Policy Coherence and the Future of the UK's International Development Agenda

8/14/2019 Policy Coherence and the Future of the UK's International Development Agenda

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PolicyCoherenceand

theFutureoftheUKsInternational

DevelopmentAgenda

AreporttoWorldVisionUKByMatthewLockwoodandSarahMulley,withEmilyJones,AlexGlennie,KatiePaintinand

AndrewPendleton

March2010

ippr2010

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy


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ippr|PolicyCoherenceandtheFutureoftheUKsInternationalDevelopmentAgenda2

Aboutippr ........................................................................................................................... 3

Abouttheauthors............................................................................................................... 3

Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. 4

ForewordbyWorldVision ................................................................................................... 5

Listofabbreviations........................................................................................................... 7

Executivesummary ............................................................................................................. 8

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 13

1.Conflict.......................................................................................................................... 19

2.Tradeandinvestment.................................................................................................... 30

3.Corruption..................................................................................................................... 40

4.Climatechange ............................................................................................................. 46

5.Internationalmigration ................................................................................................ 52

6.Towardsgreatercoherence............................................................................................ 60

7.Conclusionsandrecommendations .............................................................................. 74

References......................................................................................................................... 77

Appendix:Listofinterviewees.......................................................................................... 85

Contents


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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.

Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.

WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.

ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]

www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065

ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2010.ippr2010

Aboutippr

MatthewLockwoodisanAssociateDirectorinipprsGlobalChangeProgramme.Matthewhasover20yearsexperienceofglobaldevelopmentissueswithafocusonAfrica.HestudiedattheUniversityofOxford,wherehetookanM.Philineconomicsin1984andaD.Philin1989.HewasthenaResearchFellowattheUniversityofCambridgeandaLecturerinSociologyattheUniversityofSussex.From1997to2000hewasHeadofInternationalPolicyatChristianAid,andwasHeadofUKAdvocacyatActionAidbetween2002and2004.In2005hepublishedaninfluentialcritiqueofconventionalgovernmentandNGOthinkingonAfrica,TheStateTheyreIn(June2005,2nded.October2006,ITDGPublishing).Before

joiningipprin2006,hewasanadviseronclimatechangetothethenDeputyMayorofLondon,NickyGavron,andworkedfortheLondonClimateChangeAgency.

SarahMulley isaSeniorResearchFellowinipprsGlobalChangeProgramme.Beforejoiningippr,SarahwascoordinatoroftheUKAidNetwork,acoalitionofUKNGOsworkingtogethertodeveloppolicyandadvocacyoninternationalaid.ShewaspreviouslyaresearchassociateattheGlobalEconomicGovernanceProgrammeinOxford,andaseniorpolicyanalystatHMTreasury,workingonarangeofdomesticandinternationalpolicyissues.SarahhasanM.PhilinInternationalRelations,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomics,bothfromtheUniversityofOxford.

AlexGlennie hasworkedonarangeofinternationalandsecurityissuesatipprsince2006.

Duringthistime,shehasservedontheSecretariatofipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,contributedtoaprogrammeofresearchonmigrationanddevelopmentandhasledtheInstitutesworkonpoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.PriortothissheworkedatAccountAbility,aninternationalNGOcommittedtopromotingaccountabilityforsustainabledevelopment.AlexholdsaMastersdegreeinInternationalStudiesandDiplomacyfromtheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,andaBAhonoursdegreeinInternationalHistoryfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomics.

KatiePaintinwasaresearcheroninternationalandnationalsecurityissuesatippruntilJuly2009andamemberofthesecretariatforipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury.SheholdsaMastersdegreeinconflictsecurityanddevelopmentfromtheWarStudiesDepartmentatKingsCollegeLondonandaBAhonoursdegreeinhistoryfromthe

UniversityofCambridge.

AndrewPendleton isaSeniorResearchFellowatipprandconvenoroftheGlobalClimateNetwork.HepreviouslyworkedatChristianAid,whereheledpolicyandresearchonclimate

Abouttheauthors


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issues,workedonWorldTradeOrganisationnegotiationsandwrotetheagencyslandmarkBehindtheMaskreportdebunkingthemythofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Andrewspent10yearsasareporterandproducerinBBClocalandnetworkradioandisthewinneroftwoSonyRadioAwards.

EmilyJones isreadingforaDPhilintheInternationalRelationsandPoliticsDepartment,OxfordUniversity,wheresheisexaminingthepoliticaleconomyoftheEconomicPartnershipAgreementnegotiationsbetweenEuropeandthegroupofAfrican,CaribbeanandPacificcountries.Priortothis,sheworkedasatradepolicyadviserforOxfamGBwheresheledresearchandpolicydevelopmentonbilateralandregionaltradeagreementsacrosstheOxfamInternationalfederation.EmilyholdsaMastersinDevelopmentEconomicsfromtheSchoolofAfricanandOrientalStudies,UniversityofLondon,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomicsfromOxfordUniversity.

Theauthorswouldliketothankallthosewhogenerouslygaveuptheirtimetobeinterviewedduringtheresearchforthisreport,andthosewhoprovidedcommentsandfeedbackonthedraft.WeareindebtedtoWorldVisionUK,withoutwhosesupportthisworkwouldnothavebeenpossible.ParticularthanksareduetoPatrickWattwho,whileatWorldVision,playedaninvaluableroleinshapingtheresearch,andtoChrisPage.

Note:Theopinionsinthisreportarethoseoftheauthorsonlyanddonotnecessarily

representthoseofWorldVisionorippr.

Acknowledgements


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Poverty,forWorldVision,isanissueofjustice,or,morecorrectly,anissueofinjustice.Poverty,exploitationandviolencearenotinevitable.Theproblemsthatmillionslivingin

economicallypoorcountriesface,andwhichclaim30,000youngliveseachday,aretheresultoffailurestoensurethatsystemsandstructuresatinternational,nationalandlocallevelssupportthewell-beingofthosewhofindthemselvesatthemarginsofsociety.

Itisthetransformationofsocietyandcommunitiesthatwilldeliverimprovedwell-beinginthelivesofthoseintendedtobenefitfromdevelopmentefforts.Dramaticincreasesinaidoverthelastdecadehavesavedandimprovedthelivesofmillionsofpeopleinpoorercommunities,particularlychildren.Thecommunitiesweworkwithcanseethechangethataidmoneyisdeliveringandthecontributionitismakingtosustainabledevelopment,buttheseincreaseshavealsohighlightedthelimitsofaidasadevelopmenttool.

Factorssuchasgovernanceandcorruption,securityandpeacebuilding,trade,finance,migrationandclimatechangeareallimpactingondevelopment,andtheinterplaybetween

thesefactorsisincreasinglyimportantifwewantdevelopmenttobesuccessfulandsustainable.Tacklingstructuralandsystemicinjusticemustgohandinhandwiththeprovisionofdevelopmentaid.ThismeansthatawiderangeofUKpoliciesbeyondaidhavesignificantimplicationsforthelivesofpeopleineconomicallypoorcountries.

ForWorldVision,amajordevelopment,humanitarianandadvocacyorganisationworkingintownsandvillagesinnearly100countriesaroundtheworld,theimpactofeachofthesepoliciesonchildrenisofparamountimportanceasweseektoalleviatethepovertyandsufferingexperiencedbysomanyintheworldtoday.Ourprimarygoalthrougheveryaspectofourworkistocontributetochangesinsocietyandcommunitiesthatresultinimprovedwell-beinginthelivesofchildrenthroughtherealisationoftheirrights.

Ourfocusonchildrenisinformedbyabeliefthatchildrenarecentraltothedevelopmentprocess,andpoliciesimpactingondevelopmentthatignorethewell-beingofchildrenwillultimatelyfailtotransformthelivesofallthoselivinginthepoorestcommunities.Afocusonchildwell-being:

supportssustainableandequitablehumandevelopmentbybreakingcyclesofpovertyandinequalitytheeffectsofpovertyonchildrentoday,whoconstitutethemajorityofthoselivinginpoverty,haveconsequencesthatareoftenpassedontotheirchildrentomorrow

providesanentrypointintoaddressingthewell-beingoffamiliesandcommunitiesandactsasabarometerforthewell-beingofthewiderpopulationchildwell-beingisbestimprovedthroughensuringthatthecontextsinwhichtheyliveareonesin

whichtheycanthrive.Assuch,childwell-beingisanimportantmeasureofimpactforanyinterventionaimedatsupportingsocialandhumandevelopment

recognisesthatchildrencanplayasignificantroleasagentsoftransformationintheircommunities

recognisesachildrightsframeworkasthemosteffectivetooltoachieveminimumstandardsofwell-beingforchildreninareassuchashealth,care,protectionandeducation.

Failingtoputchildrenatthecentreofdevelopmentweakenstheimpactoftodaysdevelopmenteffortsbothnowandforthefuture.Butourcallforchildrentobeplacedattheheartofthedevelopmentagendaisnotpurelyutilitarian.Childrenarerights-holders,as

outlinedintheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild,and,assuch,developmentactors,includingtheUKGovernment,haveanobligationtoaddresstherightsofchildrenthroughallpoliciesandactionsthatimpactondevelopmentoutcomes.

ForewordbyWorldVision


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Recognitionthatpositive,sustainabledevelopmentoutcomescanonlybeachievedthroughengagementwiththeunderlyingcausesofpovertyexpandstheareasofpolicyrelevanttothedevelopmentendeavourbeyondthosewithapurefocusondevelopment.Theimpactsofotherareasofpolicythathaveimplicationsoninternationalpovertyreductionobjectives,

suchasthoserelatingtoconflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration,mustberecognised.

WorldVisionisconcernedthattherelationshipbetweenthesefactorsanddevelopmenthasnotbeenadequatelyexplored.ThoughwestronglybelievethattheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentshouldremainastrongandindependentdepartmentwithinGovernmentwithacabinet-levelSecretaryofState,developmentpolicymustbeconsideredbyotherUKdepartmentsincludingtheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,MinistryofDefenceandtheDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkillsifwearetomakeprogressindevelopmentoutcomesandtoimprovethewell-beingofchildrenlivinginpoverty.Asweapproachacrucialelection,andtheworldconvenestoreviewtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,nowistherighttimetoaskthesequestionsandtodeterminehowUKdevelopment

policywillbetakenforward.WecommissionedtheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)tocarryoutthisindependentresearchasaleadingUKthinktankandwethankthemfortheirconsiderableworkonthisprojectandthecontributionwehopeitmakestothefuturedevelopmentdebate.Wearealsogratefultoallthose,bothinsideandoutsideoftheUKGovernment,whoparticipatedininterviewsandprovidedcommenttoinformthefindingsandconclusionsofthisreport.

Whilethedetailedconclusionsandrecommendationsinthereportarethoseofippr,WorldVisionsupportsthefindingsandthecallforgreaterpolicycoherencefordevelopmentacrosstheUKGovernmentwithacontinuedstrongandindependentrolefortheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.HowtheUKcontributestodevelopmentpolicyandusesits

positionontheglobalstageneedstoberevisited,andWorldVisionhopesthatthisresearchhelpsshapethatdebate.

JustinByworth

ChiefExecutive,WorldVisionUK


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Overthelast12years,theUnitedKingdomhasbuiltaninternationalreputationasaleadingaiddonor,andasaninnovatorindevelopmentpolicy.TheDepartmentforInternational

Development(DFID)isastrong,independentactorbothinLondonandinthecountriesinwhichitworks.Furthermore,aconsensushasnowbeenestablishedacrossmuch(ifnotall)ofthepoliticalspectrumforthedepartmentsexistence,forthecommitmenttomeetthe0.7percentofGDPaidtarget,andforthelegitimacyofthedevelopmentagenda.Theseachievementsshouldbecelebratedandbuilton.

Butbeyondaid,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewiththeunderlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesbeyondthetraditionalterritoryofdevelopmentpolicyinforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,infinanceandenvironment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoaspolicycoherencefordevelopment,andisthefocusofthisreport.

AlthoughaidfromtheUKcanhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeoplein

thedevelopingworld,theimpactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsarebothmoreprofoundandfarwider.Theseinclude:insecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunitiesforandreturnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;corruption,andclimatechange.TheUKscommitmentto,anddeliveryof,internationalpovertyreductionobjectivesthusneedstobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesfarbeyondwhatisusuallythoughtofasdevelopmentpolicy,andwhichareoutsidethedirectcontrolandremitofDFID.

ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFIDsplacewithingovernment.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasbecomeadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutsidegovernment)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagency,separatefromtherest

ofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,environment,migrationandtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens(particularlywheretherearegenuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoorcountries);andthattheresultisalackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUKssupportfor,andengagementwith,thepoorestcountries.Ofcourse,intherealworldofpoliticstherearegenuinetrade-offsbetweentightly-focuseddevelopmentpoliciesandwiderinfluence,betweenshort-termpovertyreductionobjectivesandlonger-termchangeprocesses,and,insomecases,betweentheinterestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreportdoesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers.Rather,weaimtosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offsthatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKgovernmentinthefaceofthesetrade-offsanddrawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidencesuggeststhatdifferentchoices

shouldbemadeinthefuture.

TheUKrecordonpolicycoherence

Theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehas,inprinciple,beenpresenteversincetheestablishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominencetopolicycoherence,althoughthefocushasshiftedovertime.TheGovernmenthasalsotriedtouseitscentralpolicyandtarget-settingmachinerytopromotecoherence.Aplethoraofcross-Whitehallmechanismshavealsoevolvedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachieveamorejoined-upgovernmenteffortondevelopment.Thesebodiesoftenoverseespendingfromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadoutacrossdepartmentalboundaries.

Thisreport,basedinpartoninterviewswitharound25civilservantsfromarangeof

departments,aswellaspoliticaladvisersandexternalexperts,suggeststhattheGovernmenthasmaderealstepstowardsgreatercoherence,especiallyinsomeareassuchastrade,climatechangeandconflictresolution.However,moreremainstobedone.DFIDstillappears

Executivesummary


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tohaveacorefocusonconventionalaidprogrammesandin-countryreformprocesses,andiscriticisedbysomeforitslargelytechnocratic(ratherthanpolitical)approachtoputtingthedevelopmentcaseingovernment.Otherdepartments,whiletheydoincreasinglyvalueDFIDsinput,alsohaveawaytogoinreflectingtheimportanceoftheUKsinternational

developmentobjectivesintheirpoliciesandpractice.Policycoherence,andtheinteractionbetweenDFIDandothergovernmentdepartments,hasevolvedinaratherunevenway,oftenawayfromthepoliticalspotlight.

TradepolicywastargetedfromtheverystartofDFIDsexistence:anearlydecisionwastakentoinvestinexpertisewithinDFID,andtoengagewiththethenDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(DTI)tomaketheargumentthatoncetradepolicymovedawayfrommercantilism,developmentbecamethemainissue.TherewasalsoanevolutioninDFIDsapproachtoconflictquiteearlyon,withhumanitarianmilitaryinterventionintheBalkansandSierraLeoneforcingthedepartmenttothinkabouthowitworkedalongsidetheMinistryofDefence(MOD),andabouttherelationshipsbetweenstabilisation,reconstructionandlong-termdevelopment.Asomewhatdifferentsetofissueshasarisenin

themorerecentcasesofIraqandAfghanistan.WhileworkinthesecountriesaccountsforarelativelysmallpartofDFIDsprogramming,ithasattractedalargeamountofpoliticaldebate.

Morerecently,therehasbeenmajorengagementwithNumber10andtheDepartmentforEnergyandClimateChange(DECC)ontheinternationalaspectsofclimatechange.DFIDhasalsopressedsuccessfullyforactionbyotherdepartmentsonquitespecificissues,suchasthebanningofclustermunitionsbytheUKandthepromotionofaninternationalagreementonthesameissue.

Onarangeofotherissues(suchasmigration),DFIDhaseithermadelittleefforttoshapepolicyinothergovernmentdepartments,orhaslackedtheresources,argumentsorpoliticalweighttodoso.

DFIDhashadgoodreasontoholditselfslightlyapartfromtherestofgovernmentthebenefitsofDFIDsindependenceareclearinthepovertyfocusofUKaidspending,andinitsinternationalreputationbutthegainsmadeinthelastdecadeneedtobesecuredbyadvanceintoawideragenda,notbyaretreatintoanarrowlydefinedaidagencyrole.

Whypolicycoherencemattersnow

Developmentoutcomesdependcruciallyonfactorsbeyondaid,andUKGovernmentpoliciesacrossarangeofareasmatterforpovertyreductionandforsecuringbasichumanrights.Ontheotherside,UKinterestsareincreasinglyboundupwithsuccessfullyrespondingtoarangeofinternationalissues(suchasclimatechange).Inthiscontext,anarrowviewoftheUKsnationalinterestislookingincreasinglyoutdated.

ButcuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychangingfiscalandpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.AmassivesqueezeonpublicexpenditureandapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUKdevelopmentpolicy.ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewiderparametersoftheconsensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservativegovernmentwouldkeepDFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainorevenincreaseaidspending.Therearenoproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFIDspendingtopovertyreduction,althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywanttoexplorethepossibilityofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-relatedspending.Inanycase,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFIDsbudget,independenceandwaysofworking.

Therearedifferentviewsonthequestionofwherenext?forDFID,andforUKdevelopmentpolicy.Somearguethat,facedwithincreasingfiscalandpoliticalpressuresinthecomingyears,DFIDshoulddefenditsseparatenessandindependenceevenmore;othersthatthe


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changingnatureofpovertyrequiresamorejoined-upapproachacrossgovernment.SomeevenarguethatDFIDshouldbemergedbackintotheForeignandCommonwealthOffice.

MuchofthecontroversyhasfocusedonhowDFIDoperatesincountrieswheretheUKisatwar,andIraqandAfghanistaninparticular.Thesesituations,whileveryimportantpolitically,

representonlyasmallpartofwhatDFIDdoes.Particularproblemsdoariseinsuchsituationsbutwesuggestthattheyrequiretargetedsolutionsratherthansystematicchanges.ItwouldbeamistaketoreconfigureDFIDsentireapproachonthebasisofthedemandsoftheseparticularcases.Insuchsituationsitiscriticaltohaveclarityaboutthemissionandobjectives,andanagreedstrategyforthewholeofGovernmentbasedonsharedanalysis.Itthenmakessensetoapplyprinciplesofflexibilityandtransparencyintheuseofresources.Governmentspendinginsuchcircumstancesshouldnotbeaboutastrugglebetweenthosewhowanttoraidtheaidbudgetandthosewhowanttodefendtheaidbudgetatallcosts.Theimportantdistinctionshouldnotbebetweenwhichspendingcancountasofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)andwhichcannot,butbetweeneffectiveandineffectivespending.ThismightmeanDFIDrecognisingthatsecurityobjectivesarelegitimatefor

povertyreductionaswellasforwiderUKinterests,andagreeingtospendonnon-ODAcategories,butthiswillalsomeantheGovernmentbeingclearthatthisexpenditurecannotbecountedasODA.

Intheend,concernsaboutprotectingaidspendingforpovertyreductionandmaintaininganappropriateallocationofDFIDspendingbetweencountriesarebestaddressedthroughhavingastrongDFIDvoicemakingthedevelopmentalcaseattheheartofgovernment.WethinkthatthebenefitsofastrongDFID,independentoftheFCO,clearlyoutweighthecosts,andthereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFIDspositionasaseparatedepartmentwithaCabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.

However,thisdoesnotmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.ItisimportantbothforUKdevelopmentpolicyandforDFIDasadepartmentthatthecoherence

ofgovernmentpolicyandpracticedeepensandbecomesmoresystematic.DFIDshouldcontinuetobeindependentandtomakedecisionsbasedonaclearsetofdevelopmentandpovertyreductionobjectives(particularlyaboutaidprogramming),whilealsoengagingmoreeffectivelywiththerestofgovernmentatthepolicylevelandontheground.

Inthecurrenteconomicandpoliticalclimate,apublicandpoliticaldefenceofaidspending,andoftheUKssuccessfulinternationaldevelopmentpolicies,mustrecognisetheinterdependencyofdifferentobjectives.ThedevelopmentdebateintheUKwillincreasinglybelinkedtodebatesonissuesincludingconflictandsecurity,climatechange,andmigrationandtrade.Similarly,whenconsideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountries,itseemsimpossiblenottorecognisethelinksbetweendevelopmentandissuessuchasconflictandclimatechange.

So,therearebothpragmaticandprincipledreasonstoconsiderpolicycoherence.ItseemslikelythattheUKsinternationaldevelopmentcommunitymayneedtomaketheseinterdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inordertoprotecttheaidbudgetandDFIDsindependence.ThisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebateaboutwhetherDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andonwhatterms.

WherenextforUKdevelopmentpolicy?

DFIDneedstocontinuebuildingcloserrelationshipswithothergovernmentdepartments,whichbringsrisksforthepurityofDFIDspovertyreductionmission.However,DFIDcannotaffordtokeepbeingseenastheNGOdowntheroad,asithasbeencaricatured

withinotherpartsofgovernmentperceptionscanmatterasmuchasreality.Instead,inthewordsofoneinterviewee,thedepartmentmustbecomemoreofaWhitehallwarrior.

Successfulpolicycoherencefordevelopmentmustbejustthatfordevelopment.Thismeansthatthereneedtobeclearpoliticalandofficialmechanismstoensurethatthe


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Governmentsdevelopmentobjectivesaresystematicallyconsideredacrossarangeofpolicyareas.Whenotherobjectivesorinterestslegitimatelysupersededevelopmentobjectives,thisshouldbetransparent,andstepsshouldstillbetakentominimiseharmandmaximisedevelopmentbenefits.Policycoherencedoesnotmeanabandoningpoliciesthatseek

developmentandpovertyreductionfortheirownsake.Butconfidenceisneededtoengageonchallengingissues,andtorecognisethatmessycompromisesarepartofmakingprogress.Thekeyrisktobemitigatedisthat,inseekingcoherence,thedevelopmentagendagetslostordowngradedrelativetootherissues(forexample,security),andthattheUKscoredevelopmentpoliciesbecomelesseffectiveasaresult.

Acentralconclusionofthisstudyisthatgreatercoherenceisnotusuallybeingpreventedbyalackofcross-governmentmechanismsfordialogueandcooperation;therearemanysuchmechanismsonmostissues,oftenatverysenioraswellasoperationallevels.Amoreimportantissueistheincentives(orlackthereof)withingovernmenttomakethesemechanismsworkwellinpractice.Wearguethatthekeytocoherenceisagreed-uponjointstrategyacrossgovernment,basedonsharedanalysisandclearpoliticalleadership,and

supportedbyaneffectivecasemadetothepublic.Summaryofrecommendations

Developmentconcernsandobjectivesshouldformakeypartofdecision-makingacrossthefullrangeofUKpoliciesthatimpactondevelopingcountries.Attemptstoincreasepolicycoherencefordevelopmentshouldalwaysincludeachildwell-beingandrightsperspective.Wheretensionsexistanddevelopmentobjectivescannotappropriatelybegivenpriority,harmshouldbeminimised,developmentbenefitsmaximisedanddecisionsshouldbemadeopenlyandaccountably.

TheGovernmentshoulddevelopawhole-of-governmentinternationaldevelopmentstrategy,andshouldcarryoutasystematicanalysisofthedevelopmentimpactsofUK

policies(including,butnotlimitedto,conflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration).Thisshouldhavestrongownershipacrossgovernment,andastrongfocusonnon-DFIDpolicylevers.

TheGovernmentshouldensurethatDFID,theFCO,theMOD,theDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills(BIS),DECC,theUKBorderAgency(UKBA)andotherrelevantdepartmentsagreejointUKGovernmentstrategiesforallimportantdevelopingcountrieswheretheUKhasbothasubstantialaidprogrammeandsignificantstrategic,commercialorsecurityinterests.Thesecountrystrategiesshouldbebasedonsharedanalysiscontributedtobyalldepartments.

FCOpostsandDFIDcountryofficesshouldplayakeyroleintheprocessofformingjointcountrystrategiesandwiderthematicstrategies.DFIDshouldretainoperational

independenceatthecountrylevel,butneedstooperatewithincross-governmentalstrategicframeworks.

Alldepartmentsshouldcreateincentivesforexamplethroughappraisalsandpromotioncriteriaforspendingtimeandresourcesoninter-departmentalworking.Theseincentivesshouldextenduptoseniorlevels(includingviaPublicServiceAgreementframeworks)toencourageseniorcivilservantstoprovideanexampletomorejuniorstaffandcreateaculturewhereworkingwithotherdepartmentsisvalued.Careerprogressionstructuresshouldalsoreflecttheimportanceofcross-departmentalworking.

Alldepartmentsshouldreviewtheskillsoftheirstafftoensurethattheyareappropriateforachievinggreatercoherence(forexample,DFIDshouldemploymorepoliticaladvisers).

DFIDssolespendingfocusonpovertyreductionundertheInternationalDevelopmentActshouldberetainedandevenstrengthened,butshouldbebasedonabroad


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analysisofwhatdrivespovertyreduction.TherestrictionsoftheActshouldapplytoODAspendingacrossgovernment,notjustinDFID.ThedefinitionofODAshouldnotbereopened,butDFIDshouldhaveaccesstomorenon-ODAfunds,particularlyinordertoengagemoreeffectivelyinsituationsofconflict.

TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheOECDsDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteetoprovidebetterreportingonnon-ODAspendingonalimitedtypeofclearly-definedactivitiesthatpromotedevelopment,inordertograntsuchspendingmorerecognitionandpoliticalcredit.

Alldepartmentsshouldengagewiththeircivilsocietyconstituencies,andwiththepublic,ontheimportanceandvalueofthecoherenceagenda.DFIDinparticularneedstoproactivelycommunicatewiththepublicandwithParliamentinordertoexplainthecomplicatedrealitiesandambiguitiesofthedevelopmentprocess.Iftheyarereallyinterestedinachievingeffectiveoutcomesindevelopingcountries,theFCOandMODhavearesponsibilitytopromotethelegitimacybothofdevelopment,andofDFID,withtheirownconstituencies.

Ministersandpoliticiansmustmakethepoliticalandpubliccaseforpolicycoherence,andshouldhavetheconfidencetoengagewiththecomplexrealitiesofdevelopment.


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TheaimofthisreportistoinformthedebateaboutthefutureoftheUKsdevelopmentpolicy.WeassesshowfarUKpoliciesarecoherentfromadevelopmentperspective,and

whatthebalanceisbetweeninternationaldevelopmentandotherobjectives,acrossarangeofareas.Weidentifysomeofthebarrierstomorejoined-upgovernment.OnthebasisofthisanalysiswemakeaseriesofrecommendationsforboththeDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheworkingsofgovernmentmorewidely.

Thecontext

Overthelast12yearstherehavebeendramaticchangesintheUKinternationaldevelopmentpolicylandscape.Whenitcametopowerin1997,theLabourGovernmentcreatedanewDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andaseatfordevelopmentpolicyintheCabinet.Thiswasfollowedbytheuntyingofaidin2001andanInternationalDevelopmentActin2002,whichgaveBritishaidanexplicitpovertyreductionremit.Spendingonaidsteadilyincreasedto6.3billionby2008,a140percentincreaseinreal

termssince1997.Itcurrentlystandsat0.43percentofnationalincome,andin2005theGovernmentcommitteditselftotheUnitedNationstargetofgiving0.7percentofnationalincomeinaidby2013,acommitmentitnowproposestolockinthroughlegislation.

Inmanyways,Britainsinternationalaidefforthasbeenanenormoussuccess,especiallyintheareasithasprioritised,suchashealthandeducation.Infantandchildmortalityrateshavefallenacrossthedevelopingworld,morechildrenareinschool,andrealprogresshasbeenmadeintacklingtheHIV/AIDSepidemic.Whilethesechangeshavebeenbroughtaboutbymanydifferentactors,DFIDestimatesthattheUKaidprogrammehelpstolift3millionpeopleoutofpovertyeachyear(DFID2009).

DFIDisnowanacceptedpartofgovernment.Oppositionpartieshavepledgedtoretain

DFIDsCabinetplace,andtomeettheUNaidtargetof0.7percentofnationalincomeby2013atthelatest.Intheinternationaldevelopmentsystem,theUKcarriesgenuineinfluence.ItisnowthebiggestsinglecontributortotheWorldBanksprogrammeforlow-incomecountries,andhasspearheadeddiscussionsintheOECD,alongsideotherEuropeandonors,onhowtoimprovethequalityofaid.DFIDisrecognisedasaworld-leadingdevelopmentagency,andiswidelyseenasanexampleofbestpractice.AlthoughtheUKaidprogrammeisbynomeansperfect,significantprogresshasbeenmadetheGovernment,andDFID,canrightlybeproudofthevolume,qualityandpovertyfocusofUKaid.

However,thereisalsoafundamentaltensionattheheartofUKdevelopmentpolicy.EversincethecreationofDFID,policymakershavewrestledwithabalancebetweenthedesiretofocusonaddressingthemanifestationsofextremepovertyontheonehand,andtheneed

toengagewithitsunderlyingcausesontheother.ThefirstapproachhasbeenframedintermsoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs).TheMDGshavealsoplayedacentralroleinpubliccampaignstoincreasetheaidbudgetintheUK,suchasMakePovertyHistory.Inbothpublicandpoliticaldebate,internationaldevelopmenthasbecomealmostsynonymouswiththeMDGs.Inturn,aidhasdominateddiscussionsabouthowtheMDGscouldbemettheUKseffortshavefocusedonDFIDdeliveringaideffectivelyinordertosupportbasicservicesindevelopingcountries,especiallyhealthandeducation.

Thesecondapproachhasbeenlessabouttacklingtheimmediatemanifestationsofpoverty,andmoreaboutshapingpoliciesinbothrecipientanddonorcountriesacrossawiderangeofareas,fromtradeandmigrationtogovernanceandconflictprevention,andmorerecently

climatepolicy.Therehasbeenagrowingrecognitionthatpovertyisaffectedbyawiderangeoffactors,andthatgivingaidwithoutengagingwiththemisnotaneffectivelong-termstrategyforreducingpoverty.ThisanalysishasbeenapparentinUKaidprogramming,andDFIDhasbeenincreasinglyusingaidtoaddresssomeoftheseissues,andengagingwith

Introduction


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developingcountrygovernmentstoimprovewiderpolicyframeworks.

ChangesinaidprogrammingandDFIDsstrategyinthedevelopingcountrieswhereitworksareanimportantpartofthisbroaderapproachtodeliveringpovertyreduction.Butbeyondthis,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewiththe

underlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesathomebeyondthetraditionalterritoryofdevelopmentpolicyinforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,infinanceandenvironment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoaspolicycoherencefordevelopment,andisthefocusofthisreport.Coherenceisamoreambitiousagendathancoordination.Coordination(forexamplebetweenDFIDandFCOofficialsworkinginthesamecountry)suggestscommunicationanddivisionoflabour,whilecoherencesuggestsamorefundamentalalignmentofpolicyobjectives.

DFIDhasbecomeincreasinglykeentoemphasisethatitisadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency.AkeypartofthisisinfluencingthewiderUKGovernmenttoensurethattheUKspolicieshelpdeliver(oratleastdonothinder)internationaldevelopmentobjectives.

Itisimportanttonotefromtheoutsetthatthetwoapproachestointernationaldevelopmentandpovertyreductionsetoutabovearenotmutuallyexclusive.Theyshouldbemutuallysupportiveandreinforcing.However,DFIDhastodeliverambitiousobjectiveswithfiniteresources,negotiatingcapitalandpoliticalwill.Quiterightly,prioritiesmustbeset,anditisnotalwaysclearwhichapproachesandstrategieswillreapthegreatestrewardsforpeopleinthepoorestcountries.

OurargumentinthisreportisnotthattheGovernmentorDFIDhasgotitwronginthepast,butratherthatnowmightbeapropitioustimetore-examinethewayDFIDengageswiththerestofgovernmentonthewidersetofissuesthataresoimportanttodevelopment.

Whycoherencemattersnow

TheevidencepresentedinthefollowingchaptersdemonstratesthatwhileaidfromtheUKcanhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeopleindevelopingcountries,theimpactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsarebothmoreprofoundandfarwider.Theseinclude:thelevelofinsecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunitiesforandreturnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;theextentofcorruption;andtheimpactofclimatechange.ThismeansthattheUKscommitmentto,anddeliveryof,internationalpovertyreductionobjectivesneedstobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesthatextendfarbeyondwhatisusuallythoughtofasdevelopmentpolicy,andthatareoutsidethedirectcontrolandremitofDFID.

Thisfacthasparticularimportanceforagenciesthatfocusonchildwell-beingandrights,likeWorldVisionUK(seeForeword,above).Partlybecauseofthegreaterphysicalandsocialvulnerabilityofchildren,theysufferparticularlyfrompovertyandhunger,exploitation,violenceandinsecurityandabusesofrights.Conversely,theyalsobenefitthemostfrommoresecureandbetterlivelihoodsfortheirfamilies,frombetterschoolingandhealthservicesandfrompeaceandenvironmentalstability;inshort,childrenhavethegreaterstakeinthefuture.Becausemanyoftheseoutcomesdependfarmoreontherangeoffactorsoutlinedabovethanonaid,thecoherenceagendashouldbeatthecentreofthinkingaboutchildrenshealth,educationandrighttoprotectionandcare,bothinhumanitariancrisesandmorewidely.

Theimportanceofpolicycoherencehasalwaysbeenunderstood(intheUKandelsewhere),butithasneverbeenaneasyagendatodeliver,eventhoughithasarguablygrowninimportanceinrecentyears.Inthelast18monthstheseissueshavemovedtothecentreofUKdebatesaboutinternationaldevelopmentandpovertyreduction,1 promptingcallsto

1.Forexample,in2009thesekindofargumentsfeaturedprominentlyinboththeGovernmentsInternationalDevelopmentWhitePaper,BuildingOurCommonFuture,andintheConservativesPolicyGreenPaper,OneWorldConservatism:AConservativeAgendaforInternationalDevelopment.


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thinkafreshaboutthefuturedirectionofUKdevelopmentpolicy.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis.Thefirstisthattheworldfeelsincreasinglyinter-connected.Newglobalissues,likeclimatechange,haverisenuptheagenda,whileoldonesliketheglobalimpactsofbankingandfinancepolicyhavereturnedwithavengeance,causingaseverecrisiswith

deepimpactsonmanyofthepoorestcountries.Crisescanhaveparticularlynegativelong-termimpactsonchildrenbyinterruptingtheireducation,orbylimitingtheiraccesstonutrition,healthcareandsocialsupportduringkeystagesoftheirdevelopment.Inturn,thelong-termimpactsofcrisisonchildrenwillservetodeceleratedevelopmentmorebroadlyduetotheinter-generationalnatureofpovertytransmission.

Anotherreasonfortheincreasingrelevanceofthecoherencedebateisdue,paradoxically,tosuccessfuldevelopmentinmanycountries.Aspovertyinthesecountriesdeclines,developmentpolicyislikelytobecomeincreasinglyfocusedonthebottombillion(Collier2008,WorldBank2007b)thosepeoplelivingincountrieswithmultipleandparticularlyintractableproblems,wherestatesarefragileorfailing,whereinstitutionsareweak,whereconflictisoftenrife,wherechangesintheinternationaleconomymoreoftenhavenegative

impactsthanpositiveones,andmostimportantly,wheretraditionalaidapproachesdonotworkverywell(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).Developmentpolicyinthesecontextshastobeaboutmuchmorethanjustdeliveringbasicservicesasusuallydefined,andinparticularmeansbeingabletounderstandandhelpresolveviolentconflicts.InsettingslikeAfghanistan,Pakistan,Somalia,Sudan,KenyaandSierraLeone,theconceptualfirewallsbetweenpoverty-focuseddevelopmentinterventionsandgovernance,securityandwiderforeignpolicyobjectiveshavebrokendown.

Inprinciple,theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehasbeenpresenteversincetheestablishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominencetopolicycoherence,althoughtheparticularpolicyfocushasshiftedovertime.The1997WhitePaperthatestablishedthedepartmenthasawholechapteronpolicycoherenceand

explicitlystatedthatDFIDshouldnotsimplybeanaidagency.The2000WhitePaperfocusedontheimportanceoftradeandtradepolicyinthecontextofglobalisation(followingthefailureoftheWorldTradeOrganisationsummitinSeattle).Thekeythemeofthe2006WhitePaperwasimprovinggovernance,whilethe2009WhitePaperprioritisedclimatechangeandconflict.

Atthesametime,theGovernmenthastriedtouseitscentralpolicyandtarget-settingmachinerytopromotecoherence.In2007itcreatedanumberofrelevantpublicserviceagreements(PSAs),usedtoholddepartmentstoaccounttotheTreasuryandthePrimeMinister,whichapplyjointlyacrossanumberofdepartments.ThusPSA29,whichcalledforquickerprogresstowardstheMDGs,appliestoDFID,theFCO,DECCandtheTreasury.PSA30,whichisaboutreducingtheimpactofconflict,appliestoDFID,FCOandtheMOD.PSA

27onclimatechangeisledbyDECCbutalsoinvolvestheFCOandDFID.Inturn,thesePSAsaretranslatedintodepartmentalobjectives.Forexample,oneoftheFCOsdepartmentalobjectivesis:Sustainabledevelopment,underpinnedbydemocracy,goodgovernanceandhumanrights.

Beyondtarget-settingandobjectives,aplethoraofcross-Whitehallmechanismshaveemergedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachieveamorejoined-upgovernmenteffortondevelopment.TheseincludeajointDFID-BIStradeunit,thejointfundingpoolsforconflictsharedwiththeFCOandtheMOD,andajointunitwithDECConclimatechange.Thesebodiesalsooftenoverseespendingfromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadoutacrossdepartmentalboundaries,suchasthe800millionenvironmentalfundsharedbetweenDFIDandDECC,anda260millionpost-conflictfundmanagedjointlybyDFID

andtheFCO.However,thereisanongoingdebateonhowfarpolicycoherencehasbeenachievedintheUK.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasindeedbecomeadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)


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asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutsidegovernment)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagencyandistooseparatefromtherestofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,environment,migration,andtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens

(particularlywheretherearegenuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoorcountries);andthattheresultisalackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUKssupportfor,andengagementwith,thepoorestcountries.

ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFIDsplacewithingovernment.SomebelievethatdefendingDFIDspositionasafullyindependentdepartmentwithaspecificpovertyreductionremitistheonlywaytopreventtheencroachmentofotherinterestsintotheUKspolicyapproachtothepoorestcountries.OtherssuggestthatitisthisveryindependencethatlimitscoherenceinUKpolicy,andthatreducesthevoiceofdevelopmentinwiderUKpolicydecisions,andsomeevenarguethatDFIDshouldbereintegratedintotheFCO.

ipprthinksthatthebenefitsofastrongandindependentDFIDclearlyoutweighthecosts

thereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFIDspositionasaseparatedepartmentwithaCabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.

InsomesensesthisdebateaboutDFIDspositioningovernmentisamicrocosmofwiderdebatesaboutthemosteffectiveapproachtopolicycoherence.Intherealworldofpoliticstherearegenuinetrade-offstobemadebetweentightlyfocuseddevelopmentpoliciesandwiderinfluence,betweenshort-termpovertyreductionobjectivesandlonger-termchangeprocesses,and,insomecases,betweentheinterestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreportdoesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers;rather,wetrytosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offsthatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKinthefaceofthesetrade-offs,anddrawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidence

suggeststhatdifferentchoicesshouldbemadeinthefuture.

Developmentinthedownturn

CuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychangingfiscalandpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.AmassivesqueezeonpublicexpenditureandapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUKdevelopmentpolicy.

ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewiderparametersoftheconsensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservativegovernmentwouldkeepDFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainorevenincreaseaidspending.Therearenoproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFIDspendingtopovertyreduction

(ConservativeParty2009),althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywanttoexplorethepossibility(withinOECDDACrules)ofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-relatedspending(forexample,onanewStabilisationandReconstructionForce)(ConservativeParty2010).

However,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFIDsbudget,independenceandwaysofworking.ThesemaycomelessfromthecurrentleadershipoftheConservativePartythanfromexistingbackbenchers,peers,andthenewgroupofMPsexpectedtocomeintoParliamentatthenextelection.2

2.Forexample,DouglasHurd,formerlyForeignSecretaryandnowaConservativepeer,recentlycalledforDFIDtobemergedbackintotheFCO(DODSNetwork2009).Asurveyof144ConservativeprospectiveParliamentarycandidatesbythewebsite

ConservativeHomeshowedonly4percentarguingthatinternationaldevelopmentshouldbeimmunefromspendingcuts,ascomparedwith39percentinfavourofprotectingdefenceand34percentforprotectinghealthspending(ConservativeHome.com2009).ThePoliticsHomewebsitealsofindslittlesupportforprotectingtheaidbudgetamongagroupofrespondentsthatincludesConservativefrontbenchers,senioradvisersandinfluentialcommentatorsintheright-leaningpress(PoliticsHome.com2009).


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EveniftotalUKaidspendingisprotectedbythecommitmenttomeetthe0.7percenttarget,thelikelyscaleofpublicspendingcutselsewheremeansthattherewillbepressurestore-routespendingviaotherdepartments.Indeed,thisisalreadyhappeningtosomeextentwithODAspendingoutsideDFIDrisingfasterthanDFIDsownprogramme

spendinginthelastspendingreview.TherearealsolikelytobecallstoallocateDFIDsspendinginsuchawayastogivegreatersupporttoobjectivesbeyondpovertyreduction,especiallynationalsecurity.Forexample,arecentpolicyGreenPaperindicatesthataConservativegovernmentwouldprobablyincreaseaidspendinginAfghanistanandPakistan(ConservativeParty2009).3

UnderlyingtheseanticipatedpressuresistheviewheldincertainpartsoftheConservativePartyandamongitscorevoters,andalsopartsofthepressthatthetraditionallyliberal,welfare-centredapproachtodevelopmentaidisweak,andthatwherewegiveaidtoothercountries,itshouldprimarilyservetheUKsnationalinterest,supportingoursecurityandforeignpolicies,andcommercialinterests(forasenseoftherecentdebate,seeMaxwell2007).Thisargumentexplicitlyrejectstheideathatinternationaldevelopmentpolicy(andin

particularaid)shouldbedeliberatelyisolatedfromthenationalinterestsofrichcountriesliketheUK.ThelatterideahasarguablybeenadrivingforceinUKpolicyinthelastdecadeandhas,forexample,ledtoDFIDsstatusasanindependentdepartment,withlegally-limitedpovertyreductiongoals.

Thisargumentisalsorelatedtothepolicycoherencedebate,becauseoneprogressiveresponsetoitreversesthepolicycoherenceargument.Thatresponseisthatreducingpovertyoverseasisanessentialandirreplaceableprerequisiteforasustainableendtoconflictandterrorism,andforathrivingworldeconomyinwhichtheUKcanprosper(see,forexample,ippr2008).Inthisargument,developmentandpovertyreductionareimportantforwiderpolicies,aswellasthereverse.

Inpractice,anydefenceofdevelopmentpolicyandaidinthecurrenteconomicandpolitical

landscapemustrecognisetheinterdependencyofdifferentobjectives.Indeed,whenconsideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountriesitwouldseembizarrenotto.Thisnotionofinterdependencybetweenpolicyobjectivesisnotconfinedtoprogressives.Forexample,theideathatachievinglastingsecurityinplaceslikeAfghanistanrequiresnon-militaryactionsuchaseconomicreconstructionandtheestablishmentoflawandorder,reinforcingeachotherlikestrandsofarope(Browne2006),isthebasisfortheso-calledComprehensiveApproachtointervention,embracedbytheUKarmedforcesandNATO.

ItseemslikelythattheUKsinternationaldevelopmentactorsmayneedtomaketheseinterdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inordertoprotecttheaidbudgetandDFIDsindependence.ThisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebateaboutwhetherornotDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andon

whatterms.

Reportmethodologyandstructure

Aswellasawide-rangingreviewofevidenceondifferentpolicyimpactsondevelopment,thisstudyisbasedonaround40interviewswithacademics,NGOs,civilservantsfromanumberofgovernmentdepartments,andspecialadvisersandpoliticiansfromallthemajorpoliticalparties.Toencouragefrankness,weallowedallintervieweestospeakanonymously.Namesofcurrentgovernmentofficialsandadvisersarenotlisted,butotherintervieweeswhowerehappytobenamedarelistedintheAppendix.Adraftofthisreportwassharedwithallthosewhowereinterviewedaspartoftheresearch,andthefinaltextreflects,whereappropriate,furthercommentsandfeedbackfrominterviewees.

3.DFIDcurrentlyspendsaround10timestheamountinAfghanistanasitwouldinacountrywithacomparabledegreeofpovertybutnoconflict.SeecommentsbyMichaelFoster,UnderSecretaryofState,DFID,inevidencetotheDefenceSelectCommittee,7July2009.


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Sections1to5examineanumberofissuesinturn:conflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration.TheseissuesdonotrepresentacomprehensivesurveyofalltheUKpoliciesthatarerelevantfordevelopmentobjectives,butwehopethattheyprovideasenseoftherangeofchallengesandissuesthattheUKneedstoconfront.

Eachsectionreviewsthecurrentstateofevidenceontheimpactsoftheissueinquestiononpovertyandrights,especiallyforchildren,whoformthemainfocusofWorldVisionswork.

Wethenlookathowjoined-upUKpolicyandgovernmentdepartmentsareintheseareas,fromtheperspectiveofinternationaldevelopment.Weidentifyareaswhereobjectivesare(orcouldbe)alignedandthosewherethereareconflictingagendas.Theobjectiveistoassessactualcoherenceinpractice,asopposedtojustpolicystatements.AlthoughmanyoftheissuesdiscussedhereareshapedbyinstitutionsandpoliciesataEuropeanand/orinternationallevel,wedonothavespaceheretodojusticetotheseinternationaldimensions.WewouldalsosuggestthatthefirststeptosuccessfulengagementwithEuropeanandinternationalpartnersontheseissuesisacoherentUKapproach.

Section6drawsoutsomegenerallessonsthatemergefromandarecommonacrossallthe

particularpolicyareas.Afinalsectionconcludesandsummarisesourrecommendations.


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Ifhumandevelopmentisregardedasaprocessofexpandingchoiceandadvancingrights,assuggestedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),thenviolentconflict

mustsurelybeconsideredoneofthemostsignificantobstaclestoachievingit(UNDP2005).Westartthissectionbyreviewingtheeconomicandsocialcostsofconflict.

Theeconomiccostsofconflict

Inadditiontodeprivingmillionsofcitizensoftheirbasicrightstolifeandsecurity,protractedviolentconflictsarealsolikelytocauseaconsiderabledropinlevelsofproductiveeconomicactivity,withsomestudiesestimatingthatitcantakeatleastadecadeforcountriesemergingfromamajorcivilconflicttoreturnpre-warlevelsofGDPpercapita(Haughton1998).Whileattemptstoquantifytheglobalcostsofconflicthavebeenhinderedbyalackofaccurateandcomprehensivedata,PaulCollierandothershaveestimatedthatthetypicalcostofacivilwarisatleastUS$50billion(Collier2004).Otherssuggestthatcivilwars,onaverage,causeapermanentlossinincomeofaround2percentofGDP(Knightetal1996).

Thishasseriousimplicationsforlevelsofpovertyincountriesthatexperienceconflictandforthedynamicsofpovertyinpost-conflictsituations(Justino2006).

Duringaconflict,thediversionofacountrysresourcesfromproductivetodestructiveactivitiesinvolvesadoublelossfordevelopmentinthatittakesawayfromspendingonprogrammesrelatedtoeconomicandsocialgrowth,whilesimultaneouslyinflictingcostsintermsofthekeyinfrastructure(includingtelecommunicationssystems,railways,roads,bridges,portsandenergygenerationfacilities)thatmustberebuiltaftertheviolenceends(Collieretal2003).Conflictalsohasanimpactontheresourcesavailablefordevelopment,sincepoliticalandeconomicinstabilityoftenpromptsresidentstotransfertheirfinancialassetsoutofthecountry,aswellasdiscouragingpotentialexternalinvestors.Furthermore,civilwarservesasapowerfulstimulusforemigration,andasCollieretalnote,someof

theseemigrants,especiallythoseinindustrialcountries,thenprovideapost-conflictchannelforfurtheremigration(Collieretal2003:21).Notwithstandingtheboostthismightgivetoremittancelevelsintheshorttomediumterm,theforcedflightoffinancialandsocialcapitaltendstohaveanadverseeffectondevelopmentincountriesravagedbyconflictinthelongerterm.

Atthelevelofindividuals,householdsandcommunities,conflictcanclearlyhaveasevereimpactonsustainablelivelihoods.Manyofthosecaughtupinconflictwillloseimportantassetslikeproperty,modesoftransportandlivestock.Onestudyofthe1994civilwarinRwandaestimatedthat12percentofallhouseholdslosttheirhomes,whilecattlestockdiminishedbyaround50percent(Verpoorten2003).Otherslosejobsoraccesstoincome-generationopportunities(oftenduetothedeathormilitaryconscriptionoffamily-memberbreadwinners).Ithasbeensuggestedbysomeresearchthatafteracivilwarsevenyearsinduration,incomesaretypicallyabout30percentlowerthantheywouldhavebeenifthewarhadnotoccurred(Collieretal2003).Conflictcansometimescreateopportunitiesfortheverypoorestindividuals,ifjoininganarmyormilitiagroupsinvolvesmonetaryorotherformsofreward,butthenetoutcomeforsocietyisusuallyasignificantincreaseintheincidenceofabsolutepovertyandinequality.

Thesocialcostsofconflict

Beyonditsimpactoneconomicgrowth,conflictinvolvessignificantsocialcoststhatarenotsimplylimitedtothenumberofbattledeaths.Forexample,arecentInternationalRescueCommitteereportontheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)estimatesthatnearlyfiveand

ahalfmillionexcessdeathshaveoccurredinthecountryasaresultofmorethanadecadeofarmedconflictsincethelate1990s.Just0.4percentofthedeathsintheIRCssurveyperiodarethoughttohavebeenthedirectconsequenceofviolence,whilemostarethought

1.Conflict


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tohavebeencausedbyinfectiousdisease,malnutritionorneo-natalandpregnancyrelatedconditions(InternationalRescueCommittee2007).

Anotherstudy,onSierraLeone,surveyedfourruraldistrictsinconflict-affectedregionsandfoundthatthreeyearsaftertheendofadecade-longcivilwar,theaveragecrudemortality

rateintheseareaswasnearlyfourtimeshigherthantheSub-Saharanbaseline.SimilarfindingshavebeenmadeinrelationtocivilwarsinAngola,LiberiaandSouthernSudan,whileawiderstudyof51countriesaffectedbyarmedconflictshowsastronglinkbetweenconflictandtheriskofdeathanddisabilityforyearsaftertheviolencehasended(seeMdecinsSansFrontires2006,SapirandGomez2006,Beckeretal1993,Ghobarahetal2004).

Masspopulationdisplacementisanotherconsequenceofviolentconflictthathasseriousimplicationsfordevelopment.In2007,theestimatednumberofpeopleinternallydisplacedasaresultofconflictandviolenceexceeded26millionforthefirsttimesincetheearly1990s,with52countriesaroundtheworldhavingexperiencedsignificantlevelsofdisplacement(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentreandNorwegianRefugeeCouncil

2008);notethatthreecountriesinparticularSudan(5.8million),Colombia(4million),andIraq(2.5million)accountedforalmosthalfofthisglobaltotal.Internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)oftenhavelimitedornoaccesstothebasicnecessitiesoflifesuchasfood,waterandshelter,andasaresultofthebreakdownoflawandorderthataccompaniesconflict,theyfrequentlysufferviolationsoftheirhumanrightsthrougharbitraryattacks,detentionsorarrests.WomenandgirlsamongtheIDPpopulationareexposedtorapeandexploitationwhilechildrenoftenloseaccesstoeducationalopportunitiestheymayhavehadpreviously.

InternallydisplacedpopulationsalsofaceseriousrisksfrominfectiousdiseaseasaresultofpoorconditionsinmanyIDPcamps,andbecauseofdisruptionstoessentialhealthservices.Forexample,malariahadvirtuallybeeneliminatedinAfghanistanbytheendofthe1970s.However,thecollapseofcontrolprogrammesduringthe19781995civilwaralloweditsre-

emergence,andby2002,morethan50percentofthepopulationwaslivinginmalaria-endemicareas(Gayeretal2007).

Thedisplacementthatusuallyaccompaniesprotractedconflictshasafurtherspill-overimpactondevelopment,inthatviolenceinonecountryoftenaffectsthestabilityofitsneighbours.TheinterconnectedconflictsinWestAfricaoverthepastdecadeinLiberia,SierraLeone,Guinea,CtedIvoire,GuineaBissauandSenegalareaprimeexampleofthis,whilethemovementofrebelgroups,refugeesandsmallarmsandlightweaponsacrosstheborderbetweenUgandaandtheDRChasalsoservedtoperpetuateconflictandinhibitdevelopmentinbothcountriesuntilveryrecently.

Conflictandchildwell-being

Exposuretoconflictandviolencehasaparticularlynegativeimpactonchildrenandyoungpeople.Ashighlightedbyakeyreportin1996,childrenarerarelybystandersinwarsandcivilconflicts,butareoftendirecttargetsoractiveparticipants.Inadditiontothenumberofyoungpeoplethatarekilledorinjuredbywar,countlessothersgrowupdeprivedoftheirmaterialandemotionalneeds,includingthestructuresthatgivemeaningtosocialandculturallife(Machel1996).Violentconflictusuallyputssubstantiallimitsonthestatescapacitytoprovideessentialhealthandeducationservices,andthereareanumberofstudiesthatdrawonempiricalevidencetodemonstratetheadverseeffectsthatthishasonyoungpeople(seeBundervoetetal2008andShemyakina2006).

Forexample,theprevalenceofmalnutritionandtherateofmortalityamongchildrenundertheageoffiveinUgandaaresignificantlyhigherinareasofthecountryaffectedbyconflict.

Schoolattendanceisalsomuchlowerinsomeconflictareas,withonly43percentofchildrenintheKaramojaareaattendingprimaryschool,comparedwith82percentatthenationallevel.Thisrecognitionoftheparticularharmcausedtochildrenbyconflicthasled


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tothecreationofspecificinternationallegalprotectionsforchildreninsituationsofarmedconflict,includinga2005SecurityCouncilresolutionwhichestablishedaUNWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflict,includingamonitoringandreportingmechanism.

Althoughtheemotionalconsequencesofgrowingupinanenvironmentofconflictare

hardertomeasure,thereisabroadconsensusintheliteratureabouttheharmfulimpactsdoingsohasonyoungpeople.Childrenthatlosetheirparentsorotherrelativesasaresultofconflictarefrequentlyrequiredtotakeonadditionalresponsibilitiestohelpsupportthefamily,whichmayinvolvedroppingoutofschool,workingonthestreetsorengaginginsexworkandotherdangerousactivitiesasameansofmakingmoney.Othersmaybeconscripted(eitherbyforceorvoluntarily)byarmedgroupsandusedassoldiersorfornon-combatpurposes,includingtheprovisionofsexualservices(UNICEF2009;seealsoUNDP2006).Aftertheconflictends,theseyoungpeopleareoftenstigmatisedbytheirsocietiesforhavingcommittedwarcrimesandfinditdifficulttosuccessfullyreintegrate,compoundingthetraumatheyexperienceasaresultoftakingpartinconflict(Zakaria2006).

DFIDsapproachtoconflictanddevelopment

DFIDhashadadedicatedsectionworkingonconflictsincethelate1990s.Initially,thedepartmentsengagementinsituationsofconflictwaslargelytoprovidehumanitarianrelieftoaffectedcivilianpopulations.Overtime,workinginconflict-affectedorinsecurecountrieshasbecomemorecentraltoDFIDswork,anditisnowspendingaround1.5billionayearalmostaquarterofitstotalspendingincountriesclassifiedasinsecure.SomeofthelargestincreasesinDFIDsprogrammesinrecentyearshavecomeinhighlyinsecurecountries,suchasAfghanistanandtheDRC(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).DFIDprogrammeshavealsobranchedoutintoconflictpreventionandrehabilitationandreconstructionafterconflict.Thedepartmenthasbecomeincreasinglyinvolvedinwidergovernmentpolicyonsecurityandconflicttoo(suchascontributingtonationalsecurity

strategiesandassessingUKarmsexports4).

The2009DFIDWhitePaperplacesaspecialemphasisonconflictresolution(seeBox1.1),providingadeeperanalysisthatbringspeace-buildingtogetherwithstate-building(thatis,buildinginclusivepoliticalsettlementsandstrengtheninginstitutions),andacommitmenttotreatingsecurityandjusticeasabasicservice,alongsidehealthandeducation(DFID2009).Ithasbeenwidelywelcomed,bothbyexternalstakeholdersandbyothergovernmentdepartments.

SeveralofourintervieweesfeltthatinsomeareasthenewWhitePapercatchesupwithwhatDFIDisalreadydoingontheground.ButasastatementofGovernmentpurpose,italsosetsoutanewagendaforconflictreductionandstate-buildingwhichneedstobeput

intopractice.TherearevaryingviewsonhoweasilyDFIDcanachievesuchashiftinfocus.Someobservers,bothwithinDFIDandoutside,seeatensionwithinthedepartmentbetweenthosewhoworkdirectlyonconflictanalysisandprevention,andclassicaidpractitionersordevelopmentprofessionalsfocusedonachievingtheMDGsthroughthedeliveryofbasicserviceslikehealthandprimaryeducation.Itisarguedthatthelattergroupmakeupthecoreofthedepartment,holdthemajorityofseniordecision-makingposts,andcomefromaparticularprofessionalperspectiveofdevelopmentpolicywhichissometimestechnocratic,whereasreallytacklingconflictandbuildingstatesrequiresamorepoliticalperspective.Oneimplicationofthisviewisthatnewstaff,withnewskills,willincreasinglybeneededasDFIDsfocusshiftsovertime.

4.Thearmsexportregimeisoneofseveralimportantissueswhich,forreasonsofspace,wehavenotbeenabletodiscussindetailinthisreport.


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Others,includingsomeseniorstaffinDFID,arguethatthedepartmentmovedawayfromaservicedeliveryapproachseveralyearsago,thattherearenowveryfewpureaidadministratorsleftthere,andthatmoststaff(atleastinLondon),aremainlyconcernedwithwiderpolicyissuesasthequotefromNematShafikbelowshows,forexample.Theypoint

tothefactthatDFIDhasbeencarryingoutanalysesofwhatdriveslocalcapacityandinstitutions,suchastheDriversofChangeseriesandmorespecificstrategicconflictassessments,foranumberofyears,andnotethatgovernancewasamajorthemeofthe2007WhitePaper(DFID2007).InthewordsofthePermanentSecretary:Whatwehavelearnedoverthelastfewyearsisthatavoidingoneconflictisequivalenttoall[the]foreignassistanceintheworld,soifwecanjustmaintainstabilityinthecountryforaperiod,thathashugeeconomicbenefits(NematShafikinevidencetothePublicAccountsCommittee2009:Ev8).

OnereasonforwhytherearesuchdifferentviewsaboutthenatureofDFIDmaybethatwhileithasprogressivelyinvestedinpoliticalanalysesofweakandfailingstates,andindeedofopenconflicts,ithasstruggledtoputtheseanalysesintopractice(Unsworth2008).CasessuchasNepal,whereastrategicconflictassessmentfundamentallychangedDFIDsaidprogramme,stillappeartoberelativelyrare.

Box1.1:Conflictanddevelopmentinthe2009WhitePaper

TherearethreeelementstotheapproachtoconflictintheWhitePaper.Thefirstisafocusontheunderlyingcausesofconflict,andtherecognitionthatbuildinginclusivepoliticalsettlementsthataremorethanjustbargainsbetweenelitesiscritical,sinceitisonlythese

settlementsthataresustainable.Thisapproachwilloftenmeanaddressingproblemssuchassocialandpoliticalexclusion,poorgovernance,andhighlevelsofunemployment,aswellasstrengtheningformalandinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms.TheWhitePaperrecognisesthatinfragilestatestheformalandinformalmechanismsrequiredtomediateconflictspeacefullyareoftenlackingandthatformalmechanismsaremoreoftenthannotsubvertedbycorruption.

ThattheWhitePaperincludessuchanexplicitlypoliticalapproachisstriking,becauseanoft-statedcriticismofDFIDisthatitistootechnocratic(andconservativeinitsthinkingasaresult).Thispointismadenotonlybythoseelsewhereingovernment(forexampletheFCO)andbyexternalcommentators,butalsosometimesfromwithinDFIDitself.Forexample,therecentevaluationofDFIDsprogrammeinAfghanistannotedthatunderlying

politicalproblemswererecognisedonlybelatedly(Benettetal2009).Itisalsoimportantbecauseitallowsfortherecognitionthataiditselfcanexacerbateconflictundercertaincircumstances(seeHouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentCommittee2006,CRISE2007).

Thesecondelementrelatestostate-building,whichisaboutstrengtheningthesurvivalfunctionsofthestate,themostimportantofwhichistoprovidecitizenswithsecurityandtheruleoflaw.Atthesametime,theWhitePaperisclearthatitiscriticalthatthesurvivalfunctionsarestrengthenedwithaccountabilitytopopulations,recognisingthatif,forexample,securitystructuresarestrengthenedwithoutaccountability,thereisariskofincreasingrepression.

Athirdelementisaboutmeetingtheexpectationsofthepopulation.Withinthiscontext,oneinterestingattempttolockconflictreductionintothecoreofDFIDsactivityistheframingofsecurityasabasicservice.OneintervieweearguedthatthiswasparticularlyimportantbecauseDFIDiscommittedtospending50percentofitsbudgetonbasicserviceprovision.However,meetingpeoplesexpectationsisnotjustaboutbasicservices:itisaboutabroaddefinitionofaccountability,includingdemocraticinclusion,humanrights,dealingwithcorruptionandpoorgovernance.


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Moreover,becauseDFIDissohighlydecentralisedontheground,thewayinwhichtheWhitePaperconflictagendacanbepushedfromthecentrewillbelimited.Forexample,thereiscurrentlynooverarchingcentralstrategyforthedeploymentofconflictadvisers(CAs),whoareoftencriticalfordevelopingcountryaidprogrammesthatrecogniseand

addressconflicts.WhetherornotanofficehasaCAdependsontheheadofthecountryofficeandtheissuestheyarechoosingtoprioritise.Thiscanleadtowhatappeartobeanomaloussituations.ThereisnoCAinPakistan,forexample,althoughtherearetwoinNepal.5 ThereisnoCAinZimbabwebutthereisoneinUganda.SomeworkhasbeendonewithinDFIDtotryandsystematisethemainstreamingofconflictissuesintoaidprogrammingin-country,butnotenough.

AfinalbutcrucialpointisthatinmostcaseswhereDFIDistryingtopreventorresolveconflicts,itisnotworkingalone.Britishtroopsaresometimesdirectlyinvolved,asincaseslikeSierraLeone,ornowAfghanistan;ormoreoften,UNpeacekeepers.Inanincreasingnumberofcases,conflictsinthecountrieswhereDFIDisworkingarerelatedtowiderissues,suchasterrorismorinternationalcrime,whereUKnationalinterestsareatstake.

HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesonconflictanddevelopment?

Overthelasttwodecades,addressingviolentconflictindevelopingcountrieshasmoveduptheUKpolicyagenda.Thisispartlybecauseofthegrowingrecognitionofitsimportancefordevelopmentasdescribedabove,butalsobecausetheUKhasbeeninvolvedinanumberofdirectmilitaryinterventionsindevelopingcountries,includingSierraLeonein2000,Afghanistanfrom2001andIraqfrom2003.Changingpolicyhasreflectedthelessonslearnedfromtheseexperiences.

Basedonitsexperienceoverthelast20years,theMODhasbecomemuchmoreawareoftheimportanceofthewidercivilcontextforachievingsecurity.OneintervieweepointedoutthatbecausetheBritisharmedforceshaveincreasinglybeendeployedasmuchforreasonsof

humanitarianinterventionasaforceforgoodasforstrategicnationalinterest,we[theMOD]haveaninterestinworkingwithDFIDandothersinpreventingandresolvingconflict.

TherecognitionofthefailureofapurelymilitaryapproachinsuchcontextshasgivenrisetowhatisknowninmilitarycirclesastheComprehensiveApproach,whichistheneedforthemilitarytoworkinajoined-upwaywithciviliancounterpartstounderpinsecuritywitheconomicdevelopmentandinstitutionalreconstruction(MOD2006).

TheformaloverarchingframeworkforpolicyisnowgivenbyPSA30,whichhasappliedjointlytoDFID,FCOandtheMODsince2007,andisaimedatreducingtheimpactofviolentconflict.6 EachdepartmentinturnhasobjectivesandtargetsrelatingtoPSA30.

Meanwhile,theFCOisalsogovernedbyPSA30,andhasitsowntargetsforconflictresolution.Itcurrentlyspendsover400millionayearonconflictitslargestsingleprogramme.Atthesametime,theFCOalsohasanexplicitobjectivetopromotesustainabledevelopmentinternationally.TheFCOalsohasaspecificworkstreamonchildreninsituationsofarmedconflict,andisseekingtoimprovecoherenceacrossgovernmentonthisissueinparticular.

Howjoinedupisgovernmentinpractice?

Belowthesehigh-levelstatementsofprinciple,itisclearthatthestoryofUKpolicycoherenceismuchmorecomplex,andthatjoined-upgovernmentonconflictindevelopingcountriesisstillverymuchaworkinprogress(asdescribedbyLordMarkMalloch-Brown,

5.WeunderstandthataconflictadviserisnowbeingrecruitedinPakistan.

6.Actiononconflictcouldbebrokendownintoseveralconstituentparts,forexample,conflictprevention,conflictresolution,providingsecurityandpeace-keeping,andpost-conflictreconstruction.Thusfar,thefocushastendedtobeonthelastthreeareas,withconflictpreventionsomethingofanorphanissue,partlybecauseofthelackofvisibilityofimpactandthereforethedifficultyofgainingpoliticalsupportforexpandingit.ForDFID,thismaychangewiththeapproachtakeninthe2009WhitePaper.


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MinisterforAsia,AfricaandtheUNattheFCO,ontheComprehensiveApproachtotheDefenceSelectCommittee[2009,Q304]).Apictureemergesofsomebasichistoricalandstructuraltensions,withsignificantrecenteffortstoovercomethese.

ItiseasytoforgethowdifferentthemachineryoftheUKGovernmentlookedjusttwo

decadesago.TheFCOwasthemainleadonalloverseasissues,andtheMODwaspreoccupiedwiththeColdWar.Overthelast15years,inthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee,everythinghasbecomemorecomplex,moreoverlapping.MODnowworksinfragilestates.DFIDnowexists.Leadsarelessclear.7

Andwhilenewheadlinepoliciesforcoherencehavebeenintroducedinthelastfewyears,theFCO,MODandDFIDallhavedifferenthistoricalraisonsdtresandcultures,whichhavenotdisappearedovernight.Coreskillsetshavenotyetadjustedtothenewpolicylandscape.TheFCOandMODaredrivenprimarilybyUKinterestsandsecurity,andtheirhumanitarianobjectiveshavetobebalancedbyothers,suchasreducingtheriskfrominternationalterrorism.Bycontrast,DFIDhasafarmoreinternationalist,humanitarianagenda,andthroughtheInternationalDevelopmentAct,DFIDspendingcannotbetiedtonational

interest.AsBillRammellMP,MinsterfortheArmedForces,putittotheDefenceCommittee:

IfIamhonest,Ithinktherearestillculturalchallengesbetweenallthreeofour

departmentsinthatthemilitary,aidworkersanddiplomatshaveadifferentmindset

whentheycometoaprobleminitiallybutsomefundamentalsharedinterests.I

thinkwestillneedtodomoretoensurethatwecanbreakdownthosebarriers.

(HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee2009:Q303)

OneofthemostimportantwaysinwhichthedifferentculturesandapproachesofDFID,FCOandMODaremanifestedisintheirtimeframes.WhereastheMODoftenhasanimmediatesecurityfocus,andtheFCOisusedtodealingwithcrisesandpoliticaleventsoccurringoverweeksormonths,DFIDsfocusonpovertyreductionandsustainabledevelopmentnecessitatesmuchlongertimeframes,oftenstretchingtodecades.Thiscontrastintimeframes,linkedtodifferenttraditionsandwaysofthinking,appliesevenwithinareasofactivitythatallagreeareimportant.Asoneintervieweeputit,DFIDwantstobuildthecapacityofacountrysoitcanbuilditsownschools,whiletheBritisharmywantstobuildtheschoolsandgetout.Foranumberofinterviewees,includingsomeatveryseniorlevels,thisdifferenceisthenubofthepolicycoherenceproblemwhenitcomestoconflictandfailingstates.

Thesedifferentbackgroundagendas,departmentalculturesandtimeframesforactionandthinkingmeanthat,despiteprogresstowardscoherenceandbetterjointworking(seebelow),thereareneverthelessstilltensions,withsomeintervieweesfeelingthatdepartmentsarenotclosetooneanotherandstilldonotowneachothersobjectives.Acommon

perceptionofDFID,fromFCOandMODintervieweesbutalsomorewidely,includingfromseniorpoliticaladvisersatthecentreofGovernment,wasthatithadnotalwaysbeenateamplayer,andsawitselfasstandingapartfromothergovernmentdepartments.

MuchoftherecentdebateontherelationshipbetweenDFID,FCOandMODhasbeendrivenbycasessuchasIraq,Afghanistan(seeBox1.2)andPakistan.InthesecasestheUKhasamilitarypresencerelatingtointernationalsecurity,orasetofnationalsecurity

7.ThefullcomplexityofhowdepartmentalrelationshipscanworkoutonthegroundwasbroughtoutbyoneintervieweeintheMOD:TheFCOhavetheleadonforeignpolicyin-country,butifthecountrygoesdownthetubes,atsomestagewemightbecalledinasthearmedforcetotryandstabilise,doapeacesupportoperationorsomethinglikethatAtwhichstageletssayIraqin2003weendupsortofbeingtheleadagencywhilewar,fighting,peacesupporthappens.Assoonaswecan,wewant

totransitionbacktooneoftheothergovernmentdepartments,andwewanttogo,butquiteoftenwerecaughtinthereforalongerperiodoftime.Ideally,ifitsacountrythatneedsstabilisation,becauseitsafailedorfailingstateorithasnoinfrastructure,DFIDwouldbethenextorganisationafterwevedealtwiththeenemytodosomeofthedevelopmentwork.Oncethatshappened,inconjunctionwiththeFCO,thenclearlyitwoulditwouldgobacktotheFCO.


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concerns,orboth,andagreatdealisatstakepolitically.Asaresult,thetensionsbetweenDFIDandtheotherdepartmentshavecomeoutmorestrongly.Thereisariskthatthesehighprofilecases,whicharealsosomeofthemostchallengingbutaccountforarelativelysmallpartofDFIDswork,willdominatethinkingaboutDFIDswiderroleorapproach.

Afghanistanisadifficultcountrytoworkin,withhighlevelsofinsecurity,anopiumpoppy-basedeconomyandwidespreadcorruption.TheexperienceofjointworkingbetweenDFID,MODandFCOinAfghanistanillustratessomeofthechallengesandtensionsthatariseindeliveringdevelopmentinsuchcountries.

DFIDstartedaprogrammeinthecountryin2002,

followingthemilitaryinterventionin2001,andwillhavespentoverUS$1billionby2013.DFIDsprogrammehasevolvedindistinctphasessince2002,fromlimitedhumanitarianassistance,throughattemptstobuildthecapacityofthecentralgovernmentinKabul,toanadditionalfocusonHelmandProvinceintheSouthWestsince2006(Bennettetal2009).

OnepastproblemwithDFIDsattemptstodevelopthecapacityoftheAfghangovernmenthasbeenthatithasbeenquitetechnical,focusingonpublic

administrationbyformalinstitutions.Inthewordsofarecentevaluation,untilrecently,relativelylittleattentionwasgiventodevelopingapoliticaleconomyandconflictanalysistounderpinstrategicchoicesmade(Bennettetal2009).Progressivelylessattentionhasbeengiventosecuritysectorreform,whichhasalsobeencriticised.

FurthercontroversyhasarisenfromtheroleofDFIDinHelmand,wheretheUKmilitarywasdeployedin2006.ThedepartmentsufferedfromthefactthatitwassometimebeforetheUKGovernmenthada

sharedstrategyforsecurityanddevelopment,andinthewordsoftheevaluation:PursuingmultipleobjectivesinHelmandwasinitiallyproblematicbecauseapproachestowardscounter-insurgency,stabilisation,counter-narcotics,peaceanddevelopmentwerenotnecessarilymutuallyreinforcing(Bennettetal2009:xiii).

TensionsbetweenDFIDandtheMODinHelmandaroseintwomainareas.Inimmediatepost-conflictsituations,themilitarywerekeentopursuewhatarecalledQuickImpactProjects(QIPs),givingtangible

benefitstolocalpopulations,suchasbuildingschoolsordiggingwells.QIPshavebeenthefocusforsome

discontent.TheMODtendedtoseethemasaboutenhancingthelegitimacyofBritishforces;DFIDwasinsomecasesreluctanttosupportthisapproach,becauseitsawenhancingthelegitimacyofthelocalhostgovernmenttobemoreimportantforlong-termsustainability,and/orbecausethequalityofsomeQIPshasbeendubious.Additionally,accordingtooneinterviewee,itproveddifficultforDFIDtofunddeliverypartnersinAfghanistanandtogetthingsupandrunningasquicklyasthemilitarywanted:

TherehasbeenalotofcriticismofDFID.Butitis

toosimplistictoblamefailuresinAfghanistanon

lackofrisktakingandlackofwillingnessbyDFID.

TheGovernmenthadunrealisticexpectationsof

whatcouldbeachievedbyDFIDinthese

circumstances.NotafailureofDFIDbutafailureof

thebroaderstrategy.Therelationshipisalotbetter

now.

Theotherproblemhasbeenaboutsecurity.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee:

Themilitaryoperatedunderunrealistic

expectationsofwhatwouldhappen.Partofthis

camefromHelmandwherethemilitaryoperateda

veryforwardstrategyandexpectedDFIDtobe

thereinstantlyinordertofollowupwithaidand

reconstructionwork.Butthemilitarywasnotable

todeliverthesecurity,orprovidearmouredcars

andvehicles.

TheUKstrategyinAfghanistanhasevolved,andlessonshavebeenlearnt.DFIDreportsthatcross-Whitehallworkinghasbeentransformedbymorejoined-upstrategysince2007/8.Inadditiontoasinglecross-governmentstrategy,ministersnowmeetmorefrequently,andgovernmentspendingprioritiesareagreedacrossdepartments.Ontheground,asinglecommandstructurewithcivilianleadershipfortheHelmandProvisionalReconstructionTeam(PRT)hashelpedtoresolvetensionsbetweenDFID,MODandtheFCO.TheHelmandexperiencehasalsopromptedeffortstocoordinateajointmilitaryandcivilian

capabilitywithspecialtraining,specificallyforpost-conflictstabilisationandreconstruction(seebelow).

Box1.2:Afghanistan


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IncasessuchasPakistanorAfghanistan(andincreasinglyinplacessuchasSomaliaandYemen)thechallengeforDFIDistoensurethatthedevelopmentperspectivedoesnotgetlostintheprioritisationofmilitaryandcounter-terroristobjectives.ButinmostofthecountriesinwhichDFIDworksthereisaverydifferentkindofproblem,namelythattherest

oftheUKGovernmentdoesnotpaysufficientattention.TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)isagoodexample.DFIDhasitsfifthlargestprogrammethereandtheFCOnowhasasignificantpresencetoo.DespitethefactthatthehumanitarianimpactofconflictintheDRCisonafargreaterscalethanitisinAfghanistanorPakistan,thesecuritythreatstotheUKaremuchlessevidentandtherearenostrategicalliancesatstake,andasaresulttheUKonlydeploystwomilitaryadvisers.

Howfarthiswillchangeinthefuture,withPSA30andothermechanisms,isunclear.However,itwillalmostcertainlyrequireDFIDtomakeastrongerandmoreeffectivecasetoalltherelevantpartsofgovernmentforengagingwiththedevelopmentagenda.ThisinturnwillrequireDFIDtobeclosertootherdepartments.

Wefoundsomeevidencethatthisisalreadyhappening.WhiletherewasmuchawarenessofthetensionsanddifferencesbetweenDFID,theFCOandtheMOD,itwasstrikingthatofficialsfromallthreedepartmentsemphasisedtheprogressmadeinmutualunderstandingandforgingsharedobjectives.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee:Myimpression,basedonbeinginandaroundWhitehallfor20yearsis,actually,werefarmorejoinedupnowthanweveeverbeen.8

Similarly,aDFIDintervieweeemphasisedthattheimportanceofstate-buildingisincreasinglyrecognisedbytheMOD,whileanMODintervieweearguedthatDFIDhascomealongwayoverthepastfewyearsandthereisamuchbetterunderstandingthatsecurity,stabilisationanddevelopmentallgohandinhand.WithinDFID,theviewwasputthatthedepartmentisbelatedlywillingtoengagewithobjectivesofothergovernmentdepartments,andgettingbetteratmakingitscase.

Ourintervieweesemphasisedagrowingrecognitionanduseofskillsinonedepartmentbyanother,withexamplesofDFIDdrawingontheanalysisandintelligenceofmilitaryattachsinCentralAfrica,andtheMODcomingtorecognisethevalueofadevelopmentperspectiveinAfghanistaninthelasttwoyears.Perhapsmostcrucially,thereseemstohavebeenarecognitionandacceptanceofthedifferenttimeframesthatdifferentdepartmentsareworkingto.

Departmentshavealsogainedvaluableexperienceofeachotherthroughcross-governmentmechanisms,especiallytheConflictPoolsandtheStabilisationUnit(seeBox1.3).

TheviewthattherehavebeensignificantchangesinthewaythatthethreedepartmentsregardeachotherandworktogetherisechoedinrecentcivilservicecapabilityreviewsundertakenbytheCabinetOffice.ThereviewofDFIDconcludesthat:DFIDsrelationswithothergovernmentdepartmentshavesignificantlyimproved(CabinetOffice2009a:9).TheFCOreviewnotesthat:Atseniorlevel,theworkingrelationshipswiththeDFIDandtheMODhaveimprovednoticeably.ThisisasaresultofconcertedeffortsbythePermanentSecretariesinparticular,who,forexample,nowundertakejointtripstokeypoststogatherevidenceofprogressontheground(CabinetOffice2009b:10).TheMODispraisedfor:continuingtosupportimprovedwaysofworkingbetweenthemilitaryandtheForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentonoperations(CabinetOffice2009c:10).

8.DiscussingtheComprehensiveApproach,MichaelFoster,Under-SecretaryofStateatDFID,putitthus:WhenIworkedin

industryIwasabelieverincontinuousimprovement,andIthinkthatiswhatwehaveseenfromtheearlyexperiencesofjointworking,forexampleinBosniainthe1990scomparedwithwherewearenow.Therehasbeenarealimprovementintherelationshipsandhowthethreedepartmentsanddifferentpersonnelworkontheground.(HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee2009:Q304)


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Thereisalsoaviewthatamomentumnowexists.Sufficientefforthasbeenputintoinvestinginrelationshipsandapproachesonconflictthatthisattitudeisnowinthebloodstreamofallofthethreemaindepartments,inthewordsofoneinterviewee.Withfailedandfailingstatesverylikelytobehighontheagendaoverthenextdecade,theMOD,FCOandDFIDarelikelytobeworkingtogethercloselyinanumberofcountriesforthe

foreseeablefuture.

Box1.3:Cross-governmentmechanismsonconflictanddevelopment

Closerworkingbetweendepartmentsonconflictandsecurityhasbeenbothfacilitatedandfurtherencouragedbythedevelopmentofsomepost-1997cross-Whitehallmechanisms.ThemostimportantaretheConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)andthe

StabilisationUnit(SU).

ConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)

CPPswereoriginallysetupin1999bythenSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopment,ClareShort,asawaytofundthetrainingoftroopsinAfrica,whichinthewordsofoneinterviewee,wasntonMODsradaratthetime.TheideacameoutoftheexperienceofSierraLeone,whichshowedboththeneedforandthedifficultiesinvolvedinorganisingfundingforconflictpreventioninterventionsthatinvolvedbothDFIDandtheMOD.TheAfricaCPPwassoonfollowedbyaGlobalCPP.TheworkofthePoolshaswidenedovertime,andnowincludeskeyactivitiesrelatingtochildrenswell-beingandrights,includingtryingtoensureeffectiveimplementationofUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatingtowomenandchildreninconflict,andtothedemobilisationandreintegrationofchildsoldiers.

DFID,theMODandtheFCOallputresourcesintotheCPP(althoughDFIDcontributesthelionsshareandalsofinanciallymanagesandownsthepooledfunds),butonlysomeoftheexpenditurecountsasODA.Themechanismhasasteeringboardwithtri-departmentalrepresentation.

TheCPPwasviewedbyallourintervieweesasagoodideaintheory,andatoolthatsomeothercountries(particularlytheUS)lookatwithenvy.TherewasaviewthattheCPPdoesencouragejoined-upthinking,andthattheculturalchangesithasbroughttoallthreedepartmentshavebeenasvaluable,iflesstangible,thanprogrammeoutcomes.However,therewasalsoageneralconsensusthattheimplementationofprojectswaspatchy,

dependingontheindividualsleadingthem,andthatthebudgetsinvolvedweretoosmallforitsworktohavelastingimpact.

StabilisationUnit(SU)

TheSUwassetupmuchmorerecently,outoftherecognitionthattheearlyapproachinAfghanistansufferedfromalackofcommonunderstandingandstrategyacrossdepartments,andinsufficientskills.TheSUtriestomeetthesegaps,workingtothethreeparentdepartmentsofDFID,theFCOandtheMOD.Itskeyresponsibilitiesincludeorganisingthetraininganddeploymentofcivilianswhocanworkininsecureenvironments,andlearninganddisseminatinglessonsfrompastexperience.Thishasrecentlybeenbroughttogetherintheformofthe1000-strongUKCivilianStabilisationCapacity(CSC),whichismadeupofcivilianexpertsfromarangeoffields,includingcivilservantsfromanumberofgovernmentdepartments.

TheUnitwasdescribedbyoneintervieweeasanenableritcanbringpeopletogethersotheycangetabetterunderstandingofeachothersculture,butitcanonlyachievewhattheparentdepartmentsarewillingtoputinandallow.


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Thesituationin-country

OutsideofWhitehall,onthegroundindevelopingcountriesthemselves,thereappearstobeconsiderablevariationinhowjoined-upUKGovernmentthinking,strategyandactiononconflictandsecurityis,bothacrossdevelopingcountries,andwithinanyonecountryover

time.Asdiscussedabove,DFIDisquitedevolved,sotheheadofthecountryofficehasalargesayinhowprogrammeresourcesaredeployed,suchasthedecisionaboutwhetherornottohaveconflictadvisers.Themaininter-departmentalrelationshipiswiththeFCO,anddependsquiteconsiderablyontheindividualheadofofficeandHighCommissionerorAmbassadorinvolved.

InsomecasesDRCandIndiahavebeencitedascurrentexampleswherecountry-specificobjectivesareagreedandwherejointunitslookingataspecificproblemaresetup,therelationshipisclose.Inothercases,especiallywherethereisnoagreedtri-departmentalstrategy,andwheretheDFIDofficeisnotlocatedintheHighCommissionorEmbassy,itmaynotbe.Thedifferenttimeframesofthedifferentdepartmentsdiscussedaboveareoften

asmuchofaproblemin-countryastheyareinWhitehall.

ThereareanincreasingnumberofcountriesinconflictforwhichtheUKGovernmentdoeshaveagreedcross-Whitehallstrategies(seebelow),andinsomecases,evenjointdepartmentalcountryunitsinLondon.Sucharrangementsshouldhelpjoined-upapproachestoconflictin-country.However,thiswillonlyworkwhenthereisalsocoherencebetweentheapproachin-countryandinWhitehall(seeBox1.4onSudan).

Atthesametime,itisclearthatnewtoolsareneededforimmediatepost-conflictsituationswheretheUKhasitselfbeenactivelyinvolvedinmilitaryaction,partlybecausedomesticpoliticalexpectationsareunderstandablydifferentinsuchsituations.Ajointmilitary-civilian

Box1.4:Sudan

Sudanprovidesanexampleofhowdifficultitcanbetoachievethiscoherence,andalsohowhavingacross-governmentmechanisminplace,suchasacountryunit,isnotsufficientbyitself.Inprinciple,theFCOandDFIDhavejoinedupobjectivesonSudan:achievingaComprehensivePeaceAgreementandreducingpoverty.ThereisaSudanUnitinLondon,locatedintheFCO,aswellasaSpecialEnvoy,whoworkstoboththeForeignSecretaryandtheInternationalDevelopmentSecretary.

IntheconstantlyshiftingandcomplexenvironmentofKhartoum,DFIDandtheFCOhavehadagoodrelationship,andovertimehavedevelopedconsiderablecapacitytoanalysetheSudanesegovernmentsroleandmotivationsinrelationtotheDarfurconflict,whichis

thedominantprobleminthecountry.ThisrelationshipisparticularlyimportantforDFID,astheFCOhasgenerallyhadbetteraccesstotheSudanesegovernmentwhichhasbeenmoreinterestedinforeignpolicyincentives,suchasthenormalisationofrelationswiththeUSoropeninguptheissueoftheindictmentoftheSudanesePresidentattheInternationalCriminalCourtintheHague,thanindevelopmentalones,likedebtrelief.

TheSudanconflictisahighlypoliticalissueattheinternationallevelforexampleitisahighprofileissueintheUSandministers,waryofnegativeheadlinesaboutsupportfortheregime,havefavouredalowriskfocusonhumanitarianaidandbasicservices.Thechallengeforthearguablybetter-informedDFIDandFCOofficesinKhartoumhasbeentopersuadeministerstotakerisksinadifficultenvironment,bytakingonmorecomplexinstitutionalissues,suchassecuritysectorreform,orindeedthelargerpoliticaltrade-offs.

TheSudancasewhereacentralunitinLondonhasmorepowerthanbetterinformedin-countryofficesmaybeanunusualone,butitshowstheneedtothinkaboutrelationshipsbetweenLondonandposts,aswellasbetweendepartments.


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Overthepastfewdecades,ithasbecomeclearthattradeandinvestmentarecentraltothedevelopmentdebate.Themostbasic,butperhapsmostimportantlessonthathasbeen

learnedisthattheeconomicresourcesavailabletopoorcountriesthroughtradearemuchlargerthanthosecomingfromaid.In2008,totalaidfromOECDcountrieswasaroundUS$120billion,withtheleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)receivingaroundone-thirdofthis,atjustoverUS$40billion.Bycontrast,totalexportsfromdevelopingcountriesin2007wereworthUS$5.2trillion,over40timesthesizeofaidflows.ThecontrastforLDCsismuchlessexportsin2007wereworthaboutUS$126billion,butthisisstillroughlythreetimestheamountofaidtheyreceived.

Tradeanddevelopmentoutcomes

Historically,exportinghasusuallybeenanessentialpartoftheprocessbywhichverypoorcountrieshaveescapedpoverty.IntheregionsthathaveseenthemostdramaticfallsinpovertyEastandSouthEastAsiathegrowthofexportshasplayedacentralrolein

economicgrowthandpovertyreduction(WorldBank1993).Thisremainstruetoday,withexamplessuchasVietnamandBangladeshshowingtheimportanceofexportsforincreasingincomes.InChina,around200millionpeoplehaveescapedfromextremepovertysince1980,largelythroughworkingintheexportsector.Veryfewcountrieshaveeliminatedpovertywithouttradeplayingamajorrole.

However,thedevelopmentalbenefitsoftradedependonanumberoffactors.Theseinclude:thetypeofproductstraded,howfarthegainsfromtradearepassedthroughtoworkersandfarmers,andhowfartraderesourcescapturedbygovernmentsareusedefficientlyandaccountablyforpublicservices(UNCTAD2004).

Manyoftheworldspoorestcountries,especiallythoseinAfrica,areactuallyquiteexport-

oriented.Buttheirexportsareoftenheavilyconcentratedinlow-valueagriculturalcommodities(UNCTAD2002).Theseeconomieswillbenefitwhenthereisasurgeincommodityprices(aswasthecaseinthefewyearsleadinguptomid-2008).However,theinternationalfinancialcrisishasunderscoredthefragilityofAfricasrecentexpansion,andexportvaluesareexpectedtofallby40percentasaresult(CommitteeofAfricanFinanceMinistersandCentralBankGovernors2009).Afterafewyearsofsustainedstronggrowthandhighlevelsofoptimism,economicgrowthrateswereexpectedtofallto1.5percentin2009(IMF2009).

Moreover,inthelongterm,thevalueofcommoditiesrelativetomanufacturesisindecline.Itisonlybymovingupthevaluechain,andbydiversifyingintoprogressivelymorevaluablemanufacturedproducts,thatcountrieshavehistoricallyusedtradeasanescaperoutefrom

Policy Coherence and the Future of the UK's International Development Agenda

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