Planning Theory & Practice Is Israel Ready for Participatory

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Is Israel Ready for Participatory Planning? Expectations and ObstaclesDeborah F. Shmueli a

a Department of Geography, University of Haifa, Israel

To cite this Article Shmueli, Deborah F.(2005) 'Is Israel Ready for Participatory Planning? Expectations and Obstacles',Planning Theory & Practice, 6: 4, 485 — 514To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14649350500349656URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649350500349656

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Is Israel Ready for ParticipatoryPlanning? Expectations and ObstaclesDEBORAH F. SHMUELI

Department of Geography, University of Haifa, Israel

ABSTRACT This is a study of recent experiences in Israel to integrate public participation into theIsraeli planning system. It aims to analyse and evaluate the adoption of participatory structures andprocesses within Israel’s strategic master planning systems. Existing planning laws and traditions,socio-political forces, attitudes of planning leadership and affected populations, geographicalsettings and other spatial factors are examined for their impact upon the participatory process.In three cases selected for study, a variety of techniques were used to secure the desired informationand to test the effectiveness of the structures for involving the public. Two of the cases involve publicparticipation as an input into the planning process. The third is an initial effort at a collaborativeform of stakeholder involvement. The findings document the failure of the planning system and itsbureaucracy to integrate these processes effectively. An overriding question throughout the analysisis what in the Israeli political and socio-cultural context enhances or inhibits effectiveparticipation?

Keywords: Participatory planning theory and practice; Israeli planning; stakeholder involvement; collaboration;Upper Galilee; Misgav; Emek Hefer

Introduction

For over three decades, citizen participation mechanisms have beenmandated in planningprocesses in the USA, Australia and parts of Western Europe such as the UK, theNetherlands and Denmark. All have employed a wide variety of approaches. In Israel,public response to plans is solicited at the stage of deposit with the appropriate levelPlanningCommission for final statutory approval.However, participation is relatively newin the formative stages of a plan, and, at these stages, not embedded in Israeli planning lawor practice. Therefore, the case studies treated in this paper deal with voluntary efforts byregional councils to introduce participation throughout the process. While participatoryconcepts have influenced current planning thinking, in practice the results have beenmixed. Israeli planning policy makers are still searching, through experimentation, forappropriate participationmechanisms.When planners and governmental decisionmakersdo not consider the results of participation as binding, andwhen the public is uncertain thatits contribution is taken seriously, the process is undermined (Innes & Booher, 2004).

The Israeli planning system consists of three administrative levels: the national, districtand local. The district administrative level often addresses issues that are common to thenational and local levels. The cases chosen in this study include the first two participatoryregional-level strategic planning efforts in Israel. These were conducted by two of the

Correspondence Address: Deborah F. Shmueli, Department of Geography, University of Haifa 31905, Israel. Email:[email protected]

Planning Theory & Practice, Vol. 6, No. 4, 485–514, December 2005

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country’s northern regional councils, the Upper Galilee and Misgav. The third case is themaster plan for the Emeq Hefer Regional Council that is located within the Central CoastalPlain where the stream meets the Mediterranean. It is a comprehensive plan that wasdeveloped in connection with the on-going Alexander Watershed Restoration Project,which encompasses a larger area that includes Emeq Hefer (see Figure 1). The three cases

Figure 1. Case study setting: the three Regional Councils

486 D. F. Shmueli


analyse process characteristics within different physical-geographic, socio-ethnic andpolitical-ideological settings, and provide insights into how the process has workedwithin the Israeli policy-making structure.

With its highly developed, urbanized hi-tech and service-oriented economy, Israel facesmany of the planning problems of similar societies with regard to rapid urban spread andpressures on agricultural lands and open spaces. Unlike many developed countries,however, planning goals must take into account security concerns of a nation within alimited geographical area, surrounded in part by hostile countries, and in continuingconflict with the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza, and the PalestinianDiaspora. It also has a potentially destabilizing and growing internal Arab minority.In addition, the planning goals include absorption of mass immigration of Jews with manydifferent languages and cultures, and the spread of a growing population to establish apresence in as much of the country as possible, while at the same time conserving land,water and unique bio-cultures.

Awide variety of sources were used in the study. These included a series of open-endedinterviews with policy makers/planning specialists and with individuals who weredrawn into the process as citizen participants, in some instances as leaders of impactedcommunities and in others as concerned citizenry. Additional primary sources were theprotocols of steering committee and open forummeetings, and the documented objectivesof the project organizers in seeking to incorporate participation into the planning projects.Insights were also gained from a separate study in which interviews with prominentcommunity builders and designers revealed their general views towards participation.

Historical Trends in Participation Theory and Experiences

The citizen participation processes that emerged in the US and Western Europe in the1960s have evolved in the subsequent decades, and are still being refined. The reasons,motives and images of participation vary widely. For some the aim is minority influenceover public decisions; others have reluctantly acceded to community demands or legalrequirements with ‘lip-service’ acquiescence. Attitudes include views of participation as ameans of sharpening the issues in public conflict, avoidance or resolution of conflict, or anultimate expression of democracy. Some resist it because they believe that lay persons lackthe knowledge and expertise to influence public policy and its implementation, or thatthey will use it to manipulate or undermine policy.

Many of the works have focused on the development of public participationmechanisms within the framework of planning. The studies cited in this section arepresented generally by decades. While they inform practice, sometimes the theoryprecedes practice, and at others is derived from insights from field experience. Indeed,some are theoretical, some normative and others empirical.

Many mechanisms in the earlier decades were formal and prescriptive, with some of themost familiar venues being public hearings, citizen and ‘blue ribbon’ committees andfocus groups. Early proponents of public participation assumed that such venues wouldprovide minority groups with an opportunity to publicize their views and advocate theirinterests and needs. On the informal level, ‘participation by protest’ was found by variouspressure groups to be an effective tool in attracting the media and attaining their goals(O’Riordan, 1977). Definitive steps in bringing participation into the mainstream werethe legislation mandating participation processes that was enacted in the US on both thefederal and state levels, and in Britain on the local level through the passage of variousTown and County Planning Acts.

Is Israel Ready for Participatory Planning? 487


In designing the three case studies, the author was conscious of the pitfalls inherent inefforts to ‘democratize’ planning. As early as 1969 Arnstein, in her article ‘The Ladder ofCitizen Participation’1 warned that what was heralded as the promise of a new democraticprocess in the 1960s, seemed to have turned out to be exercises in manipulation. Her studybecame a benchmark that planners subsequently employed to assess the democratic goalsof public participation (Bailey, 1975; Estrin, 1979). Many of these public involvementefforts involved large numbers of participants, were very time-and money-intensive,offered little opportunity for dialogue, and had little or no influence on decision making.Participation in the 1980s, particularly in the US, was broadened through focus on thecitizen role as consumer. This created a framework for information flow from citizensto decision makers that would be used for needs assessment, and from decision makersto the public in the mode of informing.

Disappointment with both process and outcomes during the first two decades spurred ashift in focus. Those studying participation in policy contexts began to change emphasisfrom large-scale participation forums to more collaborative stakeholder-oriented venuesbased on consensus building. The goal of achieving consensus (meeting the interests of allstakeholders) differs from the advocacy role, which aims at predetermined outcomes.

Negotiation theory emerged as influential in planning because it was a goodmatch witha central fact: parties to a planning decision are often interdependent. This implies theneed for joint decision-making processes, such as negotiations, which hold the promise ofjoint gains (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987) instead of resulting in winners and losers.But negotiations provide challenges of their own, such as information dilemma traps(similar in structure to a prisoners’ dilemma) meaning that while win-win outcomesare possible, lose-lose outcomes always threaten participatory planning and planningnegotiations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Susskind & Ozawa, 1984).

Planners often play roles ‘in-between’ numerous, interdependent stakeholders(Forester, 1989, 1999). This leads them to act much like mediators as they help parties toavoid what can otherwise become mutually destructive games of defensiveness (Schon,1983) and negotiation traps, so that they can instead reach mutual gains that takeadvantage of the parties’ differences in priorities (Kolb et al., 1994). However, as they helpparties negotiate mutually acceptable outcomes, planners run the risk of forgetting that, asopposed to neutral mediators, they too are in a sense interested parties, with the mandateto uphold the public interest, which at times can be at odds with those of somestakeholders.

Beginning in the 1990s, Healey and Innes developed parallel and overlapping lines ofwork in their publications on collaboration and communicative planning (e.g. Healey,1996, 1998, 2003; Innes, 1996; Innes & Booher, 2004).2

For some theorists and practitioners, participation is ameans for expanding social capitalto enable participants to develop as individuals. They hold that reasoning together canovercome a great number of conflicts, and that collaborative frameworks for representationof interests, deliberation and flexibility increase responsiveness, in contrast to the morelimited responsiveness that characterizes the traditional decision-making approaches(Frank & Elliott, 2002; Healey, 2003; Shmueli & Plaut, 2004). Critics charge that it is naı̈ve toassume that this type of collaborative planning necessarily leads to good decision makingsince it does not necessarily address the roles of power, objective standards andaccountability (Amy, 1987, 1990; Rabe, 1988). It must be recognized that participation inplanning is seldom problem-free or without manipulation and controversy. Given Israel’slater start in participation efforts, the cases that will be discussed have telescoped some ofthe historical trends without benefiting from their lessons.

488 D. F. Shmueli


What, then, counts as participation? Public involvement or even collaboration does not,in itself, guarantee the effectiveness of the participatory process. At a minimum,frameworks that provide for representation, voice, transparency and a role in thenegotiations that lead up to the final decisions, are required. A number of criteria emergefrom this historical overview and are listed below. The relationship of each case to thesecriteria will be identified within the context of the exposition of the case. They include:

. Representation of interests.

. Ability of process to address power imbalances.

. Process flexibility and degree of prescriptiveness (to what degree of rigidity was theprocess decided upon at the outset and how open is it to adaptation, which may beindicated from understandings reached during the process itself).

. Level of transparency.

. Deliberative interaction.

. Structured negotiation among stakeholders.

. Learning process and individual growth.

. Cultural translation of values.

. Level of consensus or shared decision making.

The Israeli Context

Political, Economic and Socio-cultural Influences on Participation

To understand the setting for the effort to integrate public participation within the Israeliplanning process, it is useful to note the role of participation within the more generalIsraeli socio-political scene.

At the national political level the Israeli governance structure is highly centralized.The Knesset is organized along national party lines. Regional and local interests aresecondary to party loyalties, and have no formal representation at the national decision-making level. Absence of ‘their’ specific Knessetmember, onwhom individual citizens andcommunity groups can bring pressure, has inhibited the motivation for involvement andprotest on issues other than those of national security and economic policies. In addition,the governance structures that represent these interests lack the tax base to enable them totake substantial independent political actions. However, cities and regional councils, whilestill dependent on central governmental funding, are slowly seeking to exercise greaterindependence indirecting these funds to social and economic spheres, and indeed, it is fromhere that the initiatives for many of the participatory planning efforts have come.

On the socio-cultural level, some segments of the Israeli populace do not have atradition of participation in public affairs while others do. The culture of the Arabcommunity, which represents nearly 20 per cent3 of the population, entrusts much of thedecision making in public affairs to tribal and clan leaders. The ultra-orthodox Jewishcommunity (about 10 per cent) has a similar relationship with its leading rabbis. Many ofthe million immigrants from the Former Soviet Union who have been absorbed withinIsrael since 1990 have carried over to the Israeli scene their distrust of government, and arecynical about the efficacy of participation. One might conclude that the combination ofthese socio-cultural forces, reinforcing the widely-held opinion that the highest prioritiesare set by national security and economic development needs, leaves little room foreffective public questioning of policies that participation can generate.

However, there are countervailing forces that have historically embraced broadindividual and community participation. The culture of participatory decision making is



most entrenched within the communal kibbutz and co-operative moshav settlementmovements, which have played such a key role in shaping the destiny of the country. Thishas been carried over to the newer large and small community villages (yishuvimkehilatiyyim and mitzpim) located in rural and exurban areas, and whose participatorygovernance is akin to the New England town meeting. In the urban areas, participatoryneighbourhood and community development experiments date back to the 1970s. In thepast 15 years, Israel has seen a growing number of non-governmental civic andenvironmental organizations that operate on both the national and local levels. All of theseforces have influenced the discourse about participation that has become popular in themedia and among planners, and has begun to attract the attention of politicians. However,the interpretation of ’participation’ differs widely among the various groups.

In the economic arena, as well, contradictory trends discourage and favour publicparticipation in planning. Among the economic changes that have taken place in the pastdecade is the unprecedented growth of high-tech industries and financial services, which,fuelled by the market economy and international trade, has shifted the national attentionaway from the focus on rural settlement that characterized the early Zionist enterprise, tourbanized activities in cities and their suburbs, and isolated exurbs in rural areas. This hasbeen spurred by privatization of large-scale enterprises formerly owned by thegovernment and the General Confederation of Labor (Histadrut), and the opening up ofkibbutz and moshav farmlands for private real estate development.

Both the private corporations and the farm interests represent significant lobbyingforces that try to discourage public dialogue and participation with respect to issues suchas pollution control, encroachment on open space, or using part of the land for new,privatized development. This is supported by the attitude of the current leadership of theIsrael Land Authority (ILA) that endorses the desirability of private ownershipunhampered by governmental planning restraints, let alone by participatory processes.Thus, Vice Prime Minister and ILA Chairman Ehud Olmert espouses “the principle thatentrepreneurs should be allowed to operate without interference and without anyoneasking bothersome questions about the links between capital and government” (Rinat,2005, p. 5). The ILA resolution 979, approved by the ILA Council in 2003, is an example ofthe implementation of this approach. That decision granted the kibbutzim and moshavimextensive residential and commercial building rights on agricultural lands (leased to thekibbutzim and moshavim but owned by the State) and made possible the lease of land toexternal (non-kibbutz or moshav) commercial interests. The decision would have stymiedthe public and professional discourse on issues of preservation of open space (50 per centof open space in Israel is zoned agricultural). In an opinion written in January 2005, theAttorney General noted that this “far-reaching decision was made without a factualprofessional foundation” and stated that it should not be approved (Rinat, 2005).

Opposed to these development interests are many of the local residents and vocalenvironmental NGOs that mobilize in response to almost every plan. Supporting theagenda of the environmental interests is the recent passage of National Outline Scheme(NOS) No. 35 (January 2005). This focuses on the designation of areas for constructioninside or near urban centres, and maximum preservation of open space, making theconversion of farmland for development more difficult. This law has been reinforced by acourt decision that has frozen the process that permits kibbutzim and moshavim to usetheir land for development.

However, a strategic-political counter-force that challenges the policy put forward inNOS 35 is a recent governmental proposal to build up to 30 towns, villages and privatefarms, mostly in the Galilee and the sparsely populated Negev. Security, internal as well

490 D. F. Shmueli


as external, is the rationale for dispersing small communities along Israel’s borders andwithin these peripheral regions The Construction and Housing Minister has put oneof the security objectives of the policy in blunt terms “The purpose—including fencing offlarge tracts for individual farms—is primarily to prevent Israeli Arabs, especiallyBedouins, from encroaching on state lands” (Friedman, 2003, pp. 7–8). This illustrates asituation in which security concerns go against the policies of the planning institutionsand require amendments to statutory plans.

The present study examines how these antithetical pressures come into play indeveloping master plans to guide policy on the strategic regional planning level. The threecase studies presented take place within the rural regional context and within sectorswhich, for the most part, have a history of participatory experience within their ownlocalities. The study examined how countervailing tendencies come into play inincorporating a participatory ethic in the development of master plans to guide policyon the strategic regional planning level.

The Centralized Structure of Israeli Planning

The planning process in Israel is hierarchical and statutory. The country’s Planning andBuilding Law of 1965 controls all planning and development. It is based on the Britishlegislation of 1922 and 1936 during its mandate in Palestine, and remained in force until1965 when the Israeli Planning and Building Law was passed. British Mandate legislationdid not have a national planning body or national statutory plans. The 1965 legislationadded both (Alterman, 2001). When that law was amended to allow more local scope,localities proved ill equipped to take advantage of their additional responsibilities, bothbecause their independent financial bases suffer from limited taxing authority, andbecause they lack the breadth of professional staff to exercise these powers.

In this centralized and hierarchical planning system, there is an assumed continuityfrom the statutory Outline Schemes at the national to the district (regional) and locallevels, to actual project permitting on the local level. Master plans, which are not statutory,often precede and provide policy guidance to the Outline Schemes. This all falls within thepurview of the Ministry of Interior.

Distinct from the regulatory, the other component of Israeli planning is devoted to‘developmental planning’. This is the responsibility of a parallel set of ad hoc,development-oriented institutions and organizations. Ministries other than Interior, suchas Construction and Housing, as well as the Israel Land Authority (ILA),4 were grantedimportant powers and large budgets to effect change in the Israeli landscape (Bollens,2000). This second system is characterized by organizational complexity and is proactive,practical and strategic (Alexander et al., 1983; Hill, 1980; Yiftachel, 1993).

Alterman (2001, p. 272) points out that Israel’s centralized land-use planning system“combines top-down planning with bottom-up initiative”. The local planning commis-sions are the first and usually crucial platforms for local and regional policies and mostdevelopment initiatives. These decisions require approval of the District PlanningCommissions that are composed mainly of central governmental agencies, and in turnsubject to national planning oversight. It is the local and regional councils that providethe greatest opportunities for integrating public participation into the planning process.

Israeli Institutionalized Participatory Planning

While public participation in planning processes in Israel now generates widespreadattention from the general public, as well as organized civic groups and the media, its



weakness is that, in most cases, the process is limited to the public right to object to planswhen they are presented at the deposit stage.5 Thus, the 1965 Planning and Building Lawrequires planning authorities to publicize projects and hear public opposition only afterthe authorities have made their choice from the options available to them, and the projectswhich have been deposited await final approval. Meyer-Brodnitz, a leading privateplanner with much experience as an ‘investigator’ of contested plans in Israeli Arabvillages, points out: “The body which hears the objections is the same District Commissionthat has deposited the plan . . . First it plays an administrative role, and second, it plays aquasi-judicial role, hearing objections to a plan to which it has already formed an opinionand approved” (Forester et al., 2001, p. 80).

An important change has recently taken place with regard to the definition of the publicthat is allowed to object at this stage. In the past, the ‘public’ was narrowly limited to thosecommunity groups, individuals and selected NGOs that could prove a direct connectionto the land in question. Currently, the ‘11th-hour objection’ can be raised by a wide rangeof groups and individuals. However, the results remain that participation is seen asnegative by definition, and is viewed by local administrations and developers as anobstacle to implementation and growth. While public objections at the deposit stage maytherefore result in project delay, it has generally been considered that they rarely bringabout significant changes to, or cancellation of, the proposed project.6

Because of lack of transparency during most of the planning process and thedevelopment of plans without early public knowledge or participation, the proposedprojects often are technically and professionally impressive, but may not beimplementable because they become mired in either the Planning Committees or inlitigation (Shmueli & Plaut, 2004).

Non-mandatory Participation in Israeli Planning

Participatory experiences included in this category are not mandated by national law, butare formally adopted by local and regional councils. The last decade has witnessed growthin the number of NGOs in Israel, accompanied both by demands for participation and byexpanded use of litigation over planning projects by individuals, groups of citizens, andby NGOs. Such opposition often leads to delays, which proponents of the plan, includingdevelopers, claim are unnecessary and intolerable. This poses a dilemma. As a positiveforce, greater participation may be an enlightened solution, particularly on the local level,where planners and some of the leadership of the local and regional councils have takensteps to incorporate public input and participation. On the negative side, these efforts areoften diffused, and non-institutionalized, taking different forms and using differentmethods and instruments, and frequently by-passed by decision makers.

In recent years, in response to the conflicts engendered by development proposals,a considerable number of official participatory experiments have been initiated across thecountry to try to break the deadlocks between policy makers and activist citizen groups.In the early 1980s, the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee supportedthe establishment of Municipal Planning Units (MPUs) in city, local and regional councilsunder the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. The MPUs were set up in the early 1980s tohelp these bodies plan for the rapid growth of localities within the rural parts of thecountry, while seeking to overcome the constraints of their traditional managerialstructures (Janner-Klausner, 1994). A number of the MPU’s initiated participatoryplanning processes. Janner-Klausner, then director of the Committee’s strategic planningunits, describes the motivation for doing so:

492 D. F. Shmueli


. . . there are no channels, in Israel, for the public interest to be expressed dulyand properly. The public participation skills are underdeveloped. There’s noonus on local governments, on bureaucracy, to do outreach, to explain what it’sdoing and gain legitimacy for it . . . Israel’s a very paternalistic society in a lot ofways, and people tend to be happy with that. One side of paternalism is that itcreates a huge gray zone, which is sort of quasi-legal, in terms of how peoplegain access to information and power. So a paternalistic, closed system creates adistorted power system alongside the public interest system which nowincludes vested interests. (Forester et al., 2001, pp. 185–186)

The Case Studies

The three case studies7 that were selected belong to the category of the relatively new, notlegally mandated participatory efforts, which are designed to bring citizen groups intopositive partnerships with official bodies. The two Galilee strategic master plan cases werethe very first in which public participation was elicited. Both Regional Councils, the UpperGalilee and Misgav, share many common physical-geographic features, but differ in avariety of ways. The AlexanderWatershed case is the first participatory planning case for aregional council located within a broader watershed planning effort.

The Upper Galilee Regional Council: Strategic Planning Process

The Upper Galilee Regional Council is homogenous in terms of settlement type, composedof 43 long-established kibbutzim, with deeply entrenched socialistic interests andoutlooks. Historically, they had a strong sense of self-reliance and self-containment. Three-quarters of the kibbutzim were established between 1939 and 1949—the first two createdin 1916 and 1918, and the most recent one in 1968 (Sternberg, 1997). The territory governedby the Council is non-contiguous; it does not include the area’s development towns andmoshavim, which have their own regional or town councils.

The region is located in the northeastern corner of Israel, bordered by Lebanon on thenorth, the Golan Heights on the east and the Sea of Galilee and Beit Netufa Valley on thesouth. It embraces the Hula Valley and the highly dissected mountainous and plateau areaof the eastern Upper Galilee that lies to the west of the Hula (see Figure 1).

The crisis faced by the kibbutzim at the time of the strategic planning process was morethan economic; it was also ideological, focusing on the issue of privatization and lifestyle.After nearly a century of vibrant collective social and economic experimentation, thekibbutz ideal had lost much of its appeal for its younger generations. A third generationhad now emergedwith very different desires and goals than that of the founding pioneers.Rejecting the closed kibbutz society and in search of individual expression, many of theyounger members had begun to leave. The Upper Galilee settlements, historically thestronghold of the kibbutz movement, suffered a 7 per cent negative out-migrationbetween 1991 and 1995 (Sternberg, 1997), and that population loss continues.

Nevertheless, the individual kibbutzim in the Upper Galilee did not make an effort tobuild the impact of their changing ideologies into the strategic planning process. The focuswas solely on a reversal of economic deterioration. The ideological transition in terms ofprivatized social organization and lifestyle changes, which followed the planning process(in the late 1990s), was not addressed jointly, but was understood to be an internal matterto be dealt with by each kibbutz.



In 1993, the Upper Galilee Regional Council became the first regional council to initiate astrategic regional Master Plan with the participation of its residents (Misgav followed inthe same year.) The Council established a Municipal Strategic Planning Unit (MPU) todevelop this Plan. The MPU provided professional planning staff to work with, and reportto, the regional authority in order to augment the regional councils’ professional capacity.

While agriculture had been the original economic base of the kibbutzim, in relativelyshort order they all expanded their economies for industrial development. Many of theindustries focused on products for the agricultural market such as chemicals, fertilizersand plastics. By the time the first stage of the strategic plan had been initiated, industryhad outstripped farming as the leading economic activity, but many of these plants werenow old and outmoded. A deteriorating economic situation made it difficult to supportthe needs of an ageing population as well as provide outlets for the younger generation,and many took jobs outside the kibbutz. Moreover, over 40 per cent of the region’s entirekibbutz workforce was dedicated to community services rather than to income producingactivities (Sternberg, 1997). The focus of the plan was reversal of economic deterioration.No attention was paid to the ideological crisis over the future of a communal society.

Phase I of the strategic planning process (shown schematically and indicating whichstages included public participation in Table 1a) was carried out directly by the RegionalCouncil and the MPU. The work plan and the information gathering stages wereconducted by them without public participation. In February 1993, the process wasopened with a large-scale public forum to which 150 participants from various kibbutzimwere invited. Following the forum, thematic working groups on the non-ideological issueswere established, using the Charette8 method, wherein the group undertakes to deliver adraft on a particular theme as the outcome of wide-ranging discussions. They worked onsuch themes as education, culture and leisure, economic development, youth, welfare andhigher education, but not in the context of changing the communal, socialist kibbutzmodel. The quality of group output varied, with some reaching agreement andrecommendations, and others disintegrating. As a whole, they were unable to developstrategic recommendations.

In Phase II, without consulting the public that had already become involved, theCouncil and MPU hired an outside planning team to redirect the process (see Table 1b,Phase II). Here participation took the form of large-scale surveys and questionnaires withother types of group public participation intermittently woven into the process (Avraham,1993). One of the workshops used the Delphi9 method, wherein the organizers designedquestionnaires for the participants, and then analysed the findings to be used as inputs fordeveloping alternatives to the plan. This process left much of the power with the plannersrunning the meeting. The preference voiced by the participants was for the economicprivatization of the kibbutz and for choices among community settlement models.Thematic workshops dealt also with new directions in agriculture, tourism andtransportation. In the wake of the Oslo Agreement of 1993, another group consideredthe economic opportunities that peace might present to the region as a gateway to theArab States of the Middle Eastern interior. In neither phase of the process did they dealdirectly with the issue of how to keep the younger generations on the Upper Galileekibbutzim through major changes in lifestyles and economic re-organizations.

As Tables 1a and 1b show, the public participated in 8 of the 18 stages of the planningprocess (Phases I and II) through membership in thematic working groups, discussions,workshops and public meetings about various planning stages, reports in local media,public opinion polls and dissemination of information to the various kibbutz managementcommittees. In April of 1995, the planning consultants held a public workshop which

494 D. F. Shmueli


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alic

s¼

planningstag

ewithat-largepublicparticipation

Sou

rce:(Sternberg,19

97,pp.87

–88

).



Table

1b.PhaseII:45

0participan

ts,7.8%

ofthead

ultpopulation

Stage

Process

Product

Process

Participan

tsMethodology

7Hireoutsideplanningconsu

ltan

tsto

dev

eloptheStrateg

icPlan

Municipal

PlanningUnit

8Dev

elopprocess

andwork

plan

Municipal

PlanningUnit,

consu

ltan

ts9

Consolidation

ofprofessional

working

groupsfor:

agricu

lture,tourism

,tran

sportation,potential

forinternational

co-operation

Municipal

PlanningUnit,

consu

ltan

ts10

Analysisofcu

rren

tconditions

Professional

planningfirm

s11

Pop

ula

tion

surv

eyP

ubl

ic,

pro

fess

ion

alp

lan

nin

gfi

rms

Qu

esti

onn

aire

san

dsu

rvey

s12

Cry

stal

liza

tion

ofp

opu

lati

ond

evel

opm

ent

stra

teg

ies

Wor

ksh

op:

way

sto

exp

and

and

cult

ivat

eex

isti

ng

com

mu

nit

ies

Pu

blic

,p

rofe

ssio

nal

pla

nn

ing

firm

s,C

oun

cil

exec

uti

ves

,M

un

icip

alP

lan

nin

gU

nit

;9

4p

arti

cip

ants

Del

ph

i

13Analysisofexisting

conditionsan

dpotential

dev

elopmen

tstrategies

Professional

workinggroups

Municipal

PlanningUnit,

professional

planningfirm

sCharrette

14F

eed

back

,se

lect

ion

ofce

ntr

ald

evel

opm

ent

alte

rnat

ive

Mee

tin

gto

choo

seh

ousi

ng

and

dev

elop

men

tst

rate

gy

Pu

blic

,p

rofe

ssio

nal

pla

nn

ing

firm

s,C

oun

cil

exec

uti

ves

,M

un

icip

alP

lan

nin

gU

nit

Com

mu

nit

ym

eeti

ng

s

15F

eedb

ack,

sele

ctio

nof

them

atic

dev

elop

men

tal

tern

ativ

es

Th

emat

icm

eeti

ng

sfo

rst

rate

gy

dev

elop

men

t:ag

ricu

ltu

re,

tou

rism

,tr

ansp

orta

tion

,p

oten

tial

for

inte

rnat

ion

alco

-ope

rati

on,a

nd

spat

ial

sett

lem

ent

mod

els,

abou

t1

00

inea

chth

emat

icg

rou

p(w

ith

over

lap

,4

00

tota

l)

Pu

blic

,p

rofe

ssio

nal

pla

nn

ing

firm

s,C

oun

cil

exec

uti

ves

,M

un

icip

alP

lan

nin

gU

nit

Com

mu

nit

ym

eeti

ng

s,D

elp

hi

16Dev

elopmen

tofthethem

aticstrategies:ag

ricu

lture,tourism

,transp

ortation,

potential

forinternational

co-operation

Municipal

PlanningUnit,

professional

planningfirm

s17

Dev

elopmen

tofcomprehen

sivedev

elopmen

tstrategy

Municipal

PlanningUnit,

professional

planningfirm

s18

Feedback

Discu

ssionan

dpresentationofch

osenstrategic

dev

elopmen

tstrategy

Steeringcommittee,

Council

executives,Municipal

PlanningUnit

Not

e:norm

alfont¼

planningstag

e;it

alic

s¼

planningstag

ewithat-largepublicparticipation

496 D. F. Shmueli


responded to the public request to discuss four options or models for settlement re-organization and expansion, which for the first time touched on the major changes facingthe region: the kibbutz model as is, the ex-urban community model for kibbutz members,the kibbutz with an adjacent rental neighbourhood for non-kibbutz members, and thekibbutz with an adjacent ownership neighbourhood for non-kibbutz members. The focuswas on spatial, not ideological, ramifications of the alternatives.

Analysis of this participatory process included a series of open-ended interviews(Sternberg, 1997) with seven project initiators/organizers and 11 public participants tosolicit information on the following:

. the rationale and expectations for the public participation process;

. opinions on the structure of the process;

. levels of satisfaction with the results (deliverables); and

. reactions to the strategic participatory planning experience.

Of the public participants, seven had taken part in the working groups and four in theopen forum. Separate open-ended interview protocols were developed for the projectleadership (elected head of the Regional Council and the director of the MunicipalPlanning Unit) together with the Regional Council Department heads (who led theworking groups), and for the public participants in both the working groups and publicforum. The responses can be summarized as follows.

The four groupswere in agreement that expectationswere notmet. Only the participantswho had taken part from the onset of the project expressed opinions on the structureof the process, and they voiced a number of criticisms. The Leadership was satisfied withthe results since the plan reflected their own strategies and objectives. It sought validation,and neither wanted nor expected participation to challenge or change the plan. Indeed,when reviewing the process, leaders saw the need for strategic planning, butwere scepticalabout the need for it being participatory. The Regional Council Department heads whoorganized the working groups were divided as to results. Half reflected the positivesentiments of leadership, and half were disappointed that new ideas were not generated.In terms of process, all viewed participatory strategic planning as part of their jobs andperceived the need for better communication between Council and residents.

The seven public participants in the working groups deemed the results minimal and oflittle utility to the community. Despite this, their reactions to the process were positive.They appreciated inclusion and felt that it enhanced interaction between Council andresidents, and among the residents themselves.

After enjoying the open meeting experience, the four public forum participantsinterviewed were disappointed on all levels—they could not get answers on the resultsand had no sense of the effectiveness of the process. Table 2 details these responses.

Efficacy of the Process

. Representation of interests: geographically targeted proportional representation.

. No flexibility: the agenda set by planning consultants and local officials.

. Limited transparency only in those stages in which public was included:10 results notavailable to public forum participants.

. Deliberation limited to stages programmed by decision makers.

. Learning and individual growth modest for professionals and public; minimal forleadership.

. Cultural translation of values: side-stepped as being within the purview of each kibbutz.



Table

2.Upper

Galilee

resp

onsesto

interviews

Leadership:

Elected

head

of

Reg

ional

Council(RC)&

Direc-

torofMPU

Working

Group

Organ

izers:

RC

Dep

art-

men

tHeads

WorkingGroups:PublicParticipan

tsPublicForum

Participan

ts

Expectations

Process

notas

great

asexpected.

Publicinterest

wan

edafterfirst

open

forum.Working

groups

producedless

than

expected

Highpublicinterest,b

utitwan

edafterfirst

forum.Participan

tsdifferedin

their

expectations

Big

expectations,big

disap

pointm

ents.Open

forum

meetingunfocu

sed

Liked

what

hap

pen

edat

firstmeeting.

Disap

pointed

at nosignificant

follow-up

Structure

Wrong

participants

for

the

work

ing

groups,

too

much

focu

son

details.

Poor

group

facilitators,had

tobech

anged

mid-stream

Missedpresence

of18

to23

yearolds;Too

man

ydiverse

interestsin

workinggroups.

Too

man

yex

perts

among

participan

ts.

Participan

tsselected

atrandom

from

lists

provided

bystrategic

planners

Halfdescribed

itas

dem

ocratic;halfas

‘lip-service’.Lackofmore

gen

eral

public

mem

bersnoted.Process

complicated,sometim

esunclear

No

continuity

withrest

of

process

Results

(Deliverab

les)

Planresu

ltsmet

theexpectations

oftheinitiators,butnotthose

of

thepublicparticipan

ts.No

majordifference

inoutcomeof

thePlanbroughtab

outby

participatory

process

Public

participan

tsfocu

sed

on

small,narrow

localpoints

(size

of

kibbutz

industrial

zone

or

expan

sionarea)

Halfsatisfi

edwithresu

lts,

halfresp

onded

that

nonew

ideasweregen

erated

into

the

planproduct

ResultsofPhaseIunclear.

Contributionto

community

disap

pointingan

dminim

al

Tried

toascertain

resu

ltsbut

could

notget

answ

ers

Reactions

toStrateg

icParticipatory

Planning

Process

See

needforstrategic

planning,

uncertainas

totheutility

of

participatory

process

View

process

as

part

of

their

jobs;

Perceived

need

forbettercommunication

betweenCouncilan

dresiden

ts,especially

asregional

populationis

growing

Councilbroughtcloserto

residen

ts,who

learned

what

isgoingon;Helped

Council

dep

artm

entheads

toim

prove

relations

with

community;Enhan

ced

interaction

amongresiden

ts;Would

participatein

similar

process

infuture

communitynow

has

tools

forfuture

involvem

ent

Noidea

whether

process

was

effective

498 D. F. Shmueli


. No consensus or shared decision-making: structured negotiations among stakeholdersin Phase I that did not lead to consensus and was abandoned in Phase II.

Despite the familiarity of the kibbutzniks with participatory democracy withintheir own villages and the strength of their social networks, the process faltered.The representation of interests was deficient in the absence of 18 to 23-year olds.The openness and unpredictability of the output of Phase I caused the leadership to fearloss of control over joint industrial and other regional activities. This led to the overlyprescriptive design structure of Phase II, and the reluctance of the leaders and consultantsto cede any of their authority or expertise to the lay public. Both phases can be categorizedas ‘degrees of tokenism’ on Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’, with Phase I perhaps on ahigher rung within that category than Phase 2.

In the decade that followed the strategic master planning process, individual kibbutzimhave addressed the ideological changes that were only marginally dealt with regionally inthe plan. On the whole, the collective way of life has been dramatically weakened. Variousmodels of privatization and communal organization can be found among the kibbutzim.Large numbers of the members who work outside the kibbutz retain their own salaries.Many services have been privatized and members must pay for them. Welfare systems aretailored to the needs of each kibbutz, and individual kibbutzim have allocated parts oftheir lands for private, residential neighbourhoods.

Misgav Regional Council: Strategic Planning Process

The Misgav Regional Council, which is located within the hills and valleys of the LowerGalilee, consists of newer, smaller communities, primarily yishuvim kehilatiyyim(community settlements), with a smattering of kibbutzim (see Figure 1). The yishuvimkehilatiyyim were established between 1978 and 1982 as part of a plan by the nationalauthorities to increase the Jewish population of the Galilee. These residents are largelyeducated, middle-class commuters, who seek a rural setting and a measure of self-government. They strongly identifiedwith the regional council that they organized in 1982,inasmuch as they, unlike the kibbutzim of the Upper Galilee, had no national organizationormovement to fall back upon. After the formation of the Council, it was expanded from 20community settlements to include seven more: five kibbutzim, one moshav,11 and oneBedouin village (Salamah, which had been recognized and planned in 1976). There werealso 15 or so Bedouin encampments scattered along the north-eastern and south-westernmargins of the area which, at the time, lacked official status (Misgav Regional Council,1995). In 1992 the Jewish settlements represented about 60 per cent of the region’spopulation of approximately 9000, and the Bedouin about 40 per cent (see Figure 2).

The following year, the Misgav Regional Council became the second regional councilto initiate a strategic regional Master Plan with the participation of its residents.It established a Municipal Strategic Planning Unit (MPU) that mirrored the structureof the MPU of the Upper Galilee. The major challenge for the Misgav region was Jewish–Bedouin co-existence, inasmuch as the Jewish settlements had been placed withina heavily populated Arab area. Ironically, as in the Upper Galilee case where kibbutzideological change was not on the agenda, the major regional challenge was side-stepped.A conscious decision was made by the Council leadership and planners to omit theBedouins from the Council’s participatory planning process. The rationale offered was tofacilitate discussion by avoiding controversy, and to develop a separate, non-participatoryplan for the Bedouins.



Participation of the Jewish residents was closely managed by government officials.Nearly 4 per cent of the region’s Jewish population of 7000 in 199512 participated invarious phases of the process: the initial brainstorming forum, working groups andgeneral informational meetings. However, participation was minimized or excluded fromsuch critical stages as problem definition and alternative choices for development. (Table 3is a schematic presentation of the process, indicating which project stages involved publicparticipation and which did not.) Instead, the Regional Council leadership and the MPUplanners decided on the goals of the Plan, selected the members of the public who wouldparticipate, and the stages at which participation would occur. The public was able tocritique plan components and programmes, but the officials and technocrats retained vetopower. Interviews with public participants indicated that some were considerablydisappointed with a process that they viewed as providing a ‘rubber stamp’ for the Plan,as well as with the results. Others felt that they did influence the process through theirability to make the final choice from the planning alternatives presented (Sternberg, 1997).

Planning for the Bedouin population, then approximately 3500, was treated separately,on the grounds that, with the exception of the village of Salamah, the rest livedin ‘encampments’ that were not ‘legally authorized’ settlements. The encampmentsaredistributedalong thebottomlandsand the lower slopesof twovalleys that rimpart of theperiphery of the Misgav Regional Council’s area. These areas provide grazing land forherds, and support tree crops such as olives, almonds and grapes. Poor road connections tothe Jewish communities of the region serve towiden the socio-political gap between the twopeoples. Those Bedouin who work outside their traditional grazing-farming habitats find

Figure 2. Misgav Regional Council and surrounds

500 D. F. Shmueli


Table

3.Strateg

icPlanningProcess:Misgav.12

2participan

ts,3.6%

ofad

ultJewishpopulation

Stage

Process

Product

Process

Participan

tsMethodology

1Dev

elopprocess

andwork

plan

Municipal

PlanningUnit

2PRESENTPROCESSAND

WORK

PLAN

STEERIN

GCOMMIT

TEE,

MISGAV

COUNCIL

SESSIO

N3

Cry

stal

liza

tion

ofP

lan

top

icth

emes

Bra

inst

orm

ing

Man

agem

ent

foru

man

dJe

wis

hre

side

nts

:1

2B

rain

stor

min

g

4N

eed

sas

sess

men

tan

dfu

ture

dev

elop

men

tst

rate

gie

sT

hem

atic

wor

kin

gg

rou

ps

Cou

nci

lem

plo

yees

,Je

wis

hre

sid

ents

,p

rofe

ssio

nal

s:2

9C

harr

ette

5C

hoic

eof

dem

ogra

phic

dev

elop

men

tst

rate

gy

Pu

blic

dis

cuss

ion

‘Mis

gav

20

00

’Je

wis

hre

sid

ents

:5

1C

omm

un

ity

mee

tin

g6

Inp

ut

wit

hre

gar

dto

Pla

ng

oals

and

obje

ctiv

esT

hem

atic

wor

kin

gg

rou

ps

Cou

nci

lem

plo

yees

,Je

wis

hre

sid

ents

,p

rofe

ssio

nal

sC

harr

ette

7Dev

elopmen

t,crystallizationan

dpresentationof

goalsan

dtargets

Steeringcommittee

8P

rior

itiz

ing

goa

lsan

dob

ject

ives

Th

emat

icw

orki

ng

gro

up

sC

oun

cil

emp

loye

es,

Jew

ish

resi

den

ts,

pro

fess

ion

als

Cha

rret

te

9Dev

elopmen

tofcomprehen

siveplanalternatives

Municipal

PlanningUnit

10EVALUATIO

NOFALTERNATIV

ES

COUNCIL

MANAGEMENTFORUM

11P

ubl

ich

eari

ng

:fe

edba

ckfr

omp

ubl

icJe

wis

hre

sid

ents

:3

0E

xh

ibit

ion

,p

ubl

ich

eari

ng

12STRATEGIC

PLAN

APPROVAL

STEERIN

GCOMMIT

TEE,

MISGAV

COUNCIL

SESSIO

N13

Dev

elopmen

tofpolicy

docu

men

tsbased

onthe

chosenalternative

Municipal

PlanningUnit

Norm

alfont¼

planningstag

e;CAPITALLETTERS

¼planningstag

eincludingparticipationofpublicrepresentative;

ital

ics¼

planningstag

ewithat-largepublic

participation

Sou

rce:(Sternberg,19

97,p.65

).



seasonal or full-time employment in nearby kibbutzim or in such urban centres as Carmieland metropolitan Haifa, but this does little to close the gap.

Since1995,five13of theBedouinencampmentshavebeengrouped intovillagesat thenorth-eastern edge of the region, togetherwith the pre-existing and largest one, Salamah,which hasa population of 2200. The fifth new village is on the south-western edge (Arner, 1996).

In the Plan for the Bedouins at that time, the little participation that took place wasprimarily lip-service, with outside planners preparing the outline scheme, and at mostexplaining to Bedouin representatives why the plan was in their best interest. The result ofplanning separately for the two sectors was to avoid the region’s major challenges, craftingmeasures that would enhance coexistence between Jews and Bedouins. This failure waskeenly felt when the Israeli Arab unrest that attended the outbreak of the Second Intifadain October 2000 hit the Misgav region particularly hard.

Analysis of the participatory process was undertaken in 1995, concurrently with that ofthe Upper Galilee case, using the same interview protocols. In Misgav, ten projectinitiators/organizers and 15 public participants were interviewed. Of the publicparticipants, 11 had participated in the working groups and four in the open forum.As with the Upper Galilee, the Misgav respondents were drawn from the four groupsTheir responses can be summarized as follows.

Expectations of the leadership (head of the Regional Council and director of the MPU)were met in that the process brought the public into the workings of the Regional Council.Their critique of the structure that they had designed had to do with mechanisms forparticipation. They were disappointed with the limited numbers of Jewish participants,but defended their decision to exclude the Bedouins, asserting that the latter were notready for a formal role in participation. Leadership was split on plan results, half feelingthat the participatory process influenced the plan and the others that it had no substantialimpact. Their reaction to the benefits of the process was uniformly enthusiastic.

Department Heads, whowere theWorking GroupOrganizers, reported that they had noexpectations as to what the process could offer—this was part of their jobs. Their critiqueof the structure had to do with the composition of the working groups, as over-loadedwith experts and insufficient numbers of the public. They too did not object to exclusion ofthe Bedouins. All were pleased with the process, although none felt that the participationhad changed the plan results. Some considered this an affirmation of their planningapproach, and others were disappointed that new ideas had not emerged.

Public participants in the Working Groups had a wide range of reactions, fromsatisfaction to disappointment. Public Forum participants, who lacked continuity in theprocess, liked what happened at the open meeting, but were disappointed with the lack ofopportunity for their further input and had no information on the results. Responses aredetailed in Table 4.


. Incomplete representation of interests: Bedouins excluded and failed to object;geographically targeted proportional representation among Jewish adults.

. Flexibility: agenda set by local officials, with flexibility only within discussions.

. Transparency only in those stages in which the public was included and with nofeedback on results.14

. Deliberation limited to stages programmed by decision makers.

. Little evidence of structured negotiations: project not designed for this purpose.

. Learning process and personal growth: a wide spectrum among all participants.

502 D. F. Shmueli


Table

4.Misgav

resp

onsesto

interviews

Leadersh

ip(Elected

Headof

Reg

ional

Council(RC)&

Directorof

MPU

WorkingGroupOrgan

izers(RC

Dep

artm

entHeads)

WorkingGroups:Public

Participan

tsPublicForum

Participan

ts

Expectations

To

instil

idea

amongst

publicthat

they,rather

than

the

lead

ers

and

professionals,

are

the

Regional

Council,

and

that

what

public

participan

tswan

taccomplish

edis

fortheben

efitoftheen

tire

community

Personal

satisfactionfrom

participation

Liked

what

hap

pen

edat

firstmeeting.

Disap

pointedwithlack

ofopportunityfor

further

input

Structure

Bed

ouin

communitiesnotincluded

inprocess

–‘notread

yforit’.Poor

publicity

inattractingJewish

participan

ts.Workinggroups

should

hav

ebeenmore

interdisciplinary

Needforpublicat-large,

tooman

yexperts.Participan

tswere

peo

ple

knownto

workinggroupheads

Discu

ssion

agen

da

flexible.From

fullparticipationto

‘lip-service’

Nocontinuitywithrest

ofprocess

Results

(Deliverab

les)

Forsome,Planresu

ltsinfluen

cedby

publicparticipan

ts,cu

lminating

inch

oiceofdev

elopmen

talternative,

forothers,nosu

bstan

tial

impacton

outcomeofPlan

Half

satisfi

ed

with

resu

lts,

felt

process

affirm

edtheir

planning

approach.Halffelt

that

no

new

ideasem

erged

,toomuch

focu

son

narrow

‘practical’issu

es

‘Our’

community

did

notben

efit,

buten

tire

regionmay

No

idea

whether

their

inputinto

the

process

was

effective.

Tried

toascertain

resu

lts

but

could

notget

answ

ers

Reactions

toStrateg

icParticipatory

Planning

Process

Initiators

gained

greater

understan

dingofpublicdesires

for

improved

workingproceduresan

dbetterunderstan

ding

ofcostsan

dben

efits

oflong-term

planningan

ddev

elopmen

t.Felt

that

residen

tsgained

better

understanding

of

Reg

ional

Council’sproblems

Led

them

toamore

comprehen

sive

persp

ective,

forw

ard-thinking

and

greater

work

ing

effectiveness

through

increa

sed

dep

artmen

tal

interactions.

Got

tobetter

know

thepublic

Ranged

from

afeeling

of

full

participationto

‘lip-service’.From

satisfaction

todisappointm

ent.

Stren

gthen

edstatus

and

position

ofCouncil.Participan

tsused

asa

rubber

stam

p



. No cultural translation of values: no effort to respect Bedouin values.

. No consensus or shared decision making.

. Future conflict not averted, as demonstrated later in the Intifada period.

On the Arnstein ladder, the Misgav experience for the Jewish population falls within thecategory of ‘tokenism’—information widely shared, citizen opinion solicited at discretepoints, and citizens did serve in working groups that had limited influence on theoutcome. There was no sharing or delegation of power in terms of decision making.Of the three planning alternatives developed by the planners and presented to the publicfor evaluation, the final plan was chosen by majority vote of the invited participants.Disappointment was particularly acute among those who felt limited by the parametersof their input.

A decade has passed since the strategic planning project was conducted. Now that mostof the Bedouins live in legally authorized villages within the Misgav Council, OutlineSchemes are being developed for the individual communities, and some participatoryideas picked up in the strategic planning process are being applied.

Exclusion of the Bedouin from the process reflected the concerns of the Jewishleadership and most participants over security, and their agreement with governmentalpolicies aimed at geographical containment of the Bedouin population. Councilleadership, having absorbed the lesson of this earlier Bedouin exclusion, are making aspecial effort to introduce the collaborative approach to planning, with a desire to gobeyond the participatory experience of 1995 to 1997. They have discoveredmajor obstaclesto introducing Western planning concepts to the Bedouin culture. Two cases illustratethese difficulties. When Arab-al-Naim, the poorest of the villages, received officialrecognition, it was allotted additional land by the Israel Land Authority. Mindful of theBedouin culture in which the key decision maker is the Sheikh, Regional Council plannersmet with the Sheikh of Arab-al-Naim, and suggested siting the village centre on the newlands to avoid private land taking. The Sheikh and his advisors decided that the centreshould remain on the original private lands, even though it would necessitate land taking.He and the planners were able to convince all but two of the families to contribute land.Their refusal has deadlocked all improvements and developments in the village for thepast three years. Losing patience, the Sheikh has recently requested that the RegionalCouncil resort to governmental re-parcelization (mandated exchange of lands) of thosetwo plots.

The second example takes place in Kamaneh, the most prosperous of the villages, whichis divided into three inter-connected neighbourhoods of rival sub-clans. The RegionalCouncil planners proposed that the villagers decide on the site of a much-needed school.Each sub-clan insisted that school be located within its neighbourhood, and the impasselasted for a number of years. At this point, the Regional Council abandoned the concept ofparticipation, and built the school in one of the neighbourhoods. Despite stormy protestson the first day and threats that no child from the other two neighbourhoods would beenrolled, all the children of Kamaneh are now in attendance and the school has flourishedto the extent that even outsiders have sought to attend.

While still not an integrated planning approach for the Jewish and Arab communities,the current process does attempt to compensate for the previous exclusion of the Bedouinsfrom the strategic Master Plan framework. However, the lack of simultaneouscomprehensive collaborative planning for all Misgav residents, Jewish and Arab, limitsthe impact of Bedouins on planning for the region as a whole. Moreover, as a consequenceof their disappointment with their prior experience, a number of Bedouin communities are

504 D. F. Shmueli


requesting to separate from the Misgav Regional Council and form a separate BedouinRegional Council.

An interview with Misgav’s current strategic planning head highlighted an additionalbarrier to successful participatory planning over and above the socio-cultural divide.This is the limited training and planning skills of most Israeli planners to facilitate andguide the participation process effectively.

The Alexander Watershed: Strategic Master Plan and Outline Schemes for Emek Hefer RegionalCouncil

The third case, theAlexander RiverWatershed and the EmekHefer Regional Council locatedwithin it, was selected because it was the first watershed to attempt to address itsenvironmental problems collaboratively, and seemedmost open to the participatory process.

The watershed of the 20-mile long Alexander River covers 550 km2. Its headwaters riseas an intermittent stream west of the West Bank City of Nablus and flow through theSamarian Upland past Tulkarm before dropping onto the northern part of the Sharon,Israel’s Central Coastal Plain. There it becomes a perennial stream entering theMediterranean at Michmoret. Emek Hefer (the Alexander Valley) forms the lower portionof the river along this part of the coastal plain, covering an area of 130 km2, or one-quarterof the total watershed (see Figure 1). Much of the valley’s western half had been a malaria-ridden swamp, formed by the stream. There it had been backed up as it cut through thehard kurkar ridge parallel to the coast. Sparsely populated by Arabs until the 1920s, theseswampy lands were purchased and reclaimed by Jewish pioneers in the 1930s. The Emekhas since developed into a flourishing, densely settled agricultural region, and the Councilpresently consists of 27 moshavim, nine kibbutzim and eight yeshuvim kehilatiyyim, witha combined population of approximately 30 000.The Alexander became highly pollutedfrom canals that carry urban, agricultural and industrial wastes to the point where it wasno longer free-flowing.

The case is important not only as an illustration of master planning for a regional councilwithin a metropolitan area, but also for its international significance. Because the streamrises in the Palestinian Territory, pollution abatement requires the co-operation of twopeoples locked in political and military conflict and subject to different sets of legalsystems. On the Israeli side, while watershed improvement is dependent economically onthe decisions of regional authorities, the environmental issues have a growing impacton the day-to-day lives of its inhabitants, who feel entitled to a direct voice in decisionsabout these issues. Moreover, national environmental NGOs could be expected toencourage participation. Until very recently, the current chaotic economic and politicalconditions stemming from the Intifada, the Palestinian Arab sector had neither thecapacity nor the will to participate in integrated planning efforts on the national level,although local interaction (Tulkarm-Emek Hefer) continued intermittently.

Part of the debate amongst the Council’s various settlements over Emek Hefer’sdevelopment plans is fanned by the desires of some of the veterans to cling to their rural,ideological roots that are so much a part of Zionist settlement traditions and mythology.What fuels the conflict is the heavy demand for residential, commercial and industrial realestate created by the northward spread of the Tel Aviv conurbation. This provides a strongtemptation for many of the settlements’ members to maximize the value of their landsthrough real estate development. The traditionalists among the residents seek to preservethe status quo. External support for their opposition to the Emek Hefer Restoration



development plans comes from the country’s main environmental lobbying group, theSociety for the Preservation of Nature in Israel (SPNI).

Two central problems have plagued the river for years: (1) development pressures in theopen space surrounding the stream which threaten its potential for leisure, recreation andagriculture; and (2) pollution from a variety of domestic, agricultural and industrialsources, including the West Bank Arab cities of Tulkarm and Nablus, and the Israeli Arabtowns at the eastern edge of Emek Hefer. Indeed, Tulkarm is the single largest polluter,mostly from household sewage and olive oil processing waste. Another importantpolluter is the Emek Hefer Industrial Zone located near the river’s outlet east ofMichmoret that has a mix of enterprises including agricultural processing plants, high-tech and biotech firms, and garage maintenance facilities.

Established in 1995 with a mandate to remove pollutants and restore landscapes andecosystems, the Alexander River Restoration Authority was charged with developing acomprehensive Master Plan that would define restoration policy for the river as it flowsthrough Emek Hefer. The Authority, which served as an expanded Steering Committee,consisted of 41 members, including 20 active representatives from national governmentalagencies, local communities, NGOs and residents. This does not include the West BankPalestinian representatives who were involved in the pollution mitigation planning. Theinitiating agencies, the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Jewish National Fund (JNF)and the Emek Hefer Regional Council, as well as the National Tourism Corporation andthe Sharon Drainage Authority, led the process and provided the financial support.Among the other members were representatives of such national stakeholders as the IsraelLand Authority, the National Park Service, the Water Authority, and SPNI. The SteeringCommittee held 12 meetings with representatives of the 20 settlements that adjoin thewaterway and would be most affected by the plan. During the process, the SteeringCommittee solicited input from an additional 125 stakeholders, and in November 1997,convened a forum of 230 people from 31 settlements to which it presented the plan.

The restoration was to be carried out through 135 projects located mainly along theriver, each of which was to be guided by a planning Outline Scheme. The projects wereto be confined to EmekHefer. Point source pollutions within the watershed but outside theregion, and particularly from Tulkarm were to be addressed in a separate planningmechanism, although in parallel and coordinated fashion.

Initial capital funding for the Emek Hefer projects was to be provided by the MOE andthe JNF. Future investments, as well as continuingmaintenance costs were to be supportedby taxes levied upon the real estate developments. The German Government committedfunding for a large sewerage treatment plant for Tulkarm, a collaborative project betweenTulkarm and Emek Hefer, which is to be sited on the Green Line.

With the outbreak of the Intifida in September 2000, plans for theWest Bank project wereshelved until very recently,15 although Israel did proceed to build a first stage, low-levelwaste purification system at Yad Hannah within the Green Line to contain some of thesewerage from Tulkarm and other West Bank pollution sources. Elsewhere, wastes fromdairy farms within Emek Hefer have been diverted from the stream into three largereservoirs, with the treated water then re-used for irrigating citrus and avocado groves(Rosenberg, 2004).

From the outset of the preparation of the Master Plan, the process was open to all theinterested stakeholders and the general public. The inevitable conflicts among seeminglyopposing interests such as ecology, flood control, economic development, tourism andlandscape preservation were to be reconciled within the framework of working groups,

506 D. F. Shmueli


meetings and interviews with residents. The aim of this approach was consensus building(Israel Ministry of Environment Bulletin, 2002).

The Alexander case differed from the previous two cases in that its structure wascollaborative and open ended, rather than prescriptive and sequential. Thus Emek Hefer’sparticipatory planning was marked by vigorous, interactive dialogue. However, thereality was that power relations were strongly hierarchical and enabled the chief initiators(the MOE, JNF and the Emek Hefer Regional Council) to set most of the project agenda.When the dialogue centred on general principles of the non-statutory Master Plan,consensus was easily reached. The Master Plan for Emek Hefer’s restoration wasapproved by all 17 of the Authority’s member agencies and the planning committees.However, intense opposition from within the Authority’s membership and from somecommunities built up against the detailed Outline Schemes (statutory) that had beensubsequently prepared between 1997 and 1999, and were prerequisites for the Plan to beaccorded legal status. Because of the serious dissension, the Outline Schemes, whichincluded zoning maps and guidelines, became mired in controversy and have yet to bepassed.

The major conflict involved the development of open spaces. Proponents (particularlythe Emek Hefer Regional Council and other project initiators) claimed that restoration ofthe river and its maintenance would be funded by future revenues from the proposed realestate projects. Opponents (including the environmental groups) rejected the scale of thedevelopments advanced in the Outline Schemes, arguing that their negativeenvironmental and ecological impacts will be irreversible.

The ultimate decisions were made by the initiators who were strong advocates ofdevelopment. Most of the participating stakeholders did not feel that they had gained agreater understanding of one another’s positions and interests, nor did the process fosterbetter working relations. The mistrust grew as the conflicts became clearer and betterdefined (Yona, 2003). The general public played an informational role, participatingthrough open meetings and sessions with planners, but having no direct impact upon thedecision-making process.

An evaluation of this case was initiated in 2003 when 11 interviews were undertaken.Of these, three were drawn from Leadership—the project initiators, five from variousGovernmental Stakeholders, and three from Community and NGO representatives.Table 5 summarizes the responses of the three groups. The interview format wasstructured, open-ended, uniform for all interviewees and designed to focus on thecollaborative elements (Yona, 2003).

The Leadership group was the most enthusiastic about the process and the results.Its expectations for wide participation were met, and it supports similar approaches forthe future. Consensual decisions regarding Master Plan goals were achieved, and whenthis proved unfeasible for the statutory, detailed Outline Schemes, Leadership reservedto itself the decision-making power.

Governmental stakeholders had similar expectations, but were less supportive of futurejoint participatory efforts. They considered the inability to get the statutory Outline Planspassed an indication that the process was an impediment to implementation.

The Community and NGO constituencies expected that what had been labelleda ‘consensus building process’ would lead to joint decision making with respect to theOutline plans. They are bitter about their lack of influence and power, and have no feelingof ownership on the agreements that have been reached. They consider that relationshipsamong stakeholders have worsened and are blocking implementation.



Table

5.Alexan

der

Watersh

edResponsesto

Interviews

Leadersh

ip:Project

Initiators

Governmen

talStakeh

oldersat

all

levels

Communityan

dNGO

Rep

resentatives

Expectations

Participatory

planningaccomplish

edParticipatory

planning

Jointdecisionmak

ing:not

achieved

Structure:Open

ness

Process

open

topublic

at-largean

dwidesp

ectrum

ofstak

eholders

Dialogue

Directdialoguebetweenstak

eholders,

positionsclearlyarticu

lated

Noexplorationofdifferences

amongstak

eholder

interests,no

trust-buildingefforts

Collab

orativedecisionmak

ing

Leadersh

ipdecides

based

on

inputfrom

participan

ts;Joint

decisionsan

dconsensu

sregarding

goal

defi

nitions.Lookingfor

jointdecisionmak

ingif

byconsensu

s

Jointgoal

defi

nitions

Jointgoal

defi

nitions.Very

limited

joint-decisionmak

ing,only

when

consensu

sachieved

on

broad

goals.Littleeffort

tobalan

cepower

differences

amongstak

eholdersat

the

table

Results(D

eliverab

les)

Direct

Qualityag

reem

entat

the

MasterPlanpolicy

level

(non-statutory)

Qualityag

reem

entat

the

MasterPlanpolicy

level

(non-statutory)

Qualityag

reem

entat

the

MasterPlanpolicy

level

(non-statutory)

Improvem

entofen

vironmen

talriver

quality

Improvem

entofen

vironmen

talriver

quality

Improvem

entofen

vironmen

talriver

quality

Nostatutory

detailedplans

Nostatutory

detailedplans

Nostatutory

detailedplans

Secondary

Someen

han

cemen

tofindividual

andorgan

izational

knowledge

Someen

han

cemen

tofindividual

andorgan

izational

knowledge

Nofeelingofownersh

ipNoag

reem

entonim

plemen

tation

Support

ofresu

lts

Support

ofresu

lts

Aworsen

ingofrelationsh

ips

amongstak

eholders

Support

forfuture

participatory

processes

Minim

alsu

pport

forfuture

jointactivitiesNoplans

forinstitutionalizingparticipation

Reactionsto

process

NA

.P

roce

ssst

ill

ongoi

ng

NA

.P

roce

ssst

ill

ongoi

ng

NA

.P

roce

ssst

ill

ongoi

ng

508 D. F. Shmueli



. Representation of interests: targeted to include all interested stakeholders, Israeli Jewsand Arabs, Palestinians (transboundary), community and NGO representatives, and thegeneral public. Intifada ends direct Palestinian Arab participation.

. Flexibility: wide-ranging discussion, but agenda set by initiators.

. Transparency throughout.

. Deliberative.

. Structured negotiations among stakeholders succeeded only partially.

. Learning and individual growth: impact of process on initiating agencies and otherstakeholders both positive and negative; process intensified negative relationshipsamongst stakeholders and between them and the initiating agencies; potential forprofessionals to incorporate collaborative techniques into future processes.

. Cultural translation of values: pre-Intifada co-operation between Tulkarm and EmekHefer led to agreement on mutual action. Infrequent, local contacts continued, until aninternational agreement was reached on 6 February 2005.

. Consensus building: strong for Master Plan; absent for Outline Schemes, no shareddecision making.

The collaborative process was flawed. As long as the issues on the agenda were generaland theoretical, consensus was reached. When the different stakeholder interests wereexposed, collaboration and shared decision making broke down, and stakeholderparticipants became alienated from the process as hierarchical power relationshipsdominated. In terms of Arnstein’s ladder, the expectation of ‘citizen control’ through‘partnership’ that was raised during the Master Planning process, collapsed for theOutline Schemes, again relegating this effort to the category of ‘tokenism’

While recent efforts to improve the water quality of the river have been successful, someof the Authority stakeholders continue to oppose the Outline Schemes designating thedevelopment of open spaces to support the water quality improvements. Many membersof the Steering Committee and the general public feel manipulated, and the negativeaspects of the participation processes endanger the positive outcomes that had beenachieved through collaboration during the Master Plan deliberations. This is a case inwhich the process design could not overcome the power inequalities, and there was nomechanism to aid in conflict management and resolution.

Conclusion

This paper endeavours to demonstrate the linkage between aspects of participatoryplanning theory and experience, and the impact of the Israeli setting on participatoryprocesses, as illustrated by the case studies. Although there was considerable publicinvolvement in all three cases, none of them provided the participatory framework thatenabled a combination of voice, transparency, or a balancing of power during actualnegotiations, in particular when it came to decision making. The cases demonstrate thatpublic involvement may be considered ‘participation’, but participation does not equate tocollaboration in, or even significant influence on decision making.

The foci of the master plans for Upper Galilee and Misgav were flawed from the outset.In the former case, the ideological crisis of the kibbutzim was not tackled directly, eventhough their ideology was so closely linked to their economic situations, includingregional planning efforts. In Misgav, the goal of improving interaction between Jewishsettlements and the Bedouin communities, without the direct participation of the



Bedouins, is an obvious failing, stemming from Israeli-Jewish security concerns andpower imbalance. This shortcoming was later recognized, and attempts are now beingmade to rectify the situation.

In the Alexander case, in which much broader inclusion and collaboration was invited,the let-down was particularly bitter. Only the Leadership group, which dominated theproceedings because of the hierarchical structure of the Regional Council, would supporta future participatory process—the actual ‘participants’ felt that relationships amongstakeholders had worsened.

The approach used in the Upper Galilee to participation in planning mirrored thecentralized, hierarchical political system in which power flows from the top. Whenimplemented within the socio-economic and ideological context of the kibbutz, in whichparticipation in governance is inherent, this anticipation increased the disappointment ofthe public, which judged that it had been manipulated. Nevertheless, many felt that theyhad learned from the experience andwould be better equipped to participate on a regionallevel in the future.

The Jewish residents had somewhat more participation in the Misgav case than inthe Upper Galilee case, as reflected in Tables 3 and 4. However, the case highlights thedifficulties in Israel of advocacy planning intended to level the playing field for minorities.The Arab minority in Israel has clearly been subject to discrimination in many ways, therationale often being that it is a potential ‘fifth column’. Although the strategic challengeof the region was Jewish-Arab co-existence, when the opportunity was presented toinclude the Bedouins in participatory planning, they were excluded. National policieshave long endeavoured to contract the territorial base of the Arabs and to expand thegeographical base of the Galilee Jewish population.

Since the Intifada in 2000, when Misgav was rocked by riots, the rebuilding ofrelationships and trust between Jewish and Arab neighbours has been slow and difficult.The Misgav Regional Council can no longer side-step the challenge of Jewish-Arabcoexistence. Ironically, the reaction to exclusion in the participatory process has led to anexpansion of social capital among the Bedouin to the extent that some are now demandingtheir own Regional Council. Today, when the Council seeks to engage the Bedouinpopulation in self-planning, participation is limited by cultural norms to villageleadership.

The Alexander case highlights collaborative participatory strategies, which are builtupon structured negotiations amongst stakeholders. In the Israeli setting, this approachwould seem to be consonant with the tradition of regional co-operation in the rural sector,such as the strong networks which, early on, bound the different ideological settlementmovements and the subsequent joint economic activities among villages. On the otherhand, the tradition of centralization of power in governance tends to work against thecollaborative approach.

The Alexander River Watershed case illustrates both the potential for, and obstaclesto, collaborative planning in Israel. The large numbers of concerned individuals andorganizations involved and the stated intentions of the initiators held promise of acollaborative outcome. On the Master Planning level, consensus on goals and widepolicy objectives was reached through stakeholder dialogue and negotiations. When thescale changed and policy had to be expressed in detailed Outline Schemes that affectindividual settlements directly, consensus broke down—‘the devil was in the details’.At this point, the project initiators, who held the political power, abandoned collaborationand developed the Outline Schemes themselves. With the deposit of these Schemes,

510 D. F. Shmueli


stakeholder participation was relegated to the statutory practice of ‘participation byobjection’, paralysing implementation.

One lesson of this experience is that it is critical to decide in advance both on the rules ofagreement, and conflict management and resolution mechanisms. Such agreementrequires that those who hold power be willing to share it with other stakeholders.

Because participation in Israeli planning is neither professionally entrenched normandated (save at the deposit stage), it is easily overridden by the most powerfulstakeholders. Planning policy makers and bureaucrats have, for the most part, regardedcollaboration, transparency and shared decision making as impediments to their existingrational, technical planning models. Thus they often pursue implementation of theplanning process in ways that pay only lip-service to the interests of many stakeholders.When the public becomes aware that its contribution is not seen as binding by either theplanners or decision makers, the credibility of the participatory planning process isundermined, leading to disappointment and cynicism.

The wide diversity in attitudes toward participation is illustrated by quotations fromdecision makers at the national level. Sophia El Dor, Director of Planning, Ministry ofHousing and Building offered the following in an interview:

Whenever [planners] have a plan, they must somehow influence publicopinion to help the politicians later on . . . I believe in citizen participation, andbelieve that even our process has a lot of citizen participation built in. But thatdoesn’t mean that every person who has a personal interest in a nationalproject, like a road, should decide where the national road will pass. Of coursehe doesn’t have the right means and tools to decide . . . The public usually doesnot foresee . . . processes . . . Wherever I go, [I attempt to shape public opinion]. . . There is always . . . the danger that professionals will manipulate publicopinion, yes, but there will always be another group of professionals to balanceit. It’s educating more than manipulating. (Forester et al., 2001, pp. 357–358)

A different view of participation is expressed by Dina Rachewsky, Director, Divisionof National and Regional Plans, Ministry of Interior:

The more you involve people, from different sectors, in the plan that you arepreparing, the better is your chance of getting it understood and voted for.I notice thatmanyplanners are afraid of involving people too early for fear that itwill disrupt the process . . .My answer is that if we are going to have opposition,let us know about it from the first minute . . . They were heard. They explainedthemselves.Maybe someof their explanationsmade sense andwehad to changesomething. Maybe, for some of the explanations, we didn’t because we decidedthat it was against the public good. (Forester et al., 2001, p. 334)

Most plan proposals today require some form of participation. This emphasis requiresthat planners be trained, not only in technical skills, but also be able to act as facilitatorsand net-workers in expediting the participatory process. Development and refinementof these skills is on the agenda for many Israeli planners. At the university level, inprogrammes which train new planners, the paradigm of ‘planner as facilitator ormediator’ must be developed, along-side the current curriculum focus of ‘planneras technical expert’.

The cases selected run the gamut from mechanistic participation to collaborativeplanning structures. Each demonstrates the importance of a rich understanding of thespecific local context, its history and dynamics. This emphasizes the importance, when



embarking on participatory processes, of identifying where obstacles can derail theprocess and inhibit a successful outcome. They should be instructive to the many Israeliprofessionals now exploring how to integrate participation into Master and Outline Planprocesses, and to others introducing participatory processes in situations of intenseconflict and/or where such governance practices are underdeveloped. While these casesare set in the Israeli culture and political climate, the issues of power, transparency,flexibility, objective standards, accountability and commitment to negotiating competinginterests transcend national boundaries.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Dafna Ben-BaruchSternberg and Ezra Yona. Thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers and editorPatsy Healey for their insightful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ ranges from low to high power: non-participation—manipulation,

therapy; degrees of tokenism—informing, consultation, placation; degrees of citizen power—partnership,

delegated power, citizen control.

2. For applications in planning, see for example, Churchman & Sadan, 2003; Dotson et al., 1989; Kaufman &

Duncan, 1989; Marshall and Ozawa, 2003; Susskind and Elliott, 1983; Susskind and Field, 1996.

3. This percentage refers to the Arab population within the internationally-recognized borders of Israel,

without the still occupied areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

4. The Construction and Housing Ministry has the largest budget for planning, therefore wielding planning

power. Ninety-three per cent of the land in Israel is public domain; that is, either property of the state, the

Jewish National Fund (JNF) or the Development Authority. The Israel Land Administration (ILA) is the

government agency responsible for managing this land that comprises 5 750 000 acres. ‘Ownership’ of real

estate in Israel usually means leasing rights from the ILA for 49 or 98 years.

5. While the authorities consider the deposit stage to be final, the law requires that, at this point, objections be

heard which potentially could result in changes to the plan.

6. Research is now in process on public objections to deposited plans and the number of cases in which these

objections have led to plan change or rejection. Preliminary results indicate high variability in the degree of

influence objections have on plans, but some do show indications of significance (R. Alterman, personal

conversation 25 January 2005).

7. Data for theMisgav andUpper Galilee case studies were drawn from aMasters’ thesis written by Dafna Ben-

Baruch Sternberg (1997), and for the Alexander River case from a Masters thesis by Ezra Yona (2003). The

two theses were conducted under the direction of the author. The framework for assessing the case studies

was developed by the author independently.

8. Charrette: a marathon-type session usually with the aim of completing some product, such as a draft plan,

by the end of the session. The power relationships among participants should be clearly laid out.

9. Delphi: a methodology based on questionnaires distributed to the public about their views and positions on

specific issues. The planners pose the questions and dictate the type of answers to be given (closed, open).

Information is bi-directional: planners to public and public to planners.

10. In fact, examining the process post facto was difficult because the Director of the Upper GalileeMPU insisted

that the information was confidential!

11. Of the kibbutzim and the moshav, some are already in the process of converting to community villages.

12. By 1996 the Jewish population had increased to 8500, or 70 per cent of the Regions total of 12 700

(Sternberg, 1997)

13. Four became recognized villages in 1995, one in 1999.

14. Unlike the Director of the Upper Galilee MPU, his Misgav counterpart was very open with all information

and data, feeling that the documentation of process and its results belonged in the public domain.

15. On 6 February 2005 the Mayor of Tulkarm and the Head of the Emek Hefer Regional Council agreed to

proceed with the West Bank Project. The event attracted full news coverage as the first public example of

renewed co-operation, with national and international sanction, between the two peoples.

512 D. F. Shmueli


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