Politics, States and Social Contracts Paul Nugent, Director of Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh.

Politics, States andSocial Contracts

Paul Nugent, Director of Centre of African Studies, University of

Edinburgh

The Ubiquity of ‘Good Governance’

The Other Side of the Equation

• Governance = not simply about the choice and implementation of policies, but about political sustainability. ‘Good policies’ that clash with political norms are unlikely to get very far

• Social contracts are about the sets of understandings that underpin the relations between rulers and ruled.

A Few Basic Points

• 1. A social contract does not imply an inherently harmonious relationship, merely that those who exercise power and those who on the receiving end share a common understanding of what that relationship entails.

• 2. Social contracts are not necessarily written down, or are not necessarily found in the places where you might expect to find them

• >> In many countries, the way that politics is actually contracted may has little to do with the formal constitution and much more to do with deeply-rooted understandings of ‘rules of the game’

• . 3. Contacts often have an uneven application across national space>> geographical spread plus levels of government

• .

• 4. social contracts can only exist where there is communication flow between rules and ruled>> hence role of media is as crucial for authoritarian regimes as democratic ones (e.g. Mobutu)

Four Types of Social Contract

• 1. Coercive: regime claims the right to rule either through the application (or threat) of coercion, or the promise of protection [‘Le Guide’, President as head of family writ large]. These might sound like opposites, but are actually flip sides of the same coin because the offer of protection contains an implicit threat

• >> Note: insurgencies can weaken the moral authority of the centre (e.g. Haile Selassie) and warlords may stake own competing claims to offer ‘protection’

The Coercive Contract According to Siyad Barre

• “I, Mohammed Siyad Barre, am singularly responsible for the transformation of Somalia and Mogadisho from a bush country and scruffy hamlet into a modern state and commodious city, respectfully. Consequently, I will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me out of here; and if they try, I will take the whole country with me.”

• 2. Productive: contract is based on some conception of active performance. That is, consent is traded against the effective delivery of public goods: security, social amenities, legal regime

• In European & US history, contracts arose out of a ‘creative friction’ encapsulated ‘as no taxation without representation’

Representation without taxation?

• In African colonial systems, taxes typically borne by subjects, ot citizens (e.g. Senegal)

• At independence, most nationalist parties embraced versions of social contract forged in late colonialism >> especially variants on socialism

• But increase in aid flows (e.g. Tanzania) and the decline of direct taxation made appropriation and allocation of resources less transparent

• By the mid 1980s, many countries had arrived at the worst of worlds: minimal delivery of public goods coupled with very little transparency. At this time, there was little chance of redress either because the one-party state or military regime remained locked into command mode.

• 3. Permissive: A permissive contract is one in which those who govern tolerate a range of activity that is formally illegal in return for being absolved from scrutiny>> e.g. ‘Article 15’ (débrouillez-vous) in Zaire, and border trade in micro-states (e.g. Gambia)

• 4. Liberational>> formulated during struggles for national liberation or against extreme forms of dictatorship (e.g the Dergue) and became frozen at the point when success was achieved.

• >> primacy of the nation and the movement as the embodiment of the national interest (e.g. Eritrea, Zimbabwe). >>

Political Tenses….

• 1. Coercive contracts often have a peculiar conception of political time>> often a dysfunctional past that justifies a suspension of political time for some purposes

• 2. Liberational Contracts begin as forward-looking (the achievement of core goals), but tend to become backward-looking

• 3. Permissive contracts are lived in the present• 4. Productive contracts>> African socialism was all about

progress experienced in hyper-time. These days still looking to future, but in slow-time (MDGs)

Co-existing contracts

• In particular countries, different modes may co-exist especially as regimes mutate e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire combined coercive and permissive; South Africa combines liberational and productive >> result is often rather confused state discourses

• Note: The line of least resistance is towards permissive contracts which deflect potential conflict (but prevent traction) The line of greatest resistance is generally in the direction of productive contracts for two main reasons: (i) high risk of failure and (ii) for resource-rich states, the risk of fuelling demands

What’s in a Flag?

The Bottom Line….

Key Issues: What is the Point of Elections?

• 1. Role of Elections – a Waste of Resources? • Certainly not a panacea, but they are important

to enabling citizens to express their judgement about the performance of those in office

• >> and they may have cumulative effect (Lindberg) – a few successful rotations helps!

• << although bad habits catch on quickly (e.g. governments of national unity)

• Elections force governments to keep track off their population and to articulate their claims

• Some minimum requirements>> • (i) autonomous election commission• (ii) a credible voters’ register• (iii) a savvy electorate that is prepared to go

shopping• (iv) a modicum of trust amongst elites (the

difference between Ghana and Kenya)

Popular interest • Although electoral participation typically falls

after the founding election, the rates of participation are not bad at all considering the conjuncture of logistics and the fact that governments are doomed to disappoint

• Average turnout for Africa, 1990-2001: 64% for Africa, vs 65% for North America and Caribbean, 78% for Western Europe and 79% in Oceania

• 2. Citizenship and Belonging>> constitutions often start from the abstract citizen, whereas popular discourses of politics often follow different principles. National differences:

• (a) Francophone states have tended to import a state-centric model in which the state defines citizenship>> reflected in the passage of national domain laws … but does not always over-ride local conceptions

• (b) in some former British colonies, less from above

• >> in Ghana a strongly rooted idea of colonial state having been constructed from the bottom upwards on the basis of primary units (‘native states’). While the post-colonial state has elaborated its own rules, it is an axiom that one cannot really be a citizen unless one claim identity through membership of a primary community.

• >> infuses all aspects of national politics and local administration

• (c) in South Africa, the state effectively defined citizenship since apartheid days, but removing the apartheid legacy has also re-inforced state logics

• (i) internalised in popular conceptions of belonging defined by international border (hence the definition of foreigners)

• (ii) spatial claims internally less important than racial ones

Royal Bafokeng Nation… flags again

• The messiness of social contracts often lies in the lack of a fit between what exists on paper and the rules of the game as generally understood…. But ‘good governance’ interventions ignore these understandings at their peril

• >> the re-engagement with traditional authorities is a reflection of that reality

Chiefs inc.

• (c) Public Goods: The possibility of developing a productive social contract hinges on the ability of those who hold office to identify meaningful priorities and to deliver

However, pressure on public services is

immense, and nowhere more so in Africa’s cities

Levels of Urbanisation

Levels and Rates of Urbanisation, 2010

Country Percentage Urban Rate of Urbanization

Algeria 92.0 2.4

Djibouti 87.0 2.2

Gabon 85.0 2.1

Republic of Congo (Brazzav)

61.0 2.7

South Africa 61.0 1.4

Botswana 60.0 2.5

Ghana 50.0 3.5

Nigeria 48.0 3.8

Kenya 22.0 4.0

Malawi 19.0 5.2

Ethiopia 17.0 5.4

Uganda 13.0 4.4

Africa’s Largest Cities, millionsCity 2010 1980 1970 1950

Cairo 11.0 7.4 5.6 2.5

Lagos 10.6 4.8 1.4 0.3

Kinshasa 8.8 2.0 1.1 0.2

Johannesburg & East Rand

6.1 2.8 2.2 1.5

Khartoum/3 city

5.2 1.2 0.7 0.2

Luanda 4.8 1.0 0.5 0.1

Alexandria 4.4 2.5 2.0 1.0

Abidjan 4.1 1.4 0.6 0.07

Nairobi 3.5 1.0 0.5 0.1

Cape Town 3.4 1.6 1.1 0.6

Kano 3.4 1.4 0.5 0.1

Dar es Salaam 3.4 0.8 0.4 0.07

Lagos in by-gone days

Lagos today…. Go slow

World Development Report 2009

• Bretton Woods institutions are beginning to realize the downside of state-bashing.

• “But the top priority is the set of aspatial policy instruments that apply universally to all places – establishing market institutions to regulate land use and transactions, and delivering such basic services as schools, streets and sanitation. So in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, the role of national government is pivotal in laying the foundations of inclusive urbanization.”

Traction

• Intelligent urban planning requires enhanced capacity for state and municipal authorities, plus an efficient and equitable system for raising revenues - Traction

• In many cities, the claims of the ‘landowners’ is a real political issue that cannot be ignored

• social contracts have to involve two-way bargains in which urban land is freed up in return for service improvements

In other contexts, state is needed to cement local agreements esp in relation to cross-border resource use (an emerging public good in context of climate change)

• (d) Externality: Does the externality of the African states makes productive contracts effectively unattainable?

Depends on both the degree and nature of the externality: acute aid dependency is one form, the dominance of rents from the extractive sector is another, and remittances are a third.

• The track-record of oil-states is not good, but Botswana and Cape Verde demonstrate that some externality can be helpful in sustaining social contracts

• In Cape Verde, remittances accounted for 12% of GDP in 2006>> the importance of the diaspora raises questions of the boundedness of the national community> diaspora vote?

A final thought: Is small beautiful?

• Why is it that small states, and especially, island states perform much better in governance indices? Possible answers:

• (a) the level of demand on the state is more manageable>> In 2006, there were 145 million Nigerians (probably!) and only 1.8 million Batswana.

• (b) elite tends to be much more compact and inter-connected.

Top of Ibrahim Table on Governance in Africa 2008-9

Country Overall Governance Ranking

Participation and Human Rights Ranking

Mauritius 1 2

Seychelles 2 5

Botswana 3 4

Cape Verde 4 1

South Africa* 5 3

Namibia 6 8

Ghana 7 6

Tunisia 8 35

Egypt* 9 39

Lesotho 10 7

Sao Tome and Principe 11 9

Benin 12 10

Bottom of TableCountry Overall Governance

RankingParticipation and Human Rights Ranking

Angola* 42 27

Guinea-Bissau 43 26

Cote d’Ivoire 44 46

Guinea 45 42

Equatorial Guinea* 46 52

Sudan* 47 48

CAR 48 30

Zimbabwe 49 44

Eritrea 50 50

DRC 51 45

Chad* 52 49

Somalia 53 53

• (c) closer proximity of borders tends to embed the economies of smaller countries within regional economies, creating less pressure on state

• (d) in small countries, the overall influence of diasporas is likely to be that much greater

• (e) Finally, there is argument that it is simply easier for the state to ‘broadcast’ its power in small countries.

Conclusion

• 1. If we take the long view, there is nothing inevitable about a transition to productive contracts. Indeed, this is often the line of greatest resistance>> the preference for permissive contracts may even be accentuated by governance reforms that parcellize the state and privatize resources

• 2. But coercive contracts are more difficult to sustain these days >> especially coups

• 3. Social contracts are grounded in political cultures than cannot simply be ignored or regarded as unfortunate obstacles>> in many cases a balance between group/individual rights and elected/’traditional’ authorities may be the most viable option>> institutional pluralism has its merits.

• 3. Growth of urban population is likely to make service delivery play out more openly at election time.

• 4. In some countries, the diaspora factor looms large (party funding etc)

• 5. Successful elections tend to build trust in the process, but failed elections may create a climate of mutual suspicion that lingers… 2011 is a big election year and a few flops could set the clock back

• 6. Reforming electoral institutions is probably the intervention which is able to give the best returns in a short period of time