PragmaticProccess Model Immortality

EUGENE FONTINELL

IMMORTALITY: A PRAGMATIC PROCESSIVE MODEL

/ am the resurrection and the life. If anyone believes in me, even though he dies he will live, and whoever lives and believes in me will never die. Do you believe this?

(Jn. 11:25-26.) Leap, life Leap and dance. Dance out of death.

Leap. Dance. Life,

sun-filled, touch the phoenix self of death to life. Death to life: all death to life inflame.

(William Birmingham) In a previous essay,1 I argued that belief in immortality is plausible

something both possible and desirable. Just as it is unacceptable to ad-vance a belief in God without venturing some guess as to the character of the divine, so it would be fruitless to present a belief in immortality which did not, however tentatively and sketchily, suggest what a new life would, or at least ought, to involve. As John Hick has noted: "a doctrine which can mean anything means nothing. So long, then, as we refrain from spelling out our faith it remains empty."2 In the same vein, H.D. Lewis contends that "no one can expect or believe anything without having some idea of what it is that he expects."3 The task of this essay, then, is to suggest a model of the cosmic process which would justify belief in immortality as attractive and as life enhancing. In keeping with the experiential char-acter and this worldly-focus of the pragmatism I espouse, any acceptable

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model will have to offer possibilities for the enhancement and enrichment of life. It will be unacceptable to the extent that it is an escape from life as we here and now experience it.4 It will be acceptable to the extent that it is an invitation to enter more deeply and fully into such life.

Readers might be aided by mentally placing the term "this life" in quotation marks because the nature and scope of human life is precisely what has been and is likely to continue to be a matter of intense dispute among reflective human beings. A crucial aspect of this dispute centers on what ought to be the relationship between the present and future char-acteristics of this life. Apart from a superficial "eat, drink and be merry" mode of hedonism, most reflective efforts have involved some vision or philosophy of the future. For example, no thinkers have been more passionately opposed to any philosophical or religious positing of an other world than Marx and Nietzsche. In its eschatological dimensions Marxism invokes a dedication to the present in virtue of a belief that one is thereby contributing to a future Utopian state. Nietzsche, despite his radical indi-vidualism and fierce attacks on religion, manifested a profound concern for the future. However variously they may be interpreted, his doctrines of revaluation, overman, and eternal return are calls to move beyond the present situation and bring forth a mode of life more creative and fulfil-ling.

There is, I believe, a rather wide consensus among contemporary thinkers to avoid both a view of the present devoid of a significant future and a view of the future which reduces the present to a sheer means. Two texts by John Dewey express a mode of this present-fu ture dialectic:

We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything.

The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the future contradicts itself.5

Camus expresses a similar sentiment when he notes that "real generos-ity toward the future lies in giving all to the present."6 Hocking, who is as sympathetically inclined towards belief in immortality as Dewey and Camus are opposed, asserts that "To be able to give oneself wholehear-tedly to the present one must be persistently aware that it is not all. One must rather be able to treat the present moment as if it were engaged in the business allotted to it by that total life which stretches indefinitely beyond." At the same time, he rejects, quite properly in my view, any notion of the future which would give meaning to a presently meaningless life.

Unless there is an immediately felt meaning there is no meaning at all; no future meaning could compensate for a complete absence of meaning in the present moment; and whatever meaning life may

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come to possess hereafter must be simply the ampler interpretation of the meaning which it now has.7

Christopher Mooney makes an allied point in somewhat different lan-guage: "Christian hope in resurrection will have meaning for us only to the extent that we have some inkling of resurrection now, some experi-ence of fullness of life, of self-discovery, love or creativity."8 Finally, H.D. Lewis considers it

a great travesty of Christian truth to suppose that we should think of our salvation solely in terms of some destiny to be achieved later. It is a present reality, and the full realization of this is essential to the appreciation of Christian claims and the impact they can have on our present attitudes. But however important this empnasis may be, and however necessary in the commendation of Christianity today, it would be odd, to say the least, if the peculiar relationship established between God and men in the coming of Christ were concerned wholly with the present life. It must surely be understood in the context of an abiding fellowship. . . ,9

These texts suggest that an adequate model of the creative process demands the most intense living in the present, while at the same time remaining open to the possibility of participating in transcendent and future models of existence. To argue in favor of belief in immortality it is not necessary to claim that such belief is needed to avoid a superficial presentism or hedonism. It is sufficient to show that there is nothing intrinsic to this belief which leads to diverting energies from the tasks at hand. One can readily concede that it is possible for individuals to work in the present to build a future life in which they believe they will have no personal share. It does not follow, however, that a belief that we shall be personal participants in this future life is a deterrent or an obstacle to our living fully at the present moment. After all, few would claim that it is either unreasonable or unworthy of young persons to believe and to be taught that the efforts they are making at the moment will determine in part at least the quality of their lives as adults. Indeed, the significance and depth of youth would seem to be immeasurably increased by the belief that young persons are participating in a process in which the future depends upon the present.

Pragmatic Extrapolation Before describing some of the characteristics which a pragmatic model

of the cosmic process must have if there is to be a significant belief in immortality, a brief methodological word is in order. Any effort to talk about a future mode of the cosmic process or even about this process considered as a totality or a whole takes us beyond both direct experience and inferential reasoning strictly considered.10 Such a movement might be designated^ speculation, imagination, or the term employed here, ex-trapolation. Any pragmatic extrapolation of the future, as I have pointed

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out elsewhere,11 must fulfill at least four conditions. First, it must proceed from data given in experience. Secondly, this projected future must be plausible that is, it must not be in fundamental conflict with the data from which it is an extrapolation. Thirdly, the future state must be sufficiently different from the present state that the future is not merely the present indefinitely extended. Finally, and most importantly, the extrapolation must render o u r present life in both its individual and communal aspects more meaningful, more significant and more rich.12

Since the goal of extrapolation in the present endeavor is to produce a model of the cosmic process which is open to immortality, a word should be said about how "model" is to be understood. Ian Barbour has given us an excellent description of the nature and role of models in both science and religion. Although I cannot claim Barbour for the pragmatic tradition he calls himself a "critical realist" I will appropriate some of his lan-guage concerning models which I find eminently congenial to prag-matism.

Broadly speaking, a model is a symbolic representation of selected aspects of the behaviour of a complex system for a particular pur-pose. It is an imaginative tool for ordinary experience, rather than a description of the world. . . .

Models are taken seriously but not literally. They are neither literal pictures of reality nor 'useful fictions/ mit partial and pro-visional ways of imagining what is not observable; triey are symbolic representations of aspects of the world which are not directly acces-sible to us.

Models in religion are also analogical. They are organizing images used to order and interpret patterns of experience in human life, like scientific models. They are neither literal pictures of reality nor useful fictions.. . . Ultimate models whether of a personal God or an impersonal cosmic process direct attention to particular pat-terns in events and restructure the way one sees the world13

The kind of pragmatic model called for would not pretend to give us either a pictorial or conceptual representation of reality. Its chief function is to enable us to participate more creatively in and with reality. Such a model must result from an extrapolative process which begins in and relates back to concrete experience.14 While, as with any pragmatic evalu-ation, it will be subject to criticism in terms of consistency, coherence and continuity of experience, its ultimate worth will be determined by the quality of life which it suggests, encourages and makes possible.15

Pragmatic-Processive Model The general features of pragmatism's model of the cosmic process have

already been touched upon in my earlier discussion of metaphysics and the self.16 It remains now to explore this model with specific reference to immortality or the possibility of new life consequent upon death. Recall that for the pragmatist the world is characterized by processes and rela-

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tions which can be expressed metaphysically in terms of ever changing "fields within fields." Thus the world of reality can be described as a processive-relational continuum or field embodying and bringing-forth a plurality of subfields each with a unique focus but dependent upon, overlapping with and shading-off into other fields.

From the pragmatic perspective reality is pluralistic rather than monis-tic. Hence, it is a bit misleading to speak, as I have, of a or the cosmic or creative process. It is more accurate to speak of a plurality of processes with a variety of relations and interrelations. Though such a perspective does not exclude the possibility that one of these processes is wider and more encompassing than all others, it does exclude conceiving this pro-cess as absolute, with the narrower processes absorbed by it. Moreover, to affirm a plurality of processes is not to affirm chaos nor is it to deny some kind of unity. This unity, however, cannot be an essentially com-pleted or finished unity, nor can it be one which excludes plurality or makes this plurality peripheral or accidental. Whatever unity belongs to the collectivity of processes must, to be consistent with pragmatism's pluralistic universe, be constituted by those processes. The contribution which each process makes to this unity is not necessarily equal; it is permissible to believe that one or more of these processes makes signifi-cantly greater contributions. Unity so viewed is itself a process: reality is at every moment "one," and is at every moment "becoming one." Thus the unity which pragmatism affirms does not exclude disunity. Indeed, if our extrapolation retains experiential rootedness, it must include both unity and disunity as characteristics of reality. None of this, however, excludes belief in and a working towards increasing the unity and diminishing the disunity towards a world of ever-increasing harmony. This model allows, then, for the highest and most intense mode of interrelationship and participation without losing the distinctiveness and independence of the participating processes. Since all these processes, according to their specific quality or character, are contributing to the development and enhancement of the collective whole, one can speak with reasonable consistency of these processes living or acting "for their own sakes" while simultaneously contributing to other processes narrower and wider. Hence in the language of present and future, we can plausibly live fully for the present while contributing to the emerging life of the future.

This model is quite obviously evolutionary, and in suggesting an evolu-tionary process in which there emerge individuals capable of sharing in life beyond death, it is hardly unique. Interesting and fruitful compari-sons could be made with the models portrayed by Bergson, Teilhard or Aurobindo.17 One similarity worth mentioning is that they all in some way affirm a continuity between our experienced life and any wider or future life.18 This means that our present acts are here and now contributing to a process or processes far more extensive than is evident to our ordinary consciousness. Our actions have present and future consequences for the

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character and quality of those processes which can at best be only vaguely grasped. "It may be," James tells us, "that work is still doing in the world-process, and that we are called to bear our share. The character of the world's results may depend in part upon our acts."19 Elsewhere, James confesses that he does not see "why the very existence of an invisible world may not in part depend on the personal response which any one of us may make to the religious appeal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will."20

This, of course, is an expression of a hope, but so is the humanist or Marxist claim that our present actions have a bearing, for better and for worse, upon the future condition of humanity. The depth and scope of the process needed for a plausible belief in immortality is admittedly greater, but they all share a commitment to the present based at least partly on a belief in consequences many of which will be realized, if ever, only in a distant future.

Although I am certainly not suggesting that these views are substan-tially the same, the model I am arguing for is both like and unlike humanistic and traditional "religious" approaches. Later I will maintain that a transformationist character is essential to any new life, and this moves my model in the direction of more traditional beliefs concerning an afterlife. The poi$t here under consideration is closer to the humanistic emphasis upon the significance of present acts. Since "work is still doing in the world-process," our actions have consequences radiating far beyond the bounds of a narrowly conceived spatial-temporal present. Feeding the poor, caring for a child, tending the sick, creating works of art, solving scientific problems all these and many other human activities must be seen as in some way advancing and deepening the quality of the world-processes, just as our negative actions must be seen as impeding and diminishing them.

The pragmatic model contrasts sharply with one that would picture this life as a test which, if successfully endured, will deliver us from the temporal process into the Eternal World. Pragmatism rejects the classical dualism between the temporal and the eternal. Since pragmatism affirms continuity between the narrower and more immediate fields of our expe-rience with the wider and more encompassing ones, our everyday ac-tivities take on greater significance than in traditional religious or humanistic views. Historical and cosmic processes known and un-known are not processes from which we are striving to escape nor are they tales "told by an idiot signifying nothing." However mysterious the deeper and more ultimate characteristics of these processes are, a prag-matic perspective allows for a belief and a hope which transcend, without

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negating or diminishing, the more immediately accessible fruits and con-sequences of these processes. Time is not something to be gone through or gotten beyond but is itself reality insofar as it brings forth novelty and growth as well as loss and diminution.21 Since chance is one characteristic of creative processes, their outcome is neither pre-set nor totally deter-mined, even by the divine participant. The character and quality of the processes that constitute reality, present and future, will be determined by the free creative acts of all the participants, only a few of which, perhaps, are actually known to us at the moment.22

Any model of the creative processes which allows for immortality must account not only for the relation of the present world to some future world but also to dimensions of the present world to which we do not usually attend. Further, no model of reality would serve belief in immor-tality if it allowed only for the emergence at some future time of persons capable of participating endlessly in the divine life. This would exclude a possible immortality for all human persons involved in the evolutionary process save those who had the good fortune to emerge in its final stage.23

This World/Other World Whatever we may think of those lengthy and at times tortuous theologi-

cal speculations concerning immediate judgment and final judgment, the state of souls prior to the resurrection, and the like, they were concerned with a question which no immortality-extrapolation can avoid, namely the continuing existence of those persons who die prior, to the eschaton. Though the detailed mode of such existence may be almost completely beyond our imaginative powers, the belief in such an existence is plausible only if it is also plausible to extrapolate an other world distinct from but not separate from this one. But will this not be an escape into that otherworldliness which has been so soundly criticized in the modern era? Perhaps, but there are indications that this question has not been as decisively settled as many on both sides imagine. The difficulty rests in the not-so-evident meaning or meanings attached to the phrases "this world" and "other world." The question involved is somewhat analogous to that concerning natural and supernatural. When there was a consensus on the non-transcendent meaning of nature, affirmation of transcendence meant the theist positing some kind of supernatural and the secularist denying it. But when nature is taken as provisional, processive and open-ended, the question is transformed; we now seek to understand the various dimensions of nature or reality, and the supernatural is either relativized (as is nature) or irrelevant. Similarly, when this world was understood in a more restricted materialistic-mechanistic sense, or in the Greek-Medieval sense of a closed and finished republic of natures, affir-mation of an other world was indispensable to avoid cutting off important human possibilities. Now that this dialectic has appeared to have run its

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course, a new model is called for, one which will avoid an escapist other-worldliness and a superficial this-worldliness.

There are, to begin with, good grounds for extrapolating worlds other than those more commonly recognized. For example, it is quite evident that any reference to this world is relative and perspectival.24 Remaining close to ordinary experience, we can see that at every moment and at different moments we are engaged in a plurality of "worlds." We speak, for example, of the "workaday world," the "world of art," the "scientific world," the "world of common sense." We do not designate one of these the "real world" and call the rest "subjective" or "imaginary". Each is real insofar as it bears upon the concrete presence and continuing develop-ment of life. If the mystical world or the divine world meet this criterion of vital presence, and that is the claim and belief of many, then these worlds are no more and no less other than, say, the world of art or the world of science. I do not claim for them the same kind of degree of evidence, but do argue that the reality of an other world cannot be rejected solely because it is not identical with some alleged "this world." Of course, for the pragmatist, such other worlds are always matters of belief but at least one pragmatist, James, maintained that such belief, or overbelief, was neither alien nor opposed to experience. "If needs of ours outrun the visible universe," James argues, "why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there?"25 Two texts show how seriously James entertained the notion that we participate in worlds of which we are unaware or only vaguely aware.

The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and that al-though in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in.

In spite of rationalism's disdain for the particular, the personal, and the unwholesome, the drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious. We may be in the universe as dogs and cats are in our libraries, seeing the books and hearing the conversation, but having no inkling of the meaning of it all.26

I find that last sentence the experiential base for the extrapolation of other worlds.27 It is important to recall that an extrapolation is not con-structed in air but must be an imaginative construct suggested by data given in experience.28 Moreover, successful acts of imagination enrich and enhance experience and reality, often in ways not immediately evi-dent.29 We could add to the situation cited by James innumerable in-stances in which organisms are totally unaware of processes which at every moment contribute to the constitution of their being. Focusing on human

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experience, we have evidence of what might be called "unaware participa-tion." To what extent are most human beings aware of their involvement in social and historical worlds, processes which have a reality not simply reducible to the consciousnesses of their consti tuent members? Nietzsche's genealogical inquiries, Freud's psychoanalytic techniques, Marxist and structuralist analyses, all claim to reveal the underlying structures of morality or the psyche or history or language. These are imaginative efforts to bring to light worlds which are operative in human life but not attended to consciously.

Of course the most significant data pointing towards the reality of a world or worlds other than or beyond the customary one are the claims of those we call mystics. From the pragmatic perspective, these claims do not prove the reality of such worlds but, as James argued in his famous work, they may not be lightly dismissed. The pragmatist would insist that despite the mystic's claim to direct experience of God or the One or the Absolute, there is still a faith or interpretative dimension to these experiences. The issue here, however, is not whether the mystic is correct in describing his or her experience as intuition, or higher knowledge or enlightenment. Whatever the description, we have an enormous number of individuals distributed over the length of human history and a variety of cultures who make experiential claims which, to say the least, remain decisively unac-counted for within a narrow space-time framework. Such data, combined with other factors, contribute to the plausibility of extrapolating as real dimensions which transcend the narrow confines of our conventional world. Such data will, of course, fail to persuade someone who has not had at least an experiential inkling of what the mystic points towards. Unless one has, minimally, a vague sense of something "more" to life than that which constitutes our quotidian experience, the extrapolation I propose will lack meaning and validity.30

Continuity Between Present Life and New Life Granting the plausibility of extrapolating the reality of an other world,

what characteristics would make a new life in it desirable? Bernard Wil-liams who, as previously noted,31 rejects the desirability of immortality, nevertheless lists some of these characteristics. The first is "that it should clearly be me who lives for ever." I have already stressed at some length that personal survival is crucial to any significant immortality.32 Williams' second condition "is that the state in which I survive should be one which to me looking forward, will be adequately related, in the life it presents, to those aims which I now have in wanting to survive at all."33

A process model along the lines suggested allows for this effective continuity between our present life and any new life. It does so in its insistence that we act in the belief that we are contributing to a process or processes wider in scope and longer than those of which we are im-mediately aware. While not limiting any future participation to the exact

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mode in which we are now participating, we must believe that those aims, goals and ideals which now energize us will remain in some way operative * in any new life.

Any adequate model of the creative process and extrapolated immortal-ity will have to take account of the eternal. Even Nietzsche, though ready to surrender God and immortality, is unwilling to part with "eternity." Zarathustra sings a hymn which proclaims that "all joy wants eternity/. . . Wants deep, wants deep eternity."34 Nietzsche wants an eternity located neither in some distant future nor in some other world presently inacces-sible to human experience. An important element of the Christian tradi-tion also insists, despite differences, on the possibility, indeed necessity, of here and now participation in the eternal. Schleiermacher insists that just such participation is the authentic mode of immortality.

The goal and the character of the religious life is not the immortality desired and believed in by m a n y . . . . It is not the immortality that is outside of time, behind it, or rather after it, and which still is in time. It is the immortality which we can now have in this temporal life; it is the problem in the solution of which we are for ever to be engaged. In tne midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion.35

Though with a slightly different emphasis, Kierkegaard makes much the same point:

Immortality cannot be a final alteration that crept in, so to speak, at the moment of death as the final state. On the contrary, it is a changelessness that is not altered by the passage of the years.36

Though the pragmatic model of reality would not employ the language of Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard, and in particular would not accept any literal meaning of "changeless," it remains open to the depth experi-ence called for. What would be needed is an account which allows for, even insists upon, a relation to God or the divine or the eternal which is everlasting without being everlastingly the same. In such an account "changeless" might be accepted as a symbol of the constancy or trustwor-thiness of divine love but would not exclude some kind of change in both the divine and the human relata.

Shifting the focus a bit, it is just this everlastingness which is questioned as humanly desirable by many who reject personal immortality. At stake here is whether duration is a value that makes an endlessly enduring life desirable. Williams, who argues against Lucretius that "more days may give us more than one day," nevertheless denies that unending life would give us anything over and above what can be realized in a life which ends. "There is no desirable or significant property which life would have more of, or have more unqualifiedly, if we lasted forever.37

The counter-view is expressed by Hocking: "duration is a dimension of value." Santayana maintains that "length of things is vanity, only their height is joy."38 But according to Hocking, "it is the normal destiny of

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experience to be prolonged in proportion to its height, not inversely." Hence, "life is objectively worth more as a continued than as a closed affair."39

New Life: Duration and Transformation The attractiveness or unattractiveness of duration will depend upon

how it is to be understood. Bergson, finding it attractive, describes it as "tlje continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances."40 On the other hand, those who find endless duration unattractive presuppose that it involves an unending con-tinuance of fundamentally the same mode of life. Thus Williams in citing the Makropoulos case as evidence that one would become bored by an immortal life, describes a life which had really not changed for some 300 years, a life devoid of significant growth and real novelty. This same presupposition, that a life of unending duration would be merely an indefinite extension of human life in the same mode as it now exists, undergirds the views of those who distinguish it from the eternal life of Christian tradition. "Eternal life," we are told by Stewart Sutherland, "is not to be equated with endless life."41 We are not told, however, just what the difference is between the two, and while conceding that any new life cannot be identical with our present one, I confess that I am completely unable to grasp what an eternal life would be which excluded the char-acteristic of everlastingness. The distinguished American philosopher, John Smith, has expressed a view similar to those being challenged; though more understandable, it retains the presupposition of unending sameness. Smith considers "historically inaccurate" the "belief that the Judaeo-Christian tradition espouses a doctrine of Immortality.' On the contrary, the symbol of 'eternal life' expresses a new dimension or new quality of life and in no sense implies merely the endless continuation of the same."42 While I question his interpretation of the Judaeo-Christian .tradition, I can understand Smith's existential interpretation of eternal life. I have already expressed strong reservations concerning the efficacy of any such interpretation;43 my concern here, however, is with his asser-tion that everlastingness is to be understood as "forever more of the same." Much closer to the mark, in my opinion, is John Baillie's view that "the soul's hope has not been for more of the same, but for something altogether higher and better."44

What we need is a doctrine of transformation which enables us to acknowledge both continuity and difference between the present life and any new life which might be hoped for. That transformationist views are congenial to those reflecting within a Christian framework is evidenced in the following texts:

Does the end of the world mean its annihilation (and re-creation) or merely its transformation. . . . Today the second view, transfor-mation and not annihilation, seems to be growing stronger and

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stronger. Those who hold it think that the biblical passages should be construed as "change-passages," not as "annihilation-passages," if they are taken in a fuller biblical context.45

This theology of hope places imagination in a Christian context. Christ, the Messiah, is portrayed as one who does not simply take the facts of life for granted. In nis unique contribution to the human race he encourages us to work and labor for the transformation of things so that the kingdom may become a reality. . . . This emphasis on transformation of reality in the name of life's promises and expectations culminates in the narratives of Christ's resurrection. Thus Christians receive the promise of a life beyond the grave.46

Any process model of reality is and must be tranformationist, but whether this is a help or a hindrance to a belief in personal immortality is a much more complicated question. Any evolutionary theory which ex-trapolates some mode of new being or new consciousness must confront a dilemma:47 if the changes in human nature are such that this nature remains basically as we now know it, then there is no possibility for the kind of divine community projected by the best visionary thinkers; if, on the other hand, such a community is made possible by a total transforma-tion of human nature, then we no longer have human nature as we now know it. Because the available evolutionary data is ambiguous, it is possi-ble to make two very different extrapolations of the future one, in which humanity continues to exist, though in a profoundly transformed manner; and another, in which humanity disappears and a new species emerges. Initially, this second interpretation would seem to be more consistent with our present knowledge of the evolutionary process. After all, the revolutionary and, for many, the threatening aspect of Darwinism was that it posited the "transformation of species." The crucial conse-quence of evolution would seem to be that just as the human emerged as a new species from a species which is no longer in existence, in the distant future there will be such a transformation of the human species that it will become extinct. While this is surely a plausible extrapolation, it is not strictly entailed by the evidence. To begin with, we are not compelled to assume that the way in which evolution will continue to take place is identical with the way in which it has taken place. Indeed, such an assump-tion would seem to be contrary to one of the more exciting features of evolution the emergence of the radically new. Hence, while up to this point the transformation of species appears to have resulted in a loss of fundamental identity between the old and the new, we cannot definitively rule out a change in the evolutionary process itself whereby future trans-formation whether in "this world" or in an "other world" will result in enrichment without the loss of identity.

I suggest that there are already some grounds for such an extrapolation in both individual and collective development. The transformation of a fertilized egg into a relatively helpless, speechless, instinctive infant, and then into an adult capable of wondrous feats of creativity, would not seem

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to be qualitatively less significant than the transformation of a fish into a reptile. Yet there is a mode of identity present in the former transformation which is absent in the latter. Further, we now recognize that the earlier stages of individual human lives have a value and meaning in themselves while simultaneously contributing, positively or negatively, to the transformed later stages in which identity continues, though profoundly transformed.

Shifting our focus to the human collectivity, we are able to detect further grounds for affirming great transformative development without simple loss of identity. Consider the evolution of Homo which began with Homo habilis about 2.5 million years ago, was transformed into Homo erectus about 1.5 million years ago and into Homo sapiens some 300,000 years ago. Although anthropologists are not in complete agreement as to how "close" the Homo of 2.5 million years ago is to the present day Homo, they do seem to be making two judgments. First, they are distinguishing the 2.5 million-year-old Ho wo from that species of which it was a transformation. Secondly, they are affirming a mode of "identity" between the original Homo and the present-day one. Since no one would deny the profound changes which have taken place within humanity over those 2.5 million years or even over the shorter 300,000 year time-span H omo sapiens transformation and identity cannot be asserted as mutually exclusive. Some modes of transformation do result in loss of identity while others result in transformed identity. Further, it might be suggested, as Teilhard apparently has, that a new quality or mode of life has already emerged from the evolutionary process which allows for an even greater transformation without loss of identity than in the previous stages of evolution. Hence, one might now extrapolate a new level of human existence which will be inconceivably different from but nevertheless fundamentally continuous with our present mode of life. The alternative extrapolation, which has already been criticized,48 is to view humanity as a means or preparation for the emergence of a new species (whether in "this world" or in an "other world") which will retain the human only in the way in which we now retain the sub-human from which we have evolved.

There is a formidable difficulty with the mode of extrapolation which I favor and it must be faced, even though I do not know how to resolve it even to my own satisfaction. It can be objected that I am conflating two distinct time-space continua by extrapolating from the evident time-space continuum available to science to the not-so-evident time-space continuum of an other world. Thus, even if one were to concede that there will be a future transformation of the human species along the lines I have suggested, this is radically different from some future or new life entered into by all humans past and present as well as future on the occasion of their individual deaths. The most serious threat to the perspective here advanced is that by claiming that such a new life is already available to those who die, the long evolutionary process is rendered irrelevant. One

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way out is to say that the purpose of evolution, or at least a consequence of it, was to bring forth a species whose individuals are so constituted that death henceforth has the possibility of transformation rather than oblit-eration. While something such as this must be held if my claims for personal immortality are to stand, it still leaves unsettled the questions of why evolution should be continuing and why we should be working here and now to bring about a future transformation of the human commu-nity. In response, I must revert to the contention that our actions and their consequences are not confined within those processes available to ordi-nary and scientific consciousness. My entire case depends upon a belief such as that which we have already heard expressed by James:

. . . the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and . . . those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also; and . . . although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in.

Given such an overlapping and interpntration of processes and worlds, it makes sense to exert our fullest efforts towards transforming the world or worlds most immediately accessible to us, spurred on by the belief that these efforts bear fruits we are unable to perceive clearly at this moment. The evolutionary process, therefore, is multi-dimensional and human participation past, present and future is not restricted to the most immediately conscious dimension.49 Incidentally, an evolutionary model such as this is congenial, I believe, to a reconstruction of the traditional doctrine of the communion of saints and the practice of praying for and to the dead.

New Life: Positive Charactenstics However radical the transformation which brings about a new life

would be, it cannot be such as to obliterate all trace of those characteristics which presently constitute human life. Prominent among those char-acteristics of human life which seem inseparable from it are creative action, growth, self-development, love, community, suffering, struggle and loss. If we are to extrapolate these as also belonging to any new life, it cannot be too strongly stressed that by such extrapolation we are able to know as much and as little about the new life mode of these characteristics as we can about them when they are extrapolated as belonging to God. The same possibilities and limitations that attach to talking about God would attach to talking about any new life.50

Let me now briefly discuss the necessity that the positive characteristics of human life continue in some way in any new life. It is quite obvious that since pragmatism's process metaphysics denies any absolute permanency or status, it could not consistently allow for any new life from which process or change was absent. But a central feature of process or change is

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that at its best it brings about growth. Hence a pragmatist could not extrapolate any divine or new human life which excluded the possibility of growth. There is a growing consensus, despite metaphysical and theologi-cal differences, that any new life must be a growing or processive one. "A certain growth," Piet Schoonenberg tells us, "also remains possible in the final fulfillment. Otherwise we would perhaps cease to be human."51 Ignace Lepp maintains that "the idea of progress is in fact so intimately related to that of life that we can only conceive of eternal life as eternal growth."52 Similarly, John Shea rejects the notion of a static heaven, noting that "many people cannot conceive of human happiness except in terms of growth."53

Growth, whether human, cosmic or Divine, is possible only insofar as the participative realities or beings have the power of creative action. Diverse as the activities may be, all realities from electrons to God are real in virtue of and to the extent that they are centers of activity. It follows, then, that our extrapolation of a new life will include the possibility of proportionate creative activity for the participants in such life. "It is the yearning after continued action," according to Bergson, "that has led to the belief in an after-life."54 And Goethe in a letter to Eckermann asserted: "To me the eternal existence of my soul is proved by my idea of activity."55

The creative activity performed by those entities designated selves is directly or indirectly bound up with self-development or self-realization. Pragmatism shares the view of those who insist that the self is a project or task, not a fully realized given. It is this task of self-creativity begun in this life which must be extrapolated as continuing in any new life. John Shea's text makes clear that such a viewpoint is not restricted to a pragmatic extrapolation:

When time and history are not viewed as terrors but as mediums of human development, heaven will not be viewed as external and static perfection. Heaven will be a time for continued growth and moral progress. The project of each man's life which is begun in this world demands more time to develop.56

Similarly, Hocking contends that there can be no sense to a continuing life unless "the reflective self is concrete and active, carrying on that question-ing which is the identity of its life here."57

In his "justification" of the desire for immortality, Ralph Barton Perry notes that "there is always some unfinished business." Further, "the desire for more life springs from the belief that life on the whole is good, and to ask for more time is to have some affirmative reason for its use."58 None of this, of course, in any way proves that we are immortal. The most that can be claimed is that it indicates a certain meaning and propriety which would accompany a new life in which the projects and tasks, including that of self-creation, which have been begun and which death always leaves un-finished, would be continued and brought to fuller realization.

The activity above all other human activities which seems to cry out for a

26 CROSS CURRENTS

continuance without end is, of course, love. "The surest warrant for immortality," according to James, "is the yearning of our bowels for our dear ones."59 Mooney points out that "human love . . . is quite shameless in hoping for immortality, and believes against all evidence that it will not be affected by death."60 George Maloney suggests that "our love relations here and now determine the true, future direction of our psychic powers and the degree that they will be realized."61

Whether or not love is a sign of a continuing life, there seems to be no question that it is the human experience most painfully frustrated by the event of death. The love relation has an enduring character which the present conditions make difficult if not impossible to realize. The love relation is continually strained and ravaged by a multiplicity of factors but those loves which endure seem to express most adequately the essence of love. One of the painful features of our present mode of existence is that some loves do end, or become incapable of being maintained in their richest mode and greatest intensity. Nevertheless it appears to be hu-manly impossible to love and simultaneously accept without pain that love will end absolutely and without remainder as death seems to indicate. The death of a loved one is almost beyond question the most tragic experience human beings undergo. This tragic antithesis between love and death is poignantly expressed by Thomas Hardy in his Tess of the D'Urbervilles. As Tess is leaving her husband, Angel, shortly before she is to be hanged, the following exchange takes place:

"Tell me now, Angel, do you think that we shall meet again after we are dead? I want to know."

He kissed her to avoid a reply at such a time. "Oh, Angel I fear that means no!" said she with a suppressed

sob. "And I wanted so to see you again so much, so much! What not even you and I, Angel, who love each other so well?"62

Tess does not fear death, what she finds intolerable is that the love between Angel and her will end with her death and it will end except as a memory for Angel if she ceases to be. It would seem that if death is the annihilation of the individual, one cannot really be said to love someone who has died. If love involves the touching of two relational centers, the cessation of one of these centers necessitates the cessation of love. It would not seem possible to really love a non-existent, a nothing. Of course, it might be argued that love is maintained through memory but unless the memory involves some kind of "presence" of the other it is short-lived as experience repeatedly shows. Gabriel Marcel has sensitively and percep-tively explored the role of "presence" in the relationship between love and death. "Fidelity truly exists," he maintains, "only when it defies absence, when it triumphs over absence, and in particular, over that absence which we hold to be mistakenly no doubt absolute, and which we call death."63

Love, then, is the experience which gives the deepest ground for and

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greatest impetus to extrapolating a life which is not absolutely terminated by death. Further, any desirable new life must be such that the love relations so haltingly and imperfectly begun here, including those inter-rupted or diverted, will have an opportunity for reconciliation, renewal and fuller realization.

A central feature of pragmatism, as was seen earlier,64 is that human individuals are constituted by their social or communal relationships. This view, of course, is not peculiar to pragmatism but is shared by a range of thinkers in the twentieth century.65 An immediate corollary of the com-munal nature of humans is the need to contruct communities or a com-munity which will enrich and expand the actualities and possibilities of human life. There is a consensus that to this point in history the com-munities which have emerged are radically deficient in terms of enabling their members to reach the fullness of their potential. There follows, then, if not a consensus, a widely shared notion that human efforts ought to be directed to creating a truly human community which would be free from those features which now limit and destroy so many. Whether in Utopian, Marxian or Deweyan form, the call for such a community involves an extrapolation from past and present experience to future experience. Any suggestion of a desirable immortality must include an extrapolation similar to though obviously not identical with such future community extrapolations. It will share with these "secularist" extrapolations the notion that we are "here and now" striving to create a better community which will, we hope, be realized in the future. At the same time it will not restrict the parameters of this community, either in its present struggling form or its future realized form to a narrowly conceived "this world." Further, and most important, the kind of extrapolation called for will not restrict membership in the "new community" to those individuals who had the good fortune to come into existence concurrent with the fruitful realization of the often powerful efforts of so many other individuals.66

Immortality: Negative Characteristics To this point the extrapolation of a desirable immortality has focused

on what might be called the positive aspects of any new life which might be forthcoming after death. If, however, we are to avoid a kind of self-deception or "bad faith" we cannot ignore certain negative aspects which properly should be extrapolated as likely to accompany this new life. Let me mention three such aspects struggle, suffering and loss and indicate why and how they should be incorporated into a developed extrapolation of immortality. The evolutionary process at all levels and stages gives no evidence of taking place without the seemingly essential character of "struggle."67 An extrapolated life totally devoid of struggle would seem to involve a discontinuity between the present life and the new life which has been previously ruled out. The more encompassing

28 CROSS CURRENTS

process extrapolated from the more immediate process of our experience has been described as continous with these processes. In other terms, that divine life of which any new life would be a participation is already in a real relation to and hence in some way a participant in the world of immediate experience just as human life is really related to and already participating in the divine life. It follows, then, that God is a participant in the evolu-tionary struggle.68 How then could we properly extrapolate a new life which would be a transformed participation in the divine life while ex-cluding from such new life that struggle which even the divine does not escape? No, the struggle which is inseparable from human life appears to be related to one which is cosmic and even in a sense "trans-cosmic."69 This, of course, touches upon that deepest of mysteries, the mystery of evil. With no pretense to resolving the irresolvable let me simply indicate a response consistent with pragmatism. First, pragmatism strongly objects to any view of evil which sees it as either incorporated within the eternal plan of an omniscient, omnipotent God or as preserved but overcome within the Whole or the Absolute. The only philosophical account of evil congenial to pragmatism is one which energizes human beings in their struggle to lessen and overcome it. Hence any pragmatic immortality-belief will be in part motivated by the hope and desire of having new opportunities for continuing the struggle against evil in which humans are presently engaged.

An almost inevitable accompaniment of the evolutionary struggle, par-ticularly as manifest in the human, is suffering. It is significant, I believe, that more and more efforts have been made to show that a God intimately involved in the creative process must be a "suffering God."70 Again, therefore, any extrapolated new life cannot exclude the possibility of suffering in some form.

There remains the question of "loss" as it might pertain to any new life. Perhaps the most crucial aspect of this question has to do with the loss of everlasting union with the divine. Since I have already extrapolated a continuing struggle after death, it would follow that the achievement of everlasting union with the divine may depend on actions which are not restricted to "this life." It is because it is increasingly hard to believe that the actions of most human beings in the time alloted them in this life are of such a nature as to merit them either eternal life or eternal damnation, that thinkers such as John Hick suggest a succession of lives whereby a continuing purification will take place such that there will emerge indi-viduals worthy of the most intimate union with God. Elsewhere71 I have expressed my reservations about Hick's successive lives theory he fails in my judgment to safeguard that individuality which I consider essential t significant personal immortality. Here I wish to take issue with another aspect of his philosophical theology, namely, his affirmation of "universal salvation."72 Finding the idea of hell or eternal suffering repugnant, Hick argues that the divine love is such that all will eventually be saved, though

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some may have to undergo a succession of a greater number of lives than others in order to achieve adequate self-purification.

The question that must be raised here is whether the doctrine of universal salvation, highly motivated though it may be, does not diminish the "seriousness" of human experience. While I do not think that hell-fire and eternal torment ought to be presented even as a possibility, I am not sure that to avoid this we must assert that all human beings will necessarily be united with God in a union of joyful immediacy. At stake here, of course, is the nature and scope of human freedom. Without even touch-ing upon the numerous subtle issues related to this freedom, let me simply suggest that there is a profound difference between a human freedom whose exercise must lead to union with God and one which allows for the possibility of eternal separation from God. This in no way rules out the possibility that all humans will eventually be united with each other within the depths of the divine life indeed, this should be our hope. It would seem, however, that a world in which there can only be winners is a less serious world than one in which the possibility of the deepest loss is real. From a perspective such as Hick's the goal is assured, the only question is how long an individual will take to reach it. It is as if God has said to us, "You're going to keep doing it till you get it right." Hence, while I think that Hick has advanced a very suggestive and supportable hypothesis namely, that the process of creating ourselves and thereby moving closer to God must continue beyond "this life," he has unnecessarily weakened and softened it by asserting that the final goal is pre-set and certainly to be reached. Hence, hell, -understood as the everlasting separation of the individual from the divine center of love, must remain a live option for radically free human beings.

Reprise We have seen that the classic criticism of belief in immortality is its

alleged de-energizing character, its turning individuals away from the difficult tasks at hand and focusing their attention and energies on an illusory other world.73 I believe that a pragmatic extrapolation along the lines suggested offers an alternative to such a life-denying immortality-belief. It does so because, if consistently acted upon, it intensifies the present efforts to transform the world in which we find ourselves. Further, any future participation in the new human community will be significantly, though not necessarily exclusively, determined by the way we live and act in our present span of life. Hence, such belief in immortal-ity does not divert our energies from "this life;" rather, it intensifies them by awakening us to the depth, scope and seriousness belonging to this life. Since a new community or new world or new reality is "here and now" in the process of being created, and since we are important, though not necessarily the only, participants in this creative process, the value of our present efforts is immeasurably increased. Inasmuch as the sole pathway

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to any new life is through this life, any escapist beliefs or activities which fantasize an already realized and completed paradise to which we will leap are profoundly antithetical to authentic belief in immortality.

In the final analysis, of course, the pragmatic perspective assumed throughout this essay insists that belief or faith is not knowledge and there is no guarantee that immortality-belief, or any other belief, may not be illusory. The risk of belief is inevitable and no reflective person can avoid it or transfer it to a surrogate, whether that surrogate be called tradition, the Church, the Bible or God. The emphasis upon personal responsibility is only fitting, given that what is at stake is personal immortality. Since the person is relational or communal as well as individual, there is no sugges-tion here of any isolated, self-enclosed, egotistic and merely mental belief-activity. Indeed, unless belief in immortality gives rise to some evident existential fruits for both the individual and the community, pragmatic evaluation would be compelled to conclude that this belief is merely notional a hollow relic left over from an earlier age.

Inasmuch as living belief never occurs within a historical and cultural vacuum, we may not minimize the formidable obstacles to belief in im-mortality within our present context. But neither should we succumb to them because we are unable to fashion arguments which will completely neutralize these obstacles. Fashion arguments we must but they should reinforce, deepen and enrich rather than substitute for other human activities. Paradoxically, the best arguments produced by any believing-community, including the scientific community, have always led to mys-tery rather than mystification, expanding our sense of awe and wonder instead of explaining it away. Even the best arguments, however, never initiate or create life or belief. Only where there is a community already energized by vital belief stemming from a mysterious and irreducible experiential depth, has there emerged those whose reflections have served to support, to modify, to expand and, at times, to trivialize or destroy the originating belief or faith. Those who choose the path of reflective believing cannot know, a priori, which of these may result from their reflections. All we can know with some degree of confidence is that a belief in immortality which lacks either personal and communal fruits or reflective support has already lost its very reason for being the deepen-ing and expansion of life.

One last point. Belief in immortality should not isolate those who espouse it from others who also believe in the need to work toward the creation of a richer and more humane community. These latter would include a variety of Marxist and humanistic believers who also maintain that no significant and desirable future is possible unless a continuing effort on the part of an increasing number of human beings is made to "change the world" as it is presently constituted. Though the belief-structures which energize those endeavoring to create a better world will involve important differences which ought not be minimized, they should

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not be in superficial competition with each other. Only by a shared effort to realize convergent goals and values will an atmosphere emerge for a more fruitful dialogue concerning divergent beliefs beliefs of such magnitude and scope that what is at stake is literally a matter of death and life.

FOOTNOTES

^'Immortality: Hope or Hindrance?," Cross Currents, Summer 1981, pp. 163-184. 2Death and Eternal Life. New York: Harper & Row, 1976, p. 24. Hereafter, DEL. 3The Self and Immortality. New York: The Seabury Press, 1973, p. 196. See also, William

Ernest Hocking. The Meaning of Immortality In Human Expenence. New York: Harper 8c Brothers, 1957, pp. xi-xii. Hereafter,Meaning. "Unless an Idea has or can have an intelligible basis in the constitution of things it is illegitimate, whether for postulate or for faith: we must be able to say what it is we postulate or believe."

4Cf. David L. Norton, Personal Destinies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 358: "He who affirms the worth of life does not embrace the idea of an afterlife that is the antithesis of the life he and all human beings live."

^Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956, p. 51. 6Albert Camus, The Rebel. New York: Vintage, 1956, p. 304. 1 Meaning, pp. 155, 159.

8"Death and Human Expectation," in Philosophical Aspects ofThanatology, 2 volumes, ed. by

Florence M. Hetzler and Austin H. Kutscher, New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1978, II, p. 151. Hereafter, Thanatology.

9The Self and Immortality, pp. 207-208. 10Cf. John Herman Randall, Jr., Nature and Historical Exprience. New York: Columbia

University Press, p. 198. "We never encounter the Universe, we never act toward experience or feel being or existence as 'a whole'." See also, Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, p. 43. "The world as a whole is not an object, because we are always in it and we never confront the world as a whole. Hence we can not, from the existence of the world as a whole, infer the existence of something other than the world."

"But this notion takes on a new meaning when it is no longer regarded as a proof. Then metaphorically, in the form of an inference, it expresses awareness of the mystery inherent in the existence of the world and of ourselves in it."

n"John Hick's 'After-life': A Critical Comment," Cross Currents, Fall, 1978, pp. 315-316.

12It is important to stress that pragmatic extrapolation is rational, and while any extrapola-tion, such as the one relating to immortality, may be unsuccessful and fall as a result of critical analysis, it cannot be dismissed out of hand simply because it points us beyond the bounds of present experience or strict inferential reasoning. Pragmatic extrapolation does not have the mode of irrationalism apparent in an affirmation of immortality such as Unamuno's. The similarities and contrasts between the two approaches cannot here be delineated but one crucial difference is that the faith-reason relation in pragmatism does not have the fierce oppositional character that it has in Unamuno. Cf. his Tragic Sense of Life, trans, by J.E. Crawford Flitch. New York: Dover Publication, 1954, p. 114. "To believe in the immortality of the soul is to wish that the soul may be immortal, but to wish it with such force that this volition shall trample reason underfoot and pass beyond it."

13Myths, Models, and Paradigms, New York: Harper 8c Row, 1976, pp. 6-7. Her eafter, Myths. Barbour makes one further point supportive of the kind of pluralism espoused by prag-matism: "In place of the absolutism of exclusive claims of finality, an ecumenical spirit would acknowledge a plurality of significant religious models without lapsing into a complete relativism which would undercut all concern for truth (p. 8).

14The Plato scholar, Henry Wolz, has given what I would call a pragmatic-like description of extrapolation. "The outcome of an extrapolation can, therefore, be said to be empirical in its ongin, transempirical in its nature, and, in as much as it may serve as a norm or means of

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elucidation, once more empirical, namely, in its function." "The Protagoras Myth and the Philosopher-Kings," Review of Metaphysics, December, 1963, pp. 223-224.

15Whether an extrapolation is so "beyond" experience as to be invalidly discontinuous with it is one of the matters not able to be decided in isolation from a range and diversity of factors. Nietzsche, for example, concedes that his notion of overman is as much a conjecture as is the notion of God, but the former he considers a valid conjecture while the latter is invalid. "God is a conjecture; but I desire that your conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will. Could you create a god? Then do not speak to me of any gods. But you could well create the overman." (The Portable Nietzsche, selected and trans, by Walter Kauf-mann, New York: The Viking Press, 1968, p. 197.)

16Cross Currents, Summer, 1981, pp. 164-167. 17For a suggestion of some convergences as well as divergences between pragmatism and

the thought of Aurobindo, see Eugene Fontinell, "A Pragmatic Approach to The Human Cycle," in Six Pillars, edited by Robert A. McDermott, Chambersburg: Wilson Books, 1974, pp. 131-159.

18Such a view is antithetical to any interpretation of Jesus' teaching which sees no compari-son possible between present and future life. For a representative example, see Franz Mussner, "The Synoptic Account of Jesus' Teaching on the Future Life," in Immortality and Resurrection, ed. by Pierre Benoit and Roland Murphy, New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 53. Hereafter, IR.

19William James, The Writings of William James, ed. by John J. McDermott. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977, f.p., 1967, p. 736. Hereafter, Writings.

20The Will To Believe. New York: Dover Publications, 1956, f.p., 1897, p. 61. 21Cf. Denis Goulet, "Is Economic Justice Possible?" in Cross Currents, Spring 1981, p. 47.

"Can any religion offer a convincing rationale why men and women should build history even as they strive to bear witness to transcendence? . . . One vital arena is how any religion values time itself: is earthly life simply a means to some paradise beyond this world, or is it rather some end having its own dignity and worth?"

22Cf. James, Writings, p. 740. '"If we do our best, and the other powers do their best, the world will be perfected' this proposition expresses no actual fact, but only the complexion of a fact thought of as eventually possible."

23For a critique of Teilhard on just this point, see, George Maloney, "Death and Omega: An Evolving Eschaton," in Thanatology, I. p. 143. "Thus two great weaknesses of Teilhard's system (he never comes to serious grips with the problems) are (1) he fails to continue the evolutionary process beyond the Omega Point and (2) he does not answer how the majority of the human race, all those billions who have lived in the past, our present majority and a good deal of the future to come, how will they reach the Omega Point?"

24Cf. Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception. New York: Harper 8c Row, 1963, pp. 23-24. "That which, in the language of religion, is called 'this world' is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed, and, as it were, petrified by language. The various 'other worlds,' with which human beings erratically make contact are so many elements in the totality of the awareness belonging to Mind at Large."

25The Will To Believe, p. 56. See a\so,idem. "But the inner need of believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head."

2 Writings, pp. 781, 802. Cf. the British analytical philosopher, H.H. Price, "Survival and

the Idea of'Another World;'" mLanguage, Metaphysics, andDeath, ed. by John Donnelly, New York: Fordham University Press, 1978, p. 194. "If there are other worlds than this (again I emphasize the 'if), who knows whether with some stratum of our personalities we are not living in them now, as well as in this present one which conscious sense-perception dis-closes?"

2 7There is a highly technical question attached to the notion of a plurality of worlds, namely, the possibility or conceivability of plural times, or plural spaces or plural space-

SPRING, 1982 33

times. Speculation on this question is not confined to so-called "tender-minded" or "roman-tic" thinkers. See, for example, Hocking (Meaning, p. 210), where he refers to "Minkowski's Memoir of 1908, in which he vigorously assaulted the doctrine of monism (though chiefly for the purposes of calculation), making the radical assertion that 'from henceforth we shall speak no more of Space and Time, but of spaces and times'."

John Hick (DEL, pp. 279-295) speculates on the plurality of spaces as a prerequisite for a doctrine of bodily resurrection. The distinguished psychologist, Gardner Murphy, asks, "Is there a possibility that general psychology would say, 'We don't yet have a time-space reference for the study of death anymore than we have a time-space reference for the study of personality?'" (The Meaning of Death, ed. by Herman Feifel, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 339)

The idea of plural space-times is defended by Anthony Quinton in "Spaces and Times," Philosophy, April 1962. And working from a radically different philosophical and cultural context, P.T. Raju states: "I think that the Upanishads are right in saying that there are different levels of space and time. There is space between one book and another; but what is the space that separates ideas of cause and effect when I think of the law of causation? What is the space that separates me and my mental images? Certainly, I am not my mental images. And what is the time that separates me as observing the first instant of a duration of five seconds and me as observing the last instant? How many problems arise here? ("Self and Body: How Known and Differentiated," The Monist, January, 1978, pp. 153-154.)

28Cf. John Shea, What a Modern Catholic Believes About Heaven and Hell, Chicago: The Thomas More Press, 1972, p. 21. Hereafter, HH. "Hope is rooted in the actuality of things. . . . If personal immortality is a true hope and not a mere wish, in some way it must be intimated in the experience of men."

^Extrapolation is an act of imagination which should be sharply differentiated from idle fantasy. Cf. William Lynch, S.J., Images of Hope. New York: Mentor-Omega Books, New American Library, 1965, pp. 27, 209. "For one of the permanent meanings of imagination has been that it is the gift that envisions what cannot yet be seen, the gift that constantly proposes to itself that the boundaries of the possible are wider than they seem. . . . The first task of such an imagination, if it is to be healing, is to find a way through fantasy and lies into fact and existence." Lynch also develops this theme that the imagination is essentially reality-oriented in Christ and Apollo, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961.

30Cf. the statement of James, "I have no mystical experience of my own, but just enough of the germ of mysticism in me to recognize the region from which their voice comes when I hear it." Cited in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 volumes, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935, II, p. 346. Hereafter, TC.

I have made no reference to a large body of claims which are often cited as supporting immortalitythose of spiritualism and other paranormal psychic experiences. The evalua-tion of these claims is an undertaking in itself and one which I make no pretense of doing in a footnote. Let me simply say that I share with many who have sympathetically investigated these claims, the conclusion, "not proved." That is not their greatest weakness, however, for pragmatism neither asks nor expects "proof in such instances. What it does seek are fruits in the form of the deepening, illumination and expansion of human life. Such fruits can reasonably be said to issue from the lives of many if not all mystics but are decidedly less* evident in the case of "spiritualists," particularly in their claims of communication with the dead. James, himself deeply sympathetic and professionally supportive of such efforts, concluded rather sadly that "the spirit-hypothesis exhibits a vacancy, triviality and incoher-ence of mind painful to think of as the state of the departed." Collected Essays and Reviews, ed. by Ralph Barton Perry, New York and London: Longmans, Green 8c Co., 1920, pp. 438-439.

A figure who might be an exception here, and who commands the respect of a number of serious thinkers is Rudolph Steiner. While I find the details of his otherworld descriptions bordering on the fantastic, there is an element of insight in his writings which I think should not be dismissed. Two passages from his autobiography might be cited as most congenial to

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the kind of extrapolation or model herein offered. "I tried to show in my book that nothing unknowable lies behind the sense-world, but that within it is the spiritual world. . . . I insisted that a person who deepens his view of the world as much as lies within the scope of his powers, will discover a universal process which encompasses the true reality of nature as well as morality." Rudolph Steiner, An Autobiography, Blauvelt, New York: Rudolph Steiner Publi-cations, 1977, pp. 215, 213.

3lCross Currents, Summer 1981, pp. 168-169. 32Cf. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans, George R. Montgomery, La Salle: Open

Court Publishing Co., 1962, p. 58. "Suppose that some individual could suddenly become King of China on condition, however, of forgetting what he had been, as though being born again, would it not amount to the same practically, or as far as the effects could be perceived, as if the individual were annihilated, and a king of China were the same instant created in his place? The individual would have no reason to desire this."

33Problems of the Self. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 91. Hereafter, Problems.

34The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 339-340. 35Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, On Religion, trans, by John Oman. New York: Harper

Torchbooks, 1958. Cf. A Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of Immortality. Oxford: The Claren-don Press, 1922, pp. 136, 155-156. "But eternity and immortality are by no means necessar-ily exclusive terms: on the contrary, our experience here and now may carry in it 'the power of an endless life' and be in truth the only earnest or guarantee of such a life. . . . It does not follow that the attainment of religious insight in the present life involves the surrender of any hope of a personal life beyond. Why should not the apprehension of the eternal rather carry with it the gift of further life and a fuller fruition? . . . Throughout the New Testa-ment, accordingly, even in the passages which most clearly treat 'eternal life' as realized here and now, the present experience is never taken as foreclosing the possibility of a future life, but always rather as a foretaste, as an assurance, indeed, of a fuller realization hereafter."

36Soren Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart, trans, by Douglas V. Steere, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956, p. 35. Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, "Kierkegaard's View of Time," in Thanatology, I, p. 233. The point "Kierkegaard wants to make is that the eternal is the present or better that the present is the eternal."

37Problems, p. 89. z%GeoT%eSa.r\tya.ndL,Solitoquies In England, Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan

Press. 1967, p. 116. 39Meaning, pp. 68-69. See also, p. 71. "But if lastingness is a mark of value, is it not an

absurdity of a universe in which the everlasting things are things which do not know and cannot become aware of their post of honor?" For a diametrically opposed interpretation of the endurance of inorganic entities, see, Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life, New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966, p. 276. "If permanence were the point, life should not have started out in the first place, for in no possible form can it match the duration of inorganic bodies."

40Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans, by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Modern Lib-rary, 1944, p. 7.

41 "Immortality and Resurrection," in Language, Metaphysics, and Death, op. cit., p. 206.

42"Dying, Death and Their Significance," in Thanatology, I, xii.

43Cross Currents, Summer 1981, p. 178-180. 44And The Life Everlasting, New York: Oxford University Press, 1934, p. 204. Cited by

Louis Dupr, Transcendent Selfhood, New York: The Seabury Press, 1976, p. 81. 45EJ. Fortman, Everlasting Life After Death, New York: Alba House, 1976, p. 301. Hereaf-

ter, ELD. 46William Frost, "Religious Imagination," The Ecumenist, March-April, 1980, p. 44. Frost

describes Bloch's interpretation of "Christ's saying that he who loses his life will find it and he who seeks his life will lose it. Only those who are willing to follow the life of the soul which vibrates beyond the body and the mundane are made free for an immortality which is more than the existing form of reality. It is the trans-cosmological." Ibid, p. 43.

SPRING, 1982 35

4 7The description of this dilemma is drawn from "John Hick's 'After-life'," Cross Currents, Fall 1978, pp. 315-317.

4SCross Currents, Summer 1981, p. 177. 49Cf. Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, II, pp.

157-158. Hereafter, MB. "What we loosely call 'beyond' consists of unknown dimensions or perspectives within a universe of which we apprehend only the aspect which is in tune with our own organo-psychic structure."

5 0The most obvious limitation attending any "new life" extrapolation concerns the "new" aspect of which little or nothing can be said positively. That a future life such as that which is here suggested and hoped for must be new in an inconceivable and unimaginable way seems both congenial and mandated by faith and reason. The "newness" characterizing the risen Christ is a belief of long-standing. Cf F.X. Durrwell, The Resurrection, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960, p. 126. "The Resurrection was not merely a coming back to life, but a birth into a new life which Christ did not have in his bodily humanity." The evidence from reason for the necessity of newness is quite simply the dissolution which accompanies all living beings of our experience. Unless there is a "new" character realized through death and the saving grace of God, then there would be no possibility of a life without dissolution without death.

51"I Believe in Eternal Life," The Problem of Eschatology. Glen Rock, N.J., Paulist Press,

1969, p. 110. 52Death and Its Mysteries, New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 187. 5 3HH, p. 86. See also, Fortman, ELD, p. 135, where he describes Karl Rahner's and

Ladislaus Boros' process views of purgatory. While Fortman himself is not completely antagonistic to a processive purgatory or heaven, he balks at the notion of a processive God.

54Two Sources of Religion and Morality, trans, by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1935, p. 124.

55J.P. Eckermann, Gespraeche mit Goethe, Stuttgart: Cotta, n.d, cited by Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche, Disciple of Dionysus, Lewisburgh: Bucknell University Press, 1972, p. 267.,

5 6HH, p. 86. ^Meaning, p. 66. See also, Norton, op. cit., p. 237. "Goethe said to Eckermann that he

would not know what to do with an afterlife if it did not provide new tasks and new opportunities. This extrapolative propensity is supported by certain distinctive theories of immortality as exemplified in the thought of Immanuel Kant and Josiah Royce."

58The Hope for Immortality, The Vanguard Press, 1945, pp. 8,24. Perry was in all likelihood influenced on this matter by his mentor, William James. Cf. Perry, TC, II, p. 356. "But as James grew older he came to believe in immortality. In 1904 he had acquired a feeling of its 'probability.' Although he did not feel a 'rational need' of it, he felt a growing 'practical need.' What was this practical motive? In explaining why he was now, late in life, acquiring the belief for the first time, he said, 'Because I am just getting fit to live'. . . . With his tempera-mental love of the living, his affectionate sympathies, and his glowing moral admirations, he had come more and more to feel that death was a wanton and unintelligible negation of goodness."

^Principles of Psychology, 2 volumes, New York: Dover Publicatons, 1951, II, p. 308. mThanatology, II , p. 146. Cf. Marcel, MB, II. 153-155. "First let me quote again what one of

my characters says, 'to love a being is to say, "Thou, thou shalt not die"'. . . . [This] prophetic %

assurance . . . might be expressed fairly enough as follows: whatever changes may intervene in what I see before me, you and I will persist as one: the event that has occurred, and which belongs to the order of accident, cannot nullify the promise of eternity which is enclosed in our love, in our mutual pledge."

61Thanatology, I, p. 147. 62New York: Signet Classic, 1964, p. 416. ^Creative Fidelity. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964, p. 152. For a fine exposi-

tion of Marcel's views on death, see, Barbara E. Wall, "The Doctrine of Death in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel," in Thanatology, II, pp. 223-235. For a description of a "phenomenon" similar to Marcel's but interpreted radically differently, see, Vivienne Thoul

36 CROSS CURRENTS

Wechter, "A Time to Live A Time to Die?" in Thanatology, I, pp. 244-245. "As an addendum must be added, that though my own understanding or wish for death as 'the end,' has I suspect seeped through, there must be an admission of the ambivalence which is a common affliction. Though I choose to think, to intellectualize, to indeed wish for that kind of death as in the words of Epicurus 'when death is come we are not' nevertheless I find myself relating to loved ones who have died as though they have migrated into some kind of discarnate existence, which still is in some mysterious way related to me here. And my dreams indicate that I wish to encourage this relationship."

64Cross Currents, Summer 1981, p. 166. 65Cf., Karl Jaspers, "On My Philosophy," trans, by F. Kaufmann, in Existentialism from

Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. by Walter Kaufman, New York: Meridian Books, 1968, p. 147. "The individual cannot become human by himself. Self-being is only real in communication with another self-being. Alone, I sink into gloomy isolation only in community with others can I be revealed in the act of mutual discovery."

66Josiah Royce's ideal of the "Beloved Community," developed in his The Problem of Christianity, would be a rich resource for an extrapolation along the lines of the one being suggested. One text will indicate the direction of Royce's efforts. "The ideal Christian community is to be the community of all mankind, as completely united in its inner life as one conscious self could conceivably become, and as destructive of the natural hostilities and of the narrow passions which estrange individual men, as it is skillful in winning from the infinite realm of bare possibilities concrete arts of control over nature and of joy in its own riches of grace. This free and faithful community of all mankind, wherein the individuals should indeed die to their own natural life, but should also enjoy a newness of positive life, this community never became, so far as I can learn, a conscious ideal for early Buddhism." Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, f.p., 1913, p. 195.

67The metaphysical character of "struggle" is suggested by James in the following: "The facts of struggle seem too deeply characteristic of the whole frame of things for me not to suspect that hindrance and experiment go all the way through." Cited, Perry, TC, II, p. 379.

68Cf. Anne Carr, "The God Who Is Involved," in Theology Today, October 1981, p. 314. "There is today a theological insistence, rooted in interpretations of the Bible and of contemporary experience, that the God of Christian faith, while remaining God, is intimate to the joy and the pain, the victory and the defeat, the struggle of human existence, and comes to be known precisely there." See also, David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, New York: Seabury Press, 1975, p. 177. "Is not the God of the Jewish and Christian scriptures a God profoundly involved in humanity's struggle to the point where God not merely affects but is affected by the struggle?"

69"For it is not against human enemies that we have to struggle, but against Sovereignties

and Powers who originate the darkness in this world, the spiritual army of evil in the heavens." (Eph. 6:12.)

70Cf. Hans Kung, Does God Exist? trans, by Edward Quinn, New York: Doubleday, 1980, p. 665. "The biblical God is not a God without feeling, incapable of suffering, apathetic in regard to the vast suffering of the world and man, but a sympathetic com-passionate God.. . ." See also, Tracy, op. cit., p. 177. "Is Bonhoeffer's famous cry that only a suffering God can help merely a rhetorical flourish of a troubled man? Can the God of Jesus Christ really be simply change-less, omnipotent, omniscient, unaffected by our anguish and our achievements?"

71"John Hick's 'After-life'," Cross Currents, Fall 1978.

72See, Hick, "Universal Salvation," in DEL, pp. 242 ff. 73No one has expressed this charge more passionately and vividly than Nietzsche. See, The

Birth of Tragedy, trans, by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 23. "Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in 'another' or 'better' life."

SPRING, 1982 37

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