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1/16

anadian Journal of Philosophy

Berkeley's Ideas and the Primary/Secondary DistinctionAuthor(s): Steven NadlerSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 47-61Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231683.

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2/16

Berkeley's

deas

nd the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction

CANADIAN

JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY

47

Volume

20,

Number

1,

March

1990,

pp.

47-62

STEVEN

NADLER

University

of Wisconsin-Madison

Madison, WI 53706

U.S.A.

Partof

Berkeley's

trategy

n his attackon

materialism

n

the ThreeDi-

alogues

Between

Hylas

and Philonous1s to

argue

that

the

epistemologi-

cal

distinction

between ideas

of

so-called

primary

qualities

and

ideas

of

secondary qualities, especially

as

this distinction is found

in

Locke,

is untenable.

Both

kinds of ideas -those

presenting

to

the

mind

the

quantifiable

properties

of

bodies

(shape,

size, extension,

motion)

and

those

which are

just

sensations

(color,

odor, taste,

heat)

-are

equally

perceptions

in the

mind,

and

there is no reason to believe that

one

kind

(the

ideas of

primaryqualities) represents

true

properties

of in-

dependently

existing

external

objects

while the

other

kind

does not.

In

fact,

close

examinationreveals

that the

same or

equally strong

ar-

guments

can be

used to

prove

either set of

qualities

mind

dependent.'

Since

these

two sets

together comprise

all the

possible

properties

of

a

body,

bodies

are thus reducible to collections of

sensible

qualities,

all similarlyin the mind of some perceiver.

However,

when

Berkeley's

rguments

against

the

primary/secondary

quality

distinction are

taken

in

conjunction

with

his

solution to the

problem

of

how it is that God

(who

provides

us with all

our

sensible

ideas

of external

objects) perceives pain,

it

becomes clear that

while

he

may

have

proven

his

point

against

the materialist

(and

I

do

not

examine

this

question here),

he

appears, ultimately,

committed to a

1 All references are to the Works

of George Berkeley,

Bishop

of

Cloyne,

9

vols.,

A. A.

Luce and T.E.

Jessop,

eds.

(London:

Nelson &

Sons

1949).

TD

=

Three

Dialogues

Between

Hylas

and

Philonous,

in

vol.

2;

PHK

=

Principles

of

Human

Knowledge,

in

vol.

2;

PC

=

Philosophical

Commentaries,

n

vol. 1. 1

have also

provided

in

brackets

the

corresponding page

number from the

readily

available

Berkeley's

Philosophical

Writings,

David M.

Armstrong,

ed.

(New

York: Macmillan

1965),

abbreviated as

'A.'

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/16

48

Steven Nadler

primary/secondary ualitydistinctionon epistemological rounds.That

is,

Berkeley's

account

of

the differencebetween the

way

in

which

God

perceives pain

and

the

way

in

which we

perceive pain provides

an

opening

for a

distinction between

two

kinds of

sensory

ideas:

those

which are

perceived

by

God and

us

in

the same

way,

and those which

God

perceives

one

way

and

which we

perceive

another

way.

And

since

God's

perceptions

or ideas are

archetypal,

one

way

in which

they

func-

tion is as the standard

by

which

our

perceptions

or

sensory

ideas

are

to be

judged

regarding

the

degree

to

which

they

succeed

in

making

known their

causal

originals.

Thus,

the distinction

s

an

epistemologi-

cal one which falls along the same lines proposed by Locke.

I

Locke on

Primary

and

Secondary

Qualities

The form of the

primary/secondary

uality

distinction

with

which

Ber-

keley

is

immediately

concerned is that

found

in Locke's

An

Essay

Con-

cerning

Human

Understanding,lthough

the

ancestry

of the distinction

goes

back

through

Descartes, Galileo,

and ancient

Epicureanism.2

All

ideas,

Locke

nsists,

are

equally

clear

and

positive

ideas

in

the

mind'-

each can be clearlydistinguished from any other and identified as a

discrete item

in

the

understanding.

And our

perception

of

them is

thoroughly

adequate

as

long

as we do not

inquire

nto the causes

that

may

have

produced

them

(Essay,

Book

II,

ch.

viii,

sec.

2,

132-3).3

The

perception

of

white or

heat,

considered

in

itself,

is no less

a 'real

posi-

tive idea' than

the

perception

of

shape

or size.

These ideas

in

the

mind

are

the effects of certain

powers

in

external

objects

to

produce

them,

powers

which Locke calls

'qualities.'

Some

of

these

qualities

are

'utterly

inseparable

from the

body,

in what

es-

tate soever

it

be,'

and

constitute what it means to be

a material

body.

These qualities, which Locke calls 'primary,' nclude solidity, exten-

sion,

figure,

motion,

and number

(Essay

U, viii, 9-10,

134-5).

Other

qual-

ities which we

perceive

and

(erroneously)

attribute

o bodies are

really

nothing

but certain

powers

in

the

object

to

produce

various sensations

in

us. These

'powers'

are a

function

of

the

arrangement

of

the

primary

qualities

of the insensible

particles

of

a

body,

and include

among

their

effects our

perceptions

of

color, sound, taste,

smell,

pain,

pleasure,

2

See

Descartes,

Meditationson First

Philosophy,

Med.

II; Galileo,

TheAssayer,

in

Dis-

coveries

and

Opinions

of

Galileo,

trans. Stillman Drake

(Garden

City,

NY:

Double-

day

1957),

274ff. See Edwin Arthur

Burtt,

The

Metaphysical

Foundations

of

Modern

Physical

Science,

rev. ed.

(New

York:

Harcourt, Brace,

and Co.

1932),

75ff.

3

All

page

references to Locke's

An

Essay Concerning

Human

Understanding

are to

the text edited

by

P.H. Nidditch

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press

1975).



4/16

Berkeley's

deas

and the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction 49

heat, etc. All of this might be termed the ontologicalide of the prima-

ry/secondaryquality

distinction- that

part

of the distinctionconcerned

with the

physical

basis for the actual

and

apparentproperties

of mate-

rialbodies.

Thus,

while

primaryqualities

reallybelong

to

objects,

secon-

dary

qualities

(at

least as

we know

them)

are

merely

the effects

in

the

mind of the

object's

own

primary

qualities

and of the

bulk, texture,

and motion of

the insensible

parts

of which the

object

is

composed

(although

the term

'secondary

quality'

can also refer

to that

particular

arrangement

and

organization

of the

corpuscles

in the

object

causing

this mental

effect).

The

primary/secondary

distinction can also be consideredfrom the

'inside

out,'

so

to

speak;

that

is,

as

a

theory regarding

the

epistemic

value

of our

ideas or

perceptions.

Locke

insists

that our ideas of the

primary

qualities

of bodies

'are

Resemblances

of

them,

and the Pat-

terns

do

really

exist

in

the Bodies

themselves.' For

example,

the

square-

ness

I

perceive

(allowing

for the

distortion of

perspective)

really

characterizes

he table

I

am

looking

at;

it is

an

actual

property

of the

external

object

accurately

reflected

in

that

object's appearance

to

my

mind. The

ideas of

(or

produced

by)

secondary qualities,

on the other

hand, 'have no resemblanceto them at all. There is nothing like our

Ideas

[of

secondaryqualities]

existing

in the Bodies

themselves'

(Essay

II,

viii, 15,

137).

There

is

nothing

even

remotely

similarto the redness

I

perceive

in the

object

causing

that

perception:

only

a

corresponding

'texture'

of the

body's

minute

particles.

Thus,

the

distinctionbetween

primary

quality

ideas

and

secondary quality

ideas

is,

in

an

important

sense,

an

epistemological

istinction.

The

former

provide

us

with

accurate

knowledge

of the

external

world,

telling

us

in

detail

about the

proper-

ties

that

really

characterize

material

objects

(at

least at the

macroscop-

ic

level).

As Locke

puts

it,

'we have

by

these an Idea of the

thing,

as

it is in itself' (Essay I, viii, 23, 140). Secondary quality ideas, on the

contrary,

do

not

at all

resemble the

properties

in

the

object

that cause

them,

and

thus

are

not

a

reliable source of

knowledge

about

the

true

nature

of that

object

(though

they

do tell us much

about

how

those

objects

relate

to us-

which

are

painful

and to be

avoided,

which are

pleasurable,

etc.).4

In

other

words,

a

primary

quality

idea

resembles

4

It should be noted

that the

primary/secondary

distinction,

even

at

the level

of

ideas alone, need not be only an epistemological distinction. Malebranche, for

example,

argues

that

sensations,

which do

not

at all resemble

external

objects,

are modifications of the human

mind,

while

pure

ideas

(truly

representing

the

quantitative properties

of

objects)

are

not

part

of the human

mind

but

are

in

God.

Thus,

in

Malebranche,

the

epistemological

difference between

sensations and ideas

is

paralleled

by

an

ontological

difference.

See De

la

recherchede la

viriti,

especially



5/16

50 Steven

Nadler

and makes known its causal original;a secondary quality idea does

not.

This

particular

ormulationof the distinction

will

be

important

or

my

argument

below.

II

Berkeley

on

Primary

and

Secondary

Qualities

Berkeley

has two tacks for

establishing

the

general

claim that

the

per-

ceived

properties

of

objects

are all

really

nothing

more

than

sensible

qualities

existing

in

the mind. With

regard

to

what Locke calls

secon-

daryqualities(heat, cold, color, taste, smell, etc.), his strategyis first

to

show that

the

quality

is identical

with either

a

pleasure

or a

pain

of

some

degree.

He then

argues

that

since

it is clear

that

a

pleasure

or a

pain

cannot

exist

except

n a

perceiving

mind,

the

respective

quality

is

only

a

mind-dependent

sensation.

To

take,

for

example,

the case

of

heat,

Berkeley argues

along

the

following

lines:

1.

Intense heat is a

pain.

2. No

unperceiving thing

is

capable

of

pain

or

pleasure.

3. Materialsubstance is a senseless, unperceiving thing.

4.

Therefore,

materialsubstance cannot

be the

subject

of

pain

or

pleasure.

5.

Therefore,

material

substance

cannot

be the

subject

of intense

heat.

6. There

must

be some

subject

n

which

a

pain

or

pleasure

exists.

By

2,

this

subject

must be

a

perceiving

thing.

7.

Therefore,

ntense

heat exists

only

in a

perceiving

subject;

or,

alternately, ntenseheatexistsonly in a mindperceiving t. (TD

I,

175-8

[A, 139-42])

The

argument

is

then extended

to

'any degree

of

heat

whatsoever/

both

painful

and

pleasant.

I

do not here examine

the

validity

of the

argument

as

a whole or its

premises.

Philonous

argues

at

length

for 1

(TD

I,

176ff.

[A,

140ff.]).5

And

Hylas

himself

readily

grants

3

Book

I,

chapter

13;

Book

III,

part

2;

and fidaircissement

X.

An excellent

discus-

sion of

the

primary/secondary

distinction

in Locke is

in Peter

Alexander, Ideas,

Qualities,

and

Corpuscles:

Locke

and

Boyle

on the

External

World

(Cambridge:

Cam-

bridge University

Press

1985),

esp.

ch. 6-8.

5

For a

discussion

of the first

premise,

see

George

Pitcher,

Berkeley

London:

Rout-

ledge

and

Kegan

Paul

1977),

lOOff



6/16

Berkeley's

deas and the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction

51

(TD1, 176[A, 140])and 6 (TD1, 177[A, 141]).WhatBerkeleycleverly

does

here is

identify

intense heat

with

something

which is

evidently

and

undeniably ncapable

of

existing

outside

of a

perceiving

mind:

pain.

He

argues

similarly

with

respect

to

warmth,

reducing

it

to a

pleasure,

and

with

respect

to an intense

degree

of cold

(TD

1,

178

[A, 142]).

While

Philonousdoes

not

explicitly

apply

the

pleasure/painargument

o lesser

degrees

of

cold,

this seems

to be due less to

its

inapplicability

o these

sensations

than to

Hylas'

ntractability.

believe that

Berkeley

does con-

sider the

argument

to work

in

regard

to

all

degrees

of

cold,

just

as he

believes

it to

apply

to

all

degrees

of heat.

He then moves on to

taste

(179

{A, 143])

and odor

(180 [A, 144])

n the same manner: each

quali-

ty

is

perceived

n

some

degree

as either a

pleasure

or

a

pain,

and there-

fore

cannot

exist

in

anything

but

a

perceiving

substance

(mind).6

It is

important

o

note that

Berkeley'spoint

is not

merely

that

heat,

tastes,

and

other

'secondary qualities'

are

invariablyaccompanied

by

pain

or

pleasure,

nor even

that

they

always

cause

pain

or

pleasure.

Rather,

these

qualities

just

are

pains

or

pleasures.

Berkeley

s

identify-

ing

intense

heat

with

a

certain

kind of

pain,

warmth

with a certainkind

of

pleasure,

and so

on. When

Hylas suggests

that

pain

is

'something

distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it,' Philonous

responds

by arguing

that the

immediatelyperceived

heat and the

pain

are 'one

simple

or

uncompounded

idea...

the intense

heat immediate-

ly perceived

is

nothing

distinct

from a

particular

ort of

pain'

(TD

I,

176

[A,

140]).

Likewise,

sweetness

and bitterness

just

are

'particular

sorts

of

pleasure

and

pain'

(180

[A, 144]).

What

we have here is

a

strict

identification

f sensible

quality

with

pleasure

or

pain.

With

regard

to

light

and

colors,

Berkeley

does not

explicitly

use the

pleasure/pain

argument

for their mind

dependence,

preferring

o

rely

instead

mainly

on

an

argument

from the

relativity

and

variability

of

appearance TD1,183f [A, 148-9]).Butit is quiteconceivablehow the

6

Berkeley

also backs

up

this

pain/pleasure

argument

or

the

mind-dependence

of

sensible

qualities

with

arguments

from the

relativity

and

variability

of

appear-

ance

('that

which at other

times seems

sweet,

shall,

to

a

distemperedpalate,

ap-

pear

bitter7).

ee

Pitcher,

104-6.

Berkeley

ometimes

appears

o believe

that either

argument

s,

in

itself,

sufficient

o

prove

his

point.

For

example,

after

Philonous

uses

the

pain/pleasureargument

with

respect

to

taste,

Hylas

gives up:

'I see no

purpose

to hold

out,

so

I

give up

the cause

as to

these

mentioned

qualities'

TD

1,

180

[A,

144]).

Philonous

only

introduces

he

relativity

argument

for

your

far-

thersatisfaction/1have yet to come acrossany commentatorswho look on the

pleasure/pain

argument

as

anything

more than

a mistake.

See,

for

example,

GJ.

Warnock,

Berkeley

Notre

Dame:

University

of Notre

Dame Press

1983),

146ff For

a more

general

discussion of the distinction

and

relationship

between ideas

and

pleasure

or

pain

in

Berkeley,

ee Genevieve

Brykman,

Tleasure

and Pain

Versus

Ideas

in

Berkeley/

Hermathena

39

(1985)

127-37.



7/16

52

Steven Nadler

pleasure/painargumentcan (indeed, should, or Berkeley)be applied

to color and

other

phenomena

of

light.

It

is clear

that a

light

or color

can be so

intense as to

be

painful

or

discomforting;

and it can be

of

such a

degree

as makes it

soothing

and

pleasant.

The same

move

(how-

ever

mistaken)

which allows

Berkeley

o

identify

heat

or cold or tastes

or odors with

pleasures

and

pains

will

clearly

lead

him

to

make

the

same

identificationwith

regard

to

light

and

colors.7

This

is,

I

believe,

merely

a

logical

extension of

Berkeley's rgument,

and one

that he

him-

self would

sanction

though

it

may

also lead us

to see more

clearly

ome

of the

problems

in

the

general

kind of identification

Berkeley

wants

to make between sensible

qualities

and

pains

or

pleasures).

Thus,

as

part

of

his

argumentagainst

the

materialist,

Berkeley

den-

tifies those

qualities

which Lockeclassifies as

'secondary7

color,

heat,

odor,

etc.)

with

pains

or

pleasures,

and thus

gives

them

an undenia-

ble

dependence

on

a

perceiving

mind.

His

strategy

with

regard

to

what

Locke classifies

as

'primary'

quali-

ties is

different.

In

order to

prove

that there is no Lockean

distinction

between

primary

and


Berkeley argues

that

both

kinds of

qualities

are

equally

'in

the

mind/

and that the ideas

present-

ing them are on the same epistemicfooting with respect

to

represent-

ing something

external

o

the

mind. But

Berkeley's

arguments

hat this

is so

with

regard

to

shape,

size, motion,

extension,

and

solidity

make

no

reference

(and

wisely

so)

to

pleasures

and

pains.8

Rather,

in both

the

Principles

of

Human

Knowledge

and the

Three

Dialogues,

Berkeley

re-

lies

mainly

on the

relativity

and

variability

of

perception

argument

to

establish

the

mind-dependence

of these

qualities.

To take the cases

of

extension

and

texture,

an

object

that

appears

to

an adult

human

ob-

server as

extremely

small

and

barely

discernible

appears

to a mite

as

extremely large.

Or,

the same

object appears

different

in

figure

and

texturewhen viewed by the naked eye and when viewed through a

7 The case of color

might

be

a

bit more

complex

and

problematic

han

the

others,

since

it is clear

that an

intense

and

sharp perception

of

red,

however

painful

or

uncomfortable,

nvolves

something

more

than the

sensation

of

pain,

i.e. redness.

It

does

not

seem, however,

that this

fact,

in

itself,

seriously

weakens

Berkeley's

argument,

since

the

painfulness

would

be for

him

an essential

and

inseparable

part

of

the

sensible

quality.

Its

painfulness

would

be essential to

its

identity

as

this

particular

ed-perception.

And its

inherent

ainfulness

would

place

it,

with

the

other

qualities,

in the mind.

8

Berkeley

notes

that

a version

of the

pleasure/pain

rgument

probably

layed

some

kind of role

in the

genesis

of the

primary/secondary

istinction,

since the

pres-

ence or

absence

of

pleasure

and

pain

constitutes

a clear

differentiation

etween

the two sets

of

qualities.

See

TD

I,

191-2

(A, 155).



8/16

Berkeley's

deas

and the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction

53

microscope. Since one and the same thing cannot at the same time

be of two different

dimensions,

or have two different

textures

(and

we are

assuming

that

no

change

takes

place

in

the

object

itself),

the

extension

or texture

perceived

does not exist

in

the

external

object,

but

rather

in

the

perceiving

mind.

Philonous:

Was

it not admitted as

a

good argument,

that neither heat nor

cold

was in the

water,

because

it seemed

warm to one hand and cold

to the other?. . .Is

it not the

very

same

reasoning

to

conclude,

there is no

extension or

figure

in an

object,

because

to one

eye

it

shall seem

little, smooth,

and

round,

when at the

same time it

appears

to the

other,

great,

uneven,

and

angular?

(TD

1,

189

[A, 153])

The kind of

argument

Berkeley

s

using

here

is,

by

now,

quite

famil-

iar. From

the

variability

relative

to

a

single

observer

at one or

differ-

ent

times,

or

to several

observers)

of the

appearance

f

a

quality

shape,

color),

it is concluded

that

the

quality

does

not

belong

to an external

object,

but

is

a

perception

or idea

in the mind.9

To insist otherwise

would

be

to ascribe

ncompatible

properties

to the same

object

at

the

same

time

(two

different

colors

or

shapes);

or to claim

that different

successive

properties

really

belong

to the same

object

although

the ob-

ject

itself

has

not

undergone

any

alteration. As

Berkeley

claims,

Let

any

one

consider

those

arguments

which

are

thought

manifestly

to

prove

that

colors

and tastes

exist

only

in the

mind,

and he shall

find

they may

with

equal

force

be

brought

to

prove

the same

thing

of

extension,

figure,

and motion.

(PHK

15,

47

[A,

66-7])10

Berkeley

has

in

mind

here

only

the

relativity

argument,

not

the

pain/pleasure

argument.

And

he

applies

it

equally

to

extension,

fig-

ure,

motion,

solidity,

and number

Locke's

primary

qualities

as

I

note

above,

in

the

Dialogues

e

also

applies

it to

secondaryqualities

n order

to supplement the pain/pleasure argument).11

9 See

also

PHK

9-15,

where

Berkeley incorporates

into his

argument

a claim

regard-

ing

the

inseparability

of the

so-called

primary

and

secondary qualities.

10

This

application

of the

relativity argument

to

primary qualities

has

its most evi-

dent

source

in

Pierre

Bayle's

Dictionnaire

Historique

et

Critique,

article on

Zeno,

remark

G.

For

a

study

of

this

influence,

see Richard

H.

Popkin,

'Berkeley

and

Pyrrhonism/

in

Myles

Burnyeat,

ed.,

The

Skeptical

Tradition

(Berkeley:

Universi-

ty

of California

Press

1983),

377-%.

11

Margaret

Wilson

argues

(against

Mandelbaum, Alexander, and Mackie) that Ber-

keley

does

not

make

the

mistake

of

overestimating

the

importance

for Locke of

the

relativity

argument

in

establishing

the

primary/secondary

quality

distinction.

See

her

Did

Berkeley

Completely

Misunderstand the

Basis of the

Primary-

Secondary

Quality

Distinction

in

Locke?/

in Colin

Turbayne,

ed.,

Berkeley:

Criti-

cal and

Interpretive

Essays

(Manchester:

Manchester

University

Press

1982),

108-23.



9/16

54 Steven

Nadler

Thus, by the middle of the firstdialogue, Berkeleyhas gained much

ground

n

his

argument

against

he

materialist.He

thinkshe has shown

that there is

good

reason

to

dispense

with the distinction

between

pri-

mary

and

secondaryqualities,

at

least

in

its traditional orm.

All

of

our

perceptions-

both those of

colors, tastes, sounds,

and

odors,

and those

of

extension,

figure,

solidity,

and motion- are on the same

ontologi-

cal and

epistemological

evel.

All

of these are sensible

qualities

in the

mind,

and none of them

are,

in

themselves,

more accurate

represen-

tations

of an

'external

eality'

han

any

others. The so-called

secondary

qualities

are

all

species

of

pain

or

pleasure,

and

therefore

necessarily

exist in a

perceiving

mind. The so-called

primaryqualities

vary

in

ap-

pearance

as much as

do

colors,

tastes,

and

odors,

and therefore

are

not

inherent

properties

of

an

independently

existing

external

object,

but are

(like

other

sensible

qualities)

in

a

perceiving

mind.

Ill

God's

Pain

Berkeley's

oncern to account

for,

on his

principles,

the distinction

be-

tween ideas of sense and ideas of imagination,or between

those

strong

and

vivid ideas which we

undergo involuntarily

and those

less-lively

ones which we

conjure

up

on our

own,

leads him

to

maintain

hat our

ideas

of

sense,

our

perceptions

of external

objects

and all those

sensa-

tions

which we feel

and

suffer,

are

produced

in

our

mind

by

God.

Philonous: It is

evident that the

things

I

perceive

are

my

own

ideas,

and

that

no

idea can exist

unless it be

in

a

mind;

nor

it

is

less

plain

that

these

ideas

or

things

by

me

perceived,

either themselves

or their

archetypes,

exist

independently

of

my

mind,

since I know

myself

not to be

their

author,

it

being

out

of

my power

to determine at

pleasure

what

particular

deas

I

shall be affected

with

upon

opening

my eyes or ears: they must therefore exist in some other Mind, whose Will it is

they

should be exhibited to

me.

(TD

II,

214-15

[A, 177])

This efficacious

Mind or

Will

is

God.

And

this

passage

(among

others)

clearly

indicates

that

Berkeley's

God,

as the

governing

mind

which

causes ideas

to

appear

in

the

human

mind,

is

him/herself

the

subject

of

ideas.12

12 See TD m, 239 (A, 202): 'A thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them

to

me';

and PC

641,

78: 'We

find

in our own

minds a

great

Number of different

Ideas. We

may Imagine

in

God

a Greater

number....'

J.D.

Mabbott

argues

that

Berkeley

did not

make the

Divine

Ideas an essential

part

of his

system,

and that

there is

good

reason

to doubt

whether

Berkeley's

God

has ideas at

all;

see 'The

Place of God

in

Berkeley's

Philosophy/

Philosophy

(1931),

reprinted

in CD. Martin



10/16

Berkeley's

deas and the

Primary/

Secondary

Distinction

55

This leads Hylas to raise the question of God's pain. It is an imper-

fection to suffer

pain.

We are sometimes affected with

pain

and

un-

easiness

by

some other

Being,

as Philonous

claims.

And

whatever deas

we

perceive

from without are

in

the

mind

which so

affectsus

('A

thing

which

hath no

ideas

in

itself cannot

impart

them

to

me').

Therefore,

the ideas

of

pain

and uneasiness

are

in

God,

and

(it

would

seem)

God

suffers

pain.

But this would

be tantamount

to

admitting

an

imperfec-

tion

in the divine nature.

Berkeley

has several

responses

to this

conundrum,

the most worka-

ble

and consistent

of which is

to draw

a distinction between the

wayin which God knows

pain

and the

way

in which we know

(or

suffer)

pain-

in

essence,

to draw

a

qualitative

distinction

between

some of

God's

ideas

and the

corresponding

ones

in our

minds

(or,

alternately,

between

God's

perception

of

some

qualities

and

our

perception

of

the

same).13

Philonous:

That God

knows or understands

all

things,

and that

He

knows

among

other

things

what

pain

is,

even

every

sort

of

painful

sensation,

and

what it

is

for

His creatures

to suffer

pain,

I make no

question.

But,

that

God,

though

He

knows

and sometimes

causes

painful

sensations

in

us,

can

Himself suffer

pain,

I positively deny. . .To know everything knowable is certainly a perfection; but

to

endure,

or

suffer,

or

feel

anything

by

sense,

is

an

imperfection.

The

former,

I

say, agrees

to

God,

but

not the

latter.

God

knows

or

hath

ideas;

but

His ideas

are

not

convey'd

to

Him

by

sense,

as ours

are.

(TD

III,

240-1

[A, 202-3])

This

kind of

problem

had

clearly

occurred

to

Berkeleyearly

on.

Thus,

in the

Philosophical

ommentaries,

erkeley

nsists

that 'God

May

com-

prehend

all

Ideas

even

the

Ideas

which

are

painfull

&

unpleasant

with-

out

being

in

any

degree

pained

thereby.

Thus we our

selves can

imagine

the

pain

of

a

burn,

etc.

without

any misery

or

uneasiness at

all'(PC675, 82 [A, 365]).God thus has an idea of pain, or knowledge

of

pain,

without

feeling

or

suffering pain.

This solution

raises

ts own

questions.14

or

example,

Berkeley

s

com-

mitted

to the

claim

that

all

of

our

ideas either

have

their

immediate

and D.M.

Armstrong,

eds.,

Locke

and

Berkeley

Garden

City,

NY:

Anchor

Books

1968)

364-75.

George

Thomas

argues

that

Berkeley's

God

may

have

ideas,

but

His relation

to these

ideas

is

not

that

of

perception;

see

'Berkeley's

God

Does Not

Perceive,' Journalof the History of Philosophy 14 (1976) 163-8.

13

For a

good

discussion

of

this,

and

a

comparison

of

Berkeley's

several

arguments

concerning

God's

pain,

see

Donald

Gotterbarn,

'Berkeley:

God's

Pain,'

Philosophical

Studies 28

(1975)

245-54.

14

See

Gotterbarn,

250ff

.



11/16

56 Steven Nadler

sourcein the senses or innerexperience,or are derivedsomehow (e.g.

by imagination)

rom these

primary

ones

(PHK

1,

41

[A, 61]).

But,

as

the

passage immediately

above

indicates,

none of God's

ideas are con-

veyed

to

him/her

by

sense

as ours are.

How,

then,

can

our

ability

to

imagine

pain

without

feeling

it

(an

ability

founded on some

prior

sen-

sory

experience

of

pain) help

us understand

the

kind

of

knowledge

or

idea God must have of

pain?

Nonetheless,

this is

Berkeley's

solution

to the

problem

raised

by

Hylas.

There is

a

generic

difference

between the

idea we have

of

pain

and

God's idea of

pain.

Ours is

a

painful

sensation;

God knows

pain

but does not sense it. And it is clearthat this samesolutionmust

apply

to

pleasure:

God can be no more

susceptible

to

pleasures

(at

least as

we

experience

them)

than to

pains.

To

feel

pleasure

is to

undergo,

to

receive,

or to 'suffer7

pleasant

feelings.

It is to be

passive,

to be affect-

ed from

without.

Pleasures are

involuntary

and

capricious,

although

we can take

steps

to

help

insure

that certain

pleasures

are forthcom-

ing.

But

none of

this

can

apply

to God.

God,

'whom no external

being

can

affect. whose

will

is absolute

and

independent,

causing

all

things,

and

liableto be thwartedor resisted

by

nothing.

can

suffer othing,

nor

be affectedwith any painfulsensation,

or indeed

any

sensation

t all'

(TD

III,

241

[A,

203],

emphases

added).

God

is no more

capable

of

feeling

pleasure

han

s/he is of

feeling pain.

S/He does

(indeed,

s/he

must)

have

an idea

(a

knowledge)

of

pleasure

and of

pain.

This is

necessary

or God

to be able

to cause

them

in

us. But

God's

idea or

knowledge

of each

is

radically

different

from

ours,

which

is

conveyed

by

the senses.

IV

Reintroducing

Primary

and

Secondary

Qualities

I argue that the result of Berkeley'ssolution to the problemof God's

pain

is

the reintroduction

of the

epistemological

side

of the

distinction

between ideas of

primary qualities

and

ideas of

secondary

qualities,

although

this distinction does

not have the

same

ontological

founda-

tions

which

it

has

in

Locke. More

particularly,

when

Berkeley's

argu-

ments

for the

mind-dependence

of such

qualities

as

colors,

tastes,

and

odors,

along

with his different

arguments

for

the

mind-dependence

of

such

qualities

as

extension,

figure,

size,

and

motion,

are

taken

in

conjunction

with the distinctionbetween

God's

ideas of

pain

and

pleas-

ure and

our

deas of

pain

and

pleasure,

it becomes

clear

that

Berkeley

is committedto an epistemologicaldifferencebetween two classes of

ideas,

and

the class line falls

precisely

along

the line drawn

by

Locke

between

primary

and

secondary qualities.

Berkeley's

arguments

or the

mind-dependence

of

colors,

tastes, etc.,

while

also

making

referenceto

the

variability

and

relativity

of

appear-



12/16

Berkeley's

deas and

the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction

57

ance, rely mainly, as we saw, on identifying these sensible qualities

with

species

of

pain

or

pleasure.

This

is

explicitly

true of

heat,

cold,

taste,

and odor.

And,

I

argue,

it

must also

be true of color. On

the

other

hand,

his

arguments

for

the

mind-dependence

of

the

quantita-

tive

properties

of bodies

(figure,

extension,

etc.)

are based

only

on the

variability

nd

relativity

of

appearance,

and not at all

on the

pain/pleas-

ure

argument.

Colors, tastes, odors,

and their

like

just

are,

for Ber-

keley,

kinds of

pleasure

and

pain,

as his

arguments

n

the First

Dialogue

explictly

state.

This is not true of the other ideas

in

the

mind.

But

this means

that for a whole

class

of

qualities,

there is a radical

differencebetween the

way

in which we know them and the

way

in

which

God knows them.

If

colors, tastes,

and odors are

pains

or

pleas-

ures,

then

Berkeley's

solution to the

problem

of God's

pain implies

that

our deas of

colors,

tastes,

and odors are

genetically

different rom

God's.

We sense

hese

qualities,

we

feel

them in

their

painfulness

and

pleasantness.

It is not

simply

a difference

n

the

way

in

which the ideas

are

conveyed

into the

mind

(we

have

bodily

sense

organs,

God does

not),

but a difference

in

the

phenomenological

characterof the

per-

ception

of

the ideas. Since

for us the essence of

pain

or

pleasure

is

its feltcharacter,ourperceptionof eachof these sensiblequalitiesdoes

not,

in its most essential

aspect,

correspond

to God's

perception

or

knowledge

of the same

quality.

This is

not true

of our ideas of

extension,

solidity, figure,

and

mo-

tion.

Since,

for

Berkeley,

these

qualities

are not identical with

pleas-

ures

or

pains,

there is no

reason to

suppose

that God's

ideas or

perceptions

of

them

are,

in

any

essential

aspect,

different from ours.

The

only purpose

for which

Berkeley

ntroduces

n

the

Dialogues

dis-

tinction

between

God's ideas

and our ideas is to cover the

problem

of

pain

(and

pleasure).

And

in

the absence of the

problems attending

the case of pain, there is good reason to think that God's perception

of

these

'primary'

qualities

and our

perception

of them

correspond,

since

God

is

the cause of ours.

Thus,

there is

one class of

qualities

(color,

heat, cold, odor,

taste)

our

perception

of

which doesnot

correspond

o God's

perception.

There

is

another class of

qualities

(extension,

figure,

solidity,

motion,

num-

ber)

our

perception

of which

does

correspond

o God's

perception.

And

note

that the two classes

are

extensionally

identical

with

those Locke

calls

secondary qualities

and

primary qualities, respectively.

Why

this should be

a

problem

for

Berkeley,

and how it

reintroduces

an epistemologicalistinction between ideas of primary qualities and

ideas

of


becomes clear

if

we recall that

for Ber-

keley,

God's

ideas

(or

God's

perceptions)

are

archetypal

and

original,

while our

ideas

(or

perceptions)

are

ectypal

and derivative. What this

means

is that

it makes sense

to examine

our ideas

concerning

their



13/16

58 Steven

Nadler

success or failure in accurately corresponding to, resembling, or

representing

God's ideas. God's ideas or

perceptions

are a standard

according

to

which our

perceptions

can be

judged,

the model from

which

they

are

causally

derived

and

to which

they

can be

compared.

Philonous:

So

may you suppose

an external

archetype

on

my

principles;

-external,

I

mean,

to

your

own mind:

though

indeed it must be

supposed

to exist in that

Mind which

comprehends

all

things.

(TD

III,

248

[A, 210-11])

I have no

objection against calling

the ideas in the mind

of

God,

archetypes

of

ours.

(Berkeley

to Samuel

Johnson,

March

24, 1730, Works,

vol.

2,

292

[A, 246])

Three

remarksare warrantedhere before

proceeding.

First,

my

claim

about

an

epistemological

istinction

among Berkeley's

deas should be

distinguished

from the

claim,

which

I

am not

making,

that for

Ber-

keley

the

primary

source of the

epistemic

value of

our ideas is their

success

or

failure

in

corresponding

to God's ideas.

Epistemology

for

Berkeley

s a matter internal to the world

of our

ideas -it

regards

co-

herence

and interrelations

among

them,

not their

correspondence

to

some extra-ideal

reality,

divine or material. So

strictly

speaking,

the

epistemic

value of our ideas is

a

function

of the

degree

to

which

they

coherewith, and allow us to anticipate, orthcoming deas.15Myclaim,

on

the other

hand,

is that there is a

clear,

but

different and un-

Berkeleian,

sense

in

which

all

of

Berkeley's

deas are not on

the

same

epistemic

footing.

Second,

my argument

relies on

treating

an

archetype

as

something

which

an

ectype

may

be taken as

purporting

to

represent

and, thus,

make known.

And

this is

an

understanding

of the term

which Ber-

keley

would be

quite

familiar

with,

and

perhaps

even be

expected

to

have

in

mind

in

the

Dialogues.

Locke himself uses the terms 'arche-

type'

and

'ectype'

o refer o the

capacity

of ideas to

represent

or

resem-

ble (andthus makeknown) their causal

originals.

Ideas,he insists, are

'ectypes'

in

the

mind,

and

may represent perfectly,

partially,

or

not

at

all 'those

Archetypes,

which the

Mind

supposes

them taken

from;

which

it intends them to stand

for,

and to

which

it

refers them'

(Essay,

II,

xxxi, 1,

375).

Throughout

this

chapter,

he

refers

to

idea-ectypes

as

'copies'

and

archetypes

as 'models' or

'originals,'

and

their

intended

relationship

as one of

'correspondence.'

Now

in

the

Dialogues,

Ber-

keley's

use

of the term

'archetype'appears

to be a

concession to

the

Lockean-materialist

ay

of

speaking,

but not to its

ontology.

Forboth

Locke

and

Berkeley,

the

epistemological

relation

signified by

'arche-

type'

and

'ectype'

is the same

(although

the

ontological

status of the

15

PHK

30, 33, 36;

TD

III,

238

(A, 200-1)



14/16

Berkeley's

deas and the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction 59

archetypesdiffers):the archetypeis the model or originalwhich the

ectype

(for

both

thinkers,

an

idea)

ought

to

represent

and

resemble

(and

thus

make

known)

but

may,

in

fact,

not.

Finally,

I

should

note

that

my

reference here to God's ideas or

per-

ceptions

as

archetypal

s neutral

with

respect

to the issue of

whether

or not

for

Berkeley

here

is

in

God

a

set of

archetypal

divine

ideas nu-

merically

distinct

from our

ideas,

and of which our ideas are

copies.

There

is

much debate

among Berkeley

scholars on

this

problem,

and

the

trouble

to which

a world of

divine ideas would

give

rise

are well-

known.

For

example,

it is claimed

that it

opens

Berkeley

up

to

exactly

the same

objections

he raises

against

Locke's

alleged representative

theory

of

perception.16

Note that

I have been

speaking

alternately

of

God's

ideasand God's

perceptions,

n

order

not to

beg

the

question

with

regard

o this issue.

My argument

can

be described

n terms of a differ-

ence

or

correspondence

between

God's ideas

and

our

ideas,

or of a

difference

or

correspondence

etween

God's

perception

of certain

qual-

ities

and

our

perception

of the

(numerically)

ame

qualities.

In

order

for

the

question

of

correspondence

which

I

raise to be

relevant,

one

only

needs

the

claim,

which

Berkeley

clearly supplies,

that

there is

something archetypal n God's knowledge of things.

Philonous: Do

I not

acknowledge

a

twofold

state

of

things

-the one

ectypal

or

natural,

the

other

archetypal

and eternal?

The former

was

created

in

time;

the

latter existed

from

everlasting

in the

mind

of

God.

(TD

III,

254

[A, 217])

To

be

sure,

my

claim

about

Berkeley's

reintroduction

of a

prima-

ry/secondary

distinction

becomes

particularly

clear

(and

resembles

Locke's

distinction

even

more)

if

there is

a

realm

of divine ideas which

some

of our

ideas

resemble

and which others

do not. But the distinc-

tion

is also

reintroduced

if

it is a matter

of some

of our

perceptions

of

qualities

(or

of

ideas)

resembling

God's

perception

of

them,

while

others

do

not.

One could then call

those

qualities

or

ideas our

percep-

tion

of

which

does resemble God's

archetypal

perception

of

them

pri-

maryqualities.

Those

qualities

or ideas

our

perception

of

which does

not

resemble

God's

archetypalperception

of them

make

up

the class

of

secondary

ualities.

Thus,

the

epistemological

distinction s the

same

as the

one

found

in Locke:a distinction

between those ideas or

percep-

16 See Gotterbarn, 251ff. Samuel Johnson, D.D., is the first to raise these questions

regarding

Berkeley's

use

of the

archetype/ectype

distinction;

see his

letter

of

Sep-

tember

10,

1729

(Works,

vol.

2,

274-5).

Genevieve

Brykman

argues

that

Berkeley

is not

willingly

or

deeply

committed

to a realm of

archetypal

divine

ideas;

see

'La notion

d'

archetype

selon

Berkeley,'

Recherches ur

le XVIItme

sikle

7

(1984)

33-43. See

also Mabbott.



15/16

60 Steven

Nadler

tions which succeed in resemblingand makingknown the nature of

their

(causal)

originals,

and

those ideas or

perceptions

which fail to

resemble

and

make known the nature of their

(causal)

originals.17

Our

perception

of

color,

taste,

odor,

and

sound tells us

nothing

about God's

perception

of

the same

qualities,

even

though

God's

(archetypal)per-

ception

of them

plays

a

causal

role

in

our

(ectypal)perception

of them.

On the other

hand,

we have no reason

to doubt that our

perception

of

size,

shape, solidity,

and motion is

a

reliable source as to

the

way

in

which God knows these

qualities.

This is a

problem

for

Berkeley

because

it

is

just

this sort of

epistemo-

logical

distinctionbetween kindsof ideas that he is

hoping

to do

away

with in

the

First

Dialogue,

as we saw. His

aim

there is

to

place

all of

our

ideas,

all

sensible

qualities,

on the same

epistemological

and onto-

logical ooting.

If what

I

argue

above is

correct,

here

s at least one sense

in which he has failed

in

this aim. It

should

be clear

that this does not

directly

affect his

arguments

against

materialism-

both kinds of sensi-

ble

quality

are still

equally

in

the mind.

And the

ontological

side of

Locke's

primary/secondary

distinction,

whereby

primary

qualities

are

those

reallypossessed

by

external material

objects,

does

not enter

in

with

Berkeley.

But the kind

of epistemological qualityamong

our

ideas

that

Berkeley

wants

cannot,

on his

principles,

be

maintained. Once

again, Berkeley gets

into

trouble

in

his

attempt

to deal

with the rela-

tion

between the divine

mind and

the human

mind

in

cognition, spe-

cifically

with

the

principle

of the

archetypal

natureof God's

knowledge.

V Conclusion

There

may

be a

numberof

ways

in

which

Berkeley

can

escape

the

kind

of problemattributedo him in thispaper.Eachof theseways demands

a

reconsideration,

nce

again,

of certain

problematic assages

or

aspects

of

Berkeley's

philosophy

with which

Berkeley

scholars

have wrestled

for decades.

On the one

hand,

Berkeley

could

dispense

with the

pleasure/pain

argument.

This

argument,

which has never

seemed

very good

in

the

first

place, appears

only

in

the

Dialogues,

ot

in

the

Principles

although

it

may

seem

suggested

by

some

entries

in

the

Philosophical

ommen-

taries).

Moreover,

Berkeley

apparently

believes

that

it

needs to be

17 For

Berkeley,

of

course,

ideas are

not in

themselves

causally

efficacious

not even

God's ideas.

However,

they

do

play

an

essential

role in God's

causing

our

ideas,

since 'a

thing

which hath no ideas

in

itself cannot

impart

them to me/



16/16

Berkeley's

deas and the

Primary/Secondary

Distinction

61

backedup by the relativity argument. This raises the question as to

how much

importance

he

pleasure/painargument

bearsfor

Berkeley's

case.18

The

question

is rendered

particularly

acute when we remem-

ber that there

is reason to think that

Berkeley

does not

really

believe

that

even

the more common

relativity

argument

(which,

at

least,

has

enjoyed

some

credibility

among philosophers)

establishes the

mind-

dependence

of sensible

qualities.19

On

the other

hand,

Berkeley

could

dispense

with

the arche-

type/ectype

model of

the

relationship

between human

and

divine

per-

ception.

He never seems

wholly

comfortable

with

such

talk,

as

it

always

appears

to be a concession of sorts. In his

reply

to

Johnson

quoted

above,

for

example,

he states

in rather lukewarm terms that

'I

have

no

objectionagainst calling

the ideas

in the mind of

God,

archetypes

of ours....'

And the model does not

appear

at all

in

either the Princi-

ples

or

the

Philosophical

ommentaries,

eading

one

to wonder

(as

with

the

pleasure/pain

argument)

how

integral

t

is

to his

system.

But then

how

are we to

describe

the

relationship

between

God's ideas or

per-

ceptions

and our

ideas or

perceptions?

This,

ultimately,

is one of the

most

interesting questions

raised

by Berkeley's

theory

of

ideas,

and

one of the most problematic.20

Received:

January,

1989

18

Brykman

('Pleasure

and

Pain Versus Ideas

in

Berkeley/

129-30)

argues

that

Philonous' use

of the

pleasure/pain

argument

should not be confused with

a

com-

mitment

to it on

Berkeley's part.

19 PHK 15:

'It must be

confessed

this method of

arguing

does

not so much

prove

that

there is no extension

or colour

in an outward

object,

as that we do not know

by

sense

which is the

true extension

or colour of the

object'

(47 [A, 66-7]).

On

the other

hand,

see

TD

1,

189

(A, 153),

where Philonous calls the

relativity argu-

ment

'a

good

argument'

to the effect

that

secondary qualities

are

not

in

objects.

For

a discussion

of

Berkeley's

change

in

attitude towards

this

argument,

see Richard

T.

Lambert,

'Berkeley's

Use of the

Relativity

Argument,'

IdealisticStudies 10

(1980)

107-21.

20

An

early

draft of this

paper

was read

to the 1988

meeting

of the International

Berkeley

Society

in

Washington,

D.C.

I would like to thank the

participants

of

the

discussion there

for their

helpful

comments and

questions.

I am

particularly

grateful

to Kenneth

Winkler,

Douglas

Jesseph,

Robert

McKim,

and Richard Lam-

bert

for their extensive

written comments.

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