Portuguese Attempts at Monopoly on the Upper Guinea Coast 1580-1650- by Waltner Rodney (1965)

8/10/2019 Portuguese Attempts at Monopoly on the Upper Guinea Coast 1580-1650- by Waltner Rodney (1965)

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Journal of African History, VI, 3 (I965), pp. 307-322

PORTUGUESE ATTEMPTS AT MONOPOLYON THE UPPER GUINEA COAST, I580-I650

By WALTER RODNEY

CONSISTENT with the spirit of the times, and as a reward for fulfillingpioneer roles, the Portuguese, on the discovery of the African coast,asserted the right to a monopoly of whatever benefits were in store. One ofthe earliest steps towards translating this claim into practical terms camewith the settlement of the Cape Verde islands. These islands were by-passed in the first years of exploration, and were not discovered until I460.Since Prince Henry died at this date, the Cape Verde islands became partof the African heritage of his nephew, Ferdinand, who immediately beganto encourage settlement. Portuguese came as free men, while Africans werebrought from the mainland as slaves to help build an agricultural andtrading community centred in Santiago, the largest of the islands. As earlyas 1466, the white residents of the Cape Verde islands received their firstcomprehensive charter, setting up fiscal and judicial machinery, andgranting the settlers full rights to the commerce of the coast between CapeMount and the Sine-Salum. Thus it was that nearly the whole of theUpper Guinea Coast became the 'Guinea of Cape Verde', a situation notofficially terminated until I879.1 Since the residents of the Cape Verdeislands articulated interests which conflicted with those of the mainlandsettlers, this added further intricacy to the pattern of attempted mono-polistic control. Metropolitan Portugal found itself committed to theexercise of monopoly over Guinea, not only for Portugal's own benefit,but also for the sake of the Cape Verdeans.

Well before the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580, theFrench had already forced the Portuguese out of the profitable trade tothe north of the Gambia, although the fort of Bezeguiche (Goree) remainedin Portuguese hands, and became the object of serious struggle betweenthemselves and the Dutch in the second and third decades of the seventeenthcentury.2 Sierra Leone, at the southern extremity of the region, was theleast susceptible to control from Santiago, and it was the haven of thelanfados or tangomaus, Portuguese traders who lived on the mainland inspite of royal prohibitions, free from the payment of duties, and acting asagents for rival European powers.3 During the years between 1580 and

1 J. Sena Barcellos, Subsidios para a Historia de Cabo Verde e Guine, I (Lisboa, I91I).2 Arquivo Histdrico Ultramarino, Lisboa. Guine, caixa I. No 27, Joao Pereira Corte-

Real to the Conselho Ultramarino, Dec. I641.Lanfados and Tangomaus. These terms were used interchangeably. Lanfados is

derived from the Portuguese lanfar ('to throw'), or more probably, from the reflexive.See also p. 320. Tangomaus is a word of uncertain origin, but it may possibly be connectedto the fact that there were priests or medicine men known as Tangomaus by the people ofSierra Leone in the sixteenth century.

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WALTER RODNEY

I640, it was the small area between the River Gambia and the deep bayknown as the Ria Grande de Buba which was principally exploited by the

Portugueseand the

Spanish.The friction there did not arise

primarilyfrom foreign competition, but was generated partly within the Portuguesesystem of administration and partly through the impact of Europeaneconomic activity on the Africans. This latter is one of the most neglectedaspects of the history of the region. Conflicts between Portuguese nationalsand their government were not resolved simply by administrative decrees;nor did Portugal and France settle their differences over trade in this areamerely by exchanging diplomatic notes in Europe; nor was the strugglebetween the Royal African Company and the 'ten per cent men' conducted

solely in the British Parliament, beyond the reach of the Guinea peoples.4Ideally, the Cape Verdeans would have preferred to conduct all trade to

the mainland in their own boats, and then have ships carry the producefrom the Cape Verde islands. However, with the increase of trade by the

early sixteenth century, the Portuguese government did not support thisdemand. Instead, in i517 and I5I8 a series of measures were aimed atthe lanfados on the mainland, and at the same time reduced the privilegesof the Cape Verde settlers, from whom the lanfados were principally re-cruited. The Cape Verde trade with Sierra Leone was completely outlawed.Commerce with the remaining portion of the Upper Guinea Coast waslimited on the outward journey to articles produced by the Cape Verdeansthemselves, while on the homeward journey the Cape Verde traders wereforbidden to transport slaves beyond those needed within the islands.5Nevertheless, Santiago remained the administrative hub of the UpperGuinea Coast, successfully pressing the claim that no ships should pass toor from Cacheu without first stopping at Santiago and paying duties there.The fiscal machinery for the recovery of duties was to be found in San-

tiago, only one official being appointed to serve the whole mainland area.6What eventually weakened the position of the islands was that from about

I550 their rights were not protected directly by the crown. Instead theyhad to deal with the contract-holders to whom the trade of the UpperGuinea Coast was leased. The policy in this regard had not been consistentin the first half of the sixteenth century, which saw vacillations between thealternatives of direct royal administration and the farming of the revenues.

Eventually, the compromise was reached whereby a royal factor was per-manently present in Santiago, while the contracts continued to be sold.7

For most of the sixteenth century, the Upper Guinea Coast was dividedinto a number of 'trades' or districts, each of which was leased for three-

year periods. Under the Spanish the contract was for a time sold for six-4 The 'ten per cent men' were English private traders who were allowed to compete

with the Royal African Company, but paid an extra io per cent duty on goods importedinto England from Africa. 6 Barcellos, op. cit.

6 Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial, I (Lisboa, I950). Letters of appointment ofJoao Tavares de Sousa as captain and factor of Cacheu, Dec., I614. Document No. 26.

7 G. Scelle, La Traite Negribre aux Indes de Castille, I (Paris, 1906).

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WALTER RODNEY

Verdeans, the European traders on the mainland, the Spanish government,the Portuguese government and the Africans themselves.

The lessees and thecaptains

ofships

who held individual licences weredetermined to avoid the payment of the duties which they owed on bothsides of the Atlantic-to the Portuguese in Guinea and to the Spanish inAmerica. As stated earlier, Santiago possessed the main machinery forthe collection of revenue on the Upper Guinea Coast, and it was preciselythe inadequacy of administrative provisions on the mainland which led to thewidespread evasion of duties by registered ships, which loaded unperturbedon the Cacheu and the Ria Grande de Buba, and then set sail directly forthe Indies. At the same time, the contract-holders constantly failed tofulfil their obligations to the small ecclesiastical establishment on theislands.

The complaints of the Cape Verde authorities against the violations ofthe contract received the necessary legislative support, while conversely,the counter-claims which were presented, asking for the freeing of theCacheu trade from the necessity of proceeding via the Cape Verde islands,met with no sympathy. In June I6Io Joao Soeiro, the then holder of thecontract, petitioned the Conselho da India in a vain attempt to eliminatethe necessity of conducting all commerce via Cape Verde. In reality, thistrader was seeking official sanction for what he was already doing, andfailure to obtain it did not deter him. Subsequently, he and his agents wereprosecuted in Portugal for breaking the contract and defrauding the royalrevenues, but this did not help the situation on the Guinea coast. Here,as one governor of Cape Verde lamented, nothing could be done to stopthe registered ships being loaded at points on the mainland outside thecontrol of the Portuguese administration, because the local Europeantraders and the Africans co-operated to further these 'illegal' activities.14The struggle in terms of petition and legislation was unreal. The CapeVerde interests won all their legislative battles, and were yet left with theshell and not the substance, since there were no means of putting thedecrees into effect on the Upper Guinea Coast.

Apart from their insistence that import and export duties on theGuinea trade should be payable in Santiago, the Cape Verdeans alsovoiced serious objections against the cargoes imported into Guinea.15There were long-standing Manueline provisions against the export ofcertain articles from Portugal to Guinea, chief among these being firearms,cloth (both Indian and European), and iron (from which the Africansforged their weapons).16 The registered vessels flouted these prohibitionsto the detriment of the Cape Verde islands. The sale of cotton cloths onthe mainland accounted for a considerable part of the income of the CapeVerdeans, and there was nothing about which they were more sensitive.

14 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, No. 27, Nicolhau Castilho to the Conselho Ultra-marino, Jan. i615. 15 Ibid.

16Almeida d'Eca, Normas Economicas na Colonizafao Portuguesa ate I808 (Coimbra,1921).

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THE PORTUGUESE IN UPPER GUINEA

This was so much the case that they demanded that all female mulattoesshould be sent to the islands, since mulatto women in Guinea super-intended the

productionof cloths which

competedwith the

CapeVerde

articles.17Fortunately for the Cape Verdeans, their cloths were more than able to

hold their own, and, subsequently, Europeans were forced to buy thesecloths to facilitate their purchases of slaves, wax and ivory on the coast. Itwas iron against which they could offer no competition, and for the Africansthis was a top priority.

On the whole West African coast, slaves and other items of export were

purchased by an assortment of trade goods, ranging from firearms to glassbeads. The actual composition of a parcel of goods for payment was amatter of the greatest importance.18 In this northern region iron was the

staple requirement, and Europeans had always to provide a certain pro-portion of the value of their purchases in iron bars. The Africans on thecoast gradually pushed up the proportion of iron demanded for each slave.19For a country such as Portugal, itself a buyer of this metal, this develop-ment was not welcome.

Because of the prohibition on the export of iron to Africa, a speciallicence had to be granted to the holders of the Cape Verde-Guinea con-tract to provide iron for the area. This was quite inadequate, and, judgingfrom the Cape Verde protests, the registered vessels were carrying farmore iron than they were legally allowed. In addition, the English, Frenchand Dutch provided a great part of the iron which found its way to theUpper Guinea Coast, selling it to Portuguese intermediaries on the coastitself.20

In I615, a long memorandum on the subject of iron imports intoGuinea, probably written by Nicolau Castilho, governor of Cape Verde,rejected the view which was supported in some quarters that, because allthe iron imported was exchanged for slaves, this was in the interests ofSpain and Portugal. It contended that, apart from the unwisdom of en-couraging foreigners within the imperial domains, the fact was that themore iron imported the higher was the proportion of it which the Africansdemanded per slave. This sent up the price of each slave, because iron wasone of the most expensive articles in the complex of trade goods. At thesame time the Africans needed to sell fewer slaves to satisfy their require-ment for iron. The economic principles at work here are too straight-forward to require any explanation, and yet they have so far been little

17 Boletim do Arquivo Historico Colonial, I, Document No. 26.18 Normally, trade was in the form of simple barter, but on the Gold Coast there

developed a system whereby the parcel of trade goods was based on a specific measure ofgold. Cf. K. Polanyi, 'Sortings and ounce trade in the West African Slave Trade',Journal of African History, v (I964), 3, 38I-93.

19 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, No. 54, Memorandum on the trade of Cape Verde,Dec. I6I5.

20 Thomas Astley, Voyages, I (London, 1745). Voyage of Richard Rainolds to Guinea,I591.

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WALTER RODNEY

taken into account. Since the Europeans were trading in Africa, theobjective market conditions there were decisive. Here, as elsewhere, the

attemptto effect a

monopolywithout the

abilityto

satisfythe market was

bound to end in failure. In the long run Spain's imperial aspirations foun-dered mainly on its own industrial inadequacy, but during the union ofthe Iberian crowns the Spanish were undoubtedly the senior partner, andhelped maintain the Portuguese position on the Upper Guinea Coast byproviding iron and other imports.

While the Hispano-Portuguese regime lasted, Portuguese nationalsengaged in trade on the Upper Guinea Coast benefited greatly. The CapeVerde administration did complain, but those Cape Verde islanders whowere

activelyinvolved in commerce on the mainland,

alongwith other

white settlers on the mainland, considered the early years of Spanish ruleas the golden era of Guinea history.21 Accurate official figures of the annualexport of slaves, ivory and wax are not available. No returns whatever weremade up for Cacheu, and the books in Santiago were incredibly badly kept.The customs entries named the products imported or exported, but not thequantity. An entry such as 'many pipes of wine' represents the upper limitsof exactitude.22 In 1613 there was a royal request for information on theyield of the Cape Verde-Guinea contract for the years I609 and I6Io, aswell as for the number of slaves exported from Cacheu between June I6I iand June I6I3.23 This request met with no answer, but, fortunately,estimates from competent sources are not lacking.

Writing in 1625 with fifty years experience on the coast, Andre Dornelas,a Cape Verdean, attributed to the town of Guinala on the Ria Grande deBuba an export of close to 3000 slaves per year at the end of the previouscentury.24 Guinala was made untenable by the attacks of the neighbouringBijagos islanders, and Cacheu became the chief entrep6t. This change didnot affect the overall export of slaves. The Jesuit, Father Baltezar Barreira,gives an indication of the considerable scale of slave exports during his stayon the Upper Guinea Coast between I604 and 16I2, since one of his chiefcomplaints was that the slaves were baptized in lots of 300 to 700 instead ofindividually.25 The figure of slave exports must have been fairly constantduring the pre-I64o period, because in I622 Francisco de Moura, governorof Cape Verde, gave 3000 as his estimate of the annual export of slavesfrom the Upper Guinea Coast to the Spanish Indies, while in I644 theConselho Ultramarino was appraised that the exports of slaves from theUpper Guinea Coast previously averaged 3000 a year.

21 Andre Dornelas, Relacao em 14 capitulos sobre a Serra Leoa, I625. In 'Relacoes doDescobrimento da Costa da Guine', Ms. 5I-VIII-25, Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa.

22 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, Accounts forwarded by Francisco de Sequeira, July16I3.

23 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, Conselho da India to Francisco de Sequeira, July 16I3.24 Dorelas, op. cit.25 F. Guerreiro, Relafdo Anual das Coisas que Fizeram os Padres da Companhia de

Jesus, i, ed. Artur Viegas (Coimbra, 1930).

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This volume of slave traffic was highly profitable to Portuguese citizensin that, while the Spanish issued most of the registers and bought the slaves,it was the

Portuguesewho received most of the licences and

contracts,and

who conducted the slave trade, both as resident traders in Africa and as

captains and crews of slave ships. There were 500 whites in Cacheu alone,many of whom lived in conditions of great luxury.26 Some Spaniards didsettle on the Upper Guinea Coast, but movement in the opposite directionwas even more marked, and in I590 the governor of Cartagena reportedthat there were I64 Portuguese who had come over on the slave ships andsettled in the area.27 In all these ways the years of Spanish rule in Portugalwitnessed a strengthening of the Portuguese monopoly of the commerce ofthe

UpperGuinea Coast and of the Atlantic slave trade that was its con-

comitant.Naturally, the Spanish expected to gain from the steady flow of slaves

from the Upper Guinea Coast. Up to 1595, when the general asientobegan to replace the registers, the vast majority of the licences granted inSeville to carry slaves to the Indies continued to specify Cape Verde-Guinea as the area of supply. Surviving accounts of slave imports into theAmericas at this date are as thin as those for African exports, and, notsurprisingly, were generated in the same way-when queries were raisedabout the yield of the revenue. Thus in I590, the Casa de Contratacion,having received reports that the customs of Cartagena were being systema-tically defrauded by the arrival of registered vessels with large numbers ofslaves beyond their stipulated complement, demanded a complete accountof the slaves entering the port for the preceding five years. It is open toquestion how accurate were the totals given in reply, because it was in theinterests of the officials to record far fewer slaves than actually arrived, butproportionately the accounts give a reliable guide. Of the 6884 slaves saidto have been imported between I585 and 1590, all but 507 originated fromthe Upper Guinea Coast.28

At Cartagena the slaves were worth between oo00 nd I20 ducados, whilein the mines of Santa Fe they usually fetched Ioo pesos of gold (22*5 carats),which was equivalent to about 150 ducados, and they sometimes commandeda top price of 200 ducados.29 The price in Cartagena was therefore never lessthan ?I2 and sometimes as high as ?25. Little wonder then that the slavetraders were not deterred by the relatively inconsequential rise in the priceof slaves which took place on the Upper Guinea Coast because of thedemand for iron and the greater frequency of European ships in the area.In I6I5 the price of a slave was still only 80 barafulas, or about ?4. IOS.30

26 Manuel Alvares, 'Ethiopia Menor e Descripgao Geografica da Provincia de SerraLeoa, I6I6'. Ms. 141-C-I, Biblioteca da Sociedade de Geografia, Lisboa.

27Archivo General de India, Santa Fe 37. Letter from the Governor of Cartagena,July, 590.

28 Ibid. Santa FE 37. Accounts forwarded on 5 July 1591.29 Ibid. Santa F6 I7. Letter from the President of Santa Fe, May I594.80 Barcellos, op. cit.

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WALTER RODNEY

As for the Spanish government, even if it was defrauded of some revenue,that was nothing compared to the availability of slaves in the Americas,

especiallyin the

miningsector of the

economy.Portuguese scholars have judged harshly the consequences of the unionwith Spain on Portuguese imperial fortunes. 'The decline of Portugueseinfluence and commerce on the Upper Guinea Coast was a simple con-sequence of the incapacity and disorientation of the Kings of Castille andtheir representatives in Portugal', writes Joao Barreto. This thesis has as itsbase the erroneous contention that 1580 was a significant turning-point inthe pattern of events on the African coast-the date after which Portugal'spossessions supposedly became subject to attacks from Spain's Europeanenemies.31 In reality, there was no such sharp change. At most, theyears after 1580 witnessed an increase in the frequency of the appearancesof Iberia's rivals on the West African coast. Certainly, with regard to theUpper Guinea Coast, the anti-Spanish propositions have little basis.

It has been suggested that Portugal lost the Senegambia because of the

presence of Spanish sovereigns on the Portuguese throne.32 To supportthis, attention has been drawn to the presence of Portuguese lanfados inthat region during the last two decades of the sixteenth century, facilitatingrival European traders. However, this was not a new feature. Since theearly years of that century, the Portuguese government had been strivingineffectively to eliminate the lanfados, and thus to discourage the foreignships which for a long time relied upon resident Portuguese traders to con-duct their commerce. Furthermore, a Cape Verde report to the crownspecifically pinpointed 1568 as the date by which all official Portugueseinfluence in the Senegambia had been destroyed.33

Another facet of the charge against the Spanish is that the abuses of theregistered ships had created indiscipline and anarchy on the Upper GuineaCoast.34 But an important point to remember about the register system isthat it started long before I580. The Spanish did not impose this system onthe Portuguese. On the contrary, the latter had themselves issued licencesin Lisbon, as well as seeking them from Seville, since 1562. Besides, in1615, after the register system had fallen into disuse, the Cape Verdeadministration was pressing for its return, realizing that its replacementmeant a decline in shipping.35

There are only two hints that Portuguese monopoly was being in anyway limited by Spanish hegemony. The first appears in the proposal ofthe Conselho da India that only Portuguese should be granted registers,

31J. Barreto, Histdria da Guine (Lisboa, 1938).82 Leite de Magalhaes, 'A Costa de Guin6'. In A Restaurafao e o Imperio ColonialPortugues (Agencia Geral das Col6nias. Lisboa, I940).

83 P. Brasio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana: Africa Ocidental, III (x57o-I600). 2ndSeries. 'Relaao de Francisco de Andrade sobre as ilhas de Cabo Verde.' Santiago,26 Jan. 1582.

84 Barreto, op. cit.85A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, No. 54, loc. cit.

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and that Spanish nationals be discouraged.36 However, in practice thePortuguese did form the majority of those who received licences. Thesecond

pointerlies in the reluctance with which in

1635the Conselho da

Fazenda granted permission to a Lisbon trader who wanted to sail forGuinea to procure slaves for the Indies, its reluctance being due to thefact that he was not carrying any slaves to Brazil.37 Within a few years thePortuguese authorities made it clear that they had no liking for the orien-tation of the Guinea trade in the direction of the Spanish Indies, and triedto substitute Brazil as a destination.

Meanwhile, the years of trade with Europeans, and especially the severaldecades of more intensive Spanish trade, had bred in the Guinea peoples adesire for

European imports.38These

comprised mainlyiron bars, tin and

copper basins, kettles, knives, cloths, wine, brandy, and a variety of beadsand trinkets, as well as horses and cattle from the Cape Verde islands.European ships could never expect a quick turn round after the fashion of ashipping metropolis, and the Papels (the tribe who controlled Cacheu) inparticular earned a reputation for the lengthy spinning out of the processof providing ships with the necessary exports. Every day longer that a shipspent in port meant for the Papels additional opportunities for earninggifts and small perquisites. It was not unusual for the Spanish registeredships to be kept in Cacheu for upwards of a year while awaiting their com-plement of slaves.39 If a ship's captain wanted to speed up the process,then he would be more liberal in the handing over of largesse, so that ineither event the Papels had something to gain. All this was in addition tothe initial customs duties and the payment for wood and water made to theKing of Mata and the Chief of Mompata. How important all this was tothe Africans was clearly demonstrated when they faced a changed situationafter I640.

It is obvious that commerce on the Upper Guinea Coast developed inresponse to stimuli that were primarily of an economic nature, and thatthe political union in the Iberian peninsula had no damaging effect on thePortuguese position in the 'Guinea of Cape Verde'. On the contrary, theassociation with the Spanish, which had begun before I580, was yieldingprofitable results for nearly all the parties involved. A pattern of depen-dence on Spanish capital had been set up, a ready market for slaves wasavailable in the Spanish possessions at a time when plantation slavery hadnot yet become very extensive, and the Africans on the coast had come torely upon the Spanish supply of trade goods. It was I640 which repre-sented a break in continuity, because the Portuguese took the initiative inreversing the commercial process which had developed in response to

36 Ibid. Comments of the Conselho on a petition from the Municipality of Santiago,I624.

37 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 17-I8, Decision of the Conselho da Fazenda, July 1635.88 Ibid. No. 27, Joao Pereira Corte-Real to the Conselho Ultramarino, Dec. 1641.39 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I, No. 27, Nicolhau Castilho to the Conselho Ultra-

marino, Jan. Ix65.

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WALTER RODNEY

market conditions, and in accordance with the demands of the Africans andthe economic capacities of the respective European nations. After thisdate a Leitmotif is

provided by Portuguese inabilityto

providethe

goodswhich the Africans required and the profits which their own traders ex-pected, and, at the same time, their unwillingness to allow other Europeansto provide these. This was a policy which resident traders and Africans wereas quick to resist as were Portugal's European rivals.

With the coming of Portuguese independence, it was not long beforeaction was taken by the new dynasty to consolidate its position on theUpper Guinea Coast. Cacheu's importance as a source of slaves for theSpanish Indies was recognized. It was noted that slaves supplied here hada

high reputationwith the

Spanishfor

qualityand

fidelity,while the

seizure of Angola by the Dutch in I64I further enhanced the value ofCacheu and its dependencies.40 Shortly after his accession as monarch inhis own right, D. Joao IV issued a decree prohibiting Santiago and Cacheufrom dealing with Spanish registered vessels unless these deposited securi-ties in Portugal. At the same time all Spanish vessels in Guinea and CapeVerde ports were to be embargoed.41

The Portuguese authorities in Lisbon, Santiago and Cacheu displayed thegreatest hostility towards the Spanish-even more than towards theDutch. The fact that the Portuguese and the Spaniards were co-religionistsmade not the slightest difference. When three Spanish Capuchins arrivedin Cacheu in I647 to conduct missionary work there and in Sierra Leone,they were viewed as Spanish commercial agents and were promptly shippedacross to Santiago. Their arrival on a Spanish vessel trading 'illegally' inthe Gambia was partly their undoing.42

The Conselho Ultramarino stressed the need for the appointment of a

competent captain-major to take charge in Cacheu, and definite action was

proposed with regard to the long voiced suggestion that Cacheu be pro-perly fortified against both European and African hostility. The nomineefor the post of captain-major at this important juncture was Paulo Barradasda Silva, who had already served twice in Cacheu. Paulo Barradas was thenin Santiago, and even before he could take up his appointment on themainland, reports of his too friendly relations with the English trading tothe Cape Verde islands caused the Conselho to lose confidence in him,and the first captain-major of this new era was Gon9alo de Gamboa de

Ayala, whose departure for Guinea was delayed until i644.43Ayala had the complete approval of the Conselho Ultramarino in his

determined efforts to stop the Spanish from trading in the Ria Grande,40 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa I. The Conselho da India in a comment on a letter

dated i6 Nov. 1635, stressed the importance of Cacheu. This was doubly emphasizedafter the Dutch took Luanda. Cf. Guine, caixa I. Decision of the Conselho Ultramarino,Nov. I643. 41 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II, Royal decree of 20 Dec. I640.

42 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 52, Gamboa de Ayala to the Conselho Ultramarino,Feb. 1647.

43A.H.U., Consultas of the Conselho Ultramarino. Cod. 30, fls. 107 and 219-23contain the information on Paulo Barradas.

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the Geba, the Casamansa and the Gambia. For their part the Spaniardsdid refrain from trading while seeking to gain Portuguese permission, a

policy seemingly inspiredin

part bythe seizure of four

Seville-registeredvessels consequent upon the order of D. Joao IV. Their cargoes served tofinance the new fortifications of Cacheu. As a result there seems to havebeen a hiatus in I640-2, but before long the Spanish ships were back in fullstrength, though they avoided Cacheu when possible.

Spanish ability to flout the decrees of the Portuguese was based partly onthe presence of a trading community on the Guinea coast which was pre-pared to co-operate with the Spanish ships. In addition, a number ofSpanish nationals were actually resident in Cacheu and its vicinity, and

they clearlyconsidered themselves as

owingno

loyaltyto the

Portuguesecrown.44 One Spanish citizen, Juan Perez, a master boatbuilder of Cacheu,overreached himself in his vituperation against the restored Portuguesemonarch, forcing even the hispanophile captain-major, Luis de Magalhaes,to jail him for a token three-day period. More pertinent was the fact thatthe Spaniards removed from the settlement of Cacheu, and conducted theiroperations on another estuary of the Cacheu river.45

The Portuguese traders were scarcely more loyal. The residents ofBissau, Guinala, Geba and Cacheu did send affirmations of their fealtyto D. Joao IV on the auspicious event of liberation from Spain, butMagalhaes, in an accompanying letter, also took the opportunity to registertheir grievances. Hardly any Portuguese ships were calling at the UpperGuinea Coast, and trade was at a virtual standstill. The Guinea merchantsemphasized that, so far, their obedience to royal provisions had beenentirely voluntary, but they wondered whether the price of loyalty wasstarvation. For them this was no flippant abstraction, because famine hadactually prevailed upon the coast for two years (I639-4I), and had hithard at both Africans and Europeans. Nor did the sale of relief suppliesfrom Cape Verde at black market rates help their ugly mood. Magalhaesurged the Conselho to send an assurance in the royal name to prevent thePortuguese traders from embarking on any trading opportunities that wereoffered. But the only practical assurance would have been the substitutionof Spanish enterprise by Portuguese, and this was not forthcoming.46 Tothe extent that the earlier pattern was modified, it was by the more fre-quent appearance of other European ships. Under these circumstances,the Portuguese lanfados, never distinguished for their patriotism, settleddown to defy the orders of the metropolis, and of the captain-major ofCacheu whenever he was minded to carry them out.

For the Papels of Cacheu, no ships meant no imports, no customsduties, no perquisites. They were quick to take action against the new

44 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 54, Petition of residents against Ayala, June 1647.(This refers to eighty Spaniards in the vicinity of Cacheu.)

45 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 58, Gamboa de Ayala to the Conselho Ultramarino,June I647.

46 Ibid. No. 23, Luis de Magalhaes to the Conselho Ultramarino, May I641.

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stringency of the Portuguese which they readily perceived to be the causeof their distress. After presumably having witnessed the turning away of

non-Portuguese ships bythe

captain-major, theydetermined that

any shipof any nationality which ventured into port in Cacheu should be free totrade. This determination they communicated to the captain-major inclear and unmistakable terms. Since its construction by subterfuge in1589, the fort of Cacheu had been deliberately refused its own independentwater supplies.47 Water had to be obtained from a stream and a fountainsome small distance outside the stockade. As soon as a ship was sighted,the Papels encamped around these spots as a guarantee that trade would bepermitted. If the captain-major was determined to withstand this siege,then there were other threats and other devices to which the Papels re-sorted, including the menace of total liquidation.48 This latter was almost

certainly a bluff, since the Africans desired the presence of Europeans.However, the residents of Cacheu were particularly vulnerable to fire, astheir houses were built with thatched roofs, and so the threat to set fire tothe settlement was invariably effective.

In one grim respect, the famine of I639-4I had been useful to thePapels after all; namely, by decimating the numbers of Negro 'slaves' whowere kept by the Cacheu merchants not only for purposes of trade but alsofor defence.49 Hopelessly outnumbered, the captain-major was forced to

disobey the injunctions of his Portuguese sovereign at the behest of thePapel chiefs.

The coercion of the captain-major of Cacheu into permitting free tradewas only one of several measures which were employed to ensure trade withthe Spanish and other Europeans. As already indicated, Spaniards movedfrom Cacheu to free themselves from the new restrictions against trade tothe Spanish Indies. This must have applied also to Portuguese citizens,since only 40 whites were to be found in Cacheu in 1641 as compared to

500 in I6I6.50 Certainly, later in the century Portuguese traders displayeda marked tendency to shake off the control of the organized settlements inexchange for the protection of local chiefs.

Since Portuguese authority was strongest on the Cacheu, the 'con-trabandists' used the rivers both to the north and to the south, especiallythe Gambia, the Geba and the deep bay called the Ria Grande de Buba.The traders set up a line of communication linking the Cacheu, the Casa-mansa and the Gambia by way of Bugendo and Bichangor, two villages inthe territory of the Banhun tribe. So intensive was this trade in the Gambia,that, in 1646, Ayala requested two frigates to stop the mouth of the river.5

47 See below, p. 321.48 A.H.U., Guin6, caixa I, No. 27, Joao Pereira Corte-Real to the Conselho Ultra-

marino, Dec. I641.49 Ibid. No. 23, Luis de Magalhaes to the Conselho Ultramarino, May 1641.60 A.H.U., Cabo Verde, caixa II, Joao Serr5o da Cunha to the Conselho Ultramarino,

April I644.61 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 58, Gamboa de Ayala to the Conselho Ultramarino,

June I647.

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should be severely punished, not only for his own misdeeds, but as anexample to the others in Guinea.55 Two things are evident from the reporton this episode. In the first place, the

questionof the relations of the

Kingof Bissau with foreigners had earlier been a subject of discussion betweenthe king and the captain-major, probably because the king had previouslyencouraged other Europeans. Secondly, this must have been a practice inwhich a number of the kings and chiefs on the Upper Guinea Coast in-dulged. The Gambia trade involved the Banhuns and the Mandingas, thatof the Geba was conducted with the Mandingas and the Beafadas, that ofthe Ria Grande meant contact with Beafadas, while the Papels were alwaysin the forefront in Cacheu and Bissau. Indeed, the exceptions are easierto note. Ayala was able to secure the co-operation of the Banhuns ofZeguichor and the Beafadas of Baorilla, this being possible because of thedecentralized nature of the tribal polities.56

Both the private traders and the Africans opposed the Portugueseadministration in its measures after i640, but it is necessary to define therelations between the local groups during the preceding decades. Manyof the private traders were mulattoes, already linked to the Africans byblood, and there were those who had become so integrated into Africanlife that they wore tribal tattooes. It was these who were the authenticlanfados, literally 'those who had thrown themselves' among the Africans.57There was, therefore, a distinction between the lanfado, who lived directlyunder the protection of a Guinea chief, and the 'loyal' Portuguese trader,who lived in the settlement under the sergeant-major or the captain-major.All whites resident on the Upper Guinea Coast were really motivated bythe need to find a profitable position in relation to the two poles of powerand authority which were represented by the African chiefs on the onehand, and, on the other, the Portuguese officials in Lisbon, Santiago andCacheu. If the white was a fugitive from justice, he had no choice but tolive in the fastness of the jungle, as was the case with a high-rankingPortuguese nobleman who spent more than twenty years in the SierraLeone hinterland from about 1641 onwards.58 In any case, lanfados wereliving outside Portuguese law, owing to the many royal provisions againstgoing to Guinea and trading privately, and to re-attract them to thesettlements a formal pardon was necessary.

On the whole, the considerations which led traders to make their adjust-ments between the Portuguese and the Africans had far less to do with thelegal standing of the individuals than with the achievement of wealth.Like most capitalists and accumulators, what these traders desired greatlywas security. The chiefs of the Upper Guinea Coast guaranteed the livesand property of their 'guests', as the lanFados were called, and made

55 A.H.U., Guin6, caixa I, No. 52, Gamboa de Ayala to the Conselho Ultramarino,June I647. 56 Ibid. 57 Guerreiro, op. cit.

68 Andr6 de Faro. 'RelacAo do que obrarao na segunda missao os annos de I663 e deI664 os Religiosos Capuchos em a Terra Firme de Guin6.' In Peregrinafao de Andre deFaro d Terra dos Gentios, ed. Luis Silvera (Lisboa, I945).

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positive efforts to see that the trading requirements of their 'guests' werefulfilled.59 The factor which could offset these advantages and attract

Europeansto the fold of officialdom was the

provisionof a

strongfort,

which could offer protection against attacks by rival European Powers,and at the same time free the whites from the financial and other demandsof the Africans.

In 1589 the issue of fort-building had arisen with regard to the Papels ofCacheu. The Portuguese traders there felt that they were too exposed tothe whims of Chapala, the Papel king, and sought his permission to erecta stockade at the mouth of the Cacheu river, using as a pretext the need for

protection against the piracy being practised by the Europeans on the coast,and promising that only a few houses would be built within the stockade toshelter those who had charge of the artillery. The request was granted,and as soon as the job was completed, the Portuguese withdrew en massefrom Chapala's town, and took up quarters within the fortified walls. This

precipitated a Papel attack, which was repulsed by the whites with the aidof their grommetoes, or black servants, and the fortifications remained inexistence.60 However, it meant that from then on the traders had to main-tain constant vigilance, and this was why a top priority after I640 was thebuilding of a proper fort in Cacheu.

At about the same time that the Cacheu fort was built, the whites ofGuinala on the Ria Grande de Buba withdrew to a fortified place, sup-posedly for the same reason (protection against French pirates). TheBeafadas accused them of wishing to base their presence in Guinea onforce, and immediately the Portuguese forfeited their security of person,while the price of slaves was deliberately raised by the Beafadas.

The hostility evoked when forts were built, and the fact that the amountof money spent by the Portuguese government on fortifications was in-versely proportionate to the incessant talk about fortifying, were partialdeterrents to any further movements from the protection (albeit capricious)of the Africans to the insecurity of Portuguese fortified places. Anotherdeterrent arose from the policy pursued by the Portuguese after i640,which facilitated the opposite process, whereby more private traders be-came lanfados. Indeed, the distinction between those whites in the Africancamp and those in the Portuguese settlements tended to disappear. InCacheu, for instance, it was in the common interest of all whites to combinewith the Papels to force the captain-major to allow free trade, and thisthey did.61

There was never any network of forts on the Upper Guinea Coast com-

parable to that on the Gold Coast, but one sees the same process in minia-ture-forts being built against African opposition and subsequently

69 Alvares de Almada, Tratado Breve dos Rios da Guine, I594, ed. Luis Silvera (Lisboa,1946).

60 Ibid.61 A.H.U., Guine, caixa I, No. 27, Joao Pereira Corte-Real to the Conselho Ultra-

marino, Dec. 1641.

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WVALTER RODNEY

having to be protected with difficulty. The regulations of the Portuguesegovernment, like those of the other Europeans on the West African coast

duringthe

pre-colonial era,were

ostensiblydirected towards its own

citizens and functionaries, but inevitably the action of these laws fell uponthe Africans. Laws unsupported by coercive sanction could easily beevaded, and generally this was the case, as the instance of Bissau indicated.But any attempt to buttress policy and regulations by the construction of afort, however unpretentious, constituted an infringement of Africansovereignty, and was so interpreted by the peoples of the coast. To theclash of economic interests was added the clash of sovereignties. These arethe essentials of the situation far into the eighteenth century, and they hold

goodnot

onlyfor the

Portuguese,but for all

Europeanswho

attemptedto

exercise a monopoly of trade on the Upper Guinea Coast.62

SUMMARY

Between I580 and I640 the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crownsstrengthened he commercial partnership which previously existed with respectto the supply of Guinea slaves to the Spanish Indies. The conduct of the slavetrade on the Upper Guinea Coast nvolved the active participation f the Africanchiefs, as well as the services of a considerable number of resident Portuguesetraders, known as lanfados. Before I640, while Iberian unity prevailed, themain source of discord in the area lay in the fact that the Spanish slave ships,with the help of the lanfados and the chiefs, were able to disregard he regulationthat all ships loading slaves on the Upper Guinea Coast should pay duties atSantiago (Cape Verde islands), which the Portuguese used as the hub of theiradministration. After I640 the restored Portuguese monarch attempted toexclude Spain from the commerce of the Upper Guinea Coast, and in theprocess, alienated he lanfados and the African chiefs.

62 The research in Spanish and Portuguese archives, on which this article is largely

based, was made possible by grants from the University of the West Indies and theCentral Research Fund of the University of London, which the author gratefullyacknowledges.

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Portuguese Attempts at Monopoly on the Upper Guinea Coast 1580-1650- by Waltner Rodney (1965)

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