Political Law (Incomplete)

8/13/2019 Political Law (Incomplete)

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REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversya. ripeness

b. mootness2. Proper party3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible time4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very Lis Mota of the Case

a. Actual case or controversya conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination.CASESAn actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t e o r r i p e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o t c o n j e c t u r a l o ranticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the

petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of Optometry vs. Colet,GR 122241, July 30, 1996)The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitution ality of a la w are well -deli neated. They are: (1) there m u s t b ea n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y ; ( 2 ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y m u s t b e r a i s e d b yt h e p r o p e r p a r t y ; ( 3 ) t h e co n s t i t u t i o n a l q u es t i o n m u s t b e r a i s ed a t t h e ea r l i e s t p o ss i b l e opportunity; and (4) thdecision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from co mp lied with these requirementsThe petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i . e . , t h a t M a y o r B i n a y w i l l r u n a g a i n i n t h i sc o m i n g m a y o r a l t y elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-e lection for the same post inthe 1998 e lec tions . Con si de r i ng th a t th es e co nt in ge nc ie s ma y or ma y no t ha pp en , petitioners merely pose ahypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdictio(Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211)

In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the followinrequirements of judicial inquiry are met: ( 1 ) t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y ; ( 2 ) t h e p a r t yr a i s i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e m u s t h a v e a personal and substantial interest in the resolutionthereof;( 3 ) t h e c o n t r o v e r s y m u s t b e r a i s e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t r e a s o n a b l e opportunity; and( 4 ) t h a tt h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e m u s t , b e indispensable for the final determination othe controversy. 3A p p r a i s i n g t h e p r e s e n t p r o c e e d i n g i n t e r m s o f t h e f o r e g o i n g r eq ui re me nt s, t he S ol ic it orGeneral ur ges that the pet ition at bar do es not prese nt a justiciab le contro versy for h aving been fil ed prematurely:" . . .

p e t i t i o n e r s , w h o c l a i m t o b e p e r f o r m i n g a r t i s t s , h a d n o t previously applied with the Secretary of Labor foexemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the afore quoted provision. Said provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all

permanent or ab so lu te. It ad mi ts of ex ce pt io n . . . Bu t to rep ea t, th ere is no al le ga ti on in th e pe ti ti on th at pet it io ne rs ha dpr ev io us ly so ug ht ex emp ti on fr om th e Sec ret ar y of La bo r, fr om th e co ve ra ge of th e Ci rcu la r, be fo re fi li ng th e in st an tpe ti ti on . Ob vi ou sl y, th e pet i ti on must fail for prematurity." The Court agrees with the Solicitor General(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489).A n a c t u a l c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r s y m e a n s a n e x i s t i n g c a s e o r c o n t r o v e r sy t h a t i s a p p r o p r i a t eo r r i p e f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o t c o n j e c t u r a l o r a n t i c i p a t o r y, l e s t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o u r t w o u l d a m o u n t t o

an ad vi so r y op in io n. Th e p o we r do es no t e xt en d to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only l e a dt o d i a l e c t i c s a n d b a r r e n l e g a l q u e s t i o n s a n d t o s t e r i l e conclusions unrelated to actualities. Legal standing orlocustandihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of thegovernmental act that is being challenged,alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gis t of th e qu es ti on of st an di ng is wh ethe r a pa rt yalleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that con cr et e ad ve rse ne ss wh ich sh ar pe ns th e pr es en ta ti onof issues u p o n w h i c h t h e c o u r t d e p e n d s f o r i l l u m i n a t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t constitutionaquestions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in a n y o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s b y t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s t a t u t eo r ord inan ce, h e has n o st and ing ( L a B u g a l B ' l a a , T r i b a l A s s n . v s . D E N R Secretary, GR 127882, Jan. 27, 2004).In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no do ubt raises a justiciablecontroversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not o n l y t h e r i g h t b u ti n f a c t t h e d u t y o f t h e j u d i c i a r y t o s e t t l e t h e dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The du ty (t o ad ju di ca te )remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised

before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this Court toadjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set o u t i n t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s t h e

j u d i c i a l d e p a r t m e n t ' s d u t y a n d p o w e r t o s t r i k e d o w n g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n o n t h e

p a r t o f a n y b r a n c h o r i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y o f government including Congress. As the Court has repeatedly andfirmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters thatinvolve grave abuse of discretion brought before it inappropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the

petition alleges grave a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n a n d a s t h e r e i s n o o t h e r p l a i n , s p e e d y o r a d e q u a t e r e m e d yi n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e o f l a w , w e h a v e n o h es it at io n a t a ll i n h ol di ng t ha t t hi s p et it io n s ho ul d b e g iv en d uecourse and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule6 5 o f t h e R u l e s o f C o u r t . I n d e e d , c e r t i o r a r i ,

p r o h i b i t i o n a n d mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislativand executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that , in dec id ing to take jurisdict ion ove r thi s pet iti on, this Court will noreview the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the m e r i t s o f t r a d el i b e r a l i z a t i o n a s a p o l i c y e s p o u s e d b y s a i d i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o d y . N e i t h e r w i l l i t r u l e o nt h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and otheimport/trade barriers. Rather, i t wi ll on ly exerc ise i t s const itu tional du ty " to de termine w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e h a d

b e e n a g r a v e a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreemenand its three annexes (Tanada, et. al.vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997)


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1.RIPENESSCASESIssue: Did Lyons's injunction against the use of police chokeholds m e e t t h e t h r e s h o l d r e q u i r e m e n t s i m p o s e d b y A r t i c l e I I I o fth e Co n s ti tu ti on ? Th e C ou r t h el d t h at f ed er al co ur ts we r e wi t ho ut jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctiverel ief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he wouldagain be stopped. .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that in order toestablish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either1) th at all Los An gel es po li ce of fi ce rs always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or2) that t he Ci ty or der ed or authorize d offic er s to act in such a man ner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damageL y o n s c a s e i s n o t r i p e b e c a u s e o f t h e s p e c u l a t i v e n a t u r e o f h i s c l a i m . P r e d i c t i o n s o f f u t u r e

b e h a v i o r a r e b e y o n d t h e c o u r t s functions. The rule is that, ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or matured into a controversy worthy of

adjudication.(City of Los Angeles vs. Lyons, 449 US 934)2 MOOTNESSA moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration t hereon would be of no

pr ac ti ca l us e or va lu e. Ge ne ra ll y, co ur ts d e c l i n e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s u c h c a s e o r d i s m i s s i t o n g r o u n do f mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.D u r i n g t h e e i g h t ( 8 ) d a y s t h a t P P 1 0 1 7 w a s o p e r a t i v e , t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , a c c o r d i n g t o p e t i t i o n e r s ,c o m m i t t e d i l l e g a l a c t s i n implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?

These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, itconfers no rights, it i m p o s e s n o d u t i e s , i t a f f o r d s n o p r o t e c t i o n ; i t i s i n l e g a lcontemplation, inoperative.The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a caseCourts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; s e c o n d , t h e e x c e p t i o n a l c h a r a c t e ro f t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e paramount public interest is involved; th i r d , wh en co ns t i tu t i on al i s su e ra i s ed re qu i r esf o r m u l a t i o n o f controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review (David vs. Macapagal-ArroyoGR 171396, May 03, 2006).After being denied admission to a state-operated law school, petitioner brought this suit on behalf of himself alone for injunctiver e l i e f , c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e s c h o o l ' s a d m i s s i o n s p o l i c y r a c i a l l y discriminated against him in violation of thEqual Protection Clause o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t . T h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t b e c a u s e petitioner will complete lawschool at the end of the term for which he has registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on the merits, the Court cannotconsistently with the limitations of Art . II I of th e Co ns ti tu ti on , co ns id er th e su bs ta nt iv e co ns ti tu ti on al issues, and the case is moot.(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of th e sc h oo l ' s ad mi s si on s p ra ct ic e s bu t up on th e s i mp l e fa ctt h a t petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the term.(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions processand since it does not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because t h i s c a s e d i d n o t r e a c h t h e C o u r t u n t i lt h e e v e o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s graduation(DeFunis vs. Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343)

2. P r o p e r P a r t yConstitutional question must be raised by the proper party one who has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.2.1.Conventional Standing ---CASES

The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should be considered part of the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III of the Constitution or, aparfrom that, if the court can hear cases on" generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where none of the complainants havestanding. The court found that as none of the plaintiffs could demonstrate any injury actually done to them by the defendants, the plaintiffs were third parties to theissue and had no standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own m e a g e r f i n a n ci a l s i t u at i o n s a n d s u b s e q u e n t i n a b i l i t y t ol i ve in P en fi el d we r e fo un d by th e Co ur t to be th e co ns eq ue nc e of th e economics and housing market of the area rathethan any wrongdoing by the defendants(Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343)2.2Representative Standing

2.3 Jus Tertii StandingCASESThe Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age b a s e d o n t h e i rg e n d e r v i o l a t e s t h e E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e . Ad dit io nal ly, t he S up re me C ou rt e xa min ed j us t er ti i ( th ir d

pa rt y rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer.

The Court held that the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics

relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore,the Court found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had not been changed. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine ostanding, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to ma l e s b e t w e e n 1 8 a n d2 0 . T o h a v e s t a n d i n g , o n e m u s t s h o w a "nexus" of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of th e st atut e. In th is ca se , th estatute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party. The Supreme Court explains thatWhitener and other vendors have standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function"(Craig vs Boren, 429 US190,50 L.Ed.2d. 343)2.4Trancedental Importance to the publicCASESRespondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that thea c t i o n w a s f i l e d b y t h e m i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s S e n a t o r s a n d a s taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer'suits are to allow t a x p a y e r s t o q u e s t i o n c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e n a t i o n a l g o ve r n me n t org o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d o r c o n t r o l l e d c o r p o r a t i o n s allegedly in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are


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involved. For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers tinstitute the present action(Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436).On the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue in th eir favo r. A party' s sta ndin g before th e Co urt is a pr oce dural technicalitywhich it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmarkEmergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled

pr ompt ly an d de fi ni te ly , br us hi ng aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.(Avelino vs. Cuenco,G.R. No . L- 28 21 )." In so fa r astaxpayer s' suits are concern ed, this Court had declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether o r n o t i t s h o u l d b ee n t e r t a i n e d , " o r t h a t i t " e n j o y s a n o p e n d iscret ion to en ter ta in the same or no t (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232SCRA110).Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d i n t h e n e g a t i v e .St and in g i s a sp eci al con ce rn in con st it uti on al law b eca use so m e cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured b y

t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e l a w o r b y o f f i c i a l a c t i o n t a k e n , b u t b y co ncer ned citizen s, t axp ayer s or vot er s whoactually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit.A n d t h e y d o n o t h a v e present substantial interest in the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)as would entitle them to bring this suit(Kilosabayan vs. Morato, 246SCRA540).It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount

p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " T a x p a y e r s , v o t e r s , c o n c e r n e d c i t i z e n s a n d legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only( 1 ) i n c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s a n d (2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements onstanding. Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of i l l e g a l d i s b u r s e m e n t o f p u b l i c f u n d s , o r w h e r e a t a xmeasure is assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the validity of election laws because of theirobvious in terest i n the v a l i d i t y o f s u ch l a w s . Co n ce r n ed c i t i z en s c a n b r i n g s u i t s i f t h e constitutional question they raise is o"transcendental importance "w h i c h m u s t b e s e t t l e d e a r l y . L e g i s l a t o r s a r e a l l o w e d t o s u e t o question the validity of any official action whichthey claim in fringes their prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assera n i n t e r e s t a s t a x p a y e r s , b u t t h e y d o n o t m e e t t h e s t a n d i n g requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forthin Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA392, 403 (1980), to wit: While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,No where in their Petition dsaid petitioners allege that their tax money is"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses oflegislative power ", or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose

Ne it he r do pe ti ti on er s se ek to re st rai n res po nd en t fr om w a s t i n g p u b l i c f u n d s t h r o u g h t h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f a ni n v a l i d o r unconstitutional law.Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vMacapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or nota taxpayer's suit should be entertainedPetitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits (Kilosbayan vs.Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995)2.5 Standing members of the CONGRESSCASESWhere the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excessof the au thority ve sted on th e Pres ident by the Co nstit ution , the issue of aimpermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domainof the Legislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides amechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec27 [1]). Said remedy,however, is available only when the presidential veto is based onpolicy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed tobe ultra vires. Inthe latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court todraw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power endsand the bounds of legislative jurisdiction

begin(Philconsa vs. Enriquez,235 SCRA 506).PETRON questions theocus standi of petitioners to file the action(Rollo pp. 479-484). Petitioners however, countered that they filedthe action in their capacity as members of Congress.In

Philippine Constitution Association v Hon. Salvador Enriquez G.R.No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congressh a v e t h e l e g a l s t a n d i n g t oqu es t i on th e va l i d i ty of ac ts o f th e Executive which injures them in the i r person or the inst i tu t ion of Congress towhich they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause d e r i v a t i v e b u t n o n e t h e l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l i n j u r yw h i c h c a n b e quest ioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F.Supp. 353 [1976]) . In the absence of aclaim that the contract inquestion violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intrudedinto the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standingtoi n s t i t u t e t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n i n t h e i r c a p a c i t y a s m e m b e r s o f Congress.H o w e v e r , p e t i t i o n e r s c a n b r i n g t h ea c t io n i n t he i r ca pa ci ty a s t a x p a y e r s u n d e r t h e d o c t r i n e l a i d d o w n i nKilo sba yan, Inc . v. Guingona 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers mayqu e s t i o n c o n t r a c t s e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h ena ti on al go ve rn me n t or go ve rn me nt -o wn ed or co nt ro l l ed co rp or at io ns al le ge d to be in contravention of the law. As long athe ruling in Kilosbayanon locusstandiis not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and upholdthe legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the presentaction (Bagatsing vsCommittee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995)

2.6Standing of the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCASESThe IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case."Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal

andsubstantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained orwill sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challengedThe term "interest" means a material interest, aninterest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mereinterest in the question involved, or a mere incidentalinterest. Thegi s t o f th e qu es ti on o f st an di n g i s w h et h er a p a rt y al l eg es s uc h personal stake in the outcome of the controversyas to assure thatcon cre te adv ersen ess which sh arpen s t he p re sent at io n o f i s su esu p o n w h i c h t h e c o u r td e p e n d s f o r i l l u m i n a t i o n o f d i f f i c u l t constitutional questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchorsits standing on its allegedresponsibility to uphold the rule of law andt he Co n s t it ut io n. Ap ar t fr o m t hi s d e cl ar at io n, ho we ve r , th e I BP a s s e r t s n o o t h e r

b a s i s i n s u p p o r t o f i t s l o c u s s t a n d i T h e m e r e i n v o c a t i o n b y t h e I B P o f i t s d u t y t o p r e s e r v e t h e r u l eo f l a w a n d nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe itwith sta ndin g in this cas e. This is too gene ral an int ere stwhich isshared by other groups and the whole citizenry.Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Courthas the discretion to take cognizance of a suwhich does not satisfyt h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f l e g a l s t a n d i n g w h e n p a r a m o u n t i n t e r e s t i s involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted liberal attitudeon the l ocus s tand i of a pet iti oner whe re the p etit ion er is ab le toc raf t an iss ue of tr ansc ende ntal sign ifi canc e to the

pe op le . Th us ,when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,the Co ur t ma y br us h as id e te ch ni ca li ti es of pr oc ed ur e.18 In thiscase, a reading of the petition shows that the I BP has advancedconstitutional issues which de serve the attention oft hi s C ou rt i nv i e w o f t h e i r s e r i o u s n e s s , n o v e l t y a n d w e i g h t a s p r e c e d e n t s . Moreover, because peace and orde


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are under constant threat andl a w l e s s v i o l e n c e o c c u r s i n i n c r e a s i n g t e m p o ,u n d o u b t e d l y a g g r a v a t e d b y t h e M i n d a n a o i n s u r g e n c y p r o b l e m , t h e l e g a l controversy raised in th

petition almost certainly will not go away. Itwill stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rathethan later(IBP vs Zamora, GR 141284, Aug. 15, 2000)

2.7 Standing of the Government to question its lawsCASESIssue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the SolicitorGeneral and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in presentcase. The Court held that thePeople of the Philippines, representedby the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is aproper party in the present proceedings.The unchallenged rule isthat the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have apersonal and substantial interest in thec a s e s u c h t h a t h e h a s s u s t a i n e d , o r w i l l s u s t a i n e d , d i r e c t i n j u r y a s a r e s u l t o f

i t s enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violatesthe constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name thepresenaction is brought, has a substantial interest in having it setaside. Of greater import than the damage caused by thei l l e g a l expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon thefundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence,the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56)

2.8 Taxpayers SuitsTwo (2) requisites of Taxpayers suits:1 . P u b l i c f u n d s a r e d i s b u r s e d b y a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o rinstrumentality, and2 . A l a w i s v i o l a t e d o r s o m e i r r e g u l a r i t y i s c o m m i t t e d a n d t h a t t h e petitioner is directly affected by thalleged ultravires act.CASESIn the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining a n y d i r e c t i n j u r y a s a r e s u l t o ft h e e n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e V F A . A s taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. Othis point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived fromtaxation.

No tw it hs tan di ng , in vi ew of th e pa ram ou nt im po rt an ce an d th e constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, thiCo ur t, in - th e ex er ci se of it s so un d di sc ret io n, br us he s as id e th e procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have d o n e i n t h ee a r l y E m e r g e n c y P o w e r s C a s e s , 2 0 w h e r e w e h a d occasion to rule:". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question theconstitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and generalinterest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the o b j e c t i o n t h a t t h e y w e r e n o t p r o p e r p a r t i e s a n dr u l e d t h a t ' transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if wemust, technicalities of procedure (Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10,2000)Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of thePreparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR). In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interestthat he will stand to be benefited or injured

by the judgment or that he wi ll be en ti tl ed to th e ava il s of th e su it . No wh er e in hi s pl ea di ng s does petitioner presume to make such arepresentation. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroachedu p o n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s p o w e r s t o c r e a t e a p u b l i c o f f i c e a n d t o p ro po se a me nd me nt s t o t he C ha rt er

b y f o r m i n g t h e P C C R . A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been

disbursed in a l l e g e d c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f t h e l a w o r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . T h u s , a taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an exercisby Congress of its taxing or spending power(Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR140835, Aug. 14, 2000)

Question must beraised at theearliest possibleopportunity.General Rule: must be raised in the pleadings.Exceptions:a . c r i m i n a l c a s e s a t a n y t i m e a t t h e d i s c r e t i o no f the court

b . c i v i l c a s e s a t a n y s t a g e o f t h ep r o c e e d i n g s i f necessary for the determination of the case itself;c . e v e r y c a s e ( e x c e p t w h e r e t h e r e i s e s t o p p e l ) a t any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.d . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l q u e s t i o n m u s t t h e

v e r y "lis mota" of the case

lismotaa controversy begun. Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a final determination of the case(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).Therefore, thefollowing must be avoided: Political questions; Advisory opinions; Moot and academic issues; No standing.4. DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATIONCASESIn the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration ofunconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned a c t i s u s u a l l y t h e h a n d i w o r k o ft h e l e g i s l a t i v e o r t h e e x e c u t i v e departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of thiCourt in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of thoswho participated in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation beforedeclaring a la w un co n st i tu t io na l, o n t h e th eo r y th at th e me a su r e wa s f ir s t carefully studied by the executive and thelegislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental la w b e f o r e i t w a s f i n a l l y a p p r o v e d . T o


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d o u b t i s t o s u s t a i n . T h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y c a n b e o v e r c o m e o n l y b y t h e c l e a r e s t s h o w i n gt h a t t h e r e w a s i n d e e d a n i n f r a c t i o n o f t h e C on st it ut io n, a nd o nl y w he n s uc h a c on cl us io n i s r ea ch ed b ytherequired majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of theduty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down (Drilon vs. Lim, GR 112497Aug. 04, 1994)5. EFFECTS OF DECLARATIONOF UNCONSTITUTIONALITYThe law is either:

1.voidif on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validitybecause it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces noeffect creates nooffice and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95SCRA392).2.voidable

i f o n i t s f a c e i t e n j o y s t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f constitutionality. Thelaw becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces noretroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB

38 SCRA 429).Doctrine of Operative FactRealizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshnessand resulting unfairness must be avoided.CASESThe strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declaredunconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purp oses, a totalnullity, and it ideemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, werefer to the law itself being

per serepugnant to the Constitution. It isnot always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faultyper se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import, but invalid ini t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o c e r t a i n f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s . T o e x e m p l i f y ,a n otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it isallowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, whenit vitiates contractually vestedrights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effectsand consequences of a void act occurring prior to such declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws we have beenconstrained to recognize the Interim effects of said laws prior to theirdeclaration ounconstitutionality, but there we have likewise beenunable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.So also, even as a practical mattera situation that may aptly bedescribed as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration onullity of agoverning statute(Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993)

6 . R E L A T I V E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L I T YCASESThe constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable

p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , s i n c e t h e s t a t u t e m a y b e constitutionally valid as applied toone set of facts and invalid in its application to another.A s t a t u t e v a l i d a t o n e t i m e m a y b e c o m e v o i d a t a n o t h e r t i m e

because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though a f f i r m e d b y af o r m e r a d j u d i c a t i o n , i s o p e n t o i n q u i r y a n d investigation in the light of changed conditions(Central Bank EmployeeAssn, Inc. vs. BSP, GR 148208, Dec. 15, 2004)

Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. ColetG.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who

granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the RevisedOptometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent.Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, an d for OthePurposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restrainingorder. They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent;2. that RA No. 8050 violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation olegislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press.Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality andaddresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as CiviCase No. 95-74770, merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses.As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess therequisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that theimplementation of the questioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of

constitutionality in favor of the questioned law.The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rightsaffected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thusherein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporaryrestraining order.Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050.Ruling:Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted ordefended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grantsit a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case

No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entitiesThese run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence ofan organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidentsrepresenting the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such


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"associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue ofthe juridical personality of their "associations."For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoidof legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition.Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real partiein interest.Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned ord er rendered by the Regional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside.Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members

MARIANOvs. COMELEC (242 SCRA211)

FACTS:1 . T w o p e t i t i o n s a s s a i l i n g c e r t a i n p r o v i s i o n s o f R A N o . 7 8 5 4 ( A n A c tC o n v e r t i n g t h e M u n i c i p a l i t y o f M a k a t i I n t o a H i g h l y U r b a n i z e d C i t y ) a su n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 2 . G R N o . 1 1 8 5 7 7 i n v o l v e s a p e t i t i o n f o r p r o h i b i t i o n a n d d e c l a r a t o r yr e l i e f , a n d a s s a i l i n g t h e s t a t u t e a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o n t h e f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s : a . S e c t i o n 2 d i dn o t p r o p e r l y i d e n t i f y t h e l a n d a r e a o r t er ri to ri al ju ri sd ic ti on of Ma ka ti b ym et es an d b ou nd s, wi th te ch ni cad escr ip ti on s, in viol at io n o f Sect io n 1 0, Ar ti cl e X of t h e Co n s t i t u t i o n , i n re l a t i o n t o Se c t i o n s 7 an d 4 5 0 o f t h eL o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e . b . S e c t i o n 5 1 a t t e m p t s t o a l t e r o r r e s t a r t t h e t h r e e - c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m l i m i t f o rl o c a l e l e c t i v e o f f i c i a l s , i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 8 , A r t i c l e X o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d S e c t i o n7 , A r t i c l e V I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . c . S e c t i o n 5 2 : i . I n c r e a s e dt h e l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t o f M a k a t i o n l y b y s p e c i a l law (the Charterviolates the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to bepassed by Congress withint h r e e y e a r s f o l l o w i n gt h e r e t u r n o f e v e r y c e n s u s i i . T h e i n c r e a s e i n l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t w a s n o t e x p r e s s e d i n t h e

b i l l t i t l e i i i . T h e a d d i t i o n o f a n o t h e r l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t i n M a k a t i i s n o t i na c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 5 ( 3 ) , A r t i c l e V I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t h e p o p u l a t i o n o fM a k a t i i s 4 5 0 , 0 0 0 3 . G R N o . 1 1 8 6 2 7 i n v o l v e s a p e t i t i o n w h i c h a s s a i l s S e c t i o n 5 2a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o n t h e s a m e g r o u n d s a s a f o r e s t a t e d . ISSUE:ALSE 2013:ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONESCASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS, GODUCO,IBARRA,LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA9HELD:Yes. Petitions dismissed. RATIO:a. The importance of drawing with

precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local government unit cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of thterritorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Petitionerhave not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The existence oa boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude theterritorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. The requirements before litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)the question of constitutionality must be raised by the prope

party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must benecessary to the determination of the case itself.The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events (i.e. Mayor Binay will run again, etc.)Petitioners merely

posed a hypothetical issue. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Reapportionment of legislativedistricts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composedof not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing itsmembership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what the Congress did in enacting RA No. 7854 and

providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule so anot to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should bsufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject. D: Said section provides,inter alia, that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since ithas met the minimum populationrequirement of250,000

Warth v. SeldinBrief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certaincommunity. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific case or controversy between herself and the defendant in order to havestanding.

Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought suit against thetown of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of Penfields Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs contended thaPenfields zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in contravention of constitutional andstatutory rights. The lower federal courts held that none of the Plaintiffs had s tanding

Issue. Have the Plaintiffs established that a case or controversy exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of Article III othe United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to have standing?Held. Yes. Judgment affirmedIn order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself must have suffered some threatened or actual injury resulting from the

putatively legal action. Additionally, standing will generally not be found whena generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizensa plaintiff attempts to claim relief on the legal rights of third partiesCongress may create standing for individuals through statutes who would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct and


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palpable injury to himselfIn the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the construction ohousing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged practices affect him specifically and that court interventionwould personally benefit the plaintiffIn order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a resulof the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so

Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majoritys opinion is based insteadon the merits of the claimDiscussion. The purpose of the standing requirement is to prevent the courts from being forced to adjudicate abstract questions of wide publicsignificance, which could better be determined in other forums.

Craig v. BorenBrief Fact Summary. Oklahoma State maintained different drinking ages between men and women for the consumption of 3.2% alcohol beer. TheAppellant, Craig (Appellant), now alleges that this difference violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Gender-based classifications must satisfy intermediate scrutiny requirements to pass constitutional muster.

Facts. The State of Oklahoma prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% alcohol beer to men under the age of 21 and women under the age of 18.Suit was brought against the State, alleging the law violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution

Issue. Does the Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?Held. Yes. Appeals Court ruling reversed and remandedJustice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues that case precedent dictates that an intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing thestatute. Specifically, the gender-based classification must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to the achievement osuch objectiveThe District Court unequivocally found that the objective to be served by the statute is increased traffic safety. J. Brennan is not persuaded by theAppellees, Craig and others (Appellees), statistics that the statute closely serves the stated objective. As such, it is not constitutional

Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissents on two levels. He believes that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of scrutinyfor gender-based classification. Furthermore, he believes that the intermediate scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court of the United States (SupremeCourt) is so diaphanous and elastic as to encourage judicial prejudice.

Discussion. Craig v. Boren establishes intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review for gender-based classification. Intermediate scrutinyis distinguished from strict scrutiny at both the objective and means levels. Important government objectives (intermediate) v. compellinggovernment objectives (strict) and substantially related (intermediate) v. narrowly tailored (strict).


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THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 122241. July 30, 1996]BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, represented by its Chairman, DR. PRIMITIVA Y. PEREZ-SISON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSIONrepresented by its Commissioner, HERMOGENES P. POBRE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by its Secretary, DR. HILARION MRAMIRO, BUREAU OF FOODS AND DRUGS, represented by its Director, DR. QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT, represented by its Secretary, SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., and BUREAU OF HIGHER EDUCATION, represented by itsDirector, MONA D. VALISNO,petitioners, vs. HON. ANGEL B. COLET, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29, ACEBEDOOPTICAL COMPANY, INC., represented by its President and Chairman of the Board, MIGUEL P. ACEBEDO, OPTOMETRY PRACTITIONERSASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (OPAP), represented by its President, DR. MIRIAM F. LLAVE, CENEVIS OPTOMETRISTASSOCIATION (COA), represented by its President, DR. ROBERTO RODIS, JR., ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM OPTOMETRIST(ACMO), represented by its President, DR. CYRIL CORALES, SOUTHERN MINDANAO OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS.,

INC. (SMOAP), represented by its President, DR. ELMER VILLAROSA, and REPUBLICA A. PANOL, No. 9 Gen. Malvar St., Araneta CenterCubao, Quezon City, respondents.D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,J.:Petitioners seek to annul and set aside for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion the order of 25 August 1995 issued by publicrespondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 which granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibitingthe petitioners herein from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. No. 8050or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.The background facts are not disputed.R.A. No. 8050,i[1] entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwiseknown as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100ii[2] and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,iii[3] whichwere respectively approved by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference Committee.iv[4] The Reconciled Billv[5] wasthen separately ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representativesvi[6] and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995.On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition andinjunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.vii[7] As grounds for their petition, the private respondents alleged that:1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without thknowledge and conformity of the Senate panel, thereby derogating the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislativeconsent;2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, libertyand property without due process of law in that it authorizes optometrists to engage in acts of practice within the zone of medical practice through

permitted use in certain kinds of diagnostic pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of the services of optometrists todefinite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment of vision, resultant blindness, or possible loss of life;3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power when it provides for a penalty oimprisonment for a maximum of eight years and a fine not exceeding P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any rule or regulation promulgated

pursuant to said law;4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and

press; and5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.

They then prayed that after due notice and hearing, an order be issued granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining, restricting, andforbidding the respondents therein (herein petitioners), their agents, officers, and employees from performing or undertaking any act inimplementation or enforcement of R.A. No. 8050, or any of its provisions, or its Code of Ethics, during the pendency of the case, until further ordersof the court; and that after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered: (a) declaring R.A. No. 8050 and its Code of Ethics null and void due toconstitutional violations and transgressions; (b) granting a writ of prohibition against all the respondents therein enjoining and restraining them fromenforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics in whole or in part; and (c) making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.An examination of the petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770 in Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, disclosed that among the petitionersincluded in the caption of the petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); CenevisOptometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of thePhilippines (SMOAP)each allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical personalityand addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their

profession and home addresses.As likewise disclosed in the petitioners Complianceviii[8] filed with the trial court on 18 August 1995, the names of Miguel Acebedo, representingAcebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A. Panol, another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did notappear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, as evidenced by certifications

issued by the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC). Private respondents COA and ACMO were neither registered with the Securities andExchange Commission (SEC), as evidenced by the certifications issued by the latter.On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a Temporary Restraining Orderix[9] enjoining the respondents fromenforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics, until further orders of the court; directing that summons, with a copy of the petitionand of the temporary restraining order, be served immediately; and setting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 15August 1995.On 11 August 1995, the petitioners herein, as respondents below, filed an Oppositionx[10] to the application for preliminary injunction and allegedthat:(1) No proper ground exists to warrant the issuance of a writ as(a) petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief demanded;(b) petitioners have unquestionably not shown their legal existence or capacity to file the case, much less their authority to file it in arepresentative capacity; and(c) petitioners have misled the court into believing that an act is being done in the implementation of R.A. No. 8050 tending to make the

judgment ineffectual;


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(2) The implementation of R.A. No. 8050 carries no injurious effect; and(3) Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of R.A. No. 8050.At the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties indicated their intention to present witnesses in support of theirrespective positions. Nevertheless, the trial court, finding such procedure not [to be] conducive to the summary procedure appropriate to theauxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, merely directed the parties to submit their other arguments in writing with supp orting evidence, aftewhich the application for a writ of preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution.xi[11] The parties complied therewith.On 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order,xii[12] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for until further orders of the Court, respondents and theirofficials, agents and employees, are restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementationof the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.Let the writ issue upon filing with this Court a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND [P100,000.00] PESOS in favor of respondents

conditioned upon payment of damages sustained by respondents in case the writ is later adjudged to have been improvidently or improperly issued.We quote its ratiocinations to support the above disposition:Viewing the petition as a whole, which is duly verified, particularly the constitutional infirmities alleged by the petitioners, and the supportingexhibits, the court is inclined to findprima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operationsaid Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights.There is clear public right that laws enacted for the governance of citizens should be the product of the untrammeled will of the peoplerepresentatives in Congress. Petitioners contend and have adduced at least sufficient evidence to support this order that, in the Revised OptometryLaw, approved by the two Houses of Congress, there is a showing that at least one major paragraph imposing penalties on corporate officers, wassurreptitiously smuggled into the measure, because the clear tenor and the content of the provision (Sec. 33) as agreed upo n in the BicameraConference Committee, duly reflected in its Minutes (Exhs. S and T) did not include such paragraph. The fraud upon the legislative process thu

practiced through surreptitious and insidious tampering, manifestly contravenes and violates said public right, which violation petitioners as memberof the Philippine body politic, have the status and standing to vindicate by the present petition for extraordinary legal remedies. (See the rulings inTanada v.Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, particularly pp. 36-37, citing Severino v.Governor-General, Phil. 366, 378).Similarly, there is likewise a public right that the laws enacted for the public good should in truth and in fact promote the public good. Such publicright would be negated and violated if, as petitioners allege, the Revised Optometry Law which is intended to provide our people with betteropportunities and better facilities for better vision, institutes a practice which in its actual operation, exposes persons availing of optometric servicesto serious risk of impairment of vision, possible loss of sight and even possible loss of life, through administration by optometrists of DPAs. If thi

be true, the law under question violates that public right, because it permits inflicting of serious injury upon our people using services of optometristsAfter examining the different exhibits submitted by petitioners, in which trained experts in our government agencies themselves attest to the direconsequences that persons on whom DPAs are used may suffer, the Court finds prima faciebasis for danger of irreparable injury to public healthwhich the Court should forestall in the exercise of prudence by a preliminary writ of injunction, pending full inquiry and thorough determination aftertrial. Apart from the public rights, which petitioners are entitled to assert in this action, there are also private individual rights of petitioners whichthe Revised Optometry Law tends to injure, and which would be injured irreparably with the actual operation of said law.Hardest hit in this regard are the optometrists, whose vested right to continue in the practice is virtually bludgeoned by the Revised Optometrist Law,as virtually admitted by respondents in their Opposition. On the one hand, the revised concept of the practice of optometry [Sec. 4] mandates astandard, the use of DPAs in optometric examination. For this reason, said Law authorizes virtual suspension of the licenses of the present crop ooptometrists, until after they shall have re- trained and qualified to use DPAs [Sec. 31]. In case such optometrists insist on practicing without themandatory training, their practice could be viewed as substandard if they would avoid use of DPAs [Sec. 4]. Alternatively, i f they use DPAs before

they are qualified through mandatory training, they could incur criminal liability [Secs. 32 and 33]. In either case, their use of DPAs without or afte

qualifying training, would expose them to malpractice suits from persons who might have sustained injury through the use of D PAs. Again, theymight not have the option of refraining from the use of DPAs, since they could face an ethics charge for substandard practice in not using DPAs intheir practice.Finally, even petitioner Acebedo Co. would suffer injury in its operations because its activities, based on the affidavits submitted as exhibits, wouldsurely touch the boundaries of conduct prohibited and penalized in the Revised Optometry Law. For one thing, its right to continue in employmentthe optometrists working in its optical shop clinics [including affiant petitioners] might be injured through a criminal charge that such employmentconstitutes a prohibited indirect practice of optometry within the strictures of Section 5 in relation to Sec. 32. Or its advertising of optical goods andwares, which is its right under the general law and the Constitution, could be charged as an offense under Section 32 and subjected to penalty undeSection 33. These restraints, which could seriously prejudice existing legal rights, entitle the petitioner corporation to the extraordinary remedy odeclaratory relief, and to preliminary injunction pending the holding of a trial on the merits. The Court understands that petitioner could haveadduced more evidence than what appears especially on the matter of the jeopardy to public health as a result of changes of optometric practiceintroduced by the Revised Optometry Law. But as the Court understands it, preponderance is not required for evidentiary support for the grant o

preliminary injunction. As the rule stands, a sampling of relevant evidence is enough,so as to give the Court a justification for the issuance of thewrit [See Olalio v.Hizon, 196 SCRA 665; Syndicated Media Access vs.CA, 219 SCRA 794].Jurisprudence likewise supports the grant of preliminary writs of injunction, to maintain the status quo, in suits questioning the constitutionality of

laws with demonstrable prejudice of legal rights [J.M. & Co. v.CA, 3 SCRA 696].On the basis of the main petition, which is for declaratory relief directed at the nullification of R.A. 8050 on constitutional grounds, and for a writ of

prohibition, likewise premised on the nullity of said law due to constitutional infirmities, the Court finds that the whole or part of the relief whichpetitioners are seeking and to whichprima faciethey are entitled, consists in restraining the enforcement or implementation of the law.The Court likewise concludes, on its finding that both public rights would be prejudiced by the operation of R.A. 8050, that its enforcement pendentewould inflict substantial injustice to petitioners.xiii[13]On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,xiv[14] the dispositive portion of which reads:IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned that, until further orders, you, the said defendants, and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, andany other person assisting you refrain from enforcing and/or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics.The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporaryrestraining order and alleged that:IRESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INFINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVELOCUS STANDITO FILE THE PETITIONA QUO.


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IIRESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECREEING THAT

PRIMA FACIEEVIDENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY/INVALIDITY OF R.A. 8050 EXISTS WHICH WARRANT THE ENJOINMENT OFITS IMPLEMENTATION.IIIRESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PRELIMINARILYENJOINING R.A. 8050 ON MERE ALLEGATIONS BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THE SAME WOULD BRING INJURIOUSEFFECTS TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.IVRESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION INISSUING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

As we see it, the assigned errors quoted above may be reduced to two key issues, viz.:(1) The locus standiof the private respondents to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and(2) The absence of a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition.The petitioners maintain that for a party to have locus standito question the validity of a statute, he must have a personal and substantial interest inthe case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.xv[15] In this light, the private respondents do not havethe requisite personal and substantial interest to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050 for, per the certifications of the SEC, private respondentsCOA and ACMO are not registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the respondent associations are not duly registered optometristsas certified to by the PRC. Finally, the petitioners aver, the private respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770, and intheir Rejoinder to the Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.Refuting this charge, the private respondents claim in their Comment on the petition that they have, as held by the trial court, locus standiunder therule of Public Right pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuvera,xvi[16] citing Severino vs. Governor General;xvii[17] moreover, as also found by the trial courttheir rights as optometrists or optical companies would be adversely affected by the assailed law. They further claim that they seek to protect theiConstitutional rights to property and freedom of expression from enforcement of the provisions of the challenged law, which bar truthfuladvertisements and impose vague and unreasonable conditions for the continued practice of their profession. Insofar as private respondents AcebedoOptical Co., Inc., and Panol are concerned, the said law would likewise adversely affect the conduct of their business of maintaining optical shopsand expose them to threats of criminal prosecution. Finally, they contend that they also seek, as taxpayers and citizens,under the concept of PublicRight, to bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers the publics health, a danger clearly seen from the oppositions to the law filed before

both houses of Congress.IOnly natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended inthe name of the real party in interest.xviii[18] Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a

personality separate and distinct from that of its members.There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case

No. 95-74770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entitiesThese run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence ofan organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statementsxix[19] of the alleged presidentrepresenting the associations, which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were suchassociations mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue othe juridical personality of their associations.

For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoidof legal personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770.A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, orthe party entitled to the avails of the suit.xx[20]In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemedreal parties in interest. Moreover, since the names of private respondentsMiguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, andRepublica A. Panoldo not appear inthe registration books of the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines,xxi[21] they do not have the requisite

personal and substantial interest in the case. Even further, although private respondents Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa claimto be practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make them real parties in interest to challenge theconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.As an attempt in extremis, the private respondents now assert in their comment that the petition for declaratory relief, prohibition, and injunction wasfiled in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the enforcement of the law beca use it endangers publichealth.xxii[22] They thus suggest that their petition is in the nature of a taxpayers class suit.As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail. Not only did the private respondents fail to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed toallege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many

persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.xxiii[23]Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. Forwhile no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those whowere deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.xxiv[24]

Neither may the private respondents be allowed at this late stage to seek refuge under the doctrine allowing taxpayers suits . While they claimedtheir petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 was a taxpayers suit, and although this Court, in a catenaof cases, has shown liberality in granting locus

standito taxpayers in taxpayers suits,xxv[25] the private respondents have not adequately shown that this liberality must be extended to them. Theirplea of injury or damage is nothing but a sweeping generalization.IICivil Case No. 95-74770 must fail for yet another reason. As a special civil action for declaratory relief,xxvi[26] its requisites are: (1) the existenceof a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interestin the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.xxvii[27] On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at leastthe first and fourth requisites are wanting.


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Then there is the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the followingrequisites are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) theconstitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) theresolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case.xxviii[28]An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural oranticipatory.xxix[29] It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one handand all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. This is plain because Civil Case No. 9574770 is for declaratory relief. Then, too, as adverted to earlier, the private respondents have not sufficiently established their locus standi toquestion the validity of R.A. No. 8050.The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunctionrestraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued. Even if there wa

before him a case involving the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ with undue haste, bearing in mindour decision, penned by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, in Drilonvs.Lim,xxx[30] where we stated:We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in thegeneral definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniaryestimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charge with violatingand of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitutionvests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validityof any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declarationof unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiworkof the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher

judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with theconcurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a lawunconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and legislative departments and determined by them to bein accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcomeonly by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the requiredmajority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of 25 August 1995 of respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No95-74770 granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on 1 September1995 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.The respondent Judge is further DIRECTED to DISMISS Civil Case No. 95-74770.Costs against private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., Republica A. Panol, and the alleged presidents of Optometry Practitioner Associationof the Philippines, Cenevis Optometrist Association, Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrists, Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association ofthe Philippines.SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.,petitioners,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPALTREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995JOHN R. OSMEA,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER,AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No.7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, TeresitaTibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the

petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assaias unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds,with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the LocalGovernment Code;2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, inviolation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:


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(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of theconstitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3)years following the return of every census;(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of theConstitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.We find no merit in the petitions.ISection 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati.The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the Cityof Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in

Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City ofMandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest bythe City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundarydisputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local governmentunits. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of alocal government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. 2The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundariesmust be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of governmentonly within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflictsin the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the LocalGovernment Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. Wenote that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not addsubtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shallcomprise thepresentterritory of the municipality."The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metesand bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities oMakati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government,legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of factwhich could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technicadescriptions.3We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of otherlocal government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from definingwith reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries o

the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiarcircumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General inthis regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "theterritorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"

was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, therequirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end initself.Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundariewith neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has beensufficiently served.Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar tothose appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua nonfor its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent ofth

Political Law (Incomplete)

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