-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
The Political Consequencesof Social MovementsEdwin Amenta,1 Neal
Caren,2 Elizabeth Chiarello,1
and Yang Su11Department of Sociology, University of California,
Irvine, California 92697;email: [email protected], [email protected],
[email protected] of Sociology, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill,North Carolina 27599; email:
[email protected]
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2010. 36:287307
First published online as a Review in Advance onApril 20,
2010
The Annual Review of Sociology is online
atsoc.annualreviews.org
This articles doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120029
Copyright c 2010 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved
0360-0572/10/0811-0287$20.00
Key Words
collective benets, states, inuence, political mediation, case
studies
Abstract
Research on the political consequences of socialmovements has
recentlyaccelerated. We take stock of this research with a focus on
movementsin democratic polities and the United States in
comparative and histori-cal perspective. Although most studies
demonstrate the inuence of thelargest movements, this research has
not addressed how much move-ments matter. As for the conditions
under which movements matter,scholars have been revising their
initial hypotheses that the strategies,organizational forms, and
political contexts that aid mobilization alsoaid in gaining and
exerting political inuence. Scholars are exploringalternative
arguments about the productivity of different actions
andcharacteristics of movements and movement organizations in the
var-ied political contexts and institutional settings they face.
Researchers arealso employingmore innovative research designs to
appraise thesemorecomplex arguments. Scholarship will advance best
if scholars continueto think through the interactions between
strategies, organizations, andcontexts; addressmovement inuences on
processes in institutional pol-itics beyond the agenda-setting
stage; situate case studies in comparativeand historical
perspective; and make more comparisons across move-ments and
issues.
287
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
INTRODUCTION
The political consequences of social move-ments have drawn
extensive scholarly attentionin the rst decade of this century. The
years2001 through 2009 alone have seen an acceler-ation of
publications, including 45 articles, 38in the top four general
sociology journalstheAmerican Sociological Review, American Journal
ofSociology, Social Forces, and Social Problemsand7 in
Mobilization, the top movement specialtyjournal. This outpouring
includes severalmonographs and edited volumes from presti-gious
scholarly presses. This review takes stockof this researchits
questions, conceptualand theoretical developments, and
researchstrategieswhich was last reviewed more thana decade ago
(Giugni 1998). We address socialmovements attempts to inuence
policymak-ing, themain subject of research, but alsomove-ment
inuences on democratic rights, electoralprocesses, legal decisions,
political parties, andstate bureaucracies. In this review, we focus
onthe political impact of movements in largelydemocratized polities
and especially in the U.S.polity in comparative andhistorical
perspective.
We dene political social movements asactors and organizations
seeking to alter powerdecits and to effect social
transformationsthrough the state by mobilizing regular citizensfor
sustained political action (see Tilly 1999,Amenta et al. 2009). The
denition focuseson social movement organizations (SMOs)(McCarthy
& Zald 1977) or challengers(Gamson 1990) that can be combined
intosocial movement industries or families. Weinclude all the
political collective action ofmovements: not only
extrainstitutional actionsuch as protest marches and civil
disobedience,but also lobbying, lawsuits, and press confer-ences.1
The denition does not include public
1Our denition includes established SMOs and movementactors, such
as the National Organization for Women. Ourdenition excludes
politically active interest groups basedon business and
professional actors, such as the Chamber ofCommerce and American
Medical Association, whose con-stituents are not facing political
power decits and are seen asmembers of the polity (Tilly 1999) and
also excludes service,
opinion (cf. McCarthy & Zald 1977), which wesee as
analytically separate from movementsand may have a direct impact on
political out-comes (Giugni 2004, Brooks & Manza 2006,Agnone
2007). Using a similar denition,Amenta et al. (2009) identify 34
major socialmovement families by surveying all nationaland
political U.S. SMOs that appeared inThe New York Times in the
twentieth century.The most covered movements were those oflabor,
African American civil rights, veterans,feminists, nativists, and
environmentalists.
A central issue in the literature is whethersocial movements
have had any major politicalconsequences or can be routinely
expected tohave them. Unlike mobilizing constituents,creating
collective identities, increasing indi-vidual and organizational
capacities, or alteringthe career trajectories of movement
partici-pants, political consequences are external toand not under
the direct control of SMOs. Theproximate actors in key political
decisions arepolitical executives, legislators, administrators,and
judges, each subject to myriad inuences.The disagreement on this
basic issue is wide.Some scholars (Baumgartner & Mahoney2005,
Piven 2006) hold that social movementsare generally effective and
account for mostimportant political change. Others (Skocpol2003,
Burstein & Sausner 2005, Giugni 2007)argue that social
movements are rarely inuen-tial and overall not signicantly so
comparedwith other political actors, institutions, andprocesses.
The extant researchmainly casestudies of the largest
movementstypicallyconcludes that these movements are
politicallyinuential for the specic outcomes analyzed,but it does
not settle the larger questions ofwhether movements are generally
effective orhow inuential they are.
Most scholars studying the political in-uence of movements seek
to identify the
recreational, and fraternal organizations and actors, such asthe
March of Dimes, the American Bowling Congress, andthe Knights of
Columbus, as they are not mainly politicallyfocused. Nor do we
include all international nongovernmen-tal organizations, given
their frequent service orientation.
288 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
conditions under which social movementsare likely to be
inuential and see the impactof social movements on states as a
recursiveprocess (Soule et al. 1999, Amenta et al. 2002,Meyer 2005,
Amenta 2006, Olzak & Soule2009). The structure and activities
of statesinuence lines of organization and actionamong movements,
and social movementsseek to inuence states by mobilizing
people,resources, and claims around lines of action.Partly because
of its late start, research on thepolitical consequences of
movements began byhypothesizing that political inuence would
beproduced by the movement literatures threemain determinants of
mobilization: resourcemobilization and organizational forms
ormobilizing structures (McCarthy & Zald2002, McVeigh et al.
2003, Andrews 2004,King et al. 2005), framing strategies
(Cress& Snow 2000, McCright & Dunlap 2003,McVeigh et al.
2004, McCammon et al. 2008,McCammon 2009), and political
opportunitiesand contexts (Giugni 2004, Meyer & Minkoff2004,
Soule 2004, Meyer 2005, McVeigh et al.2006). The idea was that the
circumstancesthat helped challengers mobilize would alsoaid them in
their bids to effect political change.Recent research has suggested
that high mo-bilization is necessary for a movement to
gainpolitical inuence and that certain mobilizingstructures and
political circumstances boost theproductivity of movement efforts,
but also thatconditions and activities that spur mobilizationoften
present problems for challengers beyondthe attention-getting phase
of politics. Sortingthis out has been a focus of recent
research.
In our review, we address a series of issuesspecic to the
political consequences of move-ments. First, we specify what
inuence meansfor politically oriented challengers. Next, weaddress
the question of whether movementshave been generally inuential. We
thenreview hypothesized pathways to inuence forchallengers, going
beyond the standard deter-minants of mobilization to address
theoreticalapproaches that confront specic aspects ofpolitical
actors, structures, and processes andincorporate them in
multicausal arguments.
From there we address the distinctive method-ological issues
that arise in attempting toappraise theoretical claims about the
politicalconsequences of movements (Tilly 1999, Earl2000, Giugni
2004, McVeigh et al. 2006,Tilly & Tarrow 2006). We conclude
withsuggestions for future thinking and lines ofempirical
inquiry.
HOW MIGHT MOVEMENTSMATTER IN POLITICS?
The question of how movements might matteris about the nature of
the outcome or depen-dent variable. Scholars of the political
impactsof movements have moved away from address-ing whether
movements or organizations aresuccessful in gaining new benets or
acceptance(Gamson 1990) and have turned to examiningthe causal
inuence of movements on politicaloutcomes and processes drawn from
politicalsociology literature (Andrews 2004, Amenta &Caren
2004). The main potential political con-sequences of movements at
the structural levelare the extension of democratic rights and
prac-tices and the formation of new political parties.At amore
intermediate level are changes in pol-icy, which can provide
consistent benets to amovements constituency as well as enforce
col-lective identities and aid challengers in strug-gles against
targets not mainly state oriented.Scholars have found it valuable
to divide thepolicymaking process into its component parts.Scholars
of political outcomes have deempha-sized Gamsons (1990) acceptance
but haveargued that challengers can gain political lever-age of a
similar kind through connections withpolitical parties and through
electoral activity aswell as through what Gamson calls inclusion,or
challengers occupying state positions.
Beyond Success
Scholars of the political impact of move-ments have dropped or
modied Gamsons(1990) types of successnew advantages
andacceptancelargely because these outcomesand the idea of success
generally do not
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
289
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
correspond well to the degree of potential in-uence over states
and political processes. ForGamson, success in new advantages means
thatan SMOs goals were mainly realized, and thiscriterion works
well when a movement has oneimportant political goal, such as
gaining suf-frage (Banaszak 1996, McCammon et al. 2001)or banning
alcohol (Szymanski 2003). But thesuccess standard limits the
consideration ofmany possible political impacts. Challengersmay
fail to achieve their stated programandthus be deemed a failurebut
still win substan-tial new advantages for their constituents, a
sit-uation likely for challengers with far-reachinggoals (Amenta et
al. 2005). There may be ben-ecial unintended consequences (Tilly
1999).Challengers can do worse than fail; they can in-duce
backlashes, such as repression or increasedpolicing
(Piven&Cloward 1977; Fording 2001;Snow & Soule 2009,
chapter 6). Challengersconstituencies may gain political results
thatchallengers do not cause (Skrentny 2006b).
To address some of these issues, otherscholars start with an
alternative based on theconcept of collective goods or on
group-wiseadvantages or disadvantages from whichnonparticipants
cannot be easily excluded, andthese scholars focus explicitly on
states andpolitical processes (Amenta & Young 1999).Political
collective goods can be material, suchas categorical social
spending programs, butcan also be less tangible, such as new ways
torefer to a group. SMOs almost invariably claimto represent a
group extending beyond the or-ganizations adherents and make
demands thatwould provide collective benets to that largergroup
(Tilly 1999). The collective benet stan-dard takes into account
that a challenger canhave considerable impact even when it fails
toachieve its goals and that successful challengerscould have
negligible consequences (Amenta& Young 1999, Andrews 2004,
Agnone 2007).
These ideas regarding new benets andcollective goods have been
connected to po-litical sociological concepts (see Amenta et
al.2002). From this perspective, the greatest sortof impact is the
one that provides a group withcontinuing leverage over political
processes and
increases the political returns to the collectiveaction of a
challenger. These gains are usuallyat a structural or systemic
level of state pro-cesses and constitute a kind of
meta-collectivebenet. Gains in the democratization of
stateprocesses, such as winning the right to vote by anonfranchised
group, increase the productivityof future state-directed collective
action bysuch groups. Many of the most prominentsocial movements
have sought this basic goal,including movements of workers, women,
and,in the United States, the civil rights movement(Rueschemeyer et
al. 1992, Banaszak 1996,McAdam 1999, McCammon et al. 2001).The
formation by movements of establishedpolitical parties is also a
structural politicalchange (Schwartz 2000 andmore below), if
onestep removed from transformations in states.
Collective Goods through Policy
Most collective action, however, is aimed at anintermediate
level: benets that will continue toow from states to groups unless
some coun-tervailing action is taken. These generally in-volve
major legislative changes in state policyand the bureaucratic
enforcement and imple-mentation of that policy. State policies are
in-stitutionalized benets that provide collectivegoods in a routine
fashion to all those meet-ing specied requirements. For example,
onceenacted and enforced with bureaucratic means,categorical social
spending programs providebenets in such a manner (Amenta 1998).
Thebeneciaries gain rights of entitlement to thebenets, and
bureaucratic enforcement helps toensure the routine maintenance of
such collec-tive benets. The issue and group are privilegedin
politics. Regulatory bureaucracies may ad-vance mandates in the
absence of new legisla-tion, as with state labor commissions
(Amenta1998) or afrmative action (Bonastia 2000).However, policies
vary widely in their impli-cations. Challengers may win something
minorfor their constituency, such as a one-time sym-bolic benet
designedmainly to reassure an au-dience of voters or other
bystanders (Santoro2002).
290 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
Through their policies, states can ratifyor attempt to undermine
emerging collectiveidentities or help to create new ones,
sometimeson purpose, though often inadvertently. Inso-far as a
challenger constructs a new collectiveidentity that extends to a
beneciary group andprovides psychological rewards, winning a
po-litical afrmation of this identity is a potentiallyimportant
accomplishment (Polletta & Jasper2001). States provide
authoritative commu-nications that can greatly inuence
identitiesand are often in the vanguard of recognizingnew identity
claims through changes in policy(Amenta & Young 1999). These
results canrange from a challengers constituency gainingmore
respectful labels in ofcial governmentalrepresentations, to having
the group formallyrecognized in state policies and
regulations(Skrentny 2002, 2006b), to dening racialcategories
(Nobles 2000).
Movements and organizations that are notprimarily state oriented
may also target thestate for policies that aid them in
strugglesagainst other targets (Tarrow 1998), thusincreasing the
probability of inuencing thesetargets. For example, labor movements
focuson states to ensure rights to organize and en-gage in
collective bargaining. Also, civil rightsmovements have had an
advantage in ght-ing discrimination by corporations throughequal
employment opportunity (EEO) laws(Skrentny 2002). By outlawing a
set of practicesand providing legal remedies, EEO laws
createanother channel for collective action. Further-more, by
creating a bureau, the EEOC, theselaws have provided additional
resources andlegitimation for the movement. Thus, chal-lengers can
demand state regulations on indus-tries (Schneiberg & Bartley
2001). States mayalso become a fulcrum in transnational
protest(Paxton et al. 2006). Challengers blocked in onestate may
appeal to sympathetic SMOs in otherstates to apply pressure to
their governmentsto alter the policies of the original state.
Scholars can better assess the impact ofchallengers by dividing
the process of creatingnew laws that contain collective benetsinto
the processes of (a) agenda setting,
(b) legislative content, (c) passage, and(d ) implementation
(Amenta & Young 1999,Andrews & Edwards 2004). If a
challengerplaces its issue onto the political agenda, ithas
increased its probability of winning somecollective benets for its
larger constituency.Inuencing the political agenda matters
forachieving legislative gains (Baumgartner &Mahoney 2005), and
movement protest ismost inuential at this early stage of the
policyprocess (King et al. 2005, 2007; Soule & King2006;
Johnson 2008; Olzak & Soule 2009). Achallenger can also work to
increase the valueof collective benets included in any bill
thatmakes it onto the legislative agenda (Bernstein2001, Amenta
2006).Once the content has beenspecied, moreover, challengers can
inuenceindividual legislators to vote for the bill andthus inuence
the probability of gaining spec-ied collective benets (Amenta et
al. 2005).Then the program must be implemented,and the more secure
the implementation thegreater the probability of collective
benetsover the long run (Andrews & Edwards 2004).Winning a new
interpretation of a law can be acollective benet, too, and
litigation has beenan increasingly important process for
move-ments, especially regarding the enforcement ofexisting laws
(McCann 2006, Skrentny 2006a).
Beyond Acceptance
Democratic states generally recognize chal-lenging
organizations, and so scholars in thisarea do not frequently
address Gamsons(1990) acceptance. More useful is a modiedversion of
Gamsons (1990) inclusion, orchallengers who gain state positions
throughelection or appointment, which can lead tocollective benets
(Banaszak 2005, Amenta2006, Paxton et al. 2006). Important
interme-diate inuence can come through elections andpolitical
parties, as the willingness of ofcials toaid the constituents of
social movements oftenturns on electoral considerations
(Goldstone2003, Amenta 2006). The connections can bedirect and
tight, as whenmovements form theirown political parties (Schwartz
2000), which
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
291
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
can take ofce (usually in coalitions) and act ontheir platforms,
as with some left-libertarianand green parties in Europe (Rucht
1999). Inpolities with direct democratic devices, move-ments may
win or inuence policy changesthrough referendums (Kriesi 2004).
In the U.S. polity, creating an enduringmovement party has not
been possible, anddirect democratic devices are restricted tosome
states (Amenta 2006). More inuentialin U.S. settings are
challengers bids to forgeenduring electoral connections with one of
themain political parties, as through inuencingthe party platforms
of presidential nominees.Historically, this has been done, for
example,between labor and civil rights movementsand the national
Democratic party (Amenta1998) and, more recently, between
ChristianRight and antiabortion movements and theRepublican party
(Micklethwait &Wooldridge2005, Fetner 2008). U.S. national
legislativecandidates are not bound by party platforms,however.
Movements have sought to inuenceindividual candidates and
elections, oftenaiding friends or combating enemies as deter-mined
by voting records or campaign promises,and have avoided strict
alignments with partiesto maximize membership (Clemens 1997,Amenta
2006, McVeigh 2009). As for inclu-sion proper, U.S. challenging
organizationsrepresentatives are far more likely to beappointed to
state positions, such as to regulargovernmental bureaucracies or to
commissionsaddressing a specic issue (Amenta 2006), thanto win ofce
through elections; care is needed,however, to distinguish between
inclusion ofactual participants in challenges and inclu-sion of
members of the challengers targetconstituency.
DO MOVEMENTS MATTERIN POLITICS, AND IF SO,HOW MUCH?
The question of if and how much movementsmatter in politics is
important because onekey motivation for studying movements is
thatthey effect political and social change. Some
scholars view social movements other than la-bor as relatively
lacking in political inuencecompared with other political actors
and in-stitutions (Skocpol 2003, Burstein & Sausner2005).
Others tend to evaluate movements ashighly inuential (see Berry
1999, Baumgartner& Mahoney 2005, Piven 2006). Abundant
re-search indicates that various individual move-ments and their
activities have inuenced spe-cic policies, but researchers often nd
thatmovement inuence is contingent on favorablepolitical or other
circumstances (see Table 1).The more global questions of whether
mostmovements have mattered and how much theyhave mattered in
comparison with other deter-minants of political outcomes have not
beenconclusively addressed.
Some scholarship employs research designsthat provide leverage
on the global questions.Notably, researchers have compared
inuenceacross a random sample of U.S. movementorganizations (Gamson
1990); across the58 largest civic membership organizations(Skocpol
2003), about half of which are SMOs;and across a selection of major
political issues(Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005). Otherstudies
examine similar movements acrosscountries (Kriesi et al. 1995;
Giugni 2004,2007; Linders 2004; Halfmann 2010). Yetothers analyze
individual movements and allkey legislation enacted during the
period ofcontention (Viterna & Fallon 1998, Werum& Winders
2001, Amenta 2006, Agnone 2007,Johnson 2008, Santoro 2008, Olzak
& Soule2009), such as relating to old age, LGBTrights, or the
environment. These studies ndthat SMOs and other civic
organizations havebeen inuential. Gamson (1990) nds thatmost of his
challenging organizations gainedsome form of success, although
success is oftencontingent on goals, activities, and forms
oforganization. Skocpol (2003) nds inuenceamong civic organizations
with active mem-bership afliates across the country. Othersalso nd
that movement inuence depends inpart on the circumstances under
which move-ments contend (Amenta 2006, Santoro 2008,Halfmann 2010)
or is conned to the
292 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
Table
1Movem
entinflu
ence
asatopicad
dressedin
articles
ain
thetopfour
sociolog
yjourna
lsan
dMobilization
,200
120
09,b
ymovem
entfamily
and
prom
inen
ce,o
utcometype
analyzed
,sizean
ddirectionof
effect,and
direct
ormed
iatedinflu
ence
Influ
ence
ofMov
emen
tsMed
iation
andTyp
e
Movem
entfamily
(prominen
ce)b
Mov
emen
tsexam
ined
cStrong
Mod
est
Weak
Non
eNeg
ative
Unm
ediated
Med
iated
Partisan
Con
text
Leg
islative
Stage
Lab
or(1)
21
10
00
11
00
Civilrigh
ts,b
lack
(2)
113
61
10
110
41
Feminism/w
omen
srigh
ts(4)
117
31
00
110
42
Nativist/suprem
acist
(5)
10
00
01
10
00
Env
iron
men
t(6)
61
23
00
15
10
Antiw
ar(9)
20
01
10
11
00
Civilrigh
ts,o
ther
(19)
50
13
10
05
40
Christia
nRight
(21)
21
10
00
11
01
Lesbian
andga
y(24)
30
12
00
03
01
Other/non
-U.S.
115
51
00
011
51
Outcometype
Structural
31
11
00
12
01
Policy,
multip
le10
35
20
01
91
2Policy,
sing
le40
1414
93
04
3617
3Election/inclusion
10
00
01
10
00
Total
5418
2012
31
747
186
a The
45artic
lescatego
rizedin
thistable:
Agn
one20
07;A
lmeida
2008
;Amen
taet
al.2
005;
And
rews20
01;C
hen20
07;C
ornw
alle
tal.20
07;D
avis&
Rosan
2004
;Dixon
2008
;Evans
&Kay
2009
;Giugn
i200
7;How
ard-Hassm
ann20
05;Ing
ram
&Rao
2004
;Isaac
etal.2
006;
Jaco
bs&
Helms20
01;Jacob
s&
Ken
t200
7;John
son20
08;K
ane20
03,2
007;
Kinget
al.2
005,
2007
;Lee
2007
;McA
dam
&Su
2002
;McC
ammon
2009
;McC
ammon
etal.2
001,
2007
,200
8;M
cCrigh
t&Dun
lap20
03;M
cVeigh
etal.2
003,
2004
,200
6;Noy
2009
;Olzak
&Ryo
2007
;Olzak
&So
ule
2009
;Ped
rian
a20
04,2
006;
Santoro20
02,2
008;
Skrentny
2006
a;So
ule20
04;S
oule
&King20
06;S
oule
&Olzak
2004
;Stearns
&Alm
eida
2004
;Tsutsui
&Sh
in20
08;V
iterna&
Fallo
n19
98;
Werum
&W
inde
rs20
01.
bThe
prom
inen
ceof
amov
emen
tfam
ily(sho
wnin
parenthe
ses)refers
toits
rank
ingin
The
New
York
Tim
escitatio
ns,1
900
1999
(see
Amen
taet
al.2
009).
c Num
berof
mov
emen
tsin
each
catego
ryexam
ined
.For
artic
lesthat
exam
ined
morethan
onemov
emen
tfam
ilyor
orga
nizatio
nwith
inthat
family
,eachcase
isco
dedsepa
rately.
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
293
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
agenda-setting phase of the policy process(Baumgartner &
Mahoney 2005, Olzak &Soule 2009).
Recent high-prole articles also indicatethat movements have been
signicantly inu-ential. Table 1 considers all 45 articles,
en-compassing the analysis of 54 movements ormovement
organizations, published in the topfour sociology journals and
Mobilization be-tween 2001 and 2009 that examined state-related
outcomes of movements; all but 4 ofthe 54 found at least one
positive relation-ship between these outcomes and a
movementmeasure. These measures included the num-ber of protest
events, membership size, andorganizational density. In 33
instances, theserelationships were established through regres-sion
analyses controlling for many other poten-tial determinants of the
outcomes. In 12 oth-ers, comparative and historical analysts
selectedcases to control for other potential determi-nants of the
outcomes,meaning that about 83%of the movements examined were
deemed sig-nicantly inuential beyond controls.
Yet, for several reasons, these studies donot conclusively
answer the general questionof whether movements are typically
inuentialand how inuential they have been in compar-ison to other
potential causes. Almost all theresearch is on policy, with only
three instancesof movements seeking structural inuence.Yet only in
10 cases do researchers addressall legislation or multiple pieces
of legislationrelated to a movements main issue. And eventhese
studies only sometimes separate outthe most key legislation in
terms of benetsit may provide (Amenta et al. 2005, Olzak& Soule
2009). Almost three-fourths of themovement relationships analyzed
(40 out of 54)addressed specic policy outcomes of interestto
movements at particular points in time.Only one article addressed
an issue relatingto acceptance, in this instance a movementsinuence
on electoral results, which was neg-ative (McVeigh et al. 2004). As
for the degreeof inuence, using the scholars evaluationsplus our
own when these are not supplied, wend that 18 of these ndings
indicate a strong
(and positive) movement inuence and another20 indicate moderate
inuence. Thus, about70% of the relationships show reasonably
highmovement inuence. However, this means that30% of the ndings
show negligible positiveinuence of movements: 12, or 22%,
exhibitweak inuence, 3 nd no inuence, and 1exhibits negative
inuence. Moreover, theimpact of a movement is typically found tobe
contingent on other circumstances, suchas mobilization occurring
during a favorablepolitical alignment. In 47 of the 50 instances
inwhich there was a signicantly positive move-ment effect, the
inuence was mediatedanissue to which we return below.
Finally, this scholarship disproportionatelyexamines the largest
U.S. movements; of the54 movements examined in the articles, 31
in-volvedU.S. labor, AfricanAmerican civil rights,feminism,
nativism, and environmentalism, veof the six most-covered movement
families inthe twentieth century (Amenta et al. 2009),with 22 for
the civil rights and feminist move-ments alone. The larger
movements have beenfound to bemore inuential. Of the
threemost-covered movements (labor, African Americancivil rights,
and feminism) appearing in re-search, only 3 of 24 analyses, or
12.5%, foundthe movement to have either weak or no in-uence; among
the rest of the movement cate-gories, 13 of 30 analyses, or 43%,
found weak,no, or negative inuence.
It is worth discussing why so often researchnds that movements
exhibit little or no in-uence. For example, McVeigh et al. (2004)nd
that the framing that aided the mobiliza-tion of the Ku Klux Klan
dampened its elec-toral inuence. Cornwall et al. (2007) nd thatthe
womens suffrage movement had no effectin the states where the
movement was mobi-lized, arguing that the contexts were ripe
formobilization but not for exerting inuence.Skrentny (2006b) nds
that although AsianAmericans, Latinos, andAmerican Indians ben-eted
from Labor Department afrmative ac-tion regulations, the
organizations representingthese groups exerted little effort to
gain the ben-ets; by contrast, white ethnic groups sought to
294 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
gain these benets but failed because of the per-ceptions of
policy makers. Giugni (2007) ndsno inuence of the antiwar movement
on mil-itary spending and argues that the high-proleforeign policy
domain limits the viability oftheir claims. McAdam & Su (2002)
argue thatthe marginal inuence of antiVietnam Warprotest was due to
the movements inability tobe simultaneously threatening to elites
and per-suasive to the public. If antiwarmovements facehigher
hurdles, however, they have achievedsome inuence (Marullo &
Meyer 2004), andit is worth identifying the conditions underwhich
that is possible. More generally, schol-ars of social movements
have also found thatcertain issues and policies may be very
difcultfor movements to inuence, including policies(a) closely tied
to the national cleavage struc-ture, (b) for which high levels of
political ormaterial resources are at stake, (c) regardingmilitary
matters, or (d ) on which public opin-ion is very strong (Kriesi et
al. 1995, Giugni2004, Burstein & Sausner 2005). In thesepolicy
areas, there are more likely to be pow-erful state and nonstate
actors working in op-position to the movement. Similarly, in
struc-turally unfavorable political contexts in which agroups
democratic rights are greatly restricted(Amenta 2006), inuence over
policy is ex-tremely difcult to achieve.
Given the magnitude of the task, the globalquestions have not
been addressed systemati-cally by either quantitative or
comparative his-torical research. This is largely due to the
highdata barriers and the general trade-off betweenthe size of the
question and the ability of schol-ars conclusively to answer it.
Ascertaining thedegree to which movements have mattered
po-litically would require analyses over long timeperiods and
across many different movements,issue areas, and countries.
Scholars would needto demonstrate that movements were at least
ascausally inuential as various political institu-tions,
conditions, and actors previously foundto affect policy (Amenta
2003). This sort ofstudy has not been undertaken in part becausethe
movements are difcult to study cross-nationally and over long
stretches of time. The
Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment does not
collect data on socialmovements across capitalist democracies
theway it does on economics, demographics, andparty representation;
measures of movementscope or activity, aside from those
regardinglabor collected by the International Labor Or-ganization,
are typically gained only throughlabor-intensive archival research.
Comparativeand historical analyses of movement inuencewould pose
even greater logistical difcultiesgiven their steep knowledge
requirements.
In short, there is conclusive evidence fromwell-crafted studies
that the largest movementshave had political impacts on some issues
ofconcern to them. Scholars who ignore move-ments in analyses of
political issues over whichlarge movements are contending do so at
theirperil. All the same, it remains difcult to pin-point how much
even the larger movementshave mattered in comparison to other
actorsand structures in relation to specic outcomesof interest.
Also, some types of issues and situ-ations seem relatively
impervious to movementinuence. We discuss at the end of this
reviewsome strategies tomakemore progress on thesequestions.
UNDER WHICH CONDITIONSDO MOVEMENTS MATTERIN POLITICS?
The question addressed by most scholarshipfocused on movements
is the conditions underwhich movements matter politically.
Theinitial hypotheses about the political impacts ofmovements were
the same as the hypothesizeddeterminants of mobilization. Scholars
focusedon a movements mobilizing structures, fram-ing and other
strategies, and political contextsfavorable tomobilization
(McAdamet al. 1996).These arguments hold that what
promoteschallengers mobilization will also promotetheir political
inuence; in short, specicforms of challenger organization,
strategies(including framing strategies and protesttypes), and
political opportunities will result inboth mobilization and
political inuence and
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
295
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
benets for mobilized challengers. Althoughscholars still address
the roles of mobilizingstructures, strategies, and political
contexts, re-sults indicate that the conditions that
producemobilization sometimes make it difcult toachieve inuence at
stages in the policy processbeyond agenda setting. Finally,
political me-diation arguments reject the search for magicbullets:
There are no specic organizationalforms, strategies, or political
contexts thatwill always help challengers. Instead, scholarsshould
be looking for specic forms of organi-zation and strategies that
are more productivein some political contexts than in others.
Mobilization
The simplest argument has been that mobiliza-tion in itself is
likely to be inuential, a throw-back to rational choice accounts in
which oncea collective action problem (say, gaining contri-butions
for pizza) is solved, a collective benet(pizza) is automatically
provided. The ability tomobilize different sorts of resources is
key forthe impact of movements, and mobilization ofresources and
membership does provide somepolitical inuence (Rucht 1999, McCarthy
&Zald 2002). Because the possibility of having in-uence is
predicated on SMOs survival, somescholars focus on the
organizational character-istics that promote it (Gamson
1990,McCarthy& Zald 2002). Yet, as we note above,
politicalinuence is not something SMOs can simplyprovide,
pizza-like, for themselves.
Initial debates also addressed which formsof organization or
mobilizing structures(McAdam et al. 1996) were likely to
producepolitical gains. Gamson (1990) found thatbureaucratic SMOs
were more likely to gainnew advantages (cf. Piven & Cloward
1977).SMOs with greater strategic resources aredeemed likely to
prevail over others in the eld(Ganz 2000), and resourceful movement
infras-tructures, including diverse leaders, complexleadership
structures, multiple organizations,informal ties, and resources
coming substan-tially from members, brought gains in
policyimplementation for the civil rights movement
in the South (Andrews 2004). Yet organizationsdesigned to
mobilize people and resourcesbehind a cause may not be best suited
to engagein the tasks of political inuence, persuasion,or
litigation. For example, the Townsend Plan,an organization highly
successful in mobilizingthe elderly, saw its leaders who were in
chargeof mobilizing supporters often at odds withits Washington
lobbyists and electoral strate-gists, who were relatively
understaffed. Theorganization gained almost a million membersvery
quickly in 1934, but it could not presentcoherent testimony in
Congress (Amenta2006). This problem may be alleviated at
themovement level; a large number of tactically di-verse
organizations are associated with politicalinuence for the civil
rights movement (Olzak& Ryo 2007). In individual SMOs,
diverseleaders and complex leadership structures mayreduce the
potential conict between these twosorts of leaders and missions
(Andrews 2004).
Strategies: Framing, Protest,and Electoral Activity
The second line of thinking that addresses thepotential inuence
of mobilized challengersfocuses on their strategies, singling out
forspecial attention claims-making and framing(for a review, see
Polletta & Ho 2004). Cress& Snow (2000) argue that for a
challenger tohave a policy impact it must employ resonantprognostic
and diagnostic framesto identifyproblems and pose credible
solutions to them.McCammon (2009) nds that womens juryrights
mobilizations across states that led tofavorable outcomes were
those that deneda problem as serious and broad in scope,provided a
clear rationale, and offered concreteevidence to support the
proposed policy (cf.Burstein & Hirsh 2007).
Other problems remain, however, with us-ing framing to explain
political outcomes. Onlyrarely is the inuence of frames addressed
inmultivariate contexts (cf. Cress & Snow 2000,Burstein &
Hirsh 2007, McCammon 2009).For movements to be inuential, their
framesneed to be minimally plausible and culturally
296 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
resonant (Taylor & Van Dyke 2004), but theirvalue likely
varies by setting. Amenta (2006)nds that the Townsend Plans frames
did notchange much, but its inuence varied greatlyover time. More
important, frames that helpmobilize supporters may be
counterproductivein trying to inuence policy makers
(Lipsky1968,Mansbridge 1986). McVeigh et al. (2004)nd that the
frames that helped the Ku KluxKlan mobilize constituents, using an
us/themboundary, impeded its ability to inuence elec-tions. Amenta
(2006) nds that the TownsendPlans call for generous $200 monthly
pen-sions, designed to mobilize elderly supporters,was used by
opponents to reduce public sup-port for its sponsored legislation,
which pro-vided more modest stipends. Pedriana (2006)nds that
rights frames work best in legal set-tings regardless of how well
they work for mo-bilization or political campaigns (see review
inMcCann 2006). More generally, SMO lead-ers must nd ways to alter
their mobilizationframes in addressing political decision makersor
courts, or they must cede control over theseprocesses to other SMOs
or like-minded pol-icy makers. Scholars need to address
simulta-neously the frames used to mobilize movementsupport and to
exert inuence in political set-tings (Evans 1997).
Working from the hypothesis that specicstrategies will work
differently at individualphases of the policy cycle, recent
scholarshiphas focused on the impact of protest for threat,protest
for persuasion (Andrews & Edwards2004), and institutional
protest, as well as on thepolitical agenda-setting stage of the
policy pro-cess. Protest for threat is characterized by
with-holding compliance with political and otherinstitutions,
whereas protest for persuasion ismeant to inuence politicians by
winning overbystanders through large-scale demonstrationsof
support, such as peaceful marches. Olzak& Soule (2009) nd that
institutional environ-mental protest events inuenced
congressionalhearings, which are associated with policy ac-tion
(Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005). Protestof all types, however,
works through whatAndrews (2004) calls the
action/reactionmodel,
for which the response of political authorities tocollective
action is expected to be rapid.
There has not been nearly as much work,however, on the
strategies that work throughslow-moving processes. This is a major
gap, asthis includes most movement collective actionaddressing
political institutions and electoralpolitics, as well as legal
challenges. Althoughscholars tend to view movement action
ad-dressing institutional politics as assimilativeand likely to be
less inuential than protest,electoral strategies, such as
supporting favoredcandidates and opposing disfavored ones, areoften
far more assertive and inuential inpolitics (Clemens 1997, Amenta
et al. 2005).Political actors seek to gain reelection and toact on
party principles and personal values andare typically much less
afraid of movementsthreatening, say, to occupy their ofces thanto
drive them out of ofce. The nding thatmovements are less inuential
in later parts ofthe policy process may mean that the forms
oforganization, frames, and strategies applicableto mobilization
are unhelpful at best in laterstages of the policy process, or that
protest hasgreat limits as a movement strategy.
Beyond protest, social movements seek tohave inuence over
politics through electoralactivity (Goldstone 2003, Banaszak 2005,
Earl& Schussman 2004, Koopmans 2004, Meyer2005), seeking
sustained leverage and not sim-ply a quick reaction. Yet there is
little re-search on movement inuence over electionsand the
political inuence gained through suchelectoral support. Fetner
(2008) nds that theChristianRight inuenced theRepublican plat-form
on gay rights issues, and Micklethwait& Wooldridge (2005) argue
that George W.Bushs campaigns relied on foot soldiers fromthe
Christian Right, gun rights, and antiabor-tion movements. However,
Green et al. (2001)nd that support for the Christian Right
ac-counted less for electoral outcomes across statesthan did the
accessibility of the political partynomination processes to the
movement (seealso Kellstedt et al. 1994). Andrews (2004)nds that
African American candidates electedto ofce across Mississippi
counties depended
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
297
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
signicantly on the strength of the local civilrights movement.
Amenta et al. (1992) ndthat Townsend Plan mobilization positively
in-uenced whether its endorsed representativeswere elected. Amenta
et al. (2005) also foundthat endorsed legislators in ofce
signicantlyincreased spending on old-age programs, andsenators
willingness to vote for a key old-age pension bill depended in part
on electoralaction.
Political Context
A third argument is that once a challenger ismobilized the main
thing inuencing its im-pact is the political context or
opportunitystructure. Early claims that in open states withstrong
administrative capacities challengerswillachieve policy gains
(Kitschelt 1986,Kriesi et al.1995; see Kriesi 2004) have been
criticized onthe grounds that, within any country, move-ment
inuence has varied over time (Amentaet al. 2002) and that a states
bureaucratic ca-pacities vary by issue (Giugni 2004). Othersrely on
more ne-grained conceptual develop-ments in political sociology
(see Amenta et al.2002, Banaszak et al. 2003), arguing that
long-standing characteristics of states and
politicalinstitutionsthe polity structure, the democ-ratization of
state institutions, electoral rulesand procedures, and existing
state policiesinuence the prospects of challenges.
Thecentralization and division of power betweeneach branch of
government mean both mul-tiple points of access and veto. The level
ofdemocratization inuences mobilization (Tilly1999), and the bases
for exclusion from demo-cratic processes increase the likelihood
thatgroups will mobilize along these lines, suchas African American
civil rights in the U.S.context (McAdam 1999) and workers in
theEuropean one (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).Electoral rules such as
winner-take-all systemsdiscourage the formation of new political
par-ties (Schwartz 2000). The relative representa-tion of U.S.
Democrats has been shown to am-plify the impact of nonconservative
movements(Meyer & Minkoff 2004). Equally important,
however, the political contexts that promotemobilization,
especially those in which a move-ments constituency is threatened,
do not al-ways increase the productivity of collective ac-tion by
challengers (Meyer & Minkoff 2004,Soule & King 2006,
Cornwall et al. 2007).
Political Mediation Models
Finally, many scholars have developed differ-ent political
mediation accounts of social move-ment consequences (Piven &
Cloward 1977,Amenta et al. 1992, Skocpol 1992, Amenta2006).
According to political mediation mod-els, in a democratic political
system mobiliz-ing relatively large numbers of committed peo-ple
and making plausible claims are necessaryfor movements to achieve
political inuence.Yet a challengers action is more likely to
pro-duce results when institutional political actorssee benet in
aiding the group the challengerrepresents (Almeida & Stearns
1998, Jacobs &Helms 2001, Kane 2003). To secure new bene-ts,
challengers will typically need help or com-plementary action from
like-minded state ac-tors. This requires engaging in collective
actionthat changes the calculations of institutional po-litical
actors, such as elected ofcials and statebureaucrats, and adopting
organizational formsand strategic action that t political
circum-stances. For a movement to be inuential, stateactors need to
see it as potentially facilitatingor disrupting their own
goalsaugmenting orcementing new electoral coalitions, gaining
inpublic opinion, increasing the support for themissions of
governmental bureaus.
Political mediation arguments can relyon action/reaction models
of inuence, suchas Piven & Clowards (1977) argument
thatdisruptive collective action by poor people intimes of
electoral instability induces publicspending (see also Fording
2001). But mostpolitical mediation arguments work
throughslow-moving processes. For instance, Skocpol(2003) argues
that mass-based interest organi-zations have to t the U.S.
political context tobe inuential over the long term, which
meansgaining a wide geographical presence to cover
298 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
a district-based Congress; recent advocacyorganizations with
Washington bases andpaper memberships often fail to do so.
Otherscholars argue that particular strategies workbest in the U.S.
political context (Bernstein2001, Szymanski 2003). Recent work
makesand tests claims about the inuence of differentstrategies at
different points in the politicalprocess (McAdam & Su 2002,
Cornwall et al.2007, Olzak & Soule 2009) or in
differentpolitical contexts (Kriesi et al. 1995, Cress &Snow
2000, Ingram&Rao 2004, Linders 2004,Soule & Olzak 2004,
McCammon et al. 2008).
More generally, the political mediation ar-gument holds that
challengers need to alterstrategies and forms to address specic
polit-ical contexts, such as the level of democratiza-tion in the
polity, the partisan regime in power,and the development of
bureaucratic authoritysurrounding the issue at hand (Amenta et
al.2005, Amenta 2006). The standard distinctionbetween disruptive
and assimilative strategiesis dropped in favor of addressing
assertive-ness, i.e., increasingly strong sanctions beyondprotest.
If the political regime is supportive andthe domestic bureaucrats
are professionalizedand supportive, limited or symbolic protest
islikely to be sufcient to provide inuence. Bycontrast, achieving
collective benets throughpublic policy is likely to be more difcult
with-out a supportive regime or an administrativeauthority, and
more assertive collective actionis required. The sanctions in
assertive institu-tional collective action threaten to increase
ordecrease the likelihood of gaining or keepingsomething valuable
to political actorsoftentheir positions. The institutional
collective ac-tion of challengers works largely by
mobilizingmanypeople behind a course of activity and
thusdemonstrates that a large segment of the elec-torate cares
strongly about an issue. These the-oretical claims have the
advantage of specifyingpolitical conditions and making links
betweensystemic political contexts andmore short-termones.
Consistent with these claims are researchndings that diverse
tactics or organizationaltypes at the movement level produce
politicalgains (Olzak & Ryo 2007, Johnson 2008).
Political mediation arguments also hold thatmany simultaneous
circumstances, somemove-ment related and some not, are required to
ef-fect extensive change (McAdam & Su 2002,Amenta et al. 2005,
Amenta 2006, Giugni2007). In the U.S. setting, where controllingthe
government through a party is rarely anoption, a national
challenger with far-reachinggoals is likely to need (a) a favorable
parti-san context, (b) its issue already on the agenda,(c) high
challenger organization and mobiliza-tion, (d ) credible
claims-making directed atelites and the general public, and (e)
plausibleassertive action such as electoral strategies thatseek to
punish policy opponents and aid friends(Amenta et al. 2005, Amenta
2006). The same islikely to be true for bids to transform the
struc-tural position of groups, such as through votingor civil
rights. Giugni (2007) similarly arguesthat a movement must also
have public opin-ion in its favor to effect major change (see
alsoOlzak & Soule 2009; cf. Amenta et al. 2005,Agnone
2007).
The explanatory value of political media-tion arguments is
underlined by recent liter-ature on social movements. Of the 50
positiverelationships found, 47, or 94%, found that thesize of the
effect of the movement activity orsize indicator varied by other
factors interact-ing with it. Of these other factors, the most
fre-quently notedwas the partisan political context,involving 18
movements; another 6 addressedthe stage in the legislative process
(seeTable 1).Another set of interactions of note included
11involving different sorts of tactics.Only 5 exam-inations
ofmovements didnot attempt tomodelany sort of interaction. Two
articles (Soule &Olzak 2004, Giugni 2007) reported
examininginteraction effects, but they did not nd any sig-nicant
ones.
In short, research on the political inu-ence of movements has
advanced beyond de-ploying the hypotheses initially used to
explainmobilization. Scholars have developed morecomplex
theoretical ideas about the conditionsunder which inuence occurs,
specifying inter-actions between aspects ofmovements and
theiractions and other political actors and political
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
299
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
contexts, often deploying concepts from polit-ical science and
political sociology. These ar-guments and ndings regarding the
conditionsunder which movements might be inuentialbear on the
question of how inuential move-ments have been and can possibly be.
If in thesecausal recipes for major political change suchas
alterations in democratization,major domes-tic policy gains, or
withdrawal from participa-tion in war, mobilization is a minor
ingredientfor which substitutes are available, then move-ments are
likely rarely to matter greatly. If mo-bilization and specic lines
of assertive actionare necessary ingredients, the role of
move-ments in such major changes is much greater.The results
suggest that less dramatic changessuch as reaching the policy
agenda stage or aug-menting existing policies seem to require
fewconditions.
HOW TO TELL IFMOVEMENTS MATTER?
Analyzing the state-related consequences of so-cial movements
poses a series of methodologi-cal hurdles for empirical appraisals
of theoreti-cal claims. Establishing a challengers impact onstates
means to demonstrate that state-relatedcollective goods would not
have appeared inthe absence of themovement or specic actionstaken
by it. Determining whether a movementhad any consequences and, if
so, which ones isnot an easy task (Amenta & Young 1999,
Tilly1999, Earl 2000). Usually there aremany sets ofactors in areas
of concern to social movements,and these actors andother
conditionsmay inu-ence outcomes of interest to challengers.
Theseother potential determinants thus have to betaken into account
in assessing the impact ofchallengers. Further difculties arise
from thefact that recent theoretical claims often specifythe
mediation of the inuence of challengersand their activity through
some other set ofdeterminants. Some additional
methodologicalproblems are due to the fact that so many
re-searchers are engaged in case studies of largemovements.
Research on largemovementsmayhave few implications for small ones,
and
scholars do not typically address how the caseanalyzed compares
to or contrasts with othercases. Here we briey address the ways
schol-ars have sought to clear these methodologicalhurdles and
suggest some additional ways over.
The recent wave of research has tested thepotential impact of
challengers while address-ing alternative arguments mainly
traditionally,by gathering data on many ecological units.This
scholarship has gained information on amovements or SMOs presence
and activities,other potential determinants of politicaloutcomes,
and the outcomes themselves.Employing inferential statistical
methods onthese units facilitates the assessment of theimpact of a
challenger relative to those ofother relevant conditions and the
examinationof limited numbers of interactions. Some ofthese
analyses have taken cross-sectional form,comparing movement inuence
across coun-tries (Paxton et al. 2006) or across subnationalunits
such as states, provinces (Banaszak 1996,McCammon et al. 2001,
Ingram & Rao 2004,Amenta et al. 2005), or counties
(Andrews2001, McVeigh et al. 2006). Recently, quan-titative
analyses have addressed temporality byexamining movements over time
(McAdam &Su 2002, Giugni 2004, Olzak & Soule 2009).Models
can employ lags as appropriate andaccommodate time-varying
covariates in theanalyses. Researchers use (a) time-series
anal-ysis for individual cases (McAdam & Su 2002);(b)
hazard-rate models in multiple-case datawhen the outcome is
dichotomous, such as stateratication of the Equal Rights
Amendment(Soule&Olzak 2004); and (c) generalized
linearregression models when the outcome is con-tinuous (Amenta et
al. 2005, Brooks & Manza2006). These studies sometimes pool
timeseries and cross sections across subunits such asstates
(Soule&Olzak 2004, Amenta et al. 2005).
These quantitative case studies usefullycould be augmented by
historical analyses ofthe political process in the development
oflegislation. Historical analyses are the best wayto examine the
inuences of movements that gobeyond a quick response. Also, most
argumentsabout the impact of collective action specify
300 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
theoretical mechanisms, indicating linkagesbetween various
causes and effects, and schol-ars can trace historical processes to
addresswhether hypothesized theoretical mechanismsoccur (Tilly
1999, Andrews 2004, George &Bennett 2005). To make a convincing
claim ofmovement inuence, historical analyses needto demonstrate
that the challenger changedthe plans and agendas of political
leaders; thecontent of the proposals devised by
executives,legislators, or administrators; the votes of
rep-resentatives key to the passage of legislation;or the speed or
nature of implementation(Amenta 2006), typically by relying on
primarydocuments including contemporary testimonyand news accounts
and memoirs.
Historical analyses can be buttressed in sev-eral ways. One way
is through small-N histor-ical comparisons across two or more
countries(Banaszak 1996, Linders 2004,Halfmann 2010)or other units
(Amenta 2006, Dixon 2008),or across collective action campaigns
(Amenta2006, Dixon 2008, Halfmann 2010). Media-tion arguments can
be examined by compar-isons across challengers with different
levelsof mobilization and strategic approaches at agiven place and
time (Clemens 1997), or acrossplaces in which one challenger is
mobilized indifferent ways (Dixon 2008) or employing dif-ferent
strategies (Amenta 2006), while holdingconstant key alternative
causal claims. Com-bining historical analyses with large-N
quan-titative or formal qualitative analyses can havesynergistic
effects on knowledge accumulation.The detailed information
necessary to engagein historical studies makes it easier to
pinpointkey legislative or other political changes, to de-lineate
historical cutoff points for time-seriesanalyses, and to devise
valid indicators of con-cepts (Amenta et al. 2005, Amenta 2006,
Chen2007). Small-N analyses can also be usefullycombined with
quantitative analyses (Banaszak1996, Giugni 2004).
Another way to take advantage of ecolog-ical data sets and to
employ detailed histor-ical knowledge is to use fuzzy set
qualitativecomparative analysis (fsQCA). FsQCA can ad-dress the
more complex theoretical arguments
presented by political mediation models, as itis designed to
address combinational and mul-tiple causation (Ragin 2008). FsQCA
has beenemployed in studies of political consequencesof social
movements across U.S. states (Amentaet al. 2005, McCammon et al.
2008), cities(Cress & Snow 2000), and counties (McVeighet al.
2006). FsQCA can select on high values ofthe dependent measure
(Ragin 2008), making itwell suited to identifying pathways to
unusual,but theoretically and substantively interestingoutcomessuch
as movements having a majorimpactand provides signicance tests and
canaddress temporality (Caren & Panofsky 2005).
CONCLUSION
In the past decade there has beenextensive research on the
political conse-quences of movements. The biggest andbest-studied
movements have been shown tobe politically inuential in various
ways, andmovement protest is especially inuential inhelping to set
policy agendas. Also, scholarshave been advancing beyond initial
one-factorhypotheses derived mainly from analyses ofmobilization
and have been theorizing aboutthe politically mediated effects of
movements.These ideas take into account nonmovementfactors
inuential in politics and posit interac-tive effects among
movements, their strategies,and political contextual conditions.
Because ofthe complexity of theoretical arguments anddata
limitations on movements and their activ-ities, scholars typically
employ case or small-Nstudies, but they have done so in
increasinglysophisticated ways, analyzing overtime orsubnational
units for multivariate analyses,occasionally across countries, and
sometimesdeploying formal qualitative techniques.
Yet much work remains to be done.Scholars need to address
theoretically thepotential problems that the organizationalforms,
framing and other strategies, andpolitical contexts that promote
mobilizationpose for achieving political inuence beyondprotest.
Similarly, more thought is neededregarding the political process
beyond agenda
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
301
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
setting and the impact of movement actionaside from protest.
Scholars need to explorefurther movement action aimed at
electoralpolitics, which has often been claimed to bepolitically
inuential but has rarely been shownto be inuential (Amenta et al.
2005, Amenta2006).
In the quantitative case studies prominentin recent research,
scholars should prioritizethe policies most consequential to
challengersand try to pinpoint howmuch movements havemattered in
comparison with other determi-nants of outcomes. Structural changes
such aswinning democratic rights and major policytransformations
should be at the top of the list.Quantitative case studies can also
exploit theadvantages of fsQCA, which can address boththe
interactions specied by political mediationarguments and the more
unusual situationof major changes induced by movements.Also,
instead of theorizing about their casesas if they were
typicalexpecting that broadexplanatory claims and ndings should
apply toall movements (cf.McAdam&Su 2002, Giugni2004)scholars
should think more about whatsort of case their case is (Ragin &
Becker 1992)and make relevant comparisons with ndingsregarding
other movements. Also, it wouldbe valuable to address less
prominent cases,as most recent research has been about theAfrican
American civil rights, feminist, andenvironmental movements. It is
also importantto address the fact that movements are notalways
attempting to create new policies,but rather sometimes are ghting
to alter orreplace entrenched unfavorable policies or de-fend
favorable ones (Baumgartner & Mahoney2005). Similarly, scholars
have paid only scantattention to bids for inuence through thecourts
(Skrentny 2006a) or indirectly throughelections (Andrews 2004).
Less prominent in case studies have beendeep historical analyses
to address majorinstitutional changes and to appraise the
mech-anisms and time-order aspects of theoreticalarguments. These
analyses can more easilyaddress the impact of movements on
electoralpolitics and from there move on to policies and
other political outcomes. Qualitative studiescan address the big
questions about majorstructural shifts in politics related to
move-ments: Did the African American civil rightsmovement bring
about civil and voting rights?Did the womens suffrage movement
causewomen to gain suffrage? Is the labor movementresponsible for
legislation regarding workerorganization? Although there is the
standardtrade-off between the size of the question andthe ability
of research to provide conclusiveanswers, current research has
tilted toward themore easily answered questions. More gener-ally,
scholars may want to train their attentionon the main political
outcomes of interest tomovements, such as civil and voting rights
forthe African American civil rights movement(McAdam 1999), old-age
pensions for theold-age pension movement (Amenta 2006),or abortion
policy for the abortion rights andantiabortion movements (Halfmann
2010). Inthese analyses, scholars can address whether,how much, and
for what reasons movementsmattered in key episodes of political
change.
To address the degree to which movementshave mattered and to
test complex argumentsabout the mediation of inuence will,
however,require research designs that compare acrossseveral
movements and over long stretches oftime. Without scholarship
comparing acrossmovements, the demonstrated inuence of in-dividual
movements over specic outcomes isdifcult to place in perspective.
One way to doso is to compare a small number of
historicallysimilarmovementswith greatly different resultsin
political inuence. Moreover, social move-ment measures should be
devised and includedin standard cross-national quantitative
analysesof major social policy outcomes such as thoseregarding
social spending, as has been doneregarding public opinion (Brooks
& Manza2006). Recent work (Amenta et al. 2009) sug-gests that
there have been about 34majormove-ments over the last century in
theUnited States,and these might be compared comprehensivelyfor
their inuence in the manner of Gamsons(1990) study ofmovement
organizations. Com-parative and historical studies that examine
the
302 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
population of movements over time in onecountry, or an entire
movement across manycountries, taking into account other poten-tial
inuences on outcomes, would go far in
answering the big questions about overallmovement inuence and in
testing hypoth-esized interactions among movement form,strategies,
and political contexts.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any afliations, memberships,
funding, or nancial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting
the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Kenneth T. Andrews, David S. Meyer, Francesca Polletta,
and John D. Skrentny forhelpful comments and criticisms.
LITERATURE CITED
Agnone J. 2007. Amplifying public opinion: the policy impact of
the US environmental movement. Soc. Forces85:1593620
Almeida P. 2008.The sequencing of success: organizing templates
and neoliberal policy outcomes.Mobilization13:16587
Almeida P, Stearns LB. 1998. Political opportunities and local
grassroots environmental movements: the caseof Minamata. Soc.
Probl. 45:3760
Amenta E. 1998. Bold Relief: Institutional Politics and the
Origins of Modern American Social Policy. Princeton, NJ:Princeton
Univ. Press
Amenta E. 2003. What we know about social policy: comparative
and historical research in comparative andhistorical perspective.
InComparative andHistorical Analysis, ed.DRueschemeyer, JMahoney,
pp. 91130.New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
Details politicalmediation theory andfinds that the
pensionmovement had a great,if politically mediated,impact
overpolicymaking episodesand across states.
Amenta E. 2006.WhenMovementsMatter: The Townsend Plan and the
Rise of Social Security. Princeton,NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Amenta E, Caren N. 2004. The legislative, organizational, and
beneciary consequences of state-orientedchallengers. See Snow et
al. 2004, pp. 46188
Amenta E, Caren N, Fetner T, YoungMP. 2002. Challengers and
states: toward a political sociology of socialmovements. Res.
Polit. Sociol. 10:4783
Appraises the politicalmediation model usingstate-level data
onold-age assistance andSenate voting on seniorcitizens
pensionsthrough fsQCA.
Amenta E, Caren N, Olasky SJ. 2005. Age for leisure? Political
mediation and the impact of thepension movement on US old-age
policy. Am. Sociol. Rev. 70:51638
Amenta E, Caren N, Olasky SJ, Stobaugh JE. 2009. All the
movements t to print: who, what, when, where,and why SMO families
appeared in the New York Times in the 20th century. Am. Sociol.
Rev. 74:63656
Amenta E, Carruthers BG, Zylan Y. 1992. A hero for the aged? The
Townsend Plan, the political mediationmodel, and U.S. old-age
policy, 19341950. Am. J. Sociol. 98:30839
Amenta E, Young MP. 1999. Making an impact: the conceptual and
methodological implications of thecollective benets criterion. See
Giugni et al. 1999, pp. 2241
Andrews KT. 2001. Social movements and policy implementation:
the Mississippi civil rights movement andthe war on poverty, 1965
to 1971. Am. Sociol. Rev. 66:7195 Develops a movement
infrastructure modeland tests it againstalternatives
inMississippi counties, inthe areas of policy andelectoral
outcomes.
Andrews KT. 2004. Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: The
Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and ItsLegacy. Chicago: Univ.
Chicago Press
AndrewsKT, Edwards B. 2004. Advocacy organizations in theU.S.
political process.Annu. Rev. Sociol. 30:479506
Banaszak LA. 1996. Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity,
Culture and the Struggle for Woman Suffrage.Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
303
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
Banaszak LA. 2005. Inside and outside the state: movement
insider status, tactics, and public policy achieve-ments. See Meyer
et al. 2005, pp. 14976
Banaszak LA, Beckwith K, Rucht D. 2003. Womens Movements Facing
the Recongured State. New York:Cambridge Univ. Press
Shows that several largesocial movementstransformed the
policyagenda of the nationalgovernment.
Baumgartner FR, Mahoney C. 2005. Social movements, the rise of
new issues, and the public agenda.See Meyer et al. 2005, pp.
6586
Bernstein AE. 2001. The Moderation Dilemma: Legislative
Coalitions and the Politics of Family and Medical Leave.Pittsburgh:
Univ. Pittsburgh Press
Berry JM. 1999. The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen
Groups. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.Bonastia C. 2000.Why did
afrmative action in housing fail during theNixon era? Exploring the
institutional
homes of social policies. Soc. Probl. 47:52342Brooks C, Manza J.
2006. Social policy responsiveness in developed democracies. Am.
Sociol. Rev. 71:47494Burstein P, Hirsh CE. 2007. Interest
organizations, information, and policy innovation in the US
Congress.
Sociol. Forum 22:17499Burstein P, Sausner S. 2005. The incidence
and impact of policy-oriented collective action: competing
views.
Sociol. Forum 20:40319Caren N, Panofsky A. 2005. TQCA: a
technique for adding temporality to qualitative comparative
analysis.
Sociol. Methods Res. 34:14772Chen AS. 2007. The party of Lincoln
and the politics of state fair employment practices legislation in
the
North, 19451964. Am. J. Sociol. 112:171374Clemens ES. 1997. The
Peoples Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest
Group Politics in the
United States, 18901925. Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressCornwall M,
King BG, Legerski EM, Dahlin EC, Schiffman KS. 2007. Signals or
mixed signals: why oppor-
tunities for mobilization are not opportunities for policy
reform. Mobilization 12:23954CressDM, SnowDA. 2000.The outcomes of
homelessmobilization: the inuence of organization, disruption,
political mediation, and framing. Am. J. Sociol.
105:1063104Davis DE, Rosan CD. 2004. Social movements in the Mexico
City airport controversy: globalization, democ-
racy, and the power of distance. Mobilization 9:27993Dixon M.
2008. Movements, countermovements and policy adoption: the case of
right-to-work activism.
Soc. Forces 87:473500Earl J. 2000. Methods, movements and
outcomes: methodological difculties in the study of
extramovement
outcomes. Res. Soc. Mov. Con. Change 22:325Earl J, Schussman A.
2004. Cease and desist: repression, strategic voting and the 2000
U.S. presidential
election. Mobilization 9:181202Evans J. 1997.
Multi-organizational elds and social movement organization frame
content: the religious
pro-choice movement. Sociol. Inq. 67:45169Evans R, Kay T. 2009.
How environmentalists greened trade policy: strategic action and
the architecture
of eld overlap. Am. Sociol. Rev. 73:97091Fetner T. 2008. How the
Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay Activism. Minneapolis: Univ.
Minn. PressFording RC. 2001. The political response to black
insurgency: a critical test of competing theories of the state.
Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 95:11530Gamson WA. 1990. The Strategy of
Social Protest. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 2nd ed.Ganz M. 2000.
Resources and resourcefulness: strategic capacity in the
unionization of California agriculture,
19591966. Am. J. Sociol. 105:100362George AL, Bennett A. 2005.
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
Cambridge, MA: MIT
PressGiugni M. 1998. Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and
consequences of social movements. Annu. Rev.
Sociol. 24:37193Giugni M. 2004. Social Protest and Policy
Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in
Comparative
Perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & LittleeldGiugni M. 2007.
Useless protest? A time-series analysis of the policy outcomes of
ecology, antinuclear, and
peace movements in the United States, 19771995. Mobilization
12:5377
304 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
Giugni M, McAdam D, Tilly C, eds. 1999. How Movements Matter:
Theoretical and Comparative Studies on theConsequences of Social
Movements. Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press
Goldstone J. 2003. Bridging institutionalized and
noninstitutionalized politics. In States, Parties, and
SocialMovements, ed. J Goldstone, pp. 126. New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press
Green JC, Rozell MJ, Wilcox C. 2001. Social movements and party
politics: the case of the Christian right.J. Sci. Study Relig.
40:41326
Halfmann D. 2010. The Rules of War: Institutions and Abortion
Policy in the United States, Britain and Canada.Chicago: Univ.
Chicago Press
Howard-Hassmann RE. 2005. Getting to reparations: Japanese
Americans and African Americans. Soc. Forces83:82340
Ingram P, Rao H. 2004. Store wars: the enactment and repeal of
antichain-store legislation in America.Am. J. Sociol. 110:44687
Isaac L, McDonald S, Lukasik G. 2006. Takin it from the streets:
how the sixties mass movement revitalizedunionization. Am. J.
Sociol. 112:4696
Jacobs D, Helms R. 2001. Racial politics and redistribution:
isolating the contingent inuence of civil rights,riots, and crime
on tax progressivity. Soc. Forces 80:91121
Jacobs D, Kent SL. 2007. The determinants of executions since
1951: how politics, protests, public opinion,and social divisions
shape capital punishment. Soc. Probl. 54:297318
Johnson EW. 2008. Social movement size, organizational diversity
and the making of federal law. Soc. Forces86:96793
KaneMD. 2003. Social movement policy success: decriminalizing
state sodomy laws, 19691998.Mobilization8:31334
Kane MD. 2007. Timing matters: shifts in the causal determinants
of sodomy law decriminalization, 19611998. Soc. Probl. 54:21139
Kellstedt LA, Green JC, Guth JL, Smidt CE. 1994. Religious
voting blocs in the 1992 election: the year ofthe evangelical?
Sociol. Relig. 55:30726
King BG, Bentele KG, Soule SA. 2007. Protest and policymaking:
explaining uctuation in congressionalattention to rights issues,
19601986. Soc. Forces 86:13763
King BG, Cornwall M, Dahlin EC. 2005. Winning woman suffrage one
step at a time: social movements andthe logic of the legislative
process. Soc. Forces 83:121134
Kitschelt HP. 1986. Political opportunity structures and
political protest: antinuclear movements in fourdemocracies. Br. J.
Polit. Sci. 16:5785
Koopmans R. 2004. Political. Opportunity. Structure. Some
splitting to balance the lumping. In RethinkingSocial Movements:
Structure, Meaning, and Emotion, ed. J Goodwin, J Jasper, pp. 6173.
Lanham, MD:Rowman & Littleeld
Kriesi H. 2004. Political context and opportunity. See Snow et
al. 2004, pp. 6790Kriesi H, Koopmans R, Duyvendak JW, Guigni MR.
1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A
Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. PressLee C-S.
2007. Labor unions and good governance: a cross-national,
comparative analysis. Am. Sociol. Rev.
72:585609Linders A. 2004. Victory and beyond: a historical
comparative analysis of the outcomes of the abortion
movements in Sweden and the United States. Sociol. Forum.
19:371404Lipsky M. 1968. Protest as political resource. Am. Polit.
Sci. Rev. 62:114458Mansbridge JJ. 1986. Why We Lost the ERA.
Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressMarullo S, Meyer DS. 2004. Antiwar and
peace movements. See Snow et al. 2004, pp. 64165McAdamD. 1999.
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency,
19301970. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
Press. 2nd ed.McAdam D, McCarthy J, Zald M. 1996. Introduction:
opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing
processestoward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social
movements. In Comparative Perspectiveson Social Movements:
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings, ed. D McAdam,JD McCarthy, MN Zald, pp. 122. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press
Shows that extremeforms of protestincreased propeacevoting while
depressingthe overall pace ofcongressional action,and the reverse
forpersuasive forms ofprotest.McAdam D, Su Y. 2002. The war at
home: antiwar protests and congressional voting, 1965 to 1973.
Am. Sociol. Rev. 67:696721
www.annualreviews.org Political Consequences of Movements
305
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
McCammon HJ. 2009. Beyond frame resonance: the argumentative
structure and persuasive capacity oftwentieth-century U.S. womens
jury rights frames. Mobilization 14:4564
McCammonHJ, Campbell KE,Granberg EM,MoweryC. 2001.Howmovements
win: gendered opportunitystructures and US womens suffrage
movements, 1866 to 1919. Am. Sociol. Rev. 66:4970
Argues and shows thatU.S. jury movementactivists engaged
instrategic adaptationwere more likely to winrapid changes in
jurylaws.
McCammon HJ, Chaudhuri S, Hewitt L, Muse CS, Newman HD, et al.
2008. Becoming full citizens:the US womens jury rights campaigns,
the pace of reform, and strategic adaptation. Am. J.
Sociol.113:110447
McCammon HJ, Sanders Muse C, Newman HD, Terrell TM. 2007.
Movement framing and discursiveopportunity structures: the
political successes of the U.S. womens jury movements. Am. Sociol.
Rev.72:72549
McCann M. 2006. Law and social movements: contemporary
perspectives. Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2:1738McCarthy JD, Zald MN.
1977. Resource mobilization and social movements: a partial theory.
Am. J. Sociol.
82:121241McCarthy JD, ZaldMN. 2002. The enduring vitality of the
resourcemobilization theory of social movements.
In Handbook of Sociological Theory, ed. JH Turner, pp. 53365.
New York: Kluwer Academic/PlenumMcCright AM, Dunlap RE. 2003.
Defeating Kyoto: the conservative movements impact on U.S.
climate
change policy. Soc. Probl. 50:34873McVeigh R. 2009. The Rise of
the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics.
Minneapolis:
Univ. Minn. PressIndicates that basicprocesses inmobilization
framing,constructing collectiveidentity boundaries, canalienate the
broaderpopulation andstimulate a backlash.
McVeigh R, Myers DJ, Sikkink D. 2004. Corn, Klansmen, and
Coolidge: structure and framing insocial movements. Soc. Forces
83:65390
McVeigh R, Neblett C, Shaq S. 2006. Explaining social movement
outcomes: multiorganizational elds andhate crime reporting.
Mobilization 11:2349
McVeigh R, Welch MR, Bjarnason T. 2003. Hate crime reporting as
a successful social movement outcome.Am. Sociol. Rev. 68:84367
Meyer DS. 2005. Social movements and public policy: eggs,
chicken, and theory. See Meyer et al. 2005,pp. 126
MeyerDS, JennessV, IngramH, eds. 2005.Routing theOpposition:
SocialMovements, Public Policy, andDemocracy.Minneapolis: Univ.
Minn. Press
Meyer DS, Minkoff DC. 2004. Conceptualizing political
opportunity. Soc. Forces. 82:145792Micklethwait J, Wooldridge A.
2005. The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America. New York:
PenguinNobles M. 2000. Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census
in Modern Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.
PressNoy D. 2009. When framing fails: ideas, inuence, and
resources in San Franciscos homeless policy eld.
Soc. Probl. 56:22342Olzak S, Ryo E. 2007. Organizational
diversity, vitality and outcomes in the civil rights movement. Soc.
Forces
85:156191Olzak S, Soule SA. 2009. Cross-cutting inuences of
environmental protest and legislation. Soc. Forces 88:201
25Paxton P, Hughes MM, Green JL. 2006. The international womens
movement and womens political repre-
sentation, 18932003. Am. Sociol. Rev. 71:898920Pedriana N. 2004.
Help wanted NOW: legal resources, the womens movement, and the
battle over sex-
segregated job advertisements. Soc. Probl. 51:182201Pedriana N.
2006. From protective to equal treatment: legal framing processes
and transformation of the
womens movement in the 1960s. Am. J. Sociol. 111:171861Piven FF.
2006. Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America.
Lanham, MD: Rowman &
LittleeldPiven FF, Cloward RA. 1977. Poor Peoples Movements: Why
They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Random
HousePolletta F, Ho MK. 2004. Frames and their consequences. In
The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political
Analysis, ed. RE Goodin, C Tilly, pp. 187209. New York: Oxford
Univ. PressPolletta F, Jasper JM. 2001. Collective identity and
social movements. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 27:283305
306 Amenta et al.
Ann
u. R
ev. S
ocio
l. 20
10.3
6:28
7-30
7. D
ownl
oade
d fro
m w
ww
.annu
alre
view
s.org
by C
ambr
idge
Uni
vers
ity o
n 12
/30/
13. F
or p
erso
nal u
se o
nly.
-
SO36CH14-Amenta ARI 3 June 2010 0:31
Ragin CC. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and
Beyond. Chicago: Univ. Chicago PressRagin CC, Becker H. 1992. What
Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry. Cambridge,
UK:
Cambridge Univ. PressRucht D. 1999. The impact of environmental
movements in Western