Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development: Case Studies from Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney

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Positive and Negative Factors forTransit Oriented Development: CaseStudies from Brisbane, Melbourne andSydneyGlen Searlea, Sebastien Darchenb & Simon Hustonb

a GPEM, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australiab Faculty of Business, University of Queensland, Brisbane,AustraliaPublished online: 29 Jul 2014.

To cite this article: Glen Searle, Sebastien Darchen & Simon Huston (2014) Positive and NegativeFactors for Transit Oriented Development: Case Studies from Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney,Urban Policy and Research, 32:4, 437-457, DOI: 10.1080/08111146.2014.931280

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Positive and Negative Factors for TransitOriented Development: Case Studies fromBrisbane, Melbourne and Sydney

GLEN SEARLE*, SEBASTIEN DARCHEN* & SIMON HUSTON***GPEM, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, **Faculty of Business, University of Queensland,

Brisbane, Australia

(Received 20 August 2013; accepted 1 June 2014)

ABSTRACT Development of Transit Oriented Development (TOD) precincts in the Australiancontext has been hindered by several obstacles. The main challenges to be addressed are landamalgamation issues around train stations and the lack of governance arrangements to facilitate thedelivery of TODs. This article identifies the main factors contributing to the effective delivery ofthree Australian TODs. The article is based on the analysis of case studies in Brisbane, Melbourneand Sydney. Based on semi-directed interviews with urban stakeholders (planners at the councillevel and state level, and developers) for each case study and on the analysis of official planningdocuments, we analyse the governance arrangements, the planning frameworks and the financialmechanisms that have facilitated the delivery of the case study TODs. We also survey stakeholders toassess the general TOD delivery process and outcomes on different criteria, to better inform TODpolicymaking. We find that large sites in single ownership and special state government measures tofacilitate development approvals have been critical factors in TOD success.

在澳大利亚发展以公共交通为导向的开发区，有几个方面的阻力。最大的难题是

火车站周边土地 综合利用的问题，以及缺少治理安排来支持 TOD 的递送。本文基

于布里斯班、墨尔本和悉尼的个 案研究，分析澳大利亚这三个 TOD 开发计划中的

有利因素。我们对每一个案中城市利益相关者 （市政委员会和州里的规划者，以

及开发商）进行了半指导式的访谈，并对官方规划文件进行分 析，据此分析了支

持 TOD 开发计划递送的治理安排、规划框架和财政机制。我们还对利益相关者

进行调查，并据以评估 TOD 的总体递送过程，以及不同标准下的结果，以便为

TOD 决策提供更 多的信息。研究发现单一所有权的大片土地和州政府的特别开发

措施，是保证TOD 项目成功的关 键。

KEYWORDS: TOD constraints, TOD governance, TOD site amalgamation, TOD delivery process,Australian inner cities

q 2014 Editorial Board, Urban Policy and Research

Correspondence Address: Glen Searle, GPEM, University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072, Australia. Email:

[email protected]

Urban Policy and Research, 2014

Vol. 32, No. 4, 437–457, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08111146.2014.931280

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Introduction

Since Newman and Kenworthy’s (1989) ground-breaking Cities and Automobile

Dependence collated data to argue that higher densities are required to produce

sustainable transport provision, particularly transit use, urban planners have seen transit

provision as a requirement for sustainable high-density development. In turn, this has

led to a focus on integrating higher density development with transit access in the form

of Transit Oriented Development (TOD) within walking distance of transit stations.

The argument that higher densities are needed to underpin improved transit outcomes

has been attacked by Mees (2000), who argued for the role of integrated timetabling in

producing sustainable transit. Nevertheless, TOD is now a major planning approach in

Australia’s biggest cities, although much higher density development has also been

allowed on sites with relatively poor transit access. Despite planning intentions, the

development of Australian TOD precincts has been somewhat sporadic and limited

(see Curtis, 2012).

This article investigates possible reasons why this has been so, using three case studies

of TODs in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane. The central research question addressed in

this article is: what are the factors hindering and facilitating the delivery of TODs in an

inner-city context? TOD concepts and issues are set out in the next section, followed by an

analysis of each case study. The article concludes with general findings about factors

helping or hindering TOD precinct development. Following Curtis’ (2012) approach, we

focus on how to better deliver TODs in an inner-suburb context. Data about the origins and

implementation of each TOD were obtained from semi-directed interviews with key

stakeholders involved in the delivery process (developers, state officials and planners at

the local level) and an online survey, in addition to public domain documents including

government reports.

TOD Concepts and Issues

The TOD Concept

The term Transit Oriented Development was introduced by Calthorpe (1993). In his

conceptualisation, TOD essentially encompasses development at higher densities and a

mix of uses within a half-mile radius of a transit stop. This distance was considered to be

the maximum distance most people were prepared to walk to a station (equating to a time

of about 10minutes for the average person), and thus the radius within which residential

and other uses had a higher possibility of using transit. Calthorpe’s definition has been the

basis of subsequent planning policies that have attempted to increase the density and mix

of uses around transit stations, especially rail stations, in order to reduce urban car use.

For example, the Queensland government explains that planning a TOD:

promotes the creation of a network of well-designed communities focused around

transit stations. Areas developed using this approach are called TOD precincts, and

generally comprise a mixed-use community within a comfortable 10-minute walk of

the transit station. (Queensland Government, 2010, p. 2)

A distinction can also be made between Transit Adjacent Development (TAD) and

Transit Oriented Development (TOD): “A TAD is physically near transit [but] fails to

438 G. Searle et al.

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capitalize upon this proximity” (Cervero et al., 2002, p. 6). Thus, to achieve TOD rather

than TAD, development needs, in particular, to be significantly denser than normal in that

area. TOD should also have non-residential as well as residential uses, though the extent of

mixing of uses will depend on the potential of the transit precinct as an activity centre.

Intensive mixed-use development in TODs may not always be required to generate

high transit ridership levels, since destination attributes such as job accessibility can

significantly increase transit use among station-area residents (Cervero, 2007). It is

important to mention that the private sector is the primary deliverer of TODs and their

definition of what should be a TOD is often conflicting with the public sector or

community’s views.

TOD Critiques

Transit Oriented Development has now become the main spatial planning strategy for

achieving higher density development in Australian cities, overlapping with the parallel

strategy of promoting activity centres around rail stations (State of Victoria, 2002;

Queensland Government, 2009; Department of Planning & Western Australian Planning

Commission, 2010; New South Wales Government, 2010). However, its implementation

has been somewhat sporadic and often strongly contested. As Hale (2012) notes, TOD

outcomes remain mixed in Australia, so that the transition from planning concept into

practice and implementation remains a key issue.

Several factors involved in limiting TOD can be identified. Foremost amongst these are

factors that limit the capacity of TOD developers to make a commercial return (Dunphy

et al., 2003). To start with, certain zoning conditions are needed to make a commercial

return possible. In Perth, Curtis (2012) has found that land-use planning for TODs has

lagged behind the provision of new rail stations. The most important zoning consideration

relates to the permitted floor area ratio, while inflexible planning standards in general can

inhibit development (Cervero, 2005). At the same time, development prospects will be

enhanced if the statutory plan for the TOD is centred around developing a vision for the

TOD that incorporates excellence in urban design and that allows the realisation of the

infrastructure and public domain necessary to achieve a coherent, attractive TOD precinct

(Queensland Government, 2010, p. 10). A lack of financial resources in all but the largest

Australian local governments limits the scope for such infrastructure and public domain

improvements. Even with appropriate planning controls and infrastructure in place, there

might not be sufficient market demand for the desired TOD at the price levels required for

development to happen (Hess & Lombardi, 2004, p. 29; James, 2009, p. 194).

A major factor that potentially restricts the ability of developers to generate profitable

TODs is fragmented land ownership that requires significant property amalgamation

before sites are large enough for economically viable higher density development

(Boarnet & Compin, 1999; Birrell et al., 2005; James, 2009, p. 194). This problem is

heightened by the existence of small commercial leases in buildings where some property

amalgamation has already occurred or, even more constraining, the existence of strata title

ownership within such buildings (Searle, 2010, p. 137). Constraints generated by property

ownership can also arise from difficulties of integrating private titles and public lands

(James, 2009, p. 194).

It is very likely that there will be local community opposition to the demolition of

existing housing in TOD zones (Birrell et al., 2005, pp. 2–9), and their replacement by

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 439

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different and denser development. Such opposition will be more intense where there is

significant built heritage (Birrell et al., 2005), where residents might fear that denser

development will cause loss of local character and amenity. Where the built heritage is

centred in large non-residential structures, creative responses can often generate denser

redevelopment based on such buildings that is both economically viable and acceptable to

the local community (Huston et al., 2012). More generally, TODs will tend to be easier to

develop on sites that are non-residential, since this will eliminate potential opposition from

residents owning property within the TOD zone. We should mention that the evaluation of

TODs (measurement of success) depends upon the perspectives of different stakeholders

(Renne, 2009, p. 241). Renne (2009, p. 242) makes a distinction between primary benefits

(e.g. increased ridership, provision of joint development opportunities, etc.) and secondary

benefits of TODs (e.g. less traffic congestion, reduced sprawl, etc.).

The manner in which such constraints are addressed by planning agencies will depend

on specific local contextual factors and on differences in institutional frameworks between

planning agencies. In particular, Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) that capture some of

the TOD’s land value increases for infrastructure and public domain improvements

can be centred on the state as land developer or on a specific redevelopment authority.

Both models have been used in TOD development in Perth (Curtis, 2012) and Sydney and

Brisbane (this article).

Overall, our review of the literature shows that research in Australia on TODs has

seldom focused on the delivery process. In the one publication where this was identified as

the central concern (Mouritz & Ainsworth, 2009) the focus was on one geographic area

(Perth).

To complement existing knowledge on TODs in Australia, this article focuses on the

analysis of the delivery process. Two specific aspects are analysed:

What are the positive and negative factors influencing the delivery of TODs?

Can government policies facilitate the delivery of TODs?

The above discussion indicates that TODs can take a variety of forms depending on land

ownership patterns, planning controls and governance arrangements. The latter include

the extent to which local communities are involved in TOD planning. Furthermore, TOD

development levels will be constrained by the extent to which development will be

profitable, a function of metropolitan location and local factors such as prior commercial

development levels in the proposed TOD precinct as well as the TOD planning process

itself. Moreover, TODs take some years to evolve and thus research findings need to take

account of the development stage of each TOD. This article has selected three Australian

case studies that represent different TOD types, stages, sizes and institutional contexts in

order to identify both contextual and underlying factors influencing TOD development.

The three TODs analysed are:

. Footscray in Melbourne

. Wolli Creek in Sydney

. Yeerongpilly in Brisbane.

Table 1 shows how each case study relates to the various TOD categories.

All projects are on the fringe of the inner city, with Wolli Creek being the furthest from

the city centre at 10 kilometres from Sydney central business district (CBD) and Footscray

the closest at 5 kilometres from Melbourne CBD. The TOD model is most appropriate in

440 G. Searle et al.

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Table

1.CasestudyTODsaccordingto

TOD

categories

Case

studyTOD

TOD

type

TOD

stage

TOD

size

Institutional

context

Footscray

Commercially-oriented

developmentonproperties

infragmentedownership

pattern

Sporadic

earlystage

development

Majorcomponentofdesignated

metropolitanCentral

Activity

District.

Upto

4000dwellingsandover

1000jobsin

Priority

DevelopmentZone

StatePriority

DevelopmentZone

status,plusstatelandacquisition

andinfrastructure

provision

WolliCreek

Residentially

oriented

developmentontwomajor

sites

Majority

ofintended

developmentcomplete

Target

of6500residentsand

7000jobs

Councilfacilitationofplanning

charrette;

developmentledby

NSW

Landcom

agency

Yeerongpilly

Residentially-oriented

developmentonstate

governmentsite

First(smaller)stage

complete;secondstage

yet

tostart

Medium

andhighdensity

devel-

opmentover

15hectares(target

populationto

bedetermined)

Developmentjointlyledbystate

andBrisbaneCouncil;priority

stateplanningdesignation

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 441

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inner-city settings, as stated by Cervero (2005, p. 23): “By channelling public investments

into struggling inner-city settings . . . TOD can breathe new life and vitality into areas of

need” (although Cervero’s context is US cities, where inner cities have been in decline,

unlike cities in Australia).

TOD Case Studies

Methods

Planning documents and other public domain sources (particularly newspaper articles,

state planning department websites and sites identified by Google searches) were analysed

for each case study. The documents and other sources were analysed to ascertain the scale

and scope of each TOD and developments therein, the planning processes and controls

involved, pre-existing development and land ownership, and non-planning actions

contributing to development after TOD designation. In addition, we carried out eight

interviews with the main stakeholders (developers plus planners at city council and state

level) involved in their delivery (Appendix 1). The planners were either known to the

authors or suggested by developers known to the authors; in turn, appropriate developers

for interview were either known or suggested by the planners. The interviews sought

information via open-ended questions on the following themes: project details not

available from documents (including area/size, timescale and nature of rezoning); prior

land ownership pattern; roles of public sector, developers and others in TOD including

land acquisition/transfer; developer incentives; nature of any ‘fast tracking’; and factors

hindering or assisting TOD delivery.

We also conducted an online survey in late 2012/early 2013 of developers and planners

on factors hindering and facilitating the delivery of TODs. The nature and results of this

survey are presented after the case study discussion.

Footscray, Melbourne

Footscray railway station precinct TOD is one of the 13 Transit City sites identified in the

Victorian Government’s Transit Cities & Place Management Program in 2001 for higher

density residential and mixed-use development with improved public transport access.

It aimed to revitalise 13 locations in Victoria by better linking transport and land-use

initiatives (Schutte, 2005). The programme is based on TOD principles and aims to

stimulate investment and regenerate and cluster higher density mixed-use development

around high-quality transport services at key designated transport nodes. Master planning

accompanied by feasibility work and future structure planning sets out the strategic

framework for each city. Based on previous strategic work, 32 objectives have been

developed for Footscray station precinct by the Transit Cities programme. Some of the

objectives are: to encourage economic growth, to celebrate identity, to reinforce

connectivity, to enhance the environment, to develop an intermodal transportation hub, to

increase safety, consolidating retail space, etc. These objectives denote a broad-based

TOD development.

The Footscray Transit City project sits within a wider strategic planning context.

In 2008, the status of Footscray was elevated from a Transit City to one of Melbourne’s six

Central Activities Districts (CADs) as part of the updatedMelbourne @5 Million strategy.

442 G. Searle et al.

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As the only CAD within the western part of Melbourne, Footscray will play a vital role in

accommodating substantial future employment growth, commercial development,

housing and public investment. It is at the junction of three rail lines and has a tramline

and 13 bus routes servicing it—a very rich public transport infrastructure (Rice, 2009).

Furthermore, its strategic position will become more critical as Melbourne’s future growth

is likely to be increasingly directed towards the west and the north (Department of

Planning and Community Development & Maribyrnong City Council, 2010).

A further favourable TOD element relates to the role of Footscray’s major university

campus as a specialised activity centre in itself. The Victoria University campus can

provide a mix of economic activities that generate high numbers of work and visitor

trips and require sustainable transport management (Department of Infrastructure, 2012).

This aligns with the objectives of the TOD model.

The Footscray station precinct renewal area could be described as a partial rather than a

full TOD as eight other precincts near the station are also considered as part of the wider

transit-oriented Footscray redevelopment: medical community services precinct, mixed-

use housing entertainment retail precinct, mixed-transport retail precincts, arts precinct

and two university/civic precincts. The station precinct plays an important strategic

role within this wider Footscray area. In particular, its pedestrian bridge forms part of the

important east–west connection through Footscray, between the defined Medical/

Community Services Precinct to the west, the commercial centre and the Arts Precinct to

the east. As a major regional transport hub at the confluence of several train lines, and with

various bus services stopping there and significant ‘activity generators’ adjacent or nearby,

the station precinct is a busy location with high levels of patronage and pedestrian activity,

but interspersed with areas of low amenity and activity levels. The real estate slowdown

of 2011–12 has reduced precinct development (development manager, interview)

(Figure 1).

The local Maribyrnong City Council recognised the need to develop a clear

strategy to drive and give direction to how Footscray was to develop over the next 30 years

(Walsh, 2005). According to Walsh (2005), the council worked with the Department

of Sustainability and Environment and VicUrban (now Places Victoria) to revisit the

established vision in August 2004 through a collaborative participatory process.

The visioning process was influenced by two concepts: that Footscray had been identified

by the state government both as a Transit City and also as a Principal Activity Centre. Over

500 participants provided their thoughts on a new vision (Walsh, 2005). The elevation to

CAD status meant new planning controls were implemented after 2010. The new controls

were guided by a stakeholder engagement strategy that resulted in 320 individuals and

organisations (out of 9405 invited) actively contributing (Capire Consulting Group, 2010).

The rail station precinct has been subject to special planning controls. A planning

document, the Planning and Urban Design Framework for Footscray Station Precinct, was

commissioned by the Department of Planning and Community Development as part

of the Footscray Renewal project announced in the 2007–2008 Victoria State Budget. The

framework document provides rigorous urban design guidance and identifies development

potential within the Footscray station precinct (SJB Urban, 2009). In order to bring

forward development in the precinct, the state government has undertaken several

measures. In 2004, it designated state land within the precinct as a Priority Development

Zone under the Victoria Planning Provisions of the Planning and Environment Act 1987,

giving the Minister for Planning responsibility for giving planning approval. The

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 443

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government has also acquired 14 or 15 property titles within the precinct, principally

surplus VicTrack land adjacent to the station in McNab Avenue. The state has, in addition,

invested in new infrastructure in the precinct, such as a new bridge over the station.

The station itself is in the process of being developed into a full transport interchange with

enhanced capacity. In total, the government has invested AUD52.1 million in the station

precinct (Bureaucrat, interview).

The McNab Avenue site covers 1.3 hectares and is to be the main focus of, and catalyst

for, Footscray’s TOD. The site will have three buildings of 7–14 storeys (with the first

building under construction in late 2013) totalling 20 500 square metres of office space,

nearly all of which the government has committed to fill with state agency tenants

(including two agency headquarters), plus over 500 residential apartments including

affordable housing and student accommodation, and complementary retail/entertainment

uses, in addition to new road and pedestrian connections to the station and main shopping

centre. The project is to be completed over 10–15 years at a cost of around AUD350

Figure 1. Footscray TOD project.Source: School of GPEM, University of Queensland.

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million to the developer, Grocon (chosen after an expression of interest process (Grocon,

2010)), and which the government is supplementing with funding of AUD9.1 million

(Development Manager, interview). The progress of the project and other Footscray TODs

is dependent on Regional Rail Link (RRL) project decisions relating to progress on the

upgrading of Footscray station. According to our interviews, the developer yield and

attraction for the McNab Avenue project has been strong. However, this is not related to

the transit-oriented dimension of the project, but rather to the inner-city location close

to the CBD (Footscray is located 5 kilometres from the CBD) with consequent likely

increases in land value and, even more importantly, the commitment of the state

government to take up nearly all the proposed office space.

The state is seen as not having been as proactive in Footscray as for other CADs

(e.g. Dandenong), however (Council Planner and Bureaucrat, interviews). The visioning

work was led by Maribyrnong Council in the early 2000s, but a facilitative planning

framework to implement the vision is seen as lacking (Bureaucrat and Council Planner,

interviews): aurban design outcomes, for example, are seen as of moderate quality

(Bureaucrat and Council Planner, interviews): according to both the council planner and

the bureaucrat we interviewed for Footscray, the lack of coordination between the state

and the council has hindered progress on the project. In particular, the interviewees

indicated that the lack of leadership, with power split between Maribyrnong Council and

the state, has engendered confusion on which objectives to prioritise. In turn, according to

the bureaucrat and the council planner, this has led to a certain degree of community lack

of trust and disengagement from the decision-making process. At the same time, wider

market factors have been significant in holding back overall development. Since new

Footscray CAD development is being privately financed by approximately 15 developers

across the nine precincts, the success of the project is highly dependent upon the situation

of the real estate market.

Our interviews and our own assessment of the Footscray TOD data sources cited above

suggest several conclusions about factors that have promoted or hindered its evolution.

The first is that the commitment of the state government in being active in packaging land

(purchase and site preparation oversight, the latter by Places Victoria, a state government

business facilitating urban development) and also in investing in the necessary

infrastructure (notably the pedestrian bridge) to attract investment has been crucial in

generating major development adjacent to the rail station. The fast tracking of planning

processes and government pre-commitment to occupying newly developed office space

have been equally significant in getting that development off the ground. In turn, the office

pre-commitment has enabled an increase in the residential component of the development

by providing a guaranteed cash flow to support increased borrowing (Development

Manager, interview). State involvement was seen as critical by the development industry,

as local authorities were considered to often lack the expertise to manage such large-scale

complex projects (Development Manager, interview). Nevertheless the local council has

funded a number of projects for the Footscray CAD to improve the development context,

including upgrades of Nicholson Street Mall, Maddern Square and Leeds Street (including

a new tram stop in the latter) in the centre of Footscray (CPG Australia, 2010). The

continuation of an active state role, especially relating to packaging of land for developers,

might be needed to accelerate the TOD development, although this will also be very

dependent on whether existing market conditions improve.

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 445

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Wolli Creek, Sydney

The Wolli Creek TOD is on a 78 hectare area fronting the Cooks River, 10 kilometres

south-west of the Sydney CBD. It is adjacent to Wolli Creek rail station, which was

opened in 2000 and is at the intersection of the city’s Illawarra, East Hills and Airport rail

lines. The area was an industrial zone in two main ownerships—Qantas and the state

government’s RailCorp. The gross floor area being developed is just under 200 000 square

metres. A 2.3 hectare parkland has been designated as curtilage around the historic 1836

Georgian-style Tempe House which adjoins the TOD (Figure 2).

The genesis of the Wolli Creek TOD was the decision to build a rail line from the CBD

to the airport as part of infrastructure upgrades in preparation for the 2000 Olympic

Games. The rail project had already been proposed by two private sector construction

companies prior to the winning of the Olympic bid in 1993. An extension of the line to join

the Illawarra and East Hills lines at Wolli Creek was adopted by the government, as it

meant that trains from south-west Sydney to the city could be routed via the airport, thus

reducing congestion problems on the existing line north from Wolli Creek (Searle, 1999).

Figure 2. Wolli Creek TOD project.Source: School of GPEM, University of Queensland.

446 G. Searle et al.

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In the meantime the TOD sites had been identified by the then chief planner of the local

council of Rockdale as being on two of the route options for the proposed M5 Motorway

(Planner, interview).

The chief council planner envisaged the potential associated with the extension of the

Airport rail line for redevelopment of the sites. After hearing about charrettes (intensive

planning sessions where citizens, designers and others collaborate to produce a vision for

development) as a tool for community participation, he gained council approval to engage

a planning firm to run a charrette to produce a plan for the sites (Planner, interview).

The charrette was extensively advertised to invite anyone in the community who wished to

take part in participating. The Minister for Planning, Robert Webster, took an interest in

the charrette and attended. This caused key state agencies including Roads and Traffic, and

Transport, to send their Directors-General rather than more junior representatives because

they realised the Minister was personally involved. This in turn allowed agency decisions

required to make the charrette plan work to be made (Planner, interview). This included

changing the route of the proposed motorway to affect less property, with little extra cost

(Meyer, 1994, p. 7). The charrette itself took place for a number of days over a one-week

period in 1993, with 40 or 50 people at a time involved. Those involved were “town

planners, urban designers, architects, landscape architects, engineers, environmental

consultants, other professionals, government agencies, and interested residents and

groups” (Meyer, 1994, p. 7). The charrette produced a series of plans, illustrations and

perspectives as the end product (Meyer, 1994, p. 7). It envisaged keeping open space

around Tempe House and along the river, changing the street pattern and generating

mixed-use high-density development (averaging 10–15 storeys) across the remainder of

the sites (Planner, interview).

The output from the charrette paved the way for redevelopment to start. A developer

who had previously worked with the state’s land development authority, Landcom,

acquired development rights over the Qantas site. He then approached Landcom to

facilitate the consolidation of that site with the State Rail land because Landcom, as a state

authority, was in a better position to achieve a deal with State Rail. This was achieved by

Landcom, which then took carriage of the redevelopment (Bureaucrat, interview).

Landcom then decided to use a joint venture equity partnership to develop the sites with

Australand. The land that Landcom had secured would form its equity share, while

Australand would be responsible for all funding of development (Bureaucrat, interview).

Rockdale Council then approved two Development Control Plans under the

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, the first in 2005 (DCP No. 45) for the

immediate railway precinct and the second in 2006 (DCP No. 62) for the remainder of

the sites. These set out detailed planning objectives and design guidelines, and allowed

successive development applications to be staged within an agreed development

framework. The first building, approved under the provisions of the council’s existing

Local Environmental Plan, was put on the market around 2003. The immediate rail

precinct development (known as Discovery Point) has been essentially completed for

several years, but development of major projects in the wider DCP No. 62 area is still

ongoing, indicating the relatively long time scale needed for major TOD implementation.

With finance for developers becoming tighter with the onset of the global financial

crisis, underlying impediments to profitable development emerged. The master plan

effectively required two podiums either side of the rail line to be built before

accommodation was built above them. This created a funding problem for the developers,

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 447

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because banks regarded the podium cost as a developer equity contribution before they

would finance the revenue-generating construction above (Bureaucrat, interview).

Secondly, efforts to find a tenant for the commercial component of the development at a

rate that was financially viable had proven fruitless despite a long search (Bureaucrat,

interview).

In order to address these problems and to make further development viable, the

developers took advantage of the new Part 3A provisions of the Environmental Planning

and Assessment Act introduced in 2005 (Maddocks, 2010). This allowed the developers to

get a revised master plan approved by the Minister for Planning, bypassing the council and

thus speeding up the process and avoiding potential council opposition to the changes. The

new plan replaced the design requirements for two major podiums, allowing separate

basements with car parking to be built for each new building, and shifted the residential

components to a more feasible spatial structure (Bureaucrat, interview). The new plan also

significantly reduced the commercial component from the original 20 per cent to under

10 per cent in the railway precinct area, to which the council was strongly opposed because

this would have involved a reduction of local employment potential.

At that point Landcom considered that its basic role as a master developer had been

completed. More pertinently, in the lead-up to the global financial crisis, loan to valuation

ratios were reduced from 80 to 60 per cent by the banks (Developer, interview). This

required an injection of new equity from the developers to maintain economic viability, a

step that Landcom did not see as part of its role in such projects. Australand took full

control of subsequent development, buying Landcom out. Landcom’s status as a

government agency was seen to have been a very positive factor in getting development

off the ground. In particular, its existing contact network with State Rail enabled it to go

straight to the appropriate people there for various technical and commercial negotiations

and approvals. As a bureaucrat put it: “If you don’t know [who to contact], dealing

with an organisation like State Rail is enormously difficult, because there’s so many

sub-departments that you have to deal with to get through” (Bureaucrat, interview).

The exit of Landcom has since led to long delays in gaining concept plan approvals from

RailCorp (part of State Rail) as a designated development referral agency. As a developer

noted: “They don’t have a typical decision making structure which is transparent”

(Developer, interview). RailCorp was seen as being badly resourced, exacerbating delays,

and its decisions could not be appealed because of its powers under the Transport

Administration Act, 1988.

The Wolli Creek project has brought out constraints specifically associated with

development alongside a rail line. Developments within 25metres of a rail line have to be

vetted by State Rail to ensure that rail safety and structural integrity, and station ingress/

egress flows are maintained through balcony design, suitable pilings, etc. This produces

requirements for monitoring plans, consultant reports and so on. In the Wolli Creek case,

the TOD area also has high voltage lines running through the centre, necessitating detailed

and technically difficult building responses.

This short history of the Wolli Creek TOD brings out several factors that were

favourable for its development. The first was the existence of two large non-residential

sites adjacent to a rail line and proposed new station, which meant only a simple site

amalgamation process was involved. The second was a visionary lead planner in the local

council who enabled a TOD plan for the area to be produced with significant community

input: this established the necessary planning framework even though the developers were

448 G. Searle et al.

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subsequently able to bypass the council and community to get the planning controls

modified. The next was the active interest of the Minister for Planning, which significantly

assisted key transport decisions at the state level to be acted on. In addition, Landcom’s

status as a state government agency significantly assisted development to get off the

ground through transfer of State Rail land, achieving approval for necessary changes to the

master plan from the government and negotiating with State Rail over issues about

development adjacent to the rail line. Nevertheless, the Wolli Creek story also highlights

negative development factors arising from the proximity of the rail line, a perverse

outcome given that TODs are necessarily built around a rail station. In particular, there are

extra design and construction costs associated with ensuring the appropriate operation of

the rail system. These costs can be exacerbated by delays experienced by developers in

negotiating the required approvals with State Rail.

Yeerongpilly, Brisbane

Yeerongpilly is 6 kilometres south-west of the Brisbane CBD. The main Yeerongpilly

TOD site is located on the site of the state government’s former Animal Research Institute

(ARI), with an area of 14.6 hectares. Heritage listed ARI buildings still dominate higher

ground on the site and they have been retained in planning of the TOD. The site is bounded

to the north by the Brisbane River itself. The designated TOD site is isolated to its south

and east by power easements, road and rail infrastructure. Yeerongpilly rail station is

connected to the site by an overpass. To the west lies the second part of the TOD—the

Queensland Tennis Centre complex and apartments built by major developer MIrvac at

Tennyson Reach on the site of a former state power station (Figure 3).

The SE Queensland Regional Plan of 2005 was the first metropolitan strategy for the SE

Queensland region, and was produced by the state government as a planning framework

for better management of the rapid growth in this part of the state. Among its policies was

Policy 8.2.5: Focus higher density and mixed-use development in and around regional

activity centres and public transport nodes and corridors (Queensland Government, 2005,

p. 65). The Queensland government saw under-used, obsolete or vacant state-owned sites

near rail stations as having significant potential to implement this policy. During 2007–

2008 it put out a competitive tender for development of the ARI site (which was to be

vacated by 2011) and the adjacent site of the Tennyson Power Station (demolished in

2006) (Queensland Government & Brisbane City Council, 2010). Two project stages were

envisaged. The first included the power station site and the second the remainder of the

area. The process was discontinued when the preferred developer could not proceed due to

poor market conditions during the global financial crisis. The first stage area was

subsequently on-sold to Mirvac in a partnership with the state, and developed into the new

Queensland Tennis Centre (owned by the Queensland government) and Mirvac’s

11 hectareTennyson Reach precinct of 207 apartments.

In late 2009, the Premier announced that the government would fast track development of

the ARI site into a TOD (Queensland Government & Brisbane City Council, 2010).

The TOD covered 14.6 hectares and would have high-quality residential accommodation of

up to nine storeys, affordable housing, retail, commercial and entertainment facilities, and

green space. The state would work in partnership with Brisbane City Council to expedite the

planning process. In July 2010 at the start of the planning process, a stakeholder consultation

workshop led by the state government was held with relevant state agencies and internal

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working groups of Brisbane City Council to help identify and confirm the site’s constraints

and opportunities (Van Rensburg, 2014). A workshop involving a charrette process was then

held with all 26 self-nominated community planning representatives who had accepted an

invitation in the first Newsletter, comprising ARI employees and people who lived and

worked in the local area. This workshop and the two subsequent community workshops were

led by Brisbane City Council’s Community Engagement Centre of Excellence (CECE)

(Van Rensburg, 2014). The representatives identified ideas for development, and discussed

options for future development and how development should proceed. The ideas from the

first workshop formed the basis of the vision and principles for the TOD (Queensland

Government & Brisbane City Council, 2010, p. 9).

After the first community workshop, a two-day design workshop was held between

consultants engaged by the state and the council and state government clients. The

intention was to explore how best to incorporate the technical input and community

feedback into site development. Considerations for optimal site outcomes involved road

layout, commercial activity location, building height and housing type distribution, open

Figure 3. Yeerongpilly TOD project.Source: School of GPEM, University of Queensland.

450 G. Searle et al.

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space location, potential tennis centre expansion, improved pedestrian and cycle

connectivity with surrounding neighbourhoods, and optimal land use–infrastructure

integration (Queensland Government & Brisbane City Council, 2010, p. 12). Three

development scenarios were eventually distilled from these deliberations to inform the

final concept plan. Following this, a second community workshop, also involving a

charrette process and led by the CECE, was held to present outcomes from the first

workshop and to seek comments on a draft vision and principles and discuss the concept

plan scenarios from the state–council design workshop (Van Rensburg, 2014). A concept

plan was then produced in October 2010 to provide a framework for a statutory Final Plan

of Development, which was to be prepared jointly as a State Planning Regulatory

Provision (SPRP) to assess development (Queensland Government & Brisbane City

Council, 2010, p. 5). A third community meeting was subsequently held in December

2010 to allow feedback and discussion on the concept plan (Van Rensburg, 2014).

In November 2011, the SPRP to give statutory effect to the final plan was promulgated

(Queensland Government, 2011). The SPRP enabled the developer to lodge a self-assessed

or code assessable development application (these involve assessment against a list of clear

criteria, without community involvement), instead of an impact assessable application

(involvingmore open-ended assessment inwhich the community has submission and appeal

rights) that would normally be required for such a proposal (Planner, interview). The

finalisation of a Detailed Plan of Development based on the SPRP is on hold, pending the

response of the government to the Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry’s final report

because of the latter’s potential planning implications for this flood-prone site.

A high-level state planner and a major developer both agreed that the supportive

governance arrangement had been successful. The developer had some reservations, based

on experience of completing the original first stage of the TOD, Tennyson Reach, as to

whether there had been a facilitative planning framework although she conceded that rapid

development had occurred (Planner, interview; Developer, interview). However, the

Tennyson Reach development involved a standard development application process, as

opposed to the special framework put in place for development of the main part of the

TOD. Potential outcomes in terms of urban design, public space provision and provision

for walkability and cycling were rated highly by both interviewees. The developer

lamented the lack of success in attracting shops or other businesses, which we attribute to

the presence of close-by existing retailing and offices near the station (including two

supermarkets) combined with the Tennyson Reach population being below the threshold

for new neighbourhood-level services.

The Yeerongpilly TOD is still at an early stage of development, and so conclusions

about factors significant in promoting or impeding development must necessarily be

tentative. Nevertheless, it is apparent that state government ownership of the whole site

allowed development planning to proceed quickly. There was little opposition, because

local stakeholders were actively involved in the planning process and because of the small

size of the local community. Development planning was also facilitated by a state–local

government partnership approach to planning of the site and the use of a state planning

instrument to fast track development of the second stage. In regard to the first stage

development, the developer said that an accelerated planning process would have been

very desirable (Developer, interview). This probably reflected developer views in general

on the slowness of ordinary planning approval processes, with the first stage development

being quite fast in comparison with development at Wolli Creek, for example.

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TOD Delivery Issues and Policy Implications

TOD delivery issues identified in the case studies are summarised in Table 2. The table

identifies the main positive and negative factors as well as the main challenges to be

overcome.

Table 2 indicates that the governance arrangements are key to the success of TODs; in

all three cases the involvement of the state has facilitated the process, even though in the

case of Footscray the leadership was unclear and perceived as hindering the progress of the

TOD and generating a lack of agreement on the objectives of the project. For the three

projects, the land ownership was an important factor for success. Our survey indicated that

there is a lack of amalgamation mechanisms in place and thus one single owner for TOD

land really facilitates the delivery process. The uncertainty around the provision of

transport infrastructure is also a factor that can delay the delivery of the project

(e.g. Footscray). Finally, the flow-on effects of TODs on economic revitalisation are

limited and remain a challenge for Footscray in particular.

To explore the extent to which the case study findings were indicative of wider TOD

issues, an online survey of developers and planners was carried out during November

2012–January 2013 to collect qualitative and quantitative data on the factors hindering

and facilitating the delivery of TODs generally. Those surveyed included the nine

interviewees for the case studies and four others suggested by interviewees as being

knowledgeable about the TODs (a state government planner in Sydney and two developers

and a state government planner in Melbourne). There were eight respondents to the survey

(a response rate of 61 per cent), so that the survey results need to be regarded as broadly

indicative rather than definitive. Four respondents were from Queensland, three from New

South Wales and one from Victoria. The questions requested evaluations on a five-point

Likert scale of a series of 21 hypothesised barriers to delivering TOD projects under the

headings of Technical (Design & Planning, Transportation); Commercial Viability; and

Regulatory; and of a series of 10 hypothesised elements producing successful TODs under

the headings of Design & Planning; Transportation; and Regulatory. The hypothesised

barriers and supportive elements were generated from a review of the literature, including

the literature cited in this article. In addition, respondents were invited to provide

qualitative views on each set of hypothesised barriers and supportive elements.

Table 2. Summary of TOD delivery issues

Footscray Wolli Creek Yeerongpilly

Positivefactors

Involvement of the state/pre-commitment of thestate

Land ownership facilitatedland amalgamation.Strong leadershipfrom local planner.Involvement of statedevelopment agency

Supportive governancearrangement withinvolvement of the state.Land owned by the state

Negativefactors

Governance arrangementswere unclear. Uncertaintyrelated to the future of theRRL project

Governance: partnershipwith State Rail.Additional construction costs(proximity of the rail line)

First stage lackedinstruments to fast trackdevelopment

Mainchallenges

Economic revitalisation ofthe area

Attraction of shops and otherbusinesses

Attraction of shops andother businesses

Source: Authors’ research.

452 G. Searle et al.

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There was agreement among most respondents that governance arrangements for TOD

project delivery were more complicated than for traditional TOD projects. This was

associated with almost unanimous agreement that uncertainty related to the scale and

future development of TODs was a major hurdle in TOD delivery. This was also related to

concerns amongst most respondents that, to the extent that new transport investment was

required for TOD projects, this created uncertainty in itself and in sequencing land-use

investments. More generally, the majority of those surveyed considered that the

coordination challenges of complex projects in TODs were undermining the engagement

of developers. All agreed that the complexity of obtaining planning approvals was a

major hurdle, while most also saw the lack of land amalgamation mechanisms as a major

constraint. In terms of TOD success factors, nearly all respondents considered TOD

projects were assisted where there is a ‘special’ planning regulatory framework at the local

level to facilitate delivery. Most also saw frequent public transport services as essential.

However, there was no consensus on other factors seen as making TODs successful. Thus,

the survey reinforced the need identified in the case studies for special planning and

governance arrangements, facilitation of land amalgamation and certainty about future

transit investment.

Can government policies, especially at the state level, facilitate the delivery of TODs

and address the challenges identified? It is clear from the case studies that special planning

and governance arrangements that reduce planning controls over development can greatly

assist TOD delivery. In all three cases, state government involvement facilitated this,

although local council cooperation played a significant role in Wolli Creek and

Yeerongpilly. The policy issues arising from the need for property amalgamation to

produce the large sites needed for economic development are more complex. In two of the

case studies here, large sites were available at the outset, while in the other case

(Footscray) the state has had to purchase properties to facilitate initial development,

justified by the relocation of state offices to the precinct. Such advance purchases by the

state might well be justified where the transit station is a major transit node that is intended

for significant upgrading as part of a major activity centre strategy, in which there might be

an expectation of land value increases in the longer term. Alternatively, local councils or

the state could compulsorily acquire strategic parcels of land where these would allow

development to proceed. While state planning acts have provision for this, it is politically

difficult without a very clear demonstration of community benefits. Finally, the case

studies indicate that the planning ideal of mixed-use TODs is not economically viable in

smaller centres. Plan requirements for minimum percentages of commercial development

in such TODs might actually deter developers who are only able to make development

economic if it is entirely residential.

Conclusions

The three case studies reported in this article allow some preliminary conclusions to be

drawn about factors that assist in the development of TOD zones in Australia. Our main

finding is that even with facilitative planning frameworks, development around rail

(transit) stations is very dependent on site context, especially whether there are large

properties in single ownership. In particular, it is clear, firstly, that context-specific

planning processes and related institutional structures to help development are highly

significant. In all three case studies, state intervention in standard local planning

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 453

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processes has helped drive development, via involvement of a state development

authority (Wolli Creek), state leadership of the planning process and the use of a state

planning instrument (Yeerongpilly), and special fast track zoning by the state (Footscray).

It was also seen as the most important success factor in the survey. This mirrors the

findings of Curtis (2012) for Perth, in which there has been greater transition to TOD

where the state had a role in planning and development outside the conventional planning

model. (By contrast, successful international examples of TOD, such as in Tokyo and

Hong Kong, have not required special planning powers (Murakimi, 2013).) In Footscray,

a joint local–state planning process appears to have lacked adequate local–state

government coordination over much of the period since the TOD was designated. Local

council support for TOD precinct development has been strong in all three cases.

Community support and involvement in planning has also been strong in each case,

facilitated by the council in Wolli Creek and Footscray and jointly by council and state

governments in Yeerongpilly. In Wolli Creek and Yeerongpilly, this facilitated TOD

implementation.

There is little doubt that TOD site ownership characteristics are also a critical factor.

The non-residential uses of the Wolli Creek and Yeerongpilly sites prior to TOD

designation meant there was little local community opposition, and provided the

opportunity for site owners to profit from upgrading of zoning to a TOD. The single or

twofold ownership of these two TOD sites also meant that agreement on a development

process and development outcomes for the TODs could be quickly reached, and

development could be carried out in an optimally staged and located manner across the

TOD. The fragmented ownership pattern of the Footscray TOD has required the state to

acquire 14–15 properties and consolidate them. The single state government ownership of

the Yeerongpilly TOD site also enabled the government to more effectively steer the

planning and development process, while this was also the case with the McNab Avenue

precinct in Footscray. Nevertheless, fragmented site ownership was a general concern for

survey respondents, with most seeing the lack of land amalgamation mechanisms as a

barrier to successful TODs. The special site purchases by the state needed in Footscray

confirm this view, while the barriers of fragmented property ownership for economic

development of TODs are also highlighted in the literature (Boarnet & Compin, 1999;

Birrell et al., 2005; James, 2009, p. 194).

The case studies also provide insights into issues of TOD profitability and value capture.

For example, there is little indication that up-zoning of a rail station precinct to a TOD

generates windfall profits that can be captured for public planning purposes. To the

contrary, high-density development beside the rail line at Wolli Creek has involved extra

development costs caused by the very proximity of the railway. In Yeerongpilly, the first

stage development suffered significantly reduced profitability because construction of the

tennis centre, which was obligated in return for a lower site sale price of the state-owned

site, experienced unforeseen geotechnical problems (Planner, interview). In Footscray the

state government has been investing heavily in infrastructure and related improvements

without much possibility of recouping this expenditure from any form of value capture.

This contrasts with extensive international use of value capture mechanisms to recoup

windfall land value gains arising from improved access to rail transit (Landis et al., 1991;

Stopher, 1993; Rybeck, 2004), and suggests either that the extra construction costs per

dwelling of higher density housing (National Housing Supply Council, 2010) were seen as

negating the land value gains from up-zoning or, more generally, that governments did not

454 G. Searle et al.

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want to impose any financial costs on developers that would constrain achievement of

government TOD and urban consolidation goals.

Finally, the case studies suggest that the TOD goal of mixed-use development might

only be properly achievable in major developments such as Footscray, as getting

commercial development has proven problematic at Wolli Creek and in the completed

stage at Yeerongpilly. Even so, significant office development in Footscray has only

been possible thus far because of a major state government commitment to the proposed

office space. Thus, Calthorpe’s (1993) intention that every TOD, even the smallest

(a ‘convenience centre’), should have commercial development appears to be problematic

for smaller scale TODs unless these are located within larger activity centres. Overall, as

this article has shown, attaining the fully realised TOD vision as set out by Calthorpe in

particular requires supportive contextual conditions that can be challenging for planning to

generate.

Acknowledgements

This article is a revised and extended version of a paper originally presented at the 2013 Planning Institute of

Australia national congress, Canberra.

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Appendix 1: Semi-directed interviewee details

Yeerongpilly

Developer, 10 October 2012.

Planner, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 9 October 2012.

Wolli Creek

Planner, formerly with NSW Department of Planning, 19 December 2012.

Bureaucrat, Landcom, 20 December 2012.

Developer, 17 December 2012.

Footscray

Planner, City Design, City of Maribyrnong, 13 September 2012.

Bureaucrat, Central Activities Areas Delivery, Urban Development and Business

Services Division Planning, Heritage and Building, Department of Planning and

Community Development, 24 September 2012.

Development Manager, Places Victoria, 21 March 2013.

Positive and Negative Factors for Transit Oriented Development 457

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