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Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.
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Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Dec 29, 2015

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Page 1: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Political Economy

Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Page 2: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Why “political economy”

Many textbooks have two separate chapters:

One on the sociology of politics,

Another on the sociology of the economy and occupations.

Both are covered in ch. 16; for example: The concentration of power and the limitation of

voting and the class bias of voting in the US The alienation of work, and the causes and

consequences of unemployment.

Page 3: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

The linkage of power and wealth

The chapter focuses on the linkage of economic and political arrangements.

For example a kibbutz (*p.529) is an economic commune,

but it is also connected to the political structure of Israel as a Jewish state,

and thus to the military-political-economic processes that removed the Palestinian people from the land and political citizenship.

Page 4: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

The political economy and society

The authoritative structures of power and the access to economic resources is central to the dynamic of all other social structures, such as race, the family, or education.

Structures of inequality generate structures of coercion and vice versa.

For example, The Dispossessed (p.*530) contrasts an egalitarian, anarchist communal planet with an inegalitarian capitalist police-state.

For example, Chomsky argues that as long as the Palestinians are deprived of land, territory, wealth and political power, conflict will continue to escalate.

Page 5: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

The relation of economy to society

Democratic political arrangements

Autocratic political arrangements

Public ownership of means of production Socialism Communism

Private ownership of means of production

Democratic capitalism

Autocratic capitalsm

In contrast to the text, the arrangements of the polity and the economy are sometimes pictured as follows:

Page 6: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Reasons the text does not use that

conceptualization:Pure capitalism and pure communism do not exist in practice; existing political economies involve a mixture of public and private provision.

“Communism” as described by Marx was democratic, rather than autocratic.

The former Soviet regimes can be described as “state capitalist” (*p.528),

who changed their name to “socialist” after 1989, similar to the dominant parties of Western Europe.

Page 7: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Conflict: the dynamic of escalation

The precondition of political conflict is a structure of inequality of wealth and power, particularly if it is tied to ascriptive traits.

Its actual dynamic is usually driven by escalation in which “hate breeds hate.”

E.g. members of group A attacks or dispossesses some members of group B, and so some members of “them”(B) attacks “them” (A) etc.

I.e. Jews kill Arabs, because Arabs killed Jews, because Jews killed Arabs, because…

Page 8: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Systemic conflict

This is a positive feedback system:

Such positive feedback systems are unstable amplifiers, capable of continuing and amplifying conflict indefinitely.

Bateson calls this “symmetrical schizmogenesis.”

Jews kill Arabs

Arabs kill Jews

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Page 9: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Additional AmplifiersStructures of social and geographical separation or stereotyping often accelerate this process.They make it less likely for members of Group A to hear or to understand the position of Group B and v.v. (Ilongots; native Americans in US)Since inequality tends to generate segregation it tends to accelerate these dynamics.

Jews kill Arabs Arabs more socially and physically segregated

Arabs kill JewsJews more socially and physically segregated

Page 10: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

“Hard line” Leaderships

An additional amplifier is that conflict with an “outgroup” tends to increase the power of more intransigent leaders in the “ingroup.”

Jews kill Arabs Arabs adopt more intransigent leaders

Arabs kill JewsJews adopt more intransigent leaders

Page 11: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

C. Carr: The Lessons of Terror (2002)

A History of warfare directed against civilians: why it has always failed and will fail again.“Terrorism, in other words, is simply the name given to, and the modern permutations of, warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.” p. 6

Page 12: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Terror’s outcomes

Rather than destroying the will to resist, Carr argues, it increases support of intransigent leaderships.

However, he also believes that it produces an almost irresistible temptation to counter-terror. (In which case, the attacked group, who adopts counter-terror, will also lose.)

Page 13: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Carr’s examples1. Carthage (vs Rome)2. American Civil War (Sherman)3. Palestinians.• Examples de does not (but probably should)

consider:1. US bombing of Hiroshima2. The Nazi repression of resistance.3. US bombing of Dresden4. Israeli “destruction of the infrastructure of

terrorism.”

Page 14: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Chomsky: The American role

Chomsky has been a consistent critic of American and Israeli foreign policy.He believes that as long as the Palestinians (90% of Israel after WWI) remain dispossessed of land, jobs, income and citizenship and, deprived of political leadership, the problem is insoluble.He believes that Sharom and those who support him are terrorists.He believes that Israeli policy explicitly and US policy implicitly has opposed to those needs.

Page 15: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Chomsky: The Fatal Triangle (1999)

The insoluble dynamic is produced by:1. The world superpower (US) continues to

arm Israel (#1 recipient of US aid) and back actions such as the East bank settlements.

2. Israel (4th strongest world military) continues to hold onto “Greater Israel” and to attack any viable Palestinian leadership or state.

3. Palestianans are impoverished, subordinated, and deprived of land and citizenship and adopt the weapons of despair.

Page 16: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Pirates and Emperors (1987)

Chomski argues that it is only because the United States has been willing to back up the dispossession of the Palestinians, characteristically by the use of terror directed against a civilian population, that millions of them are locked in despair, and that terror is a weapon of despair.Thus he allocates to the US principal responsibility.

Page 17: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

States as terroristsChomsky takes his title from Augustine:

“Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms, but little robberies? For what are robberies, themselves, but little kingdoms?…That was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when Alexander had asked what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride: “What meanest thou by seizing the whole world? But because I do it with a small ship, I am called a pirate, whilst thou, who does it with a great fleet, are called an emperor.”

Page 18: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Chomsky 9/11 (2001)

“Everyone here was quite properly outraged by the Oklahoma City bombing, and the headlines read, “Oklahoma City Looks like Beirut” I didn’t see anyone point out that Beirut also looks like Beirut, and part of the reason is that the Reagan administration had set off a terrorist truck bomb there, in 1985, outside a mosque timed to kill the maximum number of people as they left… I don’t know what name you give to the policies that are a leading factor in the deal of maybe a million civilians in Iraq and maybe a half a million children, which is the price the Secretary of State says we’re willing to pay. Is there a name for that? Supporting Israeli atrocities is another one.” 9/11 p. 44

Page 19: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

US responsibility, Chomsky and negative feedback

Chomsky argues that regardless who has the main responsibility, US intellectuals should focus on the US partWhen Group A is in conflict with Group B, intellectuals in Group A will be rewarded for criticizing B and penalized for criticizing A. But criticizing B’s role can only escalate the conflict; while criticizing A’s role can reduce it.This is similar to Pettigrew’s view of “negative feedback.”

Page 20: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Why pacifism is not necessarily the answer

Chomsky believes that the sources of the problem are an institutionalized structure of wealth and power.

Failing to make a judgment about the just outcome makes change less likely,

and it is often not possible to walk away from escalating conflict.

Page 21: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Bullies: complementary schizmogenesis.

Both Palestinians, Israelis, and the US believe that the actions of the other demanded countermeasures.And it is often the case that ignoring action of a bully can encourage, rather than discourage bullying.This is the dynamic that Bateson called complementary schizmogenesis.

Page 22: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Positive feedbacks of opposite behaviors

In addition to the escalation or positive feedback of similar behaviors (symmetrical retaliation), Bateson argued that there can be positive feedback of opposite behaviors (complementary).

complementary

Male boasting Male boasting

Male boasting Female deference

symmetrical+

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Page 23: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Fear of negotiationThe central problem is that both the Israelis and the Palestinians believe that to negotiate within the parameters that the other side offers would be to capitulate to terrorism, like acting timidly to a bully.If this is the main dynamic, then compromise and concession in the face or coercion is part of the bad dynamic:

Bullying (terror) Timidity (capitulation)

complementary+

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Page 24: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

“Absolute Power”Lord Acton argued “Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely”

This was directed against absolute power both in the state and the church.

This can be viewed as a complementary schizmogenesis.

Absolute power Diminished opposition and accountability

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Page 25: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

Another example: Pedophilia

Some analysts of the current scandals in the church have argued that:

Priestly prestige discouraged accountability to critics/victims

While simultaneously motivating authorities to conceal cases

Priest not accountable to parish

Ability to commit the act and imperative to conceal it

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Page 26: Political Economy Conflict and functional dynamics concerning the rules of the game.

So what?

In none of these cases does a systems representation “solve” any of the practical issues of power and inequality.However, they may help conceptualize the dynamics and the issues.They are one of the principle reasons that Feagin regards large inequalities and inequalities of power (especially ascribed inequalities) as non-sustainable.