Police Legitimacy, And Decision Acceptance

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http://pqx.sagepub.com/content/14/3/251Theonline version of this article can be foundat:

DOI: 10.1177/1098611111413992

2011 14: 251 originally published online 18 July 2011Police QuarterlyJeffrey T. Ward, Matt R. Nobles, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Lora M. Levett and Rob Tillyer

Policy, Police Legitimacy, and Decision AcceptanceCaught in Their Own Speed Trap: The Intersection of Speed Enforcement

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Police Quarterly

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PQX413992 PQX14310.1177/1098611111413992Ward et al.PoliceQuarterly

1University of Texas at San Antonio, TX, USA2Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA3University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jeffrey T. Ward, University of Texas at San Antonio, Department of Criminal Justice,

501 W. Durango Blvd., San Antonio, TX 78207, USA

Email: [email protected]

Caught in Their Own

Speed Trap: The

Intersection of SpeedEnforcement Policy,

Police Legitimacy, and

Decision Acceptance

Jeffrey T. Ward1

, Matt R. Nobles2

, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce3

,Lora M. Levett3, and Rob Tillyer1

Abstract

Empirical work examining the effects of police legitimacy has primarily focused ontraffic stop procedureswith less attention given to traffic enforcement policies. Thecurrent study takes advantage of a natural experiment in which a rural town with a

strict speed enforcement policy was labeled a speed trap through the introductionof a billboard advertisement funded by the American Automobile Association. Drawingon theories of police legitimacy, we hypothesize the label will result in an abrupt-permanent increase in speeding citation contestation rates, despite the fact that thebillboard actually increases predictability of citation issuance. Results of an interruptedtime-series analysis indicate statistically significant abrupt-permanent increases in thespeeding citation contestation rates for the intervention city. Further analyses revealthat significant intervention effects are confined to drivers with higher opportunityto contest tickets (in-state drivers) and to majority subgroups (Whites and men). The

implications of these findings for policy and policecitizen relationships are discussed.

Keywords

police legitimacy, decision acceptance, speed enforcement policy, policecitizen rela-tionships, interrupted time-series analysis

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252 Police Quarterly14(3)

The enforcement of traffic laws on speeding presents important challenges for society.

Municipalities, counties, and states spend a great deal of resources on traffic patrol and

enforcement (not to mention the court processing of those ticketed). The increased

rates of injuries and deaths and the high amount of property damage that are linked tospeeding (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2008) underscore the need

for traffic control. Moreover, some speeders may be involved in other crimes that

heighten public safety concerns thereby providing additional reasons for high resource

allocation to traffic enforcement (e.g., see Evans, 1991; Willett, 1964).

Despite some clear public safety justifications, speed enforcement is a double-

edged sword. Although some residents in rural areas note that speeding is a serious

concern (Ball, 2001), speed enforcement is often at odds with the needs and desires

of motorists and creates opportunities for unsolicited encounters between police and

otherwise law-abiding citizens. Over half of policecitizen interactions occur in thecontext of traffic stops and over half of these encounters result in the issuance of a

citation (Langan, Greenfield, Smith, Durose, & Levin, 2001). Typically, citizens

report feeling frustrated when being ticketed (Radelet & Carter, 1994) and some

contend that traffic enforcement is the police function that has the most damaging

effects on policecitizen relationships (Vedder & Keller, 1965; Wilson, 1962). In an

era of community-oriented policing strategies, the high frequency of traffic stops

coupled with the unpopularity of citation issuance catapults otherwise mundane traf-

fic enforcement to a research topic of substantial import for policy that extends

beyond speeding itself.The context in which ambivalence about traffic enforcement policies comes into

sharpest relief may be speed traps, especially those that represent long-standing

police policies. A town that has earned the reputation as a speed trap offers a strategic

site for exploring some complex issues of how speed enforcement policy, police legiti-

macy, and decision acceptance operate. Drawing on theories of police legitimacy, the

current study employs a quasi-experimental design to assess the influence of a literal

speed trap label on aggregate rates of citizens actual decision acceptance in the form

of traffic citation contestations.

The aims of the current study are fourfold. First, we review theoretical frame-works of police legitimacy and their connections to speed enforcement policy and

decision acceptance. Second, we examine the effects of a speed trap label on cited

individuals willingness to accept a traffic citation. We do this by using an inter-

rupted time-series design examining the change in citation contestation rates follow-

ing the application of the speed trap label to a local police agency. Third, we delve

deeper into the connection between speed enforcement policy, police legitimacy,

and decision acceptance by determining whether any observed effects operate simi-

larity for different driving groups based on residency, gender, and race. Finally, the

findings are used as a foundation to discuss the implications of speed enforcementfor police legitimacy and decision acceptance, an important topic that has largely

eluded scholarly attention.

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Ward et al. 253

Speed Enforcement Policy, Police

Legitimacy, and Decision Acceptance

The term legitimacyoriginates from the idea that internalized norms and values areimportant in securing compliance with the law and directives above and beyond the

coercive power of authorities (Weber, 1968). At the heart of the concept of legitimacy

is voluntaryacceptance or an entitlement to deference. As Tyler (2006) notes, legiti-

macy is the belief that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropri-

ate, proper, and just, which leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and

social arrangements(p. 376). Voluntariness is important as police require large-scale

cooperation to be effective in maintaining social order (Tyler, 1990). Although defer-

ence to legal authorities may be the norm, noncompliance does occur at a nontrivial

rate (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996). Citizen acceptance of an authoritys deci-sion is threatened when an authority delivers an outcome perceived to be unfavorable

(Tyler & Huo, 2002). Importantly, however, citizens do not decide to accept a decision

solely based on the favorability of an outcome. Rather, two legitimacy considerations

actually trump the importance of whether a citizen obtains a favorable outcome: the

general legitimacy of the authority and the extent to which procedural justice was

extended to the citizen (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Legitimacy has long been shown to be an important factor for gaining citizens

acceptance of unpopular policies, judgments, or actions (e.g., see Gibson, Caldiera,

& Baird, 1998; Machura, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Research examining how thepolice influence citizen decision acceptance has focused primarily on perceptions of

procedural justice with less attention given to institutionalized trust in police policy

more generally. Whereas it is certainly important to understand howproceduresinflu-

ence legitimacy and ultimately decision acceptance, it is also important to understand

the direct contributions of institutional trust inpolicies. For instance, it is possible for

citizens to experience just and fair procedures during traffic stops but nevertheless

perceive an illegitimate policy to be influencing the policecitizen encounter in the

first place. Overarching mistrust in police policy is particularly important in influenc-

ing decision acceptance as mistrusting individuals will be less likely to place empha-sis on procedures during policecitizen encounters (Tyler & Huo, 2002). In other

words, when individuals perceive a police agency to be illegitimate (i.e., they mis-

trust the motives and intentions of the police agency), the decision to contest a cita-

tion may largely have already been influenced, rendering procedural justice during

the interaction a moot point.1

Tyler (2004) argues that we need to understand how legitimacy can be enhanced or

maintained, especially as police may be unlikely to gain compliance with the law

through coercive means alone (Tyler, 1990, 1997a, 1997b). Focusing attention on poli-

cies at the agency level, there are two primary ways in which the police can attempt toenhance or maintain their legitimacy. This dichotomy broadly distinguishes instru-

mental legitimacy from normative legitimacy. The instrumental approach maintains

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254 Police Quarterly14(3)

that police can increase legitimacy by strictly enforcing laws, creating a high risk of

sanction (Tyler, 2004). In other words, police are viewed as legitimate because they

effectively accomplish their formal organizational goals. Under this view, strictly

enforcing the speed limit through coercive methods such as citation issuance to gaincompliance with the law would actually serve to reinforce voluntary deference to

authorities and, in turn, increase decision acceptance. However, past research sug-

gests that attributions of legitimacy are generally unrelated to public evaluations

about objective police performance (Tyler, 2006). In fact, decades of objective

improvement in police practices have not generated increased legitimacy for the

police generally, partly because police were not focused on promoting the idea that

their procedures and practices were fair and in the best interests of the community

(Tyler, 2006).

The normative approach suggests that police legitimacy is achieved when policiesare perceived to be developed honestly and are motivated by real concerns for citi-

zens. Measuring the normative legitimacy of police involves assessing perceptions of

trust regarding, for example, whether police policy needs to be changed, whether the

things the police do embarrass the city, whether the police are honest, or whether the

police make decisions that are good for everyone in the city (e.g., see Tyler & Fagan,

2008). In essence, the normative approach to legitimacy de-emphasizes how well a

police agency successfully executes its various job functions such as traffic enforce-

ment and, instead, emphasizes the degree to which its policies are designed to operate

in the best interests of citizens. Whether normative legitimacy was garnered throughstrict speed enforcement would be linked to how citizens perceive the fairness and

justifiability of the policy based on the underlying motives of the agency. Citizen

assessments that the agency is pursuing the policy for financial gain rather than pub-

lic safety would negatively affect the development of normative legitimacy, whereas

a belief that the policy is motivated by honest and just intentions would positively

impact normative legitimacy.

If citizens trust the motives and intentions of a police agencys strict speed

enforcement policy, both normative and instrumental legitimacies would operate in

conjunction to simultaneously decrease citation contestation. However, the effec-tiveness of a police policy and the justification for its existence can be assessed

independently and, thus, instrumental and normative legitimacies do not have to

operate in the same direction. That is, a police agency can be deemed to be effective

(i.e., they have instrumental legitimacy) but their actions can be seen as resulting

from an illegitimate policy (i.e., they lack normative legitimacy). Although it is pos-

sible that the effects of normative and instrumental legitimacy could conceivably

cancel one another out, Tyler (2003) contends that it is the degree to which a person

thinks that they understand why someone is acting (i.e., they understand their moti-

vations) and not the ability to predict their actions that matters (p. 562; see alsoTyler & Huo, 2002). With respect to influencing decision acceptance, normative

legitimacy should trump instrumental legitimacy should they be operating in differ-

ent directions.

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Ward et al. 255

Current Study

The current study explores these issues of speed enforcement policy, police legiti-

macy, and decision acceptance by assessing the effects of an intervention on citation

contestation rates among ticketed speeders caught in a speed trap. The interventionunder investigation was the implementation of a speed trap advertisement billboard,

which was erected outside Waldo, Florida in August 2003. Ordinarily, researchers

might refrain from identifying the intervention town specifically; however, this inter-

vention has been covered in local newspapers and national media (e.g., American

Automobile Association [AAA] website) and thus simply mentioning the billboard in

essence identifies the town. Moreover, identifying the town specifically allows for a

clear depiction of the type of intervention being assessed (see Figure 1).

We contend that the billboard increases the predictability of receiving a traffic cita-

tion and announces that the agency is effective in enforcing the speed limit (i.e., theyhave instrumental legitimacy). Although both of these claims are logical, the latter

warrants some discussion. Unlike common state-issued signs indicating strict enforce-

ment along specific stretches of a road or highway such as speed enforced by aircraft

Figure 1.Photo of the speed trap billboard advertisement illustrating the study interventionNote: The initial August 2003 intervention read 6 miles ahead but was otherwise similar.

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256 Police Quarterly14(3)

or strict enforcement zone, the speed trap billboard is a message that identifies an

entire rural town as a speed trap. Moreover, literally labeling an entire town as a speed

trap is quite the atypical occurrence. Waldo was only one of two agencies in the coun-

try to be labeled by AAA. For these reasons, we suggest that the billboard has aninstrumental legitimacy message that the agency is effective in enforcing the law

even if this is neither the primary nor intended message of the billboard. Under this

assumption, the normative legitimacy message of the speed trap label is left to explore.

The AAA, who funded and erected the speed trap billboard advertisement, has identi-

fied two distinct types of rigorous application of traffic laws. First, strict enforce-

ment is defined as aggressive, legitimate traffic enforcement for the purpose of

reducing crashes along high-risk highways and dangerous intersections. Enforcement

is justified by crash data history and/or existing conditions (AAA, n.d.). Second, a

traffic trap refers to traffic enforcement measures and practices which are designedto raise revenue rather than prevent crashes or where there is evidence that enforce-

ment is not justified by sound engineering principles. AAA particularly condemns the

use of traffic traps which involve unfair, unethical, or illegal law enforcement tactics

or traffic control devices, as well as the use of speed measurement devices on roads

with speed limits appreciably less than warranted by sound engineering principles

(AAA, n.d.). The speed trap billboard was erected in Waldo to declare this agencys

speed enforcement policy illegitimate.

Although it is an empirical question as to whether the billboard affirms or attacks

the normative legitimacy of the agency in the eyes of the public, given what we knowof the intended message of the intervention, the atypical nature of such a label as well

as the general negative connotation of the term speed trap in the American lexicon,

we believe it is reasonable to claim that the intervention serves, at least to most indi-

viduals, as a fairly clear challenge to the normative legitimacy of a local agencys

speed enforcement policy. Therefore, we hypothesize that a speed trap advertisement

billboard results in an abrupt-permanent increase in speeding citation contestation

rates compared with a similar, unlabeled town, despite the fact that the label serves as

a proclamation of instrumental legitimacy.

Supplementing our main hypothesis and providing added depth to our investi-gation into the effects of the speed trap billboard on citation contestation rates, we

anticipate that these effects will be strongest among those with higher opportunity

to contest the ticket in person and higher exposure to the speed trap label (in-state

drivers).2Although some minor differences have been noted (see Tyler, 2005), evidence

generally suggests that procedural justice and legitimacy considerations operate

similarly across members of different demographic groups (Tyler, 1994, 2000,

2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002). This invariance claim is quite broad and includes race

and gender as well as other factors such as income and political party affiliation

(Tyler, 1994, 2000). Determining whether there are indeed similarities in the waysin which certain groups respond to police legitimacy messages is important. For

instance, should an attack on the normative legitimacy of an agency only affect

certain subgroups, counteracting the negative publicity and minimizing challenges

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Ward et al. 257

to authority may require targeted efforts. However, if everyone is influenced similarly,

broader approaches might be warranted. Given the invariance claim, we anticipate

the effects of police legitimacy on decision acceptance will be similar across race

and gender.

Method

To assess the effects of the speed trap label on citation contestation rates, the current

study uses an interrupted time-series design with a nonequivalent no-treatment con-

trol group time series (Cook & Campbell, 1979).3While ARIMA modeling is often

used to assess intervention effects (see Campbell, 1963; McCleary & Hay, 1980;

McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, & Hay, 1980), we employ segmented regression

analysis, given the nature of our time-series data (i.e., time series are trend station-ary and lack serial autocorrelation). For a single intervention, segmented regression

breaks the time series into two segments with the first corresponding to the prein-

tervention time period and the second corresponding to the postintervention time

period. Each segment is allowed variation in both trends and levels. Trend refers to

the average change in the variable of interest per a unit of time, whereas level indi-

cates the value of the time series at the first unit of time for a given segment.

Segmented regression models specify both level and trend of the preintervention

segment and model changes in level and trend due to a given intervention indicated

by the values of the postintervention segment (Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, & Ross-Degnan, 2002).

The levels and trends of the pre- and postintervention segments can be modeled

with the following formula:

Y t step tafter et t

= + + + + 0 1 2 3

( ) ( ) ( )

Although data structure has been explained in detail elsewhere (see Wagner et al.,

2002), it is necessary here to explain the basic parameters of the univariate seg-mented regression model. In this equation, Y

tindicates the mean number or rate of

the variable of interest in month t; tindicates the time variable that ranges the entire

time series (1 through 60); stepis a dummy variable that differentiates the two seg-

ments taking on a value of 0 preintervention and 1 postintervention (including the

intervention month); tafter is the time after intervention variable that ranges the

entire postintervention time series (including the intervention month; 1 through 29)

but takes on a value of 0 preintervention; finally, et represents random variation in

variable of interest not explained by the model.

The four parameters estimated by the univariate regression model permit theresearcher to assess the gradual, abrupt, permanent, and/or temporary nature of the

effects due to a single intervention. In this case, the intercept or the level of the pre-

intervention segment is indicated by 0and its slope or trend is indicated by

1. In

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258 Police Quarterly14(3)

other words, 0 is the citation contestation rate at Time 0 and

1 is the average

change in the citation contestation rate per month prior to the intervention occurring

in August 2003. The level of the postintervention segment is indicated by 2and its

trend is indicated by 1+ 2. More specifically, 2is the level change in the citationcontestation rate and

3 is the change in the citation contestation rate trend, com-

pared with the preintervention trend. Both of these changes are attributed to the

specified intervention, which in this case is the speed trap billboard advertisement.

Of importance to the current analysis, a statistically significant 2regression coef-

ficient indicates the presence of an abrupt effect and the absence of a statistically

significant 3regression coefficient in a regressive direction back toward the trend

of 1(i.e., the preintervention trend) indicates the abrupt effect does not fade over

time. If 2is statistically significant and

3is not statistically significant, then there

is an abrupt-permanent intervention effect with no additional gradual interventioneffect. This latter specification is the hypothesized effect of the speed trap billboard

on citation contestation rates.

Data

The current study uses data from several sources which enable us to assess the

appropriateness of the comparison time series and then to estimate the effect of the

intervention on decision acceptance rates across the intervention and comparison

sites. First, U.S. Census Data (2000) and Criminal Justice Agency Profile Reportspublished by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (2005) were used to

compare static characteristics of the towns and police agencies, respectively.

Second, official individual-level traffic citation records for Alachua County, Florida

were made available which include information on driver characteristics (e.g., race,

gender, age), vehicle information (e.g., make, year, license), citing officer and

agency, details about the offense (e.g., date/time, statute violated, fine amount),

court information (e.g., court date/time, room, judge, verdict), fees collected (e.g.,

date fine collected, court costs), among other things. These data were used to esti-

mate the effect of the intervention and to assess the similarity of traffic citationcontestation trends prior to the intervention.4The individual-level traffic citation

records from 2001 to 2005 were aggregated by month to create a continuous

60-point agency-level time series.

Dependent Time Series: Decision Acceptance Rate

The dependent time series of interest was the 60-month contestation rate for speeding

citations issued by a given police agency. The total number of speeding citations

issued by a particular agency and the total number of citizens that opted for a courtdate to challenge their speeding citations were aggregated by month. The citation

contestation rate is defined as the number of individuals challenging their citations for

a speeding violation divided by the total number of individuals issued a speeding citation

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Ward et al. 259

in a given month. Employing a rate here is critical as it forms a measure of citation

contestation that is not simply a function of the amount of tickets that are issued in a

particular month. Thus, absent the intervention (e.g., preintervention period), we

anticipate the citation contestation rate to remain relatively stable over time, despitethe fact that the number of citations can vary from month to month. Higher scores on

this measure indicate greater contestation (lower decision acceptance) of speeding

citations in the aggregate.

Intervention: Police Legitimacy Manipulation

The intervention under investigation is the erection of the speed trap billboard adver-

tisement in August 2003 (see Figure 1), which is hypothesized to simultaneously

increase instrumental legitimacy and decrease normative legitimacy of the localpolice agency. Given the divergent predictions of these two simultaneous legitimacy

announcements for decision acceptance, this approach provides a unique way to

assess whether normative legitimacy trumps the importance of instrumental legiti-

macy for decision acceptance in the aggregate.

Independent Time Series: Control Variables

A number of important aggregate-level factors could affect the citation contestation

rate in a given month, threatening the validity of the quasi-experiment. To control forthe possibility of a spurious intervention effect, three time-varying demographic vari-

ables are added to the models to determine whether they corroborate the main findings

from the univariate analysis. All of the time-varying covariates were aggregated by

month similar to the dependent time series.Racedenotes the proportion of individuals

that are non-White receiving a speeding citation in a given month. The number of

citations issued to minority drivers in each of the three towns was insufficient to esti-

mate time-series models that were further disaggregated by race. Genderis the pro-

portion of women issued a speeding citation in a given month. Finally, ageis the mean

age of individuals receiving a speeding citation in a given month. Collectively, thesecharacteristics, recorded by the officer, control for monthly differences in the charac-

teristics of drivers who belong to groups that may have different propensities to con-

test a speeding citation.

Moderating Effects: Opportunity and Social Groups

It is important to account for opportunity to contest a traffic citation because the

effects of legitimacy may be considerably more pronounced among groups with

greater opportunity to contest in person. To address the issue of opportunity, we splitthe cited drivers into two opportunity groups. First, in-state drivers receiving speeding

citations are considered to have higher opportunity to contest in person. Second, out-

of-state drivers receiving speeding citations are considered to have lower opportunity

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260 Police Quarterly14(3)

to contest in person. Comparing these two groups allows us to assess the extent to

which the effects of legitimacy are conditional on opportunity to contest a traffic cita-

tion and challenge legitimacy in person.

It is important to understand if attributions of illegitimacy in speed enforcementpolicy have similar effects across divergent social groups. Existing evidence suggests

that legitimacy considerations are invariant across demographic groups (see Tyler,

1994, 2000, 2004; Tyler & Huo, 2002) and, thus, it is expected that the speed trap

billboard will have similar effects across racial and gender groups. We split the in-

state cited drivers into two race groups (White and non-White) as well as two gender

groups (males and females). Running the analyses separately by social groups allows

us to determine whether the effects of the speed trap billboard on citation contestation

rates are indeed similar across different groups, a finding that has important relevance

for policy.

Analytic Strategy

To address the research hypotheses, the analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we

compare static town characteristics as well as information on the preintervention cita-

tion contestation rates and trends in Waldo as well as two nearby, similar communities

(Alachua and High Springs) that are not labeled speed traps. This provides an assess-

ment of the comparability of the comparison series to the intervention series. We then

test for mean differences in the pre- and postintervention periods across all three citiesusing independent samples ttests. Following this preliminary analysis, we account for

the time-series nature of the data and employ univariate and multivariate segmented

regression models. Next, we separate in-state ticketed drivers from out-of-state tick-

eted drivers to see whether opportunity to contest tickets in person influences the

impact of the speed trap label on decision acceptance. Finally, the in-state ticketed

drivers (i.e., those with more opportunity to contest their citations in person) are iso-

lated for further analysis to see whether intervention effects vary by sex or race.

Throughout the analysis, we highlight results from the univariate segmented regres-

sion models as these models neatly retain straightforward descriptive information onthe levels and trends of the citation contestation rates (e.g., baseline citation contesta-

tion rate at Time 0), facilitating comparisons across different time-series models.

Accompanying the univariate results, we also report the results of the multivariate

models in each table for comparison.

Results

Table 1 contains information about the static characteristics of the police agencies

and towns featured in our analysis.5

The three police departments are relativelysimilar in terms of agency standards, such as hiring requirements, minimum age,

education, and salary level. All three agencies are also characteristically small. The

three towns are relatively similar in terms of demographic profiles, with reasonable

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Ward et al. 261

similarities in median age, gender, racial composition, educational attainment, and

poverty levels. Two noticeable differences in town characteristics as well as substan-

tial differences in citation issuance are worth mentioning. First, Waldos median

household income is substantially lower than Alachua and High Springs. Second,

Waldo is easily the smallest of the three towns. Despite being the smallest town,

however, the Waldo police department issued approximately 476 citations for speed-ing infractions in a typical month between 2001 and 2005; this is more than 3.5 times

greater than the number issued by Alachua and more than 21 times greater than the

number issued by High Springs (see Table 1). In fact, Waldos speeding citation issu-

ance in an average month approaches that of Gainesville (539.7), a city within the

county that has more than 95,000 residents. These numbers give some insight into

why the agencys normative legitimacy was attacked with the erection of the speed trap

billboard, which also happens to announce the agency is quite effective in enforcing the

speed limit.

The trends in the preintervention periods reveal important insights regarding thesuitability of the comparison sites. Figure 2 depicts time-series graphs of the mean

monthly citation contestation rates in Waldo, Alachua, and High Springs, respectively.

In the 31 months before the speed trap billboard was erected, Waldo averaged a 6.83%

Table 1.Descriptive Statistics of Police Agency and Town Static Characteristics

Waldo, FL Alachua, FL High Springs, FL

Police agency characteristics Police force sizea 7 18 11

Minimum age 21 19 19

Standard shift time 12 h 12 h 12 h

Minimum education required HS/GED HS/GED HS/GED

Salarya US$19,600 US$26,557 US$22,750

Town characteristics

Population 821 6,098 3,863

Median age 36.9 37.1 39.4

Median household income US$24,028 US$38,075 US$34,354

% female 52.3 53.3 53.9

% non-White 23.4 32.4 24.9

% high school graduate 72.7 83.0 80.4

% below poverty 16.7 16.0 12.0

Monthly speeding citationsb 476.2 134.4 22.2

Monthly speeding citationcontestationsb

39.5 6.8 1.3

Note: HS = high school; GED = General Educational Development.a. Average (5 year).b. Average (60 month).

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262 Police Quarterly14(3)

citation contestation rate, Alachua averaged a 5.06% citation contestation rate, and

High Springs averaged an 8.37% citation contestation rate (6.43% with the outlier

removed).6The preintervention average citation contestation rate for Waldo is slightly

higher than Alachua, t(60) = 2.58,p< .05, but not significantly different than High

Springs, t(60) = 0.68,p> .05. Most importantly, both Waldo and Alachua show a cita-tion contestation rate that is flat prior to the intervention. High Springs displays a

slight downward trend prior to the intervention.

The postintervention average citation contestation rate is 9.56% in Waldo and

5.61% in Alachua, indicating increases in both cities. The postintervention average

citation contestation rate in High Springs is 5.95%, showing a decline. However, a

simple pre- and postintervention comparison reveals a statistically significant mean

citation contestation rate increase in Waldo, t(58) = 7.67,p< .05, but not in Alachua,

t(58) = 0.76,p> .05, or High Springs, t(58) = 0.95,p> .05. Figure 2 shows the cita-

tion contestation time series for all three towns. As indicated by the jump in levelbetween the segments, an abrupt intervention effect appears visible in Waldo. However,

there does not appear to be a similar abrupt increase in Alachua or High Springs. The

postintervention segments that follow the intervention illustrate slight upward trends

Figure 2.Monthly speeding citation contestation rates in Waldo, Alachua, and High Springs(2001 through 2005).

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Ward et al. 263

in both Waldo and Alachua, whereas the High Springs trend is nearly flat. Although

these initial analyses are informative, they do not account for the time-series nature of

the data nor do they control for any time-varying variables.Several important diagnostic statistics are used to determine whether a series is

stationary and/or contains serial autocorrelation. The results of several tests reveal that

both the intervention and comparison time series are trend stationary and the residuals

are statistically independent.7These facts indicate that a segmented regression analy-

sis is the appropriate interrupted time-series design (Shardell et al., 2007; Wagner et al.,

2002) to assess whether citation contestation increased following the erection of the

speed trap billboard advertisement.

The results of the univariate segmented regression models are reported in Table 2.

An important initial observation is the fact that the univariate segmented regressionmodel for Waldo explains 54% of the variance in citation contestation rates (p< .05),

whereas the models for Alachua and High Springs explain only 3%. The preinter-

vention trends for all three towns are not statistically significant, indicating the

Table 2.Segmented Regression Models for Cited Drivers in the Intervention and

Comparison Cities

Waldo, FL Alachua, FL High Springs, FL

b SE b SE b SE

Univariate model estimates

Intercept (0) 0.0684 0.0050* 0.0518 0.0104* 0.1169 0.0364*

Baseline trend (1) -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.0021 0.0020

Level change afterintervention (

2)

0.0184 0.0070* -0.0030 0.0147 0.0082 0.0512

Trend change afterintervention (

3)

0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 0.0020 0.0030

Fstatistic 21.52* 0.55 0.67R2 .54 .03 .03

Multivariate model estimates

Intercept (0) -0.0124 0.0755 0.2013 0.0692 -0.0018 0.0975

Baseline trend (1) -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0000 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0023

Level change afterintervention (

2)

0.0185 0.0078* -0.0031 0.0143 -0.0174 0.0539

Trend change afterintervention (

3)

0.0007 0.0005 0.0011 0.0009 0.0021 0.0031

Age 0.0014 0.0016 -0.0034 0.0020 0.0014 0.0029

Race 0.0634 0.0744 -0.0311 0.0686 0.1020 0.1013

Sex 0.0564 0.0772 -0.1239 0.0766 0.1753 0.1503

Fstatistic 10.74* 1.28 0.97

R2 .55 .13 .10

*p< .05.

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264 Police Quarterly14(3)

preintervention citation contestation rate is regressing to a constant mean. Confirming

the visual interpretation of the time-series graphs, there is a statistically significant

abrupt increase in the citation contestation rates in Waldo. Immediately following the

intervention in Waldo, the estimated percentage of citations being contested in a given

month increased by 1.84. Compared with the rate at Time 0, this level change corre-

sponds to a 26.9% increase in the rate of contestations. Importantly, there is no statis-tically significant level change in either Alachua or High Springs.

Recall that the time-series graphs show there are slight upward trends during the

postintervention periods for Waldo and Alachua; however, the coefficients for the

trend change due to the intervention fail to reach statistical significance. Thus, there is

not a gradual intervention effect of the speed trap billboard in either town. The trend

change coefficient for High Springs is positive but similarly nonsignificant. Adding

race, sex, and age to the model as time-varying controls also results in the finding of a

statistically significant abrupt-permanent effect in Waldo but not in the other towns. In

short, the time-series results provide support for the main research hypothesis.Table 3 focuses on the cited drivers in Waldo comparing the effects of the billboard

among those with higher opportunity to contest in person (in-state drivers) and those

with lower opportunity to contest in person (out-of-state drivers). Describing first the

Table 3.Segmented Regression Models Across In-State and Out-of-State Cited Drivers in

Waldo

In-state Out-of-state

b SE b SE

Univariate model estimates

Intercept (0) 0.0753 0.0063* 0.0542 0.0082*

Baseline trend (1) -0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 0.0004

Level change after intervention (2) 0.0243 0.0088* 0.0058 0.0116

Trend change after intervention (3) 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007

Fstatistic 14.30* 7.57*

R2 0.43 0.29

Multivariate model estimates Intercept (

0) 0.1509 0.0768* -0.0260 0.0815

Baseline trend (1) -0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005

Level change after intervention (2) 0.0244 0.0100* 0.0044 0.0123

Trend change after intervention (3) 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003 0.0007

Age -0.0016 0.0019 0.0012 0.0016

Sex -0.0307 0.0788 0.1057 0.0744

Race -0.0526 0.0726 0.0349 0.1054

Fstatistic 7.19* 4.08*

R

2

.45 .32*p< .05.

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Ward et al. 265

preintervention levels at Time 1 as indicated by 0, in-state drivers generally contest at

a higher rate than out-of-state drivers as evidenced by the higher intercept (7.53%

compared with 5.42%). More importantly, results of the univariate segmented regression

model show that while the coefficient for the level change after the intervention is in theexpected direction, there is no statistically significant effect of the speed trap billboard on

citation contestation rates for out-of-state drivers (p> .05). However, there is a strong

abrupt-permanent effect for in-state drivers representing approximately a 32% jump in

citation contestations compared with the preintervention level at Time 0 (p< .05). This is

a relatively large effect and is especially noteworthy, given the fact that this test is quite

conservative; a nontrivial proportion of the cited motorists were probably unaware of the

existence of the billboard (i.e., they did not see it). This intervention effect holds firmly

while controlling for the three time-varying covariates.

We use the in-state drivers in Waldo, the group in which a statistically significantand sizeable intervention effect was found, to investigate whether there are similarities

or differences in the effects of the speed trap billboard on citation contestation rates

between divergent social groups. Table 4 reports the univariate segmented regression

models conditional on social group membership. Describing the preintervention levels

at Time 1, men tend to contest citations at a higher rate than women (8.49% compared

with 5.33%) and non-Whites tend to contest at a slightly higher rate than Whites

(9.25% compared with 7.24%). In accordance with theoretical expectations, all of the

level changes after the intervention are positive in the expected direction. However,

we find statistically significant effects for men (p< .05) but not for women (p> .05).In addition, we find significant intervention effects for Whites (p< .05) but not for

non-Whites (p> .05). Relative to baseline, the citation contestation rates among men

and Whites increased by 34% and 36% following the intervention, respectively. In

short, among those with higher opportunity to contest their citations in person (in-state

drivers), the results indicate that the citation contestation rates for men and Whites

were influenced by the speed trap billboard in the hypothesized way but the same can-

not be concluded for women and non-Whitesthough they did experience nonsignifi-

cant abrupt-permanent increases which are in the expected direction according to

theory. These results are confirmed by multivariate segmented regression models.

Discussion

Analyses of citation contestation rates before and after the identification of Waldo as

a speed trap jurisdiction offer important information regarding decision acceptance.

Initially, findings from univariate and multivariate time-series analyses revealed that

a speed trap billboard led to an abrupt and permanent increase in the rate of traffic

citation contestations in the intervention city but not the comparison jurisdictions.

These findings held when controlling for three time-varying covariates and are con-sistent with the hypothesis that the speed trap label led to changes in the way in which

motorist viewed the legitimacy of the Waldo police which, in turn, influenced decision

acceptance rates.

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266

Table4.SegmentedRegressionModels

AcrossGenderandRacialGroupsforIn-StateCitedDriversinWaldo

Gender

Race

Males

Females

Whites

Non-Whites

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

b

SE

Univariate

modelestimates

Intercept(0)

0.0849

0.0075*

0.0533

0.0113*

0.07

24

0.0066*

0.0925

0.0158*

Baseline

trend(1)

-0.0004

0.0004

0.0002

0.0006

-0.00

03

0.0004

-0.0004

0.0009

Levelchangeafterintervention(2)

0.0285

0.0105*

0.0129

0.0159

0.02

43

0.0093*

0.0251

0.0222

Trendch

angeafterintervention(3)

0.0008

0.0006

0.0006

0.0009

0.00

07

0.0005

0.0011

0.0013

F

statistic

9.45*

5.20*

11.94*

2.49

R2

.33

.22

.39

.12

Multivariatemodelestimates

Intercept(0)

0.1871

0.0749*

0.0438

0.0913

0.18

28

0.0724*

-0.0701

0.1073

Baseline

trend(1)

-0.0003

0.0004

0.0002

0.0006

0.00

00

0.0004

-0.0004

0.0009

Levelchangeafterintervention(2)

0.0294

0.0111*

0.0132

0.0165

0.02

16

0.0097*

0.0209

0.0237

Trendch

angeafterintervention(3)

0.0008

0.0006

0.0008

0.0010

0.00

04

0.0006

0.0013

0.0013

Age

-0.0024

0.0019

0.0005

0.0027

-0.00

25

0.0018

0.0047

0.0031

Sex

-0.05

25

0.0717

0.0141

0.0951

Race

-0.0913

0.0744

-

0.0527

0.1028

F

statistic

6.40*

3.08*

7.68*

1.98

R2

.37

.22

.42

.16

*p