Politics as one-man-show: Neopatrimonialism in the Central Asian context

UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA

CAMPUS FORLI

Politics as one-man-show: Neopatrimonialism in the Central

Asian context

Research paper prepared for the Seminar

„Caucasus and Central Asia“

(Teacher: Albert Binanichvili)

Master of Arts Interdisciplinary research and studies on Eastern Europe

Academic Year 2014/15

Christopher Braemer (matriculation number 0000723797)

Via Francesco Nullo 50

47121 Forli

[email protected]

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. The concept of Neopatrimonialism

3. Case study: Uzbekistan

4. Comparison in the Central Asian context

4.1 Tajikistan

4.2 Kasakhstan

4.3 Kyrgysztan

4.4 Turkmenistan

5. Conclusion

Figures

Figure 1: Concepts of personal rule 1

Charts

Table 1: Office terms of central Asian head of states 2

Index of abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

CA Central Asia

CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization

CIS Commonwealth of independent States

CE Central Europe

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

EE Eastern Europe

EU European Union

FDI Foreign direct investments

GDP Gross domestic product

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NWF National Welfare Fund

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

SME Small and medium sized enterprise

SOE State-owned Enterprise

SSR Soviet Socialist Republic

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

WTO World trade organization

1

1. Introduction

Governance in the independent Central Asia persists as a one man show since the breakup of

the Soviet Union. Reelected in march 2015 Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov as

record-term central Asian presidents do rule their countries as record CIS-leaders for almost

26 years (both since 1989, Nazarbayev in fact just one day longer than Islam Karimov). But

also the Tajik president Emomali Rakhmon are in power since 23 years and the first Turkmen

president Niyazov ruled 15 years until his unexpected death in 2006 as table one illustrates.

Table one: Office terms of Central Asian head of states

Ranking Country Head of state In power since Years in office

1 Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev *1989 (22/06) 25

2 Uzbekistan Islam Karimov *1989 (23/06) 25

3 Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon *1992 23

4 Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov *2006 9

5 Kyrgyzstan Almazek Atambayev *2011 4

Source: Own calculations.

These statistics open my main questions: Why the central Asian presidents have been

presidents for so many years? Who is really ruling in Central Asia? And which are the

differences in the rule of law between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and

Turkmenistan?

Analyzing the Uzbek case and its difference country by country in the Central Asian context,

this paper tries to explain a set of main reasons for the infinity of presidencies based on the

concept of Neopatrimonialism and to analyze its political and economical obstacles. Lewis

describes Neopatrimonialism as a political system “in which the familiar institutions of the

state are combined with informal, behind-the-scenes politicking based on patron-client

relationships, regional networks and kinship” (Lewis 2012, p. 116). Implementing this theory

on the Central Asian context could answer a set of sub-questions of this research like:

How can a handful of families rule over 25 years over 30 million people in Uzbekistan? How

can Central Asian countries be among the most natural gas owners while a huge part of the

population is freezing every winter? How can the poverty level of the central Asian states be

on the same level like some sub-Saharan states while some of the central Asian elites are

estimated as among the richest 300 Swiss inhabitants? And how can the Central Asian

presidents be so popular among their people although they are the reason for the

backwardness and poverty of their national economies?

2

In the first part of this research the concept of Neopatrimonialism (2.) deals as fundament for

a detailed analysis of the country case Uzbekistan (3.) in the Central Asian context (4.) with

the detailed description of the regional differences.

2. The concept of Neopatrimonialism

Max Weber (1958) has been one of the first scholars using the term “patrimonialism” for a

single sovereign governance monopole supported by its personal administration based

primarily on tradition and the discrete use of power. Roth (1968) differs between traditional

and nontraditional (personal rulership) patrimonialism. This personal patrimonialism has been

transformed by a prefix to Neopatrimonialism from Shmuel Eisenstadt (1973) and further

described by several African and sub-Saharan specialists like Medard (1982) or Bratton and

van de Walle (1994). Since this multidisciplinary, multidimensional (Laruelle, 2012) and

universal concept is endangered of becoming a catch-it-all concept (Erdman and Engel 2006,

Guliyev 2011), the term has to be exactly defined in this first chapter to understand the

difference to other concepts like corruption, clientelism, patronage, cronyism, capture,

predationalism, kleptocracy, prebendalism, godfatherism, berlusconism, putinism, “the big

man” syndrome, godfatherism, warlordism etc. (Laruelle 2012, Evans 1992, Guliyev 2011).

Figure one illustrates different concepts of personal rule.

Figure 1: Concepts of personal rule

Source: Guliyev, 2011.

Erdmann and Engel (2006) state that clientelism is mainly the relation between two people,

while patronage between a person (patron) and group of people. Sultanism is characterized by

the extreme personal abuse of power by one sovereign using the tools of arbitrary governance,

patronage, nepotism, cronyism, and corruption (Weber 1958, Guliyev 2011, Kunysz 2012),

3

while the main difference to cronyism1 is that it is just one feature of Sultanism which can be

found also in more democratic systems and does not necessarily prevent economic growth

(Ilkhamov 2007, Guliyev 2011, Lewis 2012, Laruelle 2012, Nawaz 2008). Based on the

dynastical family rule of one strongman a neosultanistic regime is characterized by the spread

of fear and personal cult to maintain loyalty to preserve his position (Guliyev, 2011).

Prebendalism is defined by Lewis as “decentralized [neo] patrimonial rule“ (Lewis, 1996, 79-

103).

Ilkhamov (2007) differs between three types of patron-client relations: patrimonial,

neopatrimonial, neo-neopatrimonial. Patrimonialism is characterized by purely vertical

(patron-client) power structure manifesting the historical roots of Neopatrimonialism within

the patron-client relations of liege lords and peasants in medieval peasant societies (Ilkhamov,

2007). Combining vertical and horizontal power structures (patron-client and client-client), in

Neopatrimonialistic rules of law clans instead of political parties act as intermediate

organizations. For example states with predominant agricultural sector like the Central Asian

republics (Ilkhamov, 2007). Further he differs between “hard” neopatrimonial regime with the

concentration of power on one person and a top-down national-patriotic ideology in form of

nationalism and “soft” neopatrimonial regime with clannish interest groups foundation based

on principal-agent relations with limited independent elites and an excising civil society

(Ilkhamov, 2007). The fundament of Neo-neopatrimonial are horizontal relations (client-

client) based on amass party system, organized clientelism and the increased power of clients

in modern industrial societies like Russia and Ukraine or Southern Italy during the 1960’s and

70’s (Ilkhamov, 2007).

The most important feature of Neopatrimonialism is that the rule of law is not limited by

tradition, kinship, values or norms –rather it is based on a simple exchange between patron

and client (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012, Giersch 2013, Laruelle 2012, Lewis 2012). The

patron fulfils and protects the client’s interests, mainly including the assignment of all

important positions2 within the neopatrimonial state and economic assets for his absolute

loyalty3. Patron-client relations are often more unstable than primordial kinship relations

(Ilkhamov, 2007). The patron–client system provides a relatively low-cost way of resolving

conflicts without excessive violence (Lewis, 2012). On the other hand the constancy of public

1 The appointment of friends into politics, regardless of their qualification is called cronyism.

2 Including politics as well as economics, especially the natural resources sector (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012 and

Giersch 2013). 3 Bratton & Walle (1994) underline that sub-Saharan dictators surround themselves mostly with local governors

telling them what they would like to hear.

4

services remains highly fragile, with international or local agreement can be cancelled within

a second (Laruelle, 2012).

Another main feature is the foundation on equal important legal-rational and informal4

governance structures, while it is hard to differ between them (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012,

Giersch 2013, Laruelle 2012, Lewis 2012). In close-run cases the informal element decides,

personal loyalty dominates over impersonal law (Ilkhamov, 2007). In this kind of regime with

conglomerating public and private relations, legal-rational and informal structures what makes

it hard to say whether state dominates society or vice versa. State bureaucracy, formal laws

and “grey zones” of the legislative branch are (ab-)used for governance, while patron or

leader has absolute power (Ilkhamov, 2007). The patron legitimizes his actions in different

ways, mainly by personal cult, ideology, constructed nationalism, capture, predation,

cronyism, clientelism, corruption, nepotism and the spread of fear (Giersch 2013, Ilkhamov

2007, 2010, 2012, Laruelle 2012, Lewis 2012). Opposition and civil society is harshly

oppressed and dissidents are excluded from society, imprisoned5, killed

6, or banned from the

country (Laruelle, 2012, Bratton & Walle 1994). Potential opponents can be bought off easily

by bribes or financial threats (Lewis, 2012)

Poverty, illiteracy, inequality (classes, rural and urban locations, centre and periphery, state

and society) remain a common feature of neopatrimonial societies while patronage fills some

of the gaps and gives the population an illusionary feeling of security (Ilkhamov, 2007). This

causes often underdeveloped infrastructure, unfinished market-mechanisms and bureaucracy.

Neopatrimonial societies are further characterized by a low grade of social mobility, exchange

and communication among ethnicities and religious groups.

The economic impact of Neopatrimonialism is described by Branko Milanovic (2013) who

analyses that countries with this form of government feature are among those with record

GINI-coefficient’s, meaning a unfair distribution of wealth leading to a big gap between rich

and poor (Ilkhamov 2007, Nawaz 2008, Lewis 2012, Laruelle 2012). Laruelle (2012) and

Ilkhamov (2007) underline the rent-seeking and asset stripping practice in neopatrimonial

regimes additional to the confiscation of public and private property for personal benefit. This

4 Lewis describes neopatrimonialsim as a political system “in which the familiar institutions of the state are

combined with informal, behind-the-scenes politicking based on patron-client relationships, regional networks

and kinship” (Lewis 2012, p. 116). Erdman and Engel (2007) define neopatrimonialis as „ a mix of two types of

political domination. It involves a conjunction of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. […]

Public norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their social practice is often personal and

informal. Finally, neopatrimonialism corresponds with authoritarian politics, whereas legal-rational domination

relates to democracy.“ 5 Murray 2006.

6 A crucial example is the Andijan massacre from 2005 (Lewis, 2012). The death penalty had been finally

abolished in 2008 from the Uzbek law (Kunze 2011).

5

divides the neopatrimonial society into winner and loser, included and excluded, favored and

non-favored with a small number of clannish elite groups benefiting from the exploitation of

the broad mass, whose regards are ignored. Gibson and Hoffmann (2002, p. 2) state „the basic

structure of neopatrimonial regimes consists of three sectors - the ‘ins’, the ‘outs’ and the

government. The government derives its support by providing patronage to the ‘ins’ (clients,

cronies etc.) and funds this by taxing the ‘outs’“7.

Neopatrimonial agent-principal relations are not just a feature of autocratic governments; they

are rather compatible with all regimes and may found as well in consolidated democratic

systems (Ilkhamov 2007, Lewis 2012). Being pre-dominant in sub-Saharan states the concept

of Neopatrimonialism has been applied to post-soviet countries since the middle of the 90’s

(Ilkhamov 2007, Laruelle 2012).

Ilkhamov (2007) distinguishes the concept of clan to the concept of patronage which is

preliminary to distinguish the differences of Neopatrimonialism in the post-soviet Central

Asian context. Clan networks have a group character and are based on kinship networks. The

clan-leader, often state office holder, is the main beneficial of the clan (Ilkhamov, 2007).

Patronage relations are based on agency-principal relations, while the patrons intermediate

between clients and state. Moreover, these relations are characterized by an asymmetric

favoritism, where the clients benefit more than patrons (Ilkhamov, 2007). While kinship

networks are blood-based, patronal networks are interest-based (Ilkhamov, 2007). While the

main benefit for client is legislation by the clan boss holding state power. Moreover clan

members are protection by the network, which is also fulfilling a social-stabilizing function as

problem solving unit8 (Ilkhamov, 2007). On the other side the patron benefits from the

consolidation of his power by a growing clan base mostly to low costs (Ilkhamov, 2007).

Ilkhamov (2007) states that clan structures in Central Asia excist since it have been part of the

Soviet Union, which was fighting regionalism (mestnichestvo) and factionalism (clanovost)

forming a parallel state structure, with characteristics of a state within a state. Nobody would

accuse others of clan membership; it was rather kept secret by elites (Ilkhamov, 2007). Just

the elites who were simultaneously clan members were well informed, while rumors,

stereotypes and myths were spread to the society (Ilkhamov, 2007). Clan networks override

7 Lindberg (2003) reports additionally the abuse of charity funds, e.g. for schools, football teams, public

buildings for the private use of elites in neopatrimonial and neo-neopatrimonial states like Russia and countries

of sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 8 Neopatrimonalistic Patron-client or client-client networks can for example help to find work or

accommodation, contacts or just talking about familiar and private issues and planning weddings, involves

finding someone a job or a place to stay, putting them in touch with someone else for jobs, contracts, or other

services, or just talking to them about family issues, planning funerals and other private issues (Lindberg, 2003).

6

the formal-legal structures of state institutions (Ilkhamov, 2007). Clan structures were

expected to lose their importance after finished state-building after the breakup of the Soviet

Union, but its preservation caused a blocked or even failed state-building and modernization

process (Ilkhamov, 2007).

3. Case study: Uzbekistan

The history of Neopatrimonialism in Uzbekistan reaches over 100 years back to the Khanates

of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand which were already based on feudal structures (Ilkhamov,

2007). During this time the Emir of Bukhara – maybe the modern patron in Central Asia –

used the so-called tanho practice: local governors (Uzbek: beks9) as clients received the

permission to collect taxes from peasants in exchange for loyalty and the supplement of

military and taxes to their patron (Ilkhamov, 2007). Similar agency-principal pyramid

structures are practiced till today in Uzbekistan, where the president announces local

governors who become on the one hand his loyal clients, but have their own local client

networks on the other hand (Ilkhamov, 2007). Neopatrimonialistic practices continued in

stalinistic times, when elite politicians bought themselves a higher status in the apparatus

through connections as social interaction (Ilkhamov, 2007). During this time the consolidation

of neopatrimonial system has been easy due one-party system and command economy

(Ilkhamov, 2007). After Stalin, personalistic decision-making has been transformed into

collective decision-making through Khrushchev and Brezhnev era (Ilkhamov, 2007).

A central role within the apparatus of the Uzbek Soviet Republic within Uzbekistan played

the former First Secretary of the Uzbekistan branch of the CPSU, Sharaf Rashidov. Due to

soviet style leadership combined with informal tanho practices10

, e.g. by giving local clan

bosses licenses for the use of local resources, he was able to preserve his power 24 years from

1959 to 1983 (Ilkhamov, 2007). In Brezhnev-style Rashidov has been able to establish stable

cadre policy, competent patronage network and clan agreements11

(Ilkhamov, 2007).

During the rise of several separatism movements in 1989, Islam Karimov came to power

(Ilkhamov 2007, Giersch 2012, and Murray 2006). He always tried to construct the image of

leader of the whole nation12

, totally independent from clan structures and underlines clan

9 In the combination with the stan-suffix Uzbekistan could be translated as our country of local governors.

10 A high percentage of elites had been during this time indebted to Rashidov for their political career (Ilkhamov,

2007). 11

Patronage was also a common practise in the USSR’s CPSU and central government with top soviet

bureaucrats being connected to informal and formal relationships (Ilkhamov, 2007). 12

Many Uzbeks are according to my personal experience and talks to young and old locals from different

milieus during a journey from Nukus to Andijan and my work in Tashkent over four months supporting Karimov

7

structures as one of the seven main threats of the country in his book “Uzbekistan on the

threshold of the 21. Century” (Ilkhamov, 2007 & Karimov, 1998). In the beginning of his

legislation period he has been forced to get support from Rashidov's established networks and

rather even adopted a part of this network like Ismail Djurabekov13

, Timur Alimov14

and

Abdulaziz Kamilov15

(Ilkhamov, 2007).

In Uzbekistan excist vertical (patron-client) as well as horizontal (client-client) tanish’s

(connections, Uzbek) or agent-principal relations who are permanently redistributed due to

the interests (Ilkhamov, 2007). Here patronage networks are not necessarily constructed

around families they are rather personal relations including face-to-face deals based on the

exchange of favors (Ilkhamov, 2007). Kunysz (2012) states that the inner circle of president

Karimov is a group of people from his home area of Samarkand-Jizzakh (Kunysz, 2012).The

three most influential clans in Uzbekistan after 2000 are the Tashkent-clan, the Samarqand-

clan and the Fergana clan (Murray, 2006). A key role in extension of the mega-clan played

Karimov’s oldest daughter and client Gulnara raising a gigantic economical empire thanks to

backing of the vertical-enrichment-chain including her father and patron, the administration,

the security agencies and some clans (Ilkhamov 2007, 2012, Laruelle 2012). In 2011 she has

been valued with an estimated estate of 600 billion Euros assets vas one of the 300 richest

people in Switzerland (Ilkhamov 2012, Lewis 2012). Since one year she has been after

clinches with her father under house arrest.

Eliminating several powerful clans Karimov did not use the opportunity to build up stable

institutions and rather transformed his country into a fertile ground for neopatrimonial

structures during the 1990s with his own mega-clan on the top (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012,

Lewis 2012). Instead he gradually consolidated his personal control by the full program of

neopatrimonialistic practices. The learned soviet economist (Murray, 2006) preserved and

centralized the soviet economy in his 26 year lasting presidency with a few features of a free

market16

to absorb the major export resource17

revenues in a kleptocratic manner under his

own supervision and established a new patronage network around the key administrative

“as father of the uprising nation ruling the country as strong man against radical islamists esnuring security and

development compared to neighbor Afghanistan where living standards are even worse“. This is one of the main

reasons why protests are unlikely. 13

Djurabekov was Minister of water management under Rashidov, now First deputy minister under Karimov

(Ilkhamov, 2007). 14

Former chair of Tashkent Oblast Executive committee under Rashidov, Alimov became Karimov’s personal

presidential advisor (Ilkhamov, 2007). 15

Under Rashidov Kamilov was senior official of republican KGB, while he is now Minister of Foreign Affairs

(Ilkhamov, 2007). 16

Lots of prices, e.g. for food is fixed due leading in some cases to huge differences between the domestic and

world market prices – a fertile ground for rent-seeking (Murray, 2006). 17

Uzbekistan has cotton, gold, uranium and oil but is not able to diversify its exports (Laruelle, 2012).

8

governments security, law enforcement, tax collections18

, custom finances and export

procurement (Ilkhamov 2007, Lewis 2012). He used law enforcement agencies for the

extended enrichment of the presidential family forming itself to a mega-clan (Ilkhamov 2007,

Lewis 2012). By preserving of the mega-clans assets through foreign property he bypasses

domestic laws and saves his estate (Ilkhamov 2007, Lewis 2012). The population does not

benefit from the wealth further and a part of t he population in the provinces has no gas to

heat in winter19

since the leading clans want to benefit from the export revenues (Lewis,

2012). The mainly agricultural (Murray, 2006) state Uzbekistan with its governmental

wasteful agricultural stagnation and a bad water management had been using more coercion

after long-lasting economic stagnation since (Lewis, 2012). The government promised

political and economic reform for two decades with disappointing results (Lewis, 2012).

Karimov understood how to construct power preserving mechanisms by the establishment of

checks-and-balance system to weaken central institutions of the rule of law and the clans

within the neopatrimonial, clannish post-soviet republic (Ilkhamov 2007 & Lewis, 2012).

First of all, he spreads struggle and competition among the different clans (Ilkhamov, 2007).

He enhancing competition between interior ministry and national security service to keep

them weak and to eliminate a rising power of regional government Karimov established a

three-year-rotation system for his Hokims (Ilkhamov, 2007). It became the norm for these

local governments to collect money from local companies for charity purposes, e.g. regional

soccer clubs or the renewal of public buildings (Ilkhamov, 2012). International organizations

report since decades the abuse of child labor with whole school classes, student courses, but

also the rest of the population sent every September, October of every year in the Fergana

valley forced to harvest like slaves the most produced Uzbek export goods for personal

enrichment of the top mega-clan20

(Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012, Lewis 2012, Laruelle 2012,

Murray 2006).

18

A new tax from 2013 says that every hostel-owner in Uzbekistan has to pay two Dollars per foreigner for

every night he spends in an uzbek Hostel. During my journey through the country I paid in average seven dollars

for one night including breakfast. 19

During my joruney I was attestor of several power outages in Bukhara, Chiwa and Nukus while locals were

not even suprised telling me that this is no exception. 20

The former British embassador to Uzbekistan describes how he met a highly motivated 10-year old boy in the

cotton fields who told him enthuisiastically that he wants to help to fund the development of the nation (Murray,

2006) which is for sure an extreme case according to my own conversations with locals but an example how the

national cult can affect the regional population. The story reminds about George Orwell’s animal farm where the

bull was abused to construct a new windmill fort he wealth of the farm until he died and was aten after this by

the pigs.

9

Ilkhamov (2012) describes the main features of the Karimov regime which can be

characterized as „hard“ neopatrimonial regime21

based on hyper-centralization creating a

power monopole for himself and his mega-clan including a dominating executive over

legislative and judicative22

, nationalism and ideology23

and the selective use of market

economy for personal enrichment by legal-administrative system (Ilkhamov, 2007). Within

the executive excist informal checks and balances and rivalry between several fractions

ensuring the one-person-power monopole or rivalry between fractions. Karimov with his

mega-clan interacts as a classic patron ruling with iron fist eliminates the hidden political

opposition making them to his clients by fulfilling their interests or pushing them back

brutally like in Andijan 2005 leading to social tensions (Ilkhamov, 2007). The full

background: in 2004 central clans tried to oppose local patron–client networks in favor of

themselves by using formal-legal structures, in the aftermath local leaders mobilized

thousands of peaceful demonstrators (Lewis, 2012). When the business leaders had been to

trial in 2005 mass anti-governmental demonstrations broke out in Andijan just a few miles far

from the Kyrgyz border with groups of armed anti-governmental forces who were successful

to free some prisoners and taking some officials as hostage (Lewis, 2012). The answer:

governmental forces started to fire on demonstrators with several hundred victims, while the

government stated that it was radical Islamic protest with the intension of a putsch that had to

be opposed (Lewis, 2012). Giersch (2012) states that the rule of Karimov has been based on

favors and fear preserved by harsh measures as in the case of Andijan in 2005.

The Uzbeks governmental rule is further based on the use of state ideology, nationalism

combined with censorship and the control of information. Abusing of grey legislative zones

through patronage Uzbekistan is characterized clear neopatrimonialistic governance and clan

structures resulting in serious obstacles for the further economic, political and institutional

development (Ilkhamov, 2012). Although Uzbekistan has with a good educational system and

21

The neopatrimonial regime in Uzbekistan was at the beginning of Karmiovs legislature softer with a shift after

2000, while the fundament of the patronic system remained untouched (Ilkahmov, 2007). 22

State institutions like the two-chamber parliament Olij Madshli and the extensive juridicial branch are

perfectly inscened rational-formal structures for pure window-dressing without any real influence, while

informal vertical and horizontal informal structures dominate the governance practise (Ilkhamov, 2013). 23

Karimov based the Uzbek nationalism on mustaqillik (independence) instead of ozodlik (freedom) (Ilkhamov,

2013). Main feature oft he nationalis is the ethnocentrism, rewritten history instead of soviet identity after over

100 years soviet colonialization (Ilkhamov, 2013). The oviet era is predominantly negatively connotiated,

economical and social development not honored (Ilkhamov, 2013). An interesting fact is that the historical and

ethnical construction remained as originally developed by the soviet historician Alexander Jakubowski in 1941

for the Uzbek SSR (Ilkhamov, 2013). Karimov is harshly ruling against radical Islamists crying for

secularization (Kunze, 2011). Lewis (2012) calls this a spart of his propaganda, legitimizing his autocratic-

kleptocratic leading style. As part of the anti-Russian policy the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic alphabet

was introduced in 2002 leading to the fact that parents cannot help their chidlren with their homework (Kunze,

2011). Since the1990s the Russian language has been embanked (Kunze, 2011).

10

almost 100 per cent illiteracy rate, a good social infrastructure, and a big legislation serious

development potential the countries development into a modern nation state is restrained

(Ilkhamov, 2012).

Islam Karimov has been in fact re-elected in the end of March 2015, but it is open what

happens after the death of the 77-years old man since he did not announce a processor

(Ilkhamov, 2012). Burling (1974) called this phenomenon the succession dilemma, describing

that the autocrat ruler would weaken his own position by announcing a successor since the

elites would start to respond to this new actor pushing the end of the current personal ruler.24

4. Neopatrimonialism in the Central Asian context

Neopatrimonialism differs in the Central Asian context. The regimes of Nursultan

Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Almazek Atambayev in Kyrgyzstan and Emomali Rakhmon in

Tajikistan with limited independent elites and civil society have “soft” neopatrimonial

character. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s government in Turkmenistan can be

characterized as in Islam Karimov's Uzbekistan as “hard” neopatrimonial regime with the

concentration of power on one person and top-down national-patriotic ideology in form of

nationalism (Ilkhamov, 2007). Using public goods for private purposes including predation,

these states became allocation states with small winning elite to the costs of the major loosing

population and high GINI-coefficients (Laruelle, 2012).

While Central Asia is one of the most isolated regions in the world, elites are highly

internationalized and part of the global system and further interlinked with global financial

networks in a manner based on an advanced level of corruption and the impoverishment of

local economies (Lewis, 2012). Lewis states that “security-led assessments of the region are

misleading, underestimating key political and economic dynamics in favor of an obsession

with the influence of radical Islam and terrorist activity” (2012). Western states invest

significant resources in anti-narcotic programs but pay to little attention to money-laundering

networks leading to the absorption of western money by local clans – one of the main reasons

24

This phenomenon has been also observed als in other Central Asian states namely Nazarbayev in Kasakhstan,

Rahmon in Tajikistan or Niyazov before his death in 2006. Instead oft he announcement the sucessor is choosen

after his dismiss by negotiations between the different elite groupings. This Negotiations can be fast and

sucessful as in the case oft he death of Niyazov‘s in 2006 where elites within weeks and without open conflict

decided to select Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow as the new president (Giersch 2012). The other scenario ist he

risk of clan or family fights due to existing cleavages between elite groups, e.g. the case in Kasakhstan. This

remains of a family heritage fight between the children after the death of their father.

11

why these countries accept the western institutions in their countries25

(Lewis, 2012).The won

money has been transferred abroad by carefully controlled banks (Lewis, 2012).

When Ishiyama (2002) states that Central Asian leaders legitimate themselves just through

patronage rather than by law or ideology he is not right. All Central Asian regimes are more

or less based on nepotism and cronyism, clientelism and rent-seeking elites with kleptocratic

presidents giving administrative and political positions as well as economic assets according

to informal rules for loyalty of the protected clients (Laruelle, 2012). Using public goods for

private purposes including predation, these states became allocation states with small winning

elite to the costs of the major loosing population and high GINI-coefficients (Laruelle, 2012).

Poverty, illiteracy, inequality (classes, rural and urban locations, centre and periphery, state

and society) are often features of neopatrimonial Central Asian societies while patronage fills

some of the gaps and gives population illusionary feeling of security (Ilkhamov, 2007). This

causes often underdeveloped infrastructure, unfinished market-mechanisms and bureaucracy.

The neopatrimonial central Asian societies are further characterized by a low grade of social

mobility, exchange and communication among ethnicities and religious groups.

The clientelistic administrations are based on personal connections, favors, promises,

privileges (Laruelle, 2012). Clan politics, the role of extended families and mega-clans as

informal structures in Central Asia featuring state capture are most influential in Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with very different importance of kinship and lineage relations

(Ilkhamov, 2007).

4.1 Tajikistan

As in Uzbekistan the lineage identity in Tajikistan remains not as important as in Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Local clan structures with less primordial character are

additionally based on friendship, old contacts, and homogenous economic interests as

fundament for vertical patron-client and horizontal client-client relations as form of informal

policy-making (Ilkhamov, 2007). President Emomali Rakhmon centralized the economic and

political power legitimized by national ideology around his family and patronage network,

based in his hometown Danghara (Lewis, 2012). His brother-in-law, Hassan Asadullozoda

Sadullayev, is one of the most powerful business leaders while his seven daughters made

career as businesswoman in the shadow economy (Laruelle, 2012). Analyzing legal-rational

structures, Tajikistan as soft neopatrimonialistic regime has with at least some independent

25

Contracts for transit of U.S. supplies through Uzbekistan are highly secret and propably part of deals with the

elite clan family (Lewis, 2012).

12

media, NGO’s and the Islamic Renaissance party as legal opposition more liberal institutions

than Uzbekistan (Lewis, 2012). As a country with high poverty level many people are

dependent from remittances family members working mainly in Kazakhstan and Russia26

.

From 2004 to 2008 the remittances grew by 500 per cent reaching 2,67 billion US-dollars and

a record-GDP-share of over 46 per cent in 2008 according to the World Bank (2011).

With huge benefits from the re-allocation of Chinese goods27

, narkottrafficking and numerous

aluminum mines Tajikistan is poorer of resources than his neighbor countries gaining mostly

through transits of goods like Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle, 2012).

The UNODC (2012) estimates that 90 tons of heroin or 25 percent of the total Afghan

production passed through Central Asia as “heroin route” in 2010. Lewis states that “a

genuine counternarcotics initiative in a country like Tajikistan would risk an outbreak of

Mexico-style violence” (2012, p.7).The state-owned Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO) is

interlinked with the presidential family using the public good for private purposes

(Heathershaw 2011, International Crisis Group 2009). Various international anti-corruption

initiatives failed, since these programs as in Tajikistan as well as in the Central Asian context

do not oust the source of the neopatrimonialistic networks which would in turn destabilize

them massively since clientelism is the main element of these regimes (Lewis, 2012).

Moreover the local governments absorb the international funds even getting compensation

payments in case of failed projects (Laruelle, 2012).

4.2 Kazakhstan

Like his Uzbek complement Islam Karimov, the Kasakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev –

reelected in March 2015 – persists a proven master of balancing the interests of different elite

clans and vertical and horizontal neopatrimonial relations with his own mega-clan on the top

of the country (Giersch 2012, Isaacs 2009). Kazakhstan’s presidential celebrity daughter

Dariga Nazarbayev used mainly her medial influence to become public figure during the first

half of 2000’s (Laruelle, 2012). After internal mega-clan conflicts and no more support from

the father, Dariga has been weakened additionally by her Husband Rakhat Aliev through the

divorce and the destruction of her image (Laruelle, 2012).

Also in the Kazakh case every form of opposition or disfavored individuals has been

oppressed with political and economical power of the patron, e.g. Rakhat Aliev, the former

26

Further weakened by the devaluation of the Ruble as one of the impacts of the Russian financial crisis, many

of the gastarbeiter (Russian word with German origins for guest worker) were forced to return home (Braemer,

2015). 27

The revenues have decreased since the introduction of the customs union with Russia (Laruelle, 2012).

13

son-in-law of the president who now in exile in Austria or the oligarch Mukhtar Ablazov

Kazakh who is accused of multibillion dollar fraud by the Kazakh government (Lewis 2012,

Ilkhamov 2007, Laruelle 2012).

Kazakhstan can be described as the “Central Asian tiger” with huge economical growth

leading to a broader elite benefiting from the economic boom during the last years (Lewis,

2012, Isaacs 2009, Giersch 2012). The countries economy is much more diversified than the

rest of Central Asia including hydrocarbons, minerals, uranium, constructions sector and a

modern financial and banking sector (Laruelle 2012, Isaacs 2009). On the other hand

Kazakhstan as most important trade partner on the other hand is suffering the most from the

Russian economic crisis (Braemer, 2015). This led even to the development of an urban

middle class, a good education and few social services in towns in the soft neopatrimonial

regime (Lewis 2012, Ilkhamov 2007). The local clan relations, based on primordial kinship

relations and lineage with a clear clan division according to their ethnicity are more

sedentized. They form parallel astate structure, maintaining characteristics of a state within

state (Ilkhamov, 2007).

4.3 Kyrgyzstan

The special case Kyrgyzstan has been called the only country with a peaceful transition

during the tulip revolutions by democratic elections of the actual president Almazek

Atambayev in October 2011 and is on the best way towards its development into a neo-

neopatrimonialistic state (Laruelle, 2012). Laruelle (2012) describes Kyrgyzstan as a

“neopatrimonial multi-party-system”. The reason for the failure of Kyrgyz Neopatrimonialism

manifests itself according to Laruelle (2012) within a smaller distribution of wealth between

competing local and regional allies, including the development to parliamentary system, the

search for a strong leader as in Kazakhstan or in Uzbekistan has not been successful.

Twice led the local opposition to presidential change in eastern the mountainous Central

Asian republic Kyrgyzstan (Lewis, 2012). The first time in 2005, when Askar Akaev, known

as liberal leader who used his position to dominate politics and economics enrichment28

had

been ousted by rival elite groups from the poorer south by mobilizing popular opposition to

the president after just another manipulated parliamentary election (Lewis, 2012). Successor

Kurmanbek Bakiev copied his predecessors mistakes almost exactly by dominating politics

and economics gradually and suppressing political opposition in form of media and NGO’s

28

Kyrgiztan benefits from various soviet gold mines and is transit country for plenty of Chinese goods and

narcotics from afghnistan (Lewis, 2012).

14

the leading to the second Kyrgyz revolution by northern protestors known tulip revolution to

the actual president Almazek Atambayev elected in 2011 (Lewis, 2012). After this instable

period characterized by violent civil riots Kyrgyzstan today has the most democratic legal-

rational form of government, with limited success in establishing competition between rival

elite clans by parliamentary system (Lewis, 2012).

As in Kazakhstan, local clan structures are less mobile, ethnical divided and based on

primordial relations and lineage with a clear clan division according to their ethnicity and

more sedentized forming parallel state structure, maintaining characteristics of a state within

state (Ilkhamov, 2007).

4.4 Turkmenistan

The Turkmen case differs from other Central Asian countries by the extreme international

isolation lasting until today only overtaken by Northcorea in terms of isolation (Lewis 2012,

Laruelle 2012, and Kunze 2011). Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s regime nowadays is

characterized by a neopatrimonialistic regime including a centralized command economy

combined with a monopoly on oil and gas rents trying to preserve his power (Kunysz 2012,

Lewis 2012).

The ability to free from dependence on traditional patron-client relationships and support

from civil society through internal or external mechanisms combined with an extended

personal cult29

including the Ruhnamat-practice30

and “window dressing”31

as in

Turkmenistan during the Niyazov-regime till his death 2006 has been described by Kunysz

(2012) as Sultanism. A small society, governmental control of all industries and being

independent from social support because of enormous gas reserves were ideal conditions for

the establishment of the sultanistic structures (Kunysz, 2012). Kunysz, (2012) describes the

change of Turkmenistan from Niyazov’s sultanistic towards a neopatrimonialistic regime

under Berdymukhamedov. He further points out the centre-periphery relations as main

difference between Neopatrimonialism and Sultanism. Niyazov – in difference to

29

Calling himself Turkmenbashi, translated “father of the Turkmens”, Niyazov build up to 40 meter golden

statues of himself in the Turkmen capital Ashgabat rotating to face the sun. Additionally he titulated numerous

streets, schools, buidlings, a meteorite, the first month oft he year, flowers, teas and parfums and the airport after

himself. He declared the new millenium to in 2000 to the “golden millennium of the Turkmens (Kunze, 2011). 30

In his own book which became compulsory reading in schools Niyazov offered an idealistic mix of moral and

spiritual guide to Turkmen customs. The president who was petraying himself close to Allah forced school and

universtiy students to study his book consisting of an ideological mix of stories from coran, bible and family

stories, poems, pseudoscientific historical essays (Kunze, 2011). This led to the weakest education sector among

the five central asian countries. 31

By the manipoulation of the media the Turkmen government tried to establish the image of increasing

development and modernization to the outside world.

15

Berdymukhamedov – consistently replaced outgoing governors with individuals from other

regions. The central feature of the Turkmen Neopatrimonialism manifests Kunysz (2012) by

the assignment of several top government positions including cabinet and national assembly

to relatives from Berdymukhamedov’s home region Ahal Velayat. On the other side, Niyazov,

whose parents were deceased before his presidency32

, was ruling alone in sultanistic manner,

ousting all his remaining relatives from power in 2000.

The Turkmen regime is mainly based on hydrocarbons, crude oil and natural gas (Laruelle,

2012). The law that every inhabitant of Turkmenistan gets 120 liters of gas for free (Kunze,

2011) underline how the two Turkmen rulers use the enormous natural resources of their

countries to buy themselves loyalty and support from the people who are exploited since the

elites enriching them privately by public goods, rent-seeking and narkottrafficking33

.

Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov stopped the practice of Ruhnamat (Lewis 2012), which is

still sold in the central bookstores of Ashgabat, though the head of the Central Asia office of

the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation in Tashkent, Kunze (2011) describes the continued personal

cult of the actual president Berdymukhamedov.

5. Conclusion

The rule of law in Central Asia can be described as Neopatrimonialism differing in the

regional context. The regimes of Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Almazek Atambayev

in Kyrgyzstan and Emomali Rakhmon in Tajikistan with limited independent elites and civil

society have “soft” neopatrimonial character. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s government

in Turkmenistan can be characterized as in Islam Karimov's Uzbekistan as “hard”

neopatrimonial regime with the concentration of power on one person and top-down national-

patriotic ideology in form of nationalism (Ilkhamov, 2007). Clan politics, the role of extended

families and mega-clans as informal structures in Central Asia featuring state capture are most

influential in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with very different importance of kinship

and lineage relations (Ilkhamov, 2007). The lineage identity in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is

not as important as in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Local clan structures with

less primordial character are additionally based on friendship, old contacts, and homogenous

economic interests as fundament for vertical patron-client and horizontal client-client

relations as form of informal policy-making (Ilkhamov, 2007).

32

Nyazov named several months oft he year after his parents (Kunysz, 2012). 33

Nyazov has been accused by the International Crisis Group (2003) to allocate a huge mass of narcotics in the

Central bank and in the presidential palace during the 1990’s.

16

Uzbekistan in the heart of central Asia has been analyzed as ideal neopatrimonial regime.

Which Ilkhamov (2012) describes as „hard“ based on hyper-centralization and the abuse of

legislative grey zones creating a power monopole for himself and his mega-clan including a

dominating executive over legislative and judicative, nationalism and ideology and the

selective use of market economy for personal enrichment by legal-administrative system

(Ilkhamov, 2007). Within the executive excist informal checks and balances and rivalry

between several fractions ensuring the one-person-power monopole or rivalry between

fractions. Karimov with his mega-clan interacts as a classic patron ruling with iron fist

eliminates the hidden political opposition making them to his clients by fulfilling their

interests or pushing them back brutally like in Andijan 2005 leading to social tensions

(Ilkhamov, 2007).

Although the two revolutions in the Kyrgyz case underline on the one hand the fragility of a

neopatrimonialistic regime endangered by the egoism of different clans trying to dominate

politics and economics and to benefit by enrichment through public goods (Lewis, 2012). On

the other hand the two revolutions led to less inequality and an institutionalized clan

competition enabling through democratic mechanisms a less exclusive neopatrimonialistic

regime. Moreover the elites have been alarmed by the revolution and the opposition through

media, different clans and civil society is leading to some kind of neo-neopatrimonialistic

system with apparently predominant rational-legal structures and checks and balances against

strengthening informal rule of law, less abuses of power and shorter terms of office. Ilkhamov

(2007) states that the country is changing from vertical patron to horizontal client-client

relations impeding a transformation into a neo-neopatrimonialistic regime based on with

modern institutions and a bargaining governance practice.

The Turkmen and the Kazakh regime is mainly based on hydrocarbons, crude oil and natural

gas (Laruelle, 2012). The Kazakh case shows that Neopatrimonialism does not necessarily

prevent economic growth if the country is rich on natural resources. But the society of the

“Central Asian tiger” is still exclusive, divided into winners and losers with a patronal mega-

clan on the top. The Turkmen case differs from other Central Asian countries by the extreme

international isolation and a strong personal cult lasting until today only overtaken by

Northcorea in terms of isolation (Lewis 2012, Laruelle 2012, and Kunze 2011). The regime in

Turkmenistan nowadays is characterized by a change from the sultanistic Niyazov-regime to

the neopatrimonialistic regime under Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov after 2006 including a

centralized command economy combined with a monopoly on oil and gas rents trying to

preserve his power (Kunysz 2012, Lewis 2012).

17

Neopatrimonial Central Asian leaders preserved their power by a set of different measures:

I. Involvement of a whole country by a clientelistic clan network based on friendships,

old contacts and homogenous economic interests as fundament for vertical patron-

client and horizontal client-client relations leading to a parallel state structure,

maintaining characteristics of a state within state (Ilkhamov, 2007).

II. Particular international isolation and self-sufficiency, especially in Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan. While countries like Eritrea or North Korea manage more or less to

survive in isolation, elites in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan desire international

recognition (Lewis, 2012). Owning property in Europe and the United States, they

send their children to western elite schools and universities, and try to be accepted

from the international celebrity (Lewis, 2012).

III. Oppression of the opposition and civil society, especially in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan

and Kazakhstan: potential opponents are bought off by bribes or calmed down by

financial threats till their exclusion from society, imprisonment, assassination, or

exclusion from the country by using legal-formal law enforcement (Laruelle, 2012,

Bratton & Walle 1994).

IV. Legitimization by limited rational-formal structures, personal cult, ideology,

constructed nationalism, capture, predation, nepotism, lies and wrong promises34

and

the spread of fear (Giersch 2013, Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012, Laruelle 2012, Lewis

2012). Especially Karimov, Niyazov till his death 2006, Nazarbayev and Rakhmon

titillated them as father of the young post-soviet nations. These first leaders after the

independence have the advantage that the people do not know or cannot imagine any

other leader.

V. Rent-seeking and the kleptocratic use of public goods for private purposes by the

establishment of a patronal-enrichment-chain leading to a regular clan parasitism: a

handful of families benefit to the costs of the whole country selling the resources of

their country for themselves35

, absorbing international funding and overtaking even a

part of the little rest of their property by taxes.

34

As by Islam Karimov in his book Uzbekistan on the threshold oft he 21st century or Nyzadov who promised

that the new millenium will be the time oft he Turkmens. 35

The state-owned Tajik Aluminum Company (TALCO) e.g. is interlinked with the presidential family using the

public good for private purposes (Heathershaw 2011, International Crisis Group 2009). An extreme example is

the uzbek case where the government forces the people to work every autumn in the Ferghana cotton fields in a

slavery manner while the mega-clan profits from the export revenues (Ilkhamov 2007, 2010, 2012, Lewis 2012,

Laruelle 2012, Murray 2006).

18

VI. The Central Asian patrons promise by their clan networks protection and a social-

stabilizing function as problem solving unit in exchange for the loyalty of the people.

VII. The succession dilemma according to Burling (1974): by the non-announcement of a

successor the current patron does not risk the loyalty of the elites. Islam Karimov has

been in fact re-elected in the end of March 2015, but it is open what happens after the

death of the 77-years old man. This phenomenon has been also observed as well in

other Central Asian states namely Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Rakhmon in Tajikistan

or Niyazov before his death in 2006.

This neopatrimonialistic power preservation measures have enormous success in Central Asia

– the added value of the legislation terms of Karimov (1989), Nazarbayev (1989) and

Rakhmon (1992) is 78 years. This is also caused by ideal conditions for Neopatrimonialism in

the Central Asian context:

Brain drain of the elites leading to population dominated by young people, woman and

elders (Murray 2006, Kunze 2011)

international isolation and less globalized societies (Murray 2006, Kunze 2011)

Patriarchal, small societies with historical strong leaders (Ilkhamov, 20007)

Historic-traditional neopatrimonialistic patron-client relations reaching far back in the

case of Uzbekistan over Sharaf Rashidov (leader of the Uzbek SSR from 1959-1983)

to the last Emir of Bukhara using tanho practices (Ilkhamov 2007, 2013)

A short state tradition after the (soviet) decolonialization (as in sub-Saharan states): In

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rule still the first presidents after the independence

(Ilkhamov 2007, 2013)

Governmental independence from social support because of enormous natural

resources (Ilkhamov 2007, 2013, Kunysz 2012)

poverty, illiteracy (partly), inequality (classes, rural and urban locations, centre and

periphery, state and society) (Ilkhamov 2007, 2013)

Western diplomats often try to medicate these countries by “liberal, English-speaking

technocrats who appear to discourse on change” (Lewis, 2012), but the Central Asian case

differs from the soviet one with insiders and outsiders according to Gibson and Hoffmann

(2002) instead of conservatives and reformers. Government changes often replace one set of

patron-client relations with another (Lewis, 2012). Liberal reforms would remove the

foundation of the neopatrimonialistic system which would lead to a collapse of the economy

19

(Lewis, 2012). Clan structures were expected to lose their importance after finished state-

building after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but its preservation caused a blocked or even

failed state-building and modernization manifesting e.g. in underdeveloped infrastructure,

unfinished market-mechanisms and bureaucracy (Ilkhamov, 2007). Daniel Bach (2012) used

the term “anti-development countries” for some sub-Saharan countries which could be applied

to the central Asian neopatrimonialistic context. The same phenomenon as in Central Asian

countries, independent since 1991, can be observed in Azerbaijan, some Middle Eastern and

still several sub-Saharan countries (Ilkhamov 2007, Lewis 2012, and Laruelle 2012).

This paper answered the question how the central Asian presidents preserve their power, but

created also lots of open questions: Are states based on primordial clan relations more fragile

than those based on non-primordial? Why the Kazakh Neopatrimonialism does not prevent

economic growth? Which are the reasons for the clam competition in Kyrgyzstan leading to

two changes of power? Can a broader clan competition in other central Asian states as in

Uzbekistan lead to a higher grade of economic development and the broader benefit from

export revenues? How can international organizations effectively and efficiently support the

development of the Central Asian governments in detail? Do the exclusive allocation states

lead to more regional autarky? What is the difference of the Central Asian Neopatrimonialism

in comparison to other regions like the Middle Eastern or Sub-Saharan countries?

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