Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom, Journal of the History of Philosophy

Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom

Horowitz, Maryanne Cline, 1945-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 9, Number 4, October1971, pp. 443-457 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University PressDOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.1214

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Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom

M A R Y A N N E CLINE HOROWITZ

THE IMPORTANCE OF PIERRE CHARRON (1541-1603) in the history of philosophy has come to historical attention in Eugene Rice's The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom 1 and in Richard Popkin's History oJ Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. 2 To Rice, "Pierre Charron's De la Sagesse is the most important Renaissance treatise on wisdom." 3 Traditionally, Pierre Charron has been viewed as a minor disciple of Michel de Montaigne and as a precursor to the much maligned libertins. Richard Popkin has revamped this interpretation. He sees Charron as a key disciple of Montaigne: the disciple who helped spread the master's Pyrrhonian scepticism to the libertins drudits. In analyzing Charron's scepticism from the perspective of De la Sagesse instead of from the perspective of Pyrrhonism, I find that Popkin has overemphasized the significance of Charron's Pyrrhonian arguments, and has neglected to point out that Charron's scepticism is severely limited by his theory of natural seeds of virtue and knowledge. My proof of this claim rests on my discovery of crucial textual changes from the 1601 edition to the 1604 edition of De la Sagesse. In his second edition Pierre Charron clarifies his rejection of the Aristotelian epistemological assumption of his so-called master Michel de Montaigne.

A basic assumption of Aristotelian epistemology is that the senses are the basis of knowledge: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu." The rational faculty cannot generalize except from discrete things known through the senses. Thus human knowledge is dependent upon the adequacy and natural functioning of the sense organs. 4 In his chapter "The natural senses" Charron raises doubts about the reliability and adequacy of man's senses. Various animals excel man in the acuteness of a particular sense organ. Is it not possible that a brute's perception of an object be closer to the truth than man's perception of it? A blind man can have no idea of the sense of sight. Might not mankind be unaware of a sixth sense

1 Eugene Rice, The Renaissance Idea o/ Wisdom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

Richard Popkin, History of Scepticism ]rom Erasmus to Descartes, revised edition (Netherlands: Van Gorcum Company, 1964).

3 Rice, p. 178. 4 Herschel Baker, The Dignity o/ Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947),

pp. 58-59, 279.

[443]

444 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

which, though missing, is necessary for the full knowledge of the workings of nature? Multiple examples of optical illusions and sense impressions distorted by the passions reveal that man is unable to distinguish reliable sense data from unreliable sense data. What man or beast then has the authority to judge? 5

Albert Desjardins, John Owen, Heinrich Teipel, J. B. Sabrir, and most recently Richard Popkin have quoted and referred to these arguments as an important basis of Charron's scepticism. 6 John Owen imputes to Charron the Aristotelian belief that the senses are the source of all knowledge, and then implies by reciting these arguments that Charron holds that certain knowledge is unattainable:

When he comes to treat the soul, its different powers and faculties, and the many irreconciliable opinions which have been held concerning it, his scepticism breaks forth in a quite unmistakeable form . . . . The senses are with Charron, as with other skeptics, the source of human knowledge, though of course such knowledge is imper- fect. 7

As shall be seen, Owen's argument is fallacious because his original assumption is incorrect: Charron attacks the Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge not as an Aristotelian but from the perspective of one outside the system. Richard Popkin interprets Charron in this way when he notes the necessary failure of Charron's early critics who merely restate the Aristotelian theory of the natural functioning of the senses. 8

Charron, according to Richard Popkin, attacks the Aristotelian theory from the perspective of Pyrrhonian scepticism. "The natural senses" plays a prepon- derant role in Popkin's proof that Charron is a Pyrrhonian sceptic: Charron borrows his arguments from Michel de Montaigne, who in turn borrows from the then new Latin translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines o f Pyrrhonism. 9 Popkin's emphasis on this particular set of arguments becomes particularly obvious in his short summary of Charron's scepticism in the article "Charron and Descartes: The Fruits of Systematic Doubt":

5 Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse, ed. Amaury Duval, 3 vols. (Paris, 1827), I. Ch. XI, pp. 84-93. This is a non-modernized second edition (1604) of De la Sagesse. At the bottom of the pages, Duval gives edition notes and quotes variant passages from the first edition (1601). Future references to Charron will refer to the 1604 text of this edition unless I indicate otherwise.

Albert Desjardins, Les Moralistes [rancais du seizi~me sikcle, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1870), pp. 346-348. John Owen, Skeptics o[ the French Renaissance (London, 1893), p. 577. Heinrich Tiepel, Zur Frage des Skeptizismus bei Pierre Charron, Inaugural dissertation at Frederick William University (Bonn: Elberfeld, 1912), pp. 29-30. J. B. Sabrir, De rhumanisme au rationalisme: Pierre Charron (1541-1603), l'homme, l'~euvre, l'influence (Paris: F. Allen, 1913), pp. 286-289. Richard Popkin, History o[ Scepticism, pp. 60-61. Richard Popkin, "Charron and Descartes: The Fruits of Systematic Doubt." lournal of Philosophy, LI (November, 1954), pp. 831-832.

r John Owen, p. 577. 8 Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 113, 121-131. 9 Popkin's view is evidenced by a comparison of Charron's Chapter XI, Volume I with:

Michel de Montaigne, L',4pologie de Raymond Sebond, critical edition of original text, annotated by Paul Porteau (Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1937), pp. 244-266; and Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans, and ed. R. G. Bury (London: William Heinemann Lt. D., 1933), pp. 25-93, particularly pp. 25-61.

P I E R R E C H A R R O N 445

To produce this doubt, Charron first attacks the Aristotelian theory of knowledge, by subjecting it to a Pyrrhonian barrage, and then, when this attack has been expanded to render all dogmas dubious, he presents a method to nettoyer l'esprit of all its prejudices�9 The arguments of Sextus Empiricus and Montaigne are marshaled to show the dubiousness of sense information and reasoning; to show the irrational behavior of the human soul; to show the lack of any criterion of human knowledge, etc. 1~

For Popkin, the dubiousness of the senses is the crux of the dubiousness of reasoning. This is seen in a parenthetical comment in the History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes: "Our rational faculties are also unreliable. (Most of Charron's case is made out against Aristotle's theory of knowledge, showing that if our reason has only sense information to work with, it is bound to be as unreliable as its source.)" 11 If though, as Popkin himself suggests, Charron is outside Aristotelian epistemology, then arguments for the invalidity of the senses is not proof in itself of the lack of potential in man for holding truths with certainty. I shall attempt to prove that Charron attacks Aristotelian epistemology not only from the perspective of negativistic Pyrrhonism, but also from the perspective of a theory of innate seeds of knowledge and virtue. This positive assertion is crucial to Charron's thought as a whole, for it supplies the basis of man's ability to know natural law, which provides man with a moral code on how to live. Charron's Pyrrhonism therefore needs to be put in proper perspective. Also, it is not enough to ignore Owen's interpretation of Charron's epistemology, for Charron himself presents contradictory statements on the role of the senses in the acquisition of knowledge.

Back in 1870 Albert Desjardins in Les Moralistes francais du seizi~me sikcle presented the contradiction by juxtaposing two passages:

All knowledge comes to us by the senses; these are our first masters, it begins by them and resolves in them; they are the beginning and the end of all. �9 . . not, according to Aristotle, by reception and acquisition coming from outside through the senses . . . . but by itself and without instruction, [l'esprit 12] imagines, understands, memorizes, reasons, and discusses. 13

The conclusion that satisfies Desjardins is that Charron is inconsistent and that whatever his principle at the moment, he always finds a way to lower man and to deny certitude, x4 In his belief that Charron is a sceptic, Desjardins gives more weight to the first passage and refuses to face the possibility that the second passage is a direct refutation of the first.

On checking the source and context of these quotes, I was surprised to find

10 Popkin, "Charron and Descartes," p. 832. 11 Popkin, History o[ Scepticism, p. 61. 12 I shall consistently not translate Charron's word l'esprit, which is usually translated

as "mind." The esprit is the highest faculty in man--its two main subdivisions are understanding and will�9 Later I shall show that in Charron's presentation of scepticism and of wisdom, will and understanding remain linked.

1, Desjardins, p. 347�9 Translation mine�9 14 Desjardins, p. 348�9


that in some editions of De la Sagesse the first passage contains an added phrase that implies just this: that the passage is to be later refuted. Furthermore, this divergence originates in a difference between the two original editions of the work. The passage in question is of particular importance as it is the beginning sentence of Charron's chapter "The natural senses," which as we have seen is often cited in proof of Charron's scepticism. In the first edition this chapter appears as Chapter XII and has as its full title "The natural senses, the most noble parts of the body." Desjardins correctly quotes from the first edition, differing only in the substitution of semicolons for colons. In the French of the 1601 Bordeaux edition, the passage reads:

Toute cognoissance s'achemine en nous par lessens; Ce sont nos premiers maistres: elle commence par eux & se resout en eux. Ils sont le commencement & la fin de tout. Il est impossible de reculer plus arriere . . . . as

In the "revised and augmented" 1604 edition, "The natural senses" occurs as Chapter XI rather than as Chapter XII, and a striking phrase is added to the beginning sentence. I am underlining this added phrase.

Toute cognoissance s'achemine en nous par lessens, ce dit en l'Eschole, mais n'est pas du tout vray, come se verra apres: Ce sont nos premiers maistres: eUe commence par eux, & se resout en eux: Ils sont le commencement & la fin de tout: I1 est impossible de reculer plus arriere . . . .

All knowledge comes to us through our senses, thus do they teach in the School but that is not all true, as will be seen later: they are our first masters: it begins through them, and resolves in them: They are the beginning and the end of all: It is impossible to go farther back . . . . 16

Leave out the underlined phrases and Charron appears to be epistemologically an Aristotelian. Then John Owen is correct: by Charron's exposition of the frailty and unreliability of the senses, Charron proves that certain knowledge is unattainable. Keep in the underlined phrases and Charron appears to be outside Aristotelian epistemology. He then may logically adhere to an alternative theory of knowledge.

Why have scholars not noted this textual change? The basic reason is that the 1607 edition of De la Sagesse promises the following: "For the satisfaction of the curious reader, there has been added at the end all which could have been cut out from earlier printings." a7 The text is the 1604 edition which has been softened to meet criticism, but at the back is a list of original statements from the first edition. This crucial passage is not mentioned in the list. as But perhaps this is

is Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse, 1st ed. (Bordeaux: Simon Millanges, 1601), p. 100. 1~ Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse, 2nd ed. (Paris: David Douceur, 1604), p. 69. Duval

edition, I, pp. 84-85, makes no essential changes. lr Pierre Charron, De Ia Sagesse, 3rd ed. (Paris: David Douceur, 1607), frontispiece: "En

laquelle, pour le contentement du curieux Lecteur. a estd adioustd h la fin tout ce qui pouuoit auoir estd retranchd aux precedentes impressions."

is Charron, 3rd ed., pp. 755-756.


justified as the edi tor L a Roche-Mai l l e t p romised to list passages cut out , not those added. There is another edit ion by La Roche-Mai l l e t in which the passages corrected or softened by Char ron are noted on the bo t tom of each page, ra ther than at the end. This is the edi t ion on which A m a u r y Duval bases his "cr i t ical edi t ion ," and this too lacks nota t ion of this par t i cu la r change. 19 Duvat , however, does include notes by the Monta igne scholar De Naigeon. De Naigeon does make note of this textual change. Unfor tunate ly , due to Duval ' s late discovery of De Naigeon ' s notes, they appea r at the end of the first vo lume of De la Sagesse ra ther than throughout the text as in the other two volumes. Perhaps this is the reason they have been slighted in attention�9

Moreover , De Naigeon, pursuing his s tudy of Char ron as an extension of his interest in Monta igne , is not able to evaluate p roper ly the significance of this textual change. He casual ly writes it off with s ta tement:

"Toute cognoissance s'achemine ~, nous par lessens: . . . mais n'est pas du tout (c'est- ~t-dire enti~rement) vrai." - - I n the Bordeaux edition, one does not find this reservation: I do not know why Charron has put it in; since he thought as did Montaigne on the origin of our knowledge, he ought to have said it as freely . . . . 20

Fi rs t of all, "mais n 'es t pas du tout vra i" is t ransla ted " i t is not a l together or entirely t rue" ra ther than more correct ly as "i t is not at all t rue." 21 Thus he belit t les this out r ight reversal of opinion to the status of a reservat ion or l imita t ion. Fur the rmore , ins tead of taking the reservat ion seriously, he casual ly says he does not know why Char ron put it in. Assuming that Char ron is the fai thful disciple of Miche l de Monta igne , De Naigeon provides Char ron with the excuse that he is hiding his true opinions.

But is it justified to assume that one wri ter is the disciple of another when he changes the meaning of a passage bor rowed direct ly f rom his so-cal led mentor?

�9 . . Now all knowledge comes to us through our senses: these are our masters . . . . Knowledge begins through them and resolves in them . . . . There is, the foundation and the principles of all the accumulation of our knowledge. And according to some, knowledge is nothing but sensation. Whoever can force me to contradict the senses holds me at the throat; he could not make me go back further. The senses are the beginning and the end of human knowledge . . . . If one attributes to them the least that one could, still it would be necessary to concede that by their road and interven- tion comes all our learning. 22

19 Charron, ed. Duval, xxii-xxiii and p. 84. 20 De Naigeon, "Notes ajout6es" in Duval edition of Charron, I, p. 449. Translation

mine. 21 See footnote 16. 22 Michel de Montaigne, L'Apologie, pp. 244-245: "Or toute cognoissance s'achemine

en nous par les sens: ce sont nos maistres . . . . La science commence par eux et se resout en eux . . . . Voylh le plan et les principes de tout le bastiment de nostre science. Et, selon aucuns science n'est autre chose que sentiment. Quiconque me peut pousser ~t contredire les sens, il me tient ~ la gorge, il me scauroit faire reculer plus arriere. Lessens sont le commencement et la fin de l'humaine cognoissance . . . . Qu'on leur attribue le moins qu'on pourra,

448 H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

In the first edi t ion of De la Sagesse Char ron copies words and phrases f rom this passage in Michel de Monta igne ' s L'Apologie de R a y m o n d Sebond. His only change is to omi t the quotes f rom Lucret ius , as I have done above, and to genera l ly abbrev ia te the thought . This is a perfect example of his discipleship. In the second edi t ion, however , he disputes his mas ter ' s thought b y the s ta tement "This is not at all true, as will be seen la ter ." Char ron is thus saying that it is not a t all t rue tha t all knowledge comes f rom our senses, and thus he may logical ly hold an al ternat ive theory of knowledge.

The passage to which "as will be seen la te r" refers presents just t h i s - - a n a l ternat ive theory of knowledge. The content and cross-reference (which I under- line) indicate to me that this is the la ter reference:

The most common opinion coming from Aristotle, is that l'esprit knows and understands by the ministry of the senses, that of itself it is like a clean, white paper, that nothing reaches it but what has passed through the senses, "there is nothing in the mind, that did not arrive there by the senses." But it is in the first place false; for, as all the sages have said, as it has been touched upon above, and referred to this place, the seeds of all sciences and virtues are naturally scattered and sown in our esprits, where they can live rich and joyous of their own stock; and provided that they are cultivated a little, they will grow fully in abundance. 23

Thus in the second edi t ion of De la Sagesse Pierre Char ron puts his Pyr rhonian bar rage on sense knowledge in proper perspective. Despi te the frai l ty and un- rel iabi l i ty of the senses, man ' s mind can know, unders tand, reason, and discuss. The senses are impor t an t in the beginning of knowledge, in the discovery and invent ion of things; for they make men aware of the external and accidenta l nature of things. L'espri t can get no help f rom the senses, however , for knowledge of the forms, essences, and natures of things or of the secrets of nature and non- mater ia l things. L'espri t for such knowledge has its own p r o v i s i o n s - - t h e na tura l seeds of al l sciences and virtues. 24 The above quote appears in a chap te r ent i t led " O n the inte l lectual and truly h u m a n facul ty ." There is no chapter with that t i t le in the first edit ion. By omit t ing the adject ive phrase " the most noble par t s of the b o d y " f rom the chapte r title "The na tura l senses, the mos t noble par ts of the b o d y "

tousjours faudra il leur donner cela, que par leur voye et entremise s'achemine toute nostre instruction."

23 Charron, ed. Duval, I, pp. 111-112: "La plus commune opinion venue d'Aristote, est que l'esprit cognoist et entend par le ministere des sens, que de soy il est comme une carte blanche et vuide, qu'il ne loy arrive rien qui ne soit pass6 par lessens, 'nil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu'. Mais elle est premierement fausse; car, comme tousles sages ont dict, ainsi qu'il a est6 touch6 cy-dessus, et renvoy6 en ce lieu, les semences de toutes sciences et vertus sont naturellement esparses et insinu6es en nos esprits, dont ils peuvent vivre riches et joyeux de leur propre; et pour peu qu'ils soyent cultiv6s, ils foisonnent et abondent fort."

Sabri6, De l'humanisme au rationalisme, p. 285, refers to this passage to show that Charron does not attribute to the senses the same importance that Aristotle did. Thus he puts the attack on sense knowledge in its proper perspective. I go beyond Sabri6 by pointing out the cross-references and the changes from the first to the second edition, and by interpreting the "seeds of knowledge and virtue" to be more important in Charron's thought than his scepticism.

~ Charron, ed. Duval, pp. 112-114.

P IE RRE CHARRON 449

and by adding a chapter title which stresses man's esprit and the functions of his brain as the particularly human endowment, Pierre Charron clearly renounces his earlier emphasis on the sensitive faculty as the source of human knowledge.

Following the customary scholarly procedure of considering an author's last edition to represent his final and authoritative views, one might conclude that Charron's Pyrrhonian awareness of the fallacies of the Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge goes hand in hand with a personal faith that God has bestowed on man the potentialities for knowledge. A problem that must be confronted, however, is that Charron might not be the author of these changes. The first edition he brought to the press himself, but the second edition passed at Charron's death into the hands of his friend, later eulogizer and editor, La Roche-Maillet. Is it not possible that La Roche-Maillet himself wrote the insertion "thus do they teach in the School, but that is not at all true, as will be seen later" and the "later" reference? How else might one explain La Roche-Maillers failure to note this textual change? In the list at the back of the 1607 edition, La Roche-Maillet notes a variant phrase in the paragraph directly preceding the chapter title "The natural senses." 25 Is it likely that he did not notice the title change, nor the striking addition to the first sentence? It is therefore conceivable that La Roche-Maillet, not Charron, made these changes, and then deliberately made the editing omission in order to hide the traces of his steps.

Without the original handwritten manuscripts, it would be difficult to prove for certain who is the author of these textual changes, and without such proof it is not possible to maintain that the second edition is more authoritative than the first. Therefore what I shall attempt to show is that even if we take the 1601 edition as the authoritative one, Charron rejects the Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge from a standpoint outside the Aristotelian system. Charron's belief in a theory of natural seeds of knowledge and virtue is clearly expressed in the first edition; the second edition only reorganizes and clarifies the ideas expressed in the first.

Charron's chapter "On the intellectual and truly human faculty," in which he asserts the natural potentialities of the human esprit, is according to Amaury Duval not in the first edition. Although there is no chapter with that title in the first edition, its basic content appears in the first edition in a chapter entitled "On the human soul in general." In fact, the chapter "On the intellectual and truly human faculty" follows paragraph by paragraph the middle section of the first edition chapter "On the human soul in general." The beginning and ending of this first edition chapter provide the material for the much expanded second edition chapter "On the soul in general." That is probably the reason why Amaury Duval places these two chapters together as variations of one another, and is misled into thinking "On the intellectual and truly human faculty" is a completely new chapter. A new critical edition of De la Sagesse would have to classify "On the soul in general" as the original chapter for two expanded chapters of the second edition.

25 Charron, 3rd ed., ed. La Roche-Maillet, pp. 755-766. Suspicion of La Roche-Maillet is supported by Alfred Soman, ~ Charron: A Revaluation," Biblioth~que d'Humanisme et Renaissance, XXXII/I (Jan. 1970), 57-79.


It is from this chapter in the first edition that Albert Desjardins draws his second quote (see footnote 13), the source of the conclusion that Charron is inconsistent. Giving the full reference from which Desjardins draws his quote, we shall see that in 1601 Charron had a fully developed plan of attack on the Aristotelian theory of sense knowledge:

The reasonable soul, not according to the opinion of Plato, by remembrance of what it knew before it entered the body, as if it were older than the body; nor according to Aristotle, by reception and acquisition coming from without by the senses, being of itself an open and blank card; but by itself and without instruction, it imagines, understands, retains, reasons, and discusses. And because this statement seems more difficult to believe of the reasonable soul than of the others [vegetative, sensitive souls both have provisions for their own functioning], it is proven first of all by the saying of the greatest philosophers, who all have said that the seeds of the great virtues and sciences have been scattered naturally in the soul . . . . 26

This passage uses many of the same words as the passage from the second edition quoted in note 23; and the overall meaning is clearly the same. This passage comes several chapters after the chapter on sense knowledge, and it refutes the initial statement "All knowledge comes to us through our senses." Charron most likely did not qualify this statement in the first edition in order first to attack the Aristotelian theory on its own assumptions (the assumptions of his contemporaries also) before attacking it from the standpoint of his own epistemology. The theory of natural seeds of virtue and knowledge is Charron's view, presented in both the first and second editions. La Roche-Maillet conceivably might have written in the lines "thus do they teach in the School, but that is not altogether true, as will be seen later" and the lines "as it has been touched upon above, and referred to this place"; but the theory of knowledge presented in refutation of the Aristotelian theory is Charron's own. The cross-references, whether written by Charron or by La Roche-Maillet, only serve to clarify the text.

The potentialities of the senses are therefore not of grave importance to Charron: what is important are the potentialities of the human esprit. The esprit, containing its own faculties of understanding, judgment, will, imagination, reason and others, is a very diverse and multi-purposeful faculty. In its search for truth, l'esprit may be hampered internally by the imperfections in the brain and by false reports of the senses and externally by the passions of public opinion. Charron's analysis of the external and internal causes of deception lead him to doubt that man will recognize truth when he finds it. 27 The esprit may think and reason

26 Charron, ed. Duval, I, 55-56 (1601 edition): "La raisonable [ame] de mesme, non selon l'opinion de Platon, par reminiscence de ce qu'elle sgavoit avant entrer au corps, comme si elle estoit plus aagfe que le corps; ny selon Aristote, par reception et acquisition venant de dehors par les sens, estant de soy une carte blanche et vuide: mais de soy et sans instruction, imagine, entend, retient, raisonne et discourt. Et pour ce que cette proposition semble plus difficile ~ croire de la raisonnable que des autres, elle se prouve premierement par le dire des plus grands philosophes, qui tous ont dict que les sernences des grandes vertus et sciences estoisent esparses naturellement en l'ame . . . . "

2r Charron, ed. Duval, I, pp. 115-135: J. B. Sabri6, De l'humanisme au rationalisrne, pp. 283-289.


errors as well as truths, and the greatest problem is that the esprit has no way to distinguish the two. Thus Charron concludes that "Men are born to search for the truth: possessing it belongs to a higher and greater power." 2s His humility and awe of truth lead him to write the assertion of the Academic sceptics on his door at Condom: "I do not know." 29

Charron's assertion of human ignorance is followed immediately by: "Who is the one in the world who has the right to command and give the law to the world, to subjugate the esprits, and give principles that are no longer examinable, that one cannot deny or doubt, but God the sole sovereign esprit and the true principle in the world, who alone is to be believed because he says something?" a0 Charron's philosophical position is not simply man cannot know, but man by human means alone cannot recognize truth. Charron does recognize that truth can come into man's esprit through divine revelation. Richard Popkin correctly assesses Charron's brand of religion as fideism--acceptance of revealed truth on faith. 31 As Popkin quotes Charron: "Since the effect of the method of doubt is the removal of all opinions, the practitioner cannot have the wrong opinions. The only views he might have are those which God chooses to impose upon him." a2 For Popkin, the importance of Charron's fideism is that it allows him to accept the doctrines of Catholicism on faith, and then in Les Trois Veritez to reason these doctrines from his faith. The concept of "fideism" thus provides the link between Charron's De la Sagesse and his work in defense of Catholicism, Les Trois Veritez. 33 Though valid, this interpretation takes Charron's scepticism and fideism out of its context in De la Sagesse. I shall attempt to prove that in this treatise on human wisdom, in distinction from divine wisdom, scepticism serves the purpose of cleansing the esprit for the reception of the truths of human morality. 34 The primary source of this revelation is nature. The dynamic center of De la Sagesse is Charron's fideist assertion of the existence in man of the natural seeds of virtue and knowledge and of the existence of natural law. Through these means, God has provided man with a way of knowing and adhering to the truths of morality.

De la Sagesse is by purpose and method a moral treatise. It purports to discuss human wisdom defined as "a right, beautiful and noble composition of the entire man, in his insides, his outsides, his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his movements . . . . ,, 35 The purpose of man is to be an excellently good man, and

28 Charron, I, p. 126: "Nous sommes nais h quester la veril~: la posseder appartient une plus haute et grande puissance."

~_9 Charron, II, p. 50: "Je ne s~ay." 3o Charron, II, p. 50: "Qui est celuy au monde qui aye droict de commander et donner

la loy au monde, s'assujettir les esprits, et donner des principles qui ne soyent plus examinables, que l'on ne puisse plus nier ou douter, que Dieu seul le souverain esprit et le vrai principe au monde, qui seul est h croire pource qu'il le dict?"

31 Popkin, History of Scepticism, xiv. A "fideist" is defined as one who takes religion on blind faith (a Catholic heresy) or one for whom faith comes prior to reason.

32 Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 61-62: Charron, II, pp. 53-54. ,s Popkin, History of Scepticism, pp. 59-60, 62-63. 34 Charron, I, Preface xxxvi-xxxviii. 35 Charron, I, Preface xlii: " . . . cette sagesse humaine est une droitture, belle et

noble composition de l'homme entier, en son dedans, son dehors, ses penstes, paroles, actions, et tous ses moavemens . . . . "


therefore the pursuit of truth is subordinate to this higher moral purpose. The man who has perfected himself in this manner is the preud'homme or "sage." 36 The second book of De la Sagesse is methodologically organized to prepare and guide the reader to become a wise man. First, man is taught to free his esprit from the errors and vices of the world and from the influence of his own passions. Chapter II, the "second disposition to wisdom," is entitled "Universal and full liberty of the esprit, as much in judgment as in will." 37 Herein Charron sets forth the principles of scepticism. Regrettably, most of Charron's commentators have ignored the second half of this chapter, and thus have failed to recognize the role the will plays in Charron's scepticism. The three main characteristics of the esprit --activity, agility, and universality--are properly fulfilled when the understanding and judgment are left at liberty to consider and examine all things. These same characteristics of the esprit can lead man down very dangerous and faulty paths if he allows his will to passionately attach itself to a particular opinion. 38 A man who believes he has found certain truth can be very dangerous: he may dog- matically set out to convince others of his truth; he may actively fight for his truth; or he may simply lead himself away from the good life by living according to the whims of his thoughts. To prevent such consequences, Charron gives three maxims for the proper conduct of the esprit: judge all things, tie oneself to no one opinion, and live universally and open to all new opinions. 39 The judgment is thus treed from the pursuit of particular truths and will is thus freed from adherence to superfluous or harmful truths in order that the esprit in judgment and in will might guide man in the conduct of the moral life. The scepticism of Chapter II prepares Charron's readers for the "first and fundamental part of wisdom," Chapter Ill .

Herein Charron guides the reader to discovering the internal source of wisdom --preud'homme. The following quotation, in which we find another reference to the "seeds of virtue," expresses the crux of Charron's thought:

�9 . . the doctrine of all sages imports that to live well, is to live according to nature � 9 "by taking nature as guide, you do not risk losing your way": --" the good is what is according to nature": --"all the vices are against nature": - -" i t is the same thing, to live happily and to live in accordance with nature," understanding by nature the

I am indebted to Eugene Rice's The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom for the view that Charron 's sagesse is primarily a moral virtue.

36 Charron interchangeably refers to the excellently good man as "le preud 'homme," 'Thomme de bien," or "le sage." The term "preud 'homme" particularly connotes the internal integrity from which wisdom flows.

3r Charron, II, p. 23: "Universelle et pleine libert~ de l'esprit, en jugement qu'en volont6."

38 Charron, I, pp. 120-122 and II, Ch. 1I, pp. 25-72. In stressing Charron's statements on the weaknesses of the will, I am rejecting the sharp dichotomy between intellect and will in Eugene Rice's interpretation of Charron's thought. Rice states on pp. 183-184: "Sharpening a common humanist tendency to skepticism in knowledge and Pelagianism in the moral life, he says that the intellect is weak and fickle, incapable of knowing any ultimate truth, while the will is potent, efficacious, and entirely in man's own control." This is a false dichotomy: in Charron 's thought the intellect and the will each have particular weaknesses and strengths. Scepticism derives as much from the quality of the will as from the quality of the intellect; the moral life depends on the intellect as well as on the will.

39 Charron, II, pp. 27, 44-45, 55.


equity and universal reason which lights in us, which contains and incubates in itself the seeds of aU virtue, probity, iustice . . . . 40

The source of wisdom is nature. "Nature" has multifarious meanings for Charron, but as he clarifies above, "nature," "universal reason," and "equity" are all the same. In another place Charron adds to these synonyms "universal law": " . . . nature, that is to say reason, first and universal law and light inspired by God, which shines in us." al Thus the "nature" man is to follow is God's "universal law," which is commonly called "natural law." Man's own nature is linked to natural law through the "seeds of all virtue, probity, justice." The view that the "seeds" are the seeds of natural law is supported by the following statement: "Here then is essential preud 'homme, rooted and fundamental, born in us by its own roots, by the seed of universal reason . . . . ,, 42 Thus in the important quotation above, "equity and universal reason" refers to the universal and eternal natural law while the "seeds of virtue, probity, justice" refer to the incorporation of natural law within a particular human being. The symbol of "light" also links the "seeds" to natural law, for in Charron's imagery the light of universal reason shines in man, incubating in itself the seeds of virtue. We may recall that this idea compares closely with that of the quotation in footnote 23, in which Charron declares that if the seeds of the virtues and sciences are cultivated a little, they will grow in abundance. The natural law and the seeds of virtue and knowledge provide a link between God and man. God has written the law of nature, which obliges man to be as he ought. He shines the light of natural law into man's esprit where it incubates and cultivates the seeds that are naturally there. Thus God's will or natural law is incorporated into man, and can guide him in the conduct of his life.

In the three important assertions of the seeds of virtue and knowledge, Charron supports his assertion not with proof but with the statement "as all the sages have said" (footnote 23), "it is proven first of all by the saying of the greatest philosophers" (footnote 26), and "the doctrine of all sages imports" (footnote 40). Who are these sages whose ideas Charron accepts so readily? The first sage I have found who uses an image of "seeds" approximating Charron's is Seneca. As Charron refers to Seneca several times during Book II, Chapter I I I and as several commentators on Charron have stressed his Stoicism, 43 I think that Seneca is the

~" Charron, II, pp. 86-87: " . . . la doctrine de tousles sages porte que bien vivre, c'est vivre selon nature, . . . 'naturam si sequaris ducem, nusquam aberrabis' l:--'bonum est quod secundi~m naturam':--'omnia vitia contr~t naturam sunt':--'idem beat~ vivere et secundfim naturam' 2, entendant par nature l'equit6 et la raison universelle qui luit en nous, qui contient et eouve en soy les semences de route vertu, probit6, justice... "

1 Cicero, De 01~ic., I, xxviii. z Seneca, Epist. Moral., cxviii --id. de Vita beata, cap. VIII. --id. Epist. cxxii.

41 Charron, I, Preface xliii: " . . . nature, c'est h dire la raison, premier et universelle loi et lumiere inspir~e de Dieu, qui esclaire en nous . . . . "

4~ Charron, II, p. 86: "Voyei done une preud'hommie essentielle, radicale et fondamen- tale, n6 en nous de ses propres racines, par la semence de la raison universelle... "

43 Paul Grendler, "Pierre Charron: Precursor to Hobbes," Review o[ Politics, XXV, 2 (1964), pp. 212-224. Eymard d'Angers Julien, "Le Stoicism en France dans la premiere

454 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

direct source for Charron's ideas of natural law and seeds of virtue and knowledge. These Stoic ideas, however, have a long history. They become incorporated into the Christian theology of medieval writers like Thomas Aquinas 44 long before they are self-consciously revived by men like Du Vair, neo-Stoics of the sixteenth cen- tury. 45 While the reading of Du Vair or Montaigne might have led Charron to Stoicism, the direct source he refers to and the original source for these ideas is Seneca. For example, in the selection above (footnote 40) Charron quotes directly from Cicero and from Seneca to support the view that following nature's guidance will lead man to the good life, the life of happiness. For the image of "seeds of all the sciences and virtues," Charron does not appear to quote any author directly. As Charron often refers to Seneca's Epistles and to De Beneficiis, I think it is proper to conclude that he does borrow the concept from passages like the following: "To return to the matter on which you desire information: ~How we first acquire the knowledge of that which is good and that which is honourable. ' Nature could not teach us this directly; she has given us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself," 46 Note that the knowledge attainable through the seeds is knowledge of good and evil, and that the seeds are not knowledge itself, but are the potential for knowledge. Seneca, then, is the first of the "great philosophers" Charron refers to as authorities for the existence of natural seeds of virtue and knowledge. Since natural law and the seeds are the crux of Charron's belief that man can become wise and since the Stoic Seneca is the original source for these linked ideas, I think that Charron's De la Sagesse is based primarily on Stoic, rather than Sceptic principles.

I t is significant that Charron links the words "virtue" and "sciences" in the phrase "seeds of all sciences and virtues," for wisdom depends on the assent of the understanding to moral truths and the inclination of the will towards virtue. Eugene Rice does not hold to this view, but interprets preud'homme to be based completely on the inclination of the will to virtue. 47 Rice might have been led to this interpretation by the fact that in Book II , Chapter I I I the seeds referred to are "seeds of virtue" and the will is mentioned very frequently. We may notice, however, that just as "libert6 de l 'esprit" or scepticism resides as much in judgment as in will, so also does preud'homme: " . . . preud'homme which resides and has its center in judgment and in wil/, that is to say in the soul, does not change." as And

moiti6 du xv~i e si~cle," Etudes Franciscaines. II, 6 (Aug., Dec. 1951), pp. 287-299 and 389-410. Rice, pp. 191-I97. Sabri6, pp. 272-276, 342-364.

44 I am grateful to Julius Weinberg, Vilas Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, for helping me to search out the medieval and ancient sources for Charron's concept of "seeds of virtue and knowledge." The following are examples of relevant pasages in Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae [Ottawa, Canada: Studii Generalis, 1941]): I-1I, qu. 27, art. III, obj. 4; I-II, qu. 63, art. 1-2; I-II, qu. 67, art. I.

45 L6ontine Zanta, La Renaissance du sto~cisme au XVl e si~cle (Paris: Edouard Champion, 1914).

46 Seneca, Epistulae Morales, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols. (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1925), III, pp. 380-383. "Nunc ergo ad id revertor, de quo desideras dici, quomodo ad nos prima boni honesfique notifia pervenerit. Hoc nos natura docere non potuit; semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam non dedit."

4r Rice, pp. 183-186. See footnote 38. as Charron, If, p. 78: "Or la vraie preud'hommie . . . sans s'arrester et alterer son pas


Charron does talk at great length on the universal reason or law of nature that gives man the dictates of proper conduct. By Charron's fideistic position, he holds that "it is necessary to let him [God] put and engrave what will be pleasing to him and nothing else." 49 Man, in a state of freedom of judgment and will, will let God imprint the law of nature on his rational faculties. As Chapter I I I is written to apply to those who have acquired libert~ de l'esprit and the fideist outlook, there is no necessity for Charron to say that man must first assent to natural law before following it. 5~ In the Seneca quote in footnote 46, Seneca talks precisely about "knowledge of that which is good." Therefore there is reason to believe that the "sciences" in Charron's "seeds of all sciences and virtues" cover the fields of moral knowledge.

Charron does distinguish between knowledge of morality and the willing of morality. In the chapter on will, Charron writes " . . . also it is necessary to say that the will in which lodges good and virtue, is the most excellent of all: and in fact by understanding and knowing the beautiful, good and honest things, man is not good nor bad, honest or dishonest; but by wanting and liking them: the understanding is to the will like husband to wife, guide and light to traveler; but in these here it cedes to the will." sl This passage clearly shows that knowledge of good and evil is not in the will but in the understanding; however, Charron does consider the knowing of good as easier than the willing of good. Rice then is mis- leading in his statement: "The power to know the truth with certainty and preci- sion is not in man's control; but the ability to distinguish good from e v i l . . , these are innate capabilities of the will." 52 In order to distinguish good and evil, man must have the divinely provided truths of morality. Particularly during times when the senses and passions deceive the will into seeking what is good only on super- ficial appearance, the will needs recourse to judgment and to the law of nature. 53

The need of knowledge of the law of nature, as well as the will to follow it, becomes particularly apparent in Charron's realization that nature is no longer a sufficient guide to rule man's conduct. In passages that are forerunners to Jean- Jacques Rousseau's Second Discourse, Charron explains the societal and human ills that now lead men to pursue ends other than virtue. Men have allowed their seeds of virtue to lie dormant. There is no longer common consent to the law of nature, for men hold highly divergent ethical principles. ~4 The fact that natural law can be ignored or disobeyed seems to indicate the need of assent to natural

et ses alleures pour le vent, le temps, les occasions, qui se changent, mais non pas elle, j'entens en jugement et en volont6, c'est-h-dire en l'ame, oO reside et a son siege la preud'hommie."

49 Charron, II, p. 55:"I1 le faut laisser mettre et graver ce qu'il luy plaira et non autre." ~0 Charron, II, p. 74. 51 Charron, I, p. 143: " . . . aussi faut-il dire que la volont6 ot~ loge la bont6 et vertu, est

la plus excellente de routes: et de faict pour enteudre et s(.avoir les belles, bonnes et hon- nestes choses, ou meschants et deshonnestes, l'homme n'est bonny meschant, honneste ny deshonneste; mais pour les vouloir et aymer: l'entendement a bien d'autres preeminences; car il est h la volont~ comme le mary ~t la femme, le guide et flameau au voyager; mais en celles icy il cede h la volont6."

52 Rice, p. 186. ~3 Charron, I, pp. 133, 148. ~4 Charron, II, pp. 90-94.


law before the willing of its content. Since man is no longer in his natural state, instruction as is found in De Ia Sagesse is necessary to mankind.

The instruction in De la Sagesse consists in moral and natural philosophy. The main emphasis is on moral philosophy, but natural philosophy is considered necessary on the basic premise that to know how to be an excellent man, one must know what it is to be a man. In Charron's discussion of education for children, he highly recommends these subject fields: "Those [sciences] that I recommend above all, and which serve for the end that I come from saying, are the natural and moral, which teach living and good living, nature and virtue, what we are and what we ought to be. Under the moral are included politics, economics, and history." 55 This recommendation of the study of particular "sciences" seems to contradict Eugene Rice's claim that Charron makes "science" and sagesse mutually exclusive. 56 Charron flatly declares that "science" is a way to attaining sagesse: "It is then a question, why knowing and wisdom hardly go together. There is a great reason for asking this question: for it is a strange case and against all reason that a man in order to be scholarly may no longer be wise: for 'science' is a road, a way and instrument proper to wisdom." 57 The quotes from Charron that Rice gives that indicate that wisdom and scholarship do not go together are factual statements on what usually happens. Charron does not want to be considered an enemy of learning, however. In the humanist tradition, he is suggesting a change in the educational curriculum. He seeks learning that is not distant from man but is useful and necessary to him, and he seeks teachers who are examples of good living to their students. Most important, learning must be directed to developing man's faculty of judgment rather than filling his memory. Moral and natural philosophy taught by a method designed to develop man's judgment and his will should help man become wise. Charron's first principle of instructing is " . . . it is to have much more, and all the principal care of exercising, cultivating and making well the natural and one's own, and less to amass and acquire the strange; more to care for wisdom than knowledge and art; more to form well the judgment, and by consequence the will and conscience, than to fill the memory and stuff the imagination." 5s Note that as the judgment is the master of the will, cultivating judgment will cultivate the will; the desire for the good is thus controlled ultimately by the judgment. The meaning of "the natural and one's own" is seen in another passage in which Charron suggests studying the moral philosophers: "It is not to

55 Charron III, p. 102: "Celles [sciences] que je recommande sur toutes, et qui servent ~t la fin que je viens de dire, sont les naturelles et morales, qui enseignent i~ vivre et bien vivre, la nature et la vertu, ce que nous sommes et ce que nous debvons estre Soubs la morale sont comprinses les politieques, oeconomiques, les histoires."

s6 Rice, pp. 180-183. ~7 Charron, III, p. 98" "C'est donc une question, d'o~ vient que s~avant et sage ne

se rencontrent guerres ensemble. I1 y a bien grande raison de faire cette question: car la science est un chemin, un moyen et instrument propre h la sagesse."

5s Charron, III, p. 85: " . . . c'est d'avoir beaucoup plus, et tout le principal soin d'exer- cer, eultiver et faire valoir le naturel et propre bien, et moins amasser et acquerir de l'estranger; plus tendre h la sagesse qu'~t la science et ~t l'art; plus 5 former bien le jugement, et par consequent la volont6 et la conscience, qu'~t remplir la memoire et reschauffer l'imagination."

P IE RRE CHARRON 457

enter or introduce a new, strange, or artificial preud'homme . . . . but it is in taking away the impediments, in order to rewake and relight this light almost extinguished and languishing, and to make revive his seeds almost stuffed out by the particular vice and bad temperament of the individual." 29 We may recall that in Charron's imagery "light" refers to the "light of universal reason" and the "seeds" to the "seeds of all sciences and virtues." Charron views his contemporaries as men who have let their seeds of virtue and knowledge lie dormant. In order to become wise, they must first purge themselves of the greatest evils by following the preparatory principles to wisdom. Thus restored to their natural order and harmony, they are ready to study the moral philosophers who can help man learn the content of natural law and the nature of the wise man, Thus "Science" may motivate and guide man to wisdom, but to be authentic, wisdom must flower forth from man's cultivated or re-cultivated seeds of virtue and knowledge.

Charron's entire moral treatise exemplifies his belief that the moral sphere of knowledge is knowable, and that he knows it. The truths of moral philosophy are contained in natural law. The existence of natural law Charron accepts on faith, and while his knowledge of natural law most obviously comes from his reading of the ancient Stoics, particularly Seneca, theoretically his knowledge of the content of natural law comes from the development of his seeds of virtue and knowledge. The crux of the book De la Sagesse is thus Charron's acceptance on faith of the to know and to will the God-given law of nature: thus the seeds of virtue and knowledge. This idea, although explicitly stated in only a few passages is the core, the root idea, the basic assumption on which the whole work is based. Ernest Cassirer as interpreted by Peter Gay "held that the critic begins the process of understanding a philosopher's work by searching for a dynamic center of thought. He must regard doctrines not as a series of discrete positions but as facets of a single point of view. The critic's equipment must therefore include the gift of empathy: he must sympathetically enter--indeed, relive--the thinker's world of ideas." 60 The natural seeds of virtue and knowledge provide man with the potential to know and to will the God-given law of nature: thus the seeds of virtue and knowledge are the dynamic center of De la Sagesse. The seeds of virtue and knowledge are the source of human wisdom.

Cornell University

69 Charron, II, pp. 96-97: " . . . Ce n'est pour enter ou introduire une nouvelle, estran- gets ou artificielle preud'hommie, . . .mais c'est en ostant les empeschemens, pour reveiller et rallumer cette lumiere presque esteinte et languissante, et faire revivre ses semences presque estouff6es par le vice particulier et mauvais temperament de l'individu."

60 Peter Gay, ed. and trans., The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by Ernst Cassirer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), Introduction, p. 22.

Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom, Journal of the History of Philosophy

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