INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES Potential Savings from Substituting Civilians for Military Personnel (Presentation) Stanley A. Horowitz INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 May 2014 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. IDA Document NS D-5193 Log: H 14-000580
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I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S
Potential Savings from Substituting Civilians for Military Personnel
(Presentation)
Stanley A. Horowitz
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882
May 2014
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
IDA Document NS D-5193
Log: H 14-000580
About this Publication The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring organization.
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (a)(16) [Sep 2011]
The Institute for Defense Analyses is a non-profit corporation that operatesthree federally funded research and development centers to provide objectiveanalyses of national security issues, particularly those requiring scientific andtechnical expertise, and conduct related research on other national challenges.
I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S
IDA Document NS D-5193
Potential Savings from Substituting Civilians for Military Personnel
(Presentation)
Stanley A. Horowitz
Potential Savings from Substituting Civilians for Military Personnel
Stan Horowitz June 2014
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government
Objective
Identify areas where it may be efficient to substitute some civilian personnel for military Provide rough estimates of potential savings Consider impediments to substitution
24 June 2014 1
Much of this is preliminary and is meant to identify directions for analysis
24 June 2014 2
Outline
Background and motivation Areas of opportunity Medical Cyber Infrastructure
Conclusions and suggestions
Civilian Personnel Have Been Substituted for Military
In almost all force and infrastructure categories, civilian staffing has risen more or fallen less than military staffing
In FY 2012 there were still > 500,000 active duty personnel in infrastructure positions
24 June 2014 3
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Active
Civilian
Staffing Changes between 2000 and 2012
Motivation There is pressure to cut civilian staff – management by input??
Medical: ban on mil-to-civ conversion; directed reduction in Army civilians Continuing civilian personnel caps FY 2013 NDAA emphasis on achieving savings in civilian workforce H.R. 4257: “Rebalance for an Effective Defense Uniform and Civilian Employees Act”
– 15% cut in civilians by 2021 American Enterprise Institute (AEI): “Hagel must rein in DoD civilian workforce”
DoD Policy (Instruction 1100.22) provides proper framework Identify mission requirements Determine whether inherently governmental Determine military essentiality Identify most efficient performer for non-military essential positions
Civilian personnel are generally less expensive than equivalent military DoDI 7041.04: compare full marginal costs Example in the instruction shows civilians cost 75% to 80% of military
Many military personnel seem to be in non-military essential jobs The pressure to cut civilians may be revealed to be misguided
24 June 2014 4
Criteria for Identifying Promising Areas for Civilianization
Functions where many do not deploy Less compelling case for military essentiality Generating forces; e.g., training, personnel
administration, acquisition support Non-deploying combat-related forces: e.g., many cyber,
non-operational medical, intelligence, UAVs Expanding, non-deploying functions where we are
soon likely to substantially increase the number of military personnel It’s easier to influence something before it exists Cyber and UAV workforce, for example
24 June 2014 5
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Army Medical Corps Specialties by Deployment Rate
Occupational Group Average Deployment Rate Average Deployment Rate, All Specialties Average Deployment Rate, Medical Specialties
Army Medical Deployment Rates (2001–2012)
24 June 2014 6
Fraction of man-years with at least one day deployed in the year.
Operationally required specialties deploy more than those primarily associated with beneficiary care Even the most deployed medical specialties had deployment rates below the Army average Other medically related corps display similar patterns
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7 24 June 2014 7
Potential to Use More Medical Civilians
Military medical staffing is greater than required to meet deployment/readiness requirements
Civilian medical personnel are cheaper than military Composite rate understates special pays and training costs Full (or any) cost is not evident to users of military personnel Civilian personnel have fewer overhead requirements; e.g.,
Graduate Medical Education (GME)
Ratio of military/civilian medical personnel varies by Service Army has most
aggressively civilianized Moving others to Army
ratio could save $500M/year (double in the long run)
24 June 2014 8
Medical Manpower: Observations and Recommendations
24 June 2014 9
Management information, incentives, and constraints inhibit choosing the most efficient mix of personnel
Recommendations Develop annual estimates of training cost by specialty Move more of the cost of military personnel into MILPERS account,
so programmers see it Develop pilot projects to allow organizations to trade expenditures
on military, civilian, and contractor personnel Remove prohibition to mil-civ conversion
The Cyber Workforce
The cyber workforce is expanding rapidly Services are forming various kinds of cyber teams USCYBERCOM provided guidance that this
workforce should be 80% military Service policies vary, but some meet or exceed
the 80% guidance Most cyber work is done in CONUS offices We are examining the extent to which the
positions are military-essential Savings may be possible. Training costs may be
high and retention difficult 24 June 2014 10
Selected Infrastructure Areas
Army usually has the highest fraction of civilians relative to military Moving all Services to same ratio as the highest Service could save $1.6B/year Examine rationales for military personnel; e.g., sea-shore rotation
11
0
5000
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15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
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Air Force Army Marines Navy
Departmental ManagementCiv
Departmental ManagementAD
Central Training Force Installations
Personnel Admin. Departmental Mgmt.
24 June 2014
Conclusions
Since 2000 we have been substituting civilians for military personnel
It likely saved a good deal of money There is strong, continuing pressure to reduce the
use of civilians in DoD under any circumstances. This is misguided
There are opportunities for further civilianization in the medical area, in other infrastructure activities, and probably in the cyber workforce
Fairly modest increases in civilianization would save several billion dollars a year – CBO agrees
24 June 2014 12
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