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PORTFOLIO MANAGER’S REVIEW Edited by the Research Team of
A Monthly Publication of BeyondProxy LLC www.manualofideas.com May 28, 2009
When asked how he became so successful, Buffett answered: “we read hundreds and hundreds of annual reports every year.”
With
John Mihaljevic, CFA Managing Editor, The Manual of Ideas [email protected]
“If our efforts can further the goals of our members by giving them a discernible edge over other market participants, we have succeeded.”
Top 5 Ideas In This Report
EchoStar Corporation (Nasdaq: SATS) ……………… p. 57
EMC Corporation (NYSE: EMC) …………………. p. 59
Republic Airways (Nasdaq: RJET) ………………. p. 62
Ticketmaster Entertainment (Nasdaq: TKTM) ……………… p. 64
WellCare Health Plans (NYSE: WCG) ………………… p. 68
Also Inside
Editor’s Commentary …………….. p. 4
Portfolios with “Signal Value” …. p. 5
Exclusive Interview: Zeke Ashton p. 27
Exclusive Interview: Igor Lotsvin p. 35
100 Superinvestor Stocks ……… p. 38
Value Investing Congress Notes p. 139
Essay: Want to Be Next Buffett? p. 153
About Portfolio Manager’s Review
Our goal is to bring you compelling investment ideas on the basis of intrinsic value versus market price.
John Mihaljevic, editor, is a fund manager, former banker and analyst. He is a member of Value Investors Club, an exclusive community of top money managers, and has won the Club’s prize for best investment idea. John is a trained capital allocator, having studied under Yale chief investment officer David Swensen and served as research assistant to Nobel laureate James Tobin. John holds a BA in Economics, summa cum laude, from Yale and is a CFA charterholder. He resides in New York City with his wife and two kids.
THE SUPERINVESTOR ISSUE
► Snapshot of 100 companies owned by superinvestors ► 30 companies profiled and analyzed
► Proprietary selection of Top 5 candidates for investment ► Plus: Latest holdings of top investors
► Plus: Exclusive Interviews with Zeke Ashton, Igor Lotsvin ► Plus: Notes from Value Investing Congress
Superinvestor companies mentioned in this issue include Alexander's, American Express, American Railcar, AmeriCredit, AmerisourceBergen,
Amylin Pharma, Apartment Investment, Ark Restaurants, Borders, Bristol Myers Squibb, Burlington Northern, Canadian Natural, Capital Southwest,
CarMax, Cemex, Chesapeake Energy, Coca-Cola, ConocoPhillips, Consolidated-Tomoka Land, Costco Wholesale, Coventry Health Care, Cresud, CSX, Ctrip.com International, Deckers Outdoor, Dell, Dillard's, DISH Network, Dr Pepper Snapple, Eaton, eBay, EchoStar, Einstein Noah Restaurant, EMC,
Facet Biotech, Fair Isaac, Fairfax Financial, Fidelity National Financial, General Dynamics, Goldman Sachs, Greenlight Capital Re, Harman International,
Harvest Natural, Health Net, Helix Energy Solutions, Hertz Global Holdings, Hess, Horsehead, Ingersoll-Rand, Intel, International Assets Holding, Iteris, Jefferies, Johnson & Johnson, Jones Apparel, Lab Corp. of America, Lear,
AMERICREDIT (ACF) – OWNED BY CUMMING/STEINBERG, BERKOWITZ..................................... 100 CONSOLIDATED-TOMOKA LAND (CTO) – OWNED BY WINTERS, WHITMAN ................................. 103 HARVEST NATURAL RESOURCES (HNR) – OWNED BY PABRAI .................................................. 105 JEFFERIES GROUP (JEF) – OWNED BY CUMMING & STEINBERG ............................................... 108 LEUCADIA NATIONAL (LUK) – OWNED BY BERKOWITZ, PABRAI ................................................. 111 MEMC ELECTRONIC MATERIALS (WFR) – OWNED BY EINHORN .............................................. 114 PFIZER (PFE) – OWNED BY BERKOWITZ .................................................................................. 116 SYNERON MEDICAL (ELOS) – OWNED BY KLARMAN ................................................................ 120 TAL INTERNATIONAL (TAL) – OWNED BY BERKOWITZ .............................................................. 122 USG CORPORATION (USG) – OWNED BY BUFFETT, WATSA, WEITZ ......................................... 125 YAHOO! (YHOO) – OWNED BY ICAHN, ASHTON, MILLER .......................................................... 128
REDUCED OR ELIMINATED SUPERINVESTOR HOLDINGS ................. 130
AMERISOURCEBERGEN (ABC) – OWNED BY PZENA, ROBBINS .................................................. 131 ARK RESTAURANTS (ARKR) – OWNED BY RICHARDSON, GREENBLATT .................................... 133 DELL (DELL) – OWNED BY HAWKINS, GREENBERG, WATSA ..................................................... 135 URS CORPORATION (URS) – OWNED BY EINHORN ................................................................. 137
NOTES FROM VALUE INVESTING CONGRESS, MAY 5-6 .................... 139
ZEKE ASHTON, CENTAUR CAPITAL ........................................................................................... 139 JOHN BURBANK III, PASSPORT CAPITAL ................................................................................... 141 J. CARLO CANNELL, CANNELL CAPITAL .................................................................................... 142 DAVID CHU AND IGOR LOTSVIN, SOMA ASSET MANAGEMENT .................................................... 143 CHARLES DE VAULX, INTERNATIONAL VALUE ADVISERS ............................................................ 144 BRIAN GAINES, SPRINGHOUSE CAPITAL ................................................................................... 145 SCOTT KLEIN, BEACH POINT CAPITAL MANAGEMENT ................................................................ 146 DAVID NIERENBERG, D3 FAMILY OF FUNDS .............................................................................. 147 JED NUSSDORF, SOAPSTONE CAPITAL ..................................................................................... 148 DAVID RABINOWITZ, KIRKWOOD CAPITAL ................................................................................. 149 GUY SPIER, AQUAMARINE CAPITAL .......................................................................................... 150 WHITNEY TILSON AND GLENN TONGUE, T2 PARTNERS ............................................................. 151 WILLIAM WALLER AND JASON STOCK, M3 FUNDS ..................................................................... 152
ESSAY: WANT TO BE THE NEXT WARREN BUFFETT? ....................... 153
This report is printed on recycled paper that is FSC certified and endorsed by the Rainforest Alliance.
Bruce Berkowitz, Fairholme Bruce Berkowitz, manager of The Fairholme Fund, has been one of the most successful value-oriented investors of the past decade. From inception on December 29, 1999 through December 31, 2008, The Fairholme Fund has delivered a cumulative return, net of expenses, of 153.92%, versus a return of -27.83%, before expenses, for the S&P 500 Index. MOI Signal Rank™ – Top Current Ideas of Fairholme
Market Price ($) Shares Owned Holdings
Value Latest Filing ∆ Since Latest ∆ Since as % of
Company Ticker ($mn) Date Date Filing Filing 12/31/08 Co. Fund
Zeke Ashton of Centaur Capital Partners spoke eloquently on the topic of value investing and risk management at the Value Investing Congress in Pasadena earlier this month. We found Zeke’s presentation enlightening and asked him to elaborate on some of his key points. A week or so ago, we conducted an exclusive interview with Zeke, and it’s our pleasure to bring it to you here.
Before we proceed to the interview, we should point out that Zeke’s approach to risk management has worked. In 2008, the Centaur Value Fund was down 6.9%, trouncing the 37.1% and 40.0% declines of the S&P 500 and Nasdaq Composite indexes. From inception in August 2002 through the end of 1Q09, the Centaur Value Fund gained 134.6%, net of fees and expenses, versus returns of 15.1% for the Nasdaq Composite and -0.3% for the S&P 500 Index.
MOI: You spoke recently on the topic of value investing and risk management. The “backdrop” was the somewhat surprising fact that a number of prominent value investors suffered debilitating losses in the market collapse of 2008 and early 2009. Adherence to “margin of safety” principles apparently didn’t help. Why?
Zeke Ashton: I think that is a very good question, and I don’t think there is any one easy answer. Part of it was simply because very few investors were prepared for such an extreme negative scenario as the one that ultimately played out. I know we didn’t foresee things deteriorating as much as they did. What transpired in late 2008 and early 2009 was so far outside of the range of experience for most people that it didn’t seem like a plausible scenario twelve months before. With perfect 20/20 hindsight, of course, it is easy to see the warning signs that were present, but most investors simply continued to do the things which had rewarded them in the past, not knowing that this time might be different.
We and many other value investors have historically been rewarded for buying in times of fear and uncertainty, as well as for purchasing stocks that were cheap relative to asset values or normalized earnings power. However, in 2008 it wasn’t enough to buy stocks that looked cheap based on low multiples to book value or normalized earnings. Many companies, particularly in the financial sector, won’t get the chance to recover to normalized earnings because they got wiped out or were forced to dilute their shareholders to the extent that the losses are effectively permanent. In the end, it appears to me that when faced with an extreme environment like 2008 and early 2009, there are really only two things that can save you: the luck or skill to see it coming and get out of the way, or a portfolio structure and risk management approach that is specifically designed to promote survival in a catastrophic scenario that you didn’t see coming. I feel very fortunate that we had a portfolio that was able to take some hits and survive to play another day.
Igor Lotsvin and David Chu of Soma Asset Management recently presented at the Value Investing Congress in Pasadena. Their talk was entitled, The U.S. Banking Sector: Chaos and Opportunity. Last week, we conducted an exclusive interview with Igor Lotsvin, and it’s our pleasure to bring it to you here.
Soma Asset Management benefited from its bearish outlook on credit in 2008, reporting a return of 26%, net of fees.
MOI: What was the impetus for starting Soma Asset Management and how would you describe the essence of your firm?
Igor Lotsvin: At the end of 2006 we noticed very rapid deterioration in the credit statistics of most consumer loans – residential housing, credit cards, auto loans, etc. This was surprising, as at the time, unemployment level was low and capital markets were flooded with abundant liquidity. As we further investigated various credit asset classes — leveraged loans, high yield, CDOs, etc. — we came to the conclusion that the world was in the middle of a credit bubble, not simply a housing bubble. The bubble began to burst in the weakest part of housing market – subprime, to be exact. But we felt that it would likely spread to all asset classes. At the time very few people shared our view, and David Chu and I decided to start our firm to effectuate that variant view.
We are value investors who pursue the most compelling risk-reward asymmetric opportunities across the entire capital structure. We can be invested in debt, loans, equity or options, depending on the risk-reward outlook. Moreover, we believe that capital markets are intricately and, over longer periods of time, always linked. Hence we try to find opportunities where we believe dislocations are temporary and markets converge.
Specifically we pursue three separate strategies – long/short across the capital structure, capital structure arbitrage, and distressed value investing.
MOI: What lessons have you and David learned running your own firm that you might not have learned in your previous role at Symphony Asset Management?
Igor Lotsvin: We have a much broader mandate at Soma than in a typical hedge fund. The ability to invest across the capital structure presents us with a unique vantage point into how different markets function and interact. Quite often, investors who are only limited to investing in equities, for example, miss the developments in credit markets completely and may miss the next big development.
MOI: You seek out investments with limited downside risk. How do you ascertain such risk?
BUSINESS OVERVIEW Harman provides high fidelity audio products and electronic systems. The company operates in three segments:
Automotive provides audio, electronic and infotainment systems to be installed as original equipment by auto makers.
Consumer provides audio, video and electronics for home, mobile and multimedia. Products are sold through retailers such as Circuit City, Best Buy, MediaMarkt and Fnac.
Professional provides loudspeakers and electronic systems used by audio professionals in concert halls, stadiums, airports, houses of worship, and theme attractions. INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHTS
Owns renowned brands JBL, Infinity, Harman/ Kardon, Mark Levinson, and Becker. It is a leader in integrated infotainment for the auto industry.
Growth opportunities exist in all three segments: (1) automotive: potential to increase number of models offering Harman systems and to increase per-vehicle content of premium branded audio; (2) consumer: may benefit from convergence of home and multimedia technologies (offers branded accessories for iPod and iPhone); (3) professional: proprietary HiQnet system protocol incentivizes users to purchase complete compatible systems.
Targeting $400 million of annualized savings by FY11, of which $150 million have been realized. Total after-tax savings would amount to $4/share.
Mid-Infotainment system launch expected in fall 2009, ahead of original target. The company has been gaining share via new product introductions. China capacity has been doubled with a new plant.
Dinesh Paliwal (50) became chairman and CEO in July 2008. He was previously CEO of ABB North America. Herbert Parker (50) joined as CFO in June 2008. He was previously also at ABB N.A.
According to Greenlight Capital, Harman “could earn over $2 per share within the next couple of years, and much more in a normal environment.”
Weak end markets in CQ1 2009, with global, U.S., European and China/India auto production down 38%, 56%, 41%, and 17%, respectively. Consumer and professional markets are also weak.
Debt of $662 million, partially offset by cash of $334 million. Debt appears manageable, as earliest maturity not until the end of 2011. $400 million convert carries 1.25% coupon and matures in 2012.
SELECTED OPERATING DATA
FYE June 30 2006 2007 2008 YTD
3/31/09 % of revenue by segment:Automotive 69% 70% 72% 70% Professional 16% 16% 15% 16% Consumer 15% 14% 13% 14% Revenue growth by segment:Automotive 5% 11% 19% -28% Professional 6% 8% 9% -20% Consumer 18% 1% 7% -28% Total revenue 7% 9% 16% -27% Headcount 4% 4% 0% -14% EBIT margin by segment: Automotive 15% 14% 5% -4% Professional 11% 14% 16% 12% Consumer 10% 3% -1% -11% Unallocated and other -2% -1% -2% -2% Total EBIT margin 12% 11% 4% -4% Selected items as % of revenue: Gross profit 35% 34% 27% 24% SG&A 23% 23% 24% 28% EBIT 12% 11% 3% -19% D&A 4% 4% 4% 5% Capex 4% 5% 3% 3% % of revenue by geography: Germany 44% 45% 42% n/a Other Europe 18% 18% 16% n/a U.S. 22% 21% 23% n/a Other regions 17% 16% 18% n/a % of revenue by major customer: Daimler and Chrysler 1 23% 23% 18% 16% Audi / VW 9% 10% 11% 15% BMW 10% <10% <10% 14% Return on tangible equity 33% 32% 11% -8% Tang. equity to assets (avg) 41% 47% 44% 36% shares out (avg) -1% -1% -6% -6%
Source: Gridstone Research, Company filings, Manual of Ideas analysis. 1 Standalone Chrysler accounted for 7% of revenue YTD 3/31/09.
Customer concentration. Daimler made a strategic
decision in 2006-07 to move to dual sourcing, causing Harman’s share of Mercedes business to decline in FY08 and again in FY09. The business should stabilize at a “substantial” level in FY10.
CEO received total comp of $17 million in FY08. MAJOR HOLDERS Insiders 1% │ Cap Re 12% │ Cap World 9% │ Greenlight 6% │ Relational 6% │ T Rowe 6% │ Elm Ridge 3% RATINGS VALUE Intrinsic value materially higher than market value? MANAGEMENT Capable and properly incentivized? FINANCIAL STRENGTH Solid balance sheet? MOAT Able to sustain high returns on invested capital? EARNINGS MOMENTUM Fundamentals improving? MACRO Poised to benefit from economic and secular trends? EXPLOSIVENESS 5%+ probability of 5x upside in one year?
THE BOTTOM LINE Harman occupies a strong competitive position in high-end audio products primarily for automotive applications. When the auto industry return to “normal,” Harman appears likely to reestablish profitability of several dollars per share. However, we view future earning power as too uncertain to warrant a meaningful multiple of projected earnings. We note that David Einhorn’s Greenlight Capital established its position at $11.07 per share, significantly below the recent market price. f
Notes from Value Investing Congress, May 5-6 Manual of Ideas research analyst Zain Griffith attended the Value Investing Congress in Pasadena. Here are his notes.
Zeke Ashton, Centaur Capital Zeke Ashton’s presentation was entitled Surviving the Worst Case: Risk Management and Value Investing.
LONG Investment Idea: Alleghany (Y)
Holding company that operates primarily in the specialty and property & casualty insurance industry.
Long term track record of value creation by building, acquiring, and selling businesses—particular expertise in the insurance, investment management, and natural resource areas.
Investment results are in high teens. Alleghany uses a “total return” approach to investing its float and has a good investment track record. Over the past five years, the company has produced a 10.6% annualized return vs. a -2.2% annualized return for the S&P 500 Index.
The company has a $4.1 billion investment portfolio and has a portfolio of valuable assets.
Valuation: Sum of Parts: RSUI (insurance with 80% combined ratio in 2008) 1.5x book = $1.65 bil. Capitol Transamerica – 1.2x book = $360 mil. EDC .75x book = $125 mil. Cash and investments at parent = $800 mil.
LONG Investment Idea: Odyssey Re (ORH)
Globally diversified insurance and reinsurance company, one of the top 20 reinsurance companies in the world.
71% owned by FFH, investment portfolio managed by Prem Watsa.
Grown BV/share by more than 20% annually since going public in 2001.
Buying back stock below book; spent $351 million on share buybacks in 2008, ~13% of shares outstanding in 2008.
Bottom line: ORH is classified as a medium risk stock. Current book value is about $43.80/share (as of Mar. 31), thinks BV/share should increase to $47-$48. At 1.3x book, company would be worth upwards of $55+/share.
Risk Management & Value Investing
Many value manager downfalls may have been due to complacency. Asks the question: If the core principle of value investing is "margin of safety" then how did so many well-known value investors lose as much or more than the market average during the bear market that began in 2007? Did they do something wrong or are they unlucky? Why did their value investing principles, years of experience, and long track records of success fail to protect them? Did they become overconfident?
Value investors previously assessed risk at the individual position level. This was all the "risk management" that seemed required. A lesson he recently learned was that risk must be assessed from the portfolio level—looking at the portfolio from the "top down" can be a useful exercise. He believes managers should try to determine if a bubble is building and where the economy is at in the business cycle.
Centaur doesn’t want: 1) excessive concentration—never wants the outcome of any one or two ideas to determine their ability to survive or dominate results in a given period, 2) Excessive portfolio-wide exposure to any one specific factor or theme (i.e. inflation, interest rate/currency fluctuations), 3) Excessive leverage at the portfolio level or the individual idea level, 4) Political risk – does not want investments to be overly vulnerable to change in government regulations, laws, tax codes, etc, 5) Liquidity risk, 6) Shorting stocks—wants to avoid “blow-up” risk. Believes we will see some short funds blow up due to recent market rally.
Concept of risk limits: Limits prevent investors from taking unacceptable risks, which should be thought about in advance. Home run style investors will have a different risk management style than high probability investors.
Helpful limits: 1) position size, 2) total exposure (long and short), 3) leverage, 4) limits on illiquid stocks.
Example of Fairfax Financial Holdings (FFH): Many people were short FFH in prior years when it really should have been a long (due to their large CDS portfolio). –Not a typical insurance holding.
Centaur’s ideal position is about 5%, i.e. 20 stock portfolio. Believes that 20 names in a portfolio is better than 6 or 100, thinks 20 is the sweet spot. The ultra-concentrated model increases the odds of experiencing occasional periods of outstanding performance, but also increases odds of really terrible performance.
Diversifying by idea doesn’t necessarily help if there is excessive sector or single factor correlation. “If you owned a bunch of different stocks in different industries that all had leveraged balance sheets, you probably didn’t benefit much from diversification in a year like 2008.”
Two types of leverage: 1) Recourse (high-risk leverage) 2) Non-recourse (smart leverage). Best way to achieve non-recourse leverage is by using in-the-money LEAPs—which offer reasonable implied borrowing costs as well as an implied put below a certain price.
Two Schools of Value Investing
1. Home run (i.e. Eddie Lampert) – magnitude of winners is the success factor. If one idea triples, you can afford to have a few ideas that do not do well.
2. High-probability (i.e. Seth Klarman) – Less concentrated portfolio, but more concentrated relative to the rest of the world. Centaur has 15-30 positions—1-2 big winners will not drive portfolio performance. Zeke follows the high-probability approach.
Each style depends on the type of investor. Key is matching investment style to the type/characteristics of the capital base and manager philosophy.
It is important to match the attributes of the capital base to the investment style of the manager. The "home-run" style investor must have stable, long-term capital in order to compensate for higher volatility of fund performance. These types of investors are at the highest risk of business failure.
“High probability” investors can operate with a much more fluid capital base—business failure is driven more by showing favorably divergent returns over time.
Centaur risk limits: Position 7.5% --10% maximum size at market. Sector – no more than 20% in any one sector—25% at market.
Ingredients of a blow up: 1) excessively sized bets, 2) excessive leverage, 3) unexpected negative event, 4) inadequate liquidity to unwind the position without negatively affecting price.
Take away from Kelly Formula: 1) The better the idea, the bigger you can go. 2) The more undervalued the idea, the lower the risk, the bigger the position should be. Believes that investors who rely on the Kelly Formula as intellectual support to take excessively sized bets will accelerate gambler’s ruin, not avoid it.
About Zeke Ashton
Zeke Ashton is the founder and Managing Partner of Centaur Capital Partners, a Dallas-based value-oriented investment firm. He and co-portfolio manager Matthew Richey are the advisors to the Centaur family of private partnerships using a long / short equity strategy, and are the sub-advisors to the Tilson Dividend Fund, a mutual fund utilizing a unique, income-oriented value investing strategy.
undertake any investment strategy. It does not constitute a general or personal recommendation or take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual investors. The price and value of securities referred to in this newsletter will fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance, future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of all of the original capital invested in a security discussed in this newsletter may occur. Certain transactions, including those involving futures, options, and other derivatives, give rise to substantial risk and are not suitable for all investors. Disclaimers There are no warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy, completeness, or results obtained from any information set forth in this newsletter. BeyondProxy will not be liable to you or anyone else for any loss or injury resulting directly or indirectly from the use of the information contained in this newsletter, caused in whole or in part by its negligence in compiling, interpreting, reporting or delivering the content in this newsletter. Related Persons BeyondProxy’s officers, directors, employees and/or principals (collectively “Related Persons”) may have positions in and may, from time to time, make purchases or sales of the securities or other investments discussed or evaluated in this newsletter. John Mihaljevic, Chairman of BeyondProxy, is also a principal of Mihaljevic Capital Management LLC (“MCM”), which serves as the general partner of a private investment partnership. MCM may purchase or sell securities and financial instruments discussed in this newsletter on behalf of the investment partnership or other accounts it manages. It is the policy of MCM and all Related Persons to allow a full trading day to elapse after the publication of this newsletter before purchases or sales of any securities or financial instruments discussed herein are made. Compensation BeyondProxy receives compensation in connection with the publication of this newsletter only in the form of subscription fees charged to subscribers and reproduction or re-dissemination fees charged to subscribers or others interested in the newsletter content.
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