoralistsor Maasai in order to attract donor attention. As one par-ticipant commented, "Some people just put on red clothsand call themselves pastoralists!" He reiterated the samepoint later: "Who is a pastoralist? Who is it we are tryingto help, those families who have one or two cows, or thosewhose life depends entirely on cattle?" The unstated subjecthere was Arusha people, Maa-speakers who are primarilyagro-pastoralists and have only recently come to reclaimtheir Maasai heritage in light of donor preferences to help"the Maasai," not "the Arusha."

A related set of problems concerned significant socialdifferences of age, gender, and class between INGO leadersand their constituencies, and among constituents them-selves (cf. Burdick 1995). INGO leaders were almost allyounger, educated men. Yet most of them came from so-cieties such as Maasai that confer specific rights, responsi-bilities, and powers to men according to their age set. Byassuming the leadership of INGOs, junior men provokedgenerational tensions by challenging the customary author-ity of elder men. Similarly, women, young or old, wererarely included in INGO leadership or consulted in theirprogramming, thereby reinforcing women's ongoing eco-nomic and political disenfranchisement (Hodgson 1997,1999a, 1999b, 1999d, 1999e, 2001). In addition, illiteratemembers of their communities, in particular, perceivedsome leaders as elitist and worried about the "power of thepen" to transform their lives (Hodgson 1999c, 2001).

Moreover, there was the problem of "conflicting rep-resentation" noted by Nangoro and Daborn (2000:6): INGOscompeted with other institutions—customary leadershipstructures, village government, district government, andeven other INGOs—to represent community interests (cf.Cameron 2001:59). "There is often," they explain, "noclearly defined lines of demarcation between the roles andresponsibilities of these different structures" (Nangoro andDaborn 2000:6). Indeed, INGOs often complicate the pic-ture by aligning with one or more of the structures or bysparking power struggles among these representative struc-tures, producing confusion, if not alienation, of their sup-posed constituencies. But another commentator noted, "Dif-ferent pastoralist peoples may feel more comfortable withdifferent systems of representation. Is standardisation theway to go?" (Anonymous 2000:7).

Finally, there was the related question of how eachINGO was formed, which had significant consequences forINGOs' accountability to their supposed constituencies: Wasit a "bottom-up" process of community discussion and se-lection? Or was it a "top-down" process whereby one ormore people decided to form an INGO and then soughtcommunity support and approval (or just claimed it allalong)? Several INGOs had reputations of being purely op-portunistic, created by educated men with few job pros-pects as more of a "private business" with no popular baseas an NGO (cf. Bebbington and Riddell 1997:111).

(2) Representation of INGOs by PINGOs or a New"Umbrella Group"

Participants voiced many grievances about PINGOs' inef-fectiveness as a coordinating group, including its poorcommunication with members; its lack of transparency indecision-making and financial matters; its exclusion ofcertain INGOs (including Maasai INGOs); the dominanceof Maasai INGOs and, therefore, Maasai interests; and itsfailure to ensure an inclusive agenda and strategy. Severalparticipants implied that PINGOs was an oligarchy, repre-senting the interests of a few in the name of many (cf.Fisher 1997:456). As one Maasai activist complained, "I'vebeen a member of PINGOs since 1996, and I have neverbeen invited to a meeting." A Barabaig participant scoffedat PINGOs' claims to have worked with non-Maasai pas-toralist groups for over ten years: "If so, the Barabaig knewnothing about this!" Another man claimed that his INGOhad applied to PINGOs for membership over four yearsago and had still never received a reply. Several partici-pants accused PINGOs of being a "donor-driven" organiza-tion in terms of its finances and agendas (see also Sansom2000). Some acknowledged, however, that a significantcause of PINGOs' demise as an umbrella organization hadto do with the problems of mistrust, competition over re-sources, and minimal communication and informationsharing among the INGOs themselves.

As before, the cultural politics of ethnicity, collectiveidentity, and livelihood were central to debates aboutwhether common interests or a shared identity (and, if so,which identity) should determine membership in the um-brella group. Should, as a Hadzabe man repeatedly asked,PINGOs or the umbrella group represent just pastoralistINGOs or include hunter-gatherers as fellow "indigenous''people? In the ensuing debate, some participants arguedthat hunter-gatherers should be included: They sharedcommon resources with pastoralists (especially land), "weare all marginalized people," and they had already decidedat previous meetings to work together since they sharedcommon interests. "But they need to tell us what theirneeds are," explained one man, "then we can begin to ad-dress them." One participant believed that livelihoodrather than ethnicity should be foregrounded in decidingabout inclusion. Thus, he contended, although Ndorobospoke Maa (and could therefore be considered Maasai),


they were more like the Hadzabe because they were hunter-gatherers. Other participants were less sympathetic:

We pastoralists decided to meet together, then the hunter-gatherers decided to attend. Fine, but they shouldn't com-plain that the meeting does not address their concerns.This is a meeting of pastoralists. Or perhaps we shouldretitle the name of the workshop as a pastoralists andhunter-gatherers conference?

One claimed that most hunter-gatherers were merely"poachers/' hunting for theft rather than subsistence. An-other framed the problem in elitist terms, invoking ideolo-gies of modernization and progress: "Hunter-gatherers arevery different from Maasai, and very far behind. A Hadz-abe man attends school until Form Two then returns tohunt; what good is that?" Some just expressed frustration:"We are being diverted from our purpose by these sur-prises. We are searching for our self-identity as pastoralists:Where are we? Which way forward? From where?" In theend, the group decided to invite the few representatives ofhunter-gatherers present to form a breakout group to dis-cuss concerns and then report them to the plenary. De-spite this debate, however, the workshop continued to fo-cus on pastoralist issues, as reflected in the discussions andfinal workshop report (Sangale 2000a).

A related debate occurred about power hierarchiesamong pastoralist groups themselves in the formation ofalliances. PINGOs was accused of being dominated byMaasai INGOs and, thereby, marginalizing the concerns ofnon-Maasai pastoralist groups such as Parakuyo and Bara-baig. For example, PINGOs named its newsletter Ngatitinol Maasai (The Voice of the Maasai), claiming, when someBarabaig complained, that it was an oversight (Igoe 2000:290). These discussions echoed long-standing historicaltensions between Parakuyo and Maasai over cultural iden-tity, and Barabaig and Maasai over rangeland and range re-sources, as well as jealousy over donor obsession with "theMaasai." Moreover, even some Maasai INGOs were ex-cluded from PINGOs because of personal jealousies and ri-valries.

One commentator, who claimed to be playing "devil'sadvocate," questioned the entire premise of a coalitionbased on a shared mode of production:

Why do you need a pastoralist forum? Is there a mountaincommunity forum? Is there a coastal people (fishermen)forum? Can a pastoralist forum really be truly repre-sentative of the disparate aims and views of the many dif-ferent pastoral peoples in Tanzania? [Anonymous 2000:2]

(3) Representation of the INGOs and UmbrellaGroup to the State and Donors

Many of the same problems identified above were echoedin the discussion of relations among INGOs, donors, andthe state. Donors complained that many INGOs, especiallyPINGOs, suffered from a lack of communication, inadequateand infrequent financial reporting, and ineffectual leader-ship and project management skills. One donor represen-tative explained that although his organization had been

involved with PINGOs for years, there had been very littlecommunication. "In my two and a half years," he remarked,"I don't recall receiving any reports or requests for infor-mation from them. I have no sense of their agenda or is-sues." A few participants, however, wondered whether do-nors would actually liaise with such an umbrella group ofpastoralist or indigenous NGOs to coordinate their activi-ties. "Donors," noted one commentator, "especially smalldonors, often work directly through [INGOs] precisely be-cause they have direct contact of the recipient communi-ties and are more likely to be representatives of and sensi-tive to specific community needs" (Anonymous 2000:2).

For many participants, PINGOs' inability to effective-ly coordinate, mobilize, and represent its member groupsin relationships with the government was one of its great-est weaknesses. Several activists bemoaned the most recentconsequence of their ineffective, fractured coalition—thefailure to successfully advocate pastoralist interests (suchas collective land titles) in recent national land reform de-cisions, arguably the most important political opportunityand challenge in decades. One activist compared their fail-ure with the striking success of women's organizations inTanzania, which were able to form a viable political alli-ance to lobby for certain progressive reforms (such as codi-fying women's rights to own and inherit land). Someclaimed that the lack of an effective working relationshipbetween PINGOs (and many other INGOs) and the na-tion-state had contributed to government mistrust of IN-GOs (Ole Morindat 2000:5).

THE WAY FORWARD?

Some participants argued forcefully that efforts should bemade to reform and restructure PINGOs to be a more effec-tive and representative umbrella organization. As one activistcommented, "If we abandon PINGOs to create anotherumbrella group, we will be like an enaruk mingani" (Maa,lit. "a woman who goes from husband to husband"). Mosteventually decided to form a new organization that couldlearn from the problems that plagued PINGOs but avoidthe taint of its damaged reputation. "Resurrecting PINGOs,"one man remarked, "will only resurrect its problems."

After deliberating in groups about the structure, pur-pose, and name of the new umbrella organization, theworkshop formed a taskforce to review and synthesize thegroup reports and to prepare a draft proposal and registra-tion documents for the new organization. Not surpris-ingly, the cultural politics of representation were centralto debates about the appropriate composition of the task-force membership. There was a general consensus thatwomen needed to be represented (they needed two women,argued one facilitator, "because women often have troublegetting to meetings"), as well as hunter-gatherers. Whichpastoralist groups and the proportionality of their repre-sentation was a more contentious issue: Everyone agreedthat Barabaig needed a representative. But Parakuyo? Someparticipants argued that Parakuyo did not need a separate


representative because they were Maasai, but a few Parakuyodisagreed: "We need our own representative, or else wewill be silenced." Similar debates ensued about Arusha—Would Maasai adequately represent their interests? At thispoint, one man became quite annoyed. "If we start divid-ing up by groups," he asked, "why not clans or sections?We are all the same, but we could have endless divisionssuch as Laiser, Mollel [clan names], and so forth." Therewas also a discussion about ensuring the geographical rep-resentation of Maasai from all five government regions.Finally the ten-member taskforce was appointed as follows:three Maasai, two Barabaig, one Hadzabe, two women (oneArusha and one Barabaig), and two (Maasai) experts.9

STRUCTURAL PREDICAMENTS

Participants were remarkably open and perceptive in theiranalysis of the problems plaguing the INGO movement,but most of their critiques implicitly and often explicitlyblamed INGOs for their problems, disregarding (often in-tentionally) some of the external causes contributing totheir dilemmas. Except for a few references to the govern-ment's involvement in land alienation, no participant pub-licly questioned the role of the government or donors inprovoking some of their problems, especially their effortsto form and sustain an umbrella group. As one facilitatorargued when colonialism was invoked, "The main prob-lem is pastoralists, ourselves; we blame colonialism, yet ithas been over for almost 40 years now." Obviously thiswas in part a strategic silence, given the number of donorsand scattering of government representatives at the work-shop. Like all social movements, however, the indigenousmovement in Tanzania is the historical product of complex,local-global interactions of culture, power, and history.10

During the past decade, the movement has changed tre-mendously in at least two significant ways: It has shiftedfrom a group of few INGOs struggling for donor attentionand support into a collection of dozens of groups with sub-stantial national and international visibility vying for sig-nificant donor resources; and the objectives of its constitu-ent INGOs have changed from advocating broaderpolitical mandates such as land reform to supporting muchless overtly political agendas of community developmentand welfare projects. These two changes are not unrelatedand are in fact central, I believe, to explaining some of thetensions, or "structural predicaments," currently plaguingthe movement.

I would like to consider, therefore, some of the externalpressures that have contributed to, produced, or exacer-bated the problems identified by the workshop partici-pants. First, the economic and political landscape of Tan-zania, like many other so-called Third World countries,has changed dramatically in recent years under the impactof three related processes—"democratization," "economicliberalization," and "decentralization"—that have providedboth new constraints and new opportunities for INGOs.11

Democratization, that is, the transition from single-party

rule to multiparty politics, has, in its efforts to "strengthen"civil society, created the space for grassroots organizingand, thus, the formation of pastoralist and indigenous NGOs(Neumann 1995). Under the impact of structural adjustmentprograms, economic liberalization has encouraged the pri-vatization of key industries, state disinvestments from so-cial services such as education and health, and investmentby international capital. One result has been to intensifyeconomic inequalities and political discontent among al-ready marginalized peoples. For pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, one of the most alarming effects of liberaliza-tion has been the tremendous acceleration of illegal andquasi-legal incursions onto, and alienation of, their landsfor large-scale commercial farms, mining, game parks, andwildlife reserves to attract tourists (tourism is a key com-ponent of the state's economic development plans), andother revenue-generating endeavors by the state, elites,and private capital. The related process of decentralizationinvolves the "reform" of centralized state planning to shiftpolitical control and economic resources from the level ofthe nation-state to the subsidiary units of the districts,making the latter the key units of development. Decen-tralization has encouraged "local" control but has alsohampered government and INGO attempts to organize orimplement programs that link these units.

These three processes have been deeply contradictoryfor pastoralist and indigenous people; they have simulta-neously opened the political space for these peoples' mo-bilization through the formation of INGOs, shrunk theeconomic space on which their livelihoods depend by al-ienating their lands, encouraged "local" control and deci-sion making over the development process, and frustratedefforts to mobilize and coordinate translocal initiatives. Inaddition, these processes have aggravated tensions betweenINGOs and the national government in at least threeways.12 First, by organizing around the identity claims of"being indigenous," premised in part on ethnicity, INGOshave revitalized ethnic identifications and challengeddemocratic liberalism's championing of the individualrights and responsibilities of "citizens" with their claimsof collective grievances and rights (cf. Muehlebach 2001).The Tanzanian government is wary of appearing to endorse"ethnic favoritism" (Anonymous 2000:8), equates politicalorganizing along ethnic lines with "tribalism," and fearsthat such ethnic mobilization could strengthen politicalopposition, produce economic and political instability, oreven foster violence (see, e.g., Neumann 1995).

Second, these processes have promoted the prolifera-tion of INGOs by shifting international development as-sistance away from state-based development programs to-ward "local" NGO initiatives, in order to more effectivelyand efficiently reach and enact progressive change at the"grassroots" level (Bratton 1989). The tremendous increasein the availability of donor funding, decentralization ofpolitical power and economic resources, and the sheernumber of INGOs has hindered government efforts tomonitor and control INGO activities. Although the gov-


ernment oversees INGOs through its centralized registra-tion and reporting process, efforts to coordinate INGOand government development initiatives occur primarilyat the district or village level, hampering efforts for moresystematic oversight, planning, and coordination.13 More-over, the ability of INGOs to capture significant amountsof donor funds has also, on occasion, sparked the jealousy,resentment, and suspicions of the Tanzanian government(Hodgson 1999d; Igoe 2000).

Finally, the failure of INGOs to build a viable coalitionhas significantly hindered their effectiveness as advocatesat the national level. As a result, they have engaged inpiecemeal rather than systematic lobbying and sporadicrather than sustained political pressure. Moreover, accord-ing to Greg Cameron, even when PINGOs was a viable or-ganization, it "neglected to engage the Tanzanian govern-ment via lobbying and campaigning and instead didinternational advocacy with Western donors" (2001:57).14

Of course, this presumes that the Tanzanian governmentis even interested or willing to recognize PINGOs (or an-other umbrella group) as a duly representative organiza-tion and negotiate with it accordingly. As Tania Murray Li(2000, 2001), Sidsel Saugestad (2001), and Richard Werbner(2002), among others, have discussed in the case of otherindigenous rights movements, the "politics of recogni-tion" (from Taylor 1994)—that is, demanding and attain-ing national and international recognition of first theidentity (and, later, the rights and claims) of an "indige-nous" group—takes place in complex fields of power:

The "others" with whom those who seek recognitionmust engage include government departments with di-verse agendas; colonial and contemporary legal codes,subject to interpretation; individual politicians and bu-reaucrats with more or less populist inclinations; interna-tional donors; national and international "non-govern-mental organizations"; and the media which both formsand responds to the common-sense understandings andsentiments of the "national-popular." [Li 2001:653-654]

For all of the reasons detailed above—fear of ethnic revi-talization, resistance to the acknowledgement of collectiverights, jealousies over donor attention and resources—and,more, working for and achieving recognition by the Tan-zanian nation-state has been and continues to be a gruel-ing, time-consuming, and ongoing challenge.

In addition to their sometimes troubled relationshipwith the government, the demands and pressure of donorsthemselves exert tremendous, at times fracturing, stresseson INGOs (cf. Bratton 1989; Fisher 1997; Hulme and Ed-wards 1997b). Like NGOs, the "donor community" is nomonolithic entity with a common form, function, oxagenda—they include multilateral and bilateral fundingagencies, international NGOs, religious institutions, theenvironmental lobby, and more. Their reasons for sup-porting certain INGOs may vary tremendously and evenconflict. For example, although one donor currently fundsan INGO to create community wildlife management areas,a second finances another INGO to lobby against the fur-

ther encroachment of game reserves on to pastoralist andhunter-gatherer lands. The political orientation of donorsdiffers as well, especially in terms of their willingness tosupport groups that challenge or criticize governmentpolicies in some way. Such differences among donors pro-mote differences, even conflicts, among INGOs and con-tribute to the proliferation of INGOs as each donor seeksits own partner INGO. As a result of their structural posi-tion as "gatekeepers," INGOs, like other NGOs must navi-gate and negotiate the often contradictory demands oftheir constituencies and donors. As one facilitator at theArusha workshop asked: "Who owns the INGOs? Theirleaders? Members? Communities? Donors?"

Furthermore, I would argue, the dependence on do-nor aid, and the unwillingness of most donors to directlychallenge state policies, has depoliticized the agendas ofmost INGOs, producing a shift from primarily "political"concerns (that make some claims on the state) to more"economic" concerns that, at least to the state and donors,seem more politically benign (cf. Cameron 2001).15 Depend-ence on donor funds, as several workshop participantsmentioned, creates vulnerability to, and pressure to complywith, donor political and economic agendas. (Ironically,the very unwillingness of INGO leaders to publicly cri-tique donors at the workshop is in itself strong testimonyto such pressures.) Moreover, the small-scale and largenumbers of INGOs make them even more susceptible tosuch pressures (further highlighting the need for some kindof coalition to negotiate with donors). Fisher has describedthis process as the "co-optation" of NGOs by donors from"empowerment/social mobilization" to "service delivery/development" (1997:454) as NGOs reconfigure themselvesto attract and retain donor funds. Rather than set theirown agendas and selectively recruit progressive donors,PINGOs and a number of INGOs have been seduced bythe availability of donor funds to adopt development pro-grams and projects shaped by donor interests, at the ex-pense of the land reform efforts advocated by their con-stituents.

This tendency of INGO programs, under donor pres-sure, to shift focus from political to economic issues hasfurther fractured the original unifying agenda of INGOs. Iwould argue—and this is certainly open to debate—that itis easier to sustain a coalition based on a common politicalagenda (such as codifying land rights) that identifies acommon "outside" adversary (the government) than analliance premised on the shared economic agenda of com-munity development. All INGOs share a mutual interest inlobbying the nation-state to protest land alienation and todemand legal rights to their customary land; land reformsat the national level would be advantageous for all of them.16

In contrast, their shift to primarily economic agendas thatseek funds for community development projects of vari-ous types produces disagreement and disunity, as INGOsmust compete with one another (as well as with PINGOs,their supposed umbrella group) for donor attention andfunds. Attempts to coordinate donor funding foreground


this conflict of interest: Newer, less-funded groups want to"share the wealth" and demand equitable distribution ofdonor aid while older, established INGOs want to protectand maintain their special, lucrative relationship with cer-tain donors. Moreover, as the workshop made clear, IN-GOs do not presently share a common vision for their eco-nomic future beyond the protection of land rights. Shouldcommunities be encouraged to rely primarily on pastoral-ism for their livelihoods or should they be encouraged todiversify economically? What role should education playin their future? What would be their ideal relation to theTanzanian state? What is their position on certain culturalpractices, language issues, and identity claims? What doesit mean, inquired one commentator, to organize around ashared identity as pastoralists "when the future develop-ment of existing pastoralist communities is that they de-cide to forego pastoralism as a way of life? . . . Is there a vi-sion for the future of pastoralist culture and way of life"(Anonymous 2000:1)?

Furthermore, the zeal of donors in courting and support-ing the INGOs and especially PINGOs sometimes blindedthem to the personal, political, and structural problems ofINGOs. Even when they became aware of such problems, acommon response was simply to infuse more cash ratherthan demand institutional reforms (e.g., Cameron 2001:65),thereby exacerbating the problems of financial manage-ment and accountability. In addition, the blizzard of do-nor attention and demands on the time and resources ofPINGOs and INGO leaders—in the form of seemingly end-less workshops, meetings, short courses, study tours, andoverseas travel—further alienated leaders from their localconstituents and commitments.

A third external influence on the indigenous move-ment is the cultural politics inherent in the strategic deci-sions by activists to link their efforts to transnational dis-courses and networks of indigenous peoples. Such a link,as comparative evidence suggests, creates both opportunitiesand risks (see, e.g., Conklin and Graham 1995; Jackson1995; Saugestad 2001; Warren 1998). The positive effects,as mentioned before, include increased visibility, resources,and leverage against the state. But mobilizing around thelabel "indigenous" implies that members share commoninterests because of their common identity, an assump-tion that may reflect more rhetoric than reality. The po-tentially volatile and splintering effects of debates over thecriteria for inclusion and exclusion in the indigenousmovement were clearly evidenced in the workshop discus-sions. Less evident are the consequences of organizingaround the label of "indigenous" for nonindigenous groups.Most communities in northern Tanzania are ethnicallymixed, which means that only certain members of a com-munity—whether because of their ethnicity or primarylivelihood—are singled out for representation and resources,while the needs of other community members are ignored.In some areas, as Jim Igoe (2000) has documented, the for-mation of INGOs has catalyzed ethnic tensions over localresources and political control. Moreover, those villages or

communities who do not yet have an INGO to representtheir interests are unable to contribute to, or benefit from,the indigenous movement. The proliferation of INGOs has,in part, been one response to this issue, as every village orcommunity forms an INGO to seek development funds.

Moreover, the structural problems of some INGOshave been intensified because of the timing of their forma-tion. As Saugestad (2001:232-233) argues, "established" in-digenous organizations that were formed in earlier periodsin Canada, the United States, Scandinavia, Australia, andNew Zealand underwent a long period of internal mobili-zation to develop and consolidate local organizations be-fore they engaged in dialogue or litigation with their re-spective governments over land rights issues. In contrast,INGOs that were started in the 1990s were:

(a) immediately supported by an existing international in-digenous network offering both solidarity and informa-tion, which meant that (b) they immediately set out toaddress the most complex of all possible issues: rights toland and water. Inevitably, this means that extremelycontroversial issues are being addressed before what wemight call the "normal" process of local mobilisation andawareness-raising has run its course towards the consoli-dation of regional and national organisational structures.[Saugestad 2001:233]

As Saugestad cautions, "the kind of 'flying start' the neworganisations receive on the international circuit helps inmany respects, but cannot substitute for painstaking grass-roots mobilisation" (2001:234). In other words, immedi-ate access to substantial donor funds may short-circuit orsubstantially condense some of the slow, painful, but nec-essary stages of organizational maturation and coalitionbuilding.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the structural predicaments faced by INGOs arenumerous, intense, and relentless. Translocal and espe-cially transnational organizing of any kind must confrontsimilar problems (Brown and Fox 1998; Edelman 2001;McAdam et al. 1996). As the vast literature on social move-ments makes clear, building political alliances, or "um-brella organizations," is no easy matter and sustainingthem over time is even more difficult. Members must share acommon cause or objective that is sufficiently unifyingand inspiring, compromise over differences in their par-ticular agendas, share information and resources, and seekways to maintain their visibility and momentum. More-over, all movements confront spatial and temporal chal-lenges to their long-term viability: They must create thenecessary mechanisms to reach, engage, and coordinategroups and individuals who are often dispersed in differ-ent places, and they must negotiate shifts, both gradualand sudden, in the internal dynamics of their members aswell as local, regional, national, and transnational economicand political landscapes over time (cf. Li 2001; Saugestad2001).


The structural predicaments of INGOs, however, areunique in some ways. The historical conjuncture betweenthe intensified inequalities experienced by marginalizedminorities such as Maasai as a result of neoliberal economicinterventions; donor fantasies about, and expectations of,the possibilities for NGOs and civil society; and the trans-national prominence, appeal, and strength of the indige-nous rights movement is no coincidence. For Maasai andother groups, "becoming indigenous" is one of the onlypolitically viable strategies currently available in a time ofradical dislocation. By reframing their long-standing griev-ances and demands against their states in the terms of theindigenous rights movement, they have gained greatervisibility, increased legitimacy, and enormous resources.They have also introduced a complex cultural politics ofinclusion and exclusion that has, I believe, intensified thestructural predicaments outlined above. In particular, theambivalent place in all of these processes of the state—crippled by mandated cutbacks in personnel and resources,struggling to understand and implement democratic "re-forms" and the tenets of "decentralization"—makes thestate even more wary of the collective demands and pres-sures of indigenous peoples and their organizations. More-over, the role of donors as brokers and intermediaries withparticular, sometimes contradictory, notions of "civil soci-ety," "the state," "NGOs," and "indigenous peoples" onlyfurther complicates matters.

My purpose in analyzing the structural predicamentsand cultural politics is to place the issues raised in theworkshop in their broader context to explore how manyof the problems identified by the workshop participantswere produced or aggravated by outside political and eco-nomic processes and institutions over which they have lit-tle control. It is not meant, however, to absolve INGOs ofall responsibility for their actions. In fact, as the workshopdiscussions made clear, INGO leaders and members realizethat they will do little to achieve an effective politicallobby and working relationship with their donors and theTanzanian government until they sort out the basis fortheir claims to be recognized as "indigenous," establish acommon political agenda, and form, by participatory andaccepted procedures, a truly representative umbrella or-ganization with the legitimate authority to represent con-stituent members in national-level political efforts.

Tracing and distilling the cultural, political, historical,and structural dynamics of the INGO movement in Tanza-nia is a difficult task, but essential to charting an effectivefuture and to forming a viable alliance. This article is inmany ways a testament to the honesty, insights, and po-litical courage of INGO organizers as they have struggledto identify and understand the problems and tensions thathave troubled their organizations and especially their ef-forts to create and sustain a broad-based alliance. PINGOsmay be history, but the grievances, demands, and agendasof INGOs persist. Their future, together or apart, dependson their interpretations and understandings of the past.Moreover, although the details may vary, their dilemmas

and debates offer insights into the broader cultural politicsand structural predicaments that shape the precarious alli-ances of INGOs elsewhere.

DOROTHY L. HODGSON Department of Anthropology, RutgersUniversity, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1414

NOTES

Acknowledgments. I am grateful to Alais Ole Morindat, LoserianSangale, Francis Ole Ikayo, Peter Toima, William Ole Seki, the lateSaruni Ole Ngulay, and other Maasai and indigenous activists forproviding me with copies of relevant documents and their willing-ness to include me in their critical reflections and debates over theissues discussed in this article. Research funding was provided by aRichard Carley Hunt Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Wenner-Gren Foundation, an Anne U. White Award from the Associationof American Geographers (in collaboration with Richard Schroeder),and a Faculty Research Grant from the Research Council of RutgersUniversity. Writing was completed while I was a Fellow at the Cen-ter for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, supported byGrant #29800639 from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and aCompetitive Fellowship Leave from Rutgers University. I am in-debted to the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technologyfor permission to undertake this research, the late Professor C. K.Omari and Dr. Anku Sanga for serving as my local research con-tacts, and Belinda Blinkoff for research assistance at Rutgers Uni-versity. Finally, I am grateful to Charles Briggs, Ben Gardner, CindiKatz, Tania Li, Rod Neumann, Joanne Rappaport, Sidsel Saugestad,Rick Schroeder, and Dick Werbner for discussions of these issuesand comments on this article.

1. I do not use the phrase "indigenous nongovernmental organi-zations" here to distinguish, as Bratton (1989) does, local from in-ternational NGOs. Instead, this phrase refers specifically to a categoryof local NGOs that invoke or rely on the rhetoric of "indigenouspeoples" to support their demands and agendas. See Kingsbury1998 for an erudite analysis of how to understand "indigenouspeoples" as an international legal concept.

2. The use of the term indigenous by cultural minorities in Africaand elsewhere is not without controversy (see, e.g., discussion inMuehlebach 2001).3. Let me make clear that this article and the broader study are notconcerned with determining the "authenticity" of Maasai culturalidentities or the merits of their claims to being "indigenous."Rather, I am interested in probing the opportunities and chal-lenges encountered as Maasai and others "position" (Li 2000:151)themselves as "indigenous" and engage with the transnational in-digenous rights movement. For a critical reflection on my account-ability, politics, and positionality in pursuing this research, seeHodgson 1999d.

4. For the complicated history of these efforts in Tanzania vis-a-visMaasai, see Hodgson 2001, Ole Nangoro 1999; for llparakuyo, seeRigby 1985, 1992; for Barabaig, see Lane 1996; and for Hadzabe,see Madsen 2000.

5. Some INGOs distinguish between being an NGO and what theycall a community-based organization (CBO), but the differencesare often murky.

6. In 1989, Moringe Parkipuny, the founder of KIPOC, first madethese arguments to the Sixth Session of the UN Working Group onIndigenous Populations. For a copy, see http-.//www.cwis.org/fwj/22/hra.htm, accessed October 19, 2001. His comments are alsoquoted in Muehlebach 2001.

7. The total amount of donor support is difficult to calculate, asmany INGOs are protective about the sources and amounts of theirfunding.

8. For more on PINGOS, see Cameron 2001; Igoe 2000; PINGOsForum 1999.

9. The proposed names for the new umbrella organization re-flected similar debates and tensions over identity and representa-tion: MABAWA (Maasai, Barabaig, Wahadzabe); Tanzania Pastoral-


ist Forum (TPF); Tanzania Pastoral Hunter-Gatherer Forum; Unionof Pastoralists and Hunter Gatherer Organizations (UMWATA);and Tanzania Association of Pastoralists, Indigenous Hunters andGatherers.10. There is a vast literature on social movements, collective ac-tion, and contentious politics in political science and sociology,and, to a lesser extent, anthropology. Edelman 2001 provides auseful recent overview of the field.11. The combination of democratic liberalism and economic liber-alization is also known as the "New Policy Agenda" (e.g., Hulmeand Edwards 1997a). Other scholars who have explored how theseprocesses have reconfigured the relationship between NGOs, do-nors, and the state include contributors to Edwards and Hulme1992, 1995; Hulme and Edwards 1997b; Bratton 1989; and Fowler1995, among others.12. Of course, as Michael Bratton has argued, there is always a ten-sion between "the government's urge for order and control andthe NGO quest for organizational autonomy" (1989:570). Accord-ing to Bratton (1989:570), governments seek to control NGOsthrough a range of strategies, including monitoring, coordination,cooptation, and dissolution; and NGOs in turn have a range ofcounterstrategies such as maintaining a low profile, selectivelychoosing when and how to collaborate with the government, orusing explicit policy advocacy. Hulme and Edwards (1997a:13)categorize government interventions as either "carrots" (tax-exemptstatus, access to policymakers, and public funding) or "sticks" (clo-sure, deregistration, investigation, and coordination). See alsoFriedman 1994.

13. These endeavors are further complicated by the vast differ-ences that can exist among regional and local government agen-cies, as well as individual officials, as to their attitudes, effective-ness, and practices with regard to INGOs and local communities.14. Cameron argues that "a judicious mix of tactical approaches tothe state should have been given pride of place by PINGOs. Thisshould have included court cases (legalism), lobbying governmentleaders (interest group politics), constitutionalism, and support forsympathetic party officials (parliamentarianism)" (2001:68; cf.Bratton 1990).15. I am grateful to Ng'wanza Kamata (personal communication,February 26, 2002) for helping me to clarify this definition of politi-cal.16. Although it may be easier to mobilize at the national levelover land rights, struggles over land and resources on the land con-tinue to divide residents within communities and pit communitiesagainst each other (cf. Hodgson 2001; Hodgson and Schroeder2002). As Saugestad (e-mail to author, March 25, 2002) reminds us,land, unlike donor funds, is a zero-sum game.

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