Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association Newsletter, Special Edition

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Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Towards the end of 2012, the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Asso-

ciation (PAYA) decided the time had come to bring back our

newsletter. This is a special occasion for us since it’s a relaunch

edition that reports the main events hosted by PAYA throughout

the past year. In addition to this, we have included three short

articles as an important step to realign our national chapter’s

publication objectives.

In this renewed newsletter/jornal edition, João Teixeira de

Freitas kicks off with his reflections and ideas on how atlantic

values and interests can be promoted by enganging with youth

across the various YATA national chapters. Throughout 2012,

NATO and the EU were in the spotlight either for austerity, soli-

darity issues, partnerships or integration set-backs. To follow suit

on this trend, Raquel Patrício revisits the classical NATO-EU

topic, contributing with her views on this often protracted rela-

tionship. The articles section concludes with a piece on NATO’s

2012 Summitt in Chicago, looking beyond the objectives set

forth in the official declaration, and accounting for what’s been

accomplished since then.

Other great reads include the two special reports on some of

YATA’s flagship events: DAYS, PAYS and photos from the

North Atlantic Council simulation, SIMOTAN VI. Francisco

Costa shares his experience as a delegate and this year’s repre-

sentative for PAYA in Aalborg, Denmark. Perchuhy Kazhoyan

brings an unbiased contribution and briefs our readers on the one

-week long seminar held by PAYA at the Sintra Air Base near

Lisbon. Finally, we close with news on upcoming events and two

new sections: NATO in Portugal and Book reviews.

The purpose and message of this new format is twofold. First

we renew our commitment to provide updated information of our

activities and events to our friends and partners. Likewise, we

aim to establish a publication where young atlanticists and pro-

fessionals can contribute on topics relating to security, defence

and NATO. Second - and indeed the most important driver - is

the need to continuously address our raison d’etre as a national

chapter of a founding member state of the atlantic treaty: to pro-

mote and share the alliance’s values and objectives, whilst remin-

ding younger generations of NATO’s enduring relevance. This

publication and the events we organize year round embody the

efforts carried out to accomplish our core mission. We hope you

enjoy reading this newsletter as much as we enjoyed putting it

together.

Best Regards,

Alexandre Marques Pinho

Inside this Issue

Features

X2 | “Bridging the Gap” –

New Atlanticist Generations

and the Role of YATA

■ João Teixeira de Freitas

X3 | NATO-EU Relations: Cooperation and Gridlock

■ Dr. Raquel Caria Patrício

X5 | NATO Chicago Summit 2012 ■ Alexandre Marques Pinho

X8 | SIMOTAN VI

10 | 27th Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar Report ■ Francisco Costa

11 | 17th Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar Report

■ Perchuhy Kazhoyan

Upcoming Events and other YATA news | 14

NATO in Portugal – News and Updates | 15

Book Reviews and reading suggestions | 16

Inside this Issue

PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC

YOUTH ASSOCIATION

Special Annual Edition 2012 | Year: 3 | No: 1

NEWSLETTERNEWSLETTER

LETTER FROM

THE EDITOR

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Since the role of most Atlantic Youth chapters is to dy-

namically engage all students and academics into matters of

Defence, Security and NATO related topics, our presenta-

tion was done through a Demo of our very own SIMOTAN

– a North Atlantic Council Crisis Management Simulation.

Having pre-screened the CVs and credentials of the partici-

pants beforehand, we “randomly” called out names from

among the audience of participants that had just attended

one of the conferences that took place during the event, in

order to take the selected group to the largest auditorium

within the University where a prepared meeting table for

‘international delegations’ was waiting on the stage.

After both the initial nervous ticks and the anxiety began

to fade, and we explained the rules of the Simulation as well

as how the Demo differed from its full version by having a

less complex scenario and only 3 hours and a half for reso-

lution (as well as lacking some other elements like con-

stantly updated world events), most participants started to fit

well into their roles.

The debate was fluid and dynamic, with the U.S.A., Den-

mark and Germany delegations often taking the wheel of the

discussions, the participants were actively engaging in the

lessons of what it means to negotiate within an international

structure and how the decision process takes place within

the NAC. At times we were accompanied by an audience of

colleagues of these participants who were entertained as

well as interested by the Simulated NAC’s proceedings.

“BRIDGING THE GAP”

“the presence of the Portuguese Atlantic

Youth Association at the National Encounter

of IR Students represents an effort to bridge

the gap”

Features

NEW ATLANTICIST GENERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF YATA

BY JOÃO TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS

D uring March 31st, 2012, at the Portuguese National Encounter of International

Relations Students that took place in the School of Social and Political Sci-

ences of Lisbon, the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association presented itself

for the first time to several students of I.R. from across the country. This was

one of the strategic actions chosen by the Association to promote knowledge of Atlanti-

cism and youth Atlantic activities among university students all over Portugal, through a

personalized and up-close approach. Using the worthwhile results of events similar to

this National Encounter allows for youth activism to foster itself among a much larger

national audience than usual, mainly in countries which focus that kind of activism in the

capital and in one other main city or so, as is the case with Portugal.

Nearly everyone left the Demo (dubbed Flash SIMO-

TAN) feeling quite enriched by the experience and ready to

carry on with the upcoming activities. In fact, during the

same national encounter, the Portuguese YATA team also

cooperated with the I.R. Students Body to bring together the

Ambassador of Egypt to Portugal and LSE Professor Chris-

topher Coker in the panel ‘NATO and the Dilemma of Lib-

eral Interventionism’ – I had the pleasure to Moderate this

panel and observe the positive feedback from the audience

as they enjoyed the topics of the Arab Spring and NATO’s

role.

Portuguese Delegation at the 58th Atlantic Treaty Association

General Assembly in Rome, Italy 4-6 February, 2012 . (from left

to right) João Teixeira de Freitas (PAYA President), Francisco

Costa (PAYA Vice-President) and Jorge Girão (Portuguese Atlan-

tic Committee).

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All in all, the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association’s

presence in this event meant a deepening of the efforts to

bridge the gap between the more core audiences of such

initiatives and the generality of students that exist within the

I.R. spectrum. The results yielded did not disappoint: inter-

est in our 17th edition of the Portuguese Youth Atlantic

Seminar, that took place this July, was emboldened and

more contact and interest networks were established.

I personally believe, and PAYA’s members do as well,

that such efforts should be followed throughout the various

national chapters. It’s time the organized Atlanticist Youth

approached ALL students which might be prone to develop

an interest in the topics we deal in. Reeling them in by es-

tablishing cooperative efforts with local University associa-

tions and taking part in national events that encompass sev-

eral Universities at once are some of the ways forward.

And, more importantly, they are tools which prove para-

mount in bridging the gap.

“such efforts should be followed throughout

the various national chapter; approaching all

students who are interested in NATO affairs”

Features

PAYA President João Teixeira de Freitas addresses an audience

of youth delegates who participated in the first Portuguese Natio-

nal Encounter of International Relations Students.

On the other hand, the US was unwilling to remain the

primary actor in the European security scene after the fall

of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Negotiations over a bilateral framework were built upon

NATO's Washington Summit in 1999 and the conclusions

of the European Council at Nice in December 2000 as well

as the EU-NATO joint declaration of December 2002, ac-

cording to which a comprehensive package of bilateral

agreements was established: the Berlin Plus Agreements

giving content to an EU-NATO Strategic Partnership that

allows the EU to access NATO`s planning, assets and capa-

bilities. This process would finish in March 2003 with the

Comprehensive Framework for the EU-NATO permanent

2012 | Lisbon, Portugal

João Teixeira de Freitas

President of the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association Secretary-General of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

European States` interest in collective security and de-

fense dates back to the end of the Second World War and

the establishment of the WEU in 1948 was the first big step

in that direction. That interest evolved after the fall of the

Berlin Wall, the 9/11 and the Arab Spring. Nowadays the

objective is to improve the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership

launched in 2002 after the institutionalization of bilateral

relations in 2001 based on the steps taken during the 1990`s

to promote greater EU responsibility in defense matters, as

the Bosnian crisis of the 1990`s had demonstrated the diffi-

culties in mounting a concerted and institutionalized Euro-

pean response. Thus the EU aimed to increase its visibility

and capabilities in its own security and defense.

N ATO-EU relations have greatly evolved in the last twenty years, especially since December 1998, when in

St. Malo Summit Great Britain and France agreed on moving the EU to the forefront in security matters

and on bringing to an end the short-lived Western European Union (WEU) period.

NATO-EU RELATIONS

COOPERATION AND

GRIDLOCK

BY

DR. RAQUEL PATRÍCIO

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This framework includes the right of first refusal, which

means that NATO must first decline to intervene in a given

crisis so that the EU, through an unanimous NATO`s deci-

sion, may use NATO`s assets to intervene in that same cri-

sis. Alongside with it was established a Comprehensive

Approach Action Plan, updated in March 2012, for tasks

that are implemented by a civilian-military task force which

involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands. In this

sense, the comprehensive approach is a global concept of-

ten associated with civil-military cooperation and men-

tioned together with counter insurgence, provincial recon-

struction teams, peace and stability operations and crisis

management. It became a central aspect of the new Strate-

gic Concept adopted by NATO at the Lisbon Summit in

2010, which underlines that effective crisis management

demands a comprehensive approach involving political,

civilian and military instruments. After all the military

means aren`t enough to face the new challenges to the in-

ternational security. The threat paradigm is different:

there`s no clear knowledge on who the enemy truly is and

threats are easily spread.

Features

In spite of having built a solid partnership, the EU-

NATO`s dialogue isn`t always easy. Not only the agenda

between them excludes any reference to military and intel-

ligence issues, as there is a huge capabilities gap, because

the EU keeps too much armed forces but insufficiently

funded and technologically and structurally weak, without

unity of command and experience in joint action. There`s

also a deadlock related to the divided island of Cyprus.

Even though the Republic of Cyprus is member of the EU

since 2004, it isn`t member of the Alliance nor of NATO`s

Partnership for Peace. Turkey vetoes any Cyprus participa-

tion at issues and meetings between NATO and the EU, as

well as any Cyprus attempt to integrate some security ar-

rangements with NATO. Cyprus also vetoes any kind of

Turkish cooperation with the EU. This impasse has pre-

vented the EU and NATO from fully operating the existing

bilateral agreements and arrangements.

A joint declaration adopted by the

European Union and NATO on 16

December 2002 opened the way

for closer political and military co

-operation between the two orga-

nisations.

NATO Secretary General Lord

Robertson (left) and Javier Solana

High Representative for the Com-

mon Foreign and Security Policy

(EU).

In this sense, NATO`s leaders agreed in Lisbon that a

comprehensive approach is needed both as part of the inter-

national community`s efforts to manage crisis, both as to

improve NATO`s ability to contribute to the stabilization

and reconstruction of instable areas. Therefore, NATO

needs to work more closely with civilian partners on the

ground, as well as at a political level, especially with its

most important partners: the EU and the United Nations

(UN).

The current EU-NATO relations lay on a multilevel basis

(military, political and civilian) and demand effective con-

sultation, cooperation and transparency between both part-

ners. That`s why the entry into force of the EU`s Lisbon

Treaty in 2009 was so important. This treaty provides the

EU with a framework for strengthening its capacities to

address common security challenges, namely to do it with

NATO.

“it`s necessary to change the tone of transatlantic

relations with full British and French involvement as

well as a German ability to deal otherwise with the

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen holds

the new strategic concept during the press conference of

day 1 of the NATO Summit 2010 on November 19th, 2010

in Lisbon, Portugal. NATO’s new Strategic Concept

underwrites the importance of working more closely with

partners through a deeper political engagement.

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Another challenge is the question of whether transatlantic

relations can be improved through a genuine dialogue

amongst the US, Great Britain, France and Germany. It`s

necessary to change the tone of transatlantic relations with

full British and French involvement as well as a German

ability to deal otherwise with the current crisis. On the

other hand, within the EU relations with NATO are further

complicated by Denmark`s opt-out from defense-related

aspects of the Treaty of Lisbon and by the conditions under

which France was reintegrated in the Integrated Military

Command in 2009, ending a 43 years old rift created by

Charles de Gaulle who pulled out from the Alliance`s mili-

tary in protest over what he perceived as US domination of

NATO policies. These conditions, imposed by the former

French president Nicolas Sarkozy, establish that no supple-

mentary troops would be sent to Afghanistan and that

France would be committed on doing more on the civilian

aspects. Further difficulties may come from the severe re-

source constraints that both the EU and NATO face and

from the difference between them at the strategic level. The

more political and economic goals of the EU mean that its

growth in security and defense dimensions has to be framed

in the context of this normative dimension of the EU and

the Union has no clear concept of what it is in the interna-

tional scene.

All these issues affect the EU-NATO relations. However,

both organizations have been able to interact and share

tasks. That`s the case of the on-going interventions in Bos-

nia and Herzegovina since 2004, of the process of the Arab

Spring and also the case of the armed intervention in Libya.

In Libya, the military operations were under the responsi-

bility of NATO from March to October 2011, due to the

UN Resolution 1973.

Features

In April 2011 the EU decided to es-

tablish a task-force (EUFOR Libya) as a

military operation led by the EU in the

context of its Foreign, Security and De-

fense Common Policy to support the

humanitarian assistance operations in

response to the Libyan crisis. It shows

that the EU acts in the support of the

humanitarian action while leaves the

military intervention to the armed force

itself, NATO. The fact that the EU has

been developing its military operational

capabilities doesn`t mean that it is being

done without coordination and interac-

tion with NATO. Although many voices

consider that those European efforts to obtain military op-

erational capacity may in the future dissociate the EU from

NATO`s dependency, it is probable that the EU won`t have

the necessary capacity to do so. In any case, this is a central

issue within the agenda of understanding between both

organizations.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an area where the

EU and NATO could complement each other, bringing to-

gether civilian and military capabilities to achieve common

2012 | Lisbon, Portugal

Dr. Raquel de Caria Patrício: Lecturer in Portuguese Foreign Policy,

Regional Studies: Latin America and Common Foreign and Security Pol-icy; at the School of Social and Political Sciences of Lisbon - Technical

University of Lisbon (ISCSP/UTL)

NATO CHICAGO SUMMIT:

DEBRIEF & FOLLOW-UP

BY ALEXANDRE MARQUES PINHO

When looking at the year that lies behind us, it’s inevita-

ble to account for the Chicago Summit held in May. Much

was written about the event that gathered NATO Heads of

State and alliance partners. Therefore, it felt more useful to

take this opportunity to frame the summit within a wider

picture and catch up on how NATO has set out to accom-

plish the objectives laid out in the final declaration, instead

of reporting on the event’s proceedings. To some extent,

the Summit wasn’t more than a grand 'steering committee'

to ensure the Lisbon 2010 vision (mainly supported by the

new Strategic Concept) remains on track, yet this also in-

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Features

cluded important follow-ups on major short and long term

issues: Afghanistan, Partnerships and Capabilities.

The Summit covered the security issue in Afghanistan

and the transition strategy 2011-2014 agreed in Lisbon,

with a strong endorsement of the 2014 exit plan. With a

special declaration on Afghanistan, the event conveyed the

Alliance's commitment to end the afghan war and the inten-

tion of further supporting Afghanistan beyond 2014 (NATO

Strategic Plan for Afghanistan). NATO members reaf-

firmed the intention to provide long-term political and prac-

tical support through a broad comprehensive approach pre-

viously stated in the Enduring Partnership declaration

signed in Lisbon in 2010 and further outlined during the

Bonn Conference (2011).

Since the 2010 troop surge, the Taliban’s advantage has

been turned around and the overall security situation in

Afghanistan is less dire. At this stage, NATO forces have

already shifted their mission from combat to support role

and continue to transfer responsibility to the Afghan Na-

tional Security Forces (ANSF), operating under the name of

‘Inteqal’ – the Dari and Pashtu word for transition. On the

31st of December 2012, President Karzai announced the

forth group of Afghan provinces, cities and districts to enter

the transition process. Once this decision is fully imple-

mented, 87 per cent of the population will live in areas

where ANSF is responsible for its security. 23 provinces

out of 34 are now fully in transition. Training and capability

development of Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan

National Army (ANA), with NATO’s Training Mission

(NTM-Afghanistan) as its main driver, has met its objec-

tives ahead of schedule with a combined force of 352,000

personnel.

Reports indicate 50% of Afghans already live in areas of

security; Coalition military fatalities and Improvised Explo-

sive Devices (IED) ‘reported events’ have dramatically

decreased in the last two years; However, both Helmand

and Kandahar provinces account for well above average in

military and civilian casualties; Overall, civilian casualties

have risen steeply every year for the past five years - al-

though these have also registered a significant decrease in

the first half of 2012; Taliban infiltration tactics have regis-

tered an increase in "green-on-blue” attacks (by members of

the Afghan police and army against coalition forces in Af-

ghanistan), as part of the militants overall strategy of under-

mining allied forces in Afghanistan and western public

opinion; In 2012 about 60 ISAF personnel were killed due

to "green-on-blue" incidents (15% of total Coalition deaths

in 2012), further straining the bleak relationship between

ISAF and ISAF and ANP – ANA. This culminated in a

temporary suspension of join operations, which resumed a

few weeks later in the fall of 2012; NATO has a total of 26

established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

throughout Afghanistan. PRT’s are important because they

focus on delivering concrete improvements in local govern-

ance, reconstruction (infrastructures) and development

(education, health, etc). This comes as an important element

to kick-start Afghan economy and rebuilding its infrastruc-

tures. These efforts are expected to improve local resilience

when transition is over making key areas, major cities, and

and important infrastructures easier to secure. While PRT

may be seen as a security enabler, it represents the opera-

tionalization of the alliance’s vision on the security-

development nexus and constitutes an important element of

NATO’s strategy towards Afghanistan, within the scope of

a broad comprehensive approach and major tasks identified

in the new Strategic Concept: collective defence, crisis

management and cooperative security. The following

months of 2013 - period when militants usually become

more active - will be paramount to assess if NATO’s coun-

terinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies are failing or

realistically improving, hence confirming these improve-

ments are sustainable.

The French and Canadian withdrawals ahead of the 2014

yardstick and the ambitions set forth in Chicago, increases

pressure on Afghanistan and ISAF to achieve political and

military goals within the timeframe laid out. This is likely

to leverage the prospect for peace or political settlements,

including a re-opening of dialogue with the Taliban, forc-

ing President Karzai to seek some kind of possible solution

within these lines. For the time being, finance for Afghani-

stan has been secured until 2014. At the Tokyo Conference

on Afghanistan (last July), the international community

committed to provide over $16billion through 2015. Who

will fill the gaps beyond that date remains unknown. How-

ever, Secretary-General Rasmussen has already confirmed

that NATO will continue to provide training, advisory and

assistance to Afghanistan (initially announced at Chicago),

though this post-2014 presence in the country will no

longer be a combat mission. The name of the mission will

be called ‘Resolute Support’. At this stage analysts specu-

late this could evolve to an operation that resembles the

kind of KFOR mission with NATO and non-NATO part-

ners.

The Chicago Summit agenda also focused on Partner-

ships and cooperation. Amongst the 61 countries repre-

sented at Chicago, these included 13 Middle-Eastern, Asian

and other European states; all of whom have contributed to

NATO-led operations. The significant presence of various

partners and the praise for NATO’s network of relations at

the summit, emphasizes NATO’s commitment to become a

hub for security and remain a ‘military’ power-house. It’s

interesting to see how cooperation in this area has been

enhanced in recent months. In the Balkans, the KFOR mis-

sion has been downgraded with other partners - EU and

EUROFLEX - taking up more responsibility. This high-

lights the complementary role of EU civilian crisis manage-

ment assets and NATO military capabilities. Extension of

Ocean Shield until 2014 and the mutually reinforcing effort

of Operation Atalanta reaffirm the commitment to work

alongside the EU to fight piracy off the horn of Africa.

Operation Active Endeavour (Art.5) increased NATO pres-

ence in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of 9/11, to pa-

trol and deter terrorist activity in region and will continue

to do so. This operation promotes the Alliance’s security

cooperation programme with seven countries in the wider

Mediterranean - Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania,

Morocco and Tunisia, and enhances the ‘Mediterranean-

Dialogue’ partnership, while contributing to regional secu-

7

Features

-rity and stability.

This focus on partnerships reflects the alliance is more

inclined to work within a framework of consultation and as

an enabler of multilateral relations and initiatives, rather

than limiting its options to the ultimate partnership policy -

‘enlargement’. Given the political deadlocks regarding

global membership and sine die advancements for eastern

enlargement, NATO is signaling its willingness to look

beyond geographic confinements and membership status,

but still retaining an alternative to its global requirements.

This third-way is driven by a functionalist approach primar-

ily concerned with division of capabilities, cooperative se-

curity across the board of shared interests “28+n”, and un-

derpinned by a military, operational (interoperability), and

financial rationale - which comes out of the recent ISAF

experience.

After Chicago, NATO advanced some of these objectives,

especially those that require more flexibility and a compre-

hensive overlap of responsibility to protect “global com-

mons” and new interconnected strategic areas that require

security and defence: Bilateral agreement with Australia to

deepen cooperation to meet common threats; Increased

cooperation and exercises with Russia on protecting mass

transit systems against terrorist attacks (Project STAN-

DEX); Advancing cooperation with the EU on Cyber de-

fense, capability development and common policies.

Besides Afghanistan and Partnerships, the Summit also

covered NATO capabilities. Every summit addresses press-

ing issues including those that take up most of media’s at-

tention but there is always one topic that defines the event

itself. If Prague (2002) was the ‘Transformation’ summit;

Strasbourg-Kehl (2009) the alliance’s 60th anniversary and

French reintegration; Lisbon (2010) known as the summit

that adopted the ‘new’ Strategic Concept; then Chicago

could be easily be defined as the summit for ‘Capabilities’.

Claiming that ‘capabilities’ was arguably the single most

important issue doesn’t remove any significance from other

topics discussed in May. In fact, this reinforces everything

else touched upon, since most of what is laid out in NATO

planning is intrinsically related to requirements that make

objectives ‘achievable’.

Like his predecessors Lord Robertson and De Hoop

Scheffer, Secretary-General Rasmussen continues to stress

the importance of capabilities and the need for a renewed

commitment on more cooperative defence spending. At

previous summits, efforts to convince allies to leverage the

recovery of defence spending have been met with member-

states repeatedly pledging to enhance capabilities. How-

ever, the majority of European members in NATO have

consistently failed to meet upon those goals. Overall de-

fence spending is declining across the alliance. In 2011only

two European allies devoted 2+ % of their GDP to defence,

four devoted less than 1%, and the trend is that non-US

share of NATO defence spending is falling from 35% to

23% since 1991. From the lens of ‘capabilities’, never has

the transatlantic gap been so asymmetrical and never has it

been so urgent to close down on this gap, before it becomes

irreparably unsustainable.

The summit’s timing and setting did indeed take place

against a background of global economic turmoil and a

sovereign debt crisis in Europe. With an increasingly un-

certain strategic environment, the alliance faces an ever

expanding range of interests requiring protection and a

broadening scope of engagement. In this sense, the summit

was very much about how to envision NATO strategy in

times of austerity. Many will argue the divestment pattern

in defence will remain unchanged, mainly because member

-states’ governments are unwilling or unable to commit

resources and this won’t matter. But this time it’s different.

It’s different because capabilities are the common denomi-

nator that underpins NATO discussion now and into the

future. Capability development will be paramount for

NATO, and this applies especially in the military and or-

ganizational dimensions of the alliance for varying reasons:

In the military dimension, NATO will be facing a para-

digm shift from platform centric to network centric driven

type of warfare, as a direct consequence of information age

transformations. The protection of global commons such as

Cyberspace and (outer-Space) requires large investments

and Research & Development (R&D) which are essential if

NATO is to protect it’s military assets and its member

states’ critical infrastructures which represent the backbone

of allied economies and wellbeing. On the other hand, al-

lied militaries will have to ensure they retain the ability to

operate together beyond 2014 after combat operations in

Afghanistan are over and as other deployments get down-

graded. Also, during NATO’s recent crisis management

intervention - Operation Unified Protectorate in Libya -

specific military (strategic and operational) capability gaps

were identified, including shortfalls in intelligence, surveil-

lance and reconnaissance (ISR).

Organizationally, NATO will be pressed to upgrade its

ability to manage the acquisition and use of limited re-

sources in a more intelligent (smarter) way, by being more

connected, more aware, and more effective. The Reform

plan to reduce agencies and posts and to establish a leaner

command structure will continue. Pooling and Sharing (a

key element of Smart Defence) intends to build mutual

confidence and decrease costs for individual members.

There are a few successful examples of these efforts: The

‘Sentry’ Airbourne Warning & Control System (AWACS)

project is the alliance’s largest collaborative venture - 17

aircraft monitor alliance airspace - owned and operated by

NATO. Other multinational initiatives include the Strategic

Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) with Russia and Ukraine

as consortium partners; the Strategic Airlift Capability (3

NATO Boeing C-17 aircraft) and the ‘NATO Air Policing’

deployments in the Baltic states. Still, decisions that imply

transferring individual capability requirements to other

states raises issues of sovereignty and doubts whether some

states are actually able to meet those financial commit-

ments.

At Chicago, allied leaders and NATO officials approved

a ‘Defence Package’ to address these issues. NATO

Forces 2020 will be the overarching concept that will

guide NATO to have a coherent set of deployable, interop-

erable and sustainable forces that are equipped, trained,

8

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exercised and commanded. The NATO Forces 2020

‘vision’ will be advanced by two major initiatives: Smart

Defence and The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).

1) Smart Defence aims to ‘ensure greater security for less

money, by working together with more flexibility’ (official

definition). This would resume Rasmussen’s plan to drive

members to prioritize, specialize and opt– for multinational

solutions. There are currently 24 concrete multinational

projects underway. These aim to optimize collective re-

sources and improve joint effectiveness across a wide range

of areas. The most important are the following:

Training, Hubs of Education and Centers of Excellence:

simulating war-like environments, helicopter exercises,

R&D, training and education; Logistics: Mine Resistant

Ambush Vehicle (MRAP) maintenance, helicopter mainte-

nance, fuel provision to deployed forces; Air Activation

Modules: pooling components required for deployable air-

fields in support of operations; Pooling & Sharing Multina-

tional Medical Treatment Facilities; Counter IED R&D;

NATO Universal Armaments Interface: flexible approach to

enable fighter jets to use munitions from various sources

and nations; Multinational Cyber Defence Capability De-

velopment (MNCD2): aims to facilitate the development of

cyber defence capabilities within NATO nations to prepare

for, prevent, detect, respond to and recover from attacks to

ensure allied ‘information assurance’ - confidentiality, in-

tegrity and availability of information.

On-going multi-national projects on strategic programmes

include:

Missile Defence Capability: NATO’s interim ballistic de-

fence missile (BDM) has been established and sensors and

operational control of radars, that were deployed in Turkey,

command and control (C2) was transferred from US to

NATO responsibility. Germany hosts this C2 structure for

NATO BDM at Alliance Headquarters Air Command Ram-

stein, Germany.

Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS): Also part of the

Smart Defence narrative, the AGS programme will address

ISR shortfalls. NATO acquired five Unmanned Aerial Ve-

hicles (UAV), through a procurement contract with

Northrup Grumman worth $1.7bn, in order to meet the alli-

ance’s need to keep a continuous flow of ISR from the bat-

tle field to ground, maritime and air commanders anytime

and anywhere in the world during operations. These are

expected to become fully operational between 2015 - 2017

and will be exclusively owned by NATO, and should com-

plement the AWACS capability.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR):

JISR is an initiative that aims to bring together AGS capa-

bilities (UAV’s, AWACS and other ISR assets) to integrate

intelligence and provide better situational awareness to

commanders during operations. A technical trial was con-

ducted in mid-June 2012 to test interoperability of member-

state’s military in this domain.

2) CFI is fundamental to keep allied militaries capable of

meeting its tasks. As ISAF comes to a close, NATO will

reduce its operational engagement. CFI will ensure allied

militaries are tightly integrated and remain at a high level

of readiness. A combined set of joint exercises are being

planned for the period 2015-2020 and some could be flexed

to become larger NATO conducted war-games. Invest-

ments have also been made in Command, Control, Com-

munications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Recon-

naissance (C4ISR) capabilities amongst allies to update and

improve connectivity and effectiveness across the full spec-

trum of operations.

The increasing complexity of transnational threats em-

phasizes the importance of a vision that encompasses shar-

ing of security burdens and benefits. In this sense, NATO

continues to provide a robust framework through transat-

lantic solidarity, shared values and greater collective secu-

rity. And despite the current economic difficulties, the sum-

mit and the months that followed demonstrated the alliance

retains ‘a realist posture but yields flexibility’. If not the

least, for the recognition there is an widening gap between

reality and ambition, and that security and economic well-

being are indivisible. Therefore, capability requirements

are essential to guarantee NATO remains effective. As

Toynbee has reminded us, institutions and ‘organizations’

compromise their own existence when they fail to adapt to

the morphological effects of evolution, not by acting but

fundamentally through inaction or ‘strategic standstill’.

Hence transformation and reform constitute a cornerstone

of the ever evolving strategic process, even if this comes in

the shape of pursuing a new business model for NATO.

We’ll keep a close eye as this continues to unfold.

On the 25th, 26th and 27th of May, the Portuguese

Atlantic Youth Association invited young atlanticists to

participate in the annual North Atlantic Council (NAC)

simulation. SIMOTAN IV took place at the School of

Social and Political Sciences of the Technical University

of Lisbon on the 25th, 26th and 27th of May. For the

sixth consecutive year, participants from all around the

world - from countries such as Poland, Georgia and

India just to name a few - gathered for an intense NAC

simulation exercise, held in response to a specific inter-

national crisis. This year’s scenario depicted the rising

tension between Iran and Israel, and escalation which

culminating in the use of nuclear arsenal. The represen-

tatives of Alliance member states demonstrated resolve

as events unfolded and reached a consensus through a

common declaration, announced at the end of the simu-

lation.

SIMOTAN VI

North Atlantic Council Simulation

24 – 27 May, 2012

Portuguese Atlantic Committee

Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association

9

SIMOTAN VI

Negotiations kick off

Photo by Katarina Klingova

SIMOTAN participants enjoy their night out in Bairro

Alto, Lisbon. U.K. listens to the U.S. perspective.

Germany issues a warning regarding Iran's pretensions

Turkey presents its position.

Norway proposes negotiations between Iran and Israel.

France accuses peace talks of being unrealistic.

Portugal lobbies to bring in U.N. and the Security Council

10

Reports

2012 | Lisbon, Portugal

Francisco Costa

Vice-President of the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association

T he Danish Atlantic Youth

Seminar (DAYS) was held by

the Atlantic Treaty Association

in cooperation with the Youth Atlantic

Treaty Association from the 2nd to the

8th of July, 2012 at Aalborg Airbase.

The 27th edition was held under the

headline “Tomorrow's Challenges To-

day” and involved 22 participants

from 15 different countries and it was

really a pleasure for me to take part on

that. We discussed a lot of subjects

such as drone warfare, Smart Defence

and the future role of international in-

stitutions, in lectures, debates and, in

the final two days, we had the oppor-

tunity to play a simulation game called

“Diplomacy and Crisis Management

in the backyard of Europe: The South

Caucasus”. At the same time, the or-

ganization did not forget the impor-

tance of social activities and we also

had time, after work, to chat and have

fun, as well to visit the wonderful city

of Aalborg.

During the seminar, lecturers from

both national and international aca-

demic and military institutions visited

DAYS, and presented their thoughts

on the subjects mentioned above. On

my point of view, all the speakers

were really interesting and provided us

a vision in a more practical level. In

addition, it was a pleasure for me to

introduce Dr. Christopher Coker from

the London School of Economics and

Political Science (LSE) giving his

thoughts on “Drone warfare and what

it means for the ethics of war” on

Tuesdays debate.

During the last two days of the semi-

nar we were thrown head first into the

world of real political challenges as

we were tasked with each playing the

role of a nation in the troubled Cauca-

sus region trying to secure its national

interests. This simu-

lation game was co-

ordinated by Mr.

Selim Percinel, who

worked to develop

realistic obstacles for

the different nations,

so as to create an en-

vironment in which

none of the actors felt

completely secure. In

the end, it was a very interesting ex-

perience, mainly because I was repre-

senting the United States, so I had a

lot of meetings with the other coun-

tries and it felt really good to have a

key role in Caucasus rescue.

In order to conclude, everything

went very well. The organizers were

really flexible and polite. As they tried

to show us, DAYS is more than just

the intellectual stimulation, it is also a

social event for young people with a

desire for international politics to meet

from across the world. And so it was.

Special Report

Danish Atlantic Youth Association Seminar g BY FRANCISCO COSTA

DAYS Participants gathered on

the last evening for a Gala event

(above)

DAYS event flyer (bottom).

Special Report

Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association Seminar

The 17th Portuguese At-

lantic Youth Seminar

(PAYS XVII) - was held

near Lisbon at the Sintra

Air Base and Portuguese

Air Force Academy. The

central theme of this year’s

seminar was "NATO

Transformation and the

New Transnational Threat

Paradigm”. PAYS XII

combined a comprehensive

set of academic confer-

ences focused on NATO

11

Reports

“Operation Ocean Shield”

BY PERCHUHY KAZHOYAN

presentations on broad themes: “Insights into

Portuguese Culture”, “Portugal’s role in devel-

oping the Transatlantic link”, “NATO-EU rela-

tions”, “NATO-Russia Partnership” and

“NATO Reform and Transformation”; And

conferences on trending issues and topics:

“NATO-Russia Partnership”, “Terrorism in the

21st Century”, “Nuclear Proliferation” and

“Gender and Security Issues in NATO”. The

presentations were followed by intense de-

bates and stimulating questions. Throughout

the week, participants also had the opportu-

nity to take part in other recreational activi-

ties, such as a trip to the Portuguese Parlia-

ment and a visit to the Senate Room; a guided

tour through Sintra in the morning and after-

noon at the beach. On the last day partici-

pants worked on their Policy-making Simula-

tions and presentations on NATO’s Strategy

for Reform and Transformation. Seminar

activities came to end with a closing ceremony

with Q&A led by H.E. Minister of State and

Foreign Affairs, Mr. Paulo Portas. The event

brought together more than 20 young

“atlanticits” coming from various places

around the globe, who were selected from

among 220+ candidates. From Canada to Ar-

menia and Norway to Montenegro. For the

seventeenth consecutive year, we are proud to

say the outcome was once again, very positive.

We hope to see you again next year!

PAYS 17th participants s H.E. The Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Paulo Portas

addresses the audience at the closing ceremony of this year’s seminar (from left to right)

Mr. Jorge Girão (Portuguese Atlantic Committee), Lieutenant-General PilAv. João Cor-

deiro (Commanding Officer and Superintendent of the Portuguese Air Force Academy),

H.E. Minister of State and Foreign Affairs Mr. Paulo Portas, Mr. Pedro Holstein Cam-

pilho (Portuguese Atlantic Committee President), João Teixeira de Freitas (Portuguese

Atlantic Youth Association President).

F rom a participant’s point of view the 2012

PAYS was an excellent experience. Several

points are worth mentioning specifically as

outstanding successes: the exquisite organizational

capabilities of the Portuguese YATA members

who provided both participants and speakers with a

relaxed atmosphere that was conducive for learn-

ing; how the selection of all participants was done

in a wise and professional manner, bringing to-

gether a largely diverse group of bright partici-

pants, who personally added to the memorable ex-

perience through their insightful opinions; and how

the organizers were able to successfully include

lectures covering an array of interesting subjects

delivered by qualified experts.

The lecture that stood out most to me was about

NATO’s anti-piracy campaign "Operation Ocean

Shield", which was brilliantly delivered by Captain

Luís Carlos de Sousa Pereira. NATO’s involve-

ment in anti-piracy measures began in October

2008, mandated by the United Nations Security

Council, and was aimed at providing protection to

vessels carrying humanitarian assistance from the

On the request of UN Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon, in late 2008, NATO started

to provide escorts to UN World Food

Programme (WFP) vessels transiting off

the coast of the Horn of Africa, under

Operation Allied Provider (October-

December 2008). This operation evolved

in August 2009 to become Operation

Ocean Shield. Operation Ocean Shield also

contributes to providing maritime security

in the region (Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden,

Arabian Sea, Red Sea) and is helping to

reduce the overall pirate attack success

rate. NATO is conducting counter-piracy

activities in full complementarity with the

relevant UN Security Council Resolutions

and with actions against piracy initiated by

other actors, such as the European Union.

12

Reports

UN and the World Food Program. In

2009, NATO involvement expanded

and started to include building regional

capacity to combat piracy in addition

to its original goal of combating piracy

off the Horn of Africa and the Indian

Ocean, thus becoming what is now

kno wn a s ‘Op era t io n Ocean

Shield’ (OOS).

The territory at stake accommodates

the busiest maritime routes in the

world but at the same time is one of the

most dangerous due to ongoing attacks

from Somali pirates on commercial

and other-type ships. Strangely

enough, international aid and piracy

have become the two main resources of

income for Somalia, a country endur-

ing a civil war for the past two decades

and lacking a government since 1991.

Drawing from his own experience as

the commander of the Portuguese frig-

ate "NRP Álvares Cabral", Captain

Sousa Pereira flawlessly illustrated the

extent of the ocean area where ‘OOS’

takes place, pointing out that it is larger

than the area of mainland Europe. The

difficulties that come with guarding

such a colossal territory with limited

means are quite evident: from lack of

resources, to nuisances in terms of

communication and information shar-

ing.

PAYS 17th participants group photos during a visit to

the Portuguese Parliament.

(from left to right, front row) Member of Parliament

(MP) Mr. João Rebelo; Mr. João Teixeira de Freitas

(PAYA President); MP Mr. Duarte Marques; Mr.

Jorge Girão (Portuguese Atlantic Committee).

The mandate of ‘Operation Ocean

Shield’ goes beyond protecting vessels

passing through the area. It attributes a

significant importance to cooperation

with entities in the region which are

willing to join in on anti-piracy initia-

tives in those waters. The governments

of Puntland and Somaliland have es-

tablished counter-piracy forces in an

effort to intercept, combat, and detain

pirates while expanding their activities

onshore. This is critical to NATO

forces and international actors which

are in many cases reluctant to involve

themselves in onshore activities due to

the unavoidable legal ramifications.

Just as Captain Sousa Pereira quoted

the ancient saying "Give a man a fish,

you have fed him for today. Teach a

man to fish, and you have fed him for a

lifetime", and following the philosophy

of this saying, ‘OOS’ actively cooper-

ates with the coast guards of countries

located in the Horn of Africa in order

to help combat piracy, while emphasiz-

ing educational initiatives by training

them in effective maritime security

tactics.

I believe that prevention is the best

strategy; thus, preventing pirate attacks

and hijackings as opposed to combat-

ing them during hostage situations is

the only viable option within the piracy

issue. Getting one step ahead of the

adversary is crucial for any operation,

and ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ exempli-

fies this. Spreading awareness about

threats such as piracy, in addition to

organizing and conducting educational

programs regarding the struggle

against piracy, is the most important

measure to be taken at this stage. To

achieve this, increased collaboration

with the governments of the countries

in the region is critical. This should be

done by certified specialists, spreading

awareness and teaching effective anti-

piracy measures to the local coast-

guards as well as self-defense meas-

ures to crews of international ships

passing through these dangerous wa-

ters.

With one of the emphasis of the

PAYS Seminar being on how to man-

age threats in an era of austerity, only

collaborative efforts designed to build

trust and cooperation will be successful

in countering the threat of international

piracy and sustaining ‘Operation

Ocean Shield’.

2012 | Yerevan, Armenia

Perchuhy Kazhoyan

Research Analyst at Group on Foreign Affairs. Perchuhy will be joining ATA in Brussels as an

intern in 2013

13

Reports

(clockwise) PAYS participants dur-

ing a visit to Sintra’s National Pal-

ace; PAYA Committee members;

Closing Ceremony with H.E. Minis-

ter of State and Foreign Affairs Mr.

Paulo Portas; Mr. Pedro Holstein

Campilho (Portuguese Atlantic

Committee President) addresses

PAYS participants during the fare-

well dinner; Seminar participants

attending various conferences and

enoying the social evenings at the

Sintra Air Base.

14

The PAYA is looking

fo rward t o hos t

“SIMOTAN Portugal I”

this Spring.

Further information

and the detailed pro-

gramme will follow in

due course to all our

members, friends and

others who may wish to

participate. This year’s

event will be limited to

participants living in

Portugal and will in-

clude an Opening Con-

ference covering the

topic that is related to

the ‘scenario’ which

will be unveiled later

during the crisis simula-

tion.

The purpose of SIMO-

TAN is to simulate an

emergency meeting of

the North Atlantic

Council held in response

to a specific interna-

tional crisis, during

which NATO member

states will have to agree

upon a crisis manage-

ment operation.

The escalating tension

from the outset of the

Simulation will lead to a

scenario where the vari-

ous Alliance Members’

delegations will have to

defend their conflicting

interests, as well as their

inevitably opposing

views on how to main-

tain international order.

The specificities of the

crisis scenario and the

composition of the

teams will only be re-

vealed to the partici-

pants at the beginning of

the simulation exercise

in order to promote a

more dynamic environ-

ment amongst fellow

delegations.

The main theme of

the 18th edition of

P A Y S w i l l b e

‘Enhancing NATO Ca-

pabilities in the 21st

Century – The Future

of Collective Security’

This annual event is a

one week long interna-

tional seminar where a

myriad of nationalities

and backgrounds come

together to discuss and

breathe Defence, Secu-

rity and NATO related

issues and subjects.

PAYS focuses on a

balance between aca-

demic curriculum (with

morning conferences

and early afternoon de-

bates) and diverse so-

cial activities, promot-

ing informal conversa-

tion and networking

within a dynamic work

environment.

This is the perfect

chance for any Young

Atlanticist or academic

interested in geopoli-

tics, defence and secu-

rity issues to experience

a full, productive and

enriching summer week

in Lisbon.

During the summer

break of 2013, the Por-

tuguese Atlantic Com-

mittee and the PAYA

will be co-hosting their

most important and in-

ternationally recognized

annual event for the

eighteenth consecutive

year.

This year’s Portu-

guese Atlantic Youth

Seminar (PAYS) will

be held at the Portu-

guese Naval Academy

(Alfeite), near Lisbon,

from the 20th (arrival)

to the 27th of July

(departure).

Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar XVIII

20th-27th July, 2013 (expected)

SIMOTAN Portugal I

16th - 18th May, 2013

The PAYA hosts a number of international seminars and conferences throughout each year.

This section features the PAYA’s upcoming events.

Upcoming Events and other PAYA news

Draft Programme:

15th May

Arrival and accommodation

(non-Lisbon residents);

16th May

Welcoming session,

Opening Conference (open to all),

Simulation scenario presentation and

role distribution,

Presentation of initial positions

(plenary);

17th May

Press conference,

Presentation of positions (plenary);

18th May

Presentation of final statements,

Final session,

Farewell lunch,

Departures.

Draft Programme:

20th July

Arrivals and accommodation;

21st July

Insight to Portuguese Culture, NATO Partnership

for Peace, NATO Operational Capabilities;

22nd July

NATO-EU Relations, Trip to Portuguese Parlia-

ment and Visit to the Senate Room;

23rd July

Gender and Security, Mechanized Warfare and

Security, NATO Open Door Policy, NATO-

Russia Relations;

24th July

Cyberwarfare, Resource Pooling, Afternoon at

the Beach;

25th July

Nunclear Proliferation, Counter-Piracy, North

Atlantic Council (NAC) Summit Meeting Simu-

lation, Free Afternoon and Night in Lisbon;

26th July

NAC Summit Meeting Simulation, Closing

Session, Farewell Dinner;

27th July

Departure

15

After being commissioned in 1971, Allied Joint Force Command Lisbon

(JFCL) was transferred to Naples Joint Force Command (effective as of 2013).

JFCL was formally deactivated on the 20th December 2012 during a ceremony

headed by the Portuguese Minister of Defence, Jose Pedro Aguiar-Branco

(centre), Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis (left)

and Chief of Portuguese General Staff, General Luís Araújo (right). While this

constitutes a downgrading of the Command status, set out by NATO’s Com-

mand Structure Reform, Portugal will keep Joint Command Lisbon (JCL) - a

smaller HQ - and the recently moved Naval Striking and Support Forces

NATO (STRIKFORNATO) which relocated from Naples to Lisbon in the

Summer of 2012.

STRIKFORNATO coordinates naval units from several alliance members, including the US 6th Fleet

and provides a rapidly deployable Joint but predominantly Maritime headquarters to plan, command, and

control maritime operations across the full spectrum of Alliance Fundamental Security Tasks, including

maritime Expanded Task Force operations and maritime-heavy Smaller Joint Operations within the Euro

-Atlantic region or at strategic reach. The decision to site NATO’s rapid reaction naval command in Lis-

bon, highlights the importance of having modern and deployable naval capabilities and comes as recog-

nition of Portugal’s role in the Alliance and of its territory’s geostrategic importance. It also bears a sym-

bolic meaning in light of Portugal’s historical setting as a maritime nation and invaluable contri-

bution to maritime expansion. JCL is currently responsible for providing advice and assistance to

the African Union mission in Darfur; preparing staff to command a NATO Response Force;

mounting a sea-based Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters; and providing support for coop-

eration and dialogue under the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue programmes.

In 2012, the Joint Allied Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC - Allied

Command Transformation) also in Lisbon (Monsanto), hosted a

ceremony to celebrate its 10th anniversary. JALLC’s relevance for

transformation within NATO’s structure was reaffirmed and widely

praised for its role supporting intelligent change in the Alliance.

Effective as of June 2011, JALLC took over the Directorship and

management of the NATO Lessons Learned Staff Officer Course.

NATO’s presence in Portugal will continue with the planned move of NATO’s Communications and Information Systems

School (NCISS) from Latina, Italy. During negotiation rounds amongst Allies over the “Post-to-Flag” agenda, included in

the recent reform of NATO’s command structure, Portugal secured 70 officer posts. Besides securing 7 officers’ posts in

STRIKEFOR, Portugal will have a position in NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Torréjon, Spain; 1 ma-

jor-general as Deputy-Chief of Staff for Planning and Command at NATO’s Maritime Command HQ (MARCOM) in North-

wood, UK; and 1 general rank position as SACEUR's Representative to NATO's Military Committee. This geographical and

organizational footprint reshuffling, comes as part of transformation in the command structure of Allied Command Opera-

tions, announced during NATO’s Lisbon summit in 2010. These transformations aim to enhance the Alliance’s military

structure to face operational challenges of coalition warfare, and to better address the emerging threats in the new millen-

nium. Officials and policymakers expect this new NATO Command Structure to be leaner, more flexible, and focused on

conducting a much wider range of missions.

NATO in Portugal

NATO IN PORTUGAL

News and Updates

Photo: MDN/Rui Oliveira

16

Book Reviews and reading suggestions

Since this is a new section

in our newsletter publica-

tion, reviewing a major text

focused on NATO came as

something obvious for us.

For this issue we reviewed a

book co-authored by leading

academics and NATO ex-

perts Gülnur Aybet and Re-

becca Moore. Both authors

look into the past, present

and future of NATO.

Our second review is on

the article co-authored by

the United States Perma-

nente Representative to

NATO, Ambassador Ivo H.

Daaler and Supreme Allied

C o m m a n d e r E u r o p e

(SACEUR) and Commander

of US European Command,

Admiral James Stavridis.

The article was published in

Foreign Affairs in early

spring 2012, in the after-

math of the alliance’s inter-

vention in Libya and pro-

vides valuable insight on

NATO’s Operation Unified

Protectorate.

Aybet, Gülnur, and Moore, Rebecca R., ed. NATO - In Search of a Vision. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. 272pp. ISBN 9781 58901 630 9.

This timely volume written in the eve of NATO’s adoption of

its SC in 2010 provides a broad overview of historical and emerg-

ing issues facing the Alliance. With a foreword by Lawrence

Freedman, the editors brought together scholars and policy ex-

perts who examine the historical and recent NATO evolution,

assess its achievements, highlight major transformational events

and the account for the role of leadership of NATO Secretaries-

General. The books argues NATO is still struggling when it

comes to crafting a strong transatlantic vision anchored in the

liberal democratic principles. Nevertheless, it outlines how this

grand strategy should be designed and used to ensure the Alliance

maintains its effectiveness in engaging the increasingly complex

and diverse international security challenges ahead. Besides ad-

dressing the complex and ambiguous diplomatic relations between NATO and Russia, the

implications of recent members and future enlargements, the authors also focus on emerg-

ing concepts that overlap the political and military dimensions, including the implementa-

tion of NATO’s comprehensive approach to operations and missile defenses within the

framework of European security.

Daaler, Ivo H., and Stavridis, James, “NATO's Victory in Libya - The Right Way to Run

an Intervention.” Foreign Affairs 91,no.2,March/April 2012 (this article can be found on-line @ foreignaffairs.com)

NATO’s operation in Libya has been praised for saving lives and ending a tyrannical

regime, writes the U.S. permanent representative to NATO and ‘Supreme Allied Com-

mander Europe’. This concise article takes the reader through a description of the diplo-

matic démarches at the UN, the US-led coalition (air and missile strikes against Libyan

forces) to enforce the UN resolution and subsequent NATO’s agreement to assume com-

mand. The Alliance’s mission in Libya - dubbed as Operation Unified Protectorate (OUP)

- and its three tasks: policing the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone, and protecting

civilians; is indeed the central theme of this article. However, throughout the text readers

inevitably get the impression the analysis is strongly anchored by the chapters that consti-

tute NATO’s Strategic Concept (SC). With its timing set in between the adoption of its SC

in Lisbon back in 2010 and the Chicago Summit in 2012, OUP conveyed three important

messages. Firstly, NATO demonstrated it can play a role in the Arab Spring and further

enhance its existing partnerships and dialogue instruments in the Mediterranean; Secondly,

the achievement of relevant strategic, operational and overall organizational objectives,

confirms NATO’s unique position to respond quickly and effectively to international cri-

ses. Finally, it renewed NATO’s status as a military powerhouse which is set within a

framework that “confers political legitimacy” when a “group of countries wants to launch

a joint intervention as a coalition.” While it may be true that several member-states did not

take part during OUP, authors dismiss claims that this can be translated into lack of politi-

cal unity. Hence the paradox, in so far that political commitment can’t come short of mili-

tary commitment which burden sharing and excessive reliance on US capabilities. While

much is devoted to praising NATO’s military accomplishments during OUP (including

precision bombing and electronic warfare), the text outlines capability gaps and technical

shortfalls, namely legal advice to support the targeting process and timely and reliable

flow of information on operational developments to the public. Furthermore, it warns

about NATO’s negligence regarding the lack of essential tools that enable keeping the

edge in military campaigns, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and preci-

sion capabilities. Hence, the essence of this text is also a warning about capability gaps in

NATO, and how this imbalance can pose a threat of having a two-tiered alliance that could

prove unsustainable. Claims of success are legitimate but we must keep in mind OUP was

far more simple, objective, military oriented and mandated by the UN, which contrasts

with other recent NATO engagements.

The Portuguese Atlantic

Youth Newsletter wel-

comes contributions from

young researchers or pro-

fessionals. Please email

us for more information

on how to submit papers,

articles and book reviews

on security and defence

issues related to NATO.

17

More Information

www.ata-sec.org www.nato.int

www.yata-network.blogspot.com www.atlantic-youth.org

18

Portuguese Atlantic Committee / Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association

Publisher

Rua Latino Coelho, 1 Edifício Aviz, Bloco A-1, 10º, 1050-132, Lisbon, PORTUGAL

Office: (+351) 21 3975906 / 21 3905957

Fax: (+351) 21 3978493

Email: [email protected]

Web: facebook.com/pagesAJPA-CPA/125613144212134

The Portuguese Atlantic Youth Newsletter

is the Portuguese Atlantic Youth Association newsletter.

It presents a compilation of articles, opinions, news, photographs and general information

related to the PAYA’s annual activities, as well as a variety of key defence and security issues

related to NATO.

Opinions expressed in this newsletter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent

the points of view of the PAYA and the Portuguese Atlantic Committee.

The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC YOUTH ASSOCIATION FOR MORE INFORMATION, VISIT US AT facebook.com/pagesAJPA-CPA/125613144212134

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