Power to the people fivas 2010

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Power to the People?

Hydropower, indigenous peoples’ rights and popular resistance in Guatemala

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Published in September 2010 Design and layout by Odgers Speed DesignAuthors: Cecilie Hirsch and Miguel Utreras Photos: Cecilie HirschPublished with the financial support of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)Copies can be downloaded from the FIVAS website www.fivas.org Osterhausgate 27, N-0183 Oslo, Norway. Tel: +47 22 98 93 25 email: [email protected]

The Association for International Water Studies (FIVAS) is an indepen-dent, non-profit organization that monitors the role of Norwegian aid and companies in the water sector in developing countries. FIVAS seeks to prevent support for policies and projects with adverse environmental and social impacts and to contribute to im-proved decision-making processes.

Acknowledgments

This report could not have been realized without the help and guidance of many people with knowledge in the area of hydropower, environmental and social impacts, Guatemala and indigenous rights. A study of this kind, looking at actors, interests and power relations in such a complex sector, requires inputs from many different sources.

We owe special thanks to everyone in Guatemala who helped us conduct the study. They were tremendously helpful in facilitating access to information, and patient and thoughtful in taking the time to share their views and experiences with us.

Thanks also to the Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwe-gian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America (LAG) for valuable contributions along the way. A special thanks to Jody Scholz and Andrew Preston for editing, proofreading and valuable inputs.

We dedicate this study to Ronaldo Cardenas, environmental activist and committed defender of the rights of local and indigenous communities, who left this world unex-pectedly on the 2nd of January 2010. Ronaldo helped us in our work with this study, and we will forever appreciate his valuable insights and knowledge. His compassion and dedication to the environment and unwavering commitment to the fight for justice will follow us in our work in the future.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarilyrepresent the official policy or position of interviewees, unless directly cited.

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Contents

1 Introduction 4

1.1 Methodology 6

2 International Context 7

2.1 Indigenous Rights 7

2.2 Hydropower standards and guidelines 11

3 The case of Guatemala 14

3.1 Background 14

3.1.1 Geography and people 14

3.1.2 Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala 16

3.1.3 Thelegaciesofthearmedconflict 17

3.1.4 Environmental policies 19

3.2 The power sector in Guatemala 22

3.2.1 1990s: An era of privatization 22

3.2.2 Strategic plan for hydropower 24

3.2.3 Actors in the hydropower sector 26

3.2.4 Current developments in the power sector 26

3.2.5 The legacy of Chixoy 29

3.2.6 Legal and institutional framework 30

3.3 Project development: social, environmental and legal aspects 33

3.3.1 Project preparation 33

3.3.2 Benefitsforwhom? 34

3.3.3 Control of territory 37

3.3.4 Environmental impacts and EIAs 39

3.4 Community resistance and local strategies 45

3.4.1 Energy sovereignty 48

3.4.2 Popular consultations 48

3.4.3 Rio Hondo 49

3.4.4 A break with the liberal model 50

3.4.5 Persecution of leaders and criminalization of social protest 51

4 Norwegian Context 57

4.1 Norway on energy 58

4.2 Norway on CSR and development cooperation 58

4.3 Clean Energy for Development 59

4.4 Norway and Guatemala 61

4.5 Lessons learnt 67

5 Conclusions and recommendations 68

Acronyms and abbreviations 71

Meetings 73

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The debate about hydropower has been revitalized in the context of climate change and the huge unmet needs for energy in many countries. Hydropower projects are being promoted by developers and financial institutions across the world as part of the solution – a low carbon means to meet the world’s energy needs.

How hydropower development benefits different stake-holders depends on a range of factors: the local cultural, economic, political and ecological context; mechanisms for distribution of benefits; the type and scale of the hy-dropower project; the processes before and during plan-ning and construction; how the hydropower plants are managed and by whom; agreements for environmental and social mitigation, compensation and resettlement; the role of the state, companies and civil society in develop-ment processes, to mention but a few.

Dams have generated serious and complex environmental and socio-economic impacts. Some of the major criti-cisms directed at project developers include inadequate

consideration given to local communities; underestima-tion of and insufficient compensation for social and environmental impacts; and unequal cost- and benefit-sharing1. Groups that are already marginalized are often highly vulnerable to further deprivation, when subjected to so-called development projects, such as hydropower.

Hydropower in Norway has been developed under very different conditions to many other countries. Whereas Norway has a well-functioning local and national democ-racy, with a solid legal framework, many countries in the Global South have weak or nascent democracies that lack the institutional structures necessary to provide for the needs of the poor and marginalized – those who comprise the majority of the population in these countries.

In many countries, local communities are highly depen-dent on rivers for economic, nutritional, cultural and spiritual sustenance. Rivers have traditionally provided water for small-scale irrigation and agricultural produc-tion, and have also played an important role in meeting the domestic water needs of local communities.

Hydropower development affects rivers, ecosystems and the surrounding land. Local people cannot always count on a functioning state and legal framework to protect their rights and safeguard access to the river and sur-rounding lands. At the same time, electricity and profits generated by the hydropower project often do not reach poor local communities, but instead benefit the wealthy, the companies and those able to pay the electricity tariffs.

Guatemala has a history of exclusion of indigenous peo-ple. Many of the areas with existing plans for hydropower development are areas inhabited by poor peasants and indigenous groups. Furthermore, Guatemala is a small

1 Introduction

1 World Commission on Dams (2000) Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision-making

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country, with fragile ecosystems and high biodiversity. This has created conflicts in many parts of the country.

Conflicts concerning hydropower are nothing new. Since large-scale hydropower first began to be developed in the 1960s, there have been conflicts, in which local and indig-enous communities have frequently voiced strong opposi-tion. In many instances, their rights have been violated, including their right to use rivers and surrounding lands; their right to decide their own development; their right to participate in decision-making processes; their right to be consulted; and their right, as indigenous peoples, to free, prior and informed consent.

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) concluded in its report from 2000 that respect for indigenous rights is a prerequisite for sustainable development. The WCD recommendations include the implementation of prin-ciples from ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples that protect the right of indigenous peoples to consultation and free, prior and informed consent in special instances such as relocation.

This study is a contribution to the debate about hydro-power development, indigenous rights and the rights of affected communities in the face of development projects in general. The report has four sections. The first provides a general overview of the current state of hydropower development and includes a presentation of relevant international standards and trends as well as indigenous rights. The second section of the report presents Guate-mala as a case study, while the third examines relevant Norwegian policies. In the final section of the report, we put forward our conclusions and recommendations.

We have chosen Guatemala as a case for various reasons: 1) the potential for hydropower development in the country and the environmental context as a small coun-try with high biodiversity; 2) the large percentage of the population that is indigenous; 3) the fact that hydropower development in the region has been defined as a Norwe-gian strategic interest; 4) the fact that Norwegian actors are already looking at possible investments in the country, while the governments of Norway and Guatemala have

River in Quiche, Guatemala. Local communities are dependent on rivers for economic, nutritional, cultural andspiritual sustenance.

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expressed interest in collaborating on both hydropower development and securing indigenous rights; and 5) the arrival of the newly established Norwegian company SN Power Africa and Central America in the region.

We hope this study will contribute to the ongoing discus-sion surrounding Norway’s Clean Energy Initiative as well as Norway’s international energy policy, in general. Fur-thermore, we hope that Norwegian actors will review this study prior to investing or getting involved in develop-ment activities in indigenous areas. Lastly, we hope that this study will serve local communities and organizations working for just and sustainable water management.

1.1 Methodology

Information gathering has been undertaken by collecting written material from international and national (Guate-malan and Norwegian) sources, and through interviews and meetings with different actors in the sector in both countries.

Information gathering in Guatemala was conducted dur-ing a series of field visits carried out over the course of several months comprising two distinct periods: June-August 2009 and November-December 2009. The sources and information from Guatemala used in this study com-prise interviews, official documents (laws and regulations, policy documents and EIA studies), observations, news-paper articles and documentation from various organi-zations. The collection of information was mainly done through interviews with different actors in the sector: state actors, actors from civil society, affected communi-ties and companies. We made several trips to different communities, and observed or participated in discussions at a variety of conferences and other events featuring top-

ics relevant to hydropower development. Furthermore, in collaboration with various experts on specialized topics, we have analysed laws, official documents, environmental impact studies and articles from the Guatemalan press.

Communities were visited in Zona Ixil, Zona Reina and Xalala in the state of Quiche; the municipality Tajamulco in the state of San Marcos; and the state of Altaverapaz. Other observations have been undertaken in the state of Zacapa and the municipality of Chuarrancho. During visits to local communities we interviewed local leaders, people from the communities and local organizations about their position regarding hydropower projects that are planned or under construction on their territories. In addition, we visited areas where consultation processes on hydropower projects have been carried out.

For more detailed information on the energy sector in Guatemala, we conducted interviews with key govern-ment and state actors. These interviews covered govern-ment plans for the sector and the related legal and politi-cal framework used to realize these plans. We conducted interviews with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MARN), the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM), and the National Council of Protected Areas (Conap). The second section of the report includes information from interviews conducted with different civil society actors, including social, indigenous and en-vironmental organizations, as well as academics. Devel-opers, including members of AGER and ANC, were also interviewed.

To get a broader picture of Norwegian policy and practice in the area, we talked to the Norwegian embassy in Guate-mala, Norad, Norfund, SN Power, and Norwegian civil society organizations, such as Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid and the Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America (LAG).

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Development initiatives in indigenous areas are contested affairs in many developing countries. Sources of conflict are often related to competing visions of what develop-ment means and who gets to decide what form it should take. This is especially true regarding questions related to access to natural resources, land ownership and the importance of environmental stewardship. Conflicting development ideologies, rights, and ethical questions regarding mining, oil and gas extraction, and large-scale infrastructure projects have been heavily debated in recent years. Hydropower projects have not been exempt from this. The question of hydropower development centres on control of territory and water resources, which in turn determines who benefits and who has access to natural resources.

Hydropower development worldwide is a US$40 billion a year industry, involving a wide range of actors, including state agencies, dam-building companies, consultancies, donor agencies, banks and international finance insti-tutions. Projects, once conceived by developers, tend to gather a momentum of their own, in which financial and technical aspects are prioritized, and environmental and social aspects are given less consideration or simply overlooked.

2.1 Indigenous Rights Historically, dams and hydropower projects have had serious impacts on the livelihoods, territories and culture of indigenous peoples. Due to discrimination and mar-ginalization, indigenous peoples have borne a dispropor-tionately higher share of the negative impacts of projects. Indigenous peoples’ rights are often not addressed in national legal frameworks, and are therefore ignored by

developers, with the result that indigenous communities are excluded from decision-making arenas.

ILO Convention 169 is a comprehensive and legally binding convention that exclusively covers indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights. The Convention is the principal instrument used to uphold the collective rights of indi-genous peoples. Latin America is the region in the world where most countries have ratified the ILO convention; 14 countries as of September 20092. The convention add-resses many aspects of indigenous people’s lives, such as education, customs, environment, land rights, the right to be consulted, the right to participate in decision-making processes, self-identification and spiritual values. Articles 6 and 7 of the convention address the right to consul-tation and participation in decision-making processes involving indigenous peoples and the right to decide their own priorities in the process of development as it affects them.

Consultation is a process to be undertaken between the respective government and indigenous peoples within the country. Indigenous peoples are to be consulted about legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly, and are to participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development that concern them (see box). Articles 13 and 16 concern land and relocation, where the term “lands” includes the concept of territories, which “covers the total environment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use”. Reloca-tion shall take place only with the indigenous groups’ free and informed consent. Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is an important principle that has been further elaborated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).

2 International Context

2 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela

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Indigenous women in Guatemala

Article 6

1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:

(a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate pro-cedures and in particular through their representative institu-tions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly;

2. The consultations carried out in application of this Con-vention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form ap-propriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.

Article 7

1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and pro-grammes for national and regional development which may affect them directly.

Article 13

1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention governments shall respect the special importance for the cul-tures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the col-lective aspects of this relationship.

2. The use of the term “lands” in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the concept of territories, which covers the total en-vironment of the areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.

Article 16

2. Where the relocation of these peoples is considered nec-essary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures established by national laws and regulations, including public inquiries where appro-priate, which provide the opportunity for effective represen-tation of the peoples concerned.

ILO Convention 169

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In 2007 the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was ratified by the UN General Assembly after more than twenty years of discus-sion within the UN system. The declaration represents an important advance in the rights of indigenous peoples; indigenous representatives played a key role in the de-velopment of the declaration3.

The declaration takes the fundamental elements of ILO Convention 169 and further elaborates self-determination and collective rights. In this context, articles 18, 19, 23, 28 and 32 are of special importance. Free prior and informed consent (FPIC) is an important element that recurs throughout the declaration. FPIC involves not only consulting with indigenous peoples, but gaining their consent and cooperation. Consent implies giving appro-val or assent after thoughtful consideration. Where ILO Convention 169 only talks about consent in relation to relocation (article 16.2) and stipulates that states should obtain agreement or consent, the declaration goes further by saying that governments shall consult to obtain free, prior and informed consent.

According to article 32 of the declaration, states shall consult and cooperate to “obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particu-larly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources”. The principles of consultation and consent promote mutual understanding and consensus in decision-making, and avoid the imposition of decisions. Free refers to a process without external manipulation, interference, coercion and intimidation; prior refers to timely disclosure of infor-mation where indigenous peoples can make decisions in

their own time; and informed means that information (relevant, understandable and accessible) should be pro-vided in their local languages and subject to local norms and customs. Indigenous peoples should be free to make choices about the way they are governed and what hap-pens on their lands. The question of consultation and consent has been a to-pic of debate regarding development projects. The World Bank and others have expressed concern that consent would effectively mean “a right of veto” for indigenous groups. Consultation is often understood as a process which only requires exchange of information that leads to “broad support of affected communities”, and does not involve sharing or transferring decision-making authority and more inclusive and collaborative decision-making. The Intenational Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank group, supports consulta-tion rather than consent. The World Resource Institute (WRI) promotes free, prior and informed consent as pre-ferable to consultation. Related to hydropower projects (see below), the World Commission on Dams is the only standard that recommends the inclusion of this principle.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has played a vital role in recent years, hearing different cases related to the rights of indigenous peoples in Latin America. The cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have generated important precedents on the obligations of States. The court has ruled in favour of demands presented by indigenous peoples from different Latin American countries. The fundamental importance of these judgements is the use of principles established in the ILO Convention 169 regarding the right to free, prior and informed consent, consultation, and real participa-

3 The vote was carried by an overwhelming majority of 143 countries in favour, 4 against (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) and 11 abstentions.

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tion of indigenous peoples in decision-making processes. The rulings also highlight the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples to define their own vision of development.

Important cases in the Inter-American human rights sys-tem include the case of the Saramaka people vs. Surina-me; the case of the indigenous community Sawhoyamaxa and the indigenous community Yakye Axa in Paraguay; the case between of the Maya Achi community and the massacre Plan Sanchez in Guatemala; and the case of the Mayan communities in the district of Toledo, Belize.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in November 20075 that States that wish to authorize pro-jects affecting natural resources and tribal and indigenous

peoples are obligated to comply with three important guarantees from international law: 1) effective partici-pation, through good faith consultations, to obtain free, prior and informed consent; 2) equitable benefit-sharing between affected populations (groups) and the State; and 3) objective and impartial preparation and monitoring of Environmental Impact Studies6.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is also de-veloping an American Declaration of Indigenous Rights. The OAS working group is currently engaged in the final revision of the draft declaration. Indigenous and state delegations are participating and submitting proposals in the debate and negotiation sessions where the text is being drafted.7

Article 18

Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.

Article 19

States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indig-enous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or ad-ministrative measures that may affect them.

Article 23

Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to devel-opment. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.

Article 28

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and in-formed consent.

Article 32

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and de-velop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own represen-tative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in con-nection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.4

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

4 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html5 Caso del Pueblo Saramaka Vs Surinam, sentencia del 28 de noviembre de 2007 (Excepciones preliminares, fondo, reparaciones, y costas).6 Carlos Loarca: Mecanismos de impunidad ambiental para la hidroeléctrica Xalalá contra la consulta comunitaria de buena fe del Ixcán7 http://www.oas.org/consejo/CAJP/Indigenous%20special%20session.asp

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2.2 Hydropower standards and guidelines The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was set up in 1998 by the World Bank and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). WCD published a report in 2000 that was the result of two years of research, dia-logue and consultation regarding the development effects of big dams. It is, to date, the most complex, global evalu-ation of specific development projects ever undertaken. It was a unique process, with representation and participa-tion from different interest groups: the hydropower indus-try, academia, government, NGOs and representatives of affected communities.

The final report concluded that dams and hydropower projects have made a significant contribution to develop-ment, but have also exacted an unacceptably and un-necessarily high price in terms of environmental and social consequences. The WCD report8 recommended a “new framework for decision-making” for projects in the water and energy sector, aimed at avoiding a repeat of the mistakes of the past. The WCD framework promotes a rights-based approach, aimed at addressing the unequal power relations between developers and affected com-munities, and based on negotiated legal settlements. WCD emphasizes that the livelihoods of affected groups should be improved as a result of the projects and that dams and hydropower should be seen as one of many alternatives for renewable energy production.

The WCD report received a mixed response, but despite criticisms and rejection by a number of dam-building

countries, there exists a broad international consensus regarding the core values and strategic priorities set out in the recommendations. A number of financial institutions have since recognized the value of the report and adopted the recommendations, including the European Invest-ment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and HSBC9. The report has also been the focus of numerous multi-stakeholder dia-

8 World Commission on Dams (2000) Dams and Development – A New Framework for Decision-making9 “HSBC is one of the largest banking and financial services organisations in the world. HSBC’s international network comprises around 8,000 offices in 88 countries and territories in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa”. Source: http://www.hsbc.com/1/2/about

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logue processes throughout the world. Germany and the Netherlands have restricted purchases of Clean Develop-ment Mechanism (CDM) carbon credits from big dams to those in line with WCD guidelines, while, under EU law, carbon credits purchased from hydropower projects larger than 20 MW can only be used in the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) if in compliance with WCD recommendations.

In spite of the consensus that has coalesced around the core principles of the WCD report, substantial challenges in hydropower development still remain. Communities directly affected by projects are often not participating in decision-making processes. Comprehensive assessments of alternatives for renewable energy production are rarely undertaken. Environmental Impact Assessments are often carried out at a late stage or poorly conducted, with the focus on mitigation rather than preventive measures. The consequences for people living downstream are often not adequately taken into account. Communities that have suffered negative impacts, as a result of dam construction, are inadequately compensated, unsuccessfully relocated and provided with inadequate forms of livelihoods.

Among the international standards and guidelines in the hydropower sector, WCD is the only one that promotes free, prior and informed consent, stating that there is a need for “negotiated agreements and decision-making processes based on free, prior, and informed consent where projects affect indigenous and tribal peoples”. Key elements of the WCD strategic priority on “public acceptance” include the recognition of rights, assessment of risks, nego-tiated agreements and decision-making processes based on FPIC. Access to information and legal assistance to enable stakeholders’ informed participation in decision-making processes is required. Moreover, the WCD considers public acceptance to be “essential”, achieved through “agreements negotiated in an open and transparent process”.

Besides the WCD recommendations, there exist a number of different international standards and frameworks aimed at ensuring sound project development and addressing the issues mentioned above. These include the Sustainability Guidelines and Sustainability Assessment Protocol of the International Hydropower Association (IHA), the World Bank’s Operational Policies and Performance Standards, and the banking sector’s Equator principles.

The Sustainability Guidelines and accompanying Sus-tainability Assessment Protocol were developed by IHA between 2004 and 2006. The protocol is currently under review and a revised protocol is expected in 2010. The IHA protocol is neither a standard, nor a set of guidelines, but a voluntary assessment framework that measures “performance” by giving “scores” on a range of aspects regarding the quality of project development. Unlike WCD, the protocol neither defines minimum standards that developers should follow nor rights that should be respected. A project that violates local communities’ or indigenous rights or international human rights can in practice get a good overall score.

The World Bank alone has financed over 550 dams world-wide. The Bank’s Operational Policies address issues such as indigenous peoples, the environment, natural habitat and dam security. In its policies, the World Bank states that avoidance of impacts is preferable to mitigation, while improving livelihoods for affected communities is desir-able. However, the policies also allow for restoration of lost livelihoods, and pay insufficient attention to downstream impacts and the importance of environmental flows. The IFC Performance Standards include detailed guidelines for relocation of affected groups and a grievance mecha-nism, but there are also many vague formulations such as “adequate openness” regarding project information and an overemphasis on monetary compensation instead of sustainable livelihoods.

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The Equator Principles are voluntary standards for finan-cial institutions to manage environmental and social risk in their project finance transactions. The principles were established in 2003 by nine banks and are based on the IFC Performance Standards on environmental and social sustainability. The IFC Performance Standards go further than the IHA Sustainability Guidelines and Assessment Protocol in calling for free, prior and informed “consulta-tion”, “informed participation” and “broad community support”. The Equator Principles call for “consultation and participation of affected parties in the design, review and implementation of the project”. Nevertheless, the Performance Standards stop short of the rights-based approach of WCD and the requirement for the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples and vulner-able groups. The performance standard also states that the views of affected communities should be considered for issues beyond just mitigation measures, including “the sharing of development benefits and opportunities, and implementation issues.”

IHA’s Sustainability Guidelines and Sustainability Assess-ment Protocol imply that “community acceptance” of the project is desirable, but not essential. The IHA guidelines call for participation in decision-making through a pro-cess that the community views as “open, fair and inclu-sive.” Community participation is emphasized primarily in mitigation measures. Neither the Guidelines nor the Protocol provide guidance as to how to facilitate effective community participation or acceptance, or what these would constitute. The IHA framework does not call for free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous or tribal peoples.

The Equator Principles promote “consultation and participation of affected parties in the design, review and

implementation of the project”. In principle 5 on “Con-sultation and Disclosure” the Equator Principles state that “the government, borrower or third party expert has consulted with project affected communities in a struc-tured and culturally appropriate manner. For projects with significant adverse impacts on affected communi-ties, the process will ensure their free, prior and informed consultation and facilitate their informed participation as a means to establish, to the satisfaction of the EPFI10 whether a project has adequately incorporated affected communities’ concerns…The borrower will tailor its consultation process to the language preferences of the af-fected communities, their decision-making processes, and the needs of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups.”

According to WCD, negotiations with affected people that result in legally enforceable agreements are essential for developing projects. People affected by the project (in the reservoir, upstream, downstream, catchment and con-struction areas) should be included in the impact assess-ment. These affected people should be the first to benefit from the project, and agreements should be negotiated with them.

IFC requires free, prior, informed consultation and good faith negotiation with the affected communities when indigenous people are to be relocated and encourages the use of “negotiated settlements” to acquire land rights. The IFC Performance Standards say vulnerable people should not be “disadvantaged in sharing development benefits” and that development opportunities should be identi-fied, but stop short of requiring benefit-sharing. The IHA framework makes no reference to the legal enforceability of agreements and puts much less emphasis on negotia-tions with affected communities. Nor does IHA require benefit-sharing with affected communities.

10 Equator Principles Financial Institution.

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In this chapter we give an overview of Guatemala’s eco-logical context, its environmental policies, its indigenous peoples and the privatization of the energy sector in the 1990s. This is followed by a presentation of the various actors in the sector, and selected topics that emerge from relations between the various actors.

3.1 Background11

3.1.1 Geography and people

Guatemala covers an area of 108,889 km² that borders Belize, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico. In 2009 the population was estimated to be around 13.3 million with a population density of 122 per km² 12. Guatemala is the most populous of the Central American countries, and population growth was estimated to be 2.1 percent in 200913. The majority of the population is indigenous peoples14. According to UNHCR15, 65 percent of the Guatemalan population is rural and three quarters of the indigenous population live in the rural departments.

In spite of being a small country, Guatemala has im-pressive cultural and ecological diversity. Mesoamerica, which includes Guatemala, is recognized as a biodiversity

hotspot and Guatemala has the largest percentage of protected areas in Central America. Due to the country’s location on the land bridge between North and South America, with the Pacific Ocean on one side and the Atlantic on the other, in addition to differences in altitude ranging from 0 to over 4 000 meters above sea level, Gua-temala is characterized by exceptionally diverse ecosys-tems and great biological diversity16.

Guatemala is rich in renewable and non-renewable en-ergy resources, and only a small percentage of these have

3 The case of Guatemala

Guatemala is recognized as a biodiversity hotspot. The country has 14 eco-regions, and in 2005 over one-third of Guatemala was forested17. About half of the forests are classified as primary forests, which are considered to con-tain the highest levels of biodiversity. According to figures from the World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Guate-mala has 1 246 known species of amphibians, birds, mam-mals and reptiles. It is also home to at least 8 681 species of vascular plants. With around 30 percent of the area de-clared protected areas, Guatemala has the largest percent-age of protected land in Central America18.

Guatemala and biodiversity

11 Much of this section is based on Hirsch, C. (2010) The political ecology of hydropower development in Guatemala: Actors, power and spaces. Master thesis University of Life Sciences 12 CIA World Factbook 201013 Ibid14 Numbers vary from 40 to 65 percent. According to many indigenous organizations, the number is 65 percent, while official numbers are 40. From the 2001 census, 40 percent of the population was indigenous groups, but the methods have been questioned. In the census K’iche made up 9.1 percent; Kaqchikel 8.4 percent; Mam 7.9 percent; Q’eqchi 6.3 percent; other Mayan 8.6 percent; indigenous non-Mayan 0.2 percent; and others 0.1 percent. In addition to Spanish, there are 23 officially recognized Amerindian languages, including Quiche, Cakchiquel, Kekchi, Mam, Garifuna, and Xinca. 15 The UN Refugee Agency http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2e812,4a66d9b550,0.html16 Detlefsen et al (1991) Plan de acción forestal de Guatemala.17 36,3 percent, according to The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)18 28 percent in 2007, according to The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)

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been exploited. Guatemala is the largest oil-producing na-tion in Central America. With over 3 000 rivers, the coun-try is regarded as ripe for hydropower development, with a potential production capacity of up to 5 000 MW, of which only 11 percent has been exploited19, according to the National Commission for Electrical Energy (CNEE).

The topography is irregular, with a volcanic chain and two mountain ranges: Sierra Madre and Sierra los Cu-chumatanes. Climate varies in the country’s three climate zones, which are the tropical climate zone (under 1,000 metres above sea level), temperate zone (1,000-2,000 metres above sea level), and the cool zone (over 2,000 metres above sea level). Guatemala’s climate is character-ized by two seasons – the wet season that lasts from May to November and the dry season which prevails between November and April.

Guatemala has a complex water system, with 40 watersheds and 3 000 rivers flowing to the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. Amongst the largest rivers, where a potential for hydropower has been identified, are the Usumacinta, Motagua, Sarstún, Ixcan and Polochic.

Despite its many natural resources, Guatemala is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and a country with huge inequalities. The distribution of income remains highly unequal; Guatemala ranks 122 on the UN HDI index (2008) with more than half the population living below the national poverty line20. In 2007, 27 percent of the adult population was illiterate and life expectancy was 70 years21.

Guatemala is a country with high biodiversity.

19 Comisión Nacional de Energia Electrica (CNEE), Plan de Expansion indicativo del Sistema de Generación 2008-202220 56 percent, estimation 2009 http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_GTM.html#21 UNDP Human Development Report 2009

BELIZE

GUATEMALA

HONDURAS

NICARAGUAEL SALVADOR

MEXICO

YUCATAN PENINSULA

PACIFIC OCEAN

GULF OF MEXICO

CARIBBEAN SEA

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3.1.2 Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala

Many international reports have revealed the grave situa-tion of the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, and the huge inequalities that exist between society in general and the indigenous population. This has resulted in calls for the Guatemalan state to comply with both the Peace Agree-ments signed in 1996 and ILO convention 169, ratified by Guatemala in 1995. The 2002 report of the UN special rapporteur22 on the situation of human rights and funda-mental freedoms of indigenous people, says the following about Guatemala:

“Guatemala is a multi-ethnic, pluri-cultural and multi-lingual society, in which around half of the population of 12 million belong to the Maya, Xinca and Garífuna indigenous peoples. In a number of regions of the country, especially in rural areas, indigenous peoples make up a majority of the population. National identity in Guatemala is based to a large extent on the living cultures of its indigenous peoples with their traditions, their community values, their languages and their spiri-tuality. But far from being full and equal partners with

the rest of the population, indigenous people have been subjected to political exclusion, cultural discrimination and economic marginalization from society.”23

The indigenous groups in Guatemala are among the poor-est in the country. Figures from 2006 show that, among the indigenous population, 74.8 percent are poor, and 27.2 percent live in extreme poverty24. Furthermore, over 70 percent of the people living in rural areas are poor. Quiche and Altaverapaz are the poorest states in the country and home to a majority of indigenous groups25. Lack of educa-tion and access to health services is a problem in many poor communities. Many indigenous groups live in the central highlands of Guatemala, largely due to agricultural policies implemented by the state or the armed conflict that have forced local communities to relocate or migrate.

The four largest indigenous groups in Guatemala are K’iche, Kaqchikel, Mam and Q’eqchi. In addition there are others Mayan groups, and a few non-Mayan groups such as the Xinka and the Garifuna. In addition to Spanish, there are 23 officially recognized Amerindian languages, includ-ing Quiche, Cakchiquel, Kekchi, Mam, Garifuna, and Xinca.

Mayan ceremonies are an important part of the Mayan culture.

22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, submitted in accordance with UN Human Rights Commission resolution 2001/57. Mission to Guatemala23 Ibid 24 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE) 200625 In Quiche, where 93.5 percent of the population is indigenous, 81 percent of the population lives in poverty, with 25.6 percent of the population living in extreme poverty. The situation in Altaverapaz is even more acute where 78 percent of the population lives in poverty and 43.5 percent lives in extreme poverty. Indigenous people account for more than 98 percent of the population in Altaverapaz.

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3.1.3 The legacies of the armed conflict

Guatemala is a country that has been deeply scarred by years of authoritarian government and a violent conflict which lasted for 36 years (1960-1996). Many people were displaced by the violence and civil war. Estimates vary from 240,000 to 1 million people. 14 years after the Peace Agree-ments many people are still waiting for compensation and many have not been able to return to their communities.

The country suffers from severe and unequal land distri-bution, mainly due to a lack of will by powerful political and economic groups to undertake land reform. Unequal land distribution was one of the causes of the civil war. The peace agreements from 1996 address land distribution, re-settlement and return to communities, as well as socioeco-nomic and political integration. However, the agreement has not been implemented successfully, largely because of resistance from the military and economic elites. Displa-

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cees from the armed conflict have been discriminated against and stigmatized, making it difficult for them to return to their communities.

The UN special rapporteur (2002) stated that “one of the fundamental problems affecting the indigenous peoples relates to the right to land. The lack of access to land, the lack of response to land-related claims, lack of respect for traditional places such as communal forests, forced re-settlement of indigenous peoples as a result of economic development projects, and problems stemming from loss of land caused by the armed conflict, create a situation of rising social tensions.” Ever increasing numbers of indig-enous people and poor peasants have turned to land oc-cupations as their last resort for addressing unequal land distribution. The occupations have led to crackdowns by the authorities, especially during the Oscar Berger gov-ernment (2004-2008).

Due to a long history of expulsions, relocations, forced resettlement and migration, many local communities lack access to the land they need. The increased and intensified use of the land in Guatemala has put ecosystems under severe pressure. The use of land for agro exports and cattle ranches, mining activities and larger infrastructure projects are now threatening the areas for local settlements and especially indigenous groups.

Lastly, and of fundamental importance, the many years of conflict and repression of all types of organisation and opposition have left a legacy of disrupted social networks, fear and lingering distrust in many local communities. The killings and persecution of local leaders and others are strong in the memory of the affected communities. The lack of trust in the state is also evident.

The Peace Agreements

The Peace Agreements constitute a framework with com-mitments to assure a long lasting peace process and to solve the enduring conflicts that have historically excluded the majority of the indigenous population from decision-mak-ing processes. The first breakthrough was the Human Rights Accord, signed in March 1994, followed by the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (AIRIP) from 1995 and the Demilitarization Accord from 199626.

The AIRIP accord mandates a constitutional amendment redefining Guatemala as a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual nation, and represents a reference point for the structural changes that the state needs to undertake to incorporate the Mayan, Garifuna and Xinca peoples in all aspects of national life. Unfortunately, this has not yet been accomplished and different international bodies have stressed the urgency of reforms related to indigenous peoples. The agreements have to a large extent disappeared from public debate and from the agendas of the political parties. AIRIP proposes reforms, including institutional models for participation by indigenous people in decision-making, and the establishment of mandatory consultation mechanisms and institutions representing indigenous peoples. AIRIP indicated the need for changes in munici-pal laws to take into account indigenous communities and their leaders, respect for common law, distribution of public expenditure and the ratification of the ILO Conven-tion 169.

The Peace Accords also acknowledged the historic neglect of the infrastructure needs of rural and other disadvan-taged communities and the importance of modern utili-ties, such as electricity and water. A commitment was made to expand electricity coverage to disadvantaged groups.

26 Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society

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Some of the laws and reforms approved in Guatemala in recent years are directly related to commitments from the Peace Agreements and are of vital importance for strengthening the rights of indigenous peoples. These include the Law of Development Councils (2002), the Municipal Code (2002) and the Reform of the Penalty Code regarding Discrimination (2002). The first two are intended to increase participation by indigenous peoples and recognize their political institutions.

In March 1995, Guatemala ratified ILO Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. The convention entered into force in June 1997. The Law of Development Councils created development councils at local, municipal, provincial, regional and national level. The local development councils were to be elected by the local communities, but primarily with an administra-tive mandate, in particular concerning the use of local budgets. The Municipal Code includes neighbourhood consultations (”consultas vecinales”), in which local communities can give their opinion about development projects “that affect all the citizens of the municipality”.

After a long period of authoritarian government, an elected civilian government took power in Guatemala in 1986. However, the country was still in the midst of conflict which disrupted the process of democratization. Alvaro Colóm from the social democratic party, Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE), won the presidential elec-tions in 2007 and took office in 2008. Colóm stated that he would create a government with a “Mayan face”, and focus on education and health, as well as social pro-grammes.

3.1.4 Environmental policies

In recent years severe environmental issues have come to the fore in Guatemala, such as deforestation, soil erosion, contamination and water pollution. According to the Na-tional Council of Protected Areas (CONAPE), more than 85 percent of the rivers in Guatemala are contaminated27. The environmental degradation is due to a combination of factors, including weak regulation and poor enforcement, a lack of environmental policies, and powerful interests in the agro-business, industrial and mining sectors28.

The environmental degradation in Guatemala was con-firmed by the United Nations Verification Mission in Gua-temala (MINUGUA) in 2001. According to MINUGUA, the environmental destruction was a result of the same social processes that generate concentration of wealth, and at the other extreme, social exclusion and poverty in the country. They asserted that it was not possible to separate natural resources from their “economic, cultural, social and political dimensions”.29

During the 1980s and 1990s the environmental, legal and institutional framework of Guatemala was elaborated, largely inspired by international processes such as the Rio conference on environment and development in 1992. An emerging environmental movement pushed for the realisa-tion of new laws and regulations. The Law of Environ-mental Protection and Improvement was passed in 1986, resulting in the creation of the National Commission of Environment, later turned into the Ministry of Natural Re-sources and Environment (MARN). Other important laws include laws on forestry (1996), protected areas (1989) and conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.

76 Personal communication, August 200928 SAVIA 2009, Realidad Ecológica de Guatemala29 MINUGUA 2001

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Importantly, Guatemala does not have a particular water law for regulating water resources. The Guatemalan constitution acknowledges water as state property and prioritizes use for social interests, but without a water law, water is in practice administered and used without regula-tions30. Several processes have been started during the last 30 years to elaborate a law proposal31, but these have met strong resistance. The last intent was made in 2006, a pro-cess initiated by the Commission for the environment and natural resources in the Congress, accompanied by the en-vironmental organization CALAS. Nevertheless, without integrating the rights of indigenous and local communi-ties and securing the human right to water, the proposal have been met by strong opposition from environmental and social organizations, and indigenous groups, particu-larly in Totonicapán. Furthermore, powerful interests in the agro-business sector also oppose a water law.

Degradation of groundwater and contamination of water sources are two serious problems. Rivers are heav-ily contaminated by intensive agriculture, agro-industrial activities and wastewater from urban areas. Mining and oil extraction have serious environmental effects, contaminat-ing both soil and water, as reported by several organiza-tions. The north of Guatemala and the state of Petén have mostly been impacted by oil extraction. The impacts from mining on the environment and local communities, as reported by the organizations, include destruction of flora and fauna; excessive use of water; and the use of chemicals that severely contaminate water, affecting both ecosystems and the health of local communities32.

During the last decade the mining sector has expanded in Guatemala. The small percentage of royalties paid to municipalities (0.5 percent) and the state (0.5 percent) has

Guatemala has over 3000 rivers.

30 Hurtado Paz y Paz, M. (2006) Protestas sociales y recursos naturales en Guatemala. FLACSO. Guatemala City. 31 A law proposal for water “Ley General de Aguas” was presented in September 2004 by congress member Alfredo Cojtí, and was elaborated by CALAS.32 Comisión Pastoral Paz y Ecología - Copae (2009): Situación actual del agua de los rios Tzala y Quivichil en el area de influencia de la mina Marlin, ubicada en los municipios de San Miguel Ixtahuacan y Sipikapa, departamento de San Marcos, Guatemala. Segundo informe annual del monitoreo y analisis de la calidad del agua. Diocesis de San Marcos.

21

been the subject of extensive debate, as well as the envi-ronmental and health impacts in the areas of exploitation. Weak enforcement of environmental regulations is felt by communities, when livelihoods and the environment are de-stroyed, and health endangered. Civil society organizations claim that the state is doing little to protect local communi-ties, and companies are operating in a legal and institutional vacuum. Local communities have mobilised and started to reject mining and big infrastructural projects in their areas.

Furthermore, Guatemala is considered one of the world’s most vulnerable countries to climate change. The Global Decadal Climate Risk Index for 1997-2007 ranked Guate-mala 11th of 177 countries, underscoring the country’s very high vulnerability to climate-related events. In recent years, storms and droughts have had massive human, environ-mental and economic impacts in Guatemala, particularly affecting poor communities in rural areas. Climate change mitigation is used as an argument for the development of the hydropower sector, potentially rendering local residents even more vulnerable to climate change than before.

A severe problem facing the country is the lack of a plan for land use, with accompanying laws and regulations, for zoning of different land uses and land management which would have permitted consideration of fragile ecosystems and secured the rights of indigenous peoples. Guatemala has also signed various conventions and agreements that have not yet been implemented in the legal framework of the country.

According to a study from FLACSO (2006), the current legal environmental framework is ample but not very effective, and the initiatives are reactive rather than proactive and pre-

ventive33. A series of institutions have been created to deal with environmental issues, but these face several challenges, such as lack of resources, lack of competent staff and little coordination between the different entities34. High turnover of bureaucrats in the various entities causes a lack of conti-nuity in priorities, which results in a lack of implementation of long term programmes and projects. Weak institutions have been taken advantage of by different actors, companies, groups and individuals for their own interests.

Guatemala has many original water sources.

33 Margarita Hurtado Paz y Pax (2006) – Protestas sociales y recursos naturales en Guatemala. FLACSO. Guatemala City34 Such as INAB, CONAP and CONRED. MEM and MIGA are also important actors related to environmental issues.

22

3.2 The power sector in Guatemala35

3.2.1 1990s: An era of privatization

During the 1990s, and especially after the Peace Agree-ments, Guatemala has pursued economic reforms on the basis of macroeconomic stabilization where neoliberal policies have predominated, following the Washington Consensus. Neoliberal policies have affected many sec-tors of Guatemalan society and introduced changes in the legal framework promoting liberalization of the economy and privatization of public companies and services. The emphasis on private initiatives has reduced the role of the state to that of regulator. Important laws were made in the wake of the Peace Agreements, such as the Hydrocarbon Law (1991), the General Law of Electricity (1996), the Mining Law (1997), and regulations for the commercial-ization of the Hydrocarbon Law (2004). Nevertheless, many of these laws were passed without public debate and consultation, and participation from civil society and af-fected groups.

In Guatemala a minority, mainly ladinos and people of Eu-ropean heritage, represent the economic and political elite. Powerful groups in the country range from the military to the financial sector to the agro-business sector, with organ-isations such as the Agrarian Owners Group (UNAGRO) or the Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commer-cial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (CACIF). With the introduction of the new economic model, impor-

tant new actors have emerged in services, banking and non-traditional agriculture. Together with international proponents of neoliberal policies, such as the World Bank and the IMF, these groups have had a strong influence on the making of many of the laws, and the elaboration of the current legal and institutional framework.

The electricity sector was privatized and liberalized in 1996 through the General Law of Electricity. Privatization was driven through by the energy and mining minister Leonel Lopez Rodas and the government of Alvaro Arzu, and sup-ported by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank Group. The Arzu period from 1996 to 2000 was the most aggressive period in Guatemala in terms of privatization and structural adjustment36.

The drastic reform of the electricity sector included split-ting it up into different functions, including production, transmission, distribution and electricity trading, favour-ing and promoting private participation in the sector. Two important institutions were created: the National Commis-sion for Electrical Energy (CNEE), as the regulatory agen-cy, and Administrador del Mercado Mayorista (AMM), the wholesale market administrator of the sector. In practice, this has led to private and foreign companies entering the sector where the state mainly provides authorisations and acts as a regulator.

Prior to the reform, electricity was provided by two state owned companies, EEGSA37 in the metropolitan region, and INDE38 throughout the rest of the country. The Electricity Law of 1996 sought to increase private invest-

35 Much of this section is based on Hirsch, C. (2010) The political ecology of hydropower development in Guatemala: Actors, power and spaces. Master thesis University of Life Sciences36 Ferrigno, I. (2009). El oscuro negocio de la luz. FLACSO. Guatemala City. 37 Empresa Electrica de Guatemala 38 Instituto Nacional de Electrificacción

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ments in the sector and improve efficiency by introduc-ing competition in electricity generation, and privatizing the distribution network39. In 1998, 80 percent of EEGSA was sold to the Spanish company Iberdrola. The distribu-tion assets of INDE were broken down into two regional distribution companies, DEORSA (serving the east of the country) and DEOCSA (serving the west) and put up for auction with 50-year concessions. The Spanish company Unión Fenosa Internacional S.A. won the bid for both companies in 1998, supported by the Multilateral Invest-ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)40. Since privatization, INDE has been dramatically downsized and left in control of power stations, mainly hydroelectric, as well as continu-ing to own and operate the national transmission grid.

The net sale revenue from the privatization of the distribu-tion companies (US$ 110 million) was placed in a trust fund to finance an ambitious rural electrification pro-gramme (PER) initiated in 199841. The two distribution companies DEORSA and DEOCSA were made contrac-tually responsible for executing the investments of the programme.42 The plan made the privatization even more attractive, as the distribution companies were paid $650 for each new eligible connection achieved43.

39 Comisión Nacional de Energía Eléctrica 40 “MIGA supported the project by providing investment insurance coverage against the risks of currency restriction, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract”. MIGA in conflict affected countries, 2003. 41 Foster & Araujo 2004 ”Does infrastructure reform work for the poor? A case study from Guatemala” 42 DEORSA and DEOCSA are responsible for the distribution assets, and INDE is responsible for operating transmission assets.43 Connections 200 meters or more beyond the existing power grid and not included in the companies concession area. Source: MIGA in conflict affected countries, 2003.

Under the new normative, institutional and operative framework for electricity, the system was divided into four operational areas: generation, transmission, distribution and electricity trading. More and more private compa-nies are getting involved in power generation, in addition to the state company INDE; two private companies are involved in transmission, in addition to INDE; 16 public institutions and three private companies are involved in distribution; while 14 private companies are engaged in electricity trading – in total, 67 entities, of which 49 are private (73.13 %). In addition there are 800 so-called “big users”.

The Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) is responsible for planning, coordination and enforcement in the sec-tor, implemented by the National Commission of Electric Energy (CNEE), which functions independently of the ministry.

The public company INDE was split into three: Empresa de Generacion de Energia (EGEE), la Empresa de Transporte y Control de Energia (ETCEE), and la Empresa de Distribu-cion de Energia Electrica (EDEE). In 1998 the latter two were converted into DEORSA and DEOCSA. 91.4 per-cent of the shares in these two companies are owned by Distribuidores Electrica del Caribe, under which the Spanish company Union Fenosa operates within the country.

Source: Ferrigno 2009 El Oscuro negocio de la luz. FLACSO.

The Electricity Reform 1996

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3.2.2 Strategic plan for hydropower

The plan to expand the hydropower sector was initiated by the former president, Oscar Berger, and the Gana44 government (2004-2008). The Strategic Plan for Hydro-power Projects was formulated in 2004 to respond to increasing electricity demand and an increase in oil prices, and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Several studies to develop the hydropower sector were carried out as early as the 1970s, but actual development was disrupted by the armed conflict. In October 2007, three months before the current government came into office, the then minister of energy and mining enacted the Energy and Mining Policy for 2008-2015.

The current Colóm government moved ahead with the plans, despite lack of participation by affected parties and civil society organizations. On the 25th of May 2008 Presi-dent Colóm announced an initiative aimed at changing the country’s “energy mix” by favouring hydropower and coal. At this point oil prices were at their highest. The goal is to reduce the country’s dependency on oil and by 2022 gener-ate 60 percent from renewable resources45.

At present, the state does not plan to develop projects itself,46 arguing that private companies will do a better job, and that the state does not have the capacity or financial resources. Private and foreign companies are given various incentives to operate in the country through the Law of Incentives for Renewable Energy (2003), while informa-tion for companies is easy to access from the Guide for Investors published by the Ministry of Energy and Mining. The Guatemalan state encourages the companies’ “social

responsibility” and insists that their investments will con-tribute to local and national development.

Plans to expand the hydropower sector in Guatemala are also part of a larger regional policy, the Plan Meso-américa (former Plan Puebla Panama). The plan, initi-ated in 2001, is a large infrastructure project extending from Puebla in Mexico to Panama. The project promotes “regional integration and development” in the region. The plan is intended to stimulate trade by building or improving large-scale infrastructure projects such as roads, airports, harbours, and electricity and telecommu-nications grids.

The Mesoamerican Plan has been criticized for following a neoliberal model of development, favouring multina-tional companies over the environment, local culture, indigenous rights and local communities who have little voice in the development process. Critics argue that the project only serves to put in place infrastructure that al-lows free trade agreements to flourish and private compa-nies to operate47.

The plan consists of integration of the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors; trade facilitation; sus-tainable development; human development; tourism; and disaster prevention and mitigation. Transport (85 percent of investments) and energy (11 percent) are the two most important components.

Plan Mesoamérica

44 Gran Alianza Nacional45 MEM 28th of February http://www.mem.gob.gt/Portal/home.aspx46 Personal communication, Ministry of Energy and Mining 47 CIEPAC http://www.ciepac.org/encontrados.php

25

A decade ago, governments in the region agreed to de-velop a system for electricity interconnection (SIEPAC)48. SIEPAC consists of the construction of at least 1,800 km 230 kV transmission line from Panama to Guatemala, aimed at developing a regional electric market. Guatema-la’s interest in the system is first and foremost in export-ing electricity. Apart from Costa Rica, other countries in the region have an electricity deficit49. In 2006, Guatemala signed an agreement with Mexico to develop the electric-ity interconnection. The interconnection was finalized in 2009, and Guatemala will buy energy from Mexico to cover the country’s social tariff. The interconnection with Mexico is financed with public funds and loans to the state, yet another form of assistance to companies that wish to export.

48 Sistema de Interconexion Electrica para America central49 It should be noted that the Costa Rican system is managed publicly with great success

• The Guatemalan Constitution • General Law of Electricity (decree 1996)• Regulations of the General Law of Electricity (Gov.ac No 256-97)• Regulations of the Wholesale market administrator, Administrador Mercado Mayorista (Gov.ac no.299-98)• Technical norms from the National Commission of Electric Energy (CNEE) and AMM• The Law of Incentives for Renewable Energy (2003) • The Law of the Environment (1986) • The Law of Protected areas (1989)• Regulations for Environmental Impact studies (2003) • Municipality Code (2002)

The legal framework for the energy sector in Guatemala

Construction of the hydropower project Xacbal in Quiche.

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3.2.3 Actors in the hydropower sector

The privatization of the electricity sector in Guatemala has created a new situation for the different actors involved. Previous to privatization the state was the main actor responsible for developing hydropower projects. While the state still manages projects developed prior to the privati-zation and has principal responsibility for the transmission network, the state’s role has largely been reduced to that of a regulator. With a weak regulatory capacity and the absence of the state in many parts of the project develop-ment process, communities, as well as private and foreign companies, are largely left in a legal vacuum. Privatiza-tion has opened the doors for the participation of private actors and transnational companies who are encouraged to develop the sector. Several private initiatives have been proposed to develop hydropower projects, facilitated by the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM).

The Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) is responsible for formulating and coordinating the policies and plans of the state and programmes in the sector and for applying the General Law of Electricity. The ministry gives the final authorization for use of water and rivers.

The National Commission of Electric Energy (CNEE) is the technical organ of the ministry in charge of compliance with the General Law of Electricity. CNEE is the regulator which issues technical norms and regulates prices.

The Wholesale Market Administrator (AMM) is a private entity, established by law, which coordinates transactions between different participants in the electricity market, securing free competition in the market and promoting investments.

Electricity generation is liberalized with free competition, with agents and large-scale users freely entering into agree-ments based on the conditions set out in the contracts, in terms of duration, quantity and price. Transmission and distribution are regulated by CNEE.

3.2.4 Current developments in the power sector

According to the Ministry of Energy and Mining, im-portant advances have been made since the beginning of the Colóm government’s term in 2008. At that time, 46 percent of electricity came from fossil fuels, and only 37 percent from renewable energy. By the end of 2008, the proportion was 45.8 percent from renewable energy, and, during the Colóm administration, renewable projects with a total of 1 202 MW of generating capacity have been developed. 312 MW was added to the system dur-ing 2009, and 444 MW of capacity are currently under construction. Nearly 90 percent of this new production is generated from hydroelectric projects51.

In October 2009 the transmission station Los Brillantes in the county (departamento) of Retahuleu was inaugurated. The station secures the electricity interconnection between Guatemala and Mexico. This means that Central America is now connected with Mexico, as part of the already

• the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM)• the regulating agency, the National Commission of Electric Energy (CNEE)• the wholesale market administrator, Administrador del Mercado Mayorista (AMM)• the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MARN)• the public company INDE• the distributors (mainly DEOCSA and DEORSA)• the developers and companies• the investors and the banking sector • the large-scale users (industry, mining, maquila industry)• the municipalities, the mayors and the Development Councils • intermediaries (consultants, lawyers, conflict resolution organisations) • actors from civil society (grassroots organizations, unions and NGOs) • the local affected communities50

Important actors in the sector in Guatemala are

50 The affected communities are defined in a broad way, including the surrounding communities and the downstream communities51 MEM 28th of February 2010 http://www.mem.gob.gt/Portal/home.aspx

27

mentioned Plan Mesoamerica. This will facilitate energy exports. In addition, the county of Petén has now been connected to the national grid (SNI)52.

Over 20 hydropower projects are currently in operation in Guatemala, nine of which are operated by the state. The oldest is from 1926; four were built during the 1960s and 1970s; and two in the 1980s. One project, in particular, has left its mark on the country: the Chixoy dam from 1983, the largest hydropower project in Guatemala (300MW). No projects were built during the most violent years of the civil war, up until 1995. Between 1995 and 2009 16 projects have started operations, only one of them operated by the state. To date, there are around 10-15 projects under construction and several in the planning phase.53 Over 30 projects have been proposed by the National Commission for Electrical Energy (CNEE).54 The projects range from

10 to 340 MW55. Projects are under planning or construc-tion in the counties of Altaverapaz, San Marcos, Quiche, Huehuetenango, Baja Verapaz, Esquintla, Petén, Quet-zaltenango and Zacapa.

Particularly since the expansion of the mining and hydropower sectors, conflicts have arisen over natural resources and the control of territories; local commu-nities have been opposed to large-scale infrastructure projects and investments from transnational companies. The focus on the potential of hydropower seems to have overlooked the people living in the affected areas, as well as indigenous rights, the environment and the special ecological context of Guatemala. The framework for the sector has created new and complicated dynamics, often fraught with conflict, between the state, business interests and local communities.

52 Sistema Nacional Interconectado53 Date: 28th of February: 30 proposed projects, according to Invest in Guatemala. http://www.investinguatemala.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=46 54 Plan de Expansion indiactivo del Sistema de Generacion 2008-202255 http://www.investinguatemala.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=46

Source: Hirsch, C. (2010) The political ecology of hydropower development in Guatemala: Actors, power and spaces. Master thesis University of Life Sciences

Hydropower projects in Guatemala

Alta Verapaz 5 1 3 17 26San Marcos 1 1 3 17 22Quiché 2 2 9 13Huehuetenango 13 13Baja Verapaz 2 1 1 4 8Esquintla 5 1 – 1 7Petén 7 7Quetzaltenango 4 1 1 – 6Zacapa 1 – 3 – 4Santa Rosa 2 – – 2 4Chiquimula 1 3 4Guatemala 2 1 3Izabal 1 1 1 3Retalhuleu – 1 – 1 2Salama 1 1Xela 1 1El Progreso 1 1Jalapa 1 1Suchitepeques 1 1Jutiapa 1 1Notspecified 4 4Total 24 9 16 83 132

County In operation Under Under preparation Estimation of Total Construction or EIA process proposed projects*

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The Chixoy dam was built by the public company INDE with financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank. Construction of the dam began without notifying the local communities in 1975, and without any esti-mates of the number of affected people. The communities living in the area to be flooded were given just a year’s notice before operations began. By 1983 the dam had flooded 1,400 hectares of fertile agricultural land and 3,400 mostly Mayan residents had been forcibly displaced56. The communities’ land titles were re-voked by INDE, denying them the right to compensation and a basis for negotiation. No social impact studies were conducted and the resettlement package involved moving communities to land with poor soils and inadequate housing, and failed to meet basic human needs.

The failure to implement an adequate resettlement programme for local residents and the lack of consultation contributed to protests and conflict in the area. Many community members rejected the resettlement package and refused to move. Tension escalated and the military declared opponents of the project “subversive”. According to a study entitled “Chixoy Dam Lega-cy Issues Study” by Barbara Johnston (2005), the army forcibly evicted residents, and, in at least two documented cases, mas-sacres of local people were carried out. In Rio Negro, 444 of the 791 villagers were killed by the army. By the time construction was completed in 1983, ten communities had been destroyed by the army to quell opposition to the dam.

In spite of this IADB and the World Bank granted a second loan to Guatemala in 1984. After pressure from human rights orga-nizations, the World Bank undertook an internal investigation in 1996 which concluded that the dam-affected communities

were never adequately compensated. In 1998, INDE asserted that they no longer had any responsibility, and the World Bank announced that their obligations had also been met.

Since then, representatives of the dam-affected communities have on various occasions testified that they have not received the compensation and assistance they are entitled to, and have demanded a negotiation process. According to Johnston, the construction of the Chixoy dam project represented a complete disregard of the local people and their rights to land, culture, livelihood and even life. The affected population was the indige-nous group Maya Achi.57 To date, they are still suffering from loss of lands, livelihoods and life. The Johnston study recommended the creation and implementation of a negotiating process that would result in a legally binding reparation agreement.

In total, the dam caused the inundation of 2,000 hectares of land and natural resources, with the disappearance of 23 communi-ties, 471 houses, 10 public buildings and 45 archaeological sites. The total affected area was 1,500 km², with 33 communities, 2,329 families and 11,383 persons impacted by the project58.

The Chixoy dam

56 http://shr.aaas.org/report/xxiv/chixoy.htm57 Center on housing rights and evictions (COHRE), “México, Honduras y Guatemala. El derecho a la vivienda y la tierra frente a los proyectos de desarrollo”, 2007, pág 47.58 Informe de Identificacción y verificación de daños y prejucios occasionados a las comundades afectadas por la construccion de la hidroeléctrica Chixoy. Signed by the president of Guatemala in November 2009.

Photo credits to ADIVIMA

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3.2.5 The legacy of Chixoy

The largest dam (300 MW) built in Guatemala is the highly contested Chixoy dam, which started operations in 1983. The state of Guatemala began construction of the dam in 1975 as part of plans to expand energy produc-tion, supported by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The dam has been heavily criticized for violations of the rights of local communities affected by the project and the lack of reparations. Over 30 years later the affected communities are still waiting for compensation. A negotiation process has taken place in recent years, the results of which will be presented in 2010.

The 33 Chixoy dam-affected communities have formed the organization “Coordinator of Communities Affected by the Chixoy Dam” (COCAIHCH) to document the impacts caused by the dam and to press for justice. After years of protests, the communities signed an agreement in 2006 with the government, establishing a framework for the identification, verification and reparation of damages and losses suffered by communities and for the creation of a roundtable to oversee the process. The executive branch of the Guatemalan government, with various state entities, and the affected communities represented by COCAHICH were to participate in the negotiations.

The negotiation process started in 2006, with facilitation provided by Roberto Menendez, a representative of the

Organization of American States (OAS). The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) were invited to participate as observers, as well as the UN refu-gee agency (UNHCR) and the Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman (PDH). At various stages in the negotiation process, the talks were on the verge of collapse due to the government’s unwilling-ness to reach a fair and just settlement with the victims.59 In March 2008 the Colóm government renewed the agree-ment. In the final negotiations, the government delegation was represented by Katalina Soberanis. COCAHICH was represented by Juan de Dios Garcia. The Swiss and the Norwegian embassies60 took part as observers for COCA-HICH, while the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) was hired to undertake the study to inform the final report and plan of reparation61.

During 2009 the negotiation process made significant progress, as confirmed by Menendez at the end of the year62. On the 9th of November 2009 the final report was signed by the President, recognizing the responsibility of the state, and their commitment to implement a plan of reparation63. The report will lay the basis for this plan, which will be presented in 2010.

The plan consists of five parts: non-repetition, restitution, rehabilitation, indemnification and satisfaction, the latter involving an acknowledgement of the damage caused to

59 Acuerdo Político entre el gobierno de la República de Guatemala y los representantes de las comunidades afectadas por la construcción del embalse de la hidroeléctrica Chixoy, que contiene las bases para la identificación, verificación y reparación en su caso, de los daños y perjuicios ocasionados a dichas comunidades, Acuerdo firmado el 18 de septiembre 2006 entre Eduardo Stein, Vicepresidente de la República de entonces, y Juan de Dios García Xajil como representante de la Coordinadora de Comunidades, y por Roberto Menéndez de la OEA como facilitador.60 From August 200961 Generación de insumos para la identificación y verificación de daños y perjucios por la construcción de la hidroelectrica Chixoy62 Personal communication, December 200963 Informe de identificacioó y verificación de daños y perjucios ocasionados a las comunidades afectadas por la conztrucción de la hidroelectrica Chixoy

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communities and an official apology from the state. Non-repetition is particularly important for the development of new projects, and aims to avoid a repetition of Chixoy. Menendez from OAS underlines the importance of the participation of affected communities in future projects from the very beginning, in benefit-sharing, monitor-ing and consideration of basic principles and standards for project development. The plan could represent a new model for hydropower development.

The success and accomplishments of the negotiations to date owe much to the well-organized work, documen-tation, proposals and tireless demands submitted by COCAHICH. As Juan de Dios Garcia, representative of COCAHICH told us:

“As coordinator of the communities affected by the construction of the Chixoy hydropower project, we have at various times said that we are not against hydropower, but against the practices that have been used in commu-nities and the violations of the rights of the communi-ties to trick them into selling their lands. Communities should not only be on the receiving end of projects, but also take part in the planning from the beginning to the evaluation of the projects. We say that the communities should be “socios” (partners). The solution is to follow the recommendations of the World Commision on Dams. We are negotiating now, 30 years afterwards. We do not want this to happen to other communities. How is 30 years of suffering possible? It is time that the state, inves-tors and financiers take responsibility for this situation not to happen on other occasions.64”

The results of the Chixoy negotiations are highly relevant to present day negotiations, not just for affected families,

but also for all the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, as well as future hydropower and other development projects. The state’s acknowledgement of earlier violations and a just compensation agreement will be an important point of departure for the state; it will signal a new willingness to respect the rights of indigenous peoples in the consider-ation of development policies in Guatemala and elsewhere.

On the 13th of May 2010, the plan for reparation was finalised and due to be approved by the President through a governmental accord (acuerdo gubernativo). At the time that this report went to print, the agreement was still not signed. In June 2010, FIVAS spoke to COCAHICH who expressed great frustration at the lack of approval of the plan. They have asked for a meeting with the President and are now calling for international pressure to ensure that the plan for reparation is approved and that the president keep his word.

3.2.6 Legal and institutional framework

The current legal and institutional framework in Guate-mala is weak when it comes to protecting citizens’ rights, especially indigenous rights. As we have seen, ILO conven-tion 169 has yet to be implemented, and Guatemala has no law on consultation with indigenous communities65. The most important law governing the sector, the General Law of Electricity, does not mention indigenous peoples. It is elaborated first and foremost to promote the participa-tion of private developers and companies, and to expedite process. Article 8 states the following:

“The installation of generating plants is liberalized and the latter shall require no authorization from any government entity whatsoever and shall not be subject to limitations

64 Meeting at the Norwegian Embassy in August 200965 A proposal for a law on consultations is on the table, as is a proposal for a general law on indigenous rights, put forward mainly by indigenous organizations

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other than those necessary for the preservation of the envi-ronment and for the protection of persons, their rights and their property. Nevertheless, in order to use property of the state for these purposes, authorization from the respective ministry (MEM) shall be required when the power of the plant is over 5 MW.(……)”

As water is defined as state property in Guatemala’s constitution, developers need to apply for a permit from the Ministry of Energy and Mining. Concessions for the use of rivers are normally given for 50 years. An envi-ronmental impact assessment is required (article 10), which must be approved by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN). The application for the permit requires a plan for easement66 for land and property required for the project development. This is left to the companies: “the interested party shall take all steps and carry out the necessary negotiations for the establishment of the easement that it must establish over the public or private fincas (estate)” (article 37). Never-theless, the dominating practice of companies is to buy land themselves instead of getting permission from the owners of the properties to use the land in exchange for indemnification.

Related to this is the question of access to and use of the judicial system. Whereas companies have the resources to make use of the system, as well as privileged access, based on alliances with decision-makers, the system is to a large extent exclusionary when it comes to serving local communities.

The role of ministries and state institutions

After the privatization of the sector, the state plays a small, but important role in planning, negotiation, construction and management of hydropower projects. The state is now primarily responsible for regulation of the sector. With inadequate mechanisms to protect citizens in the current legal and institutional framework, and given the country’s history of exclusion, many local communities do not trust the state. This has resulted in a swell of scepticism among communities and other sectors of civil society. The lack of coordination between state institutions at different levels and across sectors has created frustration in many com-munities and for the organizations that advocate on their behalf. The state does not seem to have elaborated coher-ent institutional norms and plans for the different state entities involved in the sector.

Moreover, the relevant state entities and their functionaries seem to have limited knowledge of the rights of indigenous peoples and the commitments assumed by the state at the international level. There is a lack of knowledge regarding the binding character of ILO convention 169, requiring the state to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. This leads to state institutions adopting positions and attitudes that may contradict the convention.

From interviews and information in the press, it is evident that the Ministry of Energy and Mining in many instances regards community opposition as a hindrance to the development of energy projects and lacks an understand-ing of the situation of many communities. The ministry has newly created a vice-ministry for sustainable develop-ment to develop community-based hydropower projects; distribute information about how hydropower projects function; and act as an intermediary between develop-

66 Easement means the right to use land or property not one’s own or to prevent its owner from making an inconvenient use of it.

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ers and local communities67. The question remains as to whether the role of intermediary will better serve devel-opers’ interests rather than protect the environment and the interests of local communities. The vice-ministry has employed three regional representatives, of indigenous origin, who are to be in direct contact with local leaders and communities. The vice-ministry has been criticized for promoting small-scale hydropower, with the objective of improving hydropower’s image, as a stepping-stone to developing larger projects in the future.

The Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MARN) is primarily responsible for the approval of envi-ronmental impact assessments (EIAs). In an interview with the ministry, officials underlined the importance of com-munity participation, but also acknowledged that this has

been a challenge. In 2009, the ministry succeeded in push-ing through an important change in regulations, whereby community participation became a prerequisite for under-taking an EIA. The Ministry also said that they are working on how to get information to the communities, and that they themselves will get more involved in this. The capacity of the ministry is another question; environmental organi-zations and developers have both complained about delays in response times from the ministry.

The role of municipalities

Municipalities and mayors play an important role in deci-sions to implement a project. First of all, projects cannot be initiated before the municipal council has granted the construction licence. This ostensibly gives mayors,

67 Interview with a representative of the Vice-Ministry for Sustainable Development, August 2009

The Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) plays an important role in the sector, and gives the authorizations for the use of the rivers as under public domain (dominio público).

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municipalities and communities leverage in negotiating the details of a proposed project. Nevertheless, this is only true if the mayor and municipal council are receptive to the concerns of the community, something that varies from municipality to municipality.

The risk of corruption and bribery is also present if an interested company pays the mayor, development coun-cil or local leaders to consent to a proposed project. The relationships between municipalities and communities become important, including whether communities are able to control and monitor their elected representatives through social control. In some instances, mayors defend the standpoint of communities, whereas, in others, they are allied with business interests.

The National Association for Municipalities (ANAM) has emphasized the right of communities to be consulted and have also shown an interest in developing municipal projects, both in production and distribution. Within the current framework, municipalities get little income from these projects, as taxes are minimal.

Municipal autonomy has been limited in practice. The constitutional principle of prioritizing the social interest over individual interest is used as a justification for the state’s policy of developing access to energy resources for national development, whereas the municipalities and communities’ interests are defined as individual interest (art. 44). Thus, the argument can be said to have been turned on its head and used to protect private economic and business interests instead of serving social interests.

3.3 Project development: social, environmental and legal aspects68

3.3.1 Project preparation

The initial phase of the project starts with the idea for a project, and the identification of an appropriate loca-tion. As mentioned, INDE undertook several studies of possible areas for hydropower projects at the end of the 1970s which are available for interested developers. Basic pre-feasibility studies take into account economic, legal and technical aspects, topography, services and other basic information. This leads to the design of the project, includ-ing studies of environmental and social impact. Then fol-low the construction and operational phases.

A company needs several permits to start operation, and the regulatory process includes: 1) obtaining temporary permission (maximum one year) from the Ministry of En-ergy and Mining (MEM) to access the areas and rivers for undertaking studies; 2) undertaking environmental impact assessments and submitting them to the Ministry of Natu-ral Resources and the Environment (MARN); 3) getting the approval or comments from the Ministry; 4) presenting the studies for public hearings; 5) obtaining final authorization from the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM); and 6) obtaining a construction licence from the municipality.

Parallel with the initial project phase is establishing trust in the community. With the limited role of the state, much is left to the companies. In a situation where the state is absent, many companies approach the communities

68 Much of this section is based on Hirsch, C. (2010) The political ecology of hydropower development in Guatemala: Actors, power and spaces. Master thesis University of Life Sciences

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directly, often hiring consultants or locals to help them get access and start the process of gaining confidence. This is often done by hiring a local intermediary that is famil-iar with the language, customs and the key local players, whose approval or acquiescence is considered vital for gaining authorization for the project. Other companies hire consultants from organizations specialized in local negotiations and conflict resolution.

Some developers offer small projects at the preparation stage of a project, such as water pipes, construction of schools, churches or health centres, school materials, etc. Distribution of project information varies and is often lim-ited and of poor quality. There are examples of companies entering communities and distributing false information about their presence in the area. In this phase, the com-panies also buy land from local residents. Environmental impact assessments are conducted by a team of consultants who are obliged to gather the opinions of local residents about the projects; this has often been done in a question-able manner (see section on EIAs below).

After the studies have been completed, they are delivered to the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, which has 60 days to make comments or approve the stud-ies. If the ministry fails to make any comments within 60 days, the studies are, according to the law, automatically approved (administrative silence). If the studies are ap-proved, they are then published for an open hearing which lasts 20 days, and announced in a newspaper with national coverage. However, as there are no formal mechanisms to distribute the studies to the affected parties, the studies may never reach the communities or organizations.

If no comments are made by the public during the 20 days of the open hearing, the studies are sent to the Ministry of Energy and Mining which issues the authorization. In addition to this, the company needs a construction licence

from the municipality. The construction can last for several years before the plant enters the operational phase. Evident from our talks with communities, but also with state actors and companies, is the absence of the state in development processes at local level.

3.3.2 Benefits for whom?

The principal arguments used by the government to sup-port the construction of new hydropower plants are the need for cheap and “clean” energy; access to electricity for poor, rural communities; and the contribution the plants would make to local and national development. National electricity coverage in Guatemala is 83.5 percent. The numbers vary across counties and between urban and rural areas. Access to energy in some rural areas in Gua-temala is poor. The counties with the lowest coverage are Alta Verapaz (37.4 percent), Baja Verapaz (69.6 percent) and Quiche (72.1 percent). These share the largest hydro-power project in Guatemala, Chixoy, and are also among the counties where new hydropower projects are under preparation or construction.

Whether the communities are actually benefitting from the projects is a contested topic. Developers are criticized for earning their money on the backs of local communi-ties, bribing leaders and contributing too few local benefits. Criticisms include that communities do not get access to electricity as a result of the projects; nor do municipali-ties or communities receive any considerable income from projects. According to the Law of Incentives for Renew-able Energy (2003), companies can operate tax-free for ten years and are exempt from taxes for imported materials, machine parts and other equipment.

Developers argue that many local communities agree with the projects, and that they benefit in the form of

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new infrastructure, such as roads, a new school or health clinic, as well as small-scale productive projects, dentist services, school materials or the construction of a bas-ketball court. They also argue that the project will bring local employment. Projects might bring jobs to some local residents in the construction phase, but stable jobs over time are unlikely due to low levels of education in rural areas.

These possible benefits must be seen in a context where poor people, with few opportunities, may go along with whatever they are offered by the developers because of their grave situ-ation, and the lack of information about their rights and the possible consequences and impacts of such a project.

Local communities are often not aware of their rights as citizens, and in many instances, their rights as indigenous peoples. Many local communities are poorly informed and have little knowledge about these projects or their negative or positive impacts. There are few mechanisms for local communities to secure access to information, and their right to be properly consulted is neither respected nor implemented. Companies are accused of showing only one side of the coin: the positive impacts of the projects.

Access to electricity

The construction of new hydropower projects does not necessarily mean that the communities get access to elec-tricity. According to the General Law of Electricity, com-panies (generators) can choose to sell electricity directly to “large-scale users”, such as the maquila sector, industry or the mining, or export it to neighbouring countries. In other words, there are no requirements for companies to sell the energy within Guatemala. Also, companies them-selves are not allowed to distribute electricity directly to local communities, as they are not the distributors, and cannot favour the communities close to the project. Electricity for household consumers is distributed through the National Grid (SEN), either by the large distribution companies, such as DEOCSA and DEORSA, or municipal distributors. This means that projects will not necessarily benefit local communities in terms of access to electricity. Whether electricity actually reaches poor communities depends on the policies of the government, the distributors and the rural electrification programme (PER).

The laws of Guatemala oblige a distributor to supply any inhabitants within 200 meters of the existing power grid.

RiverinthecountyofQuiche.Localyouthsfishing.

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Nevertheless, this is not complied with everywhere, and there are also communities out of range according to this calculation. Remote communities have to rely on the rural electrification programme (PER). These communities may also include communities close to a hydropower plant, without access to electricity. Since 1998 INDE has managed the rural electrification programme (PER), but the two private regional companies DEOCSA and DEORSA have been responsible for the implementation in field, financed with public funding. The programme includes transmis-sion and distribution in the rural areas of the country, and also interconnection with Petén, which was realized in 2009. The plan was originally for five years (1998-2003), but 14 years later there are still delays and still mnay people and communities without access to electricity.

In five (of a total of 22) counties 30 percent or more of the population lack access to the network; in ten coun-ties 25 percent; and in six of the counties 10 percent. The 3,500 communities (aldeas) that lack access are the poorest ones, with more than 700 000 rural inhabitants, a major-ity of which are indigenous peoples69. At national level, coverage has increased from 57.1 percent in 1996 to 83.5

percent in 2008. But this is not because of privatization and liberalization, but mainly due to public investments in the sector. Private producers and distributors invest little in infrastructure for new connections, and in practice, the state subsidizes the private sector. In 2009, the Congress started discussing a possible loan from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) of US$ 55 million to expand the programme.

Tariffs

Many of the rural communities with access to electricity pay high prices for it. Today, Guatemala has the highest electricity tariffs in Central America. The prices may also vary, according to the distributor. DEOCSA and DEORSA are the main distributors in rural areas. The tariff is based on a complicated calculation, and there is no price ceil-ing on transmission. With privatization of the electricity sector, companies were allowed to pass on to users the variation in the purchase cost of energy70. As a result, be-tween 1996 and 2004, rural electricity tariffs increased by between 60-80 percent. This has caused major protests in both rural and urban areas.

A social tariff policy was introduced to shield house-holds from increases introduced by INDE in 1998 and implemented from 2000. With the social tariff, users that consumed less than 300 kilowatt-hours per month payed less, subsidized by the state. This affected 11 million people and two million households. 89 percent of usersqualified for the social tariff. Nevertheless, according to Foster and Araujo (2004), this policy has done little to benefit the poor. Many poor households remain unconnected to the grid, and households that consume small amounts only

69 Ferrigno, V.F 2009. El Oscuro negocio de la luz. FLACSO. Guatemala City. 70 Foster and Araujo 2004. “Does infrastructure reform work for the poor? A case study from Guatemala”

The community-based project in Chel provides electricity for the nearby communities.

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accounted for 10 percent of the total value of the subsidy. In ten years, from 1999 to August 2009, INDE spent 3.9 billion GTQ on the social tariff; this amounts to 25 percent of INDE’s budget71.

The social tariff clearly does not benefit those that are not connected to the grid, who are often the poorest and most remote communities. Poor households without access spend a lot of money on candles and wick lamps, which can be even more expensive than electricity, as well as using firewood. Foster and Araju argue that it would have been better to finance new household connections than paying for the social tariff. They also assert that the amount of money paid by the poor in rural areas for elec-tricity is disproportionate to their monthly income72.

Transparency, contracts and privileges

According to Ferrigno (2009), the electricity sector lacks transparency and grants a number of privileges to compa-nies that users pay for. Following the increase in oil prices in the 1990s, private companies started looking for op-portunities in the hydropower sector. As we have seen, laws and regulations in the sector underwent drastic changes in 1996. The same companies that pushed for these changes are those with shares in the generation sector today. Companies lobbied for reform in the sector, reorienting it towards a mixed system with private sector participation. Today, private companies to a large extent manage the sec-tor, with different privileges, often at the cost of users and national and local interests.

According to Ferrigno, there is a lack of transparency in contracts, transactions and user payments, and user com-

plaints go unaddressed. The calculation of user tariffs is complicated and hard to understand for users. Ferrigno as-serts that the distributors fail to take account of cut-offs in the network and lack of service during certain periods. The high electricity prices and abusive practices of the compa-nies have provoked massive protests and popular resistance to the distribution companies DEOCSA and DEORSA.

One of the aims of the privatization was to break the monopoly of the state company delivering services. In practice, though, only large-scale users can actually choose their electricity provider. The government has also refused to set a maximum price on transmission. The national grid (Sistema Nacional Interconectado) has been constructed almost solely on the basis of consumer payments, but private companies are the ones benefitting. Lastly, some of the companies are also priviledged with agreements that guarantee them payment in dollars and payment even if they are not producing.

3.3.3 Control of territory

The expansion of the hydropower sector and other devel-opment projects are putting the territories of indigenous peoples and local communities under pressure. Hydro-power projects are not the only initiatives being promoted in rural areas. Many development projects, including large-scale monoculture plantations for agro fuels, mining activi-ties, oil exploration and other large infrastructural projects, are threatening the territories of local communities.

Hydropower projects can create new conflicts or further complicate territorial conflicts that already exist in local

71 INDE 72 Figures until 2004

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communities. This is evident from many of the projects that we have studied. Companies acquire properties in various ways. With access to the legal system, lawyers and resources, the companies purchase land either directly from individuals in local communities, buying from large landowners, or by getting access to areas that are held by the municipality or the state.

Negotiations with individuals in local communities have taken place on several occasions. The companies take direct contact with families and individuals, negotiate prices with them, and buy the land. Many community members have sold their land without any legal advice. A further problem is that the companies do not tell local communities what the land will be used for. There have even been instances where companies have given false information about the use of land. The result is that the legitimacy of the use of the land and the project itself can be called into question and that projects may exacerbate the deep inequalities that exist with respect to land ownership in many communities. Many local indigenous leaders state that this also violates the collective rights of the indigenous peoples, and that the whole commu-nity should agree when a plot is sold within their territories.

In many cases, intervention of the state and companies has generated fragmentation of territory as well as discord and conflict in local communities. Benefits are offered to certain leaders or key decision-makers in the municipal-ity. Communities that have fought for their land and built their societies there understandably resist relocation, espe-cially communities that have migrated or been displaced in the past by external interests or the war.

Companies defend themselves by saying that they have purchased the land legally. The problems here are mani-fold. Firstly, the current legal framework permits com-panies to purchase land directly from communities and local residents holding individual land titles and does not oblige them to inform about the future use of the land. With the grave problems in Guatemala, with the lack of a land reform, unequal land distribution and a large part of the land in titling processes, companies are managing to acquire land that could have been given to local communi-ties if titling processes had been completed.

Secondly, there are diverging visions of territory and land. Maintaining control over their territory is regarded by local

A sign in Quiche that reads: “No to the dam, yes to life and to nature”.

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communities as fundamental to assuring the continuity of their livelihoods, traditions and cultures. Based on the rights of indigenous peoples, their territory is not only where they live, but also the land they use and live off. In contrast, developers see the land as private property - a plot of land where they can do whatever they like within the borders of the property, and not take into account that the property lies within an indigenous territory or with a neighbouring local community close to the planned project site. There are also still communities that live on land owned by private landowners73. When the land is sold to developers, the resi-dents are left in a vacuum, with promises from the former landowner to get titles to the land they live on, which may or may not be followed up by the new owner.

Regarding water and rivers, developers argue that the sec-tion of the river being used for the project lies within the border of their property, and therefore does not impact the communities. This is also linked to what was presented earlier; the lack of a management plan for land use, natural resources and landscape planning, in addition to a water law that takes into account indigenous needs, practices and rights. Water is treated as a private good, in contradiction to the constitution, and there is a lack of integrated water and land management.

3.3.4 Environmental impacts and EIAs

The potential environmental impacts of projects tend to be downplayed both by government officials and de-velopers. The dominant discourse is that hydropower is clean, renewable energy, seemingly regardless of the context. However, environmental organizations, experts and community representatives are questioning this. As

already noted, Guatemala is rich in biodiversity, with many different ecosystems. Over 30 percent of the country is designated as protected areas, underlining the importance of assessing environmental impacts of projects. Neverthe-less, hydropower projects are planned both on the limits of protected areas and within them. The Centre of Ecological Studies (Savia) has produced a map (see below) showing Guatemala’s rivers, the protected areas (marked with red lines), and many of the planned new hydropower projects (marked with numbers).

73 Tenant laborers in e.g. Altaverapaz, called mozos colonos

Source: Map elaborated by Savia, based on information published on http://www.investinguatemala.org in 2009. With permission to reprint

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Environmental flow

An unresolved question in Guatemala is calculation of the environmental flow of water in rivers where projects are planned. Environmental flow can be defined as the flow regime required in a river to achieve desired ecological or other objectives (economic, cultural or social), or as the volume of water required to maintain river health in a particular state over time74. In environmental assessments worldwide, the first calculations of environmental flows were focused on the concept of a minimum flow level. Nevertheless, it has increasingly been recognized over the years that all elements of a flow regime are important, and that any changes in the flow regime will influence the river ecosystem in some way.75 The environmental flow require-ments of rivers are related to a number of factors, such as the size of the river, its natural state, and a combination of the desired state of the river and the uses to which it is put. Before being able to actually define flow requirements, broader objectives must be determined to indicate the type of river desired. This means that river flows are set to achieve specific pre-defined ecological, economic, cultural (spiritual) or social objectives. Functioning rivers and ecosystems are important for the world’s biodiversity and for millions of rural poor people who live off natural re-sources. It is therefore essential to predict the consequences of varying degrees of alteration of the flows in Guatemala.

In Guatemala, there are no specific requirements related to the estimation of environmental flows. Several projects state in their EIAs that the project will leave 10 percent of the flow of water, without elaborating on the consequenc-es. In many instances this could have grave impacts on the

environment. The studies are often undertaken during a short time period (usually three months), which means that the estimations of water flow have only been calcu-lated for a certain period during the year, without consid-ering seasonal variations. More importantly, the different uses of the water are not taken into account.

Water used for hydropower depends on the type and size of the project. If water is diverted for hydropower, the timing of flows downstream of the points where water is returned is likely to be altered, and flows will be depleted in a bypassed section. In the case of run-of-river hydropower, upstream water velocities may be affected and the scheme itself could interrupt river connectivity76.

Environmental impact assessments (EIAs)

The preparation of environmental impact assessments in Guatemala is governed by regulations for “Environmental evaluation, control and follow up” and procedures and terms of reference developed by the Ministry of Natu-ral Resources and the Environment (MARN). Article 80 in the Law of Environmental Protection and Improve-ment (1986) states that studies to evaluate environmental impacts have to be undertaken if the project “can produce deterioration of renewable and non-renewable natural resources”77 or introduce modifications to the landscape or the country’s natural resources. Hydropower projects larger than 5 MW require environmental impact assess-ments. Studies have to be undertaken by approved and reg-istered consultants, hired and paid by the companies, and approved by the ministry. In 2006, there were around 250 consultants and 14 consulting companies in Guatemala.

74 Acreman & Dunbar 2004. Defining environmental river flow requirements – a review.75 Ibid.76 Ibid.77 “producir detorio a los recursos naturales renovabled o no” o “introducir moficaciones nocivas o notorias al paiseaje y a los recursos naturales del patrimonio”.

41

The EIA process in Guatemala has several weaknesses, noted by many environmentalists and experts we spoke to in the country, and also in regional and international stud-ies, such as a study by CCAD and IUCN in 2006.78 Some of the weaknesses are:

1) No available and complete list of EIAs prepared: there is no official list of all EIA reports that have been prepared, nor are all studies made known to the public. To get hold of an EIA, one has to monitor the daily newpapers and apply to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, a process that may often take a long time.

2) Few rejected projects: According the CCAD study from 2006, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MARN) admitted that “a very low number” of projects are rejected. It can therefore be assumed that many EIAs for projects with considerable impacts are approved. According to our interview with MARN, they have recently begun to reject more studies.

3) Cumulative impacts disregarded: the potential cumulative impacts of several projects in one area are not taken into consideration, nor the country as a whole. The projects are evaluated separately, although their cumulative impact may be significant.

4) No integrated land use planning: as stated earlier, there are no land use planning in Guatemala that inte-grates environmental variables.

5) Lack of capacity-building for consultants: Guatemala has a register of officially approved consul-tants that undertake environmental impact assessments. Nevertheless, according to the CCAD study, there are no requirements for capacity building of consultants

in topics such as environmental impact assessment, control and monitoring of projects, and strategic envi-ronmental evaluation. The MARN does not see this as its task. The quality of the work will therefore depend on each of the consultants and competence acquired elsewhere. The study highlights the need to improve the system of capacity building for consultants.

6) No adequate EIA guidelines: Specific and detailed guidelines for preparing EIA reports have not been elaborated, and much is left to the consultants and companies.

7) Inadequate public participation: MARN confirms in the study that regulations demand public participa-tion, but that this has not yet been fully accomplished. The study confirms that interviews with relevant stakeholders are not included in the preparation of the studies, and that studies are not distributed to all affected parties for comments. This was confirmed by MARN in our interview, but they stated that they are working to improve information distribution and especially public participation.

8) Lack of technical and human resources: according to MARN, the weak monitoring and follow-up is due to lack of financial and human resources at the minis-try. The ministry reports that it is generally unable to respond in a timely manner. This was also confirmed by our interviews with different companies and orga-nizations that have been in contact with the ministry.

9) Insufficient quality of EIAs: MARN states in the study that an improvement in the quality of presented EIAs is necessary. The country’s biodiversity and different ecosystems are not sufficiently covered in many of the studies.

78 Guatemala Estudio comparativo de los Sistemas de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental de Centroamérica. A study by the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) from 2006 shows several weaknesses with the system of environmental impact assessment (EIA). The state authorities responsible for EIAs in the respective country, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment in the case of Guatemala, were asked 150 questions.

The construction phase also impacts the local ecological context.

42

Information and public participation

The studies must include a section on socio-economic conditions and public opinion about the project. Indig-enous rights are neither mentioned in the Environmental Law nor in the regulations or procedures. According to the regulations, the studies are to be published in the language used in the area of the project79. According to our sources, no studies have been translated into local languages.

The EIA regulations specify two important elements: “in-formation to the public” (article 33) and “public partici-pation” (Chapter XI). In relation to public participation, article 49 in the regulations states that the ministry should ensure public participation during the whole process of environmental assessment, control and follow-up, both in the initial phases of project design and preparation, as well as the operational phase. Article 50 states that the develop-ers of the project should involve the local population at the “earliest stage possible”. The developers should develop a plan for public participation together with the consul-tants, considering how to encourage public participation, different forms of participation, ways to get information to different sectors of society, how to handle requests for information from communities and environmental organi-zation, and ways to resolve potential conflicts.

Both the regulations and the ministry place a lot of respon-sibility on the companies. The so-called participation pro-cess is left to the companies and consultants, with the risk that these can use the weaknesses of the system to serve their own interests. What often happens is that consultants,

in collaboration with companies, organize meetings with casually assembled community residents and describe these as information-sharing and consultations.

When the company has handed in the study to the minis-try, they have 60 days to evaluate the environmental impact assessments. If they have not made any comments during the 60-day period, the studies are automatically approved. Clearly, in periods when many EIAs are submitted, the ministry may be put under pressure and there is a risk that weak studies might be approved. We were also informed that banks or other financiers of projects have pressured the ministry to approve studies as quickly as possible. This may also affect the quality of their evaluations.

Once the EIA has been prepared and approved, the minis-try and the developers have to inform the public, with the objective of receiving additional comments and feed-back, including any opposition to the project. The public can submit their comments up to 20 days after the EIA’s release. Comments from the public need to be in writing, and have to be technically, scientifically and legally based. Based on information from the studies, consultations with private and state entities, comments from the public and their own control and follow-up, the ministry makes a recommendation to approve or reject the project.

According to the regulations, the ministry is responsible for both distributing information and facilitating public participation. However, the ministry appears to lack the capacity and resources to follow through, and sometimes even the will to meet its obligations. Studies are seldom

79 4.1 Instructivo de Procedimientos para las Evaluaciones de Impacto Ambiental

43

distributed to communities, environmental organiza-tions or other interested parties, nor are studies translated into local languages. Communities and organizations have to monitor the newspapers themselves for notices of new EIAs, make requests to the ministry for copies of the studies, and even pay for them. The studies often run to hundreds of pages, and 20 days is very short a time to be able to read and analyse the studies, let the communities have their say, and then submit detailed technical, scien-tific and legal comments. As one environmentalist said; “the processes are designed to pass the studies through the system as quickly as possible, to serve the interests of the companies and the financers”. Manufacturing consent

As already noted, the regulations for EIA studies require a section on public opinion. To comply with this, consul-tants often use a questionnaire to interview community residents about their opinions about the project during the study phase. After reviewing several EIAs, we found that the questions put to community residents are often com-plicated, poorly formulated and often leading. Questions asked to the residents during the phase of studies often imply that there will be e.g. more jobs, electricity, roads and other benefits in the community, as a consequence of the project, when in fact there is nothing to indicate that this will be the case. More than asking the residents for their opinions, the studies serve to create social accep-tance for the projects. In a number of EIAs, based on their responses, residents clearly believe that the construction of the hydropower project will bring jobs to the community, and that access to electricity, as well as prices, will improve as a consequence of the project.

The Sisimite project in the county of Guatemala, munici-pality of Chuarrancho, can serve as an example, with its EIA from 2008. Consultants together with representatives

from the concerned company, carried out interviews with different families in the municipality. What emerges from reading the description of the meetings is that commu-nity residents had already received donations from the company in the form of building blocks and construction of a church prior to the study. Interviewees confuse their knowledge of the project with smaller benefits they have heard they can get or have already received. It is clear that the residents have very limited knowledge about the proj-ect at the time of the interview. They have been poorly in-formed, and at the same time have received donations. The companies could be said to be buying social acceptance.

Company representatives also took part in the interviews. This may have had an adverse affect on residents’ willing-ness to express what they really think, either out of fear for what the company could do to them or their families, or in the hope of getting benefits. Many of the residents believe that they will get benefits from the company. These perceived benefits include access to water and electricity, jobs, roads or the building of a bridge. These are not promises made by the company, but simply what residents have heard or wish for.

Community residents are clearly concerned about the river drying up and other impacts on the river system and fish-eries, as they use the river for washing, bathing, water for the animals and fishing. These concerns are downplayed by the consultants in the final study. Some of the residents also say that they do not know what a hydropower project entails, and that they want to get to know an existing proj-ect before giving an opinion.

In sum, the residents talk about benefits they would like from the project, even though these may not be realistic. The con-sultants conclude that the residents do not oppose the proj-ect. However, residents can hardly be regarded as in agree-ment with a project when they lack the information necessary to consider the project’s pros and cons. In this particular case,

Community meeting to give the local residents information about the hydropower projects in the area, organized by a local organization.

44

a referendum was held at municipal level in 2009 where the residents rejected the project; the project is still on hold.

An important project underway in Guatemala is Hidro Xacbal in the county of Quiche. Questions used by consul-tants in the Hidro Xacbal EIA (2005) include the following:

Would you like more jobs in the village (aldea) or the community?

Do you think you would have a better life if there were more jobs in your village (aldea)?

Do you think the standard of living would be better in your village with more jobs?

Do you think that opening new businesses, factories, and companies will benefit your village in terms of more work, security, roads, income, energy and water?

Would you like electricity in your village?

Do you think that better roads will provide a better standard of living for your village?

The consultants conclude that the communities are famil-iar with the project, that they support it and think that the project will bring electricity to the communities, taking, as an example, a small community-based project called Chel.

Environmental organizations have accused companies of pay-ing for studies that serve their own interests, and of employ-ing consultants that present projects in a favourable light.

Community-based projects

Community-based projects can be good for local commu-nities if they are managed by the communities themselves,

and can secure the communities’ access to electricity and other benefits. Many communities and organizations we spoke to were positive to small projects, but underlined the importance of the communities’ participation in their management, and of their being “socios” (partners).

The concern remains that the promotion of smaller community-based projects by the state and others can be used to gain acceptance for bigger projects, without communities necessarily being aware of the consequences of the larger project. Local communities are brought in to see the Chel project, but this particular project cannot give a complete picture of how a hydropower project will look like.

Inadequate access to information

Difficulties related to access to and distribution of infor-mation mean that communities and civil society actors are inevitably excluded from participation in influencing aspects of the project relevant to their daily lives. There is no functional mechanism for ensuring that informa-tion regarding proposed projects is widely disseminated amongst affected communities. Moreover, information is often incomplete.

Further complicating the issue is the multilingual nature of Guatemala’s population, as well as high levels of illiteracy, especially amongst indigenous groups. Environmental impact assessments are supposed to be translated into local languages, but this is not followed up by the companies or the state.

The information that does reach communities is largely due to the efforts of local leaders and organizations, with the help of external actors or environmental organizations. Community leaders and local residents can spend months, and even years, trying to get information about projects,

The small hydropower project in Chel is managed by the community

45

with minimal assistance from government officials or com-panies. Presenting demands to different government insti-tutions can also be difficult. The processes are complicated and demand time and resources; this inevitably restricts the involvement of local residents. Lack of coordination by government institutions also hinders participation by communities.

Asymmetrical negotiations

In practice, local communities are largely left to them-selves to negotiate with developers. In the few instances where the state has been involved, its participation seem to be more to ensure a secure investment environment for companies, rather than to protect the rights of communi-ties. The lack of organisational capacity in local communi-ties and their limited access to information is exploited by companies, who use their economic power to leverage the necessary political approval, regardless of the wishes of local communities. Direct negotiations between companies and communities can therefore generate a series of dilem-mas. With an absent state and inappropriate mechanisms to reach legally binding agreements, communities are left in a legal vacuum that renders them even more vulnerable.

3.4 Community resistance and local strategies80 Many communities are now opposing projects in Guate-mala, and their message to foreign investors is clear: we do not want any projects in our area at this time. Com-munities are demanding proper participation in decision-making as well as real and equitable benefit sharing. Further arguments against projects include the social and environmental impacts of projects on their land, territories

and rivers, including human settlements and sacred places; inadequate compensation; and inconsistent environmental impact assessments.

Many people in local communities, including local leaders, have acquired a strong awareness of their rights. Many of the leaders we spoke to express that they are not against development; but against the current practices of imple-menting projects without consulting local communities, including them in benefit sharing, and without seeing them as “socios” – partners in development. The opposi-tion to hydropower projects is not opposition to hydro-power per se, nor to development, but must be seen as part of a broader struggle. Based on a history of land conflicts, forced resettlements, marginalization of indigenous peoples, and exclusion from decision-making arenas, many local communities have simply had enough.

Communities feel under pressure from many quarters due to mining, agrobusiness and even protected areas. Changes in land use and poor land management, influenced by eco-nomic and political interests, have an impact on commu-nity livelihoods. The agrobusiness model of monoculture plantations has caused serious environmental and social impacts. The large-scale agro-export and monoculture model, which was previously concentrated in the southern coastal region, has now moved to the north of the country, where both sugar cane and oil palm plantations can be found. This is taking place in a context of evictions and forced purchase of land from impoverished communi-ties that have to migrate to other locations. In protected areas, communities are labelled “invaders” and accused of destroying the natural heritage. With different types of projects and activities, local residents suffer loss of land for agriculture, forced land purchases, displacement and forced migration.

Woman are active in the organizations to inform about the projects.

80 Much of this section is based on Hirsch, C. (2010) The political ecology of hydropower development in Guatemala: Actors, power and spaces. Master thesis University of Life Sciences

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e

The

mos

t aff

ecte

d co

mm

unity

was

not

in

clud

ed in

the

EIA

to g

ive

thei

r opi

nion

, En

viro

nmen

tal f

low

not

cal

cula

ted

B

ribes

SISI

MIT

E

Chu

arra

ncho

and

Sa

lam

a, G

uate

mal

a

El C

hol,

Baj

a V

erap

az

Rive

rs: M

otag

ua

40 M

W

Gen

erad

ora

Nac

iona

l (S.

A)

Affe

cted

: Thr

ee m

unic

ipal

ities

, esp

ecia

lly

the

com

mun

ity S

an B

uena

vent

ura.

D

epen

dant

on

the

river

for a

gric

ultu

re,

anim

als,

fishi

ng, r

ecre

atio

n an

d do

mes

tic

use.

May

as k

aqch

ikel

es a

nd la

dino

s.

Con

sulta

tion

held

2 A

ugus

t 200

9

3319

par

ticip

ated

, 274

8 (8

2.7%

) vot

ed

agai

nst t

he p

roje

ct

Proj

ect o

n ho

ld

EIA

app

rove

d, d

espi

te c

omm

unity

op

posi

tion

with

lega

l and

tech

nica

l co

mm

ents

and

29

com

men

ts fr

om

MA

RN

to b

e so

lved

by

the

com

pany

M

EM w

as to

giv

e au

thor

izat

ion

desp

ite

the

mun

icip

ality

refe

rend

um, c

omm

ents

ny

MA

RN

and

loca

l opp

ositi

on

The

com

pany

off

ered

road

, hea

lth c

linic

an

d po

tabl

e w

ater

bef

ore

refe

rend

um

Atte

mpt

s to

sabo

tage

the

refe

rend

um

Atta

cks a

gain

st in

volv

ed o

rgan

izat

ions

EIA

(200

9) A

seso

ria

Man

uel B

aste

rech

ea

Aso

ciad

o S.

A.

Com

unic

ado

de P

rens

a (A

ugus

t 200

9)

“Chu

arra

ncho

dijo

“no

a

la h

idro

elec

trica

El

Sisi

mite

”

Obs

erva

tions

and

in

terv

iew

s with

aff

ecte

d co

mm

uniti

es

Pres

s Con

fere

nce

C

HIX

OY

Sa

n C

risto

bal,

Alta

vera

paz

Rive

rs: C

hixo

y/Ri

o N

egro

300

MW

IN

DE,

EG

EE -

Stat

e

Affe

cted

: 33

com

mun

ities

Se

e th

e bo

x ab

out t

he c

ase

Com

mun

ity o

ppos

ition

C

OC

AH

ICH

La

ck o

f com

pens

atio

n Se

e th

e bo

x ab

out t

he c

ase

Ope

ratin

g si

nce

1983

30

yea

rs a

fter a

nd st

ill n

o co

mpe

nsat

ion

for t

he a

ffec

ted

com

mun

ities

Th

e go

vern

men

t has

sign

ed th

e re

port,

bu

t stil

l not

the

Plan

of r

epar

atio

n

John

ston

, B. (20

05)

"Chi

xoy

Dam

Leg

acy

Issu

es S

tudy

" In

form

e of

ficia

l C

OC

AH

ICH

E

NT

RE

R

IOS/

LA

NQ

UIN

, Sa

n A

ugus

tin L

anqu

in,

Alta

vera

paz

Ri

vers

: Lan

quin

and

C

hian

ay

8,25

MW

C

orrie

ntes

del

R

io S

.A

Impa

cts:

In

unda

tion

of a

rea

Lo

ss o

f acc

ess t

o w

ater

Im

pact

on

loca

l tou

rist a

ctiv

ities

Com

mun

ity o

ppos

ition

La

ck o

f leg

al c

erta

inty

of t

he la

nds

Aff

ecte

d co

mm

uniti

es n

ot c

onsu

lted

Bio

dive

rsity

not

incl

uded

in th

e EI

A

Extra

ctio

n of

ston

es w

ithou

t per

mis

sion

Stop

ped

by th

e m

unic

ipal

ity,

refe

rend

um to

be

held

in L

anqu

ín. A

pa

ct h

as b

een

mad

e be

twee

n th

e m

unic

ipal

aut

horit

ies,

the

loca

l de

velo

pmen

t cou

ncils

and

com

mun

ity

lead

ers a

gain

st h

ydro

pow

er a

nd m

inin

g.

Adv

isor

s of t

he lo

cal

com

mun

ities

O

bser

vatio

ns a

nd

mee

tings

TR

ES

RIO

S,

San

Pabl

o, T

acan

a,

Taja

mul

co

Rive

rs: C

anuj

a, N

egro

, C

abuz

50 M

W

Hid

roel

ectri

ca

Tres

Rio

s

Impa

cts:

En

viro

nmen

tal f

low

W

ater

div

erte

d in

tunn

els

20 w

ater

sour

ces a

ffec

ted

Se

e th

e ca

se p

age

63

Com

mun

ity o

ppos

ition

C

ompa

ny b

ough

t the

land

with

out i

nfor

min

g

Littl

e in

form

atio

n ab

out t

he p

roje

cts

Fals

e in

form

atio

n ab

out t

he u

se o

f ene

rgy

C

onsu

ltatio

n he

ld A

pril

2009

re

ject

ion

of th

e pr

ojec

t

Nor

weg

ian

inve

stor

s with

drew

. Oth

ers

inve

stor

s hav

e de

cide

d no

t to

inve

st.

Tres

Rio

s are

still

look

ing

for i

nves

tors

.

Obs

erva

tions

and

m

eetin

gs in

the

area

C

OPA

E

Nor

ad

The

Nor

weg

ian

Emba

ssy

XA

CB

AL

C

haju

l, Q

uich

e

175

MW

Im

pact

s:

Loca

l env

ironm

enta

l im

pact

s, us

e of

the

A ta

ble

of n

egot

iatio

n w

as e

stab

lishe

d. T

he

nego

tiatio

n w

as b

etw

een

vario

us c

omm

unity

St

arte

d op

erat

ions

in 2

010.

Th

e m

unic

ipal

ity h

as b

een

criti

cize

d fo

r Pa

rtici

pant

of t

he

nego

tiatio

n ta

ble

47Rive

r: X

aclb

al

X

acba

l G

ener

ació

n Li

mpi

a G

uate

mal

a (G

LG)

land

and

acc

ess t

o la

nd. T

hree

new

pla

nts

are

bein

g pl

anne

d on

the

Xac

bal r

iver

. Th

e pr

ojec

t La

Veg

a II

con

sist

s of t

wo

plan

ts, o

ne d

am a

nd o

ne ru

n of

f riv

er. T

he

plan

t Sum

alito

is d

ownr

iver

from

Veg

a II

, an

d th

e pl

ant S

an L

uis,

is in

the

river

abo

ve

Hid

ro X

acba

l

and

loca

l org

aniz

atio

ns a

nd th

e co

mpa

ny,

with

out t

he m

unic

ipal

ity a

nd th

e st

ate.

Few

be

nefit

s wer

e gi

ven

to th

e co

mm

uniti

es,

exce

pt so

me

smal

l pro

ject

s. Th

e co

mm

uniti

es

dem

ande

d 1

0 M

W

nego

tiatin

g se

para

tely

with

the

com

pany

in

rela

tion

to la

nd.

Com

mun

ities

are

als

o op

posi

ng th

e th

ree

new

hyd

ropo

wer

pla

nts t

o be

bui

lt in

rela

tion

to X

aclb

al.

Uni

vers

idad

Lan

diva

r pu

blic

atio

n 20

09

PASA

BIÉ

N

Zaca

pa

Riv

er: R

io H

ondo

12,8

mw

In

vers

ione

s Pa

sabi

én

Impa

cts:

Lo

cal e

nviro

nmen

tal i

mpa

cts

The

com

pany

was

crit

iciz

ed fo

r div

ertin

g w

ater

from

the

loca

l irr

igat

ion

syst

em a

nd fo

r co

ntam

inat

ing

the

wat

er

The

mun

icip

ality

has

dem

ande

d a

new

En

viro

nmen

tal S

tudy

to b

e un

derta

ken

C

ritic

ized

for u

nder

taki

ng m

aint

enan

ce w

ork

with

out n

otify

ing

the

affe

cted

com

mun

ities

Star

ted

oper

atio

ns in

200

0 C

ompa

ny u

nder

take

n a

wat

er st

udy

to

test

wat

er q

ualit

y

MA

RN

has

not

follo

wed

up

Th

e m

ayor

is p

rote

ctin

g th

e re

side

nts

and

has n

ot g

iven

the

cons

truct

ion

licen

se to

the

com

pany

Pasa

bien

com

pany

Pr

ess

Org

aniz

atio

ns

Mad

re S

elva

RIO

HO

ND

O II

C

olor

ado,

Zac

apa

Rive

r: R

io H

ondo

32 M

W

Hid

roel

ectri

ca

Rio

Hon

do

S.A

.

A fo

rmer

hyd

ropo

wer

stat

ion

was

dam

aged

by

Sta

n an

d w

as to

be

rebu

ilt. N

o ne

w

stud

ies w

ere

unde

rtake

n.

Com

mun

ity o

ppos

ition

Th

e re

side

nts h

ad b

ad e

xper

ienc

e w

ith o

ther

pr

ojec

ts in

the

area

sim

ilar p

ract

ice

T

he p

roje

ct w

as r

ejec

ted

in a

ref

eren

dum

in

200

5

The

com

pany

con

tinue

s to

wor

k in

the

area

to g

ain

supp

ort t

hrou

gh v

ario

us

cam

paig

ns a

nd sm

all p

roje

cts (

scho

ol

and

heal

th)

The

com

pany

has

est

ablis

hed

a R

io

Hon

do F

und

The

may

or is

pro

tect

ing

the

resi

dent

s an

d ha

s not

giv

en th

e co

nstru

ctio

n lic

ense

The

com

pany

Rio

Hon

do

Talk

with

com

mun

ity

repr

esen

tativ

e

Pres

s

El P

UE

NT

E

Joco

tan,

Chi

quim

ula

Za

capa

Ri

vers

: Rio

Gra

nde

and

Joco

tan

27 M

W

Gen

erac

ión

Lim

pia

Gua

tem

ala

(Uni

n Fe

nosa

)

C

omm

unity

opp

ositi

on

Not

app

rove

d by

MA

RN

01

0909

–M

AR

N

reso

lutio

n

EL

OR

EG

AN

O

and

CA

PAR

JÁ

Joco

tan

and

Cam

otan

Za

capa

and

C

hiqu

imul

a

Rive

rs: R

io G

rand

e

O: 1

20 M

W

C: 5

7 M

W

Des

arro

llo d

e G

ener

ació

n El

éctri

ca y

M

anej

o de

R

ecur

sos

Nat

ural

es L

as

Tres

Niñ

as S

A

Affe

cted

gro

ups:

Cho

rti p

opul

atio

n, la

dino

pe

asan

t pop

ulat

ion

Im

pact

s:

Seve

re e

nviro

nmen

tal i

mpa

cts

Com

mun

ity o

ppos

ition

Li

ttle

info

rmat

ion

abou

t the

pro

ject

s Li

ttle

will

ingn

ess f

rom

the

com

pany

to sp

read

in

form

atio

n ab

out t

he p

roje

ct

No

cons

ulta

tions

abo

ut th

e pr

ojec

ts

Cap

arjá

– N

ot a

ppro

ved

by M

AR

N

‘New

Day

’ (N

uevo

Dia

) Cho

rtí

Cam

pesi

no

Cen

tral C

oord

inat

or, p

art o

f Agr

aria

n Pl

atfo

rm h

ave

been

thre

aten

ed a

fter

wor

king

with

info

rmat

ion

dist

ribut

ion

abou

t the

pro

ject

s E

l Ore

gáno

was

rej

ecte

d.

MA

RN

and

MEM

und

erto

ok a

new

st

udy

due

to p

ress

ure

from

com

pani

es

and

cong

ress

mem

bers

, and

are

cal

ling

for t

he c

omm

uniti

es to

neg

otia

te w

ith

the

com

pany

. The

resi

stan

ce p

ersi

sts.

0608

09 –

MA

RN

re

solu

tion

Pe

ace

Brig

ade

Inte

rnat

iona

l M

eetin

gs a

nd

obse

rvat

ions

in th

e ar

ea

EL

VO

LC

AN

C

ahab

on, L

anqu

in a

nd

Sena

hu, A

lta v

erap

az

Rive

rs: C

hiac

té,

Cah

abón

and

Lan

quín

26 M

W

Gen

erac

ión

Lim

pia

Gua

tem

alal

(U

nion

Fe

nosa

)

C

omm

unity

opp

ositi

on

No

cons

ulta

tion

has b

een

unde

rtake

n w

ith th

e af

fect

ed c

omm

uniti

es

Lega

l unc

erta

inty

abo

ut th

e la

nds

The

com

mun

ity C

hiac

té, p

rope

rty

hold

er o

f the

land

whe

re th

e m

achi

ne

hous

e is

to b

e co

nstru

cted

hav

e be

en

oppo

sing

for t

hree

yea

rs. T

he p

eopl

e of

C

hiac

té a

re b

eing

pre

ssur

ed to

sell

thei

r la

nds.

Com

unic

ado

(200

9)

El P

eubl

o M

aya

Q’e

qchi

’ !R

echa

zam

os la

H

idro

elec

trica

El V

olcá

n!

PAL

O V

IEJO

C

otza

l, Q

uich

e

Rive

r: C

otza

l, C

hipa

l, el

Reg

adio

y A

rrol

lo

Esco

ndid

o

85 M

W

Agr

icol

a C

afet

eler

a Pa

lo V

iejo

La

ck o

f con

sula

tion

N

o m

eans

of r

epar

atio

n

No

mea

ns fo

r int

egra

ted

deve

lopm

ent

No

resp

ect f

or In

dige

nous

Rig

hts

Thre

aths

from

mun

icip

al a

utho

ritie

s and

se

curit

ee c

omm

ittee

s

Mili

tariz

atio

n in

San

ta A

velin

a

Dea

th o

f tw

o yo

uths

from

Moj

omay

as

Den

unci

a an

te C

IDH

(2

009)

48

3.4.1 Energy sovereignty

There are growing calls for a return to energy sovereignty in Guatemala, with the state as the main actor in the electric-ity sector and a guarantor of social interests. In 2009, a large movement, numbering thousands of people in fifteen dif-ferent states, protested against the distribution companies DEORSA and DEOCSA, and demanded that the Spanish company Union Fenosa leave the country, as well as calling for nationalization of the electricity sector and the creation of municipal energy companies with social control.81 The movement called for full nationalization of the sector, from production to distribution, back into the hands of INDE, the state institution created for this purpose.

The movement’s grievances include high prices, suspen-sion of services, subsequent damage to electrical equip-ment, and economic losses suffered by local inhabitants. The conflict has involved the use of armed force, the arrest of local leaders82 and even the killing of a local leader, Vic-tor Galvez, in October 2008.

Although INDE has been weakened financially, techni-cally, materially and legally, it still offers the lowest prices, even with the operation of dams from 1934. According to INDE’s trade union, the workers assert that the public company is fully able to manage more projects and are calling for a publicly driven company.

3.4.2 Popular consultations

In response to the lack of measures taken by the state and the inexistence of appropriate mechanisms, the communities have taken matters into their own hands

during the last few years. Especially for mining projects, and also some hydropower projects, consultations have been organized at local level, in accordance with the legal framework and their rights as indigenous peoples. The legal basis of the consultation processes are ILO Conven-tion 169, especially articles 6 and 7, and the Guatemalan Municipal Code (2001) which specifically addresses local consultations. These mechanisms have now been used by several communities in Guatemala, exercising their rights as citizens and voicing their opinions through democratic means about the projects that are planned or underway in their territories.

The Municipal Code includes neighbourhood consulta-tions (”consultas vecinales”), through which local commu-nities can give their opinion about development projects that “affect all the citizens of the municipality”. By law, the municipality is obliged to engage in consultation with resi-dents if local organizers are able to collect the signatures of 10 percent of the local population.

From 2005 to 2009 over 35 consultations were undertaken at municipal level related to mining and other develop-ment projects, and three on the question of hydropower development Between 500,000–700,000 people have participated in the consultations, which were arranged by municipalities in collaboration with local development councils, local grassroots organizations, such as unions, teachers’, peasants’, indigenous or church networks, and in some instances with support from environmental and hu-man rights NGOs.

The consultations last several months, during which the actors involved disseminate information about the projects in question. Information is spread through local assemblies,

81 http://estamosdefrente.blogspot.com/2009/03/una-sola-voz-el-pueblo-dijo-fuera-union.html82 Malacantan San Marcos

The people of Chuarrancho protesting against the project Sisimite in front of the Congress.

49

house visits, posters, theatres and other public activities. Nevertheless, information about the projects can be poor.

The final referendum is organized during the course of a day, using different methods, including a ballot paper, designed specially for the case in question, and community assemblies held according to traditional community law. Communi-ties are asked whether they accept mining, hydropower or oil extraction activities in their municipality. Local, national and international organizations have taken part as observ-ers. All the referendums to date have rejected mining and hydropower activities. Most of the consultations have been conducted in Huehuetenango, San Marcos and Quiche.

The first consultation process on indigenous territories took place in 2004 in Sipakapa, San Marcos, related to the Marlin mining project owned by the Canadian company GoldCorp. The second consultation was undertaken the same year in the mestizo area in Rio Hondo Zacapa, re-garding a hydropower project. This consultation involved a formal election process with ballot papers.

3.4.3 Rio Hondo

In 2005 the municipality of Rio Hondo and civil soci-ety organizations arranged a consultation with residents regarding the Rio Hondo II hydropower project on the Colorado river. The project, owned by the company Rio Hondo, involved rebuilding the machine house that had been destroyed during Hurricane Mitch. Negative experi-ence with another hydropower project in the area led to residents voting against the project, and, to date, investors have not been able to start construction due to the lack of a construction licence from the municipality.

However, the Sipakapa and Rio Hondo consultations came under attack, with the companies accusing them of being unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court ruled that article 27 in the regulations for consultations was un-constitutional by declaring that the results were binding. While acknowledging the right to consultation, the Court ruled that the results of consultations are indicative and non-binding83.

83 Sentence from the case of Sipakapa from May 8th. 2005

50

The Court also determined that municipal councils lack the authority to organize consultations or establish that results are binding within its territorial jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court restricted municipal councils’ authority to decide matters within their territorial jurisdic-tion or support the will of its communities. In effect, this means that municipal councils cannot ban a project based on the result from the local consultations84. According to lawyers cited in a CONAVIGUA report, the Constitutional Court passed these rulings in open viola-tion of constitutional norms that grant autonomy to the municipality and assert its right to decide matters within its own territorial jurisdiction. The report also shows how these rulings completely contradict another Court ruling regarding the case of haulage contractors vs the municipal council of Guatemala city. In this case, the Constitutional Court ruled that the municipal council has the power to decide upon matters within its own territorial jurisdiction. The report argues that this demonstrates discrimination of local communities and their municipalities in favour of companies in the cases of Sipakapa and Rio Hondo.

Since the rulings, the company has continued to operate in the Rio Hondo area, disseminating information about clean energy and implementing various social projects in the area, hoping that residents will change their minds. The projects include a school expansion and provision of school materials, dental services for children and comput-ers. In April 2007 the company opened an information centre85, and by November 2009 had carried out seven information campaigns. The company is also involved in community sports events and has helped to provide local football pitches. The Rio Hondo Foundation was created

in 2008 with the aim of implementing social projects and has supported communities with dental care, housing, re-modelling of a school and food distribution. Communities can present projects for consideration by the foundation. The company claims that more and more communities are changing their position and are now in favour of the project.

Environmental and popular organizations accuse the com-pany of buying the support of poor local residents with the projects that are being implemented. A local leader told the authors that the same opposition still exists, but that the company is working hard to convince local residents. The current mayor was re-elected in 2007, largely because of his support of the communities’ opposition to the project, and the construction licence has still not been given to the company.

3.4.4 A break with the liberal model

Consultations and hearings have always been part of tradi-tional community life in Guatemala. In local communities decisions are often legitimized through socialization of information, dialogue and consensus.

In this sense, local consultations can be said to break with “liberal democracy” and the official election system. Many of the consultations are based on trust in the communi-ties and open communication about residents’ opinions regarding projects. Many see the official election system and political parties as remote and alien to their lives, with voting done in secrecy and strong controls throughout the process86. The official system presents many people from

84 Constitutional Court Files 1408-2005 and 2134-2007 85 Centro Informativo Ambiental86 Conavigua report

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local communities with a series of barriers to participa-tion, including the need for identification papers, registra-tion and long-distance travel. Women, in particular, lack identification papers, and often have difficulties in leaving communities to take part in official voting process.

In community consultations, people express their opinions within their communities, raising their hands in public. People without identification papers and those not reg-istered in the official voting system can also express their opinions. Social control in the community assures that people voting are people from the community. Children and youth are also allowed to vote, as they are considered to have the right to participate in a matter that affects them and their future. By doing so, they also assume responsi-bilities as part of the community.

Consultations have facilitated the distribution of informa-tion about development projects, including their impacts and risks, as well as general information about the environ-ment and natural resources in the country. Communities are demanding information, and are demanding that their voices be heard. Communities are now more alert to what is happening within their territories. They have managed to raise issues at national level, including environmental problems, impacts of projects, the actions of companies and the rights of communities to decide over their natural resources and territories.

Communities have continued to organize consultations, in spite of the ruling of the Constitutional Court, dem-onstrating their desire to make use of democratic mecha-nisms that exist in law to demand their rights. But the

consultations are ignored by the state and the companies. When the state refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of consultations, local frustration towards the state and pri-vate actors may increase further. In 2009, after the case of San Juan de Sacatepéquez, the Constitutional Court ruled that ILO Convention 169 has the same hierarchical level as the constitution. The Court recognized that indigenous rights, as presented in ILO Convention 169, form part of the list of human rights set out in articles 1 to 149 in the Guatemalan constitution. This should mean that all concessions and licences must be consulted on before approval. Prior consultation applies to the authorization of licences for mining and hydropower, as well as laws, regulations and public policies in the ter-ritories of the Maya, Garífuna and Xinca. It remains to be seen how the ruling will affect the government policies and current practices.

3.4.5 Persecution of leaders and criminalization of social protest

Developers and government institutions88, with good help from the media, dismiss the communities’ response as “radical”, accusing them of being “anti-development”, and “saying no just to say no”. They also accuse environmen-tal and other organizations of stirring up opposition and spreading false information in the communities. Activists and local leaders that have opposed large-scale develop-ment projects in their areas and those that have worked for local consultation processes have been slandered in the press as “terrorists”, “communists” and “guerrillas”89.

88 Not all state entities expressed this, the Ministry of Energy and Mining is the main source of this argument 89 Press monitoring January 2009 to August 2009 and interviews with various organizations

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Organizations also claim that other organized groups are undertaking violent acts and sabotage to discredit the manifestations and protests of the social organizations, and later accuse them of the acts90.

This criminalization is followed by persecution, intimida-tion and discrimination, which can be seen at different levels. First, comes discrediting of protest with the line that the communities are “against development” and “don’t know what’s good for them”. Interviews and observations confirmed that this is a perception held by both company representatives and government officials. Then, there are the accusations made against local leaders and activists for both minor and more serious crimes that may or may not have been committed by them, and the use of the security forces and unlawful arrest.

A systematic characterization of resistance as “terrorism”, “intrusions” on private property, civil disturbance and damage to public property, is also presented in the media. According to our sources, companies and financiers have close ties to the media, which is used to spread biased information to protect the interests of developers. Another important aspect is access to and use of the legal system. Local leaders have been accused of public disorder, damage to private property, land occupations, and even murder, with orders given for their arrest. The activists who are arrested or accused seldom get a fair trial, and cases are apparently prioritized only when companies press charges against community leaders and indigenous or other activists. The system works well to protect compa-nies, and resources are allocated to carry out investigations in these cases. Poor community residents have few means

to protect themselves. Laying charges against companies is almost impossible; several organizations accuse the system of being discriminatory against indigenous and local com-munity residents.

The violent suppression of social protest is a growing con-cern. Protests have been suppressed by the military, police, private security forces and paramilitary groups. Local lead-ers and organizations involved in social protest, informa-tion campaigns and consultations have been subjected to persecution, threats and intimidation and, in some cases, have been murdered. Many community leaders can no longer go out in public, and are restricted to their homes or communities. Organizations have accused powerful interests of using these threats to scare off activists.

Several organizations were questioned about their own experience of criminalization and persecution, and, wor-ryingly, were all able to provide examples. This experience was also borne out in meetings in the communities, and has been reported by Peace Brigade International in Gua-temala. Activists and local community leaders, involved in protests against hydropower and mining, as well as the case of DEOCSA in San Marcos, were able to confirm incidents of persecution, arrests and attacks on activists. Here are some examples: • A local priest in Zacapa, José Pilar Alvarez Cabrera, was

arrested in January 2009 after helping communities to protect forests, water and biodiversity in the area of the Las Granadillas mountain. Environmental organizations claim that the police, the district attorney of Zacapa (MP) and the judiciary have become instruments of the landowners against the communities91.

Demonstration against mining. The head band reads: No to mining, yes to the environment.

90 See e.g. press release from UDEFEGUA reprinted in Peace Brigade International report March 2010. 91 http://www.madreselva.org.gt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59:una-vez-mas-sistema-de-justicia-criminaliza- a-quienes-ejercen-derechos-&catid=1:ultimas-noticias&Itemid=50

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• The director of the environmental organization CALAS was victim of an armed attack in September 2008. He was shot seven times, but luckily survived. Both the director and the organization’s coordinator for political and legal work continue to receive threats92.

• On the 15th of March 2009, two youths from the Mayan youth organization Mojomayas were killed in a hit-and-run incident involving a car from the company Hidroeléc-trica Palo Viejo in the community of Santa Avelina, Quiche, after having been involved in protests. Threats have also been made by municipal authorities and local se-curity committees against protest leaders that have worked to spread information about the rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, the community of Santa Avelina has been militarized, with the establishment of a military posse in August 2008, creating fear in the communities93.

• A lawyer in Mojomayas has received phone threats against himself and his family and had a gun pointed at him from a passing car94. The office of the organiza-tion (Mojomayas and Conavigua) has been wathced by unidentified persons, and various members have been victims of threaths and agressions.

• Community leaders involved in the protests against the project of Xalala have received various threats95.

• The environmental organization Madre Selva has been accused several times of being terrorists, and has been

slandered in the press. An official at the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) distributed flyers to discredit the organization, their members and the referendum campaign in Chuarrancho.

• The situation in San Marcos has been especially grave. 250 local residents who demonstrated against the com-pany DEOCSA were arrested in 2009. There have also been three states of emergency declared in the county and several murders of local inhabitants involved in protests. Tensions exist in the seven municipalities affected by the conflict: San José el Rodeo, Tacaná, San José Ojetenam, San Pablo, Malacatán, La Reforma and Nuevo Progreso. Three activists from the Resistance Front for the Defence of Natural Resources and People’s Rights (FRENA) were killed in what are still unclear circumstances. The first victim was Víctor Gálvez, killed on 24th October 2009 in Malacatán. Evelina Ramírez, a FRENA representative, was killed in Ocós on 13th of January 2010 and four others were wounded. They were returning from Gua-temala City after meetings with government authorities in which they had demanded the suspension of the state of emergency in San Marcos, the expulsion of the Unión FENOSA company from the country, and the prompt clarification of the murder of Victor Gálvez. On the 17th of February 2010 Octavio Roblero was killed in Malaca-tán. Officials blame armed gangs and drug trafficking96.

• The DEOCSA company cut electricity in several communities in San Marcos on the 15th of December

92 Reprinted in Peace Brigades International report April 2010. For the montly report see: http://www.pbi-guatemala.org/field-projects/ pbi-guatemala/publications/monthly-information-package/93 Denunciation by CONAVIGUA 10th of July 2009. Denuncia Ante Relator Especial sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas, Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos CIDH. Violación del derecho al Territorio y la Vida del Pueblo Maya Ixil por construcción de la Hidroelectrica denominada “Palo Viejo” en Territorio de San Juan Cotzal, el Quiche. 94 Peace Brigades International report April 2010 and personal communication95 Confirmed by community leaders from the area and other organizations 96 Peace Brigade International report March 2010

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2010. On the 18th of December, access routes lead-ing to the municipalities of El Rodeo were blocked by protestors who objected to the tariff increases charged by DEOCSA. More than 110 police officers from the Fuerzas Especiales division of the Policia Nacional Civil and 200 soldiers were sent in to clear the roads and safeguard the INDE headquarters97. A state of emer-gency was declared on the 22nd of December, and was further extended twice, on the 4th and 14th of Janu-ary 2010. A curfew was imposed, suspending popular protest and putting the area under the control of the armed forces.

• UNION FENOSA and DEOCSA have been accused of cutting electricity to several communities and destroy-ing power stations. An engineer, Angel Garcia, has been accused of sabotaging one of the power stations.98 On the 22nd of October 2009, in Nuevo Progreso, four employees of the security company Cobra, working for UNION FENOSA, were found cutting high voltage cables and were apprehended by local residents. The workers were taken to the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Publico - MP) and accepted that they were sabotaging the electricity lines. On the 1st of Decem-ber, UNION FENOSA workers, with the support of the army, removed five transformers that supply energy to 38 communities. In none of these cases has the MP laid charges against those involved.99 The national and local press, radio and TV have, instead, portrayed the people of San Marcos as saboteurs and responsible for the problems related to electricity supply.

• Peace Brigades International in Guatemala reported in April 2010 that during the past five years trade unions have experienced constant persecution and acts of violence. “More than forty union workers were killed between 2005 and 2010 in Guatemala. According to sta-tistics from the Interior Ministry, the National Civilian Police and the Guatemalan Indigenous and Campesino Trade Union Movement (MSICG), 2009 was the worst year with 16 union members killed. During the same period (2005-2010), 132 union members suffered threats and attacks, with the majority (76 cases) also taking place in 2009. According to the Committee for Trade Union Freedom, 93% of the workers killed were “in con-flict due to complaints they had made relating to labour rights or access to natural resources”. ”

• Indigenous and campesino (peasants) organisations, members of the National Coordinator of Campesino Organisations (CNOC), have denounced the increase in killings of their leaders linking them with ongoing land-related conflict that the state has been unable to resolve100.

• The Campesino Unity Committee (CUC) has demanded that the justice authorities clear up the illegal evictions and abuses occuring against indigenous and campesino communities. In 2009, 27 families were violently evicted in Coban, Alta Verapaz, by a contingent of 400 police, 40 soldiers and 50 farm workers and the alleged proprietors of the farm estate. The security forces destroyed every-thing they found, cut down large extensions of crops and demolished homes with power saws101.

97 http://www.thefreelibrary.com/GUATEMALA%3A+RISING+DISCONTENT+AGAINST+ENERGY+COMPANY+UNION+ FENOSA.-a022338976698 Prensa Libre July 12th 2009 99 http://resistance-mining.org/english/?q=node/162 100 Peace Brigades International report September 2009101 Peace Brigades International report August 2009

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• Members of the organization New Day, who have been involved in information campaigns related to three hidroelectric plant in Zacapa since 2006 - El Oregano, Caparjá (both managed by the company Tres Niñas) and El Puente (company GLG) - have received threats and attacks that they relate to the work they carry out. In September 2009 one of their members was the victim of a gun attack close to the community102.

These are just some examples of what activists and com-munity leaders in Guatemala are experiencing. The activ-ists involved are not working for individual or financial interests, but to protect nature (Madre Tierra), their land and the rights of the people and the communities. As one activist explained, “I am not afraid. I have the courage to continue what I am doing because I know that this is the right thing. This struggle has a historical commitment with the people, and my children have to know that, if some-thing ever happens to me, it was for Mother Earth and for the people. Community leaders that are fighting to defend their land, territories and their natural resources are being,

and have always been, subjected to repression by the state and their allies through direct threats, persecution of lead-ers and the killings of community leaders. Being accused of being terrorists is historically loaded, with all the accom-panying emotions, as this was what leaders were accused of during the armed conflict”.

Another indigenous leader said this: “The people stand up and defend their environment. They are not asking for anything else but to defend a territory, to defend nature and the rivers.”

In official circles and in the media, the protests are pre-sented as a threat to society, and the protesters as danger-ous or terrorists. Little is said about the peaceful and democratic methods used by the communities, such as the information campaigns, consultation processes, press conferences, letter-writing, meetings with ministries and peaceful marches. Social protest must be understood in a context where communities have few arenas to voice their claims.

102 Peace Brigade International report March 2010

Demonstration in Guatemala City

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This chapter aims to provide an overview of Norwegian policy related to hydropower and “clean energy” projects and the role that Norwegian actors play in the develop-ment of energy projects in developing countries. We will focus on how Norwegian policies interact with indigenous rights. A brief outline of the hydropower sector in Norway will also be presented in order to contextualize Norwegian actions in developing countries.

Almost all of Norway’s electricity supply comes from hydropower. Norway’s ample hydropower resources have been developed for the benefit of Norwegian society over the past hundred years. The proportion of energy use ac-counted for by electricity is considerably higher in Norway than in other countries, and electricity is used to a much wider extent for heating buildings and water. Well over 50 percent of Norway’s energy consumption derives from hydropower. Over the years, the power sector has been subject to increased regulation and today, the develop-ment of a hydropower project is a lengthy process. Strict economic, social and environmental impact assessments are conducted, with the participation of all affected parties. Licence fees, taxes and entitlements to purchase a share of the power generated are part of a framework in which all affected parties share in the benefits.

Norwegian municipalities have done well from hydro-power. Power companies are either run by the munici-pality or the state, and a considerable share of earnings remains in the municipality and is reinvested there. In addition, municipalities are entitled to purchase up to 10 percent of the electricity produced at cost price for local development.

The right of reversion (“hjemfall”), in which a hydropow-er installation reverts to the government free of charge when a licence expires, is another important principle enshrined in Norwegian law. The purpose of the law is

to prevent foreign companies gaining permanent control over water and energy resources. The Norwegian right of reversion applies only to private ownership and ensures that ownership returns to the state after 60 years. A power station is considered private if public ownership is less than two thirds.

Hydropower is widely regarded in Norway as a clean energy source. Norwegians have experienced relatively few negative social and environmental impacts of hydro-power development, compared with many other countries. Norway has undergone a long process of development in the sector, and deliberations about the legal framework and licensing procedures have involved all affected parties. However, there have been exceptions. The construction of the highly contentious Alta power plant in Northern Norway is an example of how easily economic interests can trump the interests of the local indigenous population. Widespread opposition to the Alta project by the indige-nous Sámi people led to major changes in the way the Nor-wegian government interacts with the Sámi. The project was completed, but the fallout from the conflict included an increased awareness of indigenous issues amongst the Norwegian population and the establishment of the Sámi Parliament.

4 Norwegian Context

• Water is a public good • Public companies are granted concessions without a time limit• Private companies are granted concessions with a time limit; ownership reverts to the state after the con- cessionary period• Affected parties are included early on in decision- making processes• Equitable benefit-sharing

Key elements of Norwegian hydropower policy

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4.1 Norway on energy

In Norway, it is generally accepted that large-scale hydro-power development has gone as far as it can, and hun-dreds of rivers have been declared conservation areas for environmental reasons. However, there is now increased focus on exporting Norwegian hydropower technology and expertise overseas, with investments in developing countries becoming increasingly attractive. Climate issues, together with clean and sustainable energy production and consumption, are high on the Norwegian domestic and foreign policy agendas. A key element of government policy is to put Norway at the forefront of renewable energy development, both at home and abroad. Numerous government documents emphasize these ambitions.

The ruling coalition’s political platform, known as the Soria Moria II Declaration, asserts that “the Government’s vision is for Norway to become a world-leading energy nation” and that “the Government shall also use its energy policy actively to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in Norway and in other countries.” (p. 64)

Recent government white papers are more explicit on the role of hydropower: “Norway intends to play an active role in the development of new renewable energy sources that can replace today’s fossil energy carriers. We can provide experience of hydropower that will be useful as the world seeks to shift to cleaner sources of energy103.” Moreover, “Developing countries both need and have a legitimate right to better access to energy. Norwegian companies can contribute to more environmentally friendly energy solu-tions through innovation and technology transfer104.

To achieve these goals, the government aims to support an increase in the involvement of Norwegian businesses in de-veloping countries by means of publicly-funded assistance schemes and public-private partnerships105.

4.2 Norway on CSR and development cooperationAssistance to the private sector is not without strings. Government expectations of private sector involvement are elaborated in the Soria Moria II Declaration:

Norfund is a private equity and venture capital company established and owned by the Norwegian state through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It operates in accordance with Norwegian development policy and receives fund-ing from the development assistance budget. Some of its investments are made directly in local companies, together with industrial partners, and others through investment funds and financial institutions in the countries concerned. Norfund helps to lower the threshold for Norwegian com-panies considering investment in developing countries. The objective of Norfund is to contribute to economic devel-opment in poor countries through profitable investments. Its largest single investment is in the energy company, SN Power, a joint venture with the state-owned energy utility, Statkraft.

The Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)

103 Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting: “Climate, Conflict and Capital”, p. 14104 Report No. 10 (2008–2009) to the Storting: Corporate social responsibility in a global economy, p. 60105 The support schemes include an advisory office established by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Nor- wegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund). This provides information both on the support available from Norad and Norfund, but also from other institutions, such as the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (GIEK) and Innovation Norway.

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“The Norwegian government shall: strengthen co-operation with Norwegian business and industry to contribute to increased investments in poor countries, and set clear demands so that the International Labour Organization’s core conventions are respected and that investments contribute to positive development. Norway shall be a leading country in working toward global standards for business and industry’s social responsibility.“ (Soria Moria II Declaration, p. 10)

As the CSR white paper points out, the government “ex-pects companies to respect fundamental human rights, in-cluding those of children, women and indigenous peoples, in all their operations, as set out in international conven-tions”106. The white paper on Norwegian development policy, meanwhile, sets out that the government will “seek to ensure transparency in the management of natural re-sources and that local communities, including indigenous peoples, have access and rights to land and resources.107”.

Another important document governing Norwegian development assistance to the energy sector is the 2006 Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation. As the Action Plan points out:

“Energy is essential for both social and economic development. Providing better access to reliable energy services at prices that are affordable to poor people is crucial to achieving the MDGs. Simple, decentralised solutions will play an important role.” (Action Plan, p. 17)

The Action Plan goes on to list different measures that will help “improve poor people’s access to clean energy”, including supporting the development of biomass, wind and solar energy; supporting the development of small power plants in conjunction with solutions; and support-ing measures designed to improve energy efficiency.

4.3 Clean Energy for Development The Clean Energy for Development Initiative, designed to enhance Norwegian support to the energy sector in developing countries, was approved by the Minister of the Environment and International Development in April 2007. The initiative aims to strengthen links between the environment, climate and energy in Norway’s international development cooperation and provide a framework for all Norwegian aid to the energy sector. As well as focusing on long-term administration of natural resources and efficient energy use, the initiative aims to help improve “access to clean and affordable energy in partner countries.”108

Given indigenous peoples’ dependence on the natural en-vironment and resources, environmental considerations and respect for the rights of the indigenous population must weigh heavily in areas where indigenous peoples live. There have been a number of instances where Norwegian business interests have come into conflict with the use of the environment by indigenous groups. It is therefore vital to consult and involve indigenous and local communities when planning activities that may affect their interests.

Report No. 10 (2008–2009) to the Storting: Corporate social responsibility in a global economy, p. 51

Local communities and the rights of indigenous peoples

106 Report No. 10 (2008–2009) to the Storting: Corporate social responsibility in a global economy, page 35107 Report No. 13 to the Storting: “Climate, Conflict and Capital”, p. 48108 Led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the initiative has a “project group” comprising representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norad and Norfund. The secretariat is housed within Norad.

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The Clean Energy for Development Initiative, together with the Oil for Development Initiative, are both con-sidered important elements of Norway’s overall energy policy. According to Erik Solheim, the Minister of the Environment and International Development, Norway should concentrate on “what we’re good at”. Oil for Devel-opment is an example of the practical implementation of this policy, whereby Norway contributes capacity build-ing measures in other countries, based on Norway’s own experiences in the sector. The Clean Energy Initiative is set to follow the same path. The main goal of the initiative is “to increase access to clean energy at an affordable price based on the long-term management of natural resources and efficient energy use. It is also intended to contrib-ute to sustainable economic and social development in selected partner countries and to international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”109 The initiative includes large-scale electricity generation projects (hydropower, wind and solar farms) connected to the grid, as well as projects with a clearer poverty focus, such as rural electrification, more efficient wood-burning stoves and improved charcoal production. The initiative will work to strengthen institutions, legal and institutional frameworks and infrastructure that promote investments, production and trade. The initiative will also support regional energy activities.

FIVAS and other organizations have long been critical of the close linkages between powerful interests in the hydro-power sector in Norway and the promotion of hydropower in development aid to the energy sector. Although intend-ed to be “technology neutral”, the Clean Energy Initiative has already demonstrated a marked preference for large-scale hydropower projects. The “simple, decentralized solu-tions” of the 2006 Environment in Development Action Plan remain an extremely modest part of the portfolio.

In contrast, SN Power, the hydropower investor jointly owned by Norfund and the Norwegian power utility Statkraft, received 1.2 billion NOK from the Norwegian government in 2007 to support energy development projects. The sum allocated to SN Power was equivalent to 70 percent of total Norwegian development aid earmarked for energy projects that year. In 2008, hydropower received 97% of allocations to energy generation projects.110 A pal-try 3% went to biomass, wind and solar energy.

SN Power is an international hydropower company and commercial investor, developer and operator of hydropow-er projects in emerging markets. SN Power was established in 2002 as a Norwegian limited company owned by Stat-kraft (50 percent) and Norfund (50 percent). According to an agreement concluded between the owners in 2008, Statkraft increased its share to 60 percent while Norfund reduced its holding to 40 percent from January 2009.

In January 2009, a subsidiary of SN Power was established to intensify energy-related efforts in poor countries. SN Power AfriCA will focus on energy investments in Africa and Central America. Efforts are being made to widen ownership of this company beyond Norfund and Statkraft, and Norwe-gian energy companies such as BKK and Agder Energi have invested in the company. To begin with, the company will start projects in Nicaragua, Panama and Costa Rica.

With Norfund as one of its investors, SN Power is required to follow the guidelines of the International Finance Cor-poration of the World Bank (IFC). As we have seen, IFC have included in their performance standards the rights of indigenous people to be consulted and included in deci-sion-making processes, but does not include free, prior and informed consent. Norfund insist that as long as they have shares in SN Power and SN Power AfriCA, the companies will be required to follow IFC standards.

109 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Clean Energy for Development Policy Platform (approved April 2007)109 Framtiden i våre hender, Bistandssmuler til vind og sol, 04.01.10

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4.4 Norway and Guatemala Norwegian actors have a long history in Guatemala, espe-cially in supporting the peace process and human rights. Norway is regarded by many as a positive contributor. Sev-eral Norwegian organizations have a long track record of aid and solidarity work in the country, including Norwe-gian People’s Aid, Norwegian Church Aid and the Norwe-gian Solidarity Committee for Latin America (LAG). As of 2009, there were also 15 twinning arrangements between municipalities in Norway and Guatemala.

To date, there have been few commercial activities and investments undertaken by Norwegian companies in Guatemala. Given Norway’s previous activities in Guate-mala, new Norwegian commercial activities can present a series of dilemmas. A Norwegian company might get easier access to a particular sector, as Norway is perceived as a positive contributor, while local organizations that have been supported by Norway for years might be more reti-cent about criticizing Norwegian actors for fear of losing financial support. At the same time, bonds between Nor-wegian and Guatemalan organizations represent important networks and possibilities for joint advocacy work.

A recently published report “Norway’s strategic interests in Central America” (2008) emphasizes the role Norwe-gian actors can play in the development of hydropower and other renewable energy sources in Central America, stating that “Norway has a strategic interest in further en-gagement in climate change mitigation and development of alternative energy sources in Central America”111. The

question can then be asked: what happens when Nor-wegian interests in the hydropower sector clash with the protection of indigenous rights and the Norwegian policy to promote these?

As we have seen, the development of hydropower projects is mostly taking place in districts where the majority of communities are poor and indigenous. Norwegian aid policy underlines the importance of supporting the imple-mentation of ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, and the Norwegian Embassy in Guate-mala has made indigenous rights and securing indigenous communities’ participation in decision-making processes a high priority. In 2008, the Norwegian embassy in Guate-mala decided to focus the majority of its aid program on indigenous people’s rights – dubbed the Maya program112.

To date, only one attempt has been made to invest in the hydropower sector in Guatemala by a Norwegian company, in 2008-2009. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) financed the pre-feasibility study. The case is presented below as an illustration of the poten-tial pitfalls for companies and donors, as well as the impor-tance of understanding the local context and respecting the rights of indigenous communities.

Renewable Energy Invest AS (REIAS)

The Norwegian-based private company, Renewable Energy Invest AS (REIAS), was incorporated in January 2008. The company’s focus is to “invest in renewable energy in de-veloping markets113”. The company has three shareholders,

111 Bull, B. et al (2008) Norway’s strategic interests in Central America. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM)112 Funding for the Maya program was set at 60 million Norwegian kroner over a four-year period. The agreement started in 2009 after a long planning process, and will last until 2012 . Norwegian bilateral aid was reduced considerably after 2007 with a reduction in staff at the embassy in 2007 and 2008. The embassy is responsible for El Salvador, Belize, Honduras and Guatemala. 113 Renewable Energy Invest application for support from Norad, September 2008

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each with an equal share: Cfs Invest AS, Aurandt AS and Hjelmstad Invest AS.

In September 2008, REIAS applied for support from Norad for pre-feasibility studies in Guatemala. Norad supports business initiatives in developing countries with subsidies for private companies, including support for pre-feasibility studies and project identification. REIAS was given a grant of 362 000 NOK to undertake pre-feasibility studies for the Tres Rios project in the county of San Marcos, one of four projects under consideration114. The company wrote in its application that the project was chosen after thorough consideration and that the project “is not influencing nega-tively on the environment and has a good share of sustain-able development for the area and its inhabitants”115. The company undertook pre-feasibility studies at the end of 2008, and sent in a new application for a due diligence project in April 2009.

The company states in their application that they have no “documental experience from activities or business in third

world countries”, and that their knowledge about Guate-mala is based on work “performed in-house” and from global seminars116. For this reason, they engaged consul-tants from the Norwegian consulting company Optimo Finance AS. Based on their advice and their own travel to the country, they identified Guatemala as the “best coun-try for investment in renewable energy production”117. The idea was to start with the Tres Rios project, and then establish an investment foundation in renewable energy in Central America.

Optimo Finance AS (OF) is a Norwegian-based consulting company, established in 1999. The company cooperates with companies and financial institutions worldwide, with the objective of “creating the best possible competitive solution for financing of international projects.118” OF has been involved as financial advisor in infrastructure proj-ects, in both private and public sectors, and works primari-ly in countries with limited access to competitive financing. The company evaluates companies and projects, assists in project and market evaluation, and arranges funding from

Moloj is one of the Mayan women organizations supported by Norwegian cooperation

114 Tres Rios, El Chocolate, St. Judas and La Perla115 Renewable Energy Invest application for support from Norad, September 2008116 Ibid117 Ibid118 http://www.optimofinance.no/index_files/about_us.htm

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commercial banks and other financial institutions, devel-opment agencies and multilateral banks. OF has also been engaged as facilitator for the implementation of projects giving reduced greenhouse gas emissions.

The Tres Rios project in San Marcos

The planned Tres Rios project is a dam cascade project on the Cabuz river, utilising the flow of the Cutzulchimá, Canujá, Negro and Chapá rivers, within the municipalities of San Pablo and Tajumulco in the county of San Mar-cos. The project has a generation capacity of 50 MW and requires an investment of 60 million dollars. The projects consists of three sub-projects, with their respective dams, reservoirs, tunnels, powerhouses and sub-stations for con-nection to the national grid.

REIAS intended to develop the Tres Rios project in Gua-temala in partnership with the project’s initial developer, Hydroeléctrica Tres Rios AS, in collaboration with the Guatemalan company HIDROC SA. Financing for the project was to include owner’s equity (25-30 %) and loans from commercial banks like Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The company Empresa Electrica Matamoros, S.A. (Costa Rica) was also involved, as was Diaz Duran & Asociados Central Law which pro-vided legal advice to REIAS119.

The company Inter-Credit Latin America is also believed to have been involved in the Tres Rios project. Other

potential investors have included the Meany family, Miguel Fernanced Bianchi120 and Maegli, a well-known figure in Guatemalan business. The company Cementos Progreso has also expressed interest in the project121.

Arguments used by Hidroeléctrica Tres Rios in favour of the project include an unsatisfied demand for electric-ity, high prices and a lack of provision in the area122. The objective of the project is presented as follows: “Generation of energy from renewable resources that feed the national network of electrification, contributing to satisfying the lo-cal demand for electrical energy of the population”123. But, as we have seen, the existence of a hydropower project in a municipality does not necessarily mean that the surround-ing communities and the municipality get better access to electricity, nor better prices. The company acknowledges in a presentation that they are not allowed to distribute electricity directly to the communities124.

The company also argues that there is a lack of a culture for sustainable use and conservation of natural resources. Many would disagree with this, and there are no guaran-tees that companies would represent good environmental management and conservation, due to the lack of control and follow-up of environmental consequences of projects, including weak environmental impact assessments.

A presentation, made by the company to organizations, local communities and other interested actors, includes an illustration of the river and the project, and indicates that

119 The company Hidroeléctrica Tres Ríos, S.A. is part of the conglomeration Hidrosacpur, S.A. that is constructing the hydropower La Perla in San Miguel Tucurú, Alta Verapaz, on the river Sacpur, from the river Polochic. The project is owned by Agrícola Vinaros, S.A., and is also financed by BCIE. The project La Esmeralda is placed in the same municipality, where Hidrosacpur, S.A. is also participating, also financed by BCIE120 Involved in the maquila industry, with ties to the former Oscar Berger government121 Unconfirmed information from an informed source 122 Powerpoint presentation by the company Tres Rios, obtained from local representatives in the area 123 Ibid 124Ibid

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1) the hydropower project will clean the water it uses; 2) the ecological flow will not be affected; 3) the community will receive electricity; 4) there will be reforestation close to the project; and 5) people will earn money in the commu-nity. In sum, the drawing is misleading as none of these are automatic consequences of a hydropower project.

Benefits for local communities are further presented as in-frastructure improvements; construction and maintenance of roads; social responsibility; care and protection of the environment; and legal and administrative management. Social responsibility is presented in the form of security, technical assistance and capacity-building, as well as edu-cation, communication about the project and a social fund where the community can apply for support for education and health. The environmental part is described as “appli-cation of the environmental management plan” and “man-agement of natural resources” such as forests and water. More specific benefits for the communities are presented as the creation of 250 jobs; 30 kilometers of road; reactiva-tion of the economy; conservation of forests; paying the

construction license and taxes to the municipality; public lighting; a social fund for local projects; and generation of 49 MW of clean electricity at a lower price. The argument that the project will serve the interests of local communities by providing access to electricity and cheaper electricity is used by REIAS in its application to Norad. This states that: “the project will bring necessary energy supply to the area as well as creating job oppor-tunities during construction”. What is not mentioned is that the energy produced by Tres Rios is just as likely to be exported to El Salvador or, with the construction of the interconnection line of SIEPAC, to the rest of Central America, or, given its close proximity to the border with Mexico, even beyond. By the end of April 2009, REIAS had agreed to take over the project and start due diligence of the project. In its sec-ond application to Norad for the due diligence project125, REIAS states that ”it is further intended to elaborate a plan for sustainable future development by aiding the com-

From a presentation by the the company hidroelectrrica Tres Rios.

125 dated 30.04.09

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munity to initial basic development and business (schools, health care, shops and small business etc)”. The applica-tion includes a request for 50 000 USD for local projects that can be initiated before construction starts, saying that these funds will be used for “urgent and needed efforts”. As already discussed, FIVAS is sceptical to the initiation of social projects before construction, with the apparent aim of buying local residents’ consent.

Early reactions

An initial environmental impacts assessment (EIA) was carried out for the project in 2004, and approved by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN), without informing or consulting the affected communities. Between 2004 and 2006, the company Hidroelectrica Tres Rios started buying up land and properties needed for the project. In 2006, two local women that felt pressured to sell their land contacted the human rights program of the bishop of San Marcos. The company had told them that they wanted to buy the land to turn it into a conservation area, reforest it and protect the river basin of Canuja, ac-cording to a document from the human rights program. Two community acts from 2007 show the reactions of the local communities. In 2007, the mayor of Tajamulco informed the community that the company had paid him a visit. The community made it clear that they did not wish to have the project and decided to undertake a consulta-tion process about mining and hydropower in the area. Community members expressed their concerns about the tunnel that was going to be built as part of the project and how the construction might affect the many water sources in the area. An engineer from the company assured them, at one of the meetings, that geological studies had been undertaken and that water sources would not be damaged. Another engineer informed them of the EIA, but stated that conclusions were very general, and that there was a

need for more information to predict possible damage to the ecosystem, especially water resources. The representa-tives at the meeting decided that the EIA should be made known in the communities. In July 2008 a consultation processes was undertaken in Tajamulco, where the major-ity of the inhabitants voted no to hydropower and mining projects in the municipality.

The residents of Tajamulco said no to the project for sev-eral reasons. One reason was the process of land purchases. Many of the residents felt pressured to sell their land and were not informed about the future use of the land; some were misinformed. When they were later informed about the use of the land, they regretted selling and wanted their land back. Secondly, the residents state that they have been poorly informed about the project for many years, and that they have requested information from the company and the state, without getting a response. They have also invited the company to meetings where the company has not shown up. The residents also rejected hydropower in the area because of the possible impacts it can have on water sources, and the poor environmental studies that have been undertaken. Finally, they rejected the project because there had not been any form of consultation with the com-munities concerning hydropower development in the area. The Tajamulco encounter It is in this context that the encounter between two Norwe-gian consultants and the local communities in Tajamulco in May 2009 must be seen. A meeting was organized by the Norwegian Embassy before the encounter, with local lead-ers, the company, the embassy and Norwegian and Guate-malan organizations present. The Guatemalan organiza-tions assert that the Norwegians were informed about the local context and the opposition to the project, and were given a clear signal not to travel to the area without con-sulting and notifying the communities. Nonetheless, the

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two Norwegian consultants went to the area to carry out studies, and were detained by the community. The Norwe-gians were taken to a local meeting-place and interrogated in front of 1 500 people from surrounding communities about what they were doing in the area. The Norwegians signed a document saying that they would withdraw from the project.

In July 2009, the company sent a revised application to Norad for the due diligence project, reducing the

amount of the request from 2.3 to 0.7 million NOK. They wrote in their application that there had been great enthusiasm for the project in the two lower sections of the project, but that local resistance was strong in the upper section. Therefore they would not continue the project. They also wrote that the experience and infor-mation gathered would be used in the appraisal of other projects in the area, and that they would return with a new application later.

Tajamulco, San Marcos. Local residents are opposing the hydropower project Tres Rios.

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FIVAS spoke with the communities in Tajamulco to get their side of the story. The principal demands of the com-munities in relation to projects affecting their territories are as follows:

• The communities oppose the construction of hydro-power projects involving the diversion of rivers through tunnels to generate electricity. The communities are concerned about their access to water, and water needed for the ecological system and that these types of project do not correspond with their vision of development and their culture.

• The communities wish to protect their territorial rights and prevent loss of land or fragmentation of their land. The selling of land without community consultation di-rectly impacts territorial integrity and generates divisions in the community. They demand that the lands pur-chased by the company be returned to the communities.

• The communities demand that they be consulted pursuant to rights afforded them in ILO Convention 169 and the Municipal Code of Guatemala. They demand that local consultation processes be respected.

• The communities are interested in development of their areas, but this should be in accordance with their own priorities and should benefit them directly. They seek support for the development of communal projects, managed and owned by the community.

4.5 Lessons learnt

The EIA had already been prepared several years before the Norwegian company got involved, and was weak and outdated. The plan for due diligence included a review of the existing EIA. In this case, the EIA had been prepared without consulting the communities, and the communities had on several occasions tried to get information about the

project without any success. REIAS writes, in its applica-tion to Norad, that the local company had tried to inform the communities about the project for the past two years, when the EIA is from 2004. This means that the informa-tion campaign started long after both the EIA and land purchases had been conducted. It is also a matter of concern that REIAS requested funding from Norad for local social projects prior to construction (50 000 USD). A consultation and information process should not involve donating projects to local communities, thereby confusing the situation and making it impossible to consider the larger project on an objective base. From our point of view, this represents an abuse of people with low education living in poverty.

Indigenous rights are not addressed as an element in the pre-feasibility study. REIAS and the consulting company OF appear to have had limited knowledge about the rights of indigenous peoples. The local context must be taken into account from the very beginning. In the communica-tion between Norad and REIAS, the donor requests that indigenous rights be addressed in the study report, based on concerns raised by the Norwegian embassy in Guate-mala. As far as we can see, this has not been done.

There is no mention of indigenous groups in the study report, although they represent the majority of the popula-tion in the area. A lack of knowledge and understanding of indigenous peoples and their rights is also apparent in the application for due diligence in April 2009, in which the area is described as being primarily inhabited by “Indians and the very poor”. In the preliminary study, REIAS refers to the local communities as residents, and confirms that marginal groups and women have not yet been considered. “Evaluation of the local population and consideration for them” is included in future plans. This should be the very first point to evaluate.

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Conclusions

1 The strategic plan for hydropower development in Guatemala was prepared without consulting civil society and indigenous peoples. The affected commu-nities have very limited possibilities of influencing the decision-making and development processes.

2 The privatization and liberalization of the energy sector in Guatemala has produced a legal framework that pri-oritizes the interests of private actors and has eroded the role of the state as a guarantor of citizens’ rights in Gua-temala. The state has begun to function as an intermedi-ary for private business interests and, in many cases, has acted to defend private economic interests at the expense of the local population and the environment.

3 The current legal and institutional framework for the energy sector in Guatemala leaves local communities and nature vulnerable, with limited protection.

4 The lack of implementation of ILO convention 169 leaves indigenous peoples deprived of their rights, such as real participation in decision-making; adequate con-sultation processes; mechanism for mitigation; respect for their territory, culture and organizations; and real benefit-sharing. The lack of an adequate legal frame-work is not an excuse for the state not to comply with international agreements.

5 Direct negotiations between the communities and the companies are characterised by an imbalance and asymmetry of power. This represents a model that contradicts the positive evolution of indigenous rights, in which responsibility for entering into dialogue, consulting, negotiating and making agreements with indigenous communities lies with the state. Consulta-tion is not just about providing information, holding a meeting or signing a document, but is also about pro-

cess. Adequate consultation requires the involvement of the authorities, with independent observers. The state has been absent in these processes.

6 The high degree of legal uncertainty regarding land and properties, as well as the lack of titling of land, further deepens the current conflicts.

7 Disagreements and conflict in the communities destroy social networks and peace in the community.

8 There is discrimination in different groups’ access to justice.

9 Electricity is rarely spoken of as a basic service, but as a business matter.

10 Development of projects without consultation and the consent of the communities generates conflict, with negative implications for the well-being of communi-ties and the implementation of projects.

11 Many environmental studies are weak and inadequate, and do not give enough importance to the rich bio-diversity and valuable ecosystems in Guatemala. The high vulnerability to climate change and natural catas-trophes is not taken into account in the assessments.

12 There are few incentives to promote municipal and community energy production and distribution, and municipalities and communities have little access to resources.

13 There is an acute lack of space within Guatemalan politics for the creation of public forums that can serve as arenas for dialogue and negotiation for affected local com-munities. There are no common arenas where communi-ties, municipalities, companies and the state can all par-ticipate and take into account those affected by projects.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

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14 There is limited distribution of information about projects and there are no mechanisms for distributing information among affected communities, municipali-ties, state institutions, Councils of Development, etc. The multilingual context of Guatemala and the level of illiteracy, especially among indigenous people, is not taken into account. Studies are not translated into local languages.

15 The information process that does exist is one-way communication, where the communities’ knowledge, inputs and experiences are unimportant and there is little understanding of the situation of local communi-ties among companies and state institutions alike.

16 The criminalization of social protest is a primary concern, as well as the persecution, discrimination and intimidation of local leaders and activists. Expressing one’s opinion is a democratic right.

Recommendations To the Guatemalan state, the judiciary and developers:

1 Modify the legal and institutional framework for the energy sector so that it protects the rights of citizens, and especially the rights of indigenous peoples and their ter-ritories. Modify the General Law of Electricity to incorpo-rate the duties of the state in relation to the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.

2 Put in place a legal framework that prioritizes access to electricity for the country’s inhabitants and assures benefits for the municipalities, communities and the people of Guatemala.

3 Realize the implementation of ILO convention 169, . The obligation to consult is recognized in ILO conven-tion 169, ratified by Guatemala in 1996; in the Declara-

tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, approved by Guatemala in 2009; as well as other documents, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), human rights covenants and the American Convention on Hu-man Rights.

4 Proceed with the proposals and acknowledge the efforts to elaborate a law of consultation with indigenous peoples and other laws on indigenous rights that have been put forward.

5 Declare a moratorium on new licences and authoriza-tions on the use of rivers until a law of consultation is in place and adequate information is provided.

6 Create open and participatory spaces for dialogue with indigenous peoples and local communities to receive complete and objective information, resolve any doubts and concerns, and listen to inputs and local experiences.

7 Acknowledge, respect and strengthen the local consul-tation processes that are taking place.

8 Ensure that high-quality environmental impacts assess-ments (EIAs) are prepared by qualified consultants, with clear criteria and open participative processes. Elaborate a plan to improve EIAs in line with land use planning and integrated water resource management, in collaboration with local communities, and improve the terms of reference for preparing assessments. Robust and enforceable guidelines for relocation and compensation according to the unique community context must be included in any proposed project.

9 Draw up a water law that incorporates the rights of communities, the human right to water and indigenous peoples’ rights.

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10 View local communities as a potential partner in projects. Instead of buying their lands, the land should be rented (usufructo), giving the communities a share in the benefits and income from the projects.

11 Ensure open processes, access to and distribution of information to all the affected and involved actors. The 20-day limit to provide comments on EIAs must be extended. Information should be actively distributed, at no cost, to all affected parties.

12 Follow the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams.

To Norwegian and other foreign/international actors:

1 Norwegian aid policy should take as its starting-point the energy needs of the poor and their use of and access to natural resources, rather than adopting an approach that simply embraces “what we’re good at”. Norway should support comprehensive needs and options as-sessments – not just in the case of hydropower – that take into account environmental and social dimensions as much as financial and technical aspects. Furthermore, Norway should endorse the principle of free, prior and informed consent in hydropower development projects.

2 Norwegian and other foreign actors should be more critical of their partnerships with local companies. They should ensure that the government has consulted with the communities in question, and that companies have done their part to make available all information needed, and that the communities have been heard, and their needs and inputs have been taken into account.

3 Norwegian and other foreign actors should be particu-larly careful on the question of how the local company has acquired land, and make use of different sources, not just the company, to determine how land and prop-erty have been obtained. There should be higher stan-dards in terms of required local knowledge, to avoid a repetition of unfortunate incidents in the future.

4 Local communities should be viewed as possible partners in projects. Instead of buying their lands, the land should be rented, giving the communities a share in the benefits and income from the project.

5 An evaluation of how indigenous rights are to be respected and protected in projects should be included in preliminary studies financed by Norad and other international development institutions.

6 Companies requesting support to work in areas with indigenous groups should be required to prove their competence in the area or present a plan for how they are going to handle this issue, with independent moni-toring of the process.

7 Investigations related to the criminalization and perse-cution of human rights defenders should be promoted and supported. There is also a need to strengthen the monitoring of the situation of human rights defend-ers, especially those defending economic, social and cultural rights.

8 The government of the country of origin of internation-al companies should assure that the companies promote and respect human rights beyond their national borders.

9 International pressure should be applied to ensure that the agreed Plan of Reparation in the case of the Chixoy dam is signed and implemented by the national gov-ernment.

10 All investments made by Norwegian actors in indige-nous territories should be thoroughly reviewed to es-tablish clearly the impacts and potential benefits these investments might have on the legal, social, political, economic, and cultural situation of indigenous peoples.

11 All hydropower projects should be in line with the recommendations of the World Commission on Dams.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADIVIMA Association for the Integral Development of the Victims of Violence in the Verapaces, Maya Achi – Asociación para el Desarrollo Integral de las Víctimas de la Violencia en las Verapaces, Maya Achí

AGAII Guatemalan Association of Indigenous Mayors and Authorities – Asociación Guatemalteca de Alcaldes y Autoridades Indígenas

AGER Association of Renewable Energy Generators – La Asociación de Generadores con Energia RenovableAIN Norwegian Church Aid, Ayuda de la Iglesia de NoruegaAIRIP Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples – Acuerdo sobre Identitdad y Derecho

de los Pueblos Indigenas AMM The Wholesale Market Administrator – Administrador del Mercado Mayorista ANAM The National Association for Municipalities – la Asociación Nacional de Municipalidades de la

República de GuatemalaANG National Associations of Generators – Asociación Nacional de GeneradoresAPN Norwegian Peoples Aid – Ayuda Popular de NoruegaBKK Bergenhalvøens kommunale kraftselskapCABEI Central American Bank for Economic Integration CACIF Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations –

Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y FinancierasCALAS Centre for Legal, Environmental and Social action – El Centro de Acción Legal-Ambiental y Social CCAD Central American Commission on Environment and Development – Comisión Centroamericana

de Ambiente y Dessarrollo CDM Clean Development Mechanism CNEE National Commission for Electrical Energy – Comisión National de Energía Electrica COCAHICH Coordinating Committee of Communities Affected by the Chixoy Dam – Coordinadora de

comunidades afectadas por la hidroeléctrica ChixoyCONAP National Council of Protected Areas – Consejo Nacional de Areas ProtegidasCONAVIGUA Coordination of Guatemalan Widows – Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de GuatemalaCOPAE Comisión Pastoral Paz y EcologíaCUC Central Unitario Campesino CSR Corporate Social Responsibility DEOCSA Distribuidora de Electricidad de Occidente, Sociedad AnónimaDEORSA Distribuidora de Electricidad de Oriente, Sociedad AnónimaEBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentEDEE la Empresa de Distribución de Energia Electrica EEGSA Empresa Electrica de GuatemalaEGEE Empresa de Generación de Energía EIA Environmental Impact Studies EIB European Investment BankETCEE la Empresa de Transporte y Control de Energía ETS European Emissions Trading SystemFIVAS The Association for International Water Studies – Asociación de Estudios Internacionales de AguaFLACSO The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences – Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias SocialesFPIC Free, prior and informed consentHSBC The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited IADB/BID Inter-American Development Bank – Banco Interamericano de Dessarrollo

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ICERD The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)IFC International Finance Corporation IHA International Hydropower Association IMF International Monetary Fund INAB National Forest Institute – Insituto Nacional de Bosques INDE National Institute of Electrification – Instituto Nacional de ElectrificacciónINE Instituto Nacional de Estadística IUCN International Union for the Conservation of NatureLAG The Norwegian Solidarity Committee for Latin America – El Comité Noruego de Solidaridad

con América LatinaMAGA Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle and Food – Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Alimentación MARN Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources – Ministerio del Medioambiente y Recursos NaturalesMEM Ministry of Energy and Mining – Ministerio de Energía y Minas MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee AgencyMINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in GuatemalaNorad Norwegian Agency for Development CooperationNorfund Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing CountriesGIEK Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export CreditsNUPI Norwegian Institute of International Affairs OAS Organization of American States OP Optimo Finance AS PER Rural electrification Plan – Plan de Electrificacción RuralREIAS Renewable Energy Invest AS SAVIA School of Ecological Thought – Escuela de Pensamiento Ecologista SIEPAC Central American power interconnection system – Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica para

América CentralSIN Sistema Nacional InterconectadoSN Power Statkraft Norfund Power SUM Centre for Development and the Environment UMB University of Life Sciences UNAGRO Agrarian Owners Group – Unión Nacional AgropecuariaUNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples UNE Unidad Nacional de Esperanza UNHCR United Nations Refugee Council Union Fenosa Unión Eléctrica Fenosa Sociedad Anónima WCD The World Commission on Dams WRI World Resources Institute

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Meetings with organizations: • CALAS – Centre for Legal, Environmental and Social

Action – El Centro de Acción Legal-Ambiental y Social

(CALAS)

• Ceiba – Friends of the Earth – Amigos de la Tierra

• COCAHICH – Coordinating Committee of Communi-

ties Affected by the Chixoy Dam – Coordinadora de co-

munidades afectadas por la hidroeléctrica Chixoy

• CONAVIGUA – Coordination of Guatemalan Widows –

Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala

• CONIC – National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples

and Campesinos – Coordinadora nacional Indigena y

Campesina

• Consejo de los Pueblos del Occidente

• COPAE – Comisión Pastoral Paz y Ecología

• Copae – Comisión Pastoral Paz y Ecología

• CUC – Central Unitario Campesino

• Defensoria Maya

• Fundación Solar

• Madre Selva

• Moloj – Asocación Politica de Mujeres Mayas

• New Day’ Chortí Campesino Central Coordinator, part

of the Agrarian Platform – Nuevo Dia

• SAVIA – School of Ecological Thought – Escuela de

Pensamiento Ecologista

• Uk’ux B’e

Others: • Avancso – the Guatemalan Association for the Advance-

ment of the Social Sciences

• CEDER – Centre for Rural Development in Guatemala

• El Observador

• FLACSO – The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences

– Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias

• Inforpress

• OAS – Organization of American States

• Propaz

• Universidad Rafael Landivar

Meetings and observations in communities:• Communities in Zona Reina (Quiche)

• Communities in Zona Ichil (Quiche)

• La Libertad (Tajamulco, San Marcos)

• Playitas Copon (Uspantan, Quiche)

• Camotan, Jocotan (Chiquimula)

• Chel (Chajul, Quiche)

• Altaverapaz

Meetings with government:• AGAII – Guatemalan Association of Indigenous Mayors

and Authorities

• AMM – Wholesale Market Administrator – Administra-

dor del Mercado Mayorista

• ANAM – National Association for Municipalities – la

Asociación Nacional de Municipalidades de la República

de Guatemala

• CONAP – National Council of Protected Areas –

Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas

• INDE – National Institute of Electrification – Instituto

Nacional de Electrificacción

• MARN – Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources –

Ministerio del Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales

• MEM – Ministry of Energy and Mining – Ministerio de

Energía y Minas

Congress: • Energy and Mining Commission – Comisión de Energiay

Minas

• Environment and Natural Resources Commission –

Comisión de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales

Meetings/interviews with private sector and companies • AGER – Association of Renewable Energy Generators –

La Asociación de Generadores con Energia Renovable

• ANG – National Associations of Generators – Asociación

Nacional de Generadores

• Rio Hondo

• Hidroelectrica Pasabien

• ENEL representative

• Generación Limpia Guatemala

Norwegian actors: • SN Power

• AIN – Norwegian Church Aid, Ayuda de la Iglesia de

Noruega

• APN – Norwegian Peoples Aid – Ayuda Popular de

Noruega

• Norad – Norwegian Agency for Development Coopera-

tion

• Norfund – Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing

Countries

• Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala

• Guatemalan Embassy in Norway

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The community Playita Copon reject hydropower on the river Copón and Xalalá, no more violence, yes to peace. We respect the ILO convention 169 and articles 12-13-14-15-16-67 and 68 of the constitution.

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