Post Tsunami Reconstruction and the Eastern Muslim Question

Post Tsunami Reconstruction and the Eastern MuslimQuestion

Discussion Paper based on a CPA-Field Mission to Ampara and BatticaloaMarch 16th -18th

Presented at the Seminar on ‘The Eastern Muslim Question’ held on March 31st

2005 at Hotel Renuka.

Mirak Raheem, Research Associate, Peace and Conflict Analysis Unit, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Fara Haniffa, Senior Research Fellow, Social Scientists’Association [1]

While negotiating a settlement that meets both their interests,

the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have had to confront the needs of the Muslim

people. The Muslim Community’s place as a primary stakeholder

in the peace process is widely acknowledged, as is its role for

the success of any durable solution to the ethnic conflict. [2]

Yet, the means of their inclusion into the peace process, and

the particular role they will play are by no means agreed.  The

‘Eastern Muslim Question’ that we plan to address today refers

primarily to the socio-political situation of the Muslims of

the Eastern Province in the aftermath of the Tsunami of

December 26th 2004, the recent killings involving Muslims and

the response to this situation both by the community and other

key actors. While acknowledging the critical importance of

recognizing and addressing the needs and aspirations of the

Muslims of the NorthEast as a whole, this paper will focus

particularly on the issues of Muslims from the districts of

Batticaloa and Ampara. While we recognize the importance and

distinctiveness of the needs and aspirations of the Muslims of

Trincomalee, as well as those expelled from Jaffna, Mannar and

Vanni the overlap of the issues facing the Muslim communities

across the NorthEast, this paper is based primarily on research

specific to the above two districts, namely Batticaloa and

Ampara.

This paper will examine three key issues that form part of ‘the Eastern

Muslim Question’:

1)                 The impact of the tsunami – the Eastern Muslim perspective of

post-tsunami relief and reconstruction as at 18th March 2005

2)                 The security situation in the East – the impact of

the recent spate of killings as a result of the struggle

between the LTTE and the Karuna faction on the Muslim

community.  

3)                 The peace process – examining the attempts by the Muslim

community to become a party to the track 1 peace talks and attempts to

resolve issues on the ground.

This report is based both on interviews in Colombo and a three

day field trip to Ampara and Batticaloa Districts, and the

border area of Welikanda, Polonnaruwa District from the 16th-

18th of March 2005. Meetings were conducted with Muslim

community leaders in Ampara town, Batticaloa town and

Maruthamunai, government officials in the GA’s office Ampara

and the LTTE. The research team conducted interviews in Colombo

with key stakeholders including leaders of Muslim political

parties and civil society. The research team consisted of Dr

Devanesan Nessiah, Dr Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, Fara

Haniffa, Mirak Raheem and Ruwani Wickramsinghe. 

Background : Muslim identity and ethnicity in the conflict

The question of Muslim ethnicity and identity is one that

haunts the peace process. It is not something that has been of

issue for Sinhala dominated governments, be they UNP- or SLFP-

led coalitions, but is constantly raised in various forms by

the LTTE and other Tamil political actors. This issue of

ethnicity is important in placing Muslims within the narrative

of Tamil nationalism. Historically, there has been recognition

by Tamil leaders- beginning with Ponnambalam Ramanathan who

opened the can of worms in the first place [3] - that the

Muslims have a right to their own origin story and to emphasize

an identity based on religion rather than language. However,

the LTTE has had a history of insisting on the ‘Tamilness’ of

Muslims and of calling Muslims Islamiya Thamizar—as Tamils

practicing Islam, falling within the totality of the Tamil

nation. Muslims’ repeated refusal to be thus categorized, and

the difficulty that such refusal poses for the narrative of

Tamil nationalism and its category of Tamil speaking people has

meant that the LTTE castigates Muslims as traitors. [4]

As Muslims are quick to point out, and as Dr. S. Hasbullah has

argued recently, Tamil nationalism had never worked out a

position for the Muslims whom it claimed as part of the polity

that it represented. [5] At no point were the specific

interests of the Muslims, their lack of access to adequate land

or their educational backwardness, for instance, highlighted as

an issue pertinent for Tamil nationalist agitation. And as

Taraki’s column recently stated even now the LTTE does not have

a clear position regarding the Muslims. [6] Regardless of the

fact that many Muslims, especially from the Eastern province

saw common cause with Tamilness, to the extent that they were

participants of the Tamil Nationalist struggle, the LTTE never

had a clearly thought out policy with regards to the Muslims.

The latter is true of all the armed groups, although some had

more Muslim representation in their rank and file than others. 

The particular category, by which Muslims can be identified therefore, is

still disputed by the LTTE. Some of the high level Muslim representatives

that we talked to also mentioned the fact that this currently takes the

form of LTTE reluctance to concede the Muslims a political identity even as

they grudgingly accept their right to a cultural identity. Despite the

differing views regarding identity, it must be emphasized that the LTTE

representatives in the Eastern Province whom we met seemed to be, publicly

at least, accommodating of Muslims’ socio-economic space in the North-East.

The current LTTE Eastern leadership that we met stressed that they were

working at building bridges with the Muslim community, recognizing the

importance of winning over their support. However, the place of Muslims

within the narrative of Tamil nationalism is a cause for concern,

particularly regarding the place of Muslims in any Tamil administered Tamil

homeland.

The background to the ethnic violence in the East is fairly

well known today. Patterns of coexistence in the Eastern

Province were often peppered by incidents of localized Tamil-

Muslim violence. These were mainly specific to certain villages

and would end within the course of the day in the face of the

need for coexistence for daily business. However in the mid to

late 1980s the polarization became more marked with the

involvement of armed elements: the Indian Peace Keeping Force

(IPKF), the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, and Tamil militants. The

Tamil Muslim Riots of 1985, the siege of Kattankudi in 1987,

the IPKF bombing of Ottamavadi, the Mosque massacres of

Katankudi and Eravur, the disappearance of the Haj pilgrims

from Kurukkal Madam are all pivotal moments for Muslims in

recounting their victimization due to the conflict.

Additionally inhabitants of 33 Muslim villages in the

Batticaloa district were displaced during the conflict. Most of

these people moved to the densely populated town of Kattankudi

further swelling the population of that town. The loss of land

and property owned by Muslims which was taken over by the LTTE

or Tamil farmers further compounded Muslim grievances. The 1990

expulsion of Muslim in the North by the LTTE and the resulting

15 year displacement of the Northern Muslims have often been

attributed, in discussions, to the disturbances in the East.

Certain small scale reprisal killings of Tamils by Muslims in

the aftermath of militant attacks have also been recorded.

These were largely by Muslim Home Guards with overt and cover

support from the Special Task Force (STF). Further, Muslims in

the East are accused of questionable land acquisitions and are

perceived as taking advantage of Tamil misfortune. Muslim

purchasing of paddy land from Tamil absentee landlords, buying

up Tamil owned shops, the creeping spread of Muslim villages

into Tamil villages is part of the contemporary reality of the

Eastern Province. Any illegality in this process is not yet

established, however Tamil and specifically LTTE resentment of

this process has been recorded.  

 Impact of the Tsunami

The tsunami of December 26th 2004 had an immense impact on the

Muslim communities of the Eastern Province. In terms of sheer

loss of life and damage to private property the Eastern Muslims

have been, both in terms of the proportion to the overall

Muslim population and in actual figures, “the most affected

community.”  It is estimated that approximately half of the

close to 30,000 people killed in the tsunami are Muslim.

Kalmunai and Sainthamarudhu stand out as some of the most

severely affected areas in the country, but are just a few of

the numerous Muslim communities along the Eastern shoreline

that were affected.

While the tsunami-recovery process has shifted from emergency

relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Muslims of the

Eastern Province have become increasingly disgruntled as to how

they have been treated. Their critique of the recovery process

is two-fold:  they find the pace of rehabilitation and

reconstruction to be too slow, and feel discriminated against

in relation to the South. Their protest over the pace of the

government’s post-tsunami response bears resemblance to similar

criticisms made across the island in tsunami-affected areas. As

numerous newspaper articles attest the complaints of long

delays are common to all affected parts of the country.  The

sluggish pace at which the issue of housing, be it moving

displaced people from welfare camps or the allocation of

alternative land for permanent housing in light of the coastal

buffer zone, has been addressed is a source of frustration and

distress for the tsunami victims and those involved in tsunami

assistance. Constructing temporary shelters for the displaced

is considered a priority for the Ampara district. There is

confusion about land purchase and acquisition by the government

for both temporary and permanent shelter, questions were raised

about the structure of the permanent shelter- whether it should

have one or two rooms. There was also considerable skepticism

about the government plan to construct apartments.   Tsunami

victims also complain of being ignored by the government and of

not having received adequate relief in the form of basic items

such as food, tools and implements for re-starting livelihoods.

This criticism is heavily coloured by a feeling of

discrimination on the part of the Eastern Muslims. This

perception of discrimination is founded on the belief that the

pace of recovery is particularly slow in the East, given that

the state structure’s focus is on the South. Frustration was

also voiced at the delays caused by officials of key agencies

like TAFREN and the UDA making little more than token

appearances in the region. This feeling is further compounded

in that Eastern Muslims believe that as “the most affected

community” they have not received assistance proportionate to

their losses. The CPA field mission did not, because of the

mission’s purpose and time constraints, seek to take up the

task of examining the comparative relief and reconstruction

efforts and issues of delivery.  We cannot, therefore comment

on the legitimacy of this claim. What can be said is that there

was clear feeling among the tsunami victims, voiced by

interviewed community leaders, politicians and members of civil

society, of feeling ignored and anger at the pace of

reconstruction on the ground. A striking development that we

were told about was the response of the Marathamunai community.

Faced with the destruction and displacement suffered by its

community and the lack of government action and interest, the

people took to the streets both to highlight their problems and

bring the GA to the village. (The official had not visited the

village since the tsunami) The GA was then presented a set of

proposal drawn up by the community. The proposals, as explained

to us, included designs for two storey apartment style

buildings demonstrating the community’s determination to find

creative solutions to the pressing post-tsunami problems, and

involved a participatory approach.     

The destruction along the Eastern coastline of Amapara district

was clearly phenomenal and much of the rubble of destroyed

dwellings remained at the sites three months after the event.

As far as we could see there was much less clearing here than

in the South or even in the LTTE controlled Mullaitivu coastal

region. [7] We observed persons clearing debris and stacking

bricks from what seemed to be their own houses. Several

practical difficulties regarding the distance from Colombo as

well as the local organization of the town were cited as

reasons for this state of affairs.  For instance the

difficulties of bringing heavy machinery to Ampara through not

very good roads, and the near-impossibility of moving these

machines and vehicles from the main road to the beach through

the narrow streets common to these coastal towns were

mentioned.  The assertion was also made that people were loathe

to let their houses be completely demolished, or let others do

the clearing as they would then lose the markers of their

properties. Many structures remained only partially damaged and

we observed people constructing makeshift dwellings in the

shells of their former homes. Despite being aware of the

government notification regarding the 200 meter buffer zone the

displaced people seem to have returned in significant numbers

to their partially damaged homes well inside the 200 meter

zone. Officials indicated however that there would be

flexibility regarding the enforcement of this zone. There would

be no demolition or eviction of people who were currently

residing there. People were free to move in at their own risk.

In keeping with the general trend through out the island here

too the majority of the casualties were women and children.

There were many theories produced as to why so many women were

trapped. Some of the stories indicated that the women were

trapped while trying to save children, that they were trapped

by their clothing or by their reluctance to emerge without

clothes. Others stated that the high parapet walls around each

property coupled with the fact that the access roads were

extraordinarily narrow were more significant as a cause for why

so many women were trapped. It was also clear that as elsewhere

women suffered greatly from the insecurity of camp life and

that the need for temporary shelters, at a minimum, was great. 

Permanent housing and land shortage particularly in light of

the proposed buffer zone, was an issue that was brought to our

attention. Due to the scarcity of land the settlements on the

Kalmunai coastal belt had ventured very close to the waterline

and we observed many large elaborately built homes- especially

in Kalmunai and Sainthamarathu- on the beach itself. The land

crunch produced by the imposition of the 200 meter buffer zones

was described to us repeatedly in terms of a common Eastern

Province custom- that of the dowry.  We were told that it was

the custom amongst Eastern Province Muslims that each daughter

was invariably provided with her own house at the time of

marriage. The loss of the 200 meters was therefore significant

in that many of those households will not be able to provide

their daughters with a dowry. They stated also that the flats

that were proposed for the area as an alternative to land would

not be acceptable for the same reason.  It was also pointed out

that one of the particular problems included providing houses

for couples from affected families that married after the

Tsunami. Given the insecurity of the conditions that they lived

in many families were opting to finalise marriages for children

that were of age.  Further, the communal living suggested by

the common access ways etc. of the flats was considered

unsuitable. Some of the plans that we saw for the two story

flats had provision for private entrances. Clearly the socio

cultural repercussions of the disaster will be many.

People’s resentment at the endless delays was directed at two

key actors: central government and Muslims politicians of all

political hues. The failure of central government to manage and

execute an appropriate response to the tsunami disaster was

cited by some of the interviewees. In Maruthamunai, the

community perceived the GA not visiting their area for several

weeks since the Tsunami as symptomatic of central government

apathy and disregard of the tsunami victims and their plight.

With regards to discrimination, leading politicians cited

examples such as the level of assistance provided to Panama, a

predominantly Sinhala area, relative to the damage it suffered,

as the influence of a district level bureaucracy heavily

weighted in favour of the Sinhalese.  The Sinhala-centric

nature of the central government was cited as a crucial factor

in the historically discriminatory allocation of land that is

said to continue to this day. Hence, the allocation of land for

resettlement of the Tsunami affected is constrained, we were

told, both by bureaucratic red tape and discriminatory land

allocation policies. 

The Land Question and Ethnic Boundaries

Land is an old issue in the Eastern Province.  It is the

heartland of post colonial state colonisation schemes which

drastically altered demographic patterns in the province and

the site of the country’s first post colonial communal riot

(directly linked to colonization schemes). To this date land

remains highly ethnicized in this part of the country. Muslim

owned land in LTTE controlled “uncleared areas” that Muslims

have only limited access to are a deeply felt issue amongst the

Muslims. Such a situation has been exacerbated by

administrative mistakes that have morphed into ethnic issues.

For instance, we were told of one case where two sets of

permits for chenna cultivation had been given for the same

parcel of land, Administratively speaking Muslim DS divisions

constitute a miniscule percentage of land occupation and

Muslims in both Amapara and Batticaloa expressed great

dissatisfaction with the unavailability of land for their use.

The case of the Ampara district where the state and Sinhala

settlements are allotted 76% of the district while Muslims and

Tamils have 15% and 9% respectively is a case in point. In

Batticaloa District it was pointed out that Muslims, ¼ of the

population, enjoyed 40 square kilometers of an area of over

1400 square kilometers. The central problem of land shortage

faced by the tsunami affected communities North of

Attalachchenai is intimately linked to the issue of ethnic

delimitation of DS divisions and the unwritten law that insists

that the ethnic balance within these divisions is not altered.

Amapara District in particular, and the Eastern Province in

general, seems ripe for the revisiting of the issue of

ethnicised land allocation. A story related by many during our

visit to Ampara was how a community of several Muslim and Tamil

families in the Pottuvil DS division were willing to settle

together in a spot of land about a kilometer inland from where

they used to live but were not allowed to do so due to

ethnicised land allocation. Apparently before plans were

completed for resettlement it was revealed that the land

selected belonged in fact to the Sinhala DS division of

Lahugala and was, therefore unavailable for the settlement of

Tamils and Muslims. This example was repeatedly cited by

government and NGO officials as typical of the ethnicised

nature of land in the district.  

The failure of Muslims politicians of the East to provide an

effective response to the tsuanmi disaster was criticized by

community leaders, civil society representatives and by the

politicians themselves. Ampara for instance has 12 Muslim

Members of Parliament and has representation at the cabinet

level, yet they have been unable to make a significant

difference, we were told. The explanations for this ranged from

the general lack of influence of MPs to inadequate use of

leverage by MPs currently in the coalition government serving

as cabinet ministers. In addition to the inability of Muslim

MPs to provide for their constituencies, the divisiveness of

the Muslim political leadership and its attempts at gaining

short term political mileage were cited as key obstacles to the

development of clear direction in dealing with the tsunami

disaster. We were told both by a leading politician and a local

aid worker in Ampara of an example of this with regards to the

resettlement of communities from coastal areas. Families who

have agreed to move inland and have given their consent to

their grama niladari find themselves not just under pressure

from their respective communities but also from politicians who

do not want their vote banks been broken up and who also see

political gains to be made from merely opposing any political

initiative that might be proposed by a rival politician.  

Complaints were also made about politicians’ investing

resources in costly, high budget, high visibility projects to

the detriment of other quicker, more community-friendly and

practicable solutions.

The lack of rapid and adequate resettlement coupled with an increasing

perception of being ignored is creating a groundswell of resentment. The

Mardhamunai community took to the streets in early March protesting the

slow pace of recovery and the GA not visiting the area since the tsunami.

While this protest went off peacefully and achieved its target of getting

central government to agree to act on its behalf, other protests may prove

more unruly, leading to violence and increased anger at government

inefficiency and apathy that could snowball across the East Coast.

The lack of Muslim representation in the on-going negotiations

between GoSL and LTTE for a Joint-Mechanism for tsunami

recovery has created further suspicion among Eastern Muslims.

The joint mechanism will be responsible for the supervision and

allocation of resources for the post-tsunami recovery process,

with the LTTE expected to gain a majority say in the decision-

making process of that mechanism. According to recent newspaper

reports, the mechanism will consist of an apex body and

district bodies reflecting the ethnic ratio of populations in

each district. The politicians interviewed all complained of a

lack of consultation with the representatives of the Muslim

Community. Thus, the Muslims find themselves in a difficult

position as they realize that despite the extent to which they

have been affected they are being sidelined in the planning

stages of a mechanism that will have a decisive impact on the

recovery process. Their main fear is that they will be

presented with a fait accompli that will provide the LTTE with

the key powers leaving little room for Muslim input into

decision making with regards to Muslim areas.   In addition,

the Muslim experience of NorthEast institutions, be they the

NorthEast Provincial Council or the Subcommittee on Immediate

Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), has been one of

limited representation and a lack of effective decision-making

powers. Disquiet at the LTTE being made responsible for the

entire NorthEast came up in many of the conversations, and is a

fundamental issue that must be addressed by the government, the

LTTE, Norwegian facilitators and civil society. The joint

mechanism, whether it is linked to the peace process or not,

will be a basis upon which an interim administration will be

founded. The exclusion of Muslims therefore, poses risks to the

recovery and peace processes, and to the future of Muslim

representation in the North East administration.

Security Situation

Despite the death and destruction the tsunami created, it offered renewed

hope in the cooperation and goodwill between the various communities,

thereby reinforcing faith in the ability of the communities to live in

relative harmony and to find a sustainable peace. The steady deterioration

of the security situation over the last two months has, however put

tremendous strain on Tamil-Muslim relations with a risk of aggravating

already existing tensions and of escalating the individual acts of violence

into communal responses.

The deterioration of the security situation over the last few

weeks has been largely due to the opening up of a ‘new front’

between the LTTE and the Karuna faction. While the LTTE Vanni

faction succeeded in crushing Karuna’s attempt at securing

control of LTTE held areas in the East in April 2004 Karuna’s

faction or the Tamil National Army as it calls itself has

apparently re-established itself as a combat group. Muslims

have found themselves caught in the middle of this conflict,

becoming the victims of killings, abductions and threats in

this internecine struggle. While the recent spate of LTTE-

Karuna faction killings, that increased after the assassination

of Kaushalyan, (LTTE Political Head of Batticaloa and Ampara),

have taken place from Welikanda all the way down to Tirukovil

the killings and abductions of Muslims have occurred primarily

on the border areas of Batticaloa and Welikanda, Polonnaruwa

District. Some of the key incidents include: 

March 5 - 4 Muslims were killed along with 1 Tamil and 1 Sinhalese in

Kolakanawadiya, between Welikanda and Manampitiya on the Batticaloa-

Polonnaruwa highway.

March 8 - 4 Muslims from Oddamavaadi go missing, leads to protest. They re-

appear following SLMM reports that they were found in the jungle hiding

from elephants

March 9 – A Muslims three-wheel driver, Abdul Raheem Hammed on hire from

Oddamawadi, was abducted near Kajuwatte and killed.

The identity of the killers and abductors is by no means

confirmed but the link to the LTTE- Karuna faction struggle is

more or less established. The killings have created a climate

of fear, intrigue and suspicion, with knock-on effects not just

for Muslim-LTTE relations but for Muslim-Tamil relations in

general. Muslims have got caught up in the internecine conflict

as the two sides have accused Muslim civilians of collaborating

with the other. In Muslim villages surrounding the Karuna Camp

in Thivichchenai, Welikanda the level of fear has increased

exponentially due to the presence of armed paramilitary

personnel. One resident told the field mission that this level

of fear was far greater than at any period during the conflict.

People are afraid to move at night and relations with their

neighbouring Tamil village which were maintained throughout the

conflict have deteriorated. Then, an unsigned leaflet was

distributed in Kattankudy on March 16th reminding the Muslims

of what they had suffered under the LTTE and asking them why

the LTTE was so interested in re-building relationships with

the Muslim community at this specific time. The Muslim

community acknowledges that there are ‘other parties’ at work

trying to create tensions between the LTTE and Muslims. In this

atmosphere of fear and suspicion rumours are rife, adding to

the tension as armed actors play out their struggle against

each other and as opportunists attempt to destabilize the

delicate balance between the communities in the East. The

Muslims have responded with demands for intervention by the

state, international community and the two fighting sides and

organized protests such as the two day protest in Valaichennai

after the murder of Abdul Rahim.  

The ideal solution to this security crisis for the Muslim community would,

obviously, be to bring an end to the cycle of violence between the LTTE and

Karuna Faction. The Muslims are not in any position to make the parties

accede to this demand. The GoSL, at least at this moment in time, sees

little advantage in disbanding and disarming the Karuna faction that

operates out of government controlled areas and border areas, or in taking

action against members of the Sri Lankan Forces directly assisting this

faction. The LTTE in turn, are not willing to recognize the Karuna faction

as an independent force, therefore brining them into the Ceasefire

Agreement or giving them the political space to function as a political

party is a near impossibility. Hence, the deterioration of the ground

situation is set to continue.

In addition to the direct impact on the Muslim community, the

violence has had severe repercussions for Muslim-LTTE

relations. Following the assassination of Kaushalyan,

Thamilchelvan and key LTTE leaders met Muslim leaders from

Batticaloa to consolidate the LTTE’s bonds with the Muslim

community. However, despite the promises to ensure security for

the community the LTTE has failed to stem the tide of violence.

The perception that the LTTE has been responsible for some, if

not all the killings of Muslim civilians, has only furthered

the distrust of the Muslim community towards the LTTE. Thus,

the Muslims who talked to the field mission – including members

of the North East Peace Assembly (NEMPA) that had previously

had some success working with the LTTE - voiced their fears

that nothing of substance will emerge out of the engagement

process with the LTTE, and that it will only serve as a

propaganda ploy for the group. The security situation is a

pressing issue that requires immediate attention as it poses a

threat to the entire Eastern Province given the escalation in

violence and it may only be a matter of time before a factional

struggle becomes a communal one. 

The Peace Process

The inclusion of Muslims within the Peace Process has been an

ongoing struggle, particularly since the Indo-Lanka accord of

1987.  During the honeymoon period that followed the signing of

the Memorandum of Understanding on February 22nd 2002 there was

some softening of the LTTE stance on the Muslims. For instance

Anton Balasingham’s comment at Pirabhakaran’s Press Conference

on the 1990 expulsion (“strategic blunder”), the 2002

Pirabhakaran-Hakeem meeting in the Vanni, the subsequent

Hakeem-Balansingham meeting at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in

London, were considered successful preludes to Muslim

inclusion. The ultimately negotiated prize was the right of

participation granted to Rauf Hakeem within the government

delegation as the leader of the SLMC and a leader of the Muslim

Community, not as a member of the cabinet. Hakeem was to then

lead the Muslim delegation to the second round of peace talks.

This insistence by the LTTE on highlighting Hakeem’s position

as SLMC leader was taken as a sign of the LTTE’s acceptance of

Muslims’ aspirations. Another story recounted to us was that

four places were designated at the conference table for the

government, the LTTE, the Norwegians and the Muslims when the

latter were to arrive as a separate delegation. Muslims

expected to participate at the second round of talks. However

the second round never materialized. The several meetings that

were subsequently held were termed the second session of the

first round and so on. The reason for delaying the Muslim

inclusion became an issue of postponement until “an appropriate

time.” 

The Subcommittees on Immediate Humanitarian Issues (SIHRN) and

the Subcommittee on Gender Issues did not include Muslims as a

third party but as part of the government representation. The

point made then and often afterwards was that the talks are

initial stages and as such can only be between the aggressors,

regardless of the fact that such decisions would have serious

effects on the Muslim population residing in those districts.

The inclusion of the SLMC leader as part of the negotiations

team was an important achievement for the Muslims. Although a

separate Muslim delegation was not recognized, his inclusion as

leader of the largest Muslim party was seen as a positive sign.

However, in retrospect, its symbolic import – the leader of the

Muslim Congress participating as a member of the government

delegation- could also be read as Muslims being regarded as a

part of the Sri Lankan state. Seeing Muslims as a part of the

state is consistent with the position taken by the LTTE to

refuse separate Muslim participation in the current peace

process.  Further, the inclusion of the terms “at an

appropriate time” on each of the pronouncements on the process

is something that requires further clarification. [8]   The

LTTE holds to its stance of refusing Muslim representation

until the discussion of “relevant and substantive political

issues.” The LTTE must be persuaded to recognize that

normalization talks too need Muslim representation given that

issues of Muslim return to the North and Muslim-Tamil relations

in the East are crucial questions that must be addressed in any

such forum. Recent LTTE calls for the inclusion of Muslims

within a joint mechanism is a promising sign but it is yet to

be seen if anything will materialize from it. The LTTE argument

that only those that carried arms can be privy to the initial

talks, Tamil politicians’ raising the question of whether

Muslims have earned the right to participate on an equal

footing, etc. is interpreted by both the Muslim

parliamentarians and some young Muslim student groups as a

statement that their failure has been to not engage in armed

struggle.  

Both the UNP and the UPFA have indicated their agreement, in

principle, to the participation of Muslims in the peace

process. However, neither has clearly committed to the

inclusion of a separate Muslim delegation at the outset.

Previous experience indicates that neither is especially

committed to the issue and the extent of their commitment might

in fact be directly related to the clout that Muslim MPs have

in bringing coalition governments into power. [9] It seems

likely that the ruling parties in government of either hue will

have no compunctions about under emphasizing Muslim interests

in order to bring the LTTE to the table. The Norwegians too are

focused on the GoSL and LTTE – the Muslim demands at best are

one of the tougher issues that need to be negotiated between

the two parties to the conflict, at worst an impediment to a

peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. In relation to

the joint mechanism to address the Tsunami affected areas, the

LTTE and the Government seem to be making decisions with no

consultation of Muslims. While Muslim representation within the

mechanism has been suggested, Muslims so far have not been

publicly consulted at any level of the planning process. It is

unclear if the Muslim MPs in the government have been privy to

such discussions either.

Clearly, the joint mechanism will serve as a model for the

interim authority for the NorthEast and will accordingly have

far reaching consequences for the Muslims. It is imperative

therefore that there is consultation of both Muslim

parliamentarians and local Muslim civil society organizations

that have been doing work with those affected by the tsunami. 

Political Representation of the Eastern Muslim Community

The history of Muslim representation has mainly been one of

affiliation with larger parties. While the UNP and later the

SLFP, to a lesser extent, was chosen by Muslim politicians in

the greater part of the South, Muslim MPs contesting from the

Eastern Province often contested under the Federal Party. The

emergence of the SLMC as an independent Muslim party can be

linked to the ethnic conflict, as well as the introduction of

the proportional representation system that gave smaller

parties a greater chance at winning seats from various

districts. It is important to note that the SLMC emerged as the

key opposition in the NorthEast Provincial Council following

the elections of November 1988. The recent emergence of several

Muslim splinter groups of the main SLMC has meant that a

section of the Muslim leadership has been overly preoccupied

with maintaining internal cohesion. The number of Muslim

parties/factions seems to be increasing. Consequently, Eastern

Muslim civil society expressed concern regarding their

political representatives and their inability to deliver in

relation to either the Tsunami or the peace process. The LTTE

and the government have used the very public divisiveness

amongst Muslim politicians to undermine Muslims’ right to

representation at the peace talks. This point that Muslim

political divisiveness was used as delaying tactic and an

excuse for non-inclusion of the Muslims was frequently cited to

us on our mission. The question of what manner of

representation will be possible and at what point has been left

open on the assumption that the Muslim position on the issue is

itself fragmented.  

The larger Muslim parties are aligned in a way that there is a

clear UNP or UPFA affiliation on the part of the SLMC and the

National Unity Alliance (NUA) respectively. It is possible that

the two parties will decide the manner in which Muslims find

representation at any future peace talks.  The long overdue

Muslim Peace Secretariat (MPS) has emerged as a result of NUA-

SLMC Memorandum of Understanding. It plans, we were told to

provide a forum for the airing of all Muslim political

perspectives and to provide support to any future Muslim

delegation to the peace talks. Currently the MPS is generally

perceived as being mandated only by the two major parties.

Eastern Province civil society organizations view it as little

more than a party mechanism of the two currently largest

parties with little or no real possibility of representing a

synthesized Muslim position including a wider political and

civil society perspective. However the plan to institutionalize

a mechanism whereby all Muslim perspectives could theoretically

be considered is a promising step. It is currently focused we

were told on bringing together the Muslim members of

parliament. It should now be expanded to include greater civil

society participation and input. It should ideally be the forum

for any consultative process through which Muslim proposals in

response to the government and the LTTE can be produced. [10]

Muslim Demands: Political Options for Eastern Muslims

The recognition that Muslims have specific demands that must be

addressed in any discussion on the resolution of the ethnic

question has been acknowledged. Muslim demands at this point –

outside of a generalized call for a substantial degree of

autonomy are yet to crystallize into a public proposal. 

Various individuals and organizations have put forward

proposals that emphasize different priorities in granting

autonomy to Muslims within the North and East administration.

The suggestions are many and varied and there seems to be a

degree of flexibility in the kind of mechanisms that might be

agreed on.  But the time is ripe for some public debate on the

specifics.  The general truism of the peace process is the

amazing similarities in position amongst the various actors.

The Eastern Muslim representatives, both political and civil

society, too seem to have similar position and in addition seem

willing to be flexible with regards to the manner in which

their aspirations can be reflected in any mechanism.  It is

therefore essential that Muslims have a variety of worked out

options through which their aspirations can be accommodated in

any future administrative structure.

Some of the options that were discussed during our visit and drawn to our

attention as possible administrative mechanisms include:

1.      A Muslim autonomous region/ homeland/ enclave in the South East

(Samanthurai, Pothuvil, Kalmunai) , including non-contiguous areas for some

Eastern Muslim majority communities;

2.      A Muslim enclave region in the South East (Samanthurai, Pothuvil,

Kalmunai) , excluding non-contiguous areas, and with agreements with the GoSL

and LTTE for protection of local Sinhala and Tamil minorities in the Muslim

region that would emerge from the peace process/ settlement;

3.      Guarantees from the LTTE and GoSL for power sharing with the Muslims

at all levels of an ISGA or other interim administration that would lead to

a final settlement in the North East without an autonomous Muslim region.

Both the SLMC and the NUA indicated that they were in the process of

formulating their own set of proposals. The SLMC, after observation visits

and consultation with international experts claim to have a formulated set

of proposals that they are currently in the process of finalizing through

consultations amongst key stakeholders. Several other Muslim civil society

organizations – the Northern Muslim Rights Organization, the North East

Muslim Assembly, and the Mosque Federation of the Eastern Province etc.

seem to have their own sets of proposals prepared. It is timely now to have

some public consultations whereby the various proposals, particularly those

more detailed, are analyzed and debated openly with the participation of

local experts and civil society representatives from all communities to

ensure a fairer representation of differing interests and needs.

LTTE Muslim relationships on the ground.

Repeated assurances that the Muslims have nothing to fear from the LTTE are

no longer adequate. The LTTE needs work out a more through policy with

regards to the Muslims within the Tamil speaking homeland. The indication

still is that the LTTE does not consider the Muslims as legitimate

counterparts—at most only as minor players, and at worst a nuisance. The

fact that Prabakaran accepted the expulsion as a mistake, and that Muslims

have been allowed to go into their lands in LTTE controlled areas and

engage in their livelihood activities is touted as a basis on which to

forgive and forget. This clearly is not adequate. Muslims are being asked

by the LTTE to trust them, assuring them that the LTTE will not do to the

Muslims what the state did to the Tamils. However, past experiences of LTTE

intransigence and brutality loom too large and cannot alleviate Muslims’

uncertainty and mistrust.

Attempts at resolving ground level problems have been made through the

North East Muslim Peace Assembly setting up local committees consisting of

the district LTTE leadership and district Mosque Federations. In response

to the outbreak of tension and violence forums were established for the

local LTTE and Muslim leadership to meet, to re-build confidence and trust,

and to prevent new incidents escalating into violence. Such a crisis

response committee was set up to respond to the violence in Muttur in April

2003. Such forums were also established to deal with long-term issues such

as land where Muslims were demanding the return of land owned by them and

seized by the LTTE during the conflict, most of which is currently being

cultivated by Tamil farmers. These committees offered a mechanism for

reinforcing trust and confidence at the local level, consolidating

developments at Track 1 peace talks and resolving local problems locally.

These committees offered some mode of communication and confidence building

particularly during the bouts of ethnic clashes between 2002 and 2003 where

the Muslim and Tamil communities found themselves trapped in cycles of

hartals, riots, abductions and attacks. We were told that their success in

the land issue was limited. Such mechanisms are a dire necessity for the

new theatre of operations that has opened up due to the LTTE-Karuna faction

clashes.

The fact that the LTTE currently makes an attempt to maintain

good relations with Muslim civil society in the area is a good

sign. As the peace process needs to be taken forward amongst

Tamils and Muslims at all levels.  The LTTE representatives in

the East stressed the need for trust and confidence building

with the Muslim community and made reference to the attempts to

dialogue with Muslim community leaders. However, the fact that

the LTTE considers such interaction to be evidence of its good

will and that some Muslim civil society organizations consider

such interaction to be pleasant but with little tangible

results and more than that, as helping LTTE propaganda, is a

little unfortunate. Such mechanisms are considered suspect by

local politicians who perceive them to be mechanisms whereby

the LTTE tries to bypass engagement with the political leaders.

Greater assurances are therefore needed from the LTTE and a

more firm commitment to respect Muslims return and provide

security guarantees in both the North and the East.

 Reflections

Certain civil society organizations in the East articulated a

position that was becoming clear for some time now; they

claimed that the Muslims of the North, the East and the South

were three distinct groupings with distinct problems and

interests. [11] Sri Lanka’s Muslim population is dispersed

through out the country, and the recent, geographically

specific conflict, affected Muslims differently in the

different regions. Their problems, therefore, are often

regionally specific and require specific redress. For instance,

the interests of the concentrated Muslim populations living in

the Eastern Province are different from those displaced from

the North contemplating return and those living in Sinhala

majority areas in the South. Recognizing this specificity of

interests is a perspective from which the most useful kinds of

conversations as to what Muslims’ options are could be

undertaken for the future. Muslim civil society in the Eastern

Province is fairly sophisticated today and represents a strong

presence that counters the unfortunate fissures amongst their

political representatives.  Their realization of the

specificity of their grievances is a step forward. However it

is essential that such a step is matched by an understanding of

the interests of the larger Muslim community, their mixed

settlement patterns and the consequences to all Muslims from a

settlement that involves the east. For instance there must be a

discussion of what options will be open to Northern Muslims if

political options favoring the East are privileged. And for the

East too it must be kept in mind that the everyday reality for

Muslims living in Muslim majority areas and those living in the

more isolated villages in Tamil majority areas is significantly

different.

One civil society actor that we spoke with pointed out that

there was great anxiety amongst Southern Muslim politicians

that the Eastern Muslim parties were usurping their role as the

leaders of the greater Muslim community.  There is also

uneasiness as to what repercussions Eastern Muslim ethnic

politics will have on the Southern Muslims who live amongst the

Sinhalese. While the problems of the Southern Muslims are

clearly not as immediate as those of the East or the North the

insecurity with which many Southern Muslims live in Sinhala

majority areas, the incipient violence that flares up at

various moments – the incidents of Galle and Mawanella are the

most recent—must also be kept in mind when discussing the

consequences of Muslim political decisions in the east. A

discussion that addresses the issue of Southern Muslim fears as

to what they expect the fall out to be from the different

positions that are taken by the Muslims in the conflict

affected areas would be another means of generating greater

consensus amongst the Muslim leadership.    

There should also be an appreciation of a past where

coexistence amongst ethnic groups was the norm—especially in

the case of Muslims and Tamils in the east. Given the recent

developments within Tamil nationalism, the splintering of the

LTTE on a regional platform and the emerging discussion of

eastern Tamil specificity, the Muslims and the Tamils of the

East must realize that they share common interests. In the

conceptualising of administrative enclaves there should be a

sufficient understanding of the particularly mixed cultural

geography of the region and the inevitability of interaction. 

Considering the possibility of future peaceful and amicable

coexistence is also absolutely essential when conceptualizing

such options and must temper feelings of Muslim victimhood that

generally underlies such planning.

In the two decades of conflict poverty, inequality lack of

access to land and scare resources has been utilized  by armed

actors and politicians who “re-present” and liberate poor and

socially marginal communities in the language of ethnic

liberation. Nationalism denies internal difference and internal

diversity within the ethnic group. Recognizing internal

regional diversity including poverty and economic inequalities

within ethnic groups is necessary for a substantive peace. The

regional specificity that was always recognized amongst Muslim

and is now slowly becoming institutionalized is a good sign.

Now Tamil-Muslim interests as co-regionalists are emerging once

again and should also be emphasized. Thus, the envisioning of a

future by the Muslims of the NorthEast must necessarily include

conceptulizing the position of Tamil and Sinhalese communities,

be they the minorities within Muslim majority areas or the

majority, in order to prevent replicating the exclusionary

policies the Muslims have faced.    

[1] This report is also substantially informed by notes on the field trip that were written by Dr Devanesan Nessiah and Dr Darini Rajasingham Senanayake. We would like to thank all the people who found time to host usand be interviewed by us in the various regions we visited. 

[2] Resolution at Federal Party Convention in1959, The Bandaranaike Chelvanayagam pact of 1957

The Indo Lanka Accord : conditional merger of the North and East, The Kittu/MULF agreement of 1988

The TULF proposals of  1987, Mangala Moonesinghe commission report of 1994(majority of members agreed on demerger – two separate units for the North and East. The 1995 proposals, The 2000 proposals

The Prabakaran – Hakeem MOU of 2002.

[3] Ramanathan asserted in the legislative council in 1887 and at the RoyalAsiatic Society in 1888 That Muslims were “ethnologically” Tamil. His argument was that while there was the possibility that some of the Muslims ancestors were Arab most Muslims are more likely to have been Tamils who traveled from Kayal Pattinam. Citing their language use and cultural habitsas evidence, Ramanthan called for categorizing them as Muslim Tamils. With a position in the legislative council in question Muslims were extremely put out by this suggestion and vigorously protested Ramanathan’s assertion.Their claim was that regardless of language use and their “Tamil” seeming customs their progenitors and therefore their “blood” was Arab and therefore they were distinct from Tamils. The British granted the Muslim seat and the point was moot. Among Muslims today religion has taken precedence over race or “blood” as the primary marker of their identity andthe issue of their ancestry is no longer important. However, they continue to have to agitate in the face of Tamil nationalism to be acknowledged as adistinct community.    

[4] For instance it was part of LTTE leader Yogi’s assertion in the East inthe after math of the 1990s expulsion. And it is currently being bandied about as well.  Today Tamil nationalist view Eastern Muslim politicians gaining power through the TULF only to switch to the government party when in parliament, or the case of Badi-ud-deen Mahmood being at the forefront of standardization under the SLFP government, as examples of Muslim betrayal of the Tamil cause.

[5] At Transformations a Conference on Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, organized by International Centre for Ethnic Studies, December 2004

[6] Taraki- LTTE’s Hearts and Minds Op in East. Daily Mirror Wednesday March 2nd 2005.

[7] These comparative observations are made on the basis of other trips we made to tsunami affected areas in Mullaitivu (25th January 2005), Jaffna andMullaitivu  (11th - 16th), Hambantota (6th – 7th March 2005) 

[8] The Norwegian government Press Release on the fourth session of peace talks held at in Thailand from 6th-9th January 2003 stated that “The parties agreed that a Muslim delegation will be invited to the peace talks at an appropriate time for deliberations on relevant and substantive political issues.“

[9] The SLMC has now linked its participation in any coalition government to an assurance that the negotiating party will agree to the inclusion of aseparate Muslim delegation at the peace talks as soon as the talks re-commence.

[10] Muslim civil society activity has recently increased.  For instancethe Coordinating Centre for Relief and Rehabilitation (CCRR) wasestablished in response to the tsunami to coordinate relief work among

Muslim NGOs. The CCRR has also set up the Muslim Council for Sri Lanka(MCSL) to study, research and advocate on matters related to Muslims.Currently consisting of more than 50 organizations CCRR is aiming to takeits mission to the grass root level so may provide a key forum for Muslimcivil society to assert itself.

[11] While such a position of different interests is a truism for the Southand the East we were not able to ascertain Northern Muslims’ position on the issue. It would perhaps be well to find out before any celebration of this position is to be done.