Port of Rotterdam. Radiation Detection Systems at the Major International Seaport of Rotterdam “Balance Between Trade and Security” “Benefits and Challenges”

Port of Rotterdam

Radiation Detection Systems at theMajor International Seaport of

Rotterdam

“Balance Between Trade and Security”

“Benefits and Challenges”

Sylvia Niesing

Teamleader Nuclear Detection

Rotterdam Customs

Bosporusstraat 5

3199 LJ Maasvlakte Rotterdam

the Netherlands

+31 6 1860 2987

[email protected]

South East Asia SLD Megaports Technical Workshop, Bangkok - May 12,

2009

Index

History (from “Brinker” until now) Balance between Trade and Security

The Rotterdam approach Operational mode

Results

Benefits and Challenges

Port of Rotterdam

1998: The USA started 2nd line of Defense Program (DOE)– Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of

Radioactive/Nuclear Material

2002: CSI Container Security Initiative– Canada: Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver;

Singapore; Netherlands: Rotterdam; Belgium: Antwerp; France: Le Havre; Germany: Bremerhaven and Hamburg.

History

“Brinker” Megaports project

• After a visit of the Dutch Minister of Finance to the United States

• On the 13th of August 2003

• A Mutual Declaration Of Principles was signed at Rotterdam

MUTUAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY

THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF

THE NETHERLANDS

AND

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMARICA

CONCERNING THE PREVENTION OF ILLICIT

TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR AND OTHER

RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

“Brinker” project

Objective:• Security

• To monitor as much as possible incoming and outgoing containers in order to intercept and/or stop illegal import, export and transhipment of nuclear and radioactive materials

Most important requirement:• Trade

• Logistic process in the Port of Rotterdam should not be disrupted

• All destinations, import, export and, if logistically possible, transhipment were inspected

“Brinker” project

• 4 TSA Nuclear Detection Portals were installed at the Europe Container Terminals (ECT), location Maasvlakte Rotterdam

• A computer system was placed at the Central Command Post (CCP) in the Customs main building

“Brinker” project

“Brinker” project

• Lessons learned

It’s possible to monitor large numbers of containers

a close cooperation between container terminal and customs is essential

“innocent” alarms caused by NORM materials like ceramics, fertilizer and ore disrupted the logistic process

Tender procedure

• Rotterdam Customs decided not to participate further in the Megaports Project

• Why ? To be independent To pay for all expenses To tender nuclear detection portals with “Norm”

recognition Special requirements for database To install two Central Command Posts, 40 km apart

but connected by glass fibre To investigate in the usefulness of advanced

spectral portals• Note:

There is still a very good and close relationship between DOE and Dutch Customs !!

• “turn-key” project for supply, installation

and maintenance of two connected

networks in which a total of 40

gamma/neutron portals and hand-held

equipment were requested

• ANSI N42.35 requirements at a speed

of 20 km/h with NORM recognition

• Siemens / SAIC was awarded

Tender procedure

Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam

3 different phases can be distinguished

• Phase 1: passage through the portal

Trucks and trains drive through the SAIC AT980 or ST-20 advanced portal, possible alarm, stopping container, gathering information about the contents (freight documents, BL)

Is the radiation evenly distributed in the container or are there peaks?

Is it “normal” that the cargo emits radiation (ceramics, fertilizer, etcetera ….)

Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam

• Phase 2: Identification

Inspection with identifiers like SAIC GR-135, Ortec Detective HPGe, Berthold Neutron Counter, or SAIC GR-460 mobile system

Or inspection with SAIC ST-20, an Advanced Spectral NaI Portal

Screenshot ST-20 Advanced Spectral Portal

Operational mode in the Port of Rotterdam

• Phase 3:

If not conform in Phase 2, the container is handed

over to the Department of Nuclear Safety, Security

and Safeguards of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial

Planning and the Environment

Opening and unloading of the container. If

necessary, call in police, public prosecutor, etc.;

removal and storage of the nuclear material

Results

Port of Rotterdam 10,8 million TUE in 2008

Location Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2008

Number of passages

Phase 1 alarms

Phase 2 Phase 3

3.695.833 58.676 914 11

1,59% 1,56% 1,20%

Number of passages

Phase 1 alarms

Phase 2 Phase 3

3.355.865 54.644 2192 17

1,63% 4,01% 0,78%

7.051.698

Location Rotterdam Reeweg 2008

Some examples of interceptions

Numerous containers with radioactive contaminated metal scrap

60Co and 65Zn contaminated stacking kits for washing machines and tumble dryers

Illegal transport of Co-60, Am-241/Be, Cs-137 sources

Lightning rod (Ra-226)m

ax. doserate container 650 µSv/h

(65 mrem/h)

at surface of object 1,03 mSv/h (103 mrem/h)

Some examples of interceptions

4 “empty” UF6 containers

Leather handbags with Cobalt-60 contaminated hardware

All seizures were not in conformity with Dutch Legislation

The amount of uranium exceeded the 0.1 wt% limit

Maximum doserate at surface 80 µSv/h (8 mrem/h) !!

Benefits and Challenges

• Benefits

Port of Rotterdam profiles itself as a safe port

Important for International Trade

Installing Nuclear Detection Sytems in the Port of Rotterdam could work preventative

Protection against radioactive products coming to the consumer market

•Challenges

Detection ship to ship transport

More portals in other ports and airports

Faster nuclide identification with advanced spectral portal systems can increase the logistics even more

Incorporation of Nuclear Detection Systems with X-ray scanning technology one point of control

Discuss with terminals about the possibilities of installing portals before a terminal is actually build

Benefits and Challenges

Sylvia