European Science Foundation Research Networking Programme The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective (PSE) Campus of the University of Vienna Aula and Kapelle Universitätscampus Spitalgasse 2 – 4, Hof 1 1090 Wien PHILOSOPHY International Symposium on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle EUROPEAN Abstracts International Conference December 5 – 7, 2011 Vienna Institut Wiener Kreis OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE – PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE VIENNESE HERITAGE
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European Science Foundation Research Networking ProgrammeThe Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective (PSE)Campus of the University of Vienna Aula and Kapelle UniversitätscampusSpitalgasse 2– 4, Hof 11090 Wien
PHILOSOPHY
International Symposium on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle
EUROPEAN
AbstractsInternational ConferenceDecember 5 – 7, 2011 Vienna
Institut Wiener Kreis
OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE –
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE VIENNESE HERITAGE
European Science Foundation Research Networking ProgrammeThe Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective (PSE)
PHILOSOPHY
International Symposium on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle
EUROPEAN
AbstractsInternational ConferenceDecember 5 – 7, 2011 Vienna
OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE –
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE VIENNESE HERITAGE
European Science Foundation Research Networking Programme
The ESF Research Networking Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective“ (PSE) investigates the philosophies, foundations and methodologies of the sciences. The conference on “Philosophy of Science in Europe – European Philosophy of Science and the Viennese Heritage” (Vienna, December 5–7, 2011), combines the theoretical and historical perspective focusing on the specific features of a European philosophy of science. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle the Viennese roots and influences will be addressed, in addition.
There is no doubt that contemporary philosophy of science originated mainly in Europe beginning in the 19th century and has influenced decisively the subsequent development of globalized philosophy of science, esp. in North America. Recent research in this field documents some specific characteristics of philosophy of science covering the natural, social, and also cultural sciences in the European context up to the destruction and forced migration caused by Fascism and National Socialism.
The proceedings of the opening plenary confe-rence of the Networking Programme PSE, held in Vienna, from December 18-20, 2008, and published in 2010 as The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science (Springer 2010, ed. by Friedrich Stadler) document the flourishing topicality of contemporary philosophy of science in Europe. The volume covers foundational and methodological debates, formal methods and their applications, the place of the life sciences and physical sciences in the foundations of science, and the present situation of the philosophy of the cultural and social sciences on the one hand, and some specific European manifestations, on the other hand, which can be generally identified with historical, pragmatic and interdisciplinary approaches bridging the absolute dualism of “analytic” and “continental” philosophy (of science). Therefore, also more general philosophical topics in the sciences are accom-panied by a naturalistic approach, taking into account the aims and values of philosophy of science in itself and the consequences for the related methodology (since the Methodenstreit) and historiography, obviously within the frame of a theoretical pluralism.
This European perspective with the integration of history and philosophy of science and the current situation in the philosophy of science after the transatlantic interaction and transformation, and the “return” after World War II raises the question of contemporary European characteris-tics in the philosophy of science. The forthcoming conference refers to the opening conference and its results aiming at topical issues and open question as formulated, e.g., in the review of the proceedings, namely addressing the tension and “oscillation between doing philosophy of science in Europe and doing philosophy from a European point of view … ”. (Stathis Psillos, in: Metascience Vol. 20, No. 2)
On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Institute Vienna Circle, and its establishment as Department of the University of Vienna (Faculty of Philosophy and Education) in 2011, the role and function of the renowned Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism and its impact and influence on contemporary philosophy of science is on the agenda, too. Accordingly, the general topic is dealt with in two parallel sessions representing systematic-formal as well as genetic-historical perspectives on philosophy of science in a European context up to the present.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVEDECEMBER 5–7, 2011 VIENNA
Kapelle / ChapelAula
Universitätsbräuhaus
Institut Wiener Kreis / Institute Vienna Circle,Campus Hof 1.2 / Court 1.2
Campus of the University of Vienna
PROGRAMMEPHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE – EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE VIENNESE HERITAGEINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Organized by ESF Research Networking Programme PSE and the Institute Vienna Circle (IVC) on the Occasion of its 20th Anniversary
Vienna, December 5 – 7, 2011Konferenzsprachen Deutsch und EnglischConference languages German and English
Eintritt frei, Registrierung erbetenEntrance free, registration requiredPlease register under: [email protected]
VERANSTALTUNGSORT / VENUECampus of the University of ViennaAula und Kapelle / Aula and ChapelSpitalgasse 2–4, Hof 1 1090 Wien, Österreich
Telefon: +43 1 4277 46504Fax: +43 1 4277 9465E-Mail: [email protected]
WIENER VORLESUNG 30. November 2011, 19:00, Rathaus Wien / Vienna City Hall Edward Timms (University of Sussex): Das Wissen der Wiener Moderne
2 PARALLEL SESSIONSA = AulaA: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE – EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
B = Kapelle / ChapelB: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE – THE VIENNESE HERITAGE
A B
14.30 – 15.10 Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna): From the Vienna Circle to the Institute Vienna Circle: On the Viennese Heritage in Contemporary Philosophy of Science
15.15 – 15.55 Cristina Chimisso (The Open Uni-versity, Milton Keynes): A Matter of Substance? Gaston Bachelard on Chemistry‘s Philosophical Lessons
Thomas Uebel (University of Manches-ter): Name ist Schall und Rauch? On Naming a Revolutionary Philosophy
16.00 – 16.40 Olav Gjelsvik (University of Oslo): Quine on Observation
Heidi König-Porstner (University of Vienna): General Relativity in the English-speaking World: Henry L. Brose’s Translation of Moritz Schlick’s “Space and Time in Contemporary Physics“
COFFEE BREAK
17.00 – 17.40 Claude Debru (École Normale Supérieure, Paris): On the Relationships between Neuroscience and Philosophy: The Case of Sleep and Dreaming
John Beatty (University of British Columbia): Gould on History
17.45 – 18.25 Richard Creath (Arizona State Uni-versity): Metaphysics in the Thirties: Why Should Anyone Care Now?
Ingrid Belke (Deutsches Literatur-archiv Marbach): Karl Popper und die Geschichte
18.30 – 19.00 Herbert Posch (University of Vienna): The Murder of Moritz Schlick in the Collective Memory of the University of Vienna
19.15 OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE / ERÖFFNUNGUniversitätscampus, Aula / Campus of the University of Vienna, AulaUniv.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (Vice-Rector for Research and Career Development)Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Konrad Liessmann (Vice-Dean of Faculty of Philosophy and Education)Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Friedrich Stadler (Director and Head of Institute Vienna Circle)
19. WIENER KREIS VORLESUNG / 19TH VIENNA CIRCLE LECTURE Universitätscampus, Aula / Campus of the University of Vienna, AulaHans Jürgen Wendel (Universität Rostock): Moritz Schlick und die Metaphysik
RECEPTION AND BUFFET
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5
A B
9.00 – 9.40 Maria Carla Galavotti (University of Bologna): Probabilistic Epistemology: A European Tradition
Michael Stöltzner and Veronika Hofer (University of South Carolina, Medical University of Vienna): Vienna Circle Historiographies
9.45 – 10.25 Richard Dawid (University of Vienna): A Bayesian Model of No Alternative Arguments
Antonia Soulez (Université de Paris 8): The Place of Wittgenstein in the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle
10.30 – 11.10 Michael Esfeld (University of Lausanne): In Search for a Causal Explanation of the Bell experiments
Massimo Ferrari (University of Torino): Materialien zu Moritz Schlicks intellek-tueller Biographie: Franz Erhardt und die Habilitation in Rostock
COFFEE BREAK
11.30 – 12.10 Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund University): The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Subjective Probabilities
Owen Flanagan (Duke University): The Influence of Positivism on B.F. Skinner‘s Radical Behaviorism
12.15 – 12.55 Gregory Wheeler (New University Lisbon): The Decimation of Independence
Georg Schiemer (University of Munich): Semantics in Type Theory
LUNCH BREAK
14.30 – 15.10 Theo Kuipers (University of Groningen): Truth Approximation by Belief Revision
Peter Weibel (ZKM, Karlsruhe): The Vienna Circle in Hungary (Book Presentation: András Máté/Miklós Rédei/Friedrich Stadler, eds., Der Wiener Kreis in Ungarn/The Vienna Circle in Hungary (Vienna-New York: Springer 2011)
15.15 – 15.55 Ladislav Kvasz (Charles University in Prague): Mathematics and Experience
Eckehart Köhler (University of Vienna): Gödel and Carnap: Platonism vs. Conventionalism
16.00 – 16.40 Martin Kusch (University of Vienna): Wittgenstein‘s “On Certainty” and the Philosophy of Mathematics
Karl Sigmund (University of Vienna): Gödel in Vienna
COFFEE BREAK
17.00 – 17.40 C. Kenneth Waters (University of Minnesota): An Argument for Complex Metaphysics Based on the Nature of Systematic Inquiry in an Ultimately Messy Biological World
Matti Sintonen (University of Helsinki): The Viennese Heritage in Finland: Kaila, von Wright and Hintikka
17.45 – 18.25 Pablo Lorenzano (Universidad Nacional de Quilmes): What is the Status of the Hardy-Weinberg Law within Population Genetics?
Jan Wolenski (University of Cracow): Kazimierz Twardowski and the Develop-ment of Philosophy of Science in Poland
18.30 – 19.10 Jane Maienschein (Arizona State University): Hans Driesch and Developing Organisms
Anne J. Kox (University of Amsterdam): Some Highlights from the Vienna Circle Archive
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6
A B
9.00 – 9.40 Tomasz Placek (University of Cracow): Two Notions of (In)Determinism
Thomas Mormann (University Donostia-San Sebastian): Wiener wissenschaftliche Welt-anschauungen – Zwischen „Leben”, Politik, und Wissenschaftsphilosophie
9.45 – 10.25 John D. Norton (University of Pittsburgh): Approximation and Idealization: Why the Difference Matters
Donata Romizi (University of Vienna): The Vienna Circle’s “Scientific World Conception” and the Issue of a Politically Engaged Philosophy of Science
10.30 – 11.10 Allan Janik (University of Innsbruck): The Importance of Historical Philosophy of Science for Cultural History
Günther Sandner (University of Vienna): Otto Neurath and Politics – A Re-Evaluation
COFFEE BREAK
11.30 – 12.10 Michael Heidelberger (University of Tübingen): Mathematics and Reality: Alternative French Conceptions
Herlinde Pauer-Studer (University of Vienna): Kelsen’s Legal Positivism and Vienna Circle Metaethics
12.15 – 12.55 Rainer Hegselmann (University of Bayreuth): Modeling Hume‘s Moral and Political Theory – Scientific Status and Perspectives
Otto Pfersmann (Université de Paris I): Legal Positivism – Contemporary Challenges
LUNCH BREAK
14.30 – 15.10 Jeanne Peijnenburg (University of Groningen): Reasoning in Fractals
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau (University of Vienna): Kuhn, Naturalism and Cognitive Psychology
15.15 – 15.55 Matthias Neuber (University of Tübingen): Is Logical Empiricism Compatible with Scientific Realism?
Hans-Joachim Dahms (University of Vienna): Thomas Kuhn and the Sociology of Science
16.00 – 16.40 Stathis Psillos (University of Athens): What is General Philosophy of Science?
Christian Damböck (University of Vienna): Thomas Kuhn and the Structuralist View of Scientific Theories. The Formal and the Historical Perspective of Theory Change
COFFEE BREAK
17.00 – 17.40 Miklós Rédei (London School of Economics): Hilbert’s 6th Problem and Axiomatic Quantum Field Theory
Michael Schorner (University of Innsbruck): Thomas Kuhn in England. The London Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science 1965
17.45 – 18.25 Jan Faye (University of Copenhagen): Does the Unity of Science have a Future?
Elisabeth Nemeth (University of Vienna): Edgar Zilsel on the Relationship between the Logical Analysis of Science and the History and Sociology of Science
18.30 – 19.10 Gereon Wolters (University of Konstanz): Is there a European Philosophy of Science?
HEURIGER FOR SPEAKERS AND CHAIRS
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7
´
ABSTRACTSINTERNATIONALCONFERENCEDECEMBER 5–7, 2011 VIENNA
Veröffentlichung 2011/2
Veröffentlichungen des Instituts Wiener Kreis, SonderausgabeAnniversary EditionWissenschaftliche Weltauf-fassung. Der Wiener Kreis.Hrsg. Verein Ernst Mach(Wien: Artur Wolf Verlag,1929)Reprint of the Manifestowith translations into English, French, Spanish and Italian.Edited by Friedrich Stadler and Thomas Uebel, with contributions by Henk Mulder and Thomas Uebel.Wien–New York: Springer 2011/2
IM ERSCHEINEN/ IN THE PRESS Ingrid Belke (Marbach am Neckar)
Karl Popper und die Geschichte
Karl Popper, 1902 in Wien als Sohn eines Anwalts böhmisch-jüdischer Herkun� geboren, ha� e, nach einer kurzen Revolte gegen Schule und Elternhaus, parallel eine Lehrerausbildung und Tischlerlehre absolviert und beide 1924 abgeschlossen. Er engagierte sich damals in der sozialis� schen Jugend- und Schulreformbewegung, studierte seit 1925 am Pädagogischen Ins� tut und promovierte 1928 bei dem Psychologen und Sprachtheore� ker Karl Bühler mit der Disserta� on „Die Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie“. 1930 erhielt er für die Fächer Mathema� k und Physik eine Anstellung als Haupt-schullehrer in Wien, die er bis 1935 inneha� e. Dank seiner Kontakte zum Wiener Kreis begann er seine philosophischen Ideen niederzuschreiben und veröff entlichte diese, auf Anregung von Herbert Feigl, stark gekürzt, 1934 unter demTitel Logik der Forschung in einer Schri� enreihe des Wiener Kreises.1935/36 reiste Popper für einige Monate nach London und lernte dort Erwin Schrödinger, Bertrand Russell, Ernst Gombrich, Alfred Tarski und vor allem den Ökonomen Friedrich von Hayek kennen, der ihn später beru ich förderte. Unter dem Eindruck der angespannten poli� schen Lage in Österreich nahm er 1937 eine Dozentur an der neuseeländischen Universität in Christchurch an. Dort entstan-den sein berühmtestes Werk The Open Society and Its Enemies (1950) und die mehr theore� sche Arbeit The Poverty of Historicism (1957), in der er Prinzipien der Logik der Forschung auf die Sozial-wissenscha� en übertrug.In meinem Vortrag möchte ich nicht die rein logischen Beweise disku� eren, mit denen Popper in den genannten Bänden die von ihm entwickelte geschichtsphilosophische Konzep� on des Historizismus kri� sierte und widerlegte: Für Popper ist der sogen. Historizismus ein Irrglaube, den Popper bei Platon, Hegel und Marx nachweist. Er beruhe auf dem Glauben an eine geschichtliche Notwendigkeit und an nachweisbare Gesetze der historischen Entwicklung; das Ziel wissenscha� licher Erkenntnis bestehe daher in geschichtlichen Voraussagen und in der Chance zu gesellscha� licher Totalplanung. Ich möchte klären, inwieweit er mit diesem idealtypisch entworfenen Historizismus Karl Marx und dem späteren Marxismus in seiner deutschen und österreichischen Ausprägung gerecht wird bzw. inwieweit er damit wesentliche Züge des Na� onalsozialismus tri� . Abschließend will ich darstellen, ob und wie Fachhistoriker auf Poppers geschichtsphilosophische Konzep� on reagierten.
CVBelke, Ingrid, Historikerin. Studium der Klassischen Philologie und Germanis� k (Staatsexamen, Universität Erlangen); Tä� gkeit als Verlagslektorin und Gastdozen� n (University of Cincinna� /USA, 1968/69). Studium der Allg. Geschichte des Mi� elalters und der Neuzeit, Wirtscha� swissenscha� en, Philosophie und Germanis� k (Promo� on 1975 an der Universität Basel), Disserta� on: „Die sozial-reformerischen Ideen von Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1838–1921) im Zusammenhang mit allg. Reform-bestrebungen des Wiener Bürgertums 1890–1930 (Tübingen 1978). 1976–1981 Wissenscha� liche Mitarbeiterin des Ins� tuts für die Geschichte der deutschen Juden, Hamburg und 1981–2000 des Deutschen Literaturarchivs, Marbach /N. Seit 2001 Mitherausgeberin der „Werke“ Siegfried Kracau-ers (1889-1966).
Cris na Chimisso (The Open University, Milton Keynes)
A Ma er of Substance? Gaston Bachelard on Chemistry’s Philosophical Lessons
Many historians of philosophy of science have pointed out that tradi onally philosophers of sci-ence have paid selec ve a en on to some sciences rather than others. Physics has been the model for a large part of mainstream of philosophy of science. Cri cs have argued that this has created a philosophy of science that has o en been claimed to be general but has in fact re ected the par- cular science taken as model. On the other hand, some philosophers, as for instance Bernade e
Bensaude-Vincent, have argued that the dis nc veness of an important part of French philosophy of science comes from its focus on chemistry. In this paper I shall focus on the signi cance of chemistry for some crucial aspects of the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard. He believed that ‘philosophy should follow science’ and that ‘the major lesson that the philosopher should learn from the evolu on of science is that philosophy itself should be improved’. Here I will look speci cally at some of the less-ons that for Bachelard philosophy should learn from chemistry, including lessons about the role of analysis and synthesis in knowledge, the concept of substance and of the scien c object.
CVCris na Chimisso, PhD (University of Cambridge) is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and European Studies at The Open University (United Kingdom). She was previously Rathenau fellow at the Max Planck Ins tute for the History of Science (Berlin), Sarton fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Science, and post-doctoral fellow at the Department of History of science, Harvard, and lecturer at the University of Aberdeen. She is the author of the monographs Wri ng the History of the Mind: Philosophy and Science in France, 1900 to 1960s, Ashgate 2008, and Gaston Bachelard: Cri c of Science and the Imagina on, Routledge 2001, and of ar cles on history and philosophy of science, including on Georges Canguilhem, Gaston Bachelard, Hélène Metzger, Aldo Mieli and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.
Richard Creath (Arizona State University, Tempe)
Metaphysics in the Thir es: Why Should Anyone Care Now?
We live in a metaphysical age. So some philosophers are now baffl ed (and others outraged) that members of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s a� acked metaphysics as empty at best and u� erly unin-telligible at worst. This paper examines this rejec� on of metaphysics to understand both what me-taphysics was then taken to be and why the rejec� on took the form that it did. The answer, it turns out, is as much poli� cal – in the widest sense – as it is scien� c. Once we see that, we can begin to see why that discussion of metaphysics more than 80 years ago is relevant to our own � me.
CVRichard Creath is President’s Professor of Life Sciences and of Philosophy at Arizona State University, where he is also Director, Program in History and Philosophy of Science. He is the author of nu-merous papers on Rudolf Carnap and W.V. Quine, especially on the topic of analy� city. Prof. Creath is the editor of Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work and co-editor, with Jane Maienschein, of Biology and Epistemology. He is also General Editor of the mul� -volume Collected Works of Rudolf Carnap, forthcoming from Open Court Publica� ons.
Hans-Joachim Dahms (Berlin)
Thomas Kuhn’s and the Sociology of Science
The talk will give a survey of Kuhns publica� ons and dealings with the sociology of science. This in-cludes his early aquaintance with Ludviks Flecks work „Die Entstehung einer wissenscha� lichen Tat-sache“ (to which Kuhn came back in the introduc� on to the American edi� on of that book in 1979) and his par� cipa� on in the Berkeley conference series about measurement in the social sciences in the late 50� es. Around 1960 Kuhn had plans to develop sociology of science to a respectable and powerful academic discipline, with the collabora� on of some leading representa� ves of that eld like Robert K. Merton and Bernhard Barber. It is a ques� on why these ambi� ons were not ful lled. Surprisingly in „Structures“, published soon a� erwards, sociology of science played only a minor role. And in the end Kuhn had to struggle more and more with currents like the „strong programme“ with its reduc� on of philosophy of science to a sociological subdiscipline.The paper is based on the recent literature (including publica� ons on Ludvik Fleck) and on the pa-pers of Kuhn at MIT and Merton at Columbia.
CVStudium der Philosophie, Linguis� k und Soziologie in Gö� ngen, Mitglied des Gründungsausschusses der Universität Osnabrück, Dr. phil. Bremen, Dr. phil. habil. Osnabrück; wiss. Mitarbeiter in Projekten an den Universitäten Gö� ngen, München und Wien. Buchveröff entlichungen zum Logischen Empiris-mus und ca. 50 Aufsätze zur Wissenscha� stheorie, Philosophie-, Wissenscha� s- und Universitätsge-schichte des 20. Jahrhunderts; demnächst: Neue Sachlichkeit in Malerei, Architektur und Philosophie der 1920er Jahre.
Chris an Damböck (University of Vienna)
Thomas Kuhn and the Structuralist View of Scien c Theories.The Formal and the Historical Perspec ve of Theory Change
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scien c Revolu ons is mostly viewed as a historical approach to the dynamic of scien c theories that deeply challenges the received formalist and norma ve con-cep ons of the logical empiricist tradi on. Whereas “normal science” obviously has much to do with the picture that was drawn by the logical empiricists, it is the crucial no on of “revolu onary sci-ence” in Kuhn’s reconstruc on of the dynamic of scien c theories that seems to point to an aspect of the sciences that is completely at odds with the logical empiricist picture. In spite of that Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller and their structuralist school claimed that there is a natural way to reconstruct the whole development of a science, with the inclusion of both the normal and the re-volu onary phases, from a purely formal point of view. In this paper I shall defend that claim of the structuralist school. I shall argue that Kuhn never claimed that it is impossible to reconstruct revolu- onary phases of a scien c theory from a formal and norma ve point of view. Kuhn’s challenge to
the logical empiricist tradi on was not the thesis of total failure of the formal and norma ve account but rather the claim that a ra onal reconstruc on of the sciences is necessarily incomplete as long as it is exclusively formal and norma ve and does not take into account the whole historical reality with its indispensable sociological and psychological aspects.The main basis of this paper is the scien c correspondence between Thomas Kuhn and Wolfgang Stegmüller from the Stegmüller Nachlass at the Brenner Archive in Innsbruck. This correspondence provides new insights into the philosophical posi ons of both Stegmüller and Kuhn. In par cular, it turns out from the correspondence that Kuhn’s reac on to Stegmüller’s formal “Sneedi ca on of Kuhn” was en rely posi ve and that Kuhn took Stegmüller’s formal account quite seriously, as a means for a further clari ca on of his philosophical posi ons.
CVChris an Damböck studied philosophy in Vienna with added focuses on mathema cs and history (MA 1998, PhD 2005). From 2002 to 2011 he worked in several research projects at the Ins tu-te Vienna Circle, under the leadership of Friedrich Stadler. His main research topics are history of philosophy of science in the 19th and 20th century in central Europe; the philosophy of Dilthey; the philosophy of Carnap; history and philosophy of logic; formal epistemology; philosophical logic; me-thodological ques ons in philosophy and philosophy of science; the descrip ve-norma ve-dis nc- on in philosophy of science; the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn and Wolfgang Stegmüller; philosophy
of mind; philosophy of language.chris [email protected]
Richard Dawid (University of Vienna)
A Bayesian Model of No Alterna ve Arguments
In the absence of empirical con rma on, scien sts o en resort to non-empirical strategies of theo-ry assessment in order to enhance trust in their theories’ empirical viability. A main strategy of that kind is based on the observa on that no-one has found an alterna ve to a proposed theory so far. We construct a Bayesian model to show that the observa on of a lack of alterna ves indeed cons- tutes con rma on of the one available theory under certain condi ons. The talk is based on joint
work with Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg).
CVRichard Dawid is a philosopher of science at the University of Vienna and the Ins tute Vienna Circle. He holds a PhD in physics (University of Vienna). He has worked at the technical University of Mu-nich, the UC Berkeley and as a visi ng fellow at the University of Pi sburgh. A main focus of his work is the philosophical analysis of contemporary high energy physics. Two core ques ons he addresses are the ontological implica ons of those theories and the strategies of theory assessment in the absence of empirical con rma on.
richard.dawid univie.ac.at
Claude Debru (Ecole normale supérieure, Paris)
On the Rela onships Between Neuroscience and Philosophy:The Case of Sleep and Dreaming
In the late nineteen � ies a series of dicoveries in the US and in France lead to the idea that the so-called rapid-eye-movement sleep or paradoxical sleep could be the neurophysiological basis of dreaming as a special case of conscious experience. These discoveries, made by Eugene Aserinsky and William Dement in the US, and by Michel Jouvet in France, created the hope of providing an experimental content to the old philosophical theory of psychophysical parallelism, and especially of providing an experimental equivalent of the basic concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. A� er many intense discussions these hopes could not be en� rely ful lled. However, the techniques used in the six� es and seven� es, mainly based on electrophysiology and electroencephalography, are more and more replaced by imagery techniques which provide a ner picture of brain � ssue ac� vity in sleep and dreaming, so that psychophysical parallelism keeps its philosophical value. Psychoanaly� cal the-ories of dreaming appear less compa� ble with physiological data. Current theories about the biologi-cal func� ons of sleep and dreaming are very diff erent in their orienta� ons. However, Michel Jouvet‘s func� onal theory of dreaming as a reprogramming of gene� cal behavioral proper� es remains a major one. Dreaming could play a regulatory role in the interac� on between gene� cal individual pro-per� es and day-� me experience, due to brain plas� city. These ideas may lead to further researches performend on the molecular and cellular level of brain ac� vity in small physiological � me ranges.
CVClaude Debru is Professor of philosophy of science at the Ecole normale supérieure in Paris. He has wri� en on the history of protein chemistry and molecular biology, on contemporary sleep and dreaming research, on the history of hematology and on epistemological problems of hematological research; on the development of neuroscience in France a� er World War Two, and on the rela� on-ships between philosophy and psychophysiology regarding the structure of psychological � me. He has been ac� ve in the crea� on of the European Associa� on for the history of medicine and health and in the crea� on of the European Society for the History of science. He is a full or corresponding member of several Academies and a member of the Scien� c Commi� ee of the ESF Philosophy of science in a European perspec� ve Programme.
Michael Esfeld (University of Lausanne)
In Search for a Causal Explana on of the Bell Experiments
The theorem of John Bell (1964) proves that no local theory can account for the correla ons that quantum theory predicts and that have subsequently been con rmed by experiments. However, Bell’s theorem does not imply that we have to countenance what Einstein dismissed as “spooky ac on at a distance” in order to explain these correla ons. The main idea in the philosophical litera-ture is that the quantum systems in ques on are non-separable and that the no on of nonsepara-bility can show the way to an explana on of these correla ons that avoids a commitment to ac on at a distance. The no on of non-separability can be precisely spelled out in the framework of on c structural realism (OSR), which has been developed by European philosophers of science over the last decade. However, it is clear by now that OSR is an ontological posi on about what there is in the physical world (namely certain structures), but that as such it does not include a dynamics for these structures and, consequently, not an explana on of experimental results. Against this background, I shall develop a framework for a dynamics within OSR and apply this framework to the task of a cau-sal explana on of the non-local correla ons manifested in the Bell experiments. Finally, I shall relate that framework to the three standard interpreta ons of quantum theory, namely the Evere inter-preta on, the Bohm interpreta on, and the collapse interpreta on (GRW). The result will be that all three of these interpreta ons t into OSR and can on the basis of this ontology provide for a causal explana on of the Bell experiments.
CVMichael Esfeld, born 1966, is since 2002 full professor of philosophy of science at the University of Lausanne. His main areas of research are the metaphysics of science, the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind. In his recent years, he has notably worked on on c structural realism, the causal theory of proper es, and mental causa on. His recent publica ons include a book on Conser-va ve reduc onism (with Chris an Sachse, Routledge 2011), and introductory books to the philoso-phy of science and the philosophy of mind in French and German. Recent papers include “GRW as an ontology of disposi ons” (with Mauro Dorato), Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (2010); “Physics and causa on”, Founda ons of Physics 40 (2010); “Psycho-neural reduc on through func onal sub-types” (with Patrice Soom and Chris an Sachse), Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (2010).
Jan Faye (University of Copenhagen)
Does the Unity of Science Have a Future?
The main idea behinds the program of logical posi� vism was that of the unity of science. The idea carries the belief that all the sciences including the social sciences and the humani� es ought to share some common features if these disciplines were to be considered genuine sciences (Wissen-scha� en). In the end, according to the standard view, the unity of science program failed because it entailed unrealis� c commitments to an� -metaphysics, behaviourism, reduc� onism, nomothe� c descrip� ons, objec� vity, universalism, value-freeness, and veri ca� onism. Today no philosopher of science would even think of these commitments to hold unrestrictedly for the natural sciences.The cri� cism raised against the logical posi� vist view of the unity of science program was that neit-her the social sciences nor the humani� es were able to meet most of these requirements which were given a strong posi� vis� c interpreta� on. The opponents pointed out that both the social scien-ces and the humani� es shared an orienta� on towards idiographic descrip� ons. Hence Carl Hempel’s covering law model of explana� on was useless as an account of explana� on in history, psychology, sociology or anthropology. In fact, humanis� c disciplines were more interested in understanding than explana� on. Also the cri� cs emphasized that research within the social and humanis� c elds was not value-free, and the humani� es at least were interested in subjec� vity as much as objec� vity. Moreover, they stressed that our understanding of social and humanis� c phenomena depends on the cultural and historical context of our inquiry.In my talk I shall nevertheless argue for a unity of all sciences in spite of all the diff erences. I point to some of the mistakes made by the posi� vists but claim that these mistakes do not falsify the main idea. To carry such an argument through requires some revision of some philosophers’ understan-ding of what it takes to be an interpreta� on, an explana� on, a law, a model, and a theory.
CVMy scien� c publica� ons cover a broad spectrum of topics within philosophy of science including metaphysics, philosophy of space and � me, the interpreta� on of quantum mechanics, general scien-� c methodology, and the philosophy of the humani� es. I have authored 9 books, edited 15 books, and published around 120 scien� c and philosophical papers. Several of them are published in Da-nish, but most in English. The books include The Reality of the Future (1989), Niels Bohr: His Heritage and Legacy (1991), Rethinking Science (2002), and A� er Postmodernism: A Naturalis� c Reconstruc-� on of the Humani� es (2011).
Massimo Ferrari (University of Torino)
Materialien zu Moritz Schlicks intellektueller Biographie:Franz Erhardt und die Habilita on in Rostock
Die Ursprünge von Moritz Schlicks intellektueller Entwicklung sind bis dato kaum erforscht worden. Die einzige bedeutende Ausnahme ist das Buch von Ma hias Iven, das aber nur bis 1907 die Bio-graphie des jungen Schlicks rekonstruiert; es gilt indessen auch die unmi elbar folgende Phase vor Augen zu haben, wenn man sowohl die philosophische Perspek ve als auch den akademischen und kulturellen Kontext verstehen will, die den gedanklichen Werdegang des jungen Schlicks kennzeich-nen. Insbesondere scheint es angemessen, auf Schlicks Anfänge in Rostock näher einzugehen und sein Verhältnis zum dor gen philosophisch-akademischen Milieu zu beleuchten. Dabei spielt eine nicht unbedeutende Rolle die heute in Vergessenheit geratene Figur von Franz Erhardt, der sich für Schlicks Habilita on in Rostock einsetzte und mit dem Schlick in einer rela v engerer Beziehung stand. Es geht aber nicht nur um eine biogra sche Kuriosität, sondern auch um die Frage, inwieweit und in welchem Sinne die jugendliche Philosophie einer kün igen Schlüssel gur des Wiener Kreises mit dem tradi onellen deutschen Denken um die Jahrhundertwende verbunden war.Massimo Ferrari (1954) lehrt Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Turin. Schwerpunkt sei-ner wissenscha liche Tä gkeit ist die Philosophie des XIX. und XX. Jahrhunderts, insbesondere Neu-kan anismus, Phänomenologie, Logischer Empirismus, Pragma smus und analy sche Philosophie. Zahlreiche Publika onen, u. a. Retours à Kant (Paris 2001), Ernst Cassirer. Sta onen einer philoso-phischen Biographie (Hamburg 2003), Categorie e a priori (Bologna 2033). Er hat in Vorbereitung die intelletktuelle Biographie von Moritz Schlick.
CVMassimo Ferrari (1954) lehrt Geschichte der Philosophie an der Universität Turin. Schwerpunkt seiner wissenscha lichen Tä gkeit ist die Philosophie des XIX. und XX. Jahrhunderts, insbesondere Neukan anismus, Phänomenologie, Logischer Empirismus, Pragma smus und analy sche Philoso-phie. Zahlreiche Publika onen, u. a. Introduzione al neocri cismo (Roma-Bari 1997), Retours à Kant (Paris 2001), Ernst Cassirer. Sta onen einer philosophischen Biographie (Hamburg 2003), Categorie e a priori (Bologna 2033), Non solo idealismo (Firenze 2006). Gegenwär g arbeitet er an der intellektu-ellen Biographie von Moritz Schlick.
Owen Flanagan (Duke University, Durham)
The In uence of Posi vism on B. F. Skinner‘s Radical Behaviorism
B.F. Skinner was working as a poet in Greenwich Village in NYC, when he read a popular ar cle by Bertrand Russell on logical posi vism. In his autobiography Skinner says that this was a turning point. A er reading Russell on Viennese posi vism, he applied to psychology program at Harvard propo-sing to give „opera onal de ni ons of “belief” and “desire.” The rest, as we say, is history. In this talk, I explore the ques on of whether, and if so how, Skinner‘s brand of radical behaviorism remai-ned true to the spirit of the Viennese posi vism that allegedly inspired him.
CVOwen Flanagan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University in Durham NC. He is also in Psychology and Neuroscience. Flanagan works in philosophy of mind, moral psychology, and compara ve philosophy. His most recent book is The Bodhisa va‘s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (MIT Press 2011). His other books are: The Science of the Mind (MIT press, 1984; 2nd edi on, 1991); Varie es of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism (Harvard University Press, 1991); Consciousness Reconsidered (MIT Press, 1992); Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life (Oxford University Press, 1996); Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolu on of the Con-scious Mind (Oxford University, 2000); The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Re-concile Them (Basic 2002); The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World (MIT Press 2007).
Maria Carla Galavo (University of Bologna)
Probabilis c Epistemology: A European Tradi on
Probabilis� c epistemology holds that the analysis of knowledge should start from the acknowledge-ment that probability is an essen� al ingredient of science and more generally of human knowl-edge, and that induc� on is a necessary cons� tuent of the scien� c method. This trend has been developed by a number of authors including Richard Jeff rey, Brian Skyrms, Patrick Suppes, and Bas van Fraassen, whose steps have been followed by so many that a probabilis� c concep� on of epis-temology is gradually becoming predominant. While probabilis� c epistemology has progressively ourished, awareness of its origins has been somewhat le� behind. Probabilis� c epistemology is usually seen as a product of the encounter of logical empiricism with American pragma� sm. Without denying the impact of American pragma� sts on logical empiricists, it can be argued that a probabi-lis� c approach to epistemology was already part of the European scenario before the dissolu� on of logical empiricism in the late 1930s. Traces of probabilis� c epistemology can be found in the wri� ngs of a number of authors like Janina Hosiasson, Bruno de Fine� , Harold Jeff reys, Frank Ramsey and Hans Reichenbach. The work of these and other authors stemming from the four corners of Europe tes� es to the existence of a European tradi� on in probabilis� c epistemology.
CVMaria Carla Galavo� is Professor of Philosophy of science at the University of Bologna, life member of Clare Hall College, Cambridge and of the Pi� sburgh Center for the Philosophy of Science. She is Chair of the European Science Founda� on Scien� c Networking Programme “The Philosophy of Science in Europe” (2008-2013). Her list of publica� ons includes a number of ar� cles published in important journals; the volume Philosophical Introduc� on to Probability, Stanford 2005; and the collec� ons Bruno de Fine� , Radical Probabilist, London: College Publica� ons, 2009; Cambridge and Vienna. Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle, Dordrecht-Boston 2006; Observa� on and Experi-ment in the Natural and Social Sciences, Dordrecht-Boston 2003, Stochas� c Causality, (edited with P. Suppes and D. Costan� ni), Stanford 2001; and Reasoning, Ra� onality, and Probability, (edited with R. Scazzieri and P. Suppes), Stanford 2008.
mariacarla.galavo� @unibo.it
Olav Gjelsvik (University of Oslo)
The Vienna Circle: In uences on Norwegian Philosophy
Arne Næss and his philosophical works are of course deeply marked by his interac ons with the Vienna circle, even there are other signi cant in uences, and his later philosophical works present a mul tude of topics and approaches. In my paper I will trace some of the Viennese in uence on Norway through Arne Næss, and also try to show that the most important in uences from Vienna to Norway followed other paths. I shall deal with the rst by discussing some writers directly in uenced by Næss, and the second by discussing more thoroughly three writers who can be seen as bringing Vienna to Norway independently of Næss. They are Knut Erik Tranøy, Dag nn Føllesdal, and Jon Elster. Tranøy(doctorate in Cambridge),discussed very early the ethical non-cogni vism of Carnap and voiced strong cri cism of it in the early 50thies. Tranøy was in uenced by Bri sh philosophers and also by Georg Henrik von Wright. Dag nn Føllesdal, (Harvard) developed philosophical views in cri cal discussions of Quine, and took some of Quine’s cri cisms of Carnap much further. Jon Elster (Paris) was partly in uenced by Føllesdal, and developed posi ons in the philosophy of social science with great analy cal clarity and respect for/knowledge of the sciences in ques on, thus manifes ng the Viennese spirit (of f. inst. Neurath).
CVOlav Gjelsvik received his doctorate in philosophy from University of Oxford, where he wrote a thesis on the rela onship between metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the Mind-Body problem. He has since then been employed by the University of Oslo, as full professor from 1994, and has held visi ng posi ons in Oxford, Berkeley, and LSE. He has wri en papers and ar cles about many issues in the philosophy of logic, language, mind, in metaphysics and epistemology, and also about ra onality and the addic ons. Presently he works on accounts of agency. He is since 2007 a Research Director at CSMN, a Centre of Excellence at the University of Oslo, since 2010 its Director.
olav.gjelsvik@i kk.uio.no
Michael Heidelberger (University of Tübingen)
Mathema cs and Reality: Alterna ve French Concep ons
In this paper, I would like to deal with some French concep ons of the philosophy of mathema cs star ng with Auguste Comte. They are then compared to the received view of Logical Empiricism.
CVMichael Heidelberger holds the chair for Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Tübin-gen. At the centre of his interest are topics related to causality and probability, measurement and experiment. He specialises in the history of the philosophy of science, mainly of the late nineteenth and early twen eth century and focuses on philosophy and history of psychology, of physics and related subjects in this period. He is the author of Nature from Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner’s Psychophysical Worldview (University of Pi sburgh Press 2004) and of many ar cles on a wide vari-ety of subjects. Together with Gregor Schiemann, he has recently edited a volume on the no on of hypothesis in science: The Signi cance of the Hypothe cal in the Natural Sciences.
Rainer Hegselmann (University of Bayreuth)
Modeling Hume’s Moral and Poli cal Theory – Scien c Status and Perspec ves
Hume’s moral and poli cal theory is about the problems, helpful inven ons, and driving mecha-nisms of the evolu on of societal forms from small to large groups. Hume’s theory is rich and infor-mal and although over 250 years old, it is s ll a modern theory. HUME1.0 is a computer model that reconstructs this theory and that gives detail and precision to the complex and dynamic interplay of trust and trustworthiness, the division of labour, and material wealth. The talk, rstly, describes the components of HUME1.0, solu ons of design problems and some ini al results. Secondly, the talk discusses the status, dangers and perspec ves of such an approach.
CVRainer Hegselmann was born 1950 in Essen (Germany). 1969–1973 he studied philosophy and social sciences at Bochum University. 1977 he received a doctoral degree in philosophy from Essen Uni-versity, 1983 a habilita on from Karlsruhe University. In the years 1986–1988 he got a Heisenberg s pent from the DFG. 1988–1996 he was professor at Bremen University. Since 1996 he is professor of philosophy at the University of Bayreuth. He was fellow of the Netherlands Ins tute for Advanced Study (NIAS), the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) of Bielefeld University and guest profes-sor at the Catholic University of Leuven.
Veronika Hofer (Medical University of Vienna) and Michael Stöltzner (University of South Carolina)
Vienna Circle Historiographies
During the almost 20 year both of us have been interested in the Vienna Circle, its historical percep- on has changed in many ways. While back then a large number of historical studies and philoso-
phical analyses set out with the declared inten on to overcome the ‘received view’ and go back to the sources themselves, today there exists a broad historical scholarship about the movement’s core members and their embedding into Austrian and German intellectual tradi ons. While this scholar-ship could ini ally be subdivided into a strand that took the Vienna Circle as part of an Austrian Phi-losophy and a contras ng one that analyzed the movements’ neo-Kan an roots, O o Neurath and Rudolf Carnap being the main protagonists respec vely, today we witness a stunning plurality both as regards the themes and the methodologies applied. Albeit less scru nized, the same holds true for the broader movement of Logical Empiricism. Commencing from the recently published Cam-bridge Companion, our paper provides a provisional eld guide on methodology and inves gates the lessons of the surprising diversity on the interac ons of philosophy and history of science.On a rst level of classi ca on, one nds standard historiographic methods, among them network history, ins tu onal history, intellectual history, history of ideas, cultural history, applied to the Vienna Circle alongside the history of philosophy. On a second level, these methods interact with diverging intellectual and philosophical agendas, ranging from upholding the legacy of Red Vienna or the late Enlightenment to speci c programs in contemporary philosophy of science, ranging from Neurath’s economics to Carnap’s Au au and quasianalysis. It is interes ng, Again historicizing, on a third level, these jus catory employments we nd that they were started by the movement itself, both the form of programma c wri ngs and intellectual autobiographies, a fact which in uenced the cri cs’ appraisal of the Circle. On a fourth level, the more recent debates about what cons tu-tes, both historically and thema cally, the history of philosophy of science can be understood as an a empt to rede ne the Vienna Circle’s historiographic narra ve.
CVVeronika Hofer is a researcher at the Medical University of Vienna and a research associate at the Center of Bioethics at the University of South Carolina. She has studied history, German literature and philosophy at the Universi es of Vienna and Salzburg. Her main areas of research are the history of biology and medicine in the 19th and 20th century, especially the history of gene cs, eugenics, and zoological gardens, and the history of the philosophy of biology in the 20th century.Michael Stöltzner is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of South Carolina. He has studied physics and philosophy at Tübingen, Trieste, Vienna, and Bielefeld, was a scien c member of the Ins tute Vienna Circle, and held posi ons at the Universi es of Salzburg, Bielefeld and Wup-pertal. His main areas of research are history and philosophy of physics and applied mathema cs, core principles of mathema cal physics; history of logical empiricism; the development of formal teleology; and the philosophy of applied science, in par cular the role of models and ceteris paribus laws.
[email protected]@sc.edu
Allan Janik (The Brenner Archives Research Ins� tute, University of Innsbruck)
The Importance of Historical Philosophy of Science for Cultural History
Rela� vism is the bane of cultural history. Intellectual historians want to do jus� ce to the past but so-me� mes it seems virtually impossible to do so. It is bad enough that some posi� ons, say, Aristotle’s view of women or slavery, are beyond our ken but o� en it is scarcely possible to make head or tail of the way a problem is posed. If you can’t understand the ques� on, there is not much hope of making sense of any answer that is proposed. So we some� mes end up in a situa� on where the very pro-blem that a thinker poses is enough to disqualify him from being taken seriously in the rst place; some perfectly respectable scholars simply refuse to ‘get their hands dirty’ as it were and cultural history suff ers for it. Cultural historians seem to be impaled upon the dilemma: subtle anachronism or mere rela� vism. The both are self-defea� ng for historians: the former because it is a-historical and the la� er because it abandons history’s chief challenge: to make sense of the past. The concep-� on of ra� onality embodied in historically-oriented philosophy of science with its emphasis upon science as reliable knowledge grounded in the prac� ce of a cri� cal community (vulgo “paradigms” in Kuhn’s terms) presents us with an intellectual instrumentarium that can aid cultural and intellectual historians to produce that robust rela� vism that permits us to evaluate the past on its own terms wi-thout being ourselves commi� ed to accep� ng that evalua� on. There is a problem of re exivity but it is not a fatal one. These ideas will be discussed in terms of my own researches into O� o Weininger and n de siècle Viennese culture.
CVAllan Janik, ci� zen of both Austria and the United States, is a philosopher and historian of ideas. He is senior research, fellow of the Brenner Archives at the University of Innsbruck and honorary profes-sor of philosophy at the university of Vienna. His many books include Wi� genstein’s Vienna (with S. Toulmin), The Concept of Knowledge in Prac� cal Philosophy (in Swedish), Style, Poli� cs and the Fu-ture of Philosophy as well as the study Towards a New Philosophy for the EU (Founda� on for Poli� cal Innova� on 2008). He is especially interested in problems surrounding the European Union’s “demo-cracy de cit”, the nature of par� cipatory democracy and the role of con ict in democra� c society.
Eckehart Köhler (University of Vienna and Lauder Business School)
Gödel and Carnap. Platonism vs. Conven onalism
Kurt Gödel (1955) seemed to successfully refuted the core of Carnap’s “Syntax-Program”, namely that one cannot do or even just formulate mathema� cs without content. (I.e. one needs signi cant por� ons of Hilbert’s “intui� ve” mathema� cs.) Gödel omi� ed an explica� on of Conven� ons – other then that they allegedly exclude intui� on –, but he also omi� ed an explica� on of Intui� on itself (the faculty of observa� on which makes out the content of mathema� cs). Surprisingly, Gödel himself contributed to Carnap’s famous “Principle of Tolerance” (Logical Syntax §17), the core of Carnap’s Conven� onalism – although of course Gödel would never have agreed to the formula� on there. But Gödel’s main thesis about Conven� onalism used in his refuta� on of the “syntax program”, namely that Carnap resorted to conven� ons in order to “eliminate” intui� on, is misleading. For it can be shown that, unbeknownst to Carnap (or Gödel), conven� ons in fact “reveal” intui� ons in any case. Moreover it can also be shown that Gödel’s de ni� on of Platonism, which makes essen� al reference to intui� on, actually makes Platonism compa� ble with Conven� onalism! Intui� on simply needs to be explicated as norma� ve value judgment – Gödel came to within a hair’s breadth to this idea. With reference to Hume’s Law (fact/value dichotomy), Platonism is just the belief in objec� vely valid norms. Hume’s dichotomy is presupposed in (Bayesian) Decision Theory, and using it we may easily dis� nguish the real from the ideal (Platonic) world. We also quickly see that Conven� onalism is com-pa� ble with Platonism – so long as conven� ons are suffi ciently well established. In retrospect we may view Carnap as decidedly Platonis� c, at least for certain areas: namely in his Induc� ve Logic.
CV• Born 1939 in Darmstadt, Germany, raised in the USA. Study of Philosophy at Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA, with a B.A. in 1962. Further studies in Philosophy at New York University 1962–64; at the University of Munich with Wolfgang Stegmüller; gradua� on with Ph.D. in 1976 at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln under Werner Leinfellner with a disserta� on on Carnaps Induc� ve Logic.• Managing Editor of the journal Theory & Decision 1970–76.• Par� cipa� on in and organiza� on of Wi� genstein Symposia, Kirchberg am Wechsel 1977–78.• Par� cipant in a Research Project on the Vienna Circle with Friedrich Stadler and Karl Müller, Vienna 1981–85.• Co-founder of the Kurt Gödel Society (1986) and of the Ins� tute Vienna Circle (1991); secretary of both socie� es (KGS un� l 1994, IVC un� l 2004). Teaching du� es at the University of Vienna 1986–2005, rst in the Department of Sta� s� cs and Computer Science, a� er 1992 in the Department of Business Administra� on.• Habilita� on in Philosophy of Science at the University of Vienna in 2000 with the topic “Kurt Gödel’s Philosophy of Mathema� cs”.• Author of several dozen papers and ar� cles. Editor or co-editor of several collec� ons of research studies and proceedings volumes.• Co-editor with three contribu� ons of two collec� ons on Kurt Gödel — Wahrheit und Beweisbar-keit, I & II, Vienna 2002.• Teaching du� es at the Lauder Business School since 2003; Professor (FH) 2010.
eckehart.koehler�univie.ac.at
Heidi König-Porstner (University of Vienna)
General Rela vity in the English-speaking World: Henry L. Brose’sTransla on of Moritz Schlick’s “Space and Time in Contemporary Physics”
It was on an unusual path that Moritz Schlick’s monograph „Raum und Zeit in der gegenwär� gen Physik“ had made its way into the English-speaking world: Its transla� on took place in a German prisoner camp during the Great War. One of the internees, the young Oxford physicist Henry L. Bro-se, had read about Einstein’s theory of general rela� vity (GR) in the Vossische Zeitung, arranged for books on the subject to be sent into the camp, and dedicated the remaining years of his � me as an ‘enemy alien’ in Germany to their study and transla� on.In England, prior to November 1919, when the spectacular results of Arthur Eddington’s eclipse expedi� on con rmed Einstein’s theory, no arrangements for the publica� on of either transla� ons or original works on Einstein’s theory had yet been made. The sudden interest aroused by this ‘Revolu-� on in Science.’ (The Times ,7 November 1919) had found Bri� sh publishers unprepared. Moreover, the tense poli� cal situa� on between Britain and Germany had had a devasta� ng eff ect on com-munica� on between the corresponding scien� c communi� es, and knowledge on GR was scarce even among Bri� sh physicists. So when – thanks to Briose’s enormous eff orts – Space and Time in Contemporary Physics was published in spring 1920, it was one of the very rst popular exposi� ons on GR to be available in Bri� sh bookshops . Besides retracing mechanisms of knowledge transfer be-tween scien� sts from belligerant na� ons during and a� er WW1, I shall try to evaluate the impact of Schlick’s monograph on the philosophical recep� on of GR in England of the early 1920s.
CVHeidi König-Porstner, geb. 1965. Studium der Übersetzungswissenscha� en Wien 1995–2000. 2001–2002 Forschungsmitarbeiterin am Inst. für Wissenscha� stheorie, 2002–2009 am Inst. Wiener Kreis und Inst. für Zeitgeschichte (Wien). Projekte zu „Vertreibung und Rückkehr der Wissenscha� stheorie: Rudolf Carnap und Wolfgang Stegmüller“, „Paris – Wien. Logischer Empirismus & Wissenscha� liche Weltauff assung, 1918–1938“ sowie „Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe“ ( Leitung: Friedrich Stadler). Mitherausgeberin von Band V der Schlick-Edi� on, Publika� onen zur Rezep� on der Rela� vitätstheorie im englischsprachigen Raum sowie zu Wiener Kreis- und Wissenscha� sphilosophie und -geschichte.
heidi.koenig�univie.ac.at
Anne J. Kox (University of Amsterdam)
Some Highlights from the Vienna Circle Archive
The Vienna Circle Archive at the Noord-Hollands Archief in Haarlem, the Netherlands, contains the papers of Moritz Schlick and O o Neurath. In my presenta on I will rst sketch the history of the Archive and give a global overview of its contents. I will then single out some items of par cular interest for further discussion.
CVAnne J. Kox is Pieter Zeeman Professor of History of Physics at the University of Amsterdam and a member of the Board of the Vienna Circle Founda on, which administers the Vienna Circle Archive. He is also a long-standing member of the editorial team of the Einstein Papers Project at the Califor-nia Ins tute of Technology.
a.j.kox uva.nl
Theo A. F. Kuipers (University of Groningen)
Truth Approxima on by Belief Revision
Illka Niiniluoto (1999) was the rst to raise the ques� on whether the (AGM-)Belief Revision (BR) pro-gram and the Truth Approxima� on (TA-) program could frui� ully interact.At the rst EPSA-conference (Madrid, 2007) there were at least three talks on the subject, by Gusta-vo Cevolani and Francesco Calandra (2009), Theo Kuipers (2007, unpublished) and Niiniluoto (2009). In his invited lecture, Niiniluoto sketched the development of three more or less European research programs (Structuralism, Belief Revision, and Truthlikeness) and the possibility of interac� on.This year there appeared Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, edited by Erik Olsson and Sebas� an Enqvist, without any contribu� on on BR mee� ng TA. No Complaint! I know that at least some of those invited to contribute, myself included, were at the � me (2007) not yet ready for it.At the second EPSA-conference (2009, Amsterdam) I organized a symposium en� tled as the present talk. It was easy to nd contributors from the TA-side, but it was diffi cult to nd contributors from the BR-side. Contributors were: Gustavo Cevolani (Bologna) &Vincenzo Crupi (München) &Roberto Festa (Trieste), Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki), Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf), Sonja Smets (Groningen) & Alexandru Baltag (Amsterdam), Sjoerd Zwart (Del� /Eindhoven) &Gerard Renardel (Groningen).Recently appeared Belief Revision Aiming at Truth Approxima on, a special issue of Erkenntnis (75.2; September), edited by Gerhard Schurz and myself, and including all contribu� ons, and two other pa-pers, one by Igor Douven (Groningen) & Christoph Kelp (Leuven) and a re ned version of the EPSA-2007-contribu� on of myself (Groningen).In the paper I will present 1) a survey of the problem area, 2) an indica� on of the content of the special issue, and 3) a general framework that unites the basic version of at least three prima facie diff erent approaches to Truth Approxima� on by Belief Revision, viz. the conjunc� ve (Cevolani, Festa), the monadic (Niiniluoto) and the nomic one (Kuipers).
CVTheo A. F. Kuipers (1947) studied mathema� cs and philosophy in Eindhoven and Amsterdam. He is emeritus professor of philosophy of science of the University of Groningen. A synthesis of his work on con rma� on, empirical progress, and truth approxima� on, en� tled From Instrumentalism to Construc ve Realism appeared in 2000 as Vol.287 in the Synthese Library of Kluwer AP. A twin synthesis of his work on the structure of theories, research programs, explana� on, reduc� on, and computa� onal discovery and evalua� on, en� tled Structures in Science, appeared in 2001 as Volume 301 in the Synthese Library. In December 2005 there appeared two volumes of Essays in Debate with Theo Kuipers, edited by Roberto Festa, Atocha Aliseda and Jeanne Peijnenburg. He was the volume editor of General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007.
Mar n Kusch (University of Vienna)
Wi genstein‘s On Certainty and the Philosophy of Mathema cs
This paper inves gates the rela onship between Wi genstein‘s last notebooks (published posthu-mously under the tle „On Certainty“) and his re ec ons on the founda ons of mathema cs of the 1930s and 1940s. The central focus will be how the category of „certain es“ emerges in the re ec- ons on mathema cs (and in Wi genstein‘s „Lectures on Religious Belief“), and on whether the last
notebooks can be read as a contribu on to the philosophy of mathema cs.
CVMar n Kusch is Professor for Applied Theory of Science and Epistemology at the University of Vien-na. His main book publica ons are Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium (1989), Foucault‘s Strata and Fields (1991), Psychologism (1995), The Shape of Ac on (with H. M. Collins, 1998), Psychological Knowledge (1999), Knowledge by Agreement (2002), and A Scep cal Guide to Meaning and Rules (2006). He is currently wri ng a book on Wi genstein‘s contribu on to episte-mology and the philosophy of science.
mar n.kusch univie.ac.at
Ladislav Kvasz (Charles University, Prague)
Mathema cs and Experience
The Vienna Circle understood mathema� cs as an a priori discipline whose proposi� ons are analy� c. The aim of the paper is to put this view into a broader historical context and to stress also the expe-rien� al dimension of mathema� cs. We will introduce the no� on of *symbolic experience* and argue that formal logic is, besides arithme� c, algebra and the calculus, a further tool for obtaining such experience. We will therefore interpret the thesis that mathema� cs is reducible to logic as the thesis of linguis� c pessimism - as the claim that the symbolic tool of formal logic is the nal symbolic tool and will be never overcome by some new one. We will argue against this thesis.It seems that each symbolic tool of the past was accompanied by a philosophical thesis very similar to the logicist one. Thus besides the logicist thesis of Frege and Carnap (that mathema� cs is reduci-ble to formal logic) we will discuss the „arithme� cist“ thesis of the Pythagoreans (that mathema� cs can be reduced to arithme� c), the „algebraicist“ thesis of Viete and Descartes (that all problems of mathema� cs are soluble by means of algebra) and the „calculicist“ thesis of Laplace (that everything we can know, can be derived by solving diff eren� al equa� ons).In the paper we will try to argue that symbolic experience accumulated during the development of mathema� cs changed in a radical way how we perceive shape and how we conceptualize mo� on. Thus it seems that mathema� cs contributes to our empirical experience.
CVLadislav Kvasz obtained Master degree in mathema� cs in 1986 and PhD in philosophy in 1995, both from Comenius University in Bra� slava. Since 1986 he has been employed at the Comenius Univer-sity. In 2007 he moved to Prague, where he is employed at Charles University. In 2010 he became a Professor of Mathema� cs Educa� on. He teaches courses on calculus, set theory, logic and history of mathema� cs. He was holder of the Herder Scholarship (University of Vienna, 1993), Masaryk Scholarship (King‘s College London, 1995), Fulbright Scholarship (University of California at Berkeley, 1998), Humboldt Scholarship (Technical University in Berlin, 2001). His book Pa erns of Change won the 2011 Fernando Gil Interna� onal Prize for the Philosophy of Science.
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau (University of Vienna)
Kuhn, Naturalism and Cogni ve Psychology
Logical empiricism and the standard view in the philosophy of science made a strict separa� on between the logic of science and the empirical study of cogni� ve processing as it is described by psychology. Kuhn rejected this strict separa� on and used the results of the nascent cogni� ve psycho-logy, but also from Gestalt psychology to evaluate and cri� cize the claims of the standard concep� on in philosophy of science (as he rejected the separa� on of the logic of science from sociology and history of science). Already in his unpublished Lowell lectures (1951) Kuhn used such a naturalis-� c approach and developed it further in The Structure of Scien� c Revolu� ons (1962). Based on this naturalis� c approach to philosophy of science and the new results of psychology, Kuhn gave new answers to the ques� on of the rela� on of theory and observa� on, but also to the ques� on of conceptual changes and the development of new scien� c insights. While the logical empiricists analyzed the logical rela� ons between the theore� cal and the observa� onal vocabulary le� ng aside the psychology of percep� on, Kuhn used the results of cogni� ve psychology to contest the independence between theory and observa� on. The psychology in the 50s strongly suggested the idea, that perceptual processes are penetrated by beliefs and conceptual content. Besides Gestalt psychology, the so called “new look” in psychology (e.g. Jerome Bruner) in uenced theory-ladenness and seemed to empirically con rm it. Gestalt psychology suggested that new conceptual structures and pa� erns are gained through sudden insight and permit a new organiza� on of what we see. We will inves� gate how this psychological research shaped Kuhn´s concep� on of scien� c revolu� ons in Structure and will evaluate the conclusions Kuhn drew from psychology.
CVChristoph Limbeck-Lilienau studied philosophy at the University Paris 1-Sorbonne, at the University of Vienna and for one term at Duke University (USA). Since 2005 he worked in diff erent research projects at the Ins� tute Vienna Circle (University of Vienna), so in the Schlick edi� on project, in a project on Carnap and Stegmüller and un� l 2011 in a project on the historical turn in the philosophy of science. He specialized in philosophy of science, philosophy of psychology and in philosophy of mind. He is currently wri� ng his disserta� on on the ques� on of content in philosophy of percep� on.
christoph.limbeck�univie.ac.at
Pablo Lorenzano (Na onal University of Quilmes, Argen na)
What is the Status of the Hardy-Weinberg Law within Popula on Gene cs?
The aim of this communica on is to analyze the status of the Hardy-Weinberg law within (classical) popula on gene cs. The analysis will be carried out with the no ons of the structuralist view of the-ories, specially those of fundamental law or guide-principle, specializa on, and special law, having as a background a ra onal reconstruc on of (classical) popula on gene cs–sketched in this communi-ca on– made within the framework of such a metatheory.
CVFull Professor (Ordinarius). Area: Philosophy of Science. Na onal University of Quilmes. From 1998. Researcher at the Studies and Research Center of the Na onal University of Quilmes. Member of the Career of Scien c and Technical Researcher of the Na onal Council of Scien c and Technical Inves ga ons (CONICET). Independent Researcher. From: 01/01/2009.
Jane Maienschein (Arizona State University)
Hans Driesch and Developing Organisms
Hans Driesch is variously praised (as by Rudolf Carnap) for his approach to understanding develop-mental biology, and reviled for his vitalist approach that is taken as non-scien� c or even as pro-viding a founda� on for Nazism. It is worth looking more closely at what Driesch actually said, in par� cular in his widely-read two volume Giff ord Lectures of 1906-1908, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. There, Driesch reviewed exis� ng knowledge about embryonic development, the extent to which it is possible and what limits the ability to derive causal laws to explain how an in-dividual organism becomes organized and retains its individuality. His own interpreta� ons were set aside by genera� ons of biologists, but in fact nd resonance with eff orts in regenera� ve medicine and systems biology today.
CVJane Maienschein specializes in the history and philosophy of developmental biology and directs the Embryo Project (embryo.asu.edu). She combines analysis of epistemologies, theories, laboratory prac� ces and experimental approaches with study of the people, ins� tu� ons, and changing social, poli� cal, and legal context in which science thrives. Maienschein has won the History of Science Society’s Joseph Hazen Educa� on Award, is a fellow of the American Associa� on for the Advance-ment of Science and the Associa� on for Women in Science. She is Regents’ Professor, President’s Professor, and Parents Associa� on Professor at Arizona State, where she directs the Center for Biolo-gy and Society. She is Adjunct Senior Scien� st at the Marine Biological Laboratory, where she directs the HPS Program. Her 3 books and 12 (co) edited books include the well-received Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells (Harvard University Press).
Thomas Mormann (UPV/EHU, Donos� a-San Sebas� án)
Wiener wissenscha liche Weltanschauungen – Zwischen “Leben”, Poli k, und Wissenscha sphilosophie
Das sogenannte Manifest des Wiener Kreises “Wissenscha� liche Weltauff assung – Der Wiener Kreis” gilt als einer der Schlüsseltexte des logischen Empirismus des Wiener Kreises. Gleichwohl wird es als philosophischer Text nicht besonders hochgeschätzt. Es gilt als krude und wenig sub� l, eben als ein “Manifest”, welches das Ziel ha� e, die Philosophie des Wiener Kreises einem Publikum zur Kennt-nis zu bringen, das mit feinsinnigen Unterscheidungen der akademischen Philosophie wenig hä� e anfangen können. Gleichwohl legten die Autoren des Manifestes, Neurath, Carnap und Hahn, großen Wert darauf, das Manifest in seiner Eigenart als Darstellung einer wissenscha� lichen Weltauff assung von anderen, eher unverbindlichen Darstellungen bloßer Weltanschauungen abzugrenzen. Diesem Versuch war nur mäßiger Erfolg beschieden. Auch innerhalb des Wiener Kreises und in seinem Um-feld blieb das Manifest umstri� en.Ich möchte in meinem Beitrag die Problema� k des Manifestes im Kontext einer Reihe ähnlicher zeitgenössischer Versuche disku� eren, Wissenscha� und wissenscha� liche Philosophie für gesell-scha� liche und poli� sche Veränderungen in Richtung auf Fortschri� und Au� lärung einzusetzen. Insbesondere möchte ich dabei eingehen auf Schlicks Ausführungen zu einer wissenscha� lichen Weltanschauung und Freuds Überlegungen zur “Weltanschauungsproblema� k” eingehen, die diese Autoren etwa zur selben Zeit vorgetragen haben, als das Manifest entstand.
CVThomas Mormann studierte Mathema� k, Linguis� k und Philosophie an den Universi¬täten Münster und Freiburg/Breisgau. Er promovierte in Mathema� k an der Universität Dortmund. Danach arbeite-te er zunächst im Bereich der Didak� k der Mathema� k. Später kam er zur Philosophie und habili� er-te sich an der Universität München für Philosophie, Logik, und Wissenscha� stheorie mit einer Ar-beit zur Kons� tu� onstheorie in Carnaps Au� au. Seit 2000 ist er Professor am Department für Logik und Wissen¬scha� stheorie an der Universität des Baskenlandes UPV/EHU in Donos� a-San Sebas� án in Spanien. Seine Interessengebiete umfassen Wissenscha� sphilosophie und ihre Geschichte, Philo-sophie der Mathema� k und formale Ontologie. Er veröff entlichte (u.a) eine Einführung in die Philo-sophie Rudolf Carnaps (Beck) und ist Herausgeber einer Sammlung von Carnaps unveröff entlichten frühen an� metaphysischen Manuskripten (Meiner).
Elisabeth Nemeth (University of Vienna)
Edgar Zilsel on the Rela onship between the Logical Analysis of Science and the History and Sociology of Science
I will talk about the mul� -faceted work of the philosopher, physicist, mathema� cian and historian Edgar Zilsel (1891–1944). I want to shed some light on the ques� on how Zilsel‘s studies of the histo-ry of ideas, culture and science can be related to his philosophical work. It‘s true that during his life Edgar Zilsel devoted himself more and more to historical and sociological research – nevertheless he con� nued to think of himself as a philosopher. Zilsel felt that he was affi liated to the group of Logical Empiricists, although many of his views do not easily t in the Logico-Empiricist framework. I will try to understand how Zilsel‘s historical – sociological research (into the emergence of the concept of genius and into the emergence of modern science) was related to the philosophical posi� on he took in the Vienna Circle‘s discussions about the logical structure of scien� c theories.
elisabeth.nemeth�univie.ac.at
Ma hias Neuber (University of Tübingen)
Is Logical Empiricism Compa ble with Scien c Realism?
Scien� c realism is the view that the theore� cal en� � es of science exist. Atoms, forces, electroma-gne� c elds, and so on, are not merely instruments for organizing observa� onal data but are real and causally eff ec� ve. This view seems to be hardly compa� ble with the logical empiricist agenda: As common wisdom has it, logical empiricism is mainly characterized by a strong veri ca� on criterion of meaning, i.e., by the project of de ning the meaning of theore� cal terms by virtue of the meaning of purely observa� onal terms. However, it has been largely ignored by the historians of logical empiri-cism that there indeed existed a realist fac� on within the logical empiricist movement. Among the few authors who have recognized both the historical and the programma� c relevance of this realist fac� on is Stathis Psillos who, in two recent papers, a� empts to emphasize the important role played in this connec� on by Herbert Feigl (see Psillos 2011a) and by Hans Reichenbach (see Psillos 2011b). According to Psillos, it was these two thinkers who documented in their wri� ngs the compa� bility of logical empiricism and scien� c realism.Like Psillos I am of the opinion that the realist fac� on within the logical empiricist movement deser-ves more a� en� on than it has received so far. However, I will come to a diff erent result than Psillos. According to the view I wish to defend, Feigl and Reichenbach (and with them Psillos) are s� ll too op� mis� c about the ontological impact of language. In order to establish the intended realist ac-count of logical empiricism, more metaphysics is needed than Feigl and Reichenbach (and with them Psillos) would allow. As will be shown, among the logical empiricists themselves it was Eino Kaila (1890-1958) who came closest to this—less linguis� c and more metaphysical—kind of approach.References:Psillos, S. 2011a. “Choosing the Realist Framework”, Synthese 180: 301-316.—2011b. “On Reichenbach’s Argument for Scien� c Realism”, Synthese 181: 23-40.
CVBorn 1970 in Stu� gart (Germany). Studies in philosophy, linguis� cs, and sociology at the Universi� es of Munich and Berlin. 1997 M.A. phil., 2009 Dr. phil.2000-2001 Visi� ng scholar at the University of Sea� le.2002-2005 Member of the Moritz-Schlick-Edi� on project at the Ins� tute Vienna Circle.Since 2005 Docent for ‘Logic and Philosophy of Science’ at the University of Tübingen.Summer 2010 Visi� ng fellow at the University of Helsinki.Recent Publica� ons: Die Grenzen des Revisionismus – Schlick, Cassirer und das ‘Raumproblem’. Springer: Wien/New York 2011. “Feigl’s ‘Scien� c Realism’”, Philosophy of Science 78 (2011), 165-183. “Realism as a Problem of Language – From Carnap to Reichenbach and Kaila”, in: Richard Creath (ed.), Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism (= Vienna Circle Ins� tute Yearbook 16), Springer: Dordrecht–Heidelberg–Boston–London 2011.
John D. Norton (University of Pi� sburgh)
Approxima� on and Idealiza� on: Why the Diff erence Ma� ers
Idealiza� ons are dis� nguished from approxima� ons in that only idealiza� ons involve novel refe-rence. This diff erence is important when idealiza� ons are created by taking in nite limits such as in sta� s� cal mechanics. These in nite limits may have strange proper� es, much odder than the dis-con� nui� es of phase transi� ons now widely acknowledged in the literature. The in nite limits may be indeterminis� c, or may not exist at all, so that the idealiza� on of an in nite limit should not or cannot be used.
CVJohn D. Norton is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science and Director of the Center for Philo-sophy of Science at the University of Pi� sburgh.
jdnorton@pi� .edu
Herlinde Pauer-Studer (University of Vienna)
Kelsen’s Legal Posi vism and Vienna Circle Metaethics
Hans Kelsen was a rela vist and subjec vist in regard to morality. The belief in objec ve moral truths amounted for Kelsen to a fundamentalist posi on, o en connected with a conserva ve natural law tradi on incompa ble with the value pluralism which is cons tu ve of democracy. In his meta-ethical views Kelsen was in uenced by the skep cism Vienna Circle philosophers, especially Rudolf Carnap, displayed in regard to the meaningfulness of moral u erances and judgments.A er World War II Kelsen was severely cri cized, not least for his subjec ve metaethics which was considered the reason why Kelsen drew such a sharp line between law and morality. Famous is Gustav Radbruch’s a ack that legal posi vism had rendered the judiciary helpless towards the Nazi regime.In my paper I am arguing that Kelsen indeed had the wrong metaethics, but was right to insist on the separa on of law and morality. The call for a uni ca on of law and morality was central to the work of leading Nazi jurists. By taking a closer look at the work and arguments of jurists sympathe c to the Nazi regime like O o Koellreu er, Karl Larenz and Ernst Rudolf Huber I try to show that the simple program of a moraliza on of law does not help against the Nazi distor ons of law. I conclude with poin ng out some consequences for current debates in philosophy of law.
CVHerlinde Pauer-Studer, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. ERC-Grant 2009.Selected Publica ons: Books: Autonom leben. Re exionen über Freiheit und Gleichheit (Suhrkamp 2000), Kommentar zu David Humes ‚Über Moral‘ (Suhrkamp Studienbibliothek 2007), Einführung in die Ethik, 2. erweiterte Au age (UTB 2010).Papers: Global Jus ce: Problems of a Cosmopolitan Account, in: Lukas Meyer (ed.), Jus ce, Legi ma-cy, and Public Interna onal Law, Cambridge University Press 2009, 207-231; Humean Sources of Nor-ma vity, in: Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume, Mo va on, and Virtue, Palgrave MacMillan 2009, 186-207; The Moral Standpoint: First-Personal or Second-Personal? The European Journal of Philosophy 18, 2, 2010, 296-310; Co-authored with J. David Velleman, Distor ons of Norma vity, in: Ethical Theory and Moral Prac ce, 3, June 2011, 329-356.
herlinde.pauer-studer univie.ac.at
Jeanne Peijnenburg (University of Groningen)
Reasoning in Fractals(joint work with David Atkinson)
The concept of jus ca on is at the heart of epistemology, but opinions vary as to what exactly it means to say that a proposi on p jus es a proposi on q. According to Aristotle it means that q can somehow be deduced from p, and since his me most philosophers have followed suit. It was only in the twen eth century that alterna ve understandings of jus ca on have been proposed. The account that is perhaps the most prominent one today is based on Rudolf Carnap’s work. In Carnap’s view, to say that p jus es q is to say that p makes q more probable than it would have been in the absence of p. O en one adds to this the requirement that the resul ng probability of q be not less than some threshold of jus ca onal acceptance. Earlier we have applied these considera ons to one-dimensional chains of probabilis c support. In this talk, however, I take seriously the observa- on that people typically indulge in many-dimensional reasoning. In par cular I consider the case
of two-dimensional nets, where each ‘child’ proposi on is probabilis cally jus ed by two ‘parent’ proposi ons. Surprisingly, it turns out that probabilis c jus ca on in two dimensions takes on the form of Mandelbrot’s itera on. Many-dimensional trees of reasons tend to be generated by the same itera ve rela ons as those that give rise to the familiar fractals that have been iden ed in ferns, clouds, and coastlines. Like so many pa erns in nature, probabilis c reasoning seems in the end to be fractal in character.
CVJeanne Peijnenburg is professor of Theore cal Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. She has worked in the theory of ac on (considering the problem of akrasia and the ques on whether what is done is done). She has also wri en papers on thought experiments and on the philosophy of Reichenbach, many of them together with David Atkinson. At present she is inte-rested in in nite regresses and probabilis c epistemic jus ca on. Her papers appeared in Erkennt-nis, Synthese, Mind, Philosophy of Science, Kant-Studien, Studies in History and Philosophy of Sci-ence, Philosophical Studies, History of Philosophy Quarterly, Studia Logica, and Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
Tomasz Placek (University of Cracow)
Two No ons of (In)determinism
In a venerable Laplacean tradi� on, M. Schlick, H. Reichenbach, and K. Popper explicated the concept of indeterminism in terms of laws of nature and deducibility: roughly, a state B is determined by a state A if (the descrip� on of) state B is deducible from (the descrip� on of) state A taken together with laws of nature. With this explana� on (as they observed), if laws of nature are � me-reversal symmetric, it cannot be that the past is determined, but the future is not. Whether the laws of na-ture are � me-reversal symmetric remained a point of conten� on between Schlick and Reichenbach, however.In years that followed, a percep� on grew that epistemic no� ons (like “to infer”, “to predict‘‘, “to deduce”) are misleading if applied to capture (in)determinism. The spirit of this tradi� on was nev-ertheless saved by R. Montague‘s model-theore� c de ni� on of determinis� c theories. In a nutshell, according to Montague a theory (in the logic sense) is determinis� c iff whenever some two models of this theory agree on some ini� al period of � me, they agree everywhere. Montague‘s formula� on underlies the Lewis-Earman de ni� on of (in)determinism, which is standardly used to adjudicate on determinism of theories of physics.There is, however, a diff erent intui� on about (in)determinism, present in claims like “I may be able to catch this train, but not necessarily so”, or in Aristotle‘s discussion of tomorrow’s sea ba� le. This concept is modal, as it forces one to think of alterna� ve possible future scenario (e.g., one with me on the train, and another with me missing the train). Further, examples like those above require tenses. And to evaluate such sentences we need to take into account their moments (contexts) of use, since such sentences irreducibly contain temporal indexicals (“now”, “tomorrow”, etc.). This intui� on about (in)determinism is rigorously formalised by some logical theories that combine Ka-plan’s logic of indexicals and Prior-Kripke logic of tenses and modali� es (cf. Belnap, Xu, and Perloff 2001).The two concepts of (in)determinism are used in disparate areas of discourse: the former typi-cally in debates over (in)determinism of scien� c theories and the la� er in discussions concerning agency,experiments, or in some accounts of causa� on. Yet, the two concepts share a common core. The talk nishes with some sugges� ons how to unify the two concepts.
CVTomasz Placek is a professor of philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland). His current research concentrates on the philosophy of physics (quantum nonlocality in par� cular) and general philosophical issues rela� ng to � me, tense, and modali� es. His earlier work is on history and philosophy of mathema� cs. He authored two books: Intui onism and Intersubjec vity, Kluwer 1999 and Is Nature Indeterminis c? Jagiellonian UP 2001. Apart from being a recipient of scholarly prizes for his work, in 2010 he received a medal: “For stout-hearted defenders of free word”, for his involvement in samizdat‘ publishing in 1982–1989.
Herbert Posch (University of Vienna)
The Murder of Moritz Schlick in the Collec ve Memory of the University of Vienna
Professor Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) was murdered in the Vienna University on June 22nd, 1936, shot by Johann Nelböck on the central staircase on his way to the last lecture of the summer term. Nelböck, a former student, has already twice been commi� ed to a psychiatric ward for threatening Schlick. A climate poisoned of intolerance and racism added to the crime. The murderer, mentally ill, made Schlick responsible for his personal economic and iden� ty problems. What does it mean to the university, when one of its members was shot, for personal and/or scien� c reasons? When the murderer was one of its graduates? In � mes of austrofascism Moritz Schlick was in part more and more hos� led for his philosophical theories, his “lack of transcendency” and his enmity to the offi cial ideology of the church bound “Ständestaat”. The reac� on on his murder was therefore restricted to usual forms of courtesy but no special and empathic reac� ons of mourning or horror. Around his colleagues rather hos� lity and defama� on were widespread, assisted by general statements that students should not shoot their professors. So an important reac� on on the murder was to state an act of self-defense: immediately a� er the murder the academic senate started an ini� a� ve for a law for be� er protec� on from mentally ill persons (“gemeingefährliche Psychopathen”) – which wasn’t realized anymore because the Nazi took over power in 1938. The murderer was depromoted a� er he was sentenced to ten years of jail and didn’t get back his degree even a� er he was amnes� ed only two years later by the na� onal-socialist regime. How did the university act a� er the end of austro-fascism and na� onal-socialism, regarding to this murder? What kind of honoring of the intellectual person and the vic� m of the hos� lity, an� -intellectualism and an� -semi� sm of the interwar years existed at the Vienna University? Half a century later rst serious plans for at least a commemora� ve plaque for Moritz Schlick arose. It took ve more years before the plaque on the site of his murder was realized and intellectual debates, conferences, memorial lectures and exhibi� ons took place also at this ins� tu� on, discussing his fate and ideas. This and other aspects of Moritz Schlick in the com-memora� ve landscape of the Vienna University will be discussed.
CVHerbert Posch, historian and museologist, since 2004 Ins� tute of Contemporary History/University of Vienna and member of the Historical Commission “650 Years of University of Vienna (1365–2015)”; 1991-2009 Faculty for Interdisciplinary Research and Further Educa� on/University of Klagen-furt (IFF)/Ins� tute for Science Communica� on and Higher Educa� on Research; 1990-2000 Ins� tute of Sciences and Arts (IWK) in Vienna; main elds of research and teaching are contemporary history of science, history of the Vienna University and her students, history of academic degrees, promo-� on and depromo� on; academic biographies and emigra� on in the 20th century; academic cultures of memory; university and lm; art loss and res� tu� on in Austrian federal collec� ons in the na� onal-socialism; 2009 “Memorial Book for the Vic� ms of Na� onal-Socialism at the University of Vienna in 1938”
herbert.posch�univie.ac.at
Stathis Psillos (University of Athens)
What is General Philosophy of Science?
The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assump on that there is this thing called science—as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programma c piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or sci-ence as such. Part of my narra ve makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradi on which aimed to develop a coherent philo-sophical view of science, qua a part of culture with dis nc ve epistemic features and a dis nc ve rela on to reality. But, second, this tradi on went through some important conceptual shi s which re-oriented it and made it more sensi ve to the actual development of science itself. The historical narra ve focuses on three such moments: the de ning moment, associated with Aristotle, and two major conceptual turns, related to Kant and Duhem. The pressures on the very idea of a general philosophy of science that followed the collapse of the macro-models of science that became popu-lar in the 1960s, the pressures that lay all of the emphasis on fragmenta on and not on integra on, can be dealt with by a new synthesis within general philosophy of science of the cons tu ve and the historical, in light of the intellectual tradi on that has de ned it.
CVStathis Psillos is Professor of Philosophy of Science and metaphysics at the University of Athens, Greece. He is the author of: Knowing the Structure of Nature (Palgrave 2009), Philosophy of Sci-ence A-Z (Edinburgh University Press, 2007); Causa on and Explana on (McGill-Queens U.P. 2002); and Scien c Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (Routledge, 1999). He is also the co-editor of The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (Routledge 2008). He has published more than eighty papers in learned journals and books, on scien c realism, causa on, explana on and the his-tory of philosophy of science. He has served as the President of the European Philosophy of Science Associa on (2007-2009) and is currently the co-editor of Metascience.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (University of Lund)
The Interference Problem for the Be ng Interpreta on of Subjec ve Probabili es
The paper to be presented is a joint work with Lina Eriksson. It concerns the historically in uen-� al be� ng interpreta� on of subjec� ve probabili� es due to Ramsey and de Fine� . While there are several classical and well-known objec� ons to this interpreta� on, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as be� ng rates. The reasons diff er in diff erent cases, but all these cases have in common one crucial feature: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposi� on /A/ need not coincide with her degree of belief in a condi� onal that /A/ would be the case if she were to bet on /A/, which itself is condi� oned on the supposi� on that she will have an occasion to make such a bet. Even though the two degrees of belief some� mes can coincide (they will coincide in those cases when the bet has no expected causal bear-ings on the proposi� on /A/ and the opportunity to bet have no eviden� al bearings on that proposi-� on), it is the la� er belief rather than the former that guides the agent’s ra� onal be� ng behaviour. Or so, at least, will be argued. The reason is that this la� er belief takes into considera� on poten� al interferences that bet opportuni� es and be� ng itself might create with regard to the proposi� on to be be� ed on. It is because of this /interference problem/ that the agent’s degree of belief in /A/ can-not be interpreted as her be� ng rate for /A/. This sugges� on will be developed in the talk.
CVWlodek Rabinowicz studied philosophy at the university in Warsaw and then moved to Sweden at the end of the six� es, in the a� ermath of the student rebellion in Poland in March 1968. A� er re-ceiving his doctorate at the Department of Philosophy in Uppsala, he remained there as an Associate Professor un� l 1995, when he was appointed to the Chair in Prac� cal Philosophy in Lund.Rabinowicz has published extensively in moral philosophy, decision theory, and philosophical logic. He is an editor of /Theoria/ and a former editor of /Economics and Philosophy/. He has been Presi-dent of the European Society for Analy� c Philosophy and Chairman of the Swedish Philosophical So-ciety. Visi� ng posi� ons include posi� ons as Leibniz Professor at Universität Leipzig; Adjunct Professor at the Research School for Social Sciences (RSSS) in Canberra; Visi� ng Fellow at All Souls College at the University of Oxford, and Long-Term Fellow of the Swedish Collegium of Advanced Study (SCAS) in Uppsala. Rabinowicz is a member of Ins� tut Interna� onal de Philosophie, the Royal Swedish Acad-emy of Sciences, the Royal Swedish Academy of Le� ers, and Academia Europaea. His current areas of research are theory of value and decision theory.
Wlodek.Rabinowicz@ l.lu.se
Miklós Rédei (London School of Economics)
Hilbert’s 6th Problem and Axioma c Quantum Field Theory
The talk recalls the basics of two axioma za ons of rela vis c quantum eld theory, the Wightman axioms and the Haag-Kastler axioms of local, algebraic rela vis c quantum eld theory. A er point-ing out a few conceptually intriguing features of these axioma za ons the ques on is raised in what sense are these axioma za ons realiza ons of the program formulated in Hilbert’s 6th problem sug-ges ng the axioma za on of physical theories. It is argued that both the Wightmanian and algebraic quantum eld theories are cases of ”opportunis c, so axioma za on”, which is a concept of axi-oma za on described by Hilbert and von Neumann in their 1926 axioma za on of non-rela vis c quantum mechanics.
CVMiklós Rédei studied physics and philosophy at Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest, Hungary, receiving his PhD in philosophy from Eötvös University in 1982. Currently he is Reader in the Depart-ment of Philosophy, Logic and Scien c Method in the London School of Economics. His research interests concern founda onal and philosophical problems of modern physics and related more general issues in philosophy of science such as the interpreta on of probability and theories of probabilis c causa on. He is the author of the book Quantum Logic in Algebraic Approach (Kluwer, 1998), editor of John von Neumann: Selected Le ers (American Mathema cal Society, 2005) and co-editor of the two volumes of the proceedings of the rst EPSA conference in Madrid 2007. He has had a number of visi ng posi ons in the USA and in Europe, including visi ng Fellowship in the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pi sburgh and in the Dibner Ins tute for the History of Science and Technology (Boston, MIT). He was chair of the European Science Founda on (ESF) Network “Founda onal and Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics” (2003–2005) and is co-chair of “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspec ve” ESF Networking Programme (2008–2013). He is a founding member of EPSA and has served on its Steering Commi ee between 2007–2011. Personal webpage: h p://phil.elte.hu/redei/
Donata Romizi (University of Vienna)
The Vienna Circle’s “Scien c World Concep on” and the Issue of a Poli cally Engaged Philosophy of Science
My talk is meant as a contribu� on to the current debates about the rela� onship between philosophy of science and poli� cs in the Vienna Circle. In the Vienna Circle’s “Manifesto” an “inner link” be-tween philosophy and poli� cs is men� oned, which is to be found, I will argue, in the Vienna Circle’s “scien� c world-concep� on”. In the rst part of my talk I shall off er not only an analysis, but also a new interpreta� on of the Vienna Circle’s “scien� c world-concep� on”: In par� cular, I will emphasize its prac� cal nature, in that I will interpret its tenets as a set of recommenda� ons. Such recommenda-� ons express the par� cular epistemological a� tude in which both the Vienna Circle’s philosophy of science and its poli� cal engagement were rooted.Regarding philosophy, I shall then argue that the scien� c world-concep� on can to a large extent be considered the origin of the way of doing philosophy which we call philosophy of science. Regard-ing poli� cs, I will reconstruct how the scien� c world-concep� on placed the Vienna Circle within a neoliberal-socialist poli� cal network which pursued concrete poli� cal aims.In the conclusion I shall try to point out the signi cance of my reconstruc� on with respect to the more general issue of the poli� cal relevance of philosophy of science.
CVDonata Romizi is currently Junior Researcher at the Ins� tute of Philosophy of the University of Vi-enna and member of the Research Team of the Vienna Circle Ins� tute.She studied Philosophy at the University of Bologna (Italy), where she also a� ended the Collegio Superiore (School of excellence of the University of Bologna). In Bologna she gained her nal degree with a thesis on probability theory and the emergence of indeterminism in modern physics, which has been later published as Fare I con� con il caso. La probabilitá e l’emergere dell’indeterminismo nella sica moderna (Bologna: Arche� po libri, 2009).Since 2006 she has been doing research and teaching in Vienna, where she is currently nishing her PhD thesis about “Indeterminism and the Vienna Circle”.
donata.romizi�univie.ac.at
Günther Sandner (University of Vienna)
O o Neurath and Poli cs – A Re-evalua on
Among the Vienna Circle’s members, it was certainly O� o Neurath who was most ac� ve and ambi-� ous in ma� ers of poli� cs. His par� cular self-image as a “social engineer” in uenced his understand-ing of poli� cs to various degrees throughout his intellectual life. A biographical overview shows, however, that poli� cs always played a special and some� mes the most important role in Neurath’s intellectual life. The orienta� on on social reform issues in his youth, his leading role in the Bavarian socialisa� on debate, his pedagogical relevance in Red Vienna and, not least of all, his contribu� ons and interven� ons in the discussions on Na� onal Socialism as an émigré are perhaps the most out-standing examples.Although poli� cal ques� ons were never a central theme in research on Neurath (at least not to an extent comparable to very frequently addressed elds such as the philosophy of science and visual educa� on), a number of essays and studies during the last three or four decades have addressed poli� cal issues directly.The paper rst addresses these subsequent interpreta� ons of O� o Neurath’s poli� cal wri� ngs and ac� vi� es, and discusses their diff erent foci and perspec� ves as well as accordance and possible con-tradic� ons among them. Second, it re-evaluates the main lines of argumenta� on by looking in detail at exemplary biographical periods of special poli� cal interest. And third, it raises the ques� on of how poli� cal elements in uenced Neurath’s philosophy of science – and vice versa.
CVGünther Sandner studied poli� cal science, contemporary history, journalism and German literature. His disserta� on was on discourses on nature in the German and Austrian social democra� c working class movement un� l 1933. He is ac� ve as a lecturer in poli� cal science at the University of Vienna and as a teacher in civic educa� on at the Austrian Chamber of Labour’s Social Academy. He has directed and collaborated on a number of research projects on the history of the social sciences and cultural studies, poli� cal theory and civic educa� on. His essays and books address Austro-Marxism, cultural studies, civic educa� on, poli� cs of memory and ques� ons of contemporary poli� cs. He is currently wri� ng a poli� cal biography of O� o Neurath.
guenther.sandner�univie.ac.at
Georg Schiemer (Munich Center for Mathema� cal Philosophy (MCMP))
Seman cs in Type Theory
The talk will address a cri� cal transi� on phase in the history of mathema� cal logic. The period in ques� on stretches from the publica� on of the second edi� on of Principia Mathema� ca in 1925 to the consolida� on of metalogic in the 1940s. It is marked by a signi cant reconcep� on of formal logic, i.e. a gradual transforma� on of its subject ma� er, its scope, and its boundaries. It eventually leads to the forma� on of metalogical disciplines such as formal seman� cs and proof theory as well as to the consolida� on of rst-order logic as the standard logical system. The aim here will be to discuss several transforma� ons and non-founda� onal uses of logical type theory in this period. Speci cally, the talk will focus on two closely related developments: 1) Transforma� ons in the seman� c concep� on of the universe of types; 2) A� empts to formalize metalogical concepts in type theore� c logics.Concerning the seman� cs of type theory, several contribu� ons concerning the formaliza� on of the type-theore� c universe and the exibiliza� on of types will be discussed. Following this, we survey diff erent a� empts by Carnap and Tarski to express the seman� c metatheory of axioma� c theories within a single type-theore� c framework. Speci cally, diff erent conven� ons introduced in their work to simulate domain varia� on for models of theories expressed in a fully interpreted type-theore� c language will be compared.
CVGeorg Schiemer is currently a post-doctoral researcher at the Munich Center for Mathema� cal Phi-losophy (MCMP) at LMU Munich as well as a Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna. His research interests center on the history and philosophy of logic, early analy� c philoso-phy, and philosophy of mathema� cs. In 2010, he completed his PhD at the University of Vienna with a thesis on Rudolf Carnap’s early contribu� ons to model-theore� c seman� cs. He is currently in-volved in a research project � tled “Between Logicism and Metalogic – Nonfounda� onal Uses of Type Theory” nanced by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF).
Michael Schorner (Forschungsins tut Brenner-Archiv, Universität Innsbruck)
Thomas Kuhn in England. The London Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science 1965
The recep on of Thomas Kuhn’ s work largely started outside of the USA, namely in England. Kuhn was received there even before the publica on of his Structure of Scien c Revolu ons – at a con-ference on “Scien c Change” in Oxford in 1961. There he delivered his talk “The Func on of Dogma in Scien c Research”, which was favorably commented on by Michael Polanyi.But the major event that caused a broader interest in his theses among philosophers was the Inter-na onal Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science in London four years later, which became famous for star ng the Popper-Kuhn debate on the nature of scien c development. The proceedings were published not un l ve years a er the congress and became a key text in the philosophy of science, but are considered a “ra onal reconstruc on rather than a faithful report of the actual discussion”, as stated in the preface. In my talk I will provide insight into the actual events as well as the pre-history and the organiza on of the London Colloquium for which Imre Lakatos was mainly responsi-ble. One of my sources is his correspondence. The second part of my talk will be devoted to the me a er the London Colloquium: the reac ons to the proceedings of the Kuhn-Popper volume and the recep on of Kuhn’s work which had undergone a dras c change in the mean me.
CVMichael Schorner studied philosophy and architecture at the University of Innsbruck. He worked in various research projects on the history of the philosophy of science at the research ins tute Bren-ner-Archives in Innsbruck in coopera on with the Ins tute Vienna Circle.
Ma Sintonen (University of Helsinki)
The Viennese Heritage in Finland: Kaila, von Wright and Hin kka
Modern philosophy of science as well as founda onal studies were brought to Finland by Eino Kaila (1890–1958), professor of Theore cal Philosophy rst at University of Turku and then, since 1930, at Helsinki. He had acquainted himself with Vienna Circle publica ons as well as with its leading repre-senta ves. In his book on logical neoposi vism he gave an apprecia ng discussion of Rudolf Carnap´s Au au although he remained highly cri cal of its reduc onist commitments.Kaila´s student G. H. von Wright and “Grandstudent” Jaakko Hin kka then developed the logical theories and tools that gave rise to the Finnish school of induc ve logic and philosophy of science. von Wright´s interests in the logic of norms as well as values and human ac on marked a departure from methodological monism. Yet his view of the aims of philosophy, very much in uenced by Mo-ritz Schlick, as well as the logical tools used in analyses of determinism (or determina on), causa on, or explana on and understanding, were in the Viennese spirit.Jaakko Hin kka’s work on distribu ve normal forms (1953) and cons tuents as well as his possible worlds seman cs lead to the forma on of some basic tools which were applied to a variety of prob-lems in the methodology and philosophy of science. His recent work on, e.g., the interroga ve view inquiry show that he swims upstream. Whereas it has been fashionable to downplay the role of logic in philosophy of science, Hin kka´s message is: when in trouble, you need more (not less) logic.
CVProfessor of Theore cal Philosophy, Department of History, Philosophy, Study of Culture and Arts, University of Helsinki. Life Member, Clare Hall College, Cambridge, UK, 1998. Finnish Academy of Science and Le ers, Sec on of the Humani es, Member, 2008. European Philosophy of Science As-socia on (EPSA), Founding President 2006-2007 Member of Steering Commi ee, 2006–2011. The Academy of Finland, The Research Council for Culture and Society, 2010. The Standing Commi ee for Humani es (ESF-SCH), member of The Core Group, 2010. Previous professional appointments:Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy of Science, University of Tampere 1991–2010. Professor of Philosophy (Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences), University of Helsinki, 1984–1986, 1996–2000.
ma .sintonen helsinki.
Antonia Soulez (University of Paris 8 – St Denis)
The Name of Wi genstein in the Manifesto of the VC: A Missed Encounter for Mutually Anachronic Philosophical Projects
A er having recalled the reac ons of the French reader I had at the me I read the Manifesto for the rst me, I will elicit some aspects of the way Wi genstein is presented and quoted in the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will take into account biographic-intellectual features of Wi genstein at that date, at what stage of his thought and work he nds himself to be while he is se ling in Great Britain and comes to Vienna just for holidays, being content with mee ng only Waismann and Schlick, already two dissidents of the Vienna Circle, and thereby to what extent the Vienna Circle misses the progress of its contemporaneous and so representa ve thinker.By bringing out the misunderstandings that are obstacles to their encounter, I hope to make clear the reasons of that missed encounter, if not the impossibility of a successful encounter. The Vienna Circle expects something from Wi genstein that Wi genstein cannot not bring not only because the la er is moving towards a new gramma cal concep on, but also because he is at odds with the lad-der of reconstruc on, though not exactly in the same sense as in the Tractatus. To what extent did the Vienna Circle he inspired, indirectly contribute to Wi genstein’s paving his own way against the scien c concep on of philosophy?
CVBorn in 1943 in Paris, I am professor of philosophy of language at the University of Paris 8 – St Denis. My researches bear on language and music, in a Wi gensteinian spirit, yet orientated towards con-fron ng heterogeneous tradi ons of philosophy of music con nental and analy cal.My interest into the style of wri ng philosophy then turned into a compara ve inves ga on into phi-losophy and music from the point of view of theories of composi on, form and ma er, understand-ing meaning, ques ons of expressivity but inexpressiveness, the rela on with Kant’s concep on, autonomy of the musical (Hanslick’s lia on), debates overseas about this autonomy, Schönberg and Wi genstein1, (but also Cage and Wi genstein2), the importance of Helmholtz’ scien c method of evalua on of consonance and dissonance etc.In parallel, I have been direc ng a research seminar on these ma ers in associa on with the CICM (dealing with new technologies of composi on in musical crea on) in the MSH e-g : Maison des sci-ences de l’homme, Paris nord. Hence a number of publica ons on music: Manières de faire des sons (2010, coord. Horacio Vaggione, composer-reasearcher), La pensée de G. Granger (Hermann 2010, with Arley Moreno and the collabora on of the music group in the MSH). To be soon published: Autour de Wi genstein et la musique, with the nancial help of the Centre na onal du livre, in Delatour-France, 2011–12.Co-founder in 1994 of a review with Jan Sebes k and François Schmitz Cahiers de philosophie du lan-gage, with a recent volume n° 7 on Waismann, Textures logiques (2009) with Jean-Philippe Narboux, and n° 9 in prepara on Gramma cal et/ou Transcendantal with Arley Moreno, I have also created in 2003 a collec on Formel informel (also a collec ve book) with Horacio Vaggione (composer-re-searcher) and Makis Solomos (musicologist), publ. L’Harma an.I co-organize (since 2002) with Arild Utaker (Bergen, Norway) and Esther Ramharter a partnership for annual conference on Wi genstein alterna vely in Vienna, Paris, Bergen/Skjolden, to which young researchers of the three countries are invited to deliver papers in English and exchange ideas.I have in addi on a poe c ac vity with publica ons in the review Poésie (dir. M. Deguy) and also books (recently : Sons couleurs, Delatour-France).
Friedrich Stadler (University of Vienna and Ins� tute Vienna Circle)
From the Vienna Circle to the Ins tute Vienna Circle: On the Viennese Legacy in Contemporary Philosophy of Science
The Vienna Circle, which was part of the intellectual movement of Central European philosophy of science, is certainly one of the most important currents in the emergence of modern philosophy of science. Apart from this uncontested historical fact there remains the ques� on of the direct and indi-rect in uence, recep� on and topicality of this scien� c community in general contemporary philoso-phy of science as well as in the philosophy of the individual sciences, including the social sciences and humani� es.In my paper I will focus on the “the present situa� on in the philosophy of science” (Stadler et al., eds., 2010) by inden� fying relevant impacts, ndings, and un nished projects since the classical Vienna Circle. I will also address speci c European features of this globalized philosophical tradi� on up to the present, and ouline some future perspec� ves a� er the linguis� c, historical and pragma� c turns.
CVFriedrich Stadler: Professor for History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Vienna. Found-er and director of the Ins� tut Wiener Kreis/Vienna Circle Ins� tute. Visi� ng professor at the Universi-� es of Minnesota, Berlin; and Helsinki (Collegium for Advanced Studies); Since 2009 President of the European Philosophy of Science Associa� on (EPSA). Author of 2 books, editor of 3 book series and (co-)editor of 35 books in the eld of history and philosophy of science, modern intellectual history (emigra� on exile studies). Selected book publica� ons: The Vienna Circle (German 1997/2001, English 2001, Spanish 2011); Series editor: Vienna Circle Ins� tute Yearbook (1993ff .), Veröff entlichungen des Ins� tuts Wiener Kreis (1991ff .), Emigra� on-Exil-Kon� nuität (2004ff .); Ernst Mach-Studienausgabe (2008ff .). Moritz Schlick. Kri� sche Gesamtausgabe (2006ff .). Steering commi� ee member of the ESF Research Network Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspec� ve“ (PSE).Research projects on the history of philosophy of science: h� p://hps.univie.ac.at
friedrich.stadler�univie.ac.at
Thomas Uebel (University of Manchester)
Name ist Schall und Rauch? On Naming a Revolu onary Philosophy
The philosophies of the Vienna Circle have been called many things—even by their own protago-nists. Typical appella� ons are ‘Logical Posi� vism’, ‘Neoposi� vism’, ‘Logical Empiricism’. In this talk I’ll trace the history of their use and consider whether anything of signi cance can be derived from this either about the self-understanding of the protagonists or the recep� on of their philosophieῳ by others.
CVThomas Uebel is Professor and Head of Philosophy at the University of Manchester, U.K. His research interests are history of philosophy of science and history of analy� cal philosophy and systema� c is-sues in epistemology and philosophy of social science. Among his publica� ons are Empiricism at the Crossroads. The Vienna Circle’s Protocol Sentence Debate (Open Court, Chicago, 2007) and the edi-� on (with Alan Richardson) of The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism (CUP, 2007). A Past President of HOPOS, he serves as one of the Team Leaders in the ESF-funded Philosophy of Science in Europe programme and as a member of the Steering Commi� ee of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
C. Kenneth Waters (University of Minnesota)
An Argument for Complex Metaphysics Based on the Nature of Systema c Inquiry in an Ul mately Messy Biological World
Philosophers have o en asked, “what is a gene?”, as if the concept ought to pick out a fundamental unit of DNA. Having failed to iden fy such a unit, they have concluded that gene talk is confused, and that the fundamental units of hereditary must be elsewhere (perhaps in processes or in the DNA molecule or in the developmental system as a whole). I will examine conceptual prac ce in research gene cs and argue that the gene concept is not problema c. It is both exible and precise, and it serves the purposes of researchers extremely well. The fact that the concept does not pick out fun-damental units indicates that there are no fundamental units in DNA. The metaphysical presupposi- ons behind ques ons such as ‘what is a gene?’ or ‘what is an organism’ are mistaken.
CVC. Kenneth Waters is Professor of Philosophy and Samuel Russell Chair of the Humani es at the University of Minnesota, where he serves as the Director of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. He is author of numerous papers in the philosophy of science and the history and philoso-phy of biology. He has wri en on reduc onism, pluralism, and the historical and conceptual basis of gene cs. He is co-editor of Scien c Pluralism, Volume 19 of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. He is currently wri ng a book on the epistemology of scien c prac ce in gene-centered biological sciences.
Hans Jürgen Wendel (University of Rostock)
Moritz Schlick und die Metaphysik
Die radikale Abkehr von jeglicher Metaphysik ist der charakteris� sche Grundzug der Auff assungen des Wiener Kreises, dessen Begründer Moritz war. O� mals wird die Posi� on Schlicks aus dieser Zeit der seiner früheren Jahre in Rostock, wie sie insbesondere in der „Allgemeinen Erkenntnislehre“ dar-gelegt ist, entgegengesetzt und seine philosophische Entwicklung als eine zunehmende Abkehr von seinen früheren, noch von metaphysischen Erwägungen durchsetzten Auff assungen gedeutet. Wenig Beachtung fand dabei bisher die Frage, welches Verständnis von Metaphysik Schlicks Überlegungen dabei zugrunde lag. Im Mi� elpunkt des Vortrages soll die Herausbildung von Schlicks Verständnis von Metaphysik stehen und versucht werden zu klären, wo Kon� nuität mit und wo Abkehr von sei-nen frühen erkenntnistheore� schen Überzeugungen besteht.
CVSeit 1992 Universitätsprofessor für Philosophie an der Universität Rostock. 1993 bis 2002 Mither-ausgeber der Zeitschri� LOGOS. Seit 1996 Mitherausgeber der Schri� enreihe Philosophische Unter-suchungen. Seit 1998 Leiter der Moritz-Schlick-Forschungsstelle. Seit 2001 Mitglied der Friedrich-und-Irmgard-Harms-S� � ung. 2002 bis 2006 Rektor der Universität Rostock. Seit 2002 gemeinsam mit Friedrich Stadler Gesamtherausgeber der Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe und der Schlick-Studien (seit 2008). Seit November 2006 Vorstand des Zentrums für Logik, Wissenscha� stheorie und Wissen-scha� sgeschichte. Seit 2008 Mitherausgeber der Schlickiana seit 2008 Mitherausgeber der Schlicki-ana (gemeinsam mit Olaf Engler und Mathias Iven). Seit Januar 2009 Sprecher des Exzellenzprojekts des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: „Transforma� on wissenscha� lichen Wissens in den Le-benswissenscha� en: Das Verständnis der lebenden Zelle im Wandel“. Seit 1. Januar 2011 Leiter des von der Akademie der Wissenscha� en in Hamburg geförderten Langzeitvorhabens „Moritz Schlick Gesamtausgabe. Nachlass und Korrespondenz“.
Gregory Wheeler (New University of Lisbon)
The Decima on of Independence
When, in the course of human reasoning about events uncertain, it becomes necessary to judge whether one event is unrelated to another, we turn to the Laws of Probability and to Nature’s regu-larity to declare the causes which impel our judgments. We hold this truth to be self-evidence, that one event is probabilis cally independent of another just when the probability of both is determined by the product of each, and when the es mate of one event is unchanged given the outcome of the other, when ye outcome be posi ve. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that this equivalence between stochas c independence and epistemic irrelevance, long established, should not be changed for light and transient cause. Yet, to prove this cause Just, and this Decima on sound, I shall let Facts be submi ed to a candid world.
CVGregory Wheeler (PhD Philosophy and Computer Science, Rochester) is Senior Research Scien st at CENTRIA, The Center for Ar cial Intelligence Research at the New University of Lisbon, Head of the Formal Epistemology and Logic Group, and Editor-in-Chief of Minds and Machines. His work has appeared in Mind, The Bri sh Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Applied Logic, Studia Logica, Minds and Machines, and Synthese, among others. His new book, Probabilis c Logics and Probabilis c Networks, co-authored with Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeyn, and Jon Williamson, was published in 2011.
Jan Woleński (University of Cracow)
Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland
Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in par� cular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is the same as the method of natural science. Hence, phi-losophy of science (Polish philosophers preferred the name “methodology of sciences”) became of a crucial importance for philosophy as well as science. Twardowski did not contribute to philosophy of science in its contemporary se� ng. Perhaps his de ni� on of reasoning as based on the concept of logical consequence and his ideas related to the division between a priori and a posteriori science should be remembered.Twardowski established so-called Lvov-Warsaw School at the beginning of the 20th century. The his-tory of this school can be divided into two periods: before 1918 and 1918–1939. Several members of this school students intensively worked in logic and philosophy of science and achieved remarkable results, par� cularly in the second period when philosophy of science was in uenced by logic. The (at least) following points are to be men� oned: — the problem of induc� on (Jan Łukasiewicz, Janina Hossiasson-Lindenbaum);— classi ca� ons of reasoning (Łukasiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz);— radical conven� onalism (Ajdukiewicz);— applica� ons of many-valued logic to science (Zygmunt Zawirski);— styles of thought (Ludwik Fleck – outside of Twardowski’s school);— opera� onalism (Edward Poznański, Alexander Wundheiler);— uses of formal seman� cs in analysis of science (Alfred Tarski, Maria Kokoszyńska);Polish philosophy of science was closely related to Vienna, not only via Twardowski himself, but also by close contacts and affi ni� es with the Vienna Circle.
CVJan Woleński is professor emeritus since 2010. He was ordinarius for philosophy at Jagiellonian Uni-versity in Cracow since 1991. He is a member of Polish Academy of Sciences, Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cracow), Ins� tut Interna� onal de Philosophie (Paris), Interna� onal Program Commit-tee of the Vienna Summer University as well as numerous scien� c associa� ons. In the years 2005-2008 he was the President of European Society of Analy� c Philosophy. He works in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of law and history of logic. He published 25 books, edited 30 collec� ons of papers and published over 600 hundred papers.
Gereon Wolters (University of Konstanz)
Is there a European Philosophy of Science?
In this talk I would like to give a sober and unadorned analysis of the situa� on, and at the same � me make some proposals how to improve it. An improvement of the present situa� on is, indeed, badly needed, for the answer to the ques� on in the � tle is not an unequivocal “yes”, but rather “yes and no”. In a geographical sense there is certainly a European Philosophy of Science. Our network, EPSA and its journal are ample proof of it. So the real ques� on is whether there exists a European phi-losophy of science in a qualita� ve sense. Here the answer is no, with some quali ca� ons, however. Globaliza� on in the world of learning has led to an ever increasing use of the English language also in the humani� es, and here par� cularly in disciplines like logic and philosophy of science. So, when I speak of “European” in my talk it is at the exclusion of the Bri� sh Isles. The linguis� c preponderance of English means also and most importantly that the agenda in philosophy of science is set in the An-glophone world, par� cularly in the US. As a consequence European approaches are largely marginal-ized and not even taken no� ce of in other European countries, since the “relay sta� on” is the recog-ni� on and discussion of such approaches by major Anglophone gures. As some examples show that the use of the English language is, however, only a necessary condi� on for a European to be heard. Suffi cient would be at best the complete immersion in exis� ng Anglophone networks. But this is, of course, not a guarantee, for promo� ng speci c European approaches. One has to have them rst. In closing Vienna Logical Empiricism with its deep enlightenment inten� ons (“double approach”) is described as a typical European way to conduct philosophy of science. It went lost, when the logical empiricists sought refuge in the US.
CVGereon Wolters, professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Konstanz (Germany) and member of the Na� onal Academy of Science Leopoldina, at present speaker of one of its four class-es. A� er studying at the universi� es of Innsbruck and Kiel he graduated in philosophy and math-ema� cs at Tübingen. His received his PhD (with a thesis on Johann Heinrich Lambert) at Konstanz (1977). There in 1985 he also got his Habilita on (with a book about the forgery of Ernst Mach’s texts on rela� vity) and became professor of philosophy (1988-2009). For 25 years he also taught phi-losophy of biology at the Ins� tute of Zoology at Zurich University. His main research elds are history and philosophy of biology and rela� vity, HOPOS, and Nazi Philosophy.
Fakultät für Philosophie und Bildungswissenschaft
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN EUROPE – EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE VIENNESE HERITAGEINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCEOrganized by ESF Research Networking Programme PSE and the Institute Vienna Circle (IVC) on the Occasion of its 20th AnniversaryVienna, December 5 – 7, 2011
Institut Wiener Kreis / Institute Vienna CircleUniversität WienUniversitätscampus,Spitalgasse 2–4, Hof 1, Eingang 1.21090 Wien, Österreich
Telefon: +43 1 4277 46504Fax: +43 1 4277 9465E-Mail: [email protected]
FÜR DEN INHALT VERANTWORTLICHFriedrich StadlerKaroly Kokai
ZVR-Zahl 673 803 400
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