Police response to boston bombing

• 1. The Initial Police Response THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING:

2. OUTLINE OF EVENTS April 15th, 2013 - Boston Marathon finish line suffers two explosions of unknown origins Hundreds of people are injured, 3 people are killed The evidence quickly points to pressure cooker devices, and a terrorist attack April 18th, 2013 After days of unsuccessfully being able to identify the suspected bombers, the FBI releases the images to the public April 19th, 2013 - The bombers, Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnev come out of hiding, and murder an MIT police officer. The brothers then carjack a civilian Police locate the stolen vehicle, and after a shootout, Tamerlan is killed A manhunt for Dzhokar begins on April 19, 2013, and he is found later that evening by a homeowner who discovers Dzhokar hiding in a boat Authorities respond, and take Dzhokar into custody 3. THE INITIAL POLICE RESPONSE The devices explode; police, civilians, and medical personnel rush to the blast area Police work to move pedestrian barricades, and render first aid to some of the victims Police congregate in the blast areas, and form a hasty perimeter, which lacked integrity Police allow civilians and medical to rush to and from the blast areas, at will, for several minutes Police begin to call for the transport vehicles to come to the blast areas to transport victims Police begin to clear the area several minutes after medical starts to arrive The scene is finally secured, and all injured victims are transported to area hospitals 4. AREAS OF CONCERN Police did not restrict the movement within, in, or out of the blast area Police did not form a perimeter around the blast areas to deny access or permit access to first responders The pedestrian barricades were difficult to manipulate and tear down Police did not have an organized and cohesive response Police did not move unnecessary personnel or civilians away from the blast area Police called for emergency vehicles to come directly to the blast area Police did not give consideration to: Ambush, kill box, or secondary devices 5. Threats: Secondary Explosions: Small Arms Fire: Ambush: 6. BEST COURSE OF ACTION Utilize barricades that can easily be torn down and manipulated so police and first responders have access to the crowd for a variety of reason Establish an Immediate Action Plan (IAP) prior to a major event, to include: contingencies for attack, explosions, suicide bombers, active shooter, medical emergencies, staging, rally points, communication, and chain of command In the event of an explosion from an obvious terrorist attack: Respond to the scene to gauge the damage clear the area of any civilians not injured or rendering aid call for medical personnel establish a perimeter, do not allow anyone other than police or medical to enter the area after an attack 7. BEST COURSE OF ACTION (CONT) The threat of a secondary explosion or another form of attack should be considered high Clear as many people out of the blast area as possible, immediately Injured personnel may be ambulatory, move them Restrict the number of first responders to the lowest possible amount to render aid, and evacuate injured civilians Create a casualty evacuation point away from, and out of the line of sight of the initial blast area All emergency vehicles, to include transport should respond to the casualty evacuation point, not the blast area Those who are critical victims that cannot be moved by a carry, should be evacuated by gurneys 8. Casualty Evacuation Points: Primary Secondary 9. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT The blast area must be cleared as soon as possible to lower the number of potential victims should a secondary attack or explosion occur The traditional response by first responders is to flood a scene, with an abundance of resources and personnel, only enriching a target for an attacker. In many cases, the attacker will have a line of sight on the first explosion, and will wait until the area is saturated to detonate another device, or begin another form of attack Moving victims to a casualty evacuation point, out of the line of sight of the initial blast area, will lower the chances of being exposed to further harm The response of medical personnel and emergency vehicles to the casualty evacuation point, lowers the first responder foot print at the scene, making the secondary attack, less catastrophic The large perimeter and area denial by Police will preserve a scene, and prevent others from exposure to potential future attacks 10. CONCLUSIONS