Philosophy of Sport, Eastern Philosophy and Pragmatism

This is an earlier draft of : “The Philosophy of Sport in Relation to Japanese Philosophy and Pragmatism” in A Companion for the Philosophy of Sport. C. Torres, (Ed.) (London & New York: Bloomsbury Editions). 2014. 66-82. Please cite and reference from the published version.

The Philosophy of Sport , Eastern Philosophy and Pragmatism  

Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza, Koyo Fukasawa, and Mizuho Takemura

Two scenarios set the stage:

1. In Zen and the Art of Archery, Eugene Herrigel recounts his five long years of struggle, self-doubt, and failure before finally letting the arrow release itself.1 In Kyudo, the way of archery, arrows hitting the target are secondary to process and proper form.

2. In the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic implemented

state-supported doping programs. Coupled to unparalleled scientific training methods, this turned athletes into lab specimens, leading to unprecedented Olympic and world medals, and records.

These two scenarios diametrically illustrate central issues in contemporary sport

philosophy concerning process and results, the aim(s) of sport, the nature of and relation between

body and mind, and the role of community. They also frame this chapter’s driving question:

How do Eastern philosophy and pragmatism contribute uniquely to sport philosophy? Aligned

with the first scenario, they rethink sport’s aims and nature in opposition to today’s focus on

performance, health, and revenues. Highlighting similarities and differences, the ensuing

presents their unique methodologies and philosophical contributions.

A thorough overview of Eastern philosophy and pragmatism in a single chapter is

unfeasible. Eastern philosophy spans the millenary branches of India, China, Japan, and other

distinctive traditions, e.g., Korea’s Chandogyo. Pragmatism, more circumscribed, remains

highly fertile. We focus on East Asian philosophy, primarily Japanese philosophy, and

pragmatist classical figures because:2 1) being chronologically last among the three millenary

traditions, Japanese philosophy’s comprehensively integrative development affords a more

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efficient presentation of Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian tenets; as for pragmatism, its

founding fathers—Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—are closest to sport

philosophy’s concerns. And, 2) interlacing their methodology and theory allows expedient

application to signature topics that readily connect with sport philosophy.

Section one contextualizes matters. Sections two through five discuss respectively: pure

experience, body-mind, community, and contemporary issues with two applications: a) martial

arts and Western sports, b) doping and genetic technology.

1. Theoretical and Historical Background

Several facts justify coupling Eastern philosophy and American pragmatism. One, their

temperamental affinity—to echo James, philosophy is largely a matter of temperament:3 they

share a determined attitude, eclectic philosophical appetite, and eminent optimism. Two, a focus

on practicality and the resultant flexibility: Indians are remarkably analytic and empirically

oriented, Chinese markedly practical in life and their philosophies seek harmony (most evident in

Confucianism), Japanese display great openness and adaptive mien, while pragmatists embrace a

“whatever works best” attitude. However, they prioritize this optimism and practicality

differently. Pragmatism is more concerned and theoretically begins with metaphysics and

epistemology, the East centers on and starts from ethics and aesthetics.4 This impinges on

methodological matters—a methodology is a way of doing things. Pragmatism has a penchant

for the scientific method. Peirce’s seminal article “The Fixation of Belief” first defends this,

discussing how belief assuages the itch doubt causes, which we fix by a number of methods:

tenacity, authority, a priori intuition, and the scientific method.5 With theoretically significant

differences, James, Dewey, and most pragmatists embrace various versions of the scientific

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method in a perennial quest after absolute truth. This is connected to their empiricism,

experience vets truths about the world, and naturalism, which finds explanations for reality in the

natural world, not a transcendental realm. Differently, Japanese philosophy favors intuitive

reflection marked by phenomenological and experiential analysis of pure experience over

rational discourse. This divergence noted, both see experience as vital for understanding reality.

India’s philosophical contributions begin with Hinduism, particularly the Upanishads.

Buddhism, paralleling Christianity and Judaism, arises as alternative within an orthodox Hindu

context. It keeps certain tenets: samsara, the wheel of reincarnation where we are reborn as

higher or lower life forms millions of times before reaching release (key to viewing life as

ephemeral and equanimity in accepting death); and karma, the moral law of cause and effect.

But it rejects the caste system, belief in Atman or self, and, discarding Brahman as ultimate

reality, stresses this world’s illusion. Buddhism also transforms the Hindu idea of moksha,

blissful liberation from samsara, into nirvana or cessation once we reach Buddhahood.

Siddhartha Gautama’s focus is practical ethics, thus the first Buddha bypasses metaphysical

ponderings. However, subsequent divisions among followers result in complex ontological

disputations.

In East Asian philosophy, the main religious and philosophical systems issue forth from

China’s Daoism, Confucianism, native to the Middle Kingdom, and Chan Buddhism.

Purportedly Bodhidharma brings Dhyana Buddhism from India in the sixth century CE, its stern

character being dulcified into Chan Buddhism. Eventually, Buddhism splits into two schools

that keep the basic doctrines of the four noble truths and the eightfold path: Theravada centers on

personal release and enlightenment, and Mahayana focuses on compassion for all beings. The

latter becomes more influential in East Asia. Chinese Buddhism and culture trickle into Japan

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around the seventh century CE, co-existing with native Shinto. Japanese Buddhism

progressively diversifies among others into Nichiren, Tendai, Pure Land, and Zen. Nishida

Kitaro,6 Japan’s preeminent twentieth century philosopher and the first to combine Western

philosophy and methodology with native mores of thinking, and the Kyoto School (established

by Nishida) incorporate Zen Buddhism, particularly intuitive pre-reflection—related to Zen’s

direct revelation, satori—and the idea of praxis-based inquiry.

Pragmatism is idiosyncratic in Western philosophy. An old system of thought for new

ways of thinking, as James’s subtitle to his work Pragmatism avers, it opposes mainstream views

on all major philosophical areas. Its roots sink deeply in history, but it is in America that said

method is systematically adopted.7 Agreement being scant on whether it is mainly a method,8

stance, attitude, or even therapy,9 what matters is that it does work as a method to settle

metaphysical disputes. James memorably illustrates this with the example of the squirrel’s tree

trunk circling.10 Indeed, a methodological norm of practical conduct guides pragmatists

regardless of other differences. Since epistemology is less prominent below, the following

approximates sport and pragmatism in relation to truth. Peirce starts the pragmatic business with

“How to Make Our Ideas Clear.”11 He seeks to ground meaning via his pragmatic maxim, a

simple criterion that can be paraphrased as “meaning is fixed by the habits it produces.” James

(mis)appropriates this, widening Peirce’s narrower scope, making it a matter of practical

consequences. For his part, Dewey emphasizes not the ability to settle dispute, as James does,

but the methodological advantage of overcoming quandaries, broadening pragmatism into a

philosophical system.12

These approaches fruitfully connect with sport. Eastern views are qualitatively attentive

to experience itself, and pragmatism demands action to find out the merit and meaning of ideas

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because truth lies in practical consequences. As James asks, “what concrete difference will its

being true make in any one’s actual life?13 Sport affords rich, varied opportunities to test said

concrete differences. As Richard Lally explains regarding Dewey, the truths of sport are public,

experimental, and shared.14 Through sport we find lived experiential truths—of life-changing

consequences—which pragmatism seeks and East Asian philosophy cultivates.

2. Pure Experience

This is the keystone to James’ radical empiricism, zenith of his mature views.

Methodologically, James uses a thick phenomenology to concretely explore experience’s

structure. This largely empirical project centers on human bodily interactions with the

environment—the world alive for us—in mutually influential relationship. Jamesian pure

experience is raw, pre-conceptual: “it is plain, unqualified activity or existence, a simple that”

upon which we act.15 To exemplify he tells readers to arrest themselves “in the act of reading

this article now. Now this is a pure experience, a phenomenon, or datum, a mere that or content

of fact. ‘Reading’ simply is, is there.”16 Elsewhere he clarifies, “within this full experience,

concrete and undivided, such as it is, a given, the objective physical world and the interior and

personal world of each of us meet and fuse the way lines fuse at their intersection,” a

subject/object unity Nishida further refines.17

John Kaag shows the relevance of this for sport when discussing his rowing experience:

“According to James, ‘the world of concrete personal experiences . . . is multitudinous beyond

imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed,’ and just like the first painful day of

practice, is inseparable from a more cohesive understanding or athletic mastery.”18 Continuity

permeates pure experience,19 which we divide and categorize conceptually but itself does not

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split into discrete elements. James details, “the nucleus of every man’s experience, the sense of

his own body, is, it is true, an absolutely continuous perception; and equally continuous is his

perception [. . .] of a material environment of that body, changing by gradual transition when

the body moves.”20 Mark Johnson details the radical implications of this, “every thought

implicates a certain bodily awareness [. . .] in all thinking, we are in some degree aware,” which

is predicated on James’ fulsome experience.21 Concepts are useful but not irreducibly primitive

(James staunchly defends non-conceptual thought). Kaag, quoting James, explains that we are to

“drop them [concepts] when they hinder understanding; and take reality bodily and integrally up

into philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape in which it comes.”22 Sport, remaining close to

pure experience, permits the seasoned rower to disappear in a “willingness to be as nothing.”23

James’s profoundly influences Nishida, who seeks to bring together East and West and

bridge the fact/value-is/ought gap. Nishida explains that, “by pure I am referring to the state of

experience just as it is without the least addition of deliberative discrimination,”24 that “has no

meaning whatsoever; it is simply a present consciousness of the facts as they are.”25 This direct

experience unites subject and object, knowing and object.26 This unity, not its kind, makes the

experience pure.27 A dynamic, acting intuition unifies it,28 amalgamating knowledge, emotion

and volition.29 Pure experience is continuous for him also. Trying to overcome psychologistic

description for philosophical explanation, as he explains on a re-edition of his maiden work,30 he

makes of mu (無), nothingness, the primary concept. Developing a logic of place or topos,

absolute nothingness negates the self or “I” as both empirical and transcendental self, making of

it, as Thomas Kasulis points out, an action—Nishida’s acting intuition.31 Thus, Nishida and

James view the self as a function.32 This establishes a dialectical unity of contradictories or

identity of opposites where the subject/object, mind/body, and other dichotomies disappear as

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such. That is, as our self dissolves we become integrated as pure experience with reality while

reality also identifies with us. Importantly, in the resulting unity we push further the limits of

pure experience through practice. This abstract system has quite practical applications.

Nishida states, “when inspiration arises in a painter and the brush moves spontaneously, a

unifying reality is operating behind this complex activity.”33 This applies to all disciplined

behavior. Therein, “in the mutual forgetting of the self and the object, the object does not move

the self and the self does not move the object,” and we find “simply one world, one scene.”34 In

martial arts, when a fighter effortlessly and reflectively unaware flips an opponent heretofore

opponents become integrated, both bodies moving together as one movement. Their opposition

becomes a contradictory unity of opposites, their selves negated into an unselfconsciousness that

is very aware of the felt experience, “for they are development and completion of a single

thing.”35 They become nothing, filled by a pure, ineffable experience that the Japanese call

taiken (体験), living experience, in contrast to the subsequent reflective remembrance and

articulation they name keiken (経 験), experience. Following Nishida, in sport we inhabit the

action itself.36

There is a crucial difference in James’ and Nishida’s congruent views. James writes,

“only new born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows, may be

assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a that which is not yet any definite

what.”37 He professes that mystical experience might extend our experience,38 and distinguishes

the experiencing from our ability to articulate it.39 But ultimately, Jamesian pure experience is a

limit experience. For Nishida, pure experience is both origin and terminus: we begin with and

must cultivate, through bodily practice, a return to it (crucial for sport philosophy). This

endeavor is normative: actualizing pure experience through lived praxis becomes the basis for

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Nishida’s mature analysis of art, morality, and religion.40 Here, training and discipline are vital

to nurture self-negation in lifelong practice (tied to Buddhism’s sen-nichi shugyo (千日修行)—

one-thousand days of practice to refine oneself). In short, while James descriptively analyzes

pure experience, Nishida normatively abides in it.

Sport is a lived practice, should we listen intently to its kinesthetic and kinetic dynamics.

Sport specific, these open worlds of pure sensation. As we mature in sport, we are engaged in a

continuous process where unity with reality is achieved. Yet, when trying to reach greater

depths this gives rise to conflict. Then we become conscious again until we achieve unity anew

in a spiral of perpetual perfection.41 For James and Nishida, “body both precedes and shapes

thought,” even if only the latter pursues the potential of engaging it as part of a lived practice.42

This leads to the body-mind relation.

3. Body-mind

Auspiciously, the term “body-mind” refers to Dewey’s coinage, meant to bypass

prevalent Western ontology, and to the conventional translation for the Japanese shinshin (心身),

an integrated body-mind. Orthodox Western views’ dualistic ontology faces the hard problem of

consciousness: how to scientifically explain subjective phenomena, qualia. It is usually

addressed by dualist or materialist theories. In epistemology, rationality reigns, excluding

emotion and intuition from mainstream philosophical and scientific discourse. Japanese thought

and pragmatism (especially Dewey and James), breaking ranks, endorse holism.

In Japanese Buddhism, Shinshin becomes explicit philosophically early: Kukai (774-835

CE), Shingon school founder, writes, “one becomes a Buddha in and through this very body;”43

Dogen (1200-1253 CE), Soto Zen’s nominal “patriarch,” emphasizes the body to capture the

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meaning of cultivation,44 rooting practice in seated meditation he calls “just sitting” (shikan taza

(只管打坐).45 Whereas Western mind and body are static concepts, in Japan the body-mind is

dynamic and pliable to cultivation. Yuasa Yasuo, referent point in contemporary Japanese

philosophy of the body, builds on Nishida, Kukai, Dogen, and Watsuji Tetsuro.

Yuasa Yasuo develops an integrative view of performance where different people’s

body-mind is in more or less advanced states of synchrony and levels of proficiency. This

accords with people having different sporting, martial, and artistic abilities. The highest level,

shinshin ichinyo (心身一如), oneness of body-mind, seeks spontaneity through discipline and

results in superior execution for Yuasa.46 In China this self-cultivation is achieved through

wuwei (無為), effortless action, that paradoxically takes place spontaneously.47 In Japan shugyo

(修行) denotes such self-cultivation that, if originally applied to the Buddhist practice of senichi

shugyo, eventually extends to the arts, e.g., sado (茶道), the way of tea, No theater (能), and

martial arts. This self-cultivation is particularized, being different when engaging samurai,

Buddhist monk, or athlete. Action refinement is undertaken not seeking specific results (tasty tea

or bull’s eye), but a state of no-mind, mushin (無心). Then we act unperturbed and unfettered,

Buddhist Monk Takuan Soho explains to legendary samurai Yagyu Munenori.48

Pure action, Yuasa’s term,49 may lead to better performance, but the goal is self-

realization or awareness. This agrees with Nishida,50 for whom the body is key.51 Training,

keiko (稽古) is necessary for all, gifted and average, but not sufficient. However, those less

talented may still approximate the former’s experience.52 Pure action and experience are

fundamental, but reflection remains cardinal. Thus Shugyo is thoroughly educational, and

diverges from Western high-performance sport or instrumental use of sports as means toward

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health alone. In sum, the East seeks a holistic development of persons and their abilities.

Pragmatism smiles on this.

Dewey, as empirical naturalist, theorizes the “body-mind” to counter dualist and

materialist tendencies because they reify dynamic processes to solve the very problem they

create. The body-mind is psycho-physical, not merely mental or material, and “simply

designates what actually takes place when a living body is implicated in situations of discourse,

communication and participation.”53 This works because the continuity of thought, perception,

and feeling are rooted in the body.54 Agreeing with James, Dewey stresses the role of quality.

Experience has an aesthetic quality all its own.55 It also implies a consummation, as it is “a

whole and carries with its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency.”56 Indeed, Dewey’s

complex conception of experience as fulfilled, holistic, complete, continuous, and unified,

dovetails with James and Nishida. Closer than James to the Eastern ideal, he emphasizes

development as continuous body-mind centered skill refinement. For Dewey, self-cultivation

means “the development of the individual’s personality to its fullest potential and energies.”57

Instead of specific instructions, he describes catalytic conditions that do not lead us by the hand

(agreeable to Japanese do as pedagogical ways of life).58 Pragmatism’s philosophy of self-

cultivation readily applies to sport.

Sports, genuinely engaging discipline and cultivation, imply an exquisite attunement to

the body that coheres with Dewey and James. For Dewey, revealing, fulsome experience is tied

to suffering—unavoidable in sport—which it begs for justificatory explanation.59 Lally applies

Dewey’s interest in human self-cultivation to endurance sports: faith in the experimental method,

risk, and will power coalesce into present moments that define our character and make the world

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other than it is; thus they become an experience.60 Yet, this cultivating process does not happen

at the purely individual level; it needs a community.

4. Community

Adamant individualism characterizes Western socio-politically culture. There are two

main philosophic camps, liberalism and communitarianism. The former stresses a liberal agenda

where individuals’ autonomy to freely live their lives is central, the main task of government

being fair access to liberty and economic means.61 The latter emphasizes the role of community

as egalitarian locus for common flourishing and favors particularism—culturally idiosyncratic

values--rather than a universal justice standard.62

Dewey, astride this divide, sees the goal of self-cultivation as personal flourishing within

the context of a democratic society. He prizes individuals’ cultivation and, agreeing with Plato,

sees them happiest when engaged in activities for which they are naturally talented,63 yet argues

that we measure a social form of life’s worth by “the extent in which the interests of a group are

shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other

groups.”64 Among forms of communitarian organization, a democratic society fulfills this best

because democracy stands out for its devotion to education and the realization of a social form of

life. The biggest challenge to Western liberal democracy comes from East Asia’s endorsement

of community over individual;65 there theorists have managed to point “to particular non-liberal

practices and institutions that may be appropriate for the contemporary world.”66

In the East, a family-centered harmonious community is paramount. Confucianism, its

influence still palpable, is the clearest exponent of this collectivist spirit. Confucius (Kungzi,

551-479 BCE) aims at developing a harmonious society rooted in a government that rules

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through virtue and moral example instead of punishment and force.67 Like Dewey, he believes

humans are capable of perfecting themselves and esteems best cooperative communal

associations that share a body of knowledge and values. Education is the exclusive means to

human self-realization.68 Three key virtues are key to enact this harmonious society: kindness,

justice, and propriety. Exclusively patriarchal, men who actualize this are Chunzi (perfect

gentlemen). Arguably, a salient problem is Confucianism’s endorsement of patriarchal values,

which subjugate women.69 Alternatively, Buddhists emphasize compassion.

Tetsuro, Japan’s foremost twentieth century ethicist, builds his ethics on a Confucian and

Buddhist legacy while incorporating Western thought, which Robert Carter explains, he

criticizes for its out of touch individualism.70 The centerpiece is his notion of “in betweenness of

human beings,” ningen, in the Japanese vernacular (originally jinkan in Buddhism (人間), both

use the same kanji). He writes, “the locus of ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the

isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person.”71 For Watsuji a

human being (versus an animal) must be a dialectical unity between individual and member of

society.72 We are defined in our relations with others. This takes place through a subjective

spatiality, the essential characteristic of human beings, which arises from “the manner in which

multiple subjects are related to one another.”73 Sport dynamics beautifully exemplify this

dialectic: athletes, positions, and plays are defined in relation to teammates and competitors.

In summary, in Western philosophy a community is an invariable object in contraposition

to a subject. As an abstraction, it aggregates various functions. In pragmatism, it is a variable

and developable existence that values harmony within a community where people actively

participate in creating a better state. In Japanese philosophy, a community is a concrete element

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that connects with self-identity: there is no self and object/community split, rather people’s very

existence is a community where they remarkably tend to pursue solidarity.

A pragmatically inspired sport philosophy can ease several tensions. The freedom versus

community conflict is palliated by a communitarian view of sports. Sportspersons must freely

create within the restrictions set by the sport’s constitutive rules as upheld by the community of

players. In sports, players’ personal freedom issues from the dialectical relation with their own

teammates (when applicable) in response to the contraries’ tactics who, mirroring the process,

create a self-replicating system. Relatedly, Daniel G. Campos revealingly applies Peirce’s

notion of personality as a coordination of ideas to a soccer club, which builds community by

being endowed with a personality constituted by its members’ sympathy and feelings of

allegiance.74 Hence, club and individual members, instead of using, embrace one another. The

tension between cooperation and competition is effectively approached with an East-West

comparative analysis where egolessness and benevolence encourage a collaborative model of

competition. Additionally, Joan Forry’s examination of movement’s specificity and acquired

meanings in relation to gender and sports appositely argues for an increased feminist awareness

that, through habit change, can counterbalance Confucian patriarchal tendencies from within

popular sporting practices.75 Last, such cross-culturally applied ethics may alleviate the deeper

theoretical tension between Eastern communitarian and Western liberal values, e.g., through an

educational commitment that promotes development of individuals and community, or by

increasing sporting opportunities within a framework of solidarity.

5. Contemporary Sport Philosophy: Two Applications76

a) Martial Arts and Sports

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Both engage our physical skills, sometimes being kinetically analogous, e.g., Olympic

archery and kyudo (弓道) shoot arrows at a target. But, as the opening scenarios show, there is a

marked contrast between contemporary high-performance sport and traditional martial arts. We

concentrate on two specific activities (the analysis extends to martial arts and sports generally):

kendo (剣道), because it remains truer to its roots than many other martial arts, and soccer

(football), given its worldwide popularity and inception when modern sport was institutionalized.

To begin polemically: kendo focuses on process whereas soccer is goal oriented.

When Japan enters the peaceful Tokugawa era (1600-1868 CE) Kenjutsu’s (剣術) sword

warrior skills become Kendo, the way of the sword. The new ethos swaps violence for peace,

lethality for a philosophical ethos, steel katana for bamboo shinai (竹刀), and seeks self-

cultivation through formalized movement. It becomes less about wining than about the meaning

behind our performance. Abe Shinobu attests of his kendo practice, “whether winning or losing, I

try to consider soon afterward the cause and process of victory and defeat.”77 Kendo, steeped in

Buddhist tenets, aligns with the body-mind and Nishida’s views: kendokas (剣道家) must

become egoless, and abiding in nothingness and pure experience, act spontaneously and without

deliberation. This originates in samurai reliance on Zen to learn self-forgetfulness in order to

lose concern for life. While necessary, an accurate hit is not sufficient; it is the process that

matters. Judges award ippon (一本), the win, for the manner the attack is conducted: with total

resolve and concentration. Zanshin (残心), a continuation of the attack with readiness to fight

again even after a successful ippon, must also be demonstrated after a hit. Rulings and referees

are never challenged, another way in which the fighter must remain egoless (like samurai

accepting death).

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Traditional martial arts training methods develop technique via sennichi shugyo:

kendokas perform countless yet mindful repetitions of the same cuts and parries. When students

get stuck in their development, the sensei (先生) does not give the answer but indirectly shows

the way to self-realization. This invariably frustrating process is the way to lived truths.

Herrigel’s Japanese colleague tells him, “you had to suffer shipwreck through your own efforts

before you were ready to seize the lifebelt he [sensei Awa] threw you.”78 Education predicated

on a holistic and integrative body-mind permeates this. In short, kendo develops into an exercise

in self-reflection and cultivation. In this paradigm, the activity (martial art, sport, game) must be

engaged non-instrumentally.

Football is keen on results, on scoring that goal. When it becomes high-performance

sport, it dualistically splits athletes psychologically and physiologically, and drastically

transforms tactics, technology, and training methods. Dramatic changes in formations and

strategies attest to this: the game evolves from all players converging on the ball to 3-4-3, 2-5-3

and other complex systems. As a thoroughly reductive model, quantified data—VO2 Max, Watt

output, goals, assists—defines athletes and their performances. An overemphasis on results has

inherent hazards: sport becomes an instrument, often subservient to questionable ends (money,

fame, etc.). Instrumentalization also makes cheating, game fixing, and drug use more likely,

since ends justify means. Challenging, even assaulting referees, is but a fixture of the game.

Ultimately, wins matter not skill, character, or how the game is played. There are notable

exceptions, but this is the prevalent globalization-enforced paradigm after which media,

institutional and governmental programs, and parents model themselves.

Counterbalancing this tendency philosophers like Douglas Hochstetler mount a pragmatic

defense of process-oriented sport. He writes, “if we have enjoyed or found meaning in the

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process, we are more likely to feel at peace with the outcome—regardless of the result.”79

Congruently with Abe, if we learn to face struggle when athletically pursuing excellence,

particularly when we fall short, then we find uncommon insight.80 To return to the soccer pitch,

Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza looks at the game as an outsider with a Zen beginner’s mind: defending

the intrinsic worth of the game through a Jamesian analysis, soccer flourishes when all

involved—players, fans, officials, managers—learn to enjoy its unique internal goods (the art of

the dribble) more than the thrill of the goal.81 Cesar R. Torres, affably conversing with readers,

enhances sport via broad internalism while echoing pragmatist themes: he revalorizes the know-

how of “physical” skills contra strict theoretical knowledge with James, incorporates a Deweyan

sense of engaged communitarian instrumentalism, and praises Thoreau’s walking ruminations as

meditative practice that, like Eastern ways, leads to insight.82 To close, we can pragmatically

bring East and West closer, mediating between the process and result entente: means and process

should prevail, with ends and results included as part of the very process.

b) Doping and Technology in Sport

Contemporary sports’ bane comes inside a syringe. Doping, a technology that pushes

human limits thereby complicating notions of fair play, health, and the ends of sport, is closely

tied to developing new technologies, e.g., genetic modification. There are two camps. One

favors autonomy, the right of self-determination, above all other values. Its liberal agenda

largely condones doping and favors a transhuman future for us. The other embraces

communitarian values and opposes doping and genetic modifications.

Japanese philosophy and American pragmatism conflict with permissive attitudes

regarding doping. First, concerning bodily autonomy, the key issue is ownership of the body.

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“Ownership of the body” means that “one’s self is possessed by itself.” Generally speaking, the

owner cannot logically be the owned concurrently. However, this becomes possible if we regard

bodies as objects separate from minds and thinking: “my mind owns my body.” Thus, mind-

body dualism characterizes a theory accepting doping on the basis of autonomy. Contrariwise,

Dewey overcomes such dualism by specifically valuing mind-body harmony. This differs from

the approach where bodies are considered as means without restrictions. His democratic

framework may entail certain permissiveness based on agreed upon mores, but his understanding

of the body limits this. Yuasa advocates mind-body integration, i.e., a body being synchronously

object and subject. This approach rejects ownership of the body as unchecked entitlement for

self-disposition. Second, doping makes the artificial constraints of sport less of a limitation.

Consequently, it affords quicker or otherwise impossible gains, goes against sport’s internal

goods, and, emphasizing results, largely circumvents the process. Third, the concept of

community proves noteworthy. Here, pragmatism boldly advocates a flexible platform to handle

performance enhancement in nuanced ways that adjudicate between acceptable and

impermissible methods. Contrarily, Japanese philosophy opposes practices that bring

disharmony to the community—doping egregiously doing so. However, both stress that athletes,

supporting staff, and fans commit to sporting activities as members of a community, and that all

are responsible for its continued flourishing.

The novelty of genetic modification of reproductive cells means less available extant

strategies. Pragmatism, finding here a source for human amelioration, may endorse pro-

transhumanist views, pace Claudio M. Tamburrini83 and Andy Miah,84 so long as the

enhancement does not devolve into a dualistic agenda that ignores psycho-physical unity or

undercuts democratically embraced communitarian values. Those wary of any Promethean gifts

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research laboratories may gift us with—Mike McNamee85 or Heather Reid86—urge pragmatists

to distinguish between instrumentally questionable enhancement and legitimate self-cultivation.

Traditional Japanese Shinto views mistrust modern Western medicine’s hyper-technological

focus. Shinto’s reverence for kami (神) (ancestral, divine spirits inhabiting natural features) and

belief in a sacred “of itself” or soul for humans mean an appreciation of spiritual forces and

traditional Chinese and Japanese holistic medicine. Belief in kami led to the justification of

infanticide and an eugenic agenda at times, however, as Jan Swyngedouw points out, congruency

with the belief of “the sacredness of this “of itself” quality of the individual is far from any form

of genetic manipulation based on the pretext of enhancing human nature and its potential.”87

Taking a cue from Japanese modern views on bioethics (centered on brain death and organ

transplantation) permits hypothesizing a rejection of transhumanism. Some critics (most

Japanese embrace modern medical methods) argue that mechanistic-based views objectify the

body as locus of exchangeable parts: the Japanese feel a personal connection with the body of the

deceased, believing that a human’s personality resides in the entire body.88 Besides, Hayashi

Yoshihiro points out, they are suspicious of views where wider relations to others are ignored for

the sake of the individual alone, and critical of utilitarian tendencies.89 Extrapolation from this

suggests that transhumanism will remain contentious.

We have considered how Eastern philosophy and pragmatism contribute, independently

and jointly, to sport philosophy. Characterized by a flexible, optimistic character that pays close

attention to experience itself, they are ideally suited to inquire into the kinesthetic corporeal

matters central to sport, games, martial arts, and movement. While they differ regarding

methods or punctual thematic interests, they share many and important similarities in terms of

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philosophical temperament that, supplementing other methodologies, bring novel perspectives

and profitable ways to understand sport’s philosophical quandaries.

                                                                                                               1 Eugen Herrigel, Zen and the Art of Archery, trans. R.F.C. Hull (New York: Vintage, 1999). 2 Generalizing for the sake of expediency and brevity, we acknowledge the many divergent views and suggest consulting Wing-Tsit Chan, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); James W. Heisig, Thomas Kasulis and John Maraldo, eds., Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011); Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989). With regard to pragmatism, see Richard Lally, Douglas Anderson and John Kaag, eds., Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport (London: Lexington Books, 2012). 3 William James, “Pragmatism,” in Pragmatism and Other Writings (London: Penguin, 2000), 5-132; 8. 4 This is a matter of emphasis; both traditions pursue inquiries in all main branches of philosophy. 5 Charles S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” in Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 5-22 6 We follow Japanese mores, mentioning first family name then first name. 7 Cornelis De Waal, On Pragmatism (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2005), 1-5. 8 Ibid., 4. 9 Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin, Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), 4. 10 James, “Pragmatism,” 24-25. 11 Charles S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” in Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 23-41 12 Talisse and Aikin, Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed, 9-25. 13 James, “Pragmatism,” 88. 14 Lally, “Introduction,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 3. 15 William James, “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?,” in The Works of William James: Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 3-19; 13. 16 William James, “The Place of Affectional Facts,” in The Works of William James: Essays in Radical Empiricism, 69-77; 73. James’ emphasis. 17 James, “La Notion de Conscience,” in The Works of William James: Essays in Radical Empiricism, 105-117, 115. Our translation. 18 John Kaag, “Paddling in the Stream of Consciousness,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 47-61; 48. 19 James, “A world of Pure Experience,” in Pragmatism and Other Writings, 316-19. 20 Ibid., 325.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      21 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 94. 22 Kaag, “Paddling in the Stream of Consciousness,” 55. Our emphasis. 23 Ibid., 59. 24 Kitaro Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, trans. M. Abe and C. Ives (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), 3. 25 Ibid., 4. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 7. 28 Ibid., 32. 29 Ibid., 39. 30 Ibid., xxxiii. 31 Robert Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1997), xvi. 32 Ibid., 3. 33 Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 32. 34 Ibid. 35 Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, 32. 36 Shinobu Abe, “Modern Sports and the Eastern Tradition of Physical Culture: Emphasizing Nishida’s Theory of the Body,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 14 (1987): 47. 37 James, “The Thing and its Relations” in The Works of William James: Essays in Radical Empiricism, 45-59; 46. 38 Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, 7. See William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: a Study in Human Nature (New York: The Modern Library, 2000). 39 Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, 9. 40 Joel Krueger, “William James and Kitaro Nishida on Consciousness and Embodiment,” William James Studies 1 (2007): 1-16; 6. 41 Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 75. 42 Krueger, William James and Kitaro Nishida on Consciousness and Embodiment,” 2. 43 Thomas Kasulis, Roger Ames and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 307.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     44 Yasuo Yuasa, The Body: Toward and Eastern Mind-Body Theory, trans. S. Nagatomo and T. Kasulis (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 119. 45 Shigenori Nagatomo, Attunement Through the Body (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 79. 46 Yuasa, The Body: Toward and Eastern Mind-Body Theory, 200. 47 Edward Slingerland, Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 48 Soho Takuan, The Unfettered Mind, trans. W. Wilson (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1986), 19-44. 49 Yuasa, The Body: Toward and Eastern Mind-Body Theory, 200. 50 Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, 114. 51 Abe, “Modern Sports and the Eastern Tradition of Physical Culture: Emphasizing Nishida’s Theory of the Body,” 45; Carter, The Nothingness Beyond God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nishida Kitaro, 108; 192 n. 24. 52 Yuasa, The Body: Toward and Eastern Mind-Body Theory, 200. 53 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (London: Allen and Unwin, 1929), 217. 54 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, 122. 55 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), 38. 56 Ibid, 35. 57 Richard Lally, “Deweyan Pragmatism and Self-Cultivation,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 175-198; 175. 58 Ibid., 175. 59 Dewey, Art as Experience, 41. 60 Lally, “Deweyan Pragmatism and Self-Cultivation,” 189-190. 61 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 62 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Virtue, 2d ed., (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1984); and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). 63 John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), 105. 64 Ibid., 115. 65 Daniel Bell, “Communitarianism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/communitarianism/>. 66 Ibid., 10. 67 Confucius, The Analects, trans. D.C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 1979), 63. See 2.3.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     68 John A.Tucker, “Confucian Traditions: Overview,” in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, 296. 69 Bell, “Communitarianism,” 32. 70 Tetsuro Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuro’s Rinrigaku: Ethics in Japan, trans. Y. Seisaku and R. Carter (Albany: State University of New York, 1996), 329. 71 Ibid., 10. 72 Ibid., 14-15. 73 Ibid., 157. 74 Daniel Campos, “Peircean Reflections on the Personality of a Fútbol Club,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 33-45. 75 Joan Forry, “Towards a Somatic Sport Feminism,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 125-153. 76 See Takayuki Hata and Masami Sekine’s “Philosophy of Sport and Physical Education in Japan: its History, Characteristics, and Prospects,” and Leo Hsu’s “An Overview of Sport Philosophy in Chinese-Speaking Regions,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 37 (2010): 215-224 and 237-252 respectively. 77 Shinobu Abe, “Zen and Sport,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 8 (1986): 45-48; 47. 78 Herrigel, Zen and the Art of Archery, 23. 79 Douglas Hochstetler, “Process and the Sport Experience,” in Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Sport, 17-31; 20. 80 Ibid., 24. 81 Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza, “Goles Trascendentales,” in ¿La pelota no dobla? Reflexiones filosóficas en torno al fútbol, eds. Cesar R. Torres and Daniel Campos (Buenos Aires: Libros del Zorzal, 2006), 25-57. For a summary and critical evaluation in English, see Daniel Campos, “On the Value and Meaning of Football: Recent Philosophical Perspectives in Latin America,” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 37 (2010): 69-87. 82 Cesar R. Torres, Gol de media cancha. Conversaciones para disfrutar del deporte plenamente (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila Editores, 2011). 83 Claudio Tamburrini and Tännsjö Torbjörn, Genetic Technology and Sport: Ethical Questions (New York: Routledge, 2005). 84 Andy Miah, Genetically Modified Athletes: Biomedical Ethics, Gene Doping and Sport (London: Routledge, 2004). 85 Michael McNamee, Sports, Virtues and Vices: Morality Plays (London: Routledge, 2008). 86 Heather Reid, Introduction to the Philosophy of Sport (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012). 87 Jan Swyngedow, “Ueda Kenji” in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, 543-549. 88 Hayashi Yoshihiro, “Bioethics: Overview,” in Japanese Philosophy: A Sourcebook, 1236; 1238. 89 Ibid., 1238-1242.