Political Participation and Voter Turnout “A low voter turnout is an indication of fewer people going to the polls.” (George W. Bush) “Don’t vote. It only encourages them.” (Unknown)
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Political Participation and Voter Turnout
“A low voter turnout is an indication of fewer people going to the polls.” (George W. Bush) “Don’t vote. It only encourages them.” (Unknown)
Question: Is it rational to vote? Riker and Ordeshook, “ A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,” American
Political Science Review (1968). V = P*B – C + D where P represents the probability that your vote matters (anticipated closeness
of the election) B represents the benefits of having your candidate win, compared to the
benefits of the opponent winning (care about outcome) C represents the costs of voting (including being informed) D represents psychological benefits of voting (sense of civic duty, satis-
faction from voting, desire to affirm partisanship or efficacy, and so on)
When compared with other democracies: Are the (perceived) benefits of voting lower in the United
States? Are the costs of voting higher in the United States? Are sense of civic duty or other psychological rewards lower
in the United States? Have any of these elements changed over the past 30-50
years?
Turnout Trends in Five Democracies
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_turnout
Sides, Shaw, Grossman, and Lipsitz, Campaigns and Elections (2012), p. 315; not clear whether calculations are based on VAP or VEP or something else.
A Broader Comparison, Definitely Not Pretty
Should We Care About Low Turnout? Does It Really Matter?
Studies comparing voters and nonvoters in the 1980s/90s found that:
their candidate preferences were very similar (few elections would turn out differently even with much higher turnout rates);
their party id and issue preferences were similar as well (though nonvoters did tend to be a bit more Democratic, a bit more liberal on social welfare issues, and a bit more isolationist on foreign policy);
nonvoters were only slightly less patriotic and exhibited roughly the same level of cynicism toward government as voters;
the two groups were similar in their support for civil liberties and feelings about various minorities (though nonvoters were less tolerant of gays and lesbians, probably reflecting their lower level of education);
nonvoters were much less knowledgeable about politics, though many voters scored low on this as well; and
nonvoters were less ideological, and less ideologically polarized, than voters.
OECD(2011), Society at a Glance 2011 - OECD Social Indicators (www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/ SAG); defined as “university level” (college grad?) vs. none to incomplete secondary education.
Still . . . What about the Gap in Turnout between High- and Low-Education Voters?
Don’t high- and low-education voters, not to mention high- and low-income voters (another variable related to turnout), have different policy views, partisan attachments, and candidate preferences?
For that matter, what about older people and younger people?
OECD(2011), Society at a Glance 2011 - OECD Social Indicators (www.oecd.org/els/ social/indicators/SAG)
And so it goes, across a number of politically relevant social categories . . .
Pew Research Center, October 2012; http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/01/ nonvoters-who-they-are-what-they-think/
So where does this leave us?
Pew Research Center, Aug/Sep and Nov 2010; http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/10/29/the-party-of-nonvoters/ http://www.people-press.org/2010/11/11/mixed-reactions-to- republican-midterm-win/
Pew Research Center, Sep/Oct 2012; http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/01/nonvoters-who-they-are-what-they-think/
Pew Research Center, October 2012; http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/01/nonvoters-who-they-are-what-they-think/
On the other hand (contrary to what may have been the case 20-30 years ago):
Question #1: Why is turnout so low in the United States compared with other democracies? Some possibilities . . .
registration laws (responsibility rests with individuals) noncompulsory voting (depending on enforcement/sanctions) lack of inter-party competition in many areas (due to SMD/plurality system,
gerrymandering; less voter engagement and mobilization by both sides) voter fatigue (frequent elections) relatively weak party-group linkages (reflecting two-party system); alterna-
tively . . . two-partyism itself may be associated with higher turnout (as multiple parties increase the likelihood of coalition governments w/voters not making the final decision)
bicameralism w/two equally powerful legislative chambers/separation of powers (voters have less stake in the outcome of a single race)
voting rules (voting early, by mail, on weekends/holiday)
Question #2: Already low by comparative standards, why did turnout rates in the United States decline after 1960 – especially given a variety of other changes that should have led to higher turnout, such as . . .
rising levels of education (and affluence) less restrictive legal requirements (especially residency and registration) the so-called “information explosion” (even prior to the internet) heightened interparty competition (then, not now) in some parts of the
country – especially the South, where turnout used to be higher in Demo-cratic primaries than in the general election
enfranchisement of southern blacks continued socialization of women more negative campaigns (which, short of total mudslinging, appear to →
higher turnout; it’s also questionable whether campaigns are actually more negative today than they used to be)
others?
Some possible answers, many of them focused on changes that have occurred in the electorate . . .
erosion of party id (dealignment), thus less interest in election outcome lower levels of external political efficacy reduced “social connectedness” (people being “rooted” to society, e.g.,
younger, fewer married w/children, increased mobility, diminished church attendance and other social interactions)
speaking of younger: 26th Amendment and post-war baby boom generational replacement: the New Deal cohort (born in 1932 or before)
shared an unusually strong commitment to voting rooted in the differential response of the parties to the Great Depression
weaker mobilization efforts by parties, campaigns, social movements until recently, an increased frequency of divided government at all levels
(above regarding the effect of indecisive election outcomes)
VAP includes non-citizens, felons, and ex-felons disenfranchised; it excludes Americans overseas. VEP = votes / (VAP – non-citizens – felons + overseas) Source: Michael McDonald; http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm
McDonald: It’s a trick question. Turnout dropped after 1960, but it’s higher when we use VEP rather than VAP – and it’s been going up lately (increases in three elections from 2000-08, though the numbers fell again in 2012).
An Even Longer Historical View
Percent VAP fron 1920, as calculated by the Census Bureau; see Greenberg-Page, The Struggle for Democracy, 10th ed. (2011), p. 302.
So what explains the increase in turnout since 1996? Pointing to higher turnout in presidential battleground states, McDonald suggests that this may reflect the following . . .
very close (presidential) elections, which encourage more people to think
they have a chance of affecting the outcome; and to renewed emphasis on voter mobilization (although exit polls show a slight
decline in contact since ‘04, at least on the Republican side); and more states adopting early voting (may be countered in the future due to
a shorter window and more stringent voter ID requirements; note that NVRA, or “motor voter,” appears to have had at best a very small effect on turnout, though it may have increased registration levels).
Question on the impact of close elections: What about Abramowitz’s claim that fewer states are in play today than in years past? Why should believing that the race is close at the national level matter since electoral votes are almost entirely winner-take-all by state?
Political Participation (Including, But Not Limited
To, Voting)
Hierarchy of Political Participation: The Traditional View
Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (1965).
Dimensions of Participation: The Revisionist View
1. Voting 2. Campaigning 3. Communal Activity 4. Personalized Contacting
Most people who engage in one type of activity also engage in others (a few
are “complete activists”), but some specialize in just one. Most people who do other things also vote; many who vote do nothing else. Campaigners and communalists differ in that the latter prefer to engage in
cooperative group-based activity, while the former are more comfortable with conflict.
The fourth type of activity refers to contacting government officials regarding a personal problem; contacting officials about a social problem is part of the communal dimension.
Teacher’s take (based on data from a nationwide non- probability sample of college students, asked in the early 1980s whether they had participated or would be willing to participate in a range of activities) . . . Voting (national or state election, local election) Campaigning (work for a party, contribute money, persuade friends/family
how to vote, work for candidate, attend campaign rally) Group Activity (work with local group to solve community problem, be
active on behalf of an issue, work for organized interest group, contact offi-cial about a social problem, nonviolent protest activity)
Dissent (disobey unjust law, engage in or advocate violence in order to produce/prevent fundamental changes in political system or its policies)
Military Service (during wartime or national emergency, during peacetime) Did not load: run for office, contact official about a personal problem Note: (a) group activity is not inherently cooperative and non-conflictual;
and (b) the loading of nonviolent protest on GA probably reflects age of Rs
Based on a much larger and more representative (national) sample in the early 1990s:
Correlates of Participation Socioeconomic status, especially education (generally regarded as the
single most important personal background factor in shaping the likelihood of someone becoming active in politics). The better-educated . . .
usually know more about the political system and how it affects their lives
(thereby increasing the motivation to be active) tend to live in a social environment where there is pressure to be polit-
ically active, and to come from families where participatory norms were instilled early in life
are more likely to have skills that facilitate participation (including reading and analytical skills that enable them to understand complex events and issues, and the connections among them)
tend to follow politics more closely in the mass media, and to engage in discussions with their friends/family
have stronger feelings of internal and external efficacy, both of which make participation more likely
Age, with those who are either very young and very old participating less than those in between. For example . . .
http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/28/youth-
engagement-falls-registration-also-declines/
While participation rates drop among the very old (largely reflecting
physical and mental infirmities), this is less true for voting than for other, more demanding forms of political involvement.
As best we can tell, younger people participate less mainly because they are . . .
less likely to be married and have children (giving them lower perceived
stakes in political outcomes, though getting married may actually depress participation in the short term)
more mobile (haven't had time to establish roots in their community → fewer social and organizational ties and, again, lower perceived stakes in political outcomes, the need for re-registering after a move, harder for campaigns to track and mobilize)
in general, lots of other things going on in their lives that cause them to be less interested in politics than many of them will be later on
anything else? Much was made of the relatively high turnout among young voters in
2008, but that level of engagement did not carry over into 2012; see the PREVIOUS SLIDE, also . . .
http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/28/ youth-engagement-falls-registration-also-declines/
Race/ethnicity. Black turnout is only slightly below that of whites, due mainly (or even exclusively) to SES differences; in recent years they have actually been more active in campaigns than whites (partly due to mobilization that occurs in many black churches), but less likely to give money (SES again).
Latinos and Asians have low participation relative to whites, but this varies from place to place and, in the case of voting, from election to election (e.g., whether a minority candidate is on the ballot).
Racial differences as a whole are probably declining, and those that remain
have more to do with SES and language problems than with race/ethnicity per se.
Gender is not nearly as strong a predictor of political participation as it once was – but it still matters. Although women actually vote at a slightly higher rate than men (especially among the unmarried), men are more likely to give money to a campaign, contact an official, and join a political organization.
Contextual factors such as neighborhoods and churches. City size also
appears to have an impact, with people who live in smaller communities being more politically active, on average, than others.
Attitudinal/emotional factors such as sense of civic duty, internal and
external efficacy, partisanship (esp. strength), and anger, which suggests that negative ads may boost participation by getting people angry.
Political/campaign factors such as personal contact, level of campaign
spending (perhaps including for campaign ads), and competitiveness of the race/constituency.
James H. Fowler et al., "Genetic Variation in Political Participation," American Political Science Review (2008).
Dyzygotic twins Monozygotic twins (“fraternal”) (“identical”) Share 50% of genetic material Share 100% of genetic material Shared environment Shared environment Unshared environment Unshared environment
Assumption: If MZ twins are more alike in their political par-ticipation than DZ twins are, it must be due to the differences in shared genetic material.
Conclusion: Participation and turnout are affected by both genetic and environmental factors.
Is there a “voting” gene? Maybe (probably) not, but voting may never- theless be one of several political behaviors that are manifestations of a set of genetic and environmental predispositions.
Changing Conceptions of the Citizenship Role
The theory:
Russell J. Dalton, The Good Citizen, rev. ed. (2009), p. 4.
Categories of Citizenship Participation Always vote in elections Be active in social or political organizations Choose products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons Autonomy Try to understand reasoning of people with other opinions Keep watch on actions of government Social Order Always obey laws and regulations Never try to evade taxes Being willing to serve in the military in a time of need Solidarity Support people in America who are worse off than oneself Help people in rest of the world who are worse off than oneself
“There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a good citizen. As far as you are concerned personally, on scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is not at all important and 7 is very important, how important is it to . . .”
Results here show that all of these norms are regarded as important by the American public – but some of them are more important than others to different individuals; see Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 30.
The Distribution of Citizenship Norms
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 38.
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 47.
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 49.
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 51.
Trends in Political Participation
Robert D. Putnam,, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000).
Putnam described an apparent disengagement in the U.S. that went far beyond our growing (at the time) inclination to stay home on election day – a disengagement that emerged basically over the last third of the 20th century and involved all kinds of civic involvement, from . . .
participation in politics (less voting, less campaign activity, less
involvement in community affairs, less willingness to sign a petition or write a letter to one's congressman) to . . .
participation in civic organizations of one sort or another (less PTA membership, less membership in chapter-based associations such as the League of Women Voters, B'nai B'rith, and the Knights of Columbus) to . . .
participation in religious activities (less church attendance, and the churches we go to being less engaged with the wider community, i.e., in terms of social outreach services or programs) to . . .
connections forged in the workplace (less union membership, less membership in national professional associations) to . . .
any number of other things (less likely to have dinner with one's family or to invite friends over, less likely to stay married, less involvement with neighborhood or homeowners associations; and while crime watch groups were becoming more common, there was less participation in bowling leagues and less giving to religious and charitable organizations).
Why was this happening? Among the possible reasons cited by
Putnam: television (often a substitute for civic engagement), pressures of work (time and money, esp. in two-income families), and suburban sprawl (commuting takes time).
Dalton: Balderdash! Focusing specifically on the political realm: “Rather than disengagement, the repertoire of political action has broadened” (p. 77). Measuring trends in participation is difficult with existing survey data, but here’s some of what we do know:
Sides, Shaw, Grossman, and Lipsitz, Campaigns and Elections (2012), p. 312.
Sides, Shaw, Grossman, and Lipsitz, Campaigns and Elections (2012), p. 314.
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 60.
Dalton, The Good Citizen, p. 65.
Nicholas A. Valentino et al., “Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political Participation,” Journal of Politics (January 2011): 156-170. [correlates of participation] – anger increases participation
on linkage: Gilens, Martin. 2005. “Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness.” Public Opinion Quarterly. 69
(no. 5): 778-796. [representation/empirical] – see figures 1 and 2
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