Phronesis Volume 7 Issue 2 1962 [Doi 10.2307%2F4181705] Robert G. Hoerber -- Plato's Lesser Hippias

Plato's "Lesser Hippias"Author(s): Robert G. HoerberSource: Phronesis, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1962), pp. 121-131Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181705 .

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Plato's Lesser Hippi as

ROBERT G. HOERBER

A LTHOUGH THE two propositions of the Lesser Hippias - that the truthful individual is one and the same as the liar; and that a person who commits injustice voluntarily is superior to one who

does so unwillingly - might prove puzzling to readers unversed in Socratic dialectic, there should be no doubt concerning the genuineness of the treatise. Even the generally sceptical scholars of the nineteenth century, such as Stallbaum, Steinhart, and Socher, agreed to its authen- ticity. Ast and Schleiermacher are the only Platonists of that era who rejected the composition as spurious especially because of its sophistry. I

Scholars of the current century agree with the majority of previous Platonists in accepting the Lesser Hippias as a genuine work of Plato, no doubt because Aristotle cites the dialogue in no uncertain terms.2

Both the dramatic date and time of composition, however, are questions which cannot be resolved with any degree of certainty. The consensus of opinion is that the Lesser Hippias is an early work of Plato; possibly the brevity of the treatise and the absence of metaphysical concepts have pointed Platonists in that direction. 3 Since absolute proof, or even concrete evidence, to the contrary are lacking, we may assume that the consensus of scholars is probably correct. Only two Platonists have risked an opinion on the dramatic date of the dialogue - and that

I Cf. George Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates (London 187S) I 387-8, for references to the scholars of the previous century. Even W. Lutoslawski seems to accept the Lesser Hippias, omitting it from his study merely because it is so brief and because he feels it is of no importance in the area of logic; cf. The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic (London 1905) 75, 194.

2 Metaphysica 1025a6-9: "Hence, the argument in the Hippias that the same man is false and true is misleading. For it takes him to be fasle who is able to speak falsely, though he is discerning and intelligent, and takes him to be better who is consciously false" (Richard Hope's translation). 3 Cf. Paul Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago 1957) SS; F. M. Cornford, Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge 1933) VI 3 I; Hans Raeder, Platons Philosophische Entwickelung (Leipzig i905) 57; George Grote, op. cit. (above, note I) 1 388. Wilamowitz assumes the date of the composition to be prior to 399 B.C.: "Aber ein unvorbereiteter Leser musste sagen, Sokrates vertritt im Gegensatze zu Hippias die Unsittlichkeit, and so viel sollte jeder einsehen, dass kein Sokratiker nach dem Urteil des Gerichts den- jenigen so etwas sagen lassen konnte, der als Verfuhrer der Jugend verurteilt war"; cf. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Platon: Sein Leben und seine Werke (Berlin 1 959) 10 3.

1 2 I



merely by implication; for their statements concern the dramatic date of the Greater Hippias, which may or may not implicate the Lesser Hippias. According to Wilamowitz, "Hippias spricht von seinen Besuchen in Sparta; von denen konnte nach dem Kriege von 402/i nicht mehr die Rede sein. Aber das geht nur die in Wahrheit ganz gleichgultige Zeit des fingierten Gespraches an."' A. E. Taylor states: "The presence of Hippias at Athens implies that the time is one of peace, and, as the first visit of Gorgias to the city is referred to as a past event (282b), the supposed date must be after 427 B.C., and therefore during the years of the peace of Nicias. "2 Granted that the scenes of both compositions called after Hippias took place on his same visit to Athens,3 the evidence adduced by both Taylor and Wilamowitz is so slight that the question of dramatic date is better left open, with the assumption that it possibly is sometime during the last twenty years of Socrates' life. The appearance of Hippias in the Protagoras adds little light, since the dramatic date of the Protagoras cannot be established with certainty;4 and, furthermore, there is no necessity to assume that the scenes of these two treatises (Hippias Minor and Protagoras) occurred during the same visit of Hippias.

The general tenets and accomplishments of the fifth-century sophist Hippias are well-known to students of Greek history: his stress on arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; his support of nature over against human legislation; the discovery of a new curve, the "quadratrix," to assist in the trisection of an angle and the squaring of a circle; the interest in the elements of speech, letters, syllables, rhythm, and harmony; a self-sufficiency in the crafts, by which he once brought to Olympia only the things he himself had made - a ring, a seal, an oil-can and scraper, shoes, tunic, cloak, and an elaborate Persian girdle; a compilation of a chronological list of victors in the Olympic games; an intimate acquaintance with Homer and other poets; a proficiency in the composition of epic, tragedy, dithyramb, and oratory - which has accredited Hippias with a number of treatises, almost completely extinct:

I Op. cit. (previous note) IOI.

2 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work (London 1949) 29.

3 Such a situation seems likely in view of the parallel references to Eudicus, son of Ape- mantus, and to Nestor; cf. Greater Hippias 286b and Lesser Hippias 363a-c, 364c-e,

373a-c. 4 Cf. Kathleen Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers /Oxford I949) 343-4. R. Hackforth is entirely too dogmatic in his statement: "... and the date of this [i.e. the Protagoras] must be 433-432 at latest' (Plato's Phaedrus [Cambridge 1952] 8).

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"Trojan Speech," "Collection," "Nomenclature of Tribes;" his knowledge of "archaeological" lore; his skill in mnemonics.'

The attainments of Hippias have resulted in his appearance in three of Plato's compositions2 and in references to him in two other treatises.3 Xenophon4 also records a conversation between Socrates and Hippias on the question of legislation, in which Hippias is compelled to agree that no distinction exists between justice and law. A modern commen- tator attempts to link Hippias with several additional pieces from ancient literature: the Anonymus Jamblichi; Thycydides 3.84; the Prooemium to Theophrastus' Characters; the Dissoi Logoi; and the philosophical digression in Plato's Seventh Letter (342a-343d).5 It seems much more certain to ascribe to Hippias of Elis the emendations in the accentuation of Homer which Aristotle accredits to Hippias of Thasos, no doubt by confusion.6

I Cf. Plato, Protagoras 3'8d-e, 337C-338a; Lesser Hippias 368b-d; Greater Hippias 28 sb-286b; Kathleen Freeman, op. cit. (previous note) 38I-9 1; Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (New York i 95) 1o2-4; J. B. Bury, Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge 1940)V 380; Philostratus, Vitae Sophistarum i. ii; Pausanias E. 2E. 4. 2 Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias (in which he and Socrates carry on practically the complete discussion), and Protagoras (in which Hippias plays a minor role, acting as mediator between Socrates and Protagoras [337c-338a], and in which Protagoras gibes at Hippias' stress of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music [3 i 8d-e]). The auther- city of the Greater Hippias is a question not pertinent to the present discussion. 3 The Apology (I ge-20a) contains merely a reference to Hippias, Gorgias, and Prodicus, who claim ability to teach the youth. In the Phaedrus (267b) Hippias again is merely mentioned, as agreeing with Prodicus on the appropriate length of a speech. 4 Memorabilia 4.4 5-25. Xenophon's conversation seems to have been suggested by the Greater Hippias. Both have a similar opening: 8Lx Xp6vou yocp &aLx6[ievoq o 'I7rtrLoc 'AO'vxo,e ... (Xen.) is parallel to eg 8ta xpovou F?Zv xarr pacq et -r& 'AO'vcxc. (Plato); also both discussions refer to the laws of Sparta and to the imperfection of human legislation (Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.4. 14-16; Plato, Greater Hippias 283-5). Xenophon also calls attention to Hippias as Callias' teacher in the art of mnemonics (Symposium 4.62).

s Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists (New York 1954) 273-303. W. H. S. Jones, furthermore, suggests Hippias as the author of the essay De Arte in the Hippocratic collection (Hippocrates [Loeb edition] vol. 1I); while C. E. Periphanakis assumes that Hippias is the -ratpoq in Plato's Minos (Les Sophistes et le Droit [Athens 19531 3S). For additional recent

literature on Hippias see Classical Weekly 47 (xg3-4) i8i ; 5o (I956-7) i8o. The most

recent volume on the Lesser Hippias is G. Calogero, Platone: L'Ippia Minore (Firenze I 948). Prof. Calogero refers to the work of George Smith, Platonis Ion et Hippias Minor (London 1895), but not to B. J. H. Ovink, Philosophische Erkldrung der platonische Dialoge Meno und Hippias Minor (Amsterdam 193 i). None of these commentaries consider the dramatic techniques in the Lesser Hippias. 6 Poetica 146ia21-23. Cf. K. Freeman, op. cit. (above, 122 note 4) 383-4; Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford 1948) I44. The only thing known of Hippias of Thasos is

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On the basis of the ancient evidence, then, and apart from recent attempts to associate Hippias of Elis with doubtful portions of Greek literature, the key characteristic of Hippias is that of a most versatile polymath.' Such a polymath was a figure of ridicule to the Greeks. The Greek reader would recall the comic personality of Margites, who "knew many things, but knew them all badly. "z Also Heracleitus3 expresses the ridicule of excessive versatility: 7r0XU[GC6UJ voov o1: 8L8kcaxzt.

Plato's position concerning a polymath is clear from several statements: Ho?U'XOOL yap aoL YEVOfLEVOL &VeU 8MCXX7q 70XUYV4L0Veq EtVXL 80'OUaLV,

&yvCxLOVC , Ws E TO 7r,Oo 6VTeq, xcL XoXC)to'L alvelva.L, 80~6aoPoL yeyov6eg CV'L aocp7v. (Phaedrus 2 7 5a-b)

?t 8' o{h& ToUT' 9xcL, xWV8uv6v ( ?t vLt ev pouav rTOLq 7XtocLV 7tO?V0L-

Otocv. (Laws 8 i i b)

oU2a1105ov yap 8ELOV ou8ue MpoappoV &LpLE T(V 7nrVT(V 28' oLyvaTOV xXx6v, &kX' 7ro 7trcLpla XcxL =XupXOLo 0.e-T& xoxX &yonyig yEYVVtat 7to0Xt TOU1T:V

,ut4cov 4n,Aa. (Laws 8 i ga) To Plato excessive versatility is conducive to confusion. It is no

wonder, then, that in the Lesser Hippias, which portrays Hippias as a polymath (368b-d), one of the main threads which runs throughout the treatise is confusion. Not only does the dialogue end in confusion, but Plato has Socrates twice pretend confusion (372d-e, 376b-c). Already in the introductory pages Socrates admits confusion concerning the meaning of 7roX&rpo7roq, as ascribed to Odysseus (364a). It is the adjective Homer employs to describe Odysseus in the first line of the Odyssey,

that he was put to death by the Thirty Tyrants (Lysias I 3. S4); while Plato specifically mentions the proficiency of Hippias of Elis in literature, harmony, rhythm, and syllables (Lesser Hippias 368c-d). I Cf. Cicero, De Oratore 3.32: "Hic Catulus 'di immortales,' inquit 'quantam rerum varietatem, quantam vim, quantam copiam, Crasse, complexus es quantisque ex an- gustiis oratorem educere ausus es et in maiorum suorum regno conlocare! Namque illos veteres doctores auctoresque dicendi nullum genus disputationis a se alienum putasse accepimus semperque esse in omni orationis ratione versatos; ex quibus Elius Hippias, cum Olympiam venisset maxima illa quinquennali celebritate ludorum, gloriatus est cuncta paene aundiente Graecia nihil esse ulla in arte r erum omnium quod ipse nesciret; nec solum has artis, quibus liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarum cognitionem et poetarum atque illa, quae de naturis rerum, quae de hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur, se tenere sed anulum, quem haberet, pallium, quo amictus, soccos, quibus indutus esset, Isel sua manu confecisse. . . "

2 Plato, Alcibiades 11 147c. For other references to Margites see T. W. Allen, Homeri Opera (Oxford i9i i) V 152-9.

3 Fragment 4o, cited by Diogenes Laertius 9. '.

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where it no doubt means "much-travelled," "much-wandering.", The adjective, however, may be ambiguous, in that it appears in Greek literature also in the sense of "crafty," "shifty," "clever," "versatile." It is the latter meaning which the versatile Hippias assumes for =oXi- 'rponoq, by equating 7oX&rpo7toq with 4eua'q (36sb).

Accepting Hippias' interpretation of the adjective, Socrates im- mediately adds to the confusion both by confused logic and by confused terminology. He first equates 7toX6Ctpo07oL and +?uadq with auvaroE; he then leads Hippias to admit that they are 8uvocoit U'n 7cxvoupytoc; xL 9povMae4 orLV04 (not Ui7r0 )LOL6rrfTOc xaC Ocppoavr)); Hippias finally agrees to the illogical conclusion that 7roXU?po7COL and feuadq are parallel to (pp6vL[LOL and aocpot (365d-e).2 In brief, the confused terminology which equates pp6vvqcrtq and 7ravoupyxa, is the basis of the illogical conclusion, paralleling euaceLq with ao9oL. The false reasoning is too apparent for additional comment, except to note that a similar instance of confused terminology appears later in the apparent paralleling of aocpEcc with 7tavoupylo (3 6 8e).

The confused premises, to which Hippias has agreed, prepare the

I It appear also in Odyssey 10.330. Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon thus interprets 7roX&rpo7ro in both of these passages of the Odyssey. The question which this word has raised through the years may be noted in citations from two Platonists: "Es [i.e. the word 7roXTrpoTroqj hat sogar schon vor Platon zu einer Anderung des Lesart gefiihrt, vgl. Berliner Klassikertexte V (V/I, s. 29.) I, S. 29. Wenn Antisthenes in den Scholien zu dem Verse sich mit der Erklarung abmaht, so zeigt seine Beziehung auf dieselben Homerstellen und auch die Heranziehung des weisen Nestor, dass er den Platon (364c) vor Augen hat" (Wilamowitz, op. cit. [above, 1 2 i note 31 1 o2); "Dummler (Kleine Schriften I, S. 3 5 ff.) meint nachgewiesen zu haben, dass sowohl der Ion als der Hip- pias minor Angriffe auf Antisthenes enthalten. In derTat steht aber Platon in diesen Dialogen noch seinem Mitschuler recht nahe, was gerade aus denvon Dummler zitiertenStellen deut- lich hervorgeht. Wir sehen ja aus Xenophons Symposion 3,6 und 4,6-7, Stellen, die nahe Beziehungen zum platonischen Ion haben, dass Antisthenes genau wie Platon die Rhap- soden in hohem Grade geringschatzte, und ebenso zeigt auch die von dem Scholiasten zur Odyssee x i als antisthenisch bezeugte Erklarung des Wortes TroX&ropoT0q als einer Bezeichnung mehr fur die Redegewandheit (aocpo) als fur die Schlechtigkeit (wovjplz) des Odysseus einen Gedankengang, der mit dem Hippias minor recht gut ubereinstimmt (vgl. K. Joel, Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates I, S. 404). Der Streit zwischen Platon und Antisthenes fing erst spater an" (H. Raeder, op. cit. [above, 2 i note 31 96). 2 Plato seems to give a dramatic clue that %To&rpo7roL and aopoi are not identical terms when he has Hippias distinguish between three Homeric heroes (364c):

qp-%tl y&p "'O,uxnpov Tre otnxkvxc &pta-rov adv WvSpo 'AXLX)kXz -r7v eE Tpotlv X&ptxOLkVC0v,

aoWrmt-rov 8 Nia-opz, noXurpo7rw rov 8i 'Ou:aFax. The introduction of Nestor appears to serve such a principal purpose; Nestor, moreover, was apparently one of Hippias' favorite characters (cf. Greater Hippias 2 86b).

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way for the first of the perplexing propositions of the dialogue - that the truthful individual is one and the same as the liar. For on the basis of the admission that the essential attribute of both the true person and the deceiver is ability (8uvmroo), it is relatively easy to "prove" to Hippias that the same person is best able to give either a correct answer or a false reply in matters of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (366a-368a). After an interlude, reviewing Hippias' versatility in the various crafts, literary arts, musical theory, and mnemonics, Socrates again challenges Hippias to disprove the current conclusion; but Hippias is so confused that he, the specialist in mnemonics, experiences a lapse of memory, and Socrates is forced to remind him that the current argument would make Odysseus (as well as Achilles) both a liar and a truthful person (368b-369b).

The second half of the dialogue continues the confusion, leading to another perplexing proposition - that a person who commits injustice voluntarily is superior to one who does so unwillingly. Socrates cites conflicting statements of Achilles which seem to indicate that Hippias' hero was confused concerning his plans for departure from the Greek army (37oa-37ic).' Hippias' attempt to explain the apparent confusion of Achilles involves confused terminology; for first, in contrasting &xsW and excov, he parallels ex?v with eK inltOuhg (by plan, plot, treachery), and later he employs the phrase i'A ei)vo(gq (through goodwill) as if equal to &x&w (3 7oe, 3 7 I e). Also Hippias' appeal to the laws might strike a contemporary reader as odd (372a), for Hippias' preference for nature as opposed to law was well-known; he must be confused to appeal to a standard he professed to be secondary. But after a lengthy discourse by Socrates (admitting erstwhile confusion) and a special appeal by Eudicus, Hippias is willing to continue the discussion (372b-373c). The final few pages, which propose that voluntary error is superior to involuntary mistake, present additional confusion by making no apparent distinction between rexvaL and IntLrrX.a= (37Sb8-ci) and by contrasting 8Uvoc,ut and eta-unl (37sd-e)2 - although the entire argumentation of the

I The citations are from the Iliad - 9.3 12-3; 9.357-63; i1.69-7 ; 9.65o-s. 2 The joining of uva,l?tc with rkXvvi (376a3) is another instance of loose terminology; for occurring in the same context in which there is a distinction between 86VOqLL4 e

7rat4aAr, this juxtaposition might give the impression that ktar+.pc and 'rXv-n are synonymous. Previously Socrates (368bi-2) had indicated a distinction between ntrtIrr[AOt (referring to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, which he just had discussed) and

'Exvo (comprising the crafts of Hippias, which Socrates is about to mention); but Socrates' distinction in terminology apparently made no impression on Hippias, and the two terms occur later (37sb8-ci) without any distinction being noted. Although Hippias

I26



treatise began from the premise that 8uvovoE and aocpot are identical (36sd-e). And so Plato completes the full circle of confusion, with Socrates in his final statement again admitting confusion (376b-c).

It is tempting to see a clue of confusion also in the use of the various comparatives for &yoM6q throughout the treatise. Hippias supports the claim of Eudicus' father that Achilles is O'tsLvcv than Odysseus. This comparative both Socrates and Hippias employ consistently throughout the first portion of the dialogue, with one exception - in referring to his personal accomplishments in non-physical contests at Olympia Hippias substitutes the comparative xpet'r'rv, which generally has physical connotation (364a). This is the only time the entire composition employs the comparative xpe'rL'cov, and it definitely appears out of place. In the latter portion of the discussion Socrates introduces the comparative

PEXT(v (37ie), which generally has moral connotation; and in the remainder of the discourse the two comparatives, &X.?Lev&v and PX'dE&v, are used interchangeably as if there were no distinction in connotation. The frequent interchange between &uLLvcWv and PXTVcv in the latter part of the dialogue seems to be more than merely coincidental; the variation of terms could be a clue both to the confusion which permeates the dialogue and to a possible solution of the perplexing propositions.'

fails to see the point, Plato makes it clear to the reader by emphasizing 17rroJCL

(e.g. mathematics and astronomy) in the first portion of the composition, and TryXVxL (e.g. physical skills and crafts) in the latter portion. I A brief list will illustrate the point; "S' and "H" indicate respectively Socrates or Hippias as the speaker:

&4LE1vv 363b3-4 (S), 363cI (S)

xptdr-rOv 364a8-9 (H)

&[Lelvwv 364b4 (S), 367c8 (S), 369c4 (H), 369C7 (H), 369c8 (H), 37od7 (S),

370e2 (S), 371C4 (S)

PEXTI(Ov 37ie8 (S), 372aI (H), 372d7 (S), 372e3 (S) IcLeIVG)V 373c7 (S), 373d6 (S), 374.a2 (S)

PcX'rtLV 374a6 (S), 37427 (S), 374b2 (S), 374b5 (S), 374c3 (S), 374d6 (S), 374e3 (S), 374Ce (S)

&4LEi)v 37sa2 (S), 375a3 (S), 37Sa4 (S), 375a8 (S), 375b2 (S), 37sb6 (S), 375b7 (H), 375cl (S), 37Sc6 (S)

?C)Ti6V 37sc7 (S), 37Edi (S), 375d4 (S), 37Se3 (S) &.EVO)v 37Se9 (S), 376a6 (S)

By distinguishing between &etvcov and Pek?ricv, a reader might suspect that one who errs willingly may be ,Le1vcjv (i.e. superior in ability in the sciences, the crafts, and physical skills) but not 3eX-dtwv (i.e. in the realm of ethics). Whether Plato had such a distinction in mind would be difficult to prove. It is interesting, however, to note that in the Lesser Hippias Plato employs JroLeCV and kpy&ica;Om, avoiding npi&r-rLV throughout

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That Plato was challenging his readers to work out a solution to the perplexing propositions of the Lesser Hippias seems to be clear from several aspects of the treatise. Already the various elements of confused logic and terminology, which we have noticed permeating the discourse, would lead the reader to suspect that he must scrutinize further the propositions of Socrates - especially since Socrates himself admits perplexity both in the course of the discussion and at the conclusion of the dialogue (372d-e, 376b-c). Also it was well-known that Socrates (and Plato) consistently held to a theory directly opposed to the second proposition of the Lesser Hippias; namely, according to Socrates and Plato no one commits injustice voluntarily.' Another warning Plato presents to the reader that the argumentation is not to be taken as final is the statement of Socrates on the concluding page (3 76b): 'O &pM ?x(ov 0p'prMvv xac cxaXpa xal &3LxCX 7otwO), X I7VE, r tnep T4

?atLV OUtOq, OVX XV AxAo4 ?LY) 7 0 'O6ayo. The phrase, etsp Tt{[ ?atV 0o'rO4, should warn the reader not to take seriously the puzzling propositions of the treatise; for such a phrase Plato employs in other dialogues to show his personal disagreement with the premises being discussed.2

That the argumentation is based on fallacious reasoning, leading to erroneous conclusions, should be evident to the reader. But does Plato give any dramatic clue (besides the loose logic and terminology) to the correct solution of the perplexing propositions? The principal dramatic technique of the dialogue is its construction in "doublets." Only

the treatise. One cannot help referring to the distinction among these verbs which Plato draws in the Charmides (i62a, i63e-d) - a distinction which points to a similar differentiation between crafts or skills and ethics. I The theory is found already in Plato's Apology (2sd-26a) and extends to his final work, the Laws (86od, 73Ic, 734b); cf. Meno 77b-78b, Protagoras 34sd-e and 3S8c-d, Republic s89c, Timaeus 86d-e. For the Platonic sense of voluntary (&xou'toq) as what we really wish to have, see Proclus' commentary In Rempublicam 2.3ss; that everybody really wishes for what he presumes is good, see Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea 1 172b3 - 117 P. 2 The importance of the phrase must not be overlooked. Cf. Euthyphro 7d: TI gi oL 6eot, c1 ECOvpcov; oux cftscp rt& 8Laypov'act, 8t oaura& -rTa5a 8tapo0tVr &v;

and Euthyphro 8e: 'A,x' ExoaT6v ye oltxs, X EvOUpcoV, T@'V 7 pLX0rVT30 04 lYnOUClV oi 0p4L5C-

'ro5vte4, xca MVpc7rot xol Ocol, 7t7ep LyaprO5mlv 6eo'L'

In Plato's judgment deities should not engage in quarrels; hence the phrases elTrep rt

8tM(PkpoVTaL and ?tep &La,u -nroutv Oeolt.

Also in Gorgias 480e: ... t &po 8L 'IrLVo XMXGq 7rOLeLV, etT 10p6Ov etTe 6vTtvouv ...

Plato presents a clue to his disagreement with a popular premise.

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two characters carry on the argumentation - Socrates and Hippias. The brief appearance of Eudicus in the opening paragraphs (363a-c) and again around the middle of the treatise (373a-c) seems to be a dramatic clue that there are two parts to the discussion, with an appearance of Eudicus introducing each of the two parts. Again the dialogue contains two propositions - the identity of the false person with the truthful individual, and the superiority of voluntary to involuntary injustice - each proposition being equally perplexing. Two Homeric heroes are compared - Odysseus and Achilles. Two poems of Homer are compared (363b, 365c) - Iliad and Odyssey. Other minor "doublets" permeate the introductory pages of the treatise: the opinion of Hippias and that of Eudicus' father, Apemantus (363a-b); Hippias' public remarks concerning other poets and concerning Homer (363c); Hippias at Olympia and Hippias in discourse with Socrates (363c-d); Hippias at Olympia lecturing and answering questions (Xekyov'x and a7O0xPLV[oLCvov, 363d); Hippias' mental pursuits compared to the athletes' physical prowess at Olympia (364a); Hippias' fellow citizens in Elis and his parents (xat rn 'HeEov o6Xe... xat toZ* yoVeuaL toq soq, 364b); the large crowd whom Hippias just finished addressing compared to the small group that remained for further discussion (364b, 363a); Hippias' public per- formance as compared to his willingness to reply to specific questions

(363a, 364b). The "doublets" and professed confusion within the dialogue seem to

be dramatic clues pointing the reader to two famous propositions of Socrates - that virtue is knowledge, and that no one does wrong voluntarily - each of which may lead to confusing conclusions if a twofold division is not made. The Socratic dictum, virtue is knowledge, could lead to the conclusion that ignorance is the only cause of vice, and thus make ethics a matter of the intellect alone. In the realm of mathematics, as Plato points out in the first portion of the Lesser Hippias, it is the intellect which determines either true or false answers. But mathematics is not ethics; in ethics the entire soul must be trained, for moral actions involve more than merely the intellect. The other dictum, no one does wrong voluntarily, likewise, could be interpreted as if error were never a matter of any lower part of the soul, but involving only the rational element. But, as the second portion of the treatise reveals, there must be more than natural ability for success even in physical pursuits; for the athlete may choose not to employ the full measure of his ability. The "doublets" seem to point the reader to a realization that a distinction must be made between two separate areas: ethics, on the one hand;

I 29



and scientific technique or physical prowess, on the other. In the latter area, it is true, &pe' depends primarily, if not exclusively, on mental and physical natural ability; in the realm of ethics, however. &per' encompasses not only training of the intellect, but also voluntary choice. Natural ability and voluntary choice may be separated in the sciences and in physical pursuits; in ethics, however, both are essential, if one is to escape the puzzling propositions of the Lesser Hippias.

A reader could solve the confusion of the dialogue by taking to heart the dramatic clue of "doublets" and by making the necessary distinction between terms which Plato throughout the treatise illogically employs as parallel - that is, by distinguishing between: i) 8uvTtro and aopoL; 2) Tocn#oupyfx and 9p6v'rcaYt; 3) e' eil-ou),n and '6o euvototq; 4) riXv= and et'Ma.LTL; g) O'rie.v&v and rekr(Xcv. He could observe that Socrates' premises hold true in the technical skills which depend on knowledge and the development of natural ability, but the perplexities appear when the premises are transferred to morals or ethics. The reader, furthermore, could come to the realization that Socrates' customary arguments on the basis of the *yvxoat were valid only to a point in ethical discussions - a distinction which Plato develops more fully in the Charmides, as J. Gould recently has pointed out. I

That Plato was employing "doublets" as a dramatic clue for the reader to make a distinction between ethics and other areas of human rt-w,u

and 8tKVXML seems to be clear from the influence which the Lesser Hippias wielded on Aristotle. Two passages from the Nicomachean Ethics are extremely pertinent: 6p&uev 91' TcV'rt'ocq r*v totocvT)v 90Lv pOu)O%LkVOuV X&yeLV 8LxcxLOat)V7jV, mg'

q 7rpaxXrLxOE 'xOxV 8LXOC'LCV 'LaL OCL ag b LXCXO7rpaYOuaL XOl POU'XOVTOCt 'TA

81XoLcXc OV' v oe46v s tp67rov xcL 7Sp'L &aiXaOc4, &cp' 1q 8LXOvt xUaL Xo' oAoroct t& &ceLxOc. &4 xac 0Zv 7tpii)rov (q &v 'V71:c) V7oxetaO&. Tiock. oU8i y&Sp -rv

T v CL Tp6lo te 7r v r ao v v a&v xv 9 ewv.

uvoclL, uLiFV ya'p XaL' C'7LO-n'L 8OXE! T05V e'VOCVTL'V -nOUT- CIVO9L, gEtq 8 i evxv'Td TCv e'vXtvrdv o6, otov &OM TY; vUyteLxoq ov 7trp'cTTrTol 'rx evotv'a,

x TX UYLELVX 06vov' X0yo1ev y&p UyteLLv PA8(4CtV, 6rxWv PotT UC &V O

UyLMXVG)V (I I 29a6- I 7).

I John Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge I95) 36-41. That the capacity in the crafts is twofold - either to help or to harm - also underlies the fallacy of Republic 333d-334b, which is discussed by Gould (.4.-5) and by D. J. Allan, Republic I (London 1953) 23. The same fallacy prevails in Socrates' discourse with Euthydemus in Xenophon, Memorabilia 4. 2.19-2o.

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The second passage reads: 6a r' &voyxm 'rv cpp6vYqaLv Lv dtvaXL tLeTr& X4you nepl O p M'& vpOpcaVM

yaxO& 7rpMx'TxnV. OXO ,uLv TiXp-1 tv I=Lv &'p?, cppovqaew 8 oux

=tlv- x"oL Lv ptLv yXvvn 'o ' x&)v ta?pT'av&v mpercgTpo0, neot 8 qpp6vqaLv iTsrov) (0=p Xocl 7epl Tot; ocpeTac; 0' )Bov o5v 6XT Gkper~ TLq ECTL X0CL OU Tip-1.

8uotv 8' 6vToLV ezpolv -c6q T @ Xvyov 'x6vT-cv, Ocr'pou &'v eL p

ToU a8o~mrtLOwU Te yap 86x 7rep%L T6 ?V8MX6?Levov &X?w& gXeLv xal -n'

pp6v7aq. &XXa pMv ou8' 9EL, iera' Myou ~6vov * "vLeZoV 8' 6TL Xr016 0t&V '4

ToLoar'f4 e, ; g?rt, gpov aXe& 8' OuX gotLV (I I 4ob20-30). The influence of the Lesser Hippias on Aristotle is clear from each of these passages. From the first citation it seems that the prior portion of the Lesser Hippias led Aristotle to the distinction between 9iLq versus 86v&,XLLq

and A7rLarr ,un, thus solving the riddle of the first perplexing proposition. In the second citation Aristotle appears to have the latter portion of the Lesse, Hippias in mind in distinguishing between voluntary error in ethics as contrasted with error in the 'rexva.I

The dramatic technique of the Lesser Hippias, finally, is manifest from the play on the word to?U'rpoto. The term first becomes prominent in the discussion of the Homeric characters Odysseus and Achilles. Then, in the sense of clever or skilful, the adjective becomes the chief characteristic of the polymath Hippias, who is depicted as most versatile both in the arts and in the crafts. At the conclusion of the dialogue, however, it is Socrates who is tOU'TpotoO; for he has thoroughly confused Hippias by maintaining two false theses, but he has done so voluntarily, cautioning that the preposterous propositions are not really reliable. It is Socrates, therefore, who comes off superior also on that score; for he is truly 7ro)X'rpo07o0, able to present false answers voluntarily - and, according to the argument of the treatise, also able to be truthful when he chooses. The genial humor of the composition portrays Hippias as completely baffled; Aristotle, however, apparently saw through the perplexities and no doubt appreciated the humor; a modern reader can appreciate fully the treatise by following the clues of Plato's dramatic technique.

Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri

I For another Platonic dialogue which seems to have influenced Aristotle particularly, see my article, "Plato's Lysis" (Phronesis 4 fl i 9 591 x - 2 8). To observe additional examples of the intertwining of dramatic techniques with philosophic content, compare also my studies, "Plato's Euthyphro" (Phronesis 3 [I9S8] 9S-I07) and "Plato's Meno" (Phronesis

5 [1 9601 78-10 2).

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Phronesis Volume 7 Issue 2 1962 [Doi 10.2307%2F4181705] Robert G. Hoerber -- Plato's Lesser Hippias

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