PHILOSOPHY - Andrew M. Baileyandrewmbailey.com/pvi/Incarnation.pdf · PHILOSOPHY General Editor ... textual coherence, discourse analysis and even syntax. ... * Grice, H.P. (1989)

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tance of impUcature.od without knowingsuffice to know thes even the meaning)or what is said.

;ven in truth-condi-amples.idence suggests thati English, having amating temporal or?ak sense connoting;an be accepted, theueutial connotationt be rejected (seeort tmplicature overill and saw a doctor,r does not have are, It is not the casevould be mterpretedU saw a doctor' are[uence of events.a version of 'Ock-

senses are not to be.he same can be said;laimed that sincem terms of general

•sation, the postula-safures results in at this overstates theown principles of

(semantically) 'pre-p is necessary for

; PRESUPPOSITION).opposmg Bertrandi sentence like (7a)

ible.

plausible since (7c)mgly as (7a) does.ly complicates logi-if some declarativeilse, then standarded middle' must beng these complica-tion of the negationre (see, for example,)n this view, (7c)thout logically im-may be tme whenthe Russellian towhile insisting that

INCARNATION AND CHRISTOLOGY

(7c) is true and (7a) false when (7b) is false.Supporting Strawson, though, is the strong intuitionthat Are your crimes excusable or not?' is a loadedquestion, which cannot be answered if you areinnocent. An outstanding problem for either ap-proach is to describe how implications of complexpropositions (whether presuppositions or implica-tures) are related to those of their components.

Jmplicature has also been mvoked m accounts oflexical gaps, language change, indirect speech acts,textual coherence, discourse analysis and even syntax.

See also: MEANING AND COMMUNICATION;PRAGMATICS; SEMANTICS; SPEECH ACTS

References and further reading

Blakemore, D. (1992) Understanding Utterances,Oxford: Blackwell. (A readable introduction to thetheory of impUcature developed in Sperber andWilson (1986).)

Davis, WA. (1998) Implicature: The Failure ofGriceanTheory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(A comprehensive critique of Grice's theory ofunplicature, and of similar theories. Argues thatconversational impUcatures arise not from conver-sational principles, but from intentions and con-ventions.)

Gazdar, G. (1979) Pragmatics: Implicature, Presuppo-sition, and Logical Form, New York: AcademicPress. (Attempts a partial fonnalization of con-versational unplicatures, focusing on quantity im-plicatures, and uses it to provide a pragmatic theoryof presupposition.)

* Grice, H.P. (1989) Studies in the Ways of Words,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Con-tains all of Grice s work on meaning and unpli-cature, plus an introduction and retrospectiveepilogue.)

Hamish, R.M. (1976) 'Logical Form and ImpUca-ture, repr. in S. Davis (ed.) Pragmatics: A Reader,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 316-64.(Presents many problems for Gricean theory,suggesting solutions and extensions.)

Horn, L.R. (1989) A Natural History of Negation,Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Aremarkably comprehensive and detailed accountof negation, focusing inter alia on its effect onimplicature, and explanation of a wide variety oflinguistic facts about negation in terms of impli-cature.)

Karttunen, L. and Peters, S. (1979) 'ConversationalImplicature', in C.-KL. Oh and DA. Dinneen,Syntax and Semantics, vol. 11, Presupposition,New York: Academic Press, 1979, 1-56. (A detailed,

compelling argument that different sorts of pre-supposition can be accounted for as different typesof implicature, plus a representation of conven-tional implicature using model-theoretic semantics,specifically, Montague grammar.)

Leech, G. (1983) Principles of Pragmatics, London:Longman. (A leading introduction to pragmaticsstressing implicature. Develops Grice's suggestionthat another maxim is 'Be polite', showmg that itmotivates many implicatures.)

Levinson, S.C. (1983) Pragfnatics, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press. (A leading introduction topragmatics, with an extensive discussion of con-versational kupUcature and presupposition from aGricean point of view.)

Martmich, A.P. (1984) A Theory for Metaphor',Journal of Literary Semantics 13: 35-56; repr. in S.Davis (ed.) Pragmatics: A Reader, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 507-18. (An extended Griceantreatment of metaphor.)

Sadock, J.M. (1978) 'On Testmg for ConversationalImplicature', in S. Davis (ed.) Pragmatics: AReader, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Pointsout problems with all of Grice s tests for conversa-tional implicature.)

Sperber, D. and WUson, D. (1986) Relevance: Com-munication and Cognition, Oxford: BIackwell. (De-velops a theory of implicature in terms of a single'prmciple of relevance' quite distinct from Grice s'maxim of relevance'.)

WAYNE A. DAVIS

INCARNATION ANDCHRISTOLOGYIt is a central and essential dogma of Christianity thatJesus of Nazareth, who was crucified in Judea duringthe procuratorship (AD 26-36) of Pontius Pilate, andGod, the eternal and omnipresent creator of theuniverse, were in some very strong sense 'one. Thedepartment of Christian theology that is devoted to thestudy of the nature and implications of this oneness iscalled Christology. Orthodox Christology (unlikecertain heretical Christologies) sees this oneness as aoneness of person, as consisting in the co-presence oftwo natures, the divine and the human, in one person,Jesus Christ. To speak plainly, orthodox Christologyholds that there is someone, Jesus Christ, who is bothdivine and human. Because God pre-existed and issuperior to every human being, orthodox theologianshave found it natural to speak of the union of the divineand human natures in the person of Jesus Christ as

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something that happened to the pre-existent divinenature: at a certain point in time, at the moment of theconception of Jesus, it 'took on flesh' or becameincarnate'; in the words of the Athanasian Creed, theunion of the two natures was accomplished 'not byconversion of the Godhead /divinitasy into flesh, but bytaking of the manhood into God'. This event, and thecontinuing union it established, are called the Incarna-tion. The Incarnation was not, according to Christianteaching, undone by Christ s death (his corpse - ahuman corpse - continued to be united with the divinenature by the same bond by which the living man hadbeen united) or by his 'Ascension (his 'withdrawalfrom the everyday world of space and time forty daysafter the Resurrection), and it will never be undone: theIncarnation is eternal.

The primary statements of the dogma of theIncarnation are the Definition issued by the Councilof Chalcedon (AD 451) and the Athanasian Creed(fifth century; its origins are obscure). The creed issuedby the Council of Nicaea (AD 325) and the longer,revised version of this creed that is today usedliturgically (and commonly called 'the Nicene Creed )contain nothing of substance that is not found in the twolater statements.

1 The doctrine of the Incarnation2 Logical problems3 Attributive solutions4 Predicative solutions

1 The doctrine of the Incarnation

Books present portraits, generally madvertent, oftheir authors and their mtended audiences. The NewTestament presents a portrait of Christians who werenot quite sure what to say about the relationbetween Jesus Christ and God. On the one hand,the earliest Christians could hardly deny that Christwas a man (had he not frequently referred to himselfas 'the Son of Man'?), a human being who had beenborn and had died (albeit he was not dead for verylong), who ate and drank and spoke and slept andleft prints m the dust of Palestine. On the otherhand, they could hardly speak of Christ withoutmentioniag God in the same breath, they called him'the Son of God', and they were unreflectivelywilling to ascribe to him honours held traditionallyin their cultures to be due to God alone. Explicitstatements about the relation between Christ andGod are rare m the New Testament. There are,however, a few passages in which this relation isdescribed, and all of these imply, or come very closeto implying, a 'high' Christology - a Christologythat m some sense identifies Christ with God. Thus

(the translations are those of the New AmericanStandard Bible):

In the begmning was the Word [logos}, and theWord was with God, and the Word was God. Hewas m the beginning with God. All things cameinto being by him, and apart from him nothingcame into being that has come into being.... Andthe Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and webeheld his glory...

(John 1: 1-3, 14)

He [Christ] is the image of the invisible God, thefnst-born of all creation [that is, has an authorityover the created world comparable to that which,under Jewish law, a first-born son had over hisliving father's estate]. For by him all things werecreated, both in the heavens and on earth, visibleand mvisible,... - all things have been created byhim and for him. And he is before all things and inhmi all things hold together [sunistemi\.... For inhun all the fullness of Deity dwells in bodily form.

(Colossians 1: 15-17; 2: 9)

In these last days, [God] has spoken, to us in insSon, whom he appointed heir of all things, throughwhom also he made the world [literally: 'made theages']. And he is the radiance of his [God's] glory,and the exact representation of his nature, andupholds all things by the word of his power.

(Hebrews 1: 2, 3)It should also be noted that in John 8: 58, andpossibly ia. John 10: 22-38, the author representsJesus as affirming his own deity, and that in John 20:28, the apostle Thomas addresses the risen Jesus as'My Lord and my God'.

The New Testament, although it is rich inChristological suggestion, contains no systematicChristology. The development of a systematic Chris-tology was the work of the first five Christiancenturies. The relevant biblical passages - thosequoted above, and a few others, such as Philippians2: 5-11 - have been treated by most theologians not asexplicit statements of doctrine but as data to whichexplicit statements of doctrine must be responsible.The 'developed' doctrine, the doctrine of the fifthcentury, is contained in the following two passages.

... we all unanimously teach that we shouldconfess that our Lord Jesus Christ is one and thesame Son, the same perfect m Godhead and thesame perfect m manhood, truly God and trulyman, the same of a rational soul and body,consubstantial with the Father in Godhead, andthe same consubstantial with us m manhood, Ukeus in all things except sin; begotten from the Father

726


rd [logos}, and theVord was God. Hed. All things camefrom him nothinginto being.... Andt among us, and we

(John 1: 1-3, 14)

invisible God, thes, has an authorityible to that which.son had over his

im all things wered on earth, visiblere been created byre all things and innistemi\.... For inills in bodily form,ans 1: 15-17; 2: 9)

3oken to us in hisall things, throughEiteraUy: 'made thef his [God's] glory,>f his nature, and?f his power.(Hebrews 1:2, 3)

John 8: 58, andauthor representsid that in John 20:the risen Jesus as

gh it is rich inns no systematicsystematic Chris-

'st five Christianpassages - thoseich as Philippianstheologians not asas data to which

st be responsible,trine of the fifthig two passages.

that we shouldist is one and thejodhead and they God and trulysoul and body,

in Godhead. andin manhood, liken from the Father

before the ages as regards his Godhead, and in thelast days, the same, because of us and because ofour salvation begotten from the Virgin Mary, theTheotokos [God-bearer], as regards his manhood;one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten,made known m two natures without confusion,without change, without division, without separa-tion, the difference of the natures being by nomeans removed because of the union, but theproperty of each nature being preserved andcoalescing in one prosopon [person] and onehypostasis [subsistence], not parted or divided intotwo prosopa, but one and the same Son, only-begotten, divine Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, asthe prophets of old and Jesus Christ himself havetaught us about him and the creed of our fathershas handed down.

(Definition of Chalcedon; see Kelly 1960)

... [N]ow the right faith is that we should believeand confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son ofGod, is equally both God and man.

He is God from the Father's substance, begottenbefore time; and he is man from his motherssubstance, born m time. Perfect God, perfect mancomposed of a rational soul and human flesh,equal to the Father in. respect of his divimfy, lessthan the Father m respect of his humanity.

Who, although he is God and man, is never-theless not two but one Christ. He is one, however,not by the transformation of his divinity into flesh,but by the taking up of his humanity into God; onecertainly not by confusion of substance but byoneness of person. For just as rational soul andflesh are a single man, so God and man are a singleChrist.

(Athanasian Creed; see Kelly 1964)

These passages seem to say, and rather insistently, thatthere is a single prosopon or hypostasis or persona,Jesus Christ, who both has a begmning m time andhas no beginning in time. More generally, he has all ofthe properties - attributes, features or characteristics -appropriate to a (sinless) human being, and at thesame tune has all of the properties that the Christianfaith ascribes to God.

In order to grasp the orthodox doctrme expressedm these statements, it is advisable to have someconception of unorthodoxy, of the great Christologi-cat heresies of the first five Christian centuries, forthese heresies were present m the minds of the framersof the statements and are to a large extent responsiblefor the details of the wording. The most importantheresies for this purpose are the following three.

Nestorianism denies that the two natures belong tothe same person: according to Nestorianism - if not

to the eponymous Nestorius (d. circa 451), who maynot actuaUy have held this - the divine Christ and thehuman Christ are numerically distinct persons. Thatis, however mtimate the union - or 'conjunction'(sunapheid), the word preferred by the Nestorians - ofthe human and the divine Christs, there is no one whocan say truly both 'I am God' and 'I am a humanbeing . According to Nestorians, the 'conjunction'1 ofthe divine and the human natures was effectedbetween God and a pre-existent human being. SinceGod and Jesus each existed before the conjunction,and each was then who he was, there could not havebeen only one person 'present' after the conjunctionunless the human person had somehow ceased to bewhich is obviously unacceptable. (Orthodox Christol-ogy holds that the human being Jesus ofNazareth didnot exist before the Incarnation, and that, in modemterminology, there is no possible world in which heexists, even for the briefest instant, without God'sbeing incamate in him.)

Monophysitism fone-naturism ) holds that there isonly one nature, the divme nature, in the incamateChrist. The human attributes of Jesus ofNazarefh aresomehow taken up into or made to be containedwithin the divine nature; at any rate, they do notconstitute a distinct, subsistent human nature - thatis, a human being. (It should be noted that earlyChristological writings do not always make it clearwhether <a nature' (physis, natura) is a 'predicable3,like the attributes divinity and humanity, or a 'firstsubstance', an unpredicable subject of predication,like God and Jesus of Nazareth. Some authors writeas if the distinction did not exist or was of noimportance; others seem perversely to take theiropponents to mean one of these things when theyshould pretty clearly be taken to mean the other.)

Apollinarianism (after ApoUinarius (c.310-c.390))holds that Christ did not have a human mind or spiritor rational soul - that he lacked something that isessential to human nature - and that God or some'aspect' of God (such as the divine logos) was unitedto the human body of Jesus of Nazareth in such a wayas to be a substitute for' or perform the function ofthe human mind or soul or spirit. This is perhaps themost important of the heresies for the task ofunderstanding orthodoxy: it is certainly very fre-quently suggested by the language of popular Christ-ianity. Orthodoxy insists, however, that whatever ispresent in our common human nature (other than sin)is present in Christ. The reason for this, briefly, is thatthe saving work of Christ is to heal our ruined humannature, and (in the words of Gregory of Nazianzus),'what [Christ] has not assumed he has not healed(Letter 101, Patrologia Graeca, vol. 37). The convic-tion that 'what he has not assumed he has not healed'

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is one of the main pressures that guided thedevelopment of the orthodox Chalcedonian Chris-tology. It was this conviction that made 'fully human'to be for the 'Chalcedonian' party what in the 1960swas called a non-negotiable demand .

At the same tkne, other pressures made fuUydivine' non-negotiable for most of the parties,including the Chalcedonian party, to the greatChristological controversies. One might cite (1) theconviction that the situation of fallen humanity wasso desperate that any effective saviour of humanitymust be divine, (2) the fact that from the earliest daysof Christianity, Christians had offered honours toChrist that it would be blasphemous to offer to acreature, and (3) the realization that the biblical textsquoted above - which at the very least seem torepresent Christ as very Uke God - could not beinterpreted as describing Christ as a being who wasclose to being God but was not quite God, or even asa being who was ontologically intermediate betweenGod and man: no such 'not quite God', no suchintermediate, is possible, because any being who is notGod is finite, and any finite being must be infinitelycloser ontologicaUy to any other finite being than it isto God.

2 Logical problems

The main philosophical problems facing the doctrineof the Incarnation are logical: the doctrine impUes, orseems to imply, that there is an object that has variouspairs of incompatible properties - or worse (if worse ispossible), that there is an object and a property suchthat that object both has and does not have thatproperty. (God is eternal; Jesus is not eternal, God isidentical with Jesus; hence there is something thatboth is and is not eternal.) Some theologians haveheld, apparently, that the doctrine does have thesefeatures and is therefore internally inconsistent, but isnevertheless to be believed. Having said this, theyproceed to deprecate 'merely human logic'. Theirpoint is not that the doctrme seems to be mconsistentowmg to the deficiencies of merely human logic; it israther that it is only because of the deficiencies ofmerely human logic that inconsistency (at least intheology) seems objectionable (see Morris 1986: 24—5for a nice selection of quotations on this subject). Thisposition has (to be gentle) little to recommend it. Itperhaps rests on a failure to see clearly that a truthcannot be inconsistent with a truth.

It would, of course, be possible to maintain thatalthough the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnationseems to be inconsistent, it is in fact consistent, theexplanation of the fact that it is, despite appearances,consistent being beyond human understanding. This

position wiU not be discussed in the present entry, forthe simple reason that there is little if anything thatcan be said about it. Rather, various attempts to solvethe problem that faces orthodox Christology owing tothe prima facie inconsistency of the properties itascribes to the mcamate Christ wiU be discussed.PhilosophicaUy promising solutions will be examined,but with no attempt to trace their historical roots.These solutions are (as perhaps any solution must be)of one or the other of two types:

(1) The orthodox doctrine does not imply all thestatements it appears to imply. One or the other ofeach of the mutually contradictory pairs of statementsthe doctrine appears to imply it does not m fact imply.(For example, the doctrine appears to imply thatChrist began to exist when Herod was kmg in Judea,and also appears to imply that Christ's existence hadno beginning. But it m fact implies only the latter.Those who have concluded that the doctrine impliesthe former statement have reached this conclusion onthe basis of a superficial understandmg of what iscontained m the concept of humanity.)(2) The doctrine does imply all the statements itappears to imply, but these statements are not, as theyappear to be, inconsistent. (For example, the doctrmeimplies that Christ began to exist when Herod wasking in Judea, and also implies that Christ's existencehad no beginning. But these two statements areconsistent. Those who have concluded that they areinconsistent have reached this conclusion on the basisof a superficial understanding of their logical form.)

We shall call solutions of the former type'attributive' and solutions of the latter typepredicative . These words are no more than con-

venient labels. Neither corresponds to any school ordivision in the history of theology.

3 Attributive solutionsIs it not possible that we sometimes read more intocertain of the attributes that orthodoxy ascribes toChrist than is really there? We tend to assume that ahuman being must have a beginnmg in time, and thatthis is part of the concept of a human being. But whatjustifies this assumption? We tend to assume thatwhatever is a human being is essentially a humanbeing. But, again, what justifies this assumption?Even if Solomon and Catherine the Great and allother 'ordinary' human beings have a temporal origin- even if they all have this property essentially - andeven if they are aU essentially human, does it followthat there could not be an eternal being who acquiredthe attribute of humanity at a certain point m time? Isthere something about the concept of humanity that

makes the iimpossibility'attribute of hbeing a metapbut how doconfidently timplied the ojudged a frai(No doubt wrespect of arthat the wallsquare and <human beingdoes it foil'omnipresent?and omnipipresence. It i!being to be tlumimferouscertain spot <omnipresencfOMNIPRESENa human beibeing took ohad those \thereby acquset that miglan 'ordinary'

sunply a (rapowers - nomnipotent?move mountbeen able tc'new' set of ito move moipressure onwere unableasked in res]

If a hurromnipotentthe problemthe doctrine.reality and aof Nazaret]ommscient.coherent co\also the q^Christians (1have a usemconsistentlwhich Jesus |certain thinjhitherto be^knowing th^(Matthew 2\

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e present entry, for:le if anything thatis attempts to solveiristology owing to

the properties itwin be discussed.s will be examined.ir Mstorical roots.f solution must be)

not imply all thene or the other ofpairs of statements;s not m fact unply,ars to imply thatwas king m Judea,rist's existence hadles only the latter.ie doctrine impliesthis conclusion onandmg of what islity.)the statements it

nts are not, as theyimple, the doctrinewhen Herod was

t Christ's existencem statements areided that they arelusion on the basistieir logical form.)

the former typethe latter type

> more than con-3 to any school or

es read more mtoodoxy ascribes toi to assume that ag in time, and thatm being. But whatd to assume thatientially a humantMs assumption?

the Great and all; a temporal originy essentially ~ andLan, does it followeing who acquiredin point in time? Isof humanity that

makes the idea of such a being a conceptualimpossibility? Or is there something about theattribute of humanity that makes the idea of such abeing a metaphysical impossibility? We may think sobut how do we know? Are we prepared to assertconfidently that an alleged divine revelation thatimplied the existence of such a being would have to bejudged a fraud or fantasy of merely human origin?(No doubt we ought to be prepared to assert this inrespect of an aUeged divine revelation that impliedthat the walls of the New Jerusalem would be bothsquare and circular.) Or consider onmipresence. Ahuman being must be locaUy present somewhere, butdoes it follow that a human being cannot beomnipresent? We must remember that local presenceand omnipresence are two different modes ofpresence. It is indeed impossible for one and the samebemg to be both locally present everywhere (Uke theluminiferous ether) and locaUy present only at acertain spot on the shores of the Sea of Galilee - butonmipresence is not local presence everywhere (seeOMNIPRESENCE §4). Again: is it really impossible fora human bemg to be omnipotent? If an omnipotentbeing took on a set of properties such that whateverhad those properties would be human, it wouldthereby acquire a certain set of powers or abilities, aset that might be the whole set of the powers had byan 'ordinary' human being; but might this set not besimply a (rather small) subset of the set of aU itspowers - might that being not continue to beomnipotent? Might it not contmue to be able tomove mountains? (Only, of course, in the way it hadbeen able to move mountains before it took on its'new' set of properties and powers: it would be unableto move mountains by using its limbs to exert physicalpressure on them, even as Solomon and Catherinewere unable to do this.) Similar questions can beasked in respect of omniscience.

If a human being can indeed be omnipresent,onmipotent and omniscient, then one might addressthe problem of the apparent logical inconsistency ofthe doctrine of the Incarnation simply by denying itreality and asserting, without qualification, that Jesusof Nazareth was omnipresent, omnipotent andomniscient. Whether this solution is philosophicallycoherent could be debated mtermmably. But there isalso the question whether it is in fact usable byChristians (who are, of course, the only people whohave a use for it), for it is certainly arguable that it isinconsistent with the data of the New Testament, mwhich Jesus is sometimes represented as unable to docertain things and as learning things of which he hadhitherto been ignorant and, in one case, as simply notknowing the exact day and hour of the end of the age(Matthew 24: 36; Mark 13: 32). It would no doubt be

possible to insist that the passages m the NewTestament that represent Jesus as subject to many ofthe limitations of ordinary human existence can bereconciled with the thesis that he is omnipotent,omniscient and omnipresent ~- rather as many havefound it possible to insist that the doctrine of atimeless, impassible God can be reconciled with thenarratives of the Pentateuch. But it would seem that asolution to the problem would be more attractive tomost Christians if it allowed Jesus to share our humanlimitations.

There is an attributive solution that claims to havethis feature. It is called kenoticism, from the Greekkenosis ('emptying'), an account of the nature of theIncarnation that is based on the statement (PhUip-plans 2; 7) that, in becoming mcamate, Christ'emptied3 himself. Whatever the correct interpretationof the difficult passage in which this statement occursmay be, kenoticism holds that, in becoming mcamate,Christ relinquished omnipotence, omniscience, omni-presence and various other of what are commonlycalled the divine attributes (although it continued tobe true of him that he was morally perfect, had nobegimung m thne and was not a created being).Kenoticists do not. however, hold that when Christhad become incamate no one was omnipotent andonmipresent. This entry has not so far touched on therelation of the doctrine of the Incarnation to thedoctrine of the Trinity, but the two doctrines intersecton the following point: it was the second person of theTrinity alone. God the Son, who became mcamate.According to the kenotic theory, God the Son'emptied himself of omnipotence and onmipresence,but God the Father and God the Holy Spiritcontinued to possess these attributes.

Kenoticism, it win be noted, requires a 'rethinking'of divinity and various of the divine attributes as wellas of humanity We are inclined to think that a beingthat had attributes such as omniscience and ommpo-tence would have to have them. essentially - and hencethat that being could not reUnquish them. But how,the kenoticist asks, do we know this? We are alsoinclmed to think that a bemg who was not omniscientor omuipotent at t would not be at t a divine being.But how do we know this? How do we know that, forexample, omnipotence is reaUy a divine attribute,really entailed by divinity? Might it not be that it isnot strictly omnipotence that is entailed by divinity,but rather some 'weaker' attribute - perhaps omni-potence unless onmipotence is voluntarily relia-quished?

It is very doubtful whether kenoticism can bereconciled with orthodoxy. The foUowing two diffi-culties are apparent. First, the theory does not meshwell with orthodox Trinitarian theology, for it seems

729


to imply that the persons of the Trinity are distinctsubstances, distinct beings, and hence to implytritheism (see TRINITY §§1-2). Second, the theoryallows the incarnate Christ to be divine only byconsiderably "weakening the concept of divinity. Theincamate Christ can mdeed say truly I am a divinebeing, but only because, for the kenoticist, it ispossible to be a divine being at a certain momentwithout then being omnipotent, omniscient or omni-present. It is doubtful whether kenoticism can bereconciled with the following two requirements: 'theproperty [that is, defining properties or essentialfeatures] of each nature being preserved (Definitionof Chalcedon); 'not by the transformation of hisdivinity into flesh (Athanasian Creed). Even ifkenoticism can, by artful interpretations of theirlanguage, be reconciled with the letter of the twodocuments, it certainly cannot be reconciled with theirspirit. (Kenoticism is a nmeteenth-century mventionand did not, therefore, influence the wording of theDefinition or the Creed. There can be no real doubtthat they would have been so worded as to exclude it ifit had existed in the fifth century.)

Thomas Morris (1986) has defended an attributivesolution that both takes into account the biblical dataconcerning the human limitations of Christ andretains a robust concept of divinity. Morris accountsfor the biblical data by suggesting that Christ, mbecoming incamate, acquired a human mind withoutthereby relinquishing his divine mind. (The divinemind that Christ retains is not, accordmg to Morris,'divine3 only in some etiolated, kenotic sense: itremains, for example, omniscient.) Between the twominds there exists an 'asymmetrical accessing rela-tion': only a minuscule segment of what is present mthe divine mind is accessible to the human mind.Christs human limitations are to be traced to thelimitations of his human mind, and it is this miadwhose thoughts and sufferings are recorded in theGospels.

Moms solution is certainly to be preferred both tothe unqualified solution and to kenoticism. Onemight wonder, however, whether it is not a form ofmonophysitism. (This point could also have beenbrought against the 'unqualified' solution.) Morris'solution represents Christ's human mind as a 'sub-system of his divine mind - which is, after aU, realtyjust his mind, his mind simpliciter. And althoughChrist has (on the physical side) weight and shape andlocal presence ~- all the physical properties thatsomeone needs to be fully human - these are simplyproperties that God has acquired, 'additions' to theproperties that he had before the Incarnation. Itwould seem, therefore, that Morris' solution inheritsthe following feature of the unqualified' solution: it

represents the incarnate Christ as a single substance, adivine substance that, by becoming incamate, ac-quired certain properties that would otherwise belonsonly to created beings. Morris would certainlyvigorously affirm the presence of two natures in theincamate Christ, but his account of what this meansseems to be very like the account given by thosemonophysites who were willing to accept the 'twonatures terminology: It is the claim of orthodoxythat Jesus had all of the [essential] properties ofhumanity, and aU the [essential] properties of divinity,and thus existed (and continues still to exist) in twonatures' (Morris 1986: 40). The definitional state-ments that an advocate of Morns' solution wouldhave to pay special attention to are these: 'madeknown in two natures without confusion [withoutrunning together]' (Definition of Chalcedon); 'not byconfusion of substance (Athanasian Creed).

4 Predicafive solutions

Predicative solutions concede that pairs of predicateslike 'is eternal' and 'was born of a human mother in 6ec are inconsistent. But advocates of these solutionsmamtaiu that the real logical form of some or allsentences of the superficial form 'Christ is F is notwhat that superficial form suggests. There are two, orperhaps three, ways a sentence of this form can beconstrued: 'Christ is F qua God (as regards hisdivinity), Christ is F quo, man , and, possibly, Christis F without qualification (simphciter) . Predicativesolutions contend, moreover, that pairs of sentenceslike Christ is eternal qua God and Christ was bornof a human mother ia 6 BC quo. man are consistent.(It would seem natural to suppose that proponents ofpredicative solutions - since they concede that iseternal and was born... are mconsistent -- mustregard 'Christ is eternal simpliciter'' and 'Christ wasborn of a human mother in 6 BC simpliciter asinconsistent. Indeed, it would seem natural tosuppose that they would have to say that it was falsethat Christ had either his 'exclusively divine' or his'exclusively human' attributes simpliciter, and wouldallow only that he had each of them qua God or quo,man, as appropriate - although they might hold thatChrist had certain attributes, such as moral perfec-tion, simpliciter. But some 'predicativists' may refuseto recognize the simpliciter mode of predication.And at least one 'predicativisf author explicitly treatssuch pairs of sentences as consistent, for reasons thatwill be given below.)

'Predicativism', so understood, is unquestioBabtyorthodox. But it is doubtful whether it constitutes asolution to the problem of the apparent inconsistencyof orthodox two-natures Christology. A satisfactory

730

single substance, a,ng mcamate, ae-I otherwise belongwould certainly

wo natures m thef what this meansit given by those» accept the 'twolim of orthodoxyial] properties ofperties of divinity,ill to exist) m twoiefmitional state-s solution wouldare these: 'madeinfusion [withoutkalcedon); not byn Creed).

)airs of predicatesuman mother in 6of these solutionsn of some or allZ-hrist is F is notThere are two, orthis form can be. (as regards his\, possibly, 'Christiter) . Predicattve3airs of sentences'Christ was born

in' are consistent.h.at proponents ofconcede that (is

;onsistent - mustand Christ was

3C simplicUef asseem natural toy that it was falseely divine or hisliciter, and would1 quo. God or ^yay might hold thatas moral perfec-

ivists' may refusee of predication.or explicitly treatst, for reasons that

is unquestionablysr it constitutes arent inconsistency^y. A satisfactory


predicative solution must supplement the abstracttheses of the preceding paragraph with some sort ofreply to the foUowing challenge:

Where F and G are incompatible properties, and K^and K^ are kinds , what does it mean to say ofsomething that it is Fqua K^ but G gua K{i - or that itis F qua K\ but is not F qua K{1 And can any more orless uncontroversial examples of such pairs ofstatements be found?

R.T. Herbert (1979) has offered an example of sucha pair of statements. Consider ambiguous figures, likethe familiar 'duck-rabbit'. One could point at such afigure and say truly both, That has ears qua rabbitand 'That has no ears qua duck'. But this exampleimmediately suggests a question: what does the word'that refer to? Certainly not to the ambiguous figure.The figure belongs neither to the kind 'rabbit' nor tothe kind 'duck', and therefore, presumably, has noproperties qua rabbit or quo, duck. (And if that doesnot refer to the figure, what does it refer to?) It may betrue that the figure has the property 'representingsomething with ears' quo. rabbit-representation andlacks this same property qua duck-representation. Ifso, this would be an example of a pair of iqudtstatements of the forms the above chaUenge hasdemanded. But it does not seem that this example willbe of use in Christology, for the property the figurehas quo, something and lacks qua something else isa representational property, and Christ, not being adrawing or a statue, has no representational proper-ties. (It is not accidental to the example that theproperty it involves is representational, and theexample provides the inquirer with no clue as tohow to construct an. example involvmg a propertythat is not representational.) It is true that one biblicalquotation describes Christ as the exact representation[charakter] of [God's] nature" (Hebrews 1: 3). But thismeans that Christ is a perfect copy' of God, and doesnot imply that any of Christ s properties is arepresentational property. (A daughter who is the'spit and image' of her mother is not a representationof her mother in the way a portrait of her mother is.)

Peter van Liwagen (1994) has presented a verycomprehensive and general predicative solution to theproblem of the apparent inconsistency of the doctrineof the Incarnation. It has been observed by severalauthors that Peter Geach's thesis of the 'relativity ofidentity can be employed to solve the Leibniz s Lawproblems faced by the doctrine of the Trinity (seeTRINITY §3). Van Inwagen has shown that thetechniques employed in. this solution can be extendedto solve the similar problems faced by the doctrine ofthe Incarnation. The following is a simplified versionof van Inwagen s solution.

Suppose that, although God is not (of course) thesame substance or being as the human being Jesus ofNazareth, he is nevertheless the same person - thesame I or thou OT he . (This assumption has twoclosely related presuppositions: that it is possible for xto be the same person as y but not the samesubstance; and that if x is the same person as y, andx has the property F, it does not follow that y has F.)Let the adjective Nazarene represent some conjunc-tion of 'human' properties that uniquely identify thehuman being Jesus of Nazareth. We may now offerthe following three definitions:

Jesus Christ is F simpliciter.

Something x is such that: something divine is thesame person as x; and something Nazarene is thesame person as x; and x is F.

Jesus Christ is F quo. God:

Something x is such that: something divine is thesame person as x; and something Nazarene is thesame person as x; and x is divine; and x is F,

Jesus Christ is F quo. man:

Something x is such that: something divine is thesame person as x; and something Nazarene is thesame person as x; and x is human; and x is K

The two latter defmitions have the expected anddesired consequences. The following two conse-quences of the first, however, although not unortho-dox, are certainly somewhat comiterintuitive: JesusChrist is eternal simpliciter (since something divineand something Nazarene are the same person, and theformer is eternal), and Jesus Christ had a beginning intime simpliciter (since something divine and some-thing Nazarene are the same person, and the latterhad a beginning m time). Using constructions likethose illustrated in the three definitions, van Inwagenhas shown how to correlate each statement endorsedby the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation with astatement in a formal language comprismg only thetwo relative identity predicates is the same being asand 'is the same person as' and a small stock ofadditional predicates. (The formal language containsno names or descriptions; it contains no terms butvariables.) He has shown that the set of statements inthe formal language that are correlated with the set ofstatements that orthodoxy endorses are formallyconsistent (given a certain explicitly stated set of rulesthat defines valid inference in the formal language).This 'solution' to the problem of the apparent logicalinconsistency of the doctrine of the Incarnation,unlike the other solutions we have examined, has noontological content. Van Inwagen makes no attemptat a metaphysical analysis of divinity or humanity; his

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INCOMMENSURABILITY

project is simply to set out a formal representation ofthe orthodox doctrine that is provably formallyconsistent.

His solution raises at least two serious questions (if,indeed, metaphysically empty as it is, it is proper tocall it a solution). First, do the two 'closely relatedpresuppositions' mentioned above (that it is possiblefor x to be the same person as y but not the samesubstance; and that if x is the same person as y, and xhas the property F, it does not follow that y has F)really make any logical sense? Second, van Inwagen'sconstructions represent the statements of traditionalIncamational theology as having very different logicalforms from those they appear to have. (For example,given the appropriate theological assumptions, thesentence 'Jesus Christ is eternal quo God' is true onhis analysis - but not because 'Jesus Christ' is asingular referring expression that denotes an objectthat has, on those assumptions, the property ex-pressed by the predicate is eternal quo God .) In viewof this fact, can these constructions plausibly be heldto represent the intended content of the traditionalstatements?

See also: ATONEMENT; IDENTITY; IMMUTABILITY §3;SIMPLICITY. DIVINE

References and further reading

Bettenson, H. (ed.) (1963) Documents of the ChristianChurch, Oxford and London: Oxford UniversityPress, 2nd edn. (A useful collection. Containsmaterials relating to Apollinarianism, Nestorianismand - under the heading 'Eutychianism'- mono-physitism.)

Geach, P.T. (1977) Providence and Evil, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. (An interesting dis-cussion of the logic of 'predication qua', withapplications to Christology; see especially pages24-8.)

* Gregory of Nazianzus (mid-to-late 4th century)'Letter 101', in IP. Migne (cd.) Patrologia Graeca,vol. 37, Paris, 1857-66, 162 vols; also in A.E.McGrath (ed.) The Christian Theology Reader,Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, 141-2. (The source for thequotation discussed in §1, a famous line standardlyquoted in discussions of Apollmarianism,McGrath's book contains an English translationof relevant parts of Gregory s letter.)

* Herbert, R.T. (1979) Paradox and Identity in Theol-ogy, Ithaca, NY: CorneU Umversity Press. (Anexcellent discussion of the logical problems of theIncarnation, which contains Herbert's 'ambiguousfigure' model; see especially chapter 4, 'TheAbsolute Paradox: The God-Man".)

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* Kelly, J.N.D. (1960) Early Christian Doctrines, Lon"don: A. & C. Black, 2nd edn. (The source of thetranslation of the Definition of Chalcedon quotedin the text; see especially pages 339-41.)

* — (1964) The Athanasian Creed, London: A. & C.Black. (The source of the translation quoted in thetext; see especially pages 19-20.)

McGrath, A.E. (1994) Christian Theology: An Intro-duction, Oxford: Blackwell. (Recommended forreaders with no background in theology or Churchhistory. Clear and reliable. See especially chapter 9,'The Doctrine of the Person of Christ'.)

* Morris, T.V. (1986) The Logic of God Incarnate,Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press. (The mostimportant recent work on the Incarnation by aphilosopher at time of writing. Contains discus-sions of most of the issues addressed in this article,as well as a presentation of Morns' two minds'Christology. May be consulted for references to awide range of recent philosophical work on theIncarnation.)

* Van Inwagen, P. (1994) 'Not by Confusion ofSubstance, but by Unity of Person', in A.G.Padgett (ed.) Reason and the Christian Religion:Essays in Honour of Richard Swinburne, Oxford:Clarendon Press. (An application of the 'logic ofrelative identity' to the problems of Christology.Contains what could be described as an analysis oftqua God' and 'quo man' in terms of relativeidentities.)

PETER VAN JNWAGEN

When one scientific theory or tradition is replaced byanother in a scientific revolution, the concepts involvedoften change in fundamental ways. For example, amongother differences, in Newtonian mechanics an object smass is independent of its velocity, while in relativitymechanics, mass increases as the velocity approachesthat of light. Earlier philosophers of science maintainedthat Einsteinian mechanics reduces to Newtonianmechanics in the limit of high velocities. However,Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Paul Feyerabend (1962,1965) introduced a rival view. Kuhn argued thatdifferent scientific traditions are defined by theiradherence to different paradigms, fundamental per-spectives which shape or determine not only substantivebeliefs about the world, but also methods, problems,standards of solution or explanation, and even whatcounts as an observation or fact, Scientific revolutions(changes of paradigm) alter all these profoundly,