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Potential resurgence of AQIS: Sustained Shadow of Militancy over India?

1 Potential resurgence of AQIS: Sustained Shadow of Militancy over India?

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................ 1

FORMATION AND NOTABLE ATTACKS IN THE

SUBCONTINENT (SEPTEMBER 2014-JANUARY 2017) .... 2

CALL FOR ATTACKS AND REGIONAL RESPONSE ............. 4

CASE STUDY OF INDIA ................................................................. 5

Islamist militancy trends outside Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and

Northeast ............................................................................................................ 5

Radicalization attempts and the ‘resource pool’ ................................... 5

Kerala: Terror’s own country? ..................................................................... 6

Rest of Southern India .................................................................................... 6

Uttar Pradesh (UP) ........................................................................................... 7

West Bengal and Assam ................................................................................. 7

FORECAST ......................................................................................... 8

‘Joint Venture’ with local Militant groups ............................................... 8

Targeted killings: A means for societal radicalization ........................ 8

Possibility of a low intensity, high impact attacks ................................ 8


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Between November 25- 28, al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), a regional affiliate

of the transnational militant group al- Qaeda (AQ), released a new video and a

corresponding interview series with both categorically threatening attacks against

India. The first episode of the video series is titled ‘saffron terror’ and depicts alleged

‘Hindu extremism’ targeting Muslims in India. These social media releases’ follows the

publication of a document titled ‘Code of Conduct’, purportedly released by the AQ

chief Ayman al- Zawahiri in July. The document earmarked the targets that the militants

affiliated to the group should typically engage with in the Indian subcontinent over the

coming months.

The current report aims to analyse the overall operational capabilities of the jihadist

group in the region and its potential fallout in India. This will be done in reference to

precedence of major security-related incidents in the region, which have been linked to

AQIS. It further delves into the potential areas that are more likely to be susceptible to

the group's ideology in India, especially in the backdrop of the current state of

competition between AQ and its ‘peer-competitor’ Islamic State (IS). Finally, the report

will provide a brief forecast regarding the potential strategy of the group with the aim

of consolidating its presence in the country.


FORMATION AND NOTABLE ATTACKS IN THE SUBCONTINENT (SEPTEMBER 2014-JANUARY 2017) The formation of the militant group was announced in September 2014 by the head of

the AQ- central, Ayman al- Zawahiri. It was aimed at expanding the operational reach of

the group from its traditional strongholds, namely Middle East and Africa to South Asia.

However, given the timing of the announcement, it remains likely that the move was

aimed at making up for the loss of its popularity and credibility to IS in its former

bastions.

Since its inception, AQIS has perpetrated low-scale unsophisticated attacks (with the

exception of attack on PNS Zulfiqar), primarily involved in targeted killings of secular

bloggers, University professors and activists in both Bangladesh and Pakistan. No AQIS

attack has been recorded in India since its inception. Moreover, outside Afghanistan and

Pakistan, the group primarily operates through it affiliates like the Ansar Gazwat ul-

Hind (India), Ansar al Islam (Bangladesh) and Harkat al Yakin (Myanmar). The group has

no known operational presence in Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal or Maldives.

Pakistani police officer wounded in grenade attack in Karachi


Source: Countering Extremism Project


CALL FOR ATTACKS AND REGIONAL RESPONSE Since its inception and in the wake of major terror attacks since 2014, like the Peshawar

Despite major terror attacks since 2014, such as the Army Public School attack in

Peshawar and the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka’s Gulshan area in 2016 and the

like, no significant attacks have been attributed to this AQ regional affiliate. That being

said, AQIS continues to adhere to occasional low-intensity unsophisticated attacks.

Keeping that in mind, it remains to be ascertained if this was a result of lack of

capabilities of its cadres or its larger plan to minimise collateral damage. Both seem to

be equally plausible explanations. The prolonged security operations in the region have

significantly degraded the operational capabilities of the AQ affiliate as well as the

group’s aversion to cause major collateral damage, which, in turn, may result in the loss

of local support, on which it relies so heavily.

In case of India, Ansar Gazwat ul- Hind emerged in Kashmir after its commander, Zakir

Rashid Bhat better known as Zakir Musa, reportedly switched allegiance from his

former militant group Hizbul Mujahideen to AQIS. However, the proactive stance

adopted by the Indian security forces resulted in killing of two of the senior members of

the group in August in Kashmir, which is expected to have significantly weakened the

group. In addition, it also faces strong opposition from other Kashmiri militant groups,

endangering the AQIS’ survival in the valley. Finally, unconfirmed reports also indicate

the transnational militant group is unpopular among the local Kashmiri masses.


CASE STUDY OF INDIA

Islamist militancy trends outside Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab and Northeast

Active militancy continues to be restricted to India’s Jammu and Kashmir and the

Northeast, with rest of the country witnessing a significant decline in being a target over

the recent years. The overall sophistication of these attacks and the ensuingcasualties

have also recorded a noticeable dip. In case of Islamic militancy, as on December 1, no

security-related incidents have been recorded in 2017.

Radicalization attempts and the ‘resource pool’ Like IS, AQ has also been involved in recruitment activities for its ranks throughout the

subcontinent. A closer examination of the radicalization process indicates that the latter

has adopted a similar methodology like the former in terms of effective social media

Source: SATP


campaigns through its media arm As- Sabah. Radicalization-linked material is

disseminated in local languages like Bengali, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil and Malayalam to

enhance its reach to the local population. A closer view of the language content and

choice highlights the new-found interest of the militant group to rope in cadres from

across the country, including southern India.

Kerala: Terror’s own country? The development is especially interesting against the backdrop of the developments in

the state of Kerala, which has recorded one of the highest number of IS- inspired

individuals joining or planning to join IS in the Middle East and Afghanistan from India.

Moreover, a sizable amount of the local population in the state is based out of the Middle

East, where they are more likely to be exposed to the elements involved in the

radicalization process. Some of these entities in turn have been reported to participate

in recruitment activities and even as sleeper cells. The conditions, especially in northern

Kerala’s Kasaragod, Kannur and adjoining areas have recorded maximum militancy

recruitment related instances from the state. One of the possible reasons that could

have resulted in this pattern of recruitment and radicalization could be lack of adequate

job opportunities among the educated middle and upper middle-income groups which

has directed them towards the radicalized elements. However, there is no empirical

evidence to prove this connection between radicalization of individuals and their socio-

economic conditions in Kerala. Moreover, homegrown Islamic fundamentalist groups

like Popular Front in India (PFI), which have been suspected of having been involved in

militancy related activities in the state are also the ‘go-to’ groups for these disgruntled

elements.

Rest of Southern India Reports indicate that groups like Tamil Ansar and Olivin Charathu, Syria through Indian

Eyes regularly update information on AQ and its activities in Syria in Tamil and

Malayalam. In addition to this, militant groups like the Base Movement, which claims to

have been affiliated to AQ have launched multiple low-intensity IED attacks across

multiple states including Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Though at

the time of writing, no direct linkage between the AQIS and the local terror groups in


the region have been credibly established, there still remains a great potential for the

same.

Uttar Pradesh (UP) While the al Qaeda leadership has distinctly tried to capitalize on areas that have

witnessed communal tensions, especially as they serve as perfect breeding grounds for

radicalization, Uttar Pradesh, with multiple instances of communal violence in recent

past, remains one of the preferred ‘recruitment destinations’. In the case of AQ in UP,

precedence suggests that intelligence agencies have recovered sizable amount of leads

and carried out multiple arrest raids in UP’s Sambhal district. However, the reach and

spread of influence of the militant group is not stipulated to the district itself but has

been estimated to have expanded across multiple districts in the state. Moreover, with

the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) winning a majority in UP, the narrative of

possible persecution of the minority Muslim population is likely to be used as a pretext

by AQ and its affiliates for recruitment purposes. Its latest video release titled ‘saffron

terror’ further bolsters this argument.

West Bengal and Assam The relatively porous nature of borders between India and Bangladesh, coupled with

prolonged security operations in Bangladesh have led to at least some of the militants

infiltrating into India primarily through at least two states and AQ affiliates like Ansar al

Islam is no exception to this norm. Illegal immigrants have exploited the existing security

loopholes which are partly attributed to the topography of the region as well as the

operational constraints of the security forces. This can thus enable the transnational

militant group to exploit the situation to its advantage by coordinating attacks in India

or Bangladesh from the outlying border areas, especially with lesser security cover

facilitating the setting up of perfect logistical bases.

Finally, with the territorial reverses faced by IS in the Middle East, the jihadist group is

fast losing its sheen, potentially making way for AQ and its affiliates to expedite its

recruitment process in the absence of credible competition in the region. Given the

pattern of radicalization which is more evident in specific areas of the country, AQ is

likely to concentrate its attention on these areas.


FORECAST

‘Joint Venture’ with local Militant groups In the absence of a stable presence in the subcontinent in general and India in particular,

owing to a host of operational and ideological constraints, AQIS is likely to align itself

with local militant groups. By this logic, AQIS is more likely to align with certain

disgruntled elements of banned Islamist groups like Students Islamic Movement of India

(SIMI), Islamic Research Foundation (IRF) to name a few which have a pan-India

presence and a wide follower base. This view is further bolstered by the fact that some

of the perpetrators of the Dhaka attack in July 2016 are known to have been inspired

by the influential IRF speaker Zakir Naik. Similarly, in Bangladesh, AQIS may attempt to

influence certain elements affiliated with Islamist groups like Hefazat-e-Islam, which

has a broad support base and shares similar ideology. This enables the transnational

group to achieve wider logistical support base, facilitating its larger goal of gaining an

operational presence.

Targeted killings: A means for societal radicalization While the threat from AQIS in the subcontinent does not emanate from its capabilities

(or lack of it) to launch sophisticated militant attacks, but aimed at a larger goal of

societal radicalization through targeted killings of ‘secular’ bloggers and activists. This

in the long run serves as aperfect breeding ground for propagating the militant ideology.

By this logic, the group is more likely to succeed in Bangladesh and Pakistan which has

witnessed a surge in radicalization of the local population as opposed to the case in India.

At best, the strategy may witness some success in specific areas which had a history of

communal tensions and perceived sense of marginalization by local minority groups.

Possibility of a low intensity, high impact attacks Keeping in mind the operational and ideological constraints and considering the best

possible scenario, the militant group is more likely to resort to low intensity- high impact

attacks like train derailments. Given the high density of rail network in the state of UP,

coupled with relatively lax security cover, rail infrastructure continues to remain more

susceptible to attacks.


This view is further bolstered by a September 2014 report quoting the Intelligence

Bureau (IB) which states that AQ intends to target commercial centres, tourist

destinations, religious places, aviation sector, railways infrastructure and BJP offices in

various states, including West Bengal and Assam. That being said, lonewolf vehicular

and stabbing attacks, like those witnessed in Europe, remain likely to be replicated. This

may manifest in targeted killings of local political figures and supporters similar to those

reported in Kerala, in case of assassination of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)

over the preceding months. However, the efficacy of such attacks in deriving a similar

psychological impact as compared to the more traditional forms of attacks like IED and

shooting attacks remains likely to be limited.


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