Philosophical Investigations - Wittgenstein With Commentary

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Commentary on Wittgenstein's

Philosophical Investigations by Lois Shawver

Shawver Commentary

One of the most difficult or misleading aspects of Wittgenstein's

Philosophical Investigations is the way in which he uses multiple

voices to converse with himself. To have a sense of understanding

Wittgenstein you need to be able to hear these different voices.ThePhilosophical Investigations is written in aphorisms short numbered

passages that are loosely tied together in terms of theme. !e often

begins an aphorism with a "uoted passage. #or e$ample he begins thefirst aphorism with a "uotation from %ugustine.

&ost "uoted passages are not actual "uotes however but rather

Wittgenstein's construction of a ind of interlocutor. This interlocutormight be thought of in terms of %ugustine Plato characters in Plato's

dialogues (ertrand )ussell or even early Wittgenstein or perhaps *ust

a vague composite of these various figures. %t any rate this voice +and

it is not always in "uotes, represents the problem that Wittgenstein triesto thin through. I will call this voice whatever seems most

appropriate to the passage such as the voice of %ugustine early

Wittgenstein but the label I use is somewhat arbitrary in mostinstances. What is important is that you notice that this is the voice that

provides the conte$t for Wittgenstein's response.

In addition to the interlocutor it is useful to thin of there being two

additional voices. One is the voice that discovers perple$ities oraporia. This voice is often but not always introduced with a dash and

it often but again not always begins with the word -(ut-. I will often

call this the voice of aporia.

Then there is a third voice in which Wittgenstein maes an incisive point in the face of the tradition and aporia. ou might thin of this as

the -voice of clarity.-

The basic format then is/

voice of theinterlocutor

0verything has an essence.-

voice of aporia (ut is this true1

voice of clarityIt seems that this notion has been a presumption.



Of course this greatly simplifies the content of what Wittgenstein is

saying and not every passage has "uite this form. (ut if you loo for

these different voices it should assist you maing sense of what youfind in these pages.

I suggest that you never presume that these voices are all there in any

given passage. !e sometimes introduces for e$ample a thought

e$periment that he calls language games and in those cases it does notmae much sense to spea of these three voices. (ut you might

e$amine a passage to see if thining of it in terms of these voices helps

that passage mae sense to you. If it does then you're probably right in presuming that the passage in "uestion adopts this standard format.

%nd for my part when I see this format being used I will often call

your attention to it referring to it at times as -LW's standard format.-

%phorism 2324 from

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

with commentary on the right by

Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis in bold is inserted byShawver to enhance

commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

2. -When they +my elders,named some ob*ect andaccordingly moved towards

something I saw this and I

grasped that that the thing wascalled by the sound they uttered

when they meant to point it out.

Their intention was shown by

their bodily movements as itwere the natural language of all

peoples5 the e$pression of the

face the play of the eyes themovement of other parts of the

body and the tone of the voice

which e$presses our state ofmind in seeing having

re*ecting or avoiding

something. Thus as I heard

words repeatedly used in their

This is a "uotation thatWittgensteinn has taen from%ugustine +Confessions I.6.,.

7isuali8e %ugustine's picture of

how language is learned andnotice how natural and complete

it sounds as a total e$planation

for how language is learned.



proper places in various

sentences I gradually learnt to

understand what ob*ects theysignified5 and after I had trained

my mouth to form these signs I

used them to e$press my owndesires.-

These words it seems to megive us a particular picture of the

essence of human language. It is

this/ the individual words in

language name objects--

sentences are combinations of

such names33In this picture of

language we find the roots of the

following idea/ !very word hasa meaning "he meaning is

correlated with the word It is

the object for which the word

stands

9ow Wittgenstein is beginninghis commentary. The emphasis

is mine. It is the deconstruction

of %ugustine's picture oflanguage that is the focus of this

entire boo. +%lthough I should

say that many others beside

%ugustine have shared this

picture of language. %s we willsee it is a cultural illusion,

Once deconstucted new andstriingly different ideas about

language begin to emerge.

%ugustine does not spea of

there being any difference between inds of word. If you

describe the learning of language

in this way you are I believe

thining primarily of nouns lie'table' 'chair' 'bread' and of

people's names and only

secondarily of the names ofcertain actions and properties5

and of the remaining inds of

word as something that will taecare of itself.

!ere the deconstruction begins.

Looing at the %ugustinian

picture of language we see that%ugustine has e$plained only

one type of word.

9ow thin of the following use

of language/ I send someone

shopping. I give him a slip

mared 'five red apples'. !etaes the slip to the shopeeper

who opens the drawer mared

'apples' then he loos up theword 'red' in a table and finds a

colour sample opposite it5 then

he says the series of cardinal

This scenario is a thought

e$periment. To what e$tent do

you thin the language in this

scenario is e$plained by%ugustine's picture of language1

Thin of the shopeeper

counting out the apples onethrough five. :id he learn to do

this by someone pointing to five

apples1 !ardly. The teaching of







how did the worer learn tofetch1 %s opposed say to

taing ob*ects behind the fence1

=rushing them1 Or tapping them

with a stone1

?. %ugustine we might say doesdescribe a system of communication5

only not everything that we call

language is this system. %nd one has to

say this in many cases where the

"uestion arises 'Is this an appropriatedescription or not1' The answer is/

'es it is appropriate but only for thisnarrowly circumscribed region not for

the whole of what you were claiming to

describe.-

It is as if someone were to say/ -%game consists in moving ob*ects about

on a surface according to certain

rules...- 33and we replied/ ou seem to

be thining of board games but thereare others. ou can mae your

definition correct by e$presslyrestricting it to those games.

Somehow %ugustine's

picture of languagealthough appropriate for a

subsection of langauge is

not as all inclusive ane$planation of language as

we are at first glance

inclined to believe.

%s Wittgenstein says in

+2, we tend to sweep

under the rug all the usesof language that do not fit

the %ugustinian picture

that seems to capture ourimagination.

%lthough language3game+;, restricts the

vocabulary to words thatseem to refer to ob*ects

the %ugustinian picture

cannot e$plain everythingthat happens.

@. Imagine a script in which the

letters were used to stand forsounds and also as signs of

emphasis and punctuation. +%

script can be conceived as alanguage for describing sound3

patterns., 9ow imagine someone

interpreting that script as if there

were simple a correspondence of

!ow might this be1 Suppose

we taught a parrot to say -Pollywants a cracer- and whenever

it says it we gave the parrot a

cracer. On the surface thisloos lie language. The parrot

is asing for and receiving a

cracer. !owever on closer

e$amination it is not. We could

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letters to sounds and as ifthe letters had not also

completely different functions.

%ugustine' conception oflanguage is lie such an over3simple conception of the script.

have taught the parrot to say

-<et lost>- and give it a cracer

each time it does. Then itwould not have looed as

though the parrot were speaing

0nglish.

To thin that simply saying thewords -Polly wants a cracer-

constitutes -language- is to have

this sort of over3simple

conception of the language.Something profound is missing

from this conception although it

is not yet clear e$actly what thisis. Still it is a beginning to say

that when the parrot says -Pollywants an cracer- he doesn't"uite now what this sentence

means in 0nglish. It amuses us

because nevertheless it seemsas though he does.

The same would be true if we

taught a two year old to answer

the "uestion -What is @A4divided by ?BB1- by saying

-One point two three.- It would be a correct answer in 0nglish

but the child would not nowwhat she was saying because

she would not now how to

count now wha this numbermeans or now what division

means. There is more to

language than stringing together correct words.

A. If we loo at the e$ample in +2, wemay perhaps get an inling how much

this general notion of the meaning of a

word surrounds the woring of languagewith a ha8e which maes clear vision

impossible. It disperses the fog to study

the phenomena of language in primitiveinds of application in which one can

(ut although the parroted sentences are

not language in the

richest sense of the termthey help us to

understand how

language begins theroots of language.



command a clear view of the aim and

functioning of the words.

% child uses such primitive forms of

language when it learns to tal. !ere the

teaching oflanguage is not e$planation but training.

B. We could imagine that thelanguage of +;, was the whole

language of % and (5 even the

whole language of a tribe. Thechildren are brought up to perform these actions to use

these words as they do so and to

react in this way to the words ofothers. %n important part of

the training will consist in the

teacher's pointing to the ob*ectsdirecting the child's attention to

them and at the same time

uttering a word5 for instance the

word -slab- as he points to thatshape.

%lthough the word -slab>- is nottied to any particular activity in

0nglish in the language we are

imagining in +;, it is always acommand to fetch a slab. What

tends to confuse us is that we

can imagine something lie thistaing place in 0nglish. It is

*ust that the word -slab>- would

not be confined to only this use.

!owever in the community weare imagining this is the only

use for the term -slab>- %nd

how might children be taughtthe use of the term1 We can

well imagine that the

%ugustinian picture of languagetraining might be involved. Thechild's attention will be directed

to the different shapes and the

child will learn to e$pect eachshape to be associated with a

particular sound.

+ I do not want to call this

-ostensive definition- becausethe child cannot as yet as what

the name is. I will call it

-ostensive teaching ofwords-.33333I say that it will form

an important part of the training

because it is so with human

beings5 not because it could not

What is the difference between

ostensive teaching of words andostensive definitions1 In

ostensive definitions someone

points and gives a name ofsomething and this serves to

mae clear how the term is to be

used. When someone points to

a cracer and says -cracer-

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be imagine otherwise.,

those who now what a cracer

is +but not the name for it, can

receive this as an ostensivedefinition. (ut if a child has not

yet learned language it is lie

the parrot. It does not nowwhat is being pointed to on whatthe word cracer means.

+&aybe the word -cracer-

means -s"uare- or -salty-. Ormaybe it means -food-.,

!owever the child understands

the term the child can be taughtto say it in assocition with the

ob*ect. %s %ugustine imagined

things in +2, . %s %ugustine

imagined things the childwithout any language was able

to -grasp-

This ostensive teaching of words

can be said to establish anassociation between the word and

the thing. (ut what does this

mean1 Well it can mean variousthings/ but one very li#ely

thin#s first of all that a picture

of the object comes before thechild's mind when it hears the

word $ut now% if this does

happen---is it the purpose of

the word&

The emphasis here is mine. I

want to show what I will callWittgenstein's aporetic voice.

!e is reminding us of the

cultural ways we thin so tht hecan deconstruct them. !ere

Wittgenstein is taling about the

cultural illusion that is related to%ugustine's picture of language

and what we are liely to say

that supports this illusion.

---es it can be the purpose.333Ican imagine such a use of words

+of series of sounds,. +Cttering a

word is lie striing a note on theeyboard of the imagination., (ut

in the language of +;, it is not the purpose of the words to evoeimages. +It may of course be

discovered that that helps to

attain the actual purpose.,

(ut although language maycreate images for us remember

the language in +;, was not

re"uired to create images for the

worers. The worer in +;,would understand what was

being said to him if he simply

fetched what was called forwhether or not he had images of

what called for when it was

called or not.

(ut if the ostensive teaching In +;, one understands the call



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has this effect 333am I to say that

it effects an understanding of the

word1 :on't you understand thecall -Slab>- if you act upon it in

such3and3such a way1 33

:oubtless the ostensive teachinghelped to bring this about5 butonly together with a particular

training. With different training

the same ostensive teaching ofthese words would have effected

a "uite different understanding.

-Slab>- if one brings it when it

is called. Pointing to slablie

ob*ects and saying -slab- mighthave faciliated this teaching but

one could also imagine learning

to tae the slab behind the fencewhen it is called. % differenttraining would have resulted in

the worer doing different

things with the slab hitting ithiding it burying it and so

forth.

-I set the brae up by

connecting up rod and lever.-333es given the whole of the rest

of themechanism. Only in con*unctionwith that is it a brae3lever and

separated from its support it is

not even a lever5 it may be

anything or nothing.

Cnless one nows how to weave

the word into some form of

human activity the saying of the

word is not yet language. It islie a brea that is not yet

connected with the entiremechanism. The parts seem to

be there but it does not yet have

the connections to function as itshould.

D. In the practice of the use of

language +;, one party calls outthe words the other acts on

them. In instruction in the

language the following processwill occur/ the learner names the

ob*ects5 that is he utters the

word when the teacher points tothe stone.333%nd there will be

this still simpler e$ercise/ the

pupil repeats the words after the

teacher33333both of these being processes resembling language.

%ll of this sounds lie%ugustine's picture of learning

language.

We can also thin of the whole

process of using words in +;, as

one of those games by means ofwhich children learn their native

language. I will call these games

-language3games- and will

!ere Wittgensein introduces the

concept of a language game but

he will amplify this concept laterso that it does not merely apply to

language learning e$ercises. To

anticipate this amplification of

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sometimes spea of a primitivelanguage as a language3game.

the meaning of this term we

might sometimes distinguish this

meaning of the term by callingthese language games -primitive

language games.-

%nd the processes of naming

the stones and of repeating

words after someone might also be

called language3games. Thin of

much of the use words in gameslie ring3a3ring3a3roses.

In ring3a3ring3a3roses the child

learns the phrases withoutnowing what they mean as a

parrot might learn to say -Polly

wants a cracer.-

I shall also call the whole%

consisting of language and the

actions into which it is woven%the language-game

So -the language game- is notmerely speech. In +;, he whole

activity of fetching the ob*ectswas part of the -language game-of +;,.

6. Let us now loo at an

e$pansion of language +;,.

(esides the four words -bloc--pillar- etc. let it contain a

series of words used as the

shopeeper in +2, used the

numerals +it can be the series ofletters of the alphabet,5 further

let there be two words whichmay as well be -there- and-this- +because this roughly

indicates their purpose,that are

used in conne$ion with a pointing gesture5 and finally a

number of colour samples. %

gives an order lie/ -d333slab333there-. %t the same time he

shews the assistant a colour

sample and when he says

-there- he points to a place onthe building site. #rom the

stoc of slabs ( taes one for

each letter of the alphabet up to-d- of the same colour as the

sample and brings them to the

place indicated by %.333On other

In +6, LW creates a new language

game that is a variation of +;,.

9ow we will be able to spea of

bringing E number of slabs andwe will be abe to indicate where

we want the slab to be put. Weunderstand these concepts LWe$plains because they e$ist in

0nglish. 9otice however that

LW does not say that the slabswill be counted with numbers

but with the letters of the

alphabet. This helps us get intothe feel of what it would be lie

if we had a more primitive

system of counting one in which

there was no arithemetic possisilibities for e$ample.



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occasions % gives the order

-this333there-. %t -this- he points

to a building stone. %nd so on.

F. When a child learns

this language it has tolearn the series of

'numerals' a b c ... by

heart. %nd it has to learntheir use.333Will this

training include ostensive

teaching of the words1333Well people will for

e$ample point to slabs

and count/ -a b c

slabs-.333Something more

lie the ostensiveteaching of the words

-bloc- -pillar- etc.would be the ostensive

teaching of numerals that

serve not to count but torefer to groups of ob*ects

that can be taen in at a

glance. =hildren do learnthe use of the first or si$

cardinal numerals in this

way.

!ow can we imagine the people of +6,

learning language1 =an they learn itostensively as %ugustine imagined1

Tae the learning of numbers. We could

imagine them learning to distinguishnumbers ostensively as we might learn

to distinguish two from three by

distinguishing these configurations oftwo and three/

o

o o o o

(ut this would be of limited use. Wecannot learn to distinguish apparently

much larger numbers in this fashion.

Thus we count.

%re -there- and -this

also taughtostensively1333Imagine

how one might perhaps

teach their use. One will point to places and

things333but in this case

the pointing occurs in theuse of the words too and

not merely in learning the

use.333

!ow will -there- and -this- be taught1

This is tricy and LW does not answerthe "uestion for us. :o you point to

-this- and say -this-1 :oes that clarify

the use of the word -this-1 !ardly.

24. 9ow what do the words ofthis language signify1333What is

supposed to shew what they

signify% if not the #ind of use

What does -two signify-1 :oes itsignify any two ob*ects1 Say two

blocs1 Well we now what the

word -bloc signifies.- It signifies



they have& %nd we have alreadydescribed that. So we are asing

for the e$pression -This word

signifies this- to be made a part ofthe description. In other words the

description ought to tae the form/

-The word . . . .signifies . . . .-

.

each of the two blocs. :oes

-two- signifiy something other

than what -bloc signifies-1 Thereare conceptual pu88les here.

%nd what does -this- signify. Itsignifies what I point to. (ut that

can be anything. !ow can a childlearn to associate the naming of

anything by one term1

(ut do we need to say what these

words -signify-1 Isn't everythingclear already1 Since we now

their use1 Why would we re"uire

that all words -signify-1

Of course one can reduce thedescription of the use of the word

-slab- to the statement that thisword signifies this ob*ect. This

will be done when for e$ample it

is merely a matter of removing the

mistaen idea that the word -slab-refers to the shape of building3

stone that we in fact call a

-bloc-333but the ind of 'refering'this is that is to say the use of

these words for the rest is alreadynown.

In language3game +;, pointing and

saying -slab- may be helpful to

show which slab is to be fetched but pointing and naming would not

show that the slab is to be fetched.

0"ually one can say that the

signs -a- -b- etc. signify

numbers5 when for e$ample this

removesthe mistaen idea that -a- -b-

-c- play the part actually played

in language by -bloc- -slab--pillar-. %nd one can also say that

-c- means this number and not that

one5 when for e$ample thisserves to e$plain that the letters

are to be used in the order a b c

d etc. and not in the order a b d

c.

In other words we might want to

e$plain that -c- is not *ust anotherob*ect lie -slab- or -bloc- and so

we might need e$plain -a- -b-

and -c- signify numbers. (ut

where does this leave us1 :oes itteach the child in +6, to learn to use

numbers +by counting things, and

until the child learns to count doesthe child really now what

-numbers- means1

(ut assimilating the

descriptions of the uses of the

words in this way cannot mae the

So although we can find a way to

say that -a- -b- -c- signify

something assimilating these







uses

themselves any more lie one

another. #or as we see they areabsolutely unlie.

different inds of words to the

same e$pression +they are

instances if -signifying- hides theenormity of the difference and

creates a over simplified picture

language and how language islearned.



%phorism 223;4 from


with commentary on the right byLois Shawver

Wittgenstein: +0mphasis in bold is inserted by

Shawver to enhance

commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

22. Thin of the tools in a tool3

bo$/ there is a hammer pliers asaw a screw3driver a ruler a

glue3pot glue nails and

screw.333The functions of wordsare as diverse as the functions

of these

ob*ects. +%nd in both cases

there are similarities.,

%ugustine was struc by the

similarities of different words andfailed to note their differences.

Such an understanding would be

as superficial as learning that allthe ob*ects in the toolbo$ were

-tools- but not nowing any of

their different functions.

Of course what confuses usis the uniform appearance of

words when we hear them

spoen or meet them in scriptand print. #or their application

is not presented to us so clearly.0specially when we are doing philosophy>

Loo at the words on this page.

:on't they loo alie1 They loo

so much more lie each other

than they loo lie your eyboardor your hand. This is what

confuses us.

2;. It is lie looing into the cabin of alocomotive. We see handles all looing

more or less alie. +9aturally since they

are all supposed to be handled., (ut one isthe handle of a cran which can be moved

continuously +it regulates the opening of avalve,5 another is the handle of a switchwhich has only a brae3lever the harder

one pulls on it the harder it braes5 a

fourth the handle of a pump/ it has aneffect only so long as it is moved to and

fro.

We are mesmeri8ed by

the similarity in theappearance of words.

This eeps us from

noticing the vastdifferences in their

uses.



2?. When we say/ -0very word in language signifies something-we have so far said nothing

whatever5 unless we have e$plained e$actly what distinction we wish

to mae. +It might be of course that we wanted to distinguish thewords of language +6, from words 'without meaning' such as occur in

Lewis =arroll's poems or words lie -Lilliburlero- in songs.,

2@. Imagine someone's saying/

-%ll tools serve to modify

something. Thus the hammermodifies the position of the nail

the saw the shape of the board

and so on.-333%nd what ismodified by the rule the glue3

pot the nails1333-Our nowledge

of thing's length the temperature

of the glue and the solidityof the bo$.-33333Would anything

be gained by this assimilation of

e$pressions1333

It seems we loo for ways to

disguise the differences in

different inds of terms. We tryto assimilate them all to a

particular way of describing

them. (ut the fact that we can

find an e$pression that treatsthem all the same +e.g. all

words are made of characters,

does not mean that they are assimilar as we thin. We fail to

notice their differences and this

undermines our philosophyabout language.

2A. The word -to signify- is perhaps used in the moststraight3forward way when the

ob*ects

signified is mared with thesign. Suppose that the tools %

uses in building bear certain

mars. When % shews hisassistant such a mar he

brings the tool that has that

mar on it.

It is in this and more or lesssimilar ways that a name

means and is given to a

thing.333It will often prove

useful in philosophy to say toourselves/ naming something

is lie attaching a label to a

Well does the word -signify- meananything at all1 There is ae$emplary case of our using this

term. It is used best when we mar

ob*ects with a sign. Sometimes itis useful to use such a model in

understanding language.



thing.

2B. What about the coloursamples that % shews to (/ arethey part of language1 Well it

is as you please. They do not

belong among the words5 yet

when I say to someone/-Pronounce the word 'the' -

you will count the second -the-

as part of the language3game+6,5 that is it is a sample of

what the other is meant to say.

It is most natural and causes

least confusion to recon thesamples among the instruments

of

the language.

++)emar on the refle$ive pronoun -this sentence-. 3

+A4;,,,

There is a certain analogy

between saying -This is the color

pillar I want you to bring- and-This is the way I want you to

pronounce the word 'the.'- We

sometimes give samples of how tosay things or what to call things

with words and sometimes we

use supplementary techni"ues

such as color samples.

Wittgenstein is urging us to countall of these techni"ues regardless

of whether they consist of words-language.-

2D. It will be possible to say/ In

language +6, we have different

inds of word. #or the functionsof the word -slab- and the word

-bloc- are more alie than those

of -slab- and -d-. (ut how we

group words into inds willdepend on the aim of the

classification333and on our own

inclination.

Thin of the different points of

view from which one can classify

tools or chess3men.

Treat this as an e$ercise. What

ind of words are there in +6,.The way to classify words in 6

will vary but one way that

suggests itself is we can countsome words as names some as

numbers and some as

pronouns. (ut couldn't we also

classify these words according

to whether they are one syllableor two1 %ren't there other ways

to classify them1

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26. :o not be troubled by the

fact that languages +;, and +6,

consist only of orders. If youwant to say that this shews them

to be incomplete as yourself

whether our language iscomplete5333whether it was so before the symbolism of

chemistry and the notation of the

infinitesimal calculus wereincorporated in it5 for these are

so to spea suburbs of our

language. +%nd how manyhouses or streets does it tae

before a town begins to be a

town1, Our language can be seen

as an ancient city/ ama8e of little streets and s"uares

of old and new houses and of

houses with additions fromvarious periods5 and this

surrounded by a multitude of

new boroughs with straightregular streets and uniform

houses.

%t what point does a language

become complete1 Was our

language complete before we

introduced the speciali8edlanguage of psychoanalysis1

(efore we introduced the 8erointo our counting system1 %nd

for that matter is our language

complete now1

We have no way to evaluate thecompleteness of language. 0ach

language is more or less rich but

the ways that it is rich are

different from that in otherlanguages.

2F. It is easy to imagine a

language consisting only of orders

and reports in battle.333Or a

language consisting only of"uestions and e$pressions for

answering yes and no. %nd

innumerable others.33333(nd to

imagine a language means to

imagine a form of life

Wittgenstein has already toldus that language games are not

not *ust to be -words- and our

ways of responding withwords. The language game in

+;, for e$ample was woven

into a culture that fetched slabsand blocs. Their words were

woven into their activity their

forms of life.

(ut what about this/ is the call

-Slab>- in e$ample +;, a sentenceor a word1333 If a word surely it

has not the same meaning as the

lie3sounding word of ourordinary language for in +;, it is a

call. (ut if a sentence it is surely

!ow can it be an elliptical

sentence1 There are no words possible in language3game +;,

e$cept -slab- -bloc- -pillar-

and -beam.-

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not the elliptical sentence/ -Slab>-

of our language.

33333%s far as the first "uestiongoes you can call -Slab>- a word

and also a sentence5 perhaps itcould be appropriately called a'degenerate sentence' +as one

speas of a degenerate hyperbola,5

in fact it is our 'elliptical'

sentence.333(ut that is surely onlya shortened form of sentence

-(ring me a slab- and there is no

such sentence in e$ample +;,.333

$ut why should I not on

contrary have called the

sentence $ring me a slab alengthening of the sentence

Slab)&333

0ven in 0nglish it is biased to

say that -Slab>- is an elliptical

form of -(ring me a slab.- If

we began by learning thecommand -slab>- +and maybe

we did, then wouldn't -(ring

be slab>- be a lengthened formof -Slab>-1

(ecause if you shout -Slab>- you

really mean/ -(ring me a slab-.333

!ere is LW's aporetic +or

%ugustinian voice,. Let's

unpac what we mean by-really mean.-

(ut how do you do this/ how do

you mean that while you say

-Slab>-1 :o you say the

unshortened sentence to yourself1%nd why should I translate the call

-Slab>- into a different e$pressionin order to say what someone

means by it1 %nd if they mean the

same thing333why should I not say/

-When he says 'Slab>'-1 %gain ifyou can mean -(ring me the slab-

why should you not be able to

mean -Slab>-1 33333(ut when I call-Slab>- then what I want is that he

should bring me a slab>33333=ertainly but does 'wanting this'consist in thining in some from

or other a different sentence from

the one you utter1333

%nd here are some

observations that are meant to

shed clarifying light/

!ow do you have this othermeaning -(ring me a slab>-

going on1 In what way is this

what we really mean1 Wedon't say -(ring me a slab>- to

ourselves while we say

-Slab>- Why not say that-(ring me a slab>- really

means -Slab>-

This notion -really mean- isconfusing here. We do not-really mean- a particular

sentence in this case. Or we

might *ust as well say that wereally mean -slab>- as to say

that we really mean -(ring me



a slab>-

;4. (ut now it loos as ifwhen someone says -(ring me aslab- he could mean this

e$pression as one long word

corresponding to the single word

-Slab>- 3333Then can one mean itsometimes as one word and

sometimes as four1 %nd can one

mean it sometimes as one wordand sometimes as four1 %nd

how does one usually mean

it133333

%nd when a person says -(ring

me a slab>- it is not the same asif a peson said -bring3me3a3

slab>- as if it were *ust one

word. What is wrong with ouranalysis here1

When is -(ring me a slab>- four

words and when is it one1

I thin we shall be inclined tosay/ we mean the sentence as

four words when we use it in

contrast with other sentences

such as -!and me a slab--(ring him a slab-. -(ring two

slabs- etc.5 that is in contrast

with sentences containing theseparate words of our

command in other

combinations.33333

When we have a variety of

sentences that use most of the

same words but are variations on

a theme then we will say that thesentence has four words.

(ut what does using onesentence in contrast with others

consist in1 :o the others

perhaps hover before one's

mind1 %ll of them1 %nd whileone is saying the one sentence

or before or afterwards1333

9o. 0ven if such an e$planation

rather tempts us we need onlythin for a moment of what

actually happens in order to see

that we are going astray here.

We say that

we use the command in

contrast with other sentences

because our language contains

The clarifying voice/

Our temptation to use ane$planation that re"uires us to

thin of the other sentences

-hovering- is instructive. It

teaches us to stop and loo andnot base our conclusions on

-what must be.- When we stop

to loo we see that the other



the possibility of those other

sentences. Someone who did

not understand our language aforeigner who had fairly often

heard someone giving the order/

-(ring me a slab>- might believe that this whole series ofsounds was one word

corresponding perhaps to the

word for -building3stone- in hislanguage. If he himself had then

given this order perhaps he

would have pronounced itdifferently and we should say/

he pronounces it so oddly

because he taes it for a single

word.33333

sentences are no in anyway

hovering in our minds. What

mae one way of saying -(ringme a slab>- a sentence and the

other way -(ring3me3a3slab>- aword has something more to do

with the fact that we can mae

sentences that are variations onthe theme -(ring me a slab>-

(ut then is there not alsosomething different going on in

him when he pronounces it333

something corresponding to thefact that he conceives the

sentence as a single word133333

(ut what is going on with him1

&ust he be picturing the -slab-

when he hears it1 Or must he

say this sentence to himself-(ring me a slab>-

0ither the same thing may go on

in him or something different.

#or what goes on in you whenyou give such an order1 %re you

conscious of its consisting of

four words while you areuttering it1 Of course you have a

mastery of this language333

which contains those othersentences as well333but is this

having a mastery something that

happens while you

are uttering the sentence1333%ndI have admitted that the

foreigner will probably

pronounce a sentence differentlyif he conceives it differently5 but

what we call his wrong

conception need not lie inanything that accompanies the

utterance of the command.

We we issue a command -slab>-what goes on in us1

Introspectively need there be

anything private1 There might be something present when we

utter the command but there

need not be.



The sentence is 'elliptical' not

because it leaves out somethingthat we thin when we utter it

but because it is shortened333in

comparison with a particularparadigm of our grammar.333

In our culture we create the

paradigm of the full sentence as

the -real.- Therefore we say-Slab>- is a shortened form and

not -(ring me a slab>- is a

lengthend form. (ut this paradigm that calls the longerform the real form is arbitrary.

Of course one might ob*ect here/

-ou grant that the shortened

and the unshortened sentencehave the same sense.333What is

this sense then1 Isn't there a

verbal e$pression for this

sense1-33333

%nd if they have the same sense

then isn't one form of the

sentence the -right- or -real-

form1

(ut doesn't the fact thatsentences have the same sense

consist in their having the same

use1333+In )ussian one says-stone red- instead of - the stone

is red-5 do they feel the copula

to be missing in the sense orattach it in thought1,

&aybe not. &aybe we say thatthe sentences have the same

-sense- only because they have

the same use in the language3game. They cause one person to

fetch the ob*ect and both the

same regardless of which formwe use.



%phorism ;23?4 from


with commentary on the right by

Lois Shawver

Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis in bold in Wittgenstein'ste$t has been inserted by Shawver to

enhance commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

;2. Imagine a language3game in

which % ass and ( reports thenumber of slabs or blocs in a pile

or the colours and shapes of the

building3stones that are staced in

such3and3such a place.333 Such areport might run/ -#ive slabs-. 9ow

what is the difference between the

report or statement -#ive slabs- andthe order -#ive slabs>-1333

That is what is the difference

between -#ive slabs- +in

language3game ;2, and+-#ive slabs>- in language

game 61 ,

Well% it is the part which uttering

these words plays in the language-

game

0mphasis mine. (ut isn't the

important thing that -#iveslabs>- in +6, causes the

worer to bring A slabs1

While -five slabs- in +;2,

only causes the supervisor tohave information1

9o doubt the tone of voice and the

loo with which they are uttered

and much else besides will also bedifferent. (ut we could also imagine

the tone's being the same333for an

order and a report can be spoen in

a variety of tones of voice and withvarious e$pressions of face333the

difference being only in the

application. +Of course we mightuse the words -statement- and

-command- to stand for

grammatical forms of sentence andintonations5 we do in fact call

Isn't the weather glorious to-

day& a *uestion% although it is

On the surface the difference

might be a matter of how it is

voiced. (ut we couldimagine them being voiced

with the same intonation.

The intonation is after all

only a clue as to what thedifferences are not the

difference itself.

(esides we could imagine a

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http://www.dnai.com/lw1-10.htm



used as a statement., We could

imagine a language in which all

statements had the form and tone ofrhetorical "uestions5 or every

command the form of the "uestion

-Would you lie to. . .1-. Perhaps itwill then be said/ -What he says hasthe form of a "uestion but is really a

command-333that is has the

function of a command in thetechni"ue of using the language.

+Similarly one says -ou will do

this- not as a prophecy but as acommand. What maes it the one or

the other1,

language in which everythingstated or commanded was put

in the form of a "uestion.

;;. #rege's idea that every

assertion contains an

assumption which is the thingthat is asserted really rests on

the possibility found in our

language of writing every

statement in the form/ -It isassert that such3and3such is the

case.-333 (ut -that such3and3

such is the case- is not asentence in our language333so far

it is not a move in the language3

game. %nd if I write not -It isasserted that . . . .- but -It is

asserted/ such3and3such is the

case- the words -It is asserted-simply become superfluous.

Still there is the dream +such as#rege had, of including some

sort of notation in the body of

the sentence saying how it wasused. #or e$ample one might

include a statement such as -It is

asserted that- and complete thesentence any such way. Or

alternatively one might do the

same thing by saying -It isasserted/- and complete thesentence any way.

(ut isn't it clear at least in the

last case that the notation -It is

asserted/- is superfluous1

We might very well also write

every statement in the form of a

"uestion followed by a -es-5for

instance/ -Is it raining1 es>-

Would this shew that everystatement contained a "uestion1

(esides there is nothing to

guarantee that a notation -It is

asserted/- will in fact be attachedto an assertion. %fter all don't

we use "uestioning grammatical

forms to mae statements1:on't we say -It is a wonderful

day isn't it1- 0ven when we use

formulations that seem to tell us

how a sentence is being used

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they need not accurately do so.

Of course we have the right touse an assertion sign in contrast

with a "uestion3mar fore$ample or if we want todistinguish an assertion from a

fiction or a supposition. It is

only a mistae if one thins that

the assertion consists of twoactions entertaining and

asserting +assigning the truth3

value or something of the ind,and that in performing these

actions we follow the

prepositional sign roughly as wesing from the musical score.

)eading the written sentence

loud or soft is indeedcomparable with singing from a

musical score but 'meaning'

+thining, the sentence that is

read is not.

#rege's assertion sign mars the

beginning of the sentence. Thusits function is lie that offull3stop. It distinguishes the

whole period from a clause

within the period. If I hearsomeone say -it's raining- but do

not now whether I have heard

the beginning and the end of the period so far this sentence does

not serve to tell me anything.

(ut we can try to constructlanguage so carry such a notation

accurately. The mistae is in

thining that it is the notation

that maes it so. What is in"uestion is whether the sentence

is a "uestion and the notation

does not mae it so.The notation is only a label and a

label can be correct or

misleading.

This means when we determine

that a statement is an assertion or a "uestion it is not enough to

loo to see what the notation +or punctuation, tells us. This

information is not contained in

the words but in the way thesewords are being used in the

language3game.

#rege's notation that a sentence

is an asssertion is lie the full

stop of a period at the end ofstring of words. Gust as a period

does not assure you that thesentence functions as a

statement however so #rege's

notation does guarantee that the

sentence functions as thenotation says.

See inserted comment of LW's.

;?. (ut how many inds ofsentence are there1 Say

assertion "uestion and

command1333 There are

The rules of language games arenot unchangeable laws. There is

a continuous evolution not only

in how many language games

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countless inds/ countless

different inds of use of what we

call -symbols- -words--sentences-. (nd this

multiplicity is not something

fi+ed% given once for all, butnew types of language% new

language-

games% as we may say% come

into e+istence% and others

become obsolete and get

forgotten +We can get a rough

picture of this from the changesin mathematics.,

there are but evolution too asto the ind of language games

thee are.

!ere the term -language3game-is meant to bring into

prominence the fact that the

speaing oflanguage is part of an activity or

of a form of life.

We have seen this concept of

langauge being woven in a formof life before. In +2F, he said

that to -imagine a languagemeant to imagine a form of

life.- %nd in +;, he pointed out

that the slab language of thatlanguage3game involved not

only words but activities

specifically the activity offetching ob*ects on command.

)eview the multiplicity oflanguage3game in the following

e$amples and in others/

9ow that LW has taught ussomething about -language3

games- he is going to give us

samples to count. This serves asa ind of ostensive definition of

language games although note

these e$amples differ from the primitive language games he

taled about in D +which was

illustrated by the slab language

of ;

H <iving orders and obeyingthem333

H :escribing the appearance of

an ob*ect orgiving its measurements333

H =onstructing an ob*ect from a

description +a

It is a useful e$ercise to imaginea sentence of any sort

functioning in several of the

different language games. Whenit does this it taes on a different

meaning. #or e$ample -There

was a storm today.- Imagine

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drawing,333

H )eporting an event333

H Speculating about an event333H #orming and testing a

hypothesis333

H Presenting the results of ane$periment in

tables and diagrams333

H &aing up a story5 and reading

it333H Play3acting333

H Singing catches333

H <uessing riddles333H &aing a *oe5 telling it333

H Solving a problem in practical

arithmetic333

H Translating from one languageinto another333

H %sing thaning cursing

greeting praying.

333It is interesting to compare

the multiplicity of the tools in

language and of the ways they

are used the multiplicity ofinds of word and sentence with

what logicians have said about

the structure of language.+ Including the author of the

Tractatus Logico3

Philosophicus.,

how a sentence lie this might

function in -reporting an event-

-speculating about an event-

-presenting results from ane$periment- -play acting-

-singing catches- and so forth.Some sentences of course do

not mae sense in all language

games but whenever they dothey mean something different in

different language games.

Of course Wittgenstein is

himself the author of the

Tractatus3Logico3Philosophicus.%nd in that boo as well as in

wors by other authors of that

era +e.g. )ussell, language wasseen as much more stable and

finite.

;@. If you do not eep themultiplicity of language3games

in view you will perhaps be

inclined to as "uestions lie/-What is a "uestion1-333Is it the

statement that I do not now

such3and3such or the statement

that I wish the other personwould tell me. . . .1 Or is it the

description of my mental state

of

uestions such as these LW tells

us come about from the%ugustinian +Platonic and

confused, understanding oflanguage that is our heritage.Why is this confused1

In my reading LW it is because a

-"uestion- is *ust a grammaticalform. It does not get at the



uncertainty1333%nd is the cry-!elp>- such a description1

activity of -asing-. We can aswith cries such as

Oh I wish I had someoneto go to the movies with>

+win,.

%nd a sentence in the form of of

a "uestion might not be anasing.

Would you mind going to

get me a slab1

We want to get beneath such

grammatical form +which LWcalls -surface grammar-, and

move down to the depth that is

something more important thanlanguage than the form we use to

e$press it. %sing -What is a

"uestion1- betrays a concernwith the way things loo on the

page or sound in the voic and

not a concern with the deep

structure that is the way the

language is woring and havingan impact on what is happening.

Thin how many different inds

of thing are called -description-/description of a body's

position by means of its co3

ordinates5 description of a faciale$pression5 description of a

sensation of touch5 of a mood.

If asing what a "uestion isreveals a hidden confusion what

about asing what a description

is1

Of course it is possible tosubstitute the form of statement

or description for the usual formof

"uestion/ - I want to now

whether . . . .- or -I am in doubtwhether . . . .-333but this does not

bring the different language3

!ere too with descriptions wefind there is a surface form that

does not tell us much about howthe sentence is being used. Gust

as practically anything can be

put in a "uestioning formt so practically anything can be put in

a descriptive format.

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games any closer together.

The significance of such

possibilities of transformation

for e$ample of turning allstatements into sentences

beginning -I thin- or -I

believe- +and thus as it wereinto descriptions of my inner

life, will become clearer in

another place. + Solipsism.,

LW gives an account of pain

language later that I thin this

refers to but it is too early to get

into this now. The importantthing now to feel at home in his

distinction between the surface

of language +such as -What is a"uestion-, and the "uestions

about the depth of language

+how is the sentence functioningin the language game1,

;A. It is sometimes said thatanimals do not tal because they

lac the mental capacity. %nd this

means/ -they do not thin and thatis why they do not tal.- (ut333

they simply do not tal. Or to put it

better/ they do not use language333

if we e+cept the most primitive

forms of language333

=ommanding "uestioning

recounting chatting are as much a part of our natural history as

waling eating drining playing.

!ere LW is looing bac at this

cultural imagery that he has beendeconstructing. %ccording to this

imagery to be able to -tal- one

must be able to thin 33 because-taling- is the e$pression of our

internal ideas.

:on't try to deconstruct thisimagery at this moment. Gust

notice that it is a natural thing to

thin here. :ogs do not tal

because they do not thin internalthoughts.

(ut note the parenthetical that I

have emphasi8ed. % dog can be

taught to fetch on command *ustas the worer in +;, could fetch

slabs on command. Why are we

leaving this ind of languageoutside the scope of -language-1

(ecause this is an aporetic voice

the voice of the fly3bottle.

Still we are indlined to say that-dogs do not tal- and by this we

mean that they also -do not thin.-

;B. One thins that learning What is naming a preparation



language consists in giving names

to ob*ects. 7i8 to human beings to

shapes to colours. to pains. tomoods to numbers etc. To repeat3

naming is something lie attaching

a label to a thing. One can say thatthis is preparatory to the use of a

word. (ut what is it a preparation

for1

for1 Imagine a culture that could

only name. It had no other usefor language. People simply sat

around and named things or else

they did things without

language. %ll that this culturewould lac in its language is

what naming is a preparation for.

;D. -We name things and then

we can tal about them/ can refer

to them in tal.- '%s if what wedid ne$t were given with the

mere act of naming. %s if therewere only one thing called

-taling about a thing-. Whereas

in fact we do the most various

things with our sentences.

Isn't this e$actly what the

%ugtinian picture of languagein +;, implies1 We name things

and then we can tal about

them. It is as though this is all

that is re"uired.

(ut naming things we have

come to see does not show us

what to do with them. The

worers might be able to namethe beams pillars blocs and

-slabs- and still not now to

fetch them. Language is not *ust the uttering of words. It is

the use of words in the activity

of language.

%lso the illusion that all weneed to do to be able to tal is

name things neglects how few

of the words we use are actuallynames.

Thin of e$clamations alone

with their completely different

functions.

H Water>H %way>

H Ow>

H !elp>H #ine>

H 9o>

%re you inclined still to callthese words -names of ob*ects-1

Loo at e$clamations. %re

these *ust names of ob*ects1 :o

you want to say that there is

something internal that thesewords name1 Of course

someone uttering an

e$clamation lie this mighthave a image but are they

re"uired1





In languages +;, and +6, there

was no such thing as as#ing

something's name "his% with its

correlate% ostensive definition%is% we might say% a language-

game on its own That is really

to say/ we are brought up

trained to as/ -What is thatcalled1-3upon which the name is

given. %nd there is also a

language3game of inventing aname for something and hence of

saying -This is ....- and then

using the new name. +Thus for

e$ample children give names totheir dolls and then tal about

them and to them. Thin in this

conne$ion how singular is the useof a person's name to call him>,

In +;, and +6, the worer simply brought the ob*ects re"uired.

There was no language forasing what something was

called. Pointing and naming is

a language game of its own.

One must learn how to do this.

%nd in addition to learning to

give the e$isting name of an

ob*ect one can learn how to

invent names.

;6. 9ow one can ostensively

define a proper name the nameof a colour the name of a

material a numeral the name of

a point of the compass and so

on. The definition of thenumber two -That is called

'two' -33pointing to two nuts3is perfectly e$act. 33(ut how can

two be defined lie that1 The

person one gives the definitionto doesn't now what one wants

to call -two-5 he will suppose

that -two- is the name given to

this group of nuts> !e maysuppose this5 but perhaps he

does not. !e might mae theopposite mistae5 when I wantto assign a name to this group

of nuts he might understand it

as a numeral. %nd he mighte"ually well tae the name of a

person of which I give an

ostensive definition as that of a

Where for e$ample is this hand

pointing1 Is it pointing to both of the diamonds1 Or one1 Or is it

pointing to the color red1 Or is it

pointing to the side of one of the

diamonds1

Wittgenstein says that in every

case the ob*ect being pointed to is

ambiguous. =an you thin of ane$ception1 If not does this not

undermine %ugustine's picture of

how we learn language1














colour of a race or even of a

point of the compass. That is to

say/ an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in

every case.

;F. Perhaps you say/ two can only

be ostensively defined in this way/

-This number is called 'two' -. #orthe word -number- here shews what

place in language in grammar we

assign to the word. (ut this means

that the word -number- must bee$plained before the ostensive

definition can be understood.

2 ; ?

@ A

This number iscalled -two-.

:oes that solve the problem

of how we might ostensivelydefine ;1 There are several

problems with it. #irst the

child must learn what

-numbermeans in order tounderstand what is being

pointed to.

33The word -number- in thedefinition does indeed shew this place5 does shew the post at which

we station the word. %nd we can

prevent misunderstandings bysaying/ -This colour is called so3

and3so- -This length is called so3

and3so- and so on. That is to say/

misunderstandings are sometimesaverted in this way. (ut is there only

one way of taing the word -colour-

or -length-13Well they *ust needdefining.3:efining then by means

of other words> %nd what about the

last definition in this chain1 +:o notsay/ -There isn't a 'last' definition-.

That is *ust as if you

chose to say/ -There isn't a last

house in this road5 one can always

Still you might say the ; isin the right place. One cansee where ; sits in the series

of numbers. %nd

misunderstandings cansometimes be averted by

pointing lie this. (ut how

can we define number1

=an we do it by e$ample1Should we use a figure lie

this/



build an additional one''.,

This number is called

-two-.

Or will the student beconfused by this ambiguity

too1 %nd if we tried to get

around this problem ofambiguity by defining the

words how shall we define

them without their beingambiguous too1

Whether the word -number- isnecessary in the ostensive definitiondepends on whether

without it the other person taes the

definition otherwise than I wish.

%nd that will depend on thecircumstances under which it is

given and on the person I give it to.

(ut perhaps someone learnswhat two means in a

particular conte$t even

without a completelyade"uate e$planation for all

conte$ts. I as for a ball and

the child learns to fetch a

ball/

Then I as for two balls andthe child learns to fetch two

balls. This always pleases

me.

%nd how he 'taes' the definition

is seen in the use that he maes ofthe word defined.

(ut if he -taes- it in the

right way it will become a powerful and reinforcing

tool.

?4. So one might say/

the ostensive definition

e$plains the use33themeaning33of the word

when the overall role of

the word in language is

In ?4 Wittgenstein continues to

investigate the %ugustinian model and

its problems as the total e$planation for our developing language. This model

you'll recall is based on the picture of

words being defined ostensively that is



clear. Thus if I now that

someone means to e$plain

acolour3word to me the

ostensive definition -That

is called 'sepia' - will helpme to understand theword.

by naming and pointing.

33%nd you can say this so

long as you do not forgetthat all sorts of problems

attach to the words -to

now- or -to be clear-.

Someone from another country wants

to teach you a word in her native

language. She points to a pillow andmae a strange sound -upapal- and

your "uestion is -What is she pointing

to1 Is it the pillow or the shape of the

pillow or what1- (ut if you new

somehow that she was pointing to thecolor of the pillow then that would

mae all the difference in the world.(ut that is because you now what

-color- means. Imagine then how

difficult it must be to learn a colorword from an ostensive definition if

you don't even have a concept of color.

%nd of course all of us were in that place initially. isn't it remarable that

we learned anything at all from the

e$perience1

One has already to now

+or be able to do,something in order to be

capable of asing a

thing's name. (ut whatdoes one have to now1

If I already am "uite clear about what acolor word is then I can begin to as

what the color of something is. If I

now the term for color and my teacher nows the term for -color- too then I

am indeed a smart student. Gust

pointing and saying -that is the color

sepia- should surely do it. (ut withoutthose tools things are going to be a lot

tricer.

footnote/

=ould one define the word -red- by pointing to something that wasnot red1 That would be



as if one were supposed to e$plain the word -modest- to someone

whose 0nglish was wea and one pointed to an arrogant man and

said -That man is not modest-. That it is ambiguous is no argumentagainst such a method of definition. %ny definition can be

misunderstood.

(ut it might well be ased/ are we still to call this -definition-133

#or of course even if it hasthe same practical conse"uences the same effect on the learner it

plays a different part in the calculus from what we ordinarily call

-ostensive definition- of the word -red-.



%phorism ?23?6 from



Wittgenstein: +0mphasis is bold is inserted by

Shawver to enhance

commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

?2. When one shews someone

the ing in chess and says/ -Thisis the ing- this does not tell

him the use of this piece3unless

he already nows the rules of thegame up to this last point/ the

shape of the ing. ou could

imagine his having learnt the

rules of the game without everhaving been strewn an actual

piece. The shape of the chessman

corresponds here to the sound orshape of a word.

Suppose someone showed you

an Eray and said to you -seethat tumor1- It might be evident

to all who have learned to read

Erays but *ust pointing to it isnot enough to enable this ind of

seeing. So it is with handing a

child a chess piece and saying-This is a ing.- The

bacground for maing sense of

this pointing and naming has not be laid down.

One can also imagine

someone's having learnt thegame without ever learning orformulating rules. !e might have

learnt "uite simple board3games

first by watching and have

progressed to more and morecomplicated ones. !e too might

be given the e$planation -This is

the ing-33 if for instance hewere being strewn chessmen of a

shape he was not used to. This

e$planation again only tells himthe use of the piece because as

we might say the place for it

was already prepared Or

even/ we shall only say that ittells him the use if the place is

already prepared. %nd in this

case it is so not because the

The emphasis in this passage is

mine. It represents a eyconcept the concept of anostensive definition being made

possible by the place for the

definition being prepared.

(ut the primary point I believeis that if we new the rules of

the chess game new that losing

your ing meant that you lost the

game for e$ample or how the

ing can move within the rulesof the game then having

someone say -This is the ing ina chess set- would mean a lot

more would clarify more than

if you had never heard of chessor board games. Sometimes

one does not now enough about



person to whom we give the

e$planation already nows rules

but becausein another sense he is already

master of a game.

a sub*ect to even as useful

"uestions.

=onsider this further case/ I am

e$plaining chess to someone5

and I begin by pointing to achessman and saying/ -This is

the ing5 it can move lie

this .... and so on.- 33 In this casewe shall say/ the words -This is

the ing- +or -This is called the

'ing' -, are a definition only ifthe learner already 'nows what a

piece in a game is'. That is if he

has already played other gamesor has watched other people

praying 'and understood'3and

similar things. #urther only

under these conditions will he beable to as relevantly in the

course of learning the game/

-What do you call this1-33that is

this piece in a game.

We may say/ only someone who

already nows how to do

something with it cansignificantly

as a name.

There are a family of ways one

might go about preparing a person to understand -This is a

ing- when showing them a

chess piece. It would help perhaps if a person new how to

play checers and new in

addition that in chess losing theing meant losing the game.

Still this would not prepare the

listener to understand hisstatement as much as if he

learned to play chess with pieces

that had a different ind of ing.

%nd we can imagine the personwho is ased replying/ -Settle

the name yourself-3and now the

one who ased would have to

manage everything for himself.

If you did not have the conceptof what is being named that is

if the place for this name is not

prepared then perhaps it would

be as well for you to name it foryourself. Learning the -name-

of something +instead of naming

it, is important precisely in thosecases that learning the name will

connect with what we already



now and allow us to learn what

we are seeing more completely.

Say you go to the doctor with a

sin rash and as -What is this

called1- %nd suppose the doctor gives you an unintelligible

technical name. 9ot helpful.(ut suppose the doctor says

-This is a measles rash.- Then

because you have an idea as to

what measles is you havelearned "uite a bit. (ut if you

didn't have the concept of

measles things would bedifferent. ou could call it

whatever you wanted. It would be *ust as meaningful to you.!owever it might prepare you

less well for taling with others.

?;. Someone coming into a

strange country

will sometimes learn thelanguage of the

inhabitants from ostensivedefinitions that they give him5

and he will often have to 'guess'

the meaning of these definitions5

and will guess sometimes rightsometimes wrong.

I remember !arry describing

learning a foreign language liethis. !e was in a foreign country

and people would teach him thenames of things by pointing and

naming. This seems lie a very

easy way to learn the names of

things in a foreign tongue.

%nd now I thin we can say/

%ugustine describes the learning

of human language as if thechild came into a strange

country and did not understand

the language of the country5 thatis as if it already had a

language only not this one. Or

again/ as if the child could

already thin only not yet

Isn't it so1 %ugustine describe

this ind of pointing and naming

as the way that the child learnslanguage1 (ut we have been

woring on why this e$plains so

little in the learning of languageand noticing the limits to this

ind of learning for e$ample

that pointing and naming -blue-

doesn't mean that the hearer

http://www.dnai.com/~rathbone/lwref.htm#Ostensive%20definition















spea. %nd -thin- would here

mean something lie -tal to

itself-.

recogni8es what we are naming

33 even if the hearer then can

point at the blue ob*ect and say-blue.-

%lso such an ostensivedefinition can hardly e$pain how

we learn the word -the- or -for-or in fact most words. Loo

bac at this paragraph and see

how many words could be taught

to the child by ostensivedefinition.

The problem is that the young

child in the beginning +picture

baby %ugustine, does not have a place prepared for learning by

pointing.

What ind of bacground is

necessary to prepare such a place1 !ow would you train a

child so that it understood that

you are naming a chess piece for e$ample1 Or the color -blue-1

??. Suppose however

someone were to ob*ect/ -Itis not true that you must

already be master of a

language in order tounderstand an ostensive

definition/ all you need 33of

course>33 is to now or guesswhat the person giving the

e$planation is pointing to.

That is whether for e$ample

to the shape of the ob*ect orto its colour or to its number

and so on.- 33 %nd what does

'pointing to the shape''pointing to the colour'

consist in1 Point to a piece of

!ere LW is luring us bac into the

muddle and it is good to letourselves go there for a moment

nowing it is a muddle but letting

ourselves feel the pull. In thismuddle he continues to as how can

an ostensive definition teach the

meaning of a term1 !ow does thestudent now what we are pointing

to. There is ambiguity in the

pointing in every case we can

imagine.







paper. 33%nd now point to its

shape 33 now to its

colour 33 now to its number+that sounds "ueer,. 33!ow

did you do it1 33ou will say

that you 'meant' a differentthing each time you pointed.%nd if I as how that is done

you will say you

concentrated your attentionon the colour the shape etc.

(ut I as again/ how is that

done1

Suppose someone points to a

vase and says -Loo at that

marvellous blue3the shapeisn't the point.- 33Or/ -Loo

at the marvellous shape3thecolour doesn't matter.-

Without doubt you will do

something different whenyou act upon these two

invitations. (ut do you

always do the same thingwhen you direct your

attention to the colour1

Imagine various differentcases. To indicate a few/

What we do when we -attend to the

color' of something seems whenyou thin about it rather nebulous.

H -Is this blue the same asthe blue over there1

:o you see any

difference1-H ou are mi$ing paint and

you say -It's hard

to get the blue of this

sy.-H -It's turning fine you can

already see blue

sy again.-H -Loo what different

effects these two blues

have.-H -:o you see the blue boo

over there1 (ring

=onsider all these conte$ts in whichyou -attend to the color- of blue.

Isn't there something different about

each1



it here. -

H -This blue signal3light

means ....-H -What's this blue called.'3

Is it 'indigo'1-

ou sometimes attend to

the colour by putting your

hand up to eep the outlinefrom view5 or by not looing

at the outline of the thing5

sometimes by staring at theob*ect and trying to

remember where you saw

that colour before.

ou attend to the shapesometimes by tracing it

sometimes by screwing up

your eyes so as not to see thecolour clearly and in many

other ways. I want to say/

This is the sort of thing that

happens while one 'directsone's attention to this or that'.

(ut it isn't these things by

themselves that mae us say

someone is attending to theshape the colour and so on.

Gust as a move in chessdoesn't consist simply in

moving a piece in such3and3

such a way on the board3nor

yet in one's thoughts andfeelings as one maes the

move/ but in the

circumstances that we call-playing a game of chess-

-solving a chess problem-and so on.

%lthough there are surely typical

things you actually do when you

attend to the color it is not thethings you actually do that are in

fact what we mean by the -attending

to the color.- There are a variety of

things people might actually do inthe process of -attending to the

color.-

?@. (ut suppose someone said/

-I always do the same thing

when I attend to the shape/ my

In ?@ the "uestion is/ -!ow does

the student now what the

teacher is pointing to1 What if





definition correctly or as another

e$ample incorrectly. If the

student failed to understandcorrectly would that mae the

definition any less of a

definition1

?A. There are of course what

can be called -characteristic

e$periences- of pointing to +e.g.,the shape. #or e$ample

following the outline with one's

finger or with one's eyes as one

points. 33(ut this does not

happen in all cases in which I'mean the shape' and no more

does any other one characteristic process occur in all these cases.

33(esides even if something of

the sort did recur in all cases itwould still depend on the

circumstances 33that is on what

happened before and after the pointing 33whether we should

say -!e pointed to the shape and

not to the colour-.

#or the words -to point to the

shape- -to mean the shape- and

so on are not used in the sameway as these/ -to point to this

boo +not to that one, -to point

to the chair not to the table- and

so on. 33Only thin howdifferently we learn the use of

the words -to point to this

thing- -to point to that thing-and on the other hand -to point

to the colour not the shape- -to

mean the colour- and so on.

Wittgenstein is distinguishing

two related language-games of

pointing ne in which you

point to the thing and give its

name% and another related one

in which you point to the shape

or the color and give its name

(oth cases re"uire only that you

point in the same physical way.There may be differences in the

way people point in these two

language games but thesedifferences only help us

distinguish between them. These

different ways of pointing arenot inevitable and they are not

re"uired.



To repeat/ in certain cases

especially when one points 'to

the shape' or 'to the number'there are characteristic

e$periences and ways of

pointing3'characteristic' becausethey recur often +not always,when shape or number are

'meant'. (ut do you also now of

an e$perience characteristic of pointing to a piece in a game as

a piece in a game1

association

%ll the same one can say/ -Imean that this piece is called the

'ing' not this particular bit ofwood I am pointing to-.

+)ecogni8ing wishing

remembering etc. ,

!ere LW is saying that the

sentence -/ -I mean that this

piece is called the 'ing' not this

particular bit of wood I am pointing to- is itself ambiguous.

-&ean- can mean -reccogni8ingwishing remembering etc.- #or

e$ample the above sentence

might be paraphrased -Irecogni8e that this piece is called

the 'ing'...- or -I wish this piece

were called the 'ing'... and soforth. %ll these different

paraphrases have different

meanings.

Thus this concept ofintrospective pointing to the

shape or color to teach shape and

color remains a pu88le.

?B. %nd we do here what we

do in a host of similar cases/

because we cannot specifyany one bodily action which

we call pointing to the shape

+as opposed for e$ample tothe colour, we say that a

spiritual +mental intellectual,

activity corresponds to these

words.

?B. When we point to the ball there

is a physical ob*ect we are pointing

to. When we point to the colorwhat we are pointing to is much

more nebulous. In these cases LW

says we tend to do something "uite peculiar. We imagine that there

must be something that we are

pointing to even though it is hard to

see or even imagine and this

http://www.dnai.com/~rathbone/lwref.htm#association

http://www.dnai.com/~rathbone/lwref.htm#association



Where our language suggestsa body and there is none/

there we should lie to say is

a spirit.

-something- we imagine ourselves pointing to is -spirit.-

I don't thin this concept of -spirit-necessarily implies anything

religious although it sometimes

might. What he means by -spirit- is

more subtle and available only byintrospection. One points to the

blue circle and mean -blue-. !ow

does one do this. LW is saying thatit feels lie we are doing it

-spiritually-. )emember LW is not

saying that we are doing itspiritually. !e is saying that we all

have a tendency to thin of it this

way. It is as though there issomething -spiritual- involved in

forming a -meaning- in our minds

and that this -meaning- that we

form in our spirit somehowcorresponds to the words that we

are thining.

When do we do this1 !e says wetend to do it when our languagesays there is a body we should be

referring to and where in fact

there is none. The languagesuggests that -blue- is a body but

in fact it is not so it seems we are

pointing spiritually.

Let's imagine another e$ample. Isay

-It is raining.-

Our language suggests there should

be a body to correspond with the 'it'in this sentence. 9otice however

that it is hard to find a body

although our language suggests that



there is one. !ere is a case thenthat we might be tempted to say that

the -it- that is raining is spirit.

!ere are some more e$amples/

H I have a hard time eeping allthese numbers

in my mind.-

H What about the word -numbers-1

H It's time to go.

Is there a body to correspond to

these nouns1

What about the word -mind-1 Isthere a body to correspond with

that1 What about -numbers-1 Or

the word -It's-1 :o you want to saythat -itis -timein this sentence1

Then as yourself what you oint to

when you point to time.

In cases lie this LW is saying we

are inclined to thin that what is

being referenced is spirit or

something spiritual or mental.

.

In ?B Wittgenstein noted that we cannot identify

a distinctive action that we call pointing to theshape +or pointing to the color, and because of

that we tend to see this ind of pointing as

-spiritual.-

?D. What is the

relation between name

and

thing named1Well what is

it1 Loo at

language3game+;, or at

MWhen we consider the matter more

imaginatively as %ugustine did in 2 when heimagined that he had been taught language by

being taught to name things we might well thin

of the name bringing up a mental image of thatoriginary lesson. Supposedly according to this

imaginative picture we now what the other

person is taling about +e.g. a slab, becausehaving learned the name of slab ostensively we





another one/

there

you can see thesort of thing

this relation

consists in.This relationmay also

consist

among manyother things in

the fact that

hearing thename calls

before our

mind the

picture of whatis named5 and it

also

consistsamong other

things in the

name's being written

on the thing

named or being

pronouncedwhen that thing

is pointed at.

now have mental images of a -slab- every time

we hear the word. This is particularly compelling

because we have all e$perienced mental imageswhen things are named. Still a little

introspection shows that we do not have a mental

image for every word we hear.

%lternative to the theory of mental imagesassisting understanding we sometimes imagine

ob*ects having labels attached. Still we do not

often write the word -chair-on our chairs. So in

the end these two theories of language do notwor very well when we thin about them.

(ut that does not mean we give them up. What

we do sometimes is imagine that the images +or

the labels, are there but in a fu88y and spiritualway. In this fu88y and spiritual way we point to

things and name things in our mind.

(ut then LW ass us to loo at ;. ou remember in ; we had the simple game of the worer and

his supervisor. The supervisor called out -beam>-

and the worer brought it. What is the

relationship between the name and the thing inthat particular instance1 It simply causes the

worer to fetch what the supervisor wants. 9eed

there be mental images here1 )emember ourtaling about the way I might teach a gorilla to

hand me a banana when I said -banana-1 %nd

that this would be a ind of tric. It wouldn't needto be the case that the gorilla actually understood

what the banana was apart from this particular

conte$t of handing one to me. !ere we mightsay that the 'name' of the ob*ect does not function

merely as a name. It functions more as a

command although the word we thin of as a

name has a role in maing the command clearer.

So can you see that in spite of our models of

language +pointing spiritually or attaching a label

spiritually, these models do nt seem entirely

satisfactory. %side from the problematicmetaphysics of a spiritual pointing and naming

we have the fact that in the language game the

term -slab- is not *ust a name of an ob*ect. It is a





command to fetch a slab. That activity aroundwhich the word gets pronounced is not accounted

for by naming and pointing.

%re the mental images re"uired for this activity of fetching1 9o. 9ot logically. The worer is *usttrained to do something at the sound of the name.

The supervisor does not re"uire him to create a

mental image of the ob*ect first. Of course hemight do so anyway but this is not re"uired.

This shows how problematic our notion of naming

is and how much we try to patch it up with

notions of fu88y spirits doing the wor.

?D. We have been taling about

the relationship between a nameand the thing named and we have

studied two cultural models. In

one the name is metaphorically

-attached- to the thing +lie alabel might be inscribed on the

thing it names, and in the other

model the word we use -points-

spiritually to the thing it names.These are the vague models we

use for how words -attach- tothings. (ut Wittgenstein is

leading us through a critical

reflection on these models because these models lead us to

thin we have the problem

solved when in fact they are in

many ways unsatisfactorymodels that lead us astray.

Wittgenstein continues to

deconstruct these old models of

language. !ere in ?6 he is goingto remind us again that the

models are only satisfactory

when we thin of certain inds of words. Then he points to terms



for which it is hard to use one ofthe two models above.

?6. (ut what for e$ample is theword -this- the name of in

language3game +6, or the word

-thatin the ostensive definition-that is called ....-1

-This- and -thatare very

difficult words to understand ifwe stay within the modelsabove. of teaching something by

attaching labels or pointing.

!ow could you attach the word

-this- to everything you call-this-1 %nd if you point

spiritually to a particular -this-

with your hidden soul then whaton earth does this -pointing-

have to do with the word -this- in

a more general sense. One mightillustrate an apple or a dog by

pointing to one but can one

illustrate a -this- *ust by pointing1

33If you do not want to produce

confusion you will do best notto call these words names at

all.33 et strange to say the

word -this- has been called theonly genuine name5 so that

anything else we call a name

was one only in an ine$act

appro$imate way.

This "ueer conception springs

from a tendency to sublime the

logic of our language3as onemight put it.

If we call -this- a name then it isa name that can be applied

everywhere. It offers no

specificity at all. et at a certain point in doing philosophy it

seems lie the only legitimate

name. To call something a-chair- classifies it with other

often dissimilar ob*ects. (ut

what can be purer than *ust

calling it a -this.-

This is a way of trying to mae

our logic more lofty our

statements more pure. %nd whenwe do this it leads to "ueer

conceptions.

The proper answer to it is/ we

call very different things-names-5 the word -name- is

used to characteri8e many

different inds of use of a word

!ere LW is introducing us to an

important pu88le that he willclarify later. !e wants us to

notice that diverse inds of

things are called -names' and that





related to one another in many

different ways53but the ind ofuse that -this- has is not among

them.

we have no golden thread to tie

them all into a neat conceptual

bundle.

%nd at the same time he is

showing that it will be problematic for us if we try to

include -this- and -that- withinthis diverse bundle of words that

we call names.

It is "uite true that in giving

an ostensive definition for

instance we often point to theob*ect named and say the name.

%nd similarly in giving an

ostensive definition for instancewe say the word -this- while

pointing to a thing. %nd also the

word -this- and a name oftenoccupy the same position in a

sentence. (ut it is precisely

characteristic of a name that it is

defined by means of thedemonstrative e$pression -That

is 9- +or -That is called '9' -,.

(ut do we also give the

definitions/-That is called 'this' - or -This

is called 'this'-1

This seems to devastate thenotion that you can ostensively

define -this- and -that-. !owcan one point to anyplace and say-thatis -that-. Or if one does

how does this e$plain to the

hearer what -that is.-

This is connected with theconception of naming as so to

spea an occult process.

When LW tals of the notion of

naming as a ind of occult process he is critici8ing the

picture of naming that he feels

our culture teaches us. It is the picture of naming being a ind of

spiritual pointing.

9aming appears as a "ueerconne$ion of a word with anob*ect. 33%nd you really get

such a "ueer conne$ion when

the philosopher tries to bring out

the relation between name andthing by staring at an ob*ect in

This sentence -#or philosophical problems arise when language'goes on holiday'- is a famous

sentence in Wittgenstein. It

means that language is taen out

of conte$t and philosophi8edabout it becomes -confusing-. It





front of him and repeating a

name or even the word -this-innumerable times. .or

philosophical problems arise

when language goes on

holiday. %nd here we may

indeed fancy naming to besomeremarable act of mind as it

were a baptism of an ob*ect.

%nd we can also say the word-this- to the ob*ect as it were

address the ob*ect as -this-3a

"ueer use of this word which

doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy.

reminds me of a time when I was

a child that I said -butterfly- over

and over. Isn't it strange Ithought that we say -(utter3fly-

as though butter were to fly

away or -but 3er 3fly- and by thetime that I had said this 2A timesor so the word no longer seemed

to mean -butterfly- in the simple

way it had. Often when one philosophi8es about a concept the

concept has -gone on holiday-.

We have lost our grounding inconcrete e$amples. We now

very well how to use the word

-virtue- in a sentence for

e$ample but when we scratchour heads and wonder what

-virtue- really means then the

word -virtue- is on holiday. Weare *ust thining about the word

not using it in the natural way

that our language allows us touse it.

:o you have any e$perience with

language going on holiday1 0ver

said a word a few times afamiliar word and then sort of

lose the meaning of it as you

reflect on what this word means1

%nd what do you thin about-that- and -this-1 :o they seem

lie names to you1

footnote

What is it to mean the words

-That is blue- at one time as astatement about the ob*ect one

is pointing to 33at another as an

e$planation of the word -blue-1

Paraphrase lie this can help us

be clearer about what language

game is being played.





%phorism ?F3A4 from



Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis is bold is inserted by

Shawver to enhancecommentary.,

Shawver commentary:

?F. (ut why does it occur to

one to want to mae precisely

this word into a name when itevidently is not a name13That is

*ust the reason. #or one is

tempted to mae an ob*ectionagainst what is ordinarily called

a name. It can be put lie this/ a

name ought really to signify asimple. %nd for this one might

perhaps give the following

reasons/ The word -0$calibur-

say is a proper name in theordinary sense. The sword

0$calibur consists of parts

combined in a particular way. Ifthey are combined differently

0$calibur does not e$ist. (ut it is

clear that the sentence-0$calibur has a sharp blade-

maes sense whether 0$calibur

is still whole or is broen up. (ut

if -0$calibur- is the name of anob*ect this ob*ect no longer

e$ists when 0$calibur is broen

in pieces5 and as no ob*ect wouldthen correspond to the name it

would have no meaning. (ut

then the sentence -0$calibur hasa sharp blade- would contain a

word that had no meaning and

hence the sentence would be

In +?F, LW introduces the

"uestion of whether comple$

ob*ects have simple components.We discuss whether 0$calibur

+the sword of Ning %rthur,

disappeared when it is broen intoa blade and a handle. %nd if it

does then how can we spea of

0$calibur having a sharp blade1If the blade is re"uired to be

attached to the handle in order for

0$calibur to e$ist then the blade

is part of 0$calibur and thatmeans that 0$calibur is the

handleblade combination so to

say that 0$calibur has a sharp blade is to say that this

handleblade combination has a

sharp blade 33 which maes nosense. +!ence our aporia.,



nonsense. (ut it does mae

sense5 so there must always be

something corresponding to thewords of which it consists. So

the word -0$calibur- must

disappear when the sense isanalysed and its place be taen by words which name simples. It

will be reasonable to call these

words the real names.

@4. Let us first discuss this pointof the argument/ that a word has

no meaning if nothing

corresponds to it.3It is importantto note that the word -meaning-

is being used illicitly if it is used

to signify the thing that'corresponds' to the word. That is

to confound the meaning of a

name with the bearer of the

name. When &r. 9. 9. dies onesays that the bearer of the name

dies not that the meaning dies.

%nd it would be nonsensical tosay that for if the name ceased

to have meaning it would mae

no sense to say -&r. 9. 9. isdead.-

!ere is a digression as to whethera word has a meaning if nothing

corresponds to it.

@2. In 2A we introduced

proper names into language +6,.

9ow suppose that the tool withthe name -9- is broen. 9ot

nowing this % gives ( the sign

-9-. !as this sign meaning now

ornot.13What is ( to do when he is

given it13We have not settled

anything about this. One mightas/ what mill he do1 Well

perhaps he will stand there at a

loss or shew % the pieces. !ereone might say/ -9- has become

meaningless5 and this e$pression

would mean that the sign -9- no

longer had a use in our language3

This continues with the digressionof whether names mae sense

once the ob*ects disappear. In 2A

we are taling about one of the

building site language games.The worer is fetching pillars and

blocs. If the pillars and blocs

have proper names does it mae

sense to refer to them if they haveno ob*ect to reference1









game +unless we gave it a new

one,. -9- might also become

meaningless because forwhatever reason the tool was

given another name and the sign

-9- no longer used in thelanguage3game. 33 (ut we couldalso imagine a convention

whereby ( has to shae his head

in reply if % gives him the sign belonging to a tool that is

broen.3In this way the

command -9- might be said to be given a place in the language3

game even when the tool no

longer e$ists and the sign -9- to

have meaning even when its bearer ceases to e$ist.

@;. (ut has for instance a namewhich has never been used for a

tool also got a meaning in that

game1 Let us assume that -E- issuch a sign and that % gives this

sign to ( 33 well even such signs

could be given a place in the

language3game and ( mighthave say to answer them too

with a shae of the head. +One

could imagine this as a sort of *oe between them.,

Say that the E is -tree-. The

supervisor ass the worer to

bring a (loc2 Pillar? and then-tree- and all the worers laugh.

Or instead of -tree- the

supervisor might say -angel- andthis too might provoe a laugh

even though no angel

corresponded to it. Or the worsupervisor might say -pillar B-

even though both supervisor and

worer now that -pillar B- wascrushed recently and so cannot be

brought because it -no longer

e$ists.-

@?. #or a large class of cases3

though not for all3in which weemploy the word -meaning- it

can be defined thus/ the meaning

of a word is its use in thelanguage.

%nd the meaning of a name is

sometimes e$plained by pointing

to its bearer.

The e$amples in @; that I gave

illustrate ways in which wordscan have a use in the language3

game even when they do not have

a referent that we can point to andname. This settles the "uestion

introduced in ?F. es a word can

have a meaning even if it does nothave a -bearer- +something to

point to,. Its meaning is

e$plained by its use in the

language3game.





+=lic here for an e$planded

commentary on this aphorism.,

@@. We said that the sentence

-0$calibur has a sharp blade-

made sense even when 0$calibur was broen in pieces. 9ow this

is so because in this language3game a name is also used in the

absence of its bearer. (ut we can

imagine a language3game with

names +that is with signs whichwe should certainly include

among names, in which they are

used only in the presence of the bearer5 and so could always be

replaced by a demonstrative

pronoun and the gesture of pointing.

In @@ LW uses the point

established in @? that a name can

mae sense even in the absence of its bearer. (ut now he wants to

reflect on the possibility of havinga language in which words only

made sense when they have a

bearer that is when the names

could be replaced with the pronoun -this- as in -bring this>-

+Imagine the wor supervisor

waling over and pointing to the pillar that he wanted taen over to

the pile. We can hardly imagine

this woring if the pillar wasn'tthere,

@A. The demonstrative -this-

can never be without a bearer. It

might be said/ -so long as thereis a this the word 'this' has a

meaning too whether this is

simple or comple$.- (ut that

does not mae the word into aname. On the contrary/ for a

name is not used with but onlye$plained by means of thegesture of pointing.

Imagine someone pointing to

person and saying -This isGoseph.- The -This- is not a

name. It is a way of e$plaining

who Goseph is.

@B. What lies behind the idea

that names really signify

simples1 33Socrates says in theTheaetetus/ -If I mae no

mistae I have heard some

people say this/ there is no

definition of the primaryelements 33 so to spea 33 out of

which we and everything else

are composed5 for everythingthat e$ists in its own right can

only be named no other

determination is possible neither that it is nor that it is not..... (ut

what e$ists in its own right has

!ere LW shows us how deep the

roots of the ideas of simples is.

The idea is that everything iseither a simple thing or a comple$

thing where a comple$ thing is a

composite of simples things.

http://www.dnai.com/~rathbone/lw43.htm






to be ....... named without any

other determination. In

conse"uence it is impossible togive an account of any primary

element5 for it nothing is

possible but the bare name5 itsname is all it has. (ut *ust aswhat consists of these primary

elements is itself comple$ so the

names of the elements becomedescriptive language by being

compounded together. #or the

essence of speech is thecomposition of names.-

(oth )ussell's 'individuals' and

my 'ob*ects' +Tractatus Logico3Philosophicus, were such primary elements.

@D. (ut what are the simple

constituent parts of which reality

is composed1 33 What are thesimple constituent parts of a

chair1 33 The bits of wood of

which it is made1 Or themolecules or the atoms1 33

-Simple- means/ not composite.

(nd here the point is: in what

sense 'composite'& It ma#es no

sense at all to spea# absolutely

of the 'simple parts of a chair'

+The emphasis is mine., When he

says it maes no sense to spea-absolutely- of the simple parts of

something he means that it maes

no sense to spea of -parts-without some ind of conte$t that

defines what a -part- is.

%gain/ :oes my visual imageof this tree of this chair consist

of parts1 %nd what are its simple

component parts1 &ulti3

colouredness is one ind ofcomple$ity5 another is for

e$ample that of a broen outline

composed of straight bits. %nd acurve can be said to be

composed of an ascending and a

descending segment.

This is the gestalt notion that the

perception consists of more thanthe sum of its parts. If you loo at

a particular person you do not see

*ust a collection of parts. %nd ifyou loo at a curved line

you do not *ust see the elements

of that curve. ou see it as awhole.

If I tell someone without any The "uestion re"uires a conte$t.



further e$planation/ -What I see

before me now is composite- he

will have the right to as/ -What

do you mean by 'composite'&

#or there are all sorts of things

that that can mean> 33

Otherwise we don't now what tocount as -parts.-

The "uestion -Is what you see

composite1- maes good sense if it is already established what

ind of comple$ity 33 that is

which particular use of the word

33 is in "uestion. If it had beenlaid down that the visual image

of a tree was to be called-composite- if one saw not *ust asingle trun but also branches

then the "uestion -Is the visual

image of this tree simple orcomposite1- and the "uestion

-What are its simple component

parts1- would have a clearsense3a clear use. %nd of course

the answer to the second

"uestion is not -The branches-

+that would be an answer to thegrammatical "uestion/ -What are

here called 'simple component

parts'1-, but rather a descriptionof the individual branches.

That is we can create a languagegame in which we count

-branches- as parts and say that a

tree is a composite +imagine a

setched tree, if it has branches.(ut without such a conte$t the

"uestion -Is this tree composite1-

doesn't mae much sense. If thereis no such conte$t then the

answer to the "uestion -What are

its parts- is an answer as to whatto count as parts in this conte$t

not an answer about what the

parts are aside from the conte$t.

In other words to say that -the branches- are the parts is an

answer to the grammatical

"uestion as to what to count as parts not an answer about the

component parts in this tree aside

from conte$t. If we wanted total about this particular tree +and

not *ust negotiate what are to

count as parts, we will want to dosomething closer to describing

what we see as its parts +which is

arbitrary outside of a negotiated

language game,.

(ut isn't a chessboard for

instance obviously and

absolutely composite1

9otice the word -absolutely-here. It has the special meaning

of -absolutely and irrespective of

conte$t.-

33 ou are probably thining ofthe composition out of thirty3two

white and thirty3two blac

s"uares. (ut could we not alsosay for instance that it was

composed of the colours blac

This is the "uestion again as towhether there are ever absolute

parts of anything. The chessboard

is the e$ample he chooses thatseems most compelling. :oesn't

it seem in some natural sense



and white and the schema of

s"uares1 %nd if there are "uite

different ways of looing at itdo you still want to say that the

chessboard is absolutely

'composite'1 33

that there are absolute parts of a

chessboard1 %nd these parts are

the s"uares on the chessboard1What conte$t could change the

answer to that1

%sing -Is this ob*ect

composite1- outside a particular

language3game is lie what a boy once did who had to say

whether the verbs in certain

sentences were in the active or passive voice and who raced

his brains over the "uestion

whether the verb -to sleep-meant something active or

passive.

This is Wittgenstein's emerging philosophy. It says that

everything we say maes sense

only within a language3game that

establishes the rules and sets themeaning of the terms. The

distinction between -active- and

-passive- is different when wethin of sleeping than when we

thin of grammar. In grammar if

that's our language game at themoment the passive voice has

nothing to do with being sleepy

or passive in that sense of the

term.

%nd Wittgenstein is suggesting it

is the same with -parts.- What

counts as -parts- depends on theconte$t.

We use the word -composite-+and therefore the word

-simple-, in an enormous

number of different anddifferently related ways. +Is the

colour of a s"uare on a

chessboard simple or does itconsist of pure white and pure

yellow1 %nd is white simple or

does it consist of the colours ofthe rainbow1 33 Is this length of

; cm. simple or does it consistof two parts each cm. long1

(ut why not of one bit ? cmlong and one bit I cm. long

measured in the opposite

direction1,

To show that things do not have

-absolute- parts but only partsrelative to the language game we

are playing he is now showing us

some of the different ways wedefine the parts in different

language games.

I consider the last e$ample the

one of lengths most compelling.What are the parts of a length that

is two inches1 %re there two

parts each one inch long1

Wouldn't this be different if wemeasured the ob*ect in

centimeters1



To the philosophical "uestion/

-Is the visual image of this tree

composite and what are itscomponent parts1- the correct

answer is/ -That depends on

what you understand by'composite'.- +%nd that is ofcourse not an answer but a

re*ection of the "uestion.,

%gain this is not Wittgenstein's

aporetic voice but his clarifying

voice. This is his own philosophywhich says that we can only

answer the "uestion -What are its

parts1- once we have negotiatedthe meaning of -part- in a

particular language game.

@6. Let us apply the method of

+;, to the account in theTheaetetus. /et us consider a

language-game for which this

account is really valid. Thelanguage serves to describe

combinations of coloured

s"uares on a surface. Thes"uares form a comple$ lie a

chessboard. There are red

green white and blac s"uares.

The words of the language are+correspondingly, -)- -<-

-W- -(- and a sentence is a

series of these words. Theydescribe an arrangement of

s"uares in the order/

9otice the statement -Let usconsider a language3game for

which this account is really

valid.- This is most e$plicit. Thisis what he is trying to do trying to

find an illustration in which thetheory is really valid. What

theory is that1 The theory ofsimples the theory that

Wittgenstein had in the Tractatus

and is also )ussell.

2 ; ?

@ A B

D 6 F

%nd so for instance the sentence-))(<<<)WW- describes an

arrangement of this sort/

!ere the sentence is a

comple$ of names to which

corresponds a comple$ ofelements. The primary elements

are the coloured s"uares. -(ut

The sentence is

-))(<<<)WW.- It describes

the way in which the s"uares arecolored. :oesn't it seem natural

to call these different s"uares the



are these simple1-3I do not now

what else you would have me

call -the simples- what would be more natural in this language3

game. (ut under

parts1 This is LW's aporetic voice

taing us bac into the fly3bottle.

other circumstances I should call

a monochrome s"uare

-composite- consisting perhapsof two rectangles or of the

elements colour and shape. (ut

the concept of comple$ity mightalso be so e$tended that a

smaller area was said to be

'composed' of a greater area andanother one subtracted from it.

=ompare the 'composition of

forces' the 'division' of a line by

a point outside it5

%nd here he taes us bac out of

the fly bottle. !e is pointing to away to see the components of the

above figure differently. We may

see F if we insist that each part is

a s"uare but we could see thecontinugous colors as constituting

a part.

So there would be two red parts

as the following figure helps to

illustrate/

these e$pressions shew that we

are sometimes even inclined toconceive the smaller as the result

of a composition of greater parts

and the greater as the result of adivision of the smaller.

When I read this I see a mistaethat I overlooed before. The

smaller is a division of the greater

+the smaller s"uare is half of thelarger s"uare, and the larger is a

composite of two small s"uares.

This is what I tae him to mean.

In other words we sometimes

divide up a part to mae smaller parts or combine parts to mae

larger parts.

(ut I do not now whether tosay that the figure described by

our sentence consists of four or

of nine elements> Well does the

If the parts are determined by thecolors then there are @ parts. (ut

if the parts are determined by the

shape +s"uare, then there are F.



sentence consist of four letters or

of nine1 %nd which are its

elements the types of letter orthe letters1 :oes it matter whichwe say so long as we avoid

misunderstandings in any

particular case1

Which way you count them

depends on how you define

-part.- %nd the same thing is truefor the sentence/

))(<<<)WW

ou will say there are F words ifyou count each appearance of acharacter as -a word.- (ut if you

count the second appearance of

each character merely a copy ofthe same word then you will

count a different number of

words.

@F. (ut what does it mean to

say that we cannot define +thatis describe, these elements butonly name them1 This might

mean for instance that when in

a limiting case a comple$consists of only one s"uare its

description is simply the name of

the coloured s"uare.

!ere he taes us bac to @B. +Cseyour ordinary way of returning

from a lin to get bac to this

comment after you clic on theabove @B to pea at @B., The

point is that if we are thining of

the s"uares as the -parts- then

when we loo at a single s"uarewe can no longer name the parts.

We can only describe the s"uare.

Isn't this the dilemma that Platowas noticing in the Theaetetus1

!ere we might say 33 though

this easily leads to all #inds ofphilosophical superstition 33that a sign -)- or -(- etc. may

be sometimes a word and

sometimes a proposition. (utwhether it 'is a word or a

proposition' depends on the

situation in which it is uttered or

written. #or instance if % has todescribe comple$es of coloured

s"uares to ( and he uses the

word -)- alone we shall be ableto say that the word is a

description 33 a proposition. (ut

if he is memori8ing the wordsand their meanings or if he is

teaching someone else the use of

the words and uttering them in

the course of ostensive teaching

I have emphasi8ed the

parenthetical -though this easilyleads to all inds of philosophicalsuperstition- because I want to

show you how LW shows us

which voice he is using the voicethat leads us into aporia or out of

it. !e does not really e$pand on

this aporia but you can note it.

The "uestion is when issomething a sentence or a word1

We now but it is hard to say.

We could say that it is a sentencewhen it maes complete sense

but a sentence does not always

mae complete sense and a wordsometimes does. :oesn't it1





we shall not say that they are

propositions. In this situation the

word -)- for instance is not adescription5 it names an element

but it would be "ueer to mae

that a reason for saying that anelement can only be named> #ornaming and describing do not

stand on the same level/ naming

is a preparation for description. 9aming is so far not a move in

the language3game 33 any more

than putting a piece in its placeon the board is a move in chess.

We may say/ nothing has so far

been done when a thing has

been named. It has not even gota name e$cept in the language3

game. This was what #rege

meant too when he said that aword had meaning only as part

of a sentence.

Wittgenstein steps out of this

aporia by saying that naming anddescribing do not stand on the

same level that naming is

preparation for describing it isnot a move in the langauge game.

It is lie setting up the pieces in a

game of chess.

Still this is confusing because wedon't now how to tell at times

what constitutes the langauge

game. It is easier when we thinof chess.

A4. What does it mean to say

that we can attribute neither

being nor non3being toelements1 33One might say/ if

everything that we call -being-

and -non3being- consists in thee$istence and non3e$istence of

conne$ions between elements it

maes no sense to spea of anelement's being +non3being,5 *ust

as when everything that we call

-destruction- lies in the

separation of elements it maes

no sense to spea of thedestruction of an element.

This fu88y word -being- is really

necessary here. It is the conceptthat we are reaching for when we

are in an %ugustinian frame of

mind and trying to mae sense ofthings. The idea is that if you

destroy something by breaing it

into its parts then the e$istence ofthat thing is destroyed because its

e$istence consisted in the

relationship between its parts.

#or 0$calibur to be 0$calibur the blade of the sword has to have a

certain relationship to the handle.

(ut what about the little piece ofthe handle @ cm above the blade

does it have to have a relationship

to the rest of the handle1 There isa way in which we cannot spea

of the destruction of the handle.

One would however lie to

say/ e$istence cannot be

attributed to an element for if it

(ut if the handle has to be in a

relationship to the blade in order

for 0$calibur to e$ist then



did not e$ist one could not evenname it and so one could say

nothing at all of it.

0$calibur is a handleblade in a

certain relationship. %nd what

sense would that mae1 Whenthe blade broe off we would

have to say that the handleblade

+that is 0$calibur, no longer has a blade.

33(ut let us consider an

analogous case. There is one

thing of which one can say

neither that it is one metre longnor that it is not one metre long

and that is the standard metre in

Paris.3(ut this is of course notto ascribe any e$traordinary

property to it but only to mar

its peculiar role in the language3game of measuring with a metre3

rule.3Let us imagine samples of

colour being preserved in Paris

lie the standard metre. Wedefine/ -sepia- means the colour

of the standard sepia which is

there ept hermetically sealed.Then it will mae no sense to

say of this sample either that it is

of this colour or that it is not.

!ere he gives us two e$amples of

an ob*ect becoming the paradigm

we use to mae *udgments. If we

say that the standard meter inParis is one meter long it isn't the

same sense of -one meter- as

when we say this cloth is -onemeter long.- The standard meter

sets the standard. What would it

mean to say that it is inaccuratelymeasured1 It is what sets the

standard of perfection. On the

other hand we can say that thecloth was inaccurately measured.

%nd the same is true when we

define -sepia- by giving a sample

that we will eep as being -sepia.-

We can put it li#e this: "his

sample is an instrument of the

language used in ascriptions of

colour In this language3game itis not something that is

represented but is a means of

representation.33 %nd *ust this

goes for an element in language3game +@6, when we name it by

uttering the word -)-/ this gives

this ob*ect a role in ourlanguage3game5 it is now a

means of representation. %nd to

say -If it did not e$ist it couldhave no name- is to say as much

and as little as/ if this thing did

not e$ist we could not use it in

our language3game.33

!ere he is taling about the way

in which we negotiate the

meaning of the terms of ourlanguage game. One way we do

it is by using an e$ample to define

the meaning of the term. When

we utter the word -)- in +@6, thisis actually a way of negotiating

the meaning of the term. We are

giving the ob*ect a name and arole in our language game. It is as

though someone were to place a

stic in Paris and say -This is ameter- or -this is a length we shall

call 'finger'.- It sets up a meaning

for this term.





What loo#s as if it had to e+ist%is part of the language It is a

paradigm in our language-

game, something with whichcomparison is made. %nd this

may be an important

observation5 but it is none theless an observation concerning

our language3game3our method

of representation.

It had looed as though we could

not brea the ob*ect up into

smaller components. (ut onreflection it is *ust that we had not

named the fragments of the

compents. If the s"uare was the basic unit and we could not thinof something smaller being an

element it is because we had not

learned to thin of a fragment ofthe s"uare as a component.

#or e$ample tae this s"uare as a

component that could be

multiplied +with different colors,to mae up a comple$ composite/

.

(ut imagine that we learned to

see the only columns as ob*ects so

that we saw three ob*ects whenwe saw the above s"uare 3 as we

might today if they were different

colors

. . .Perhaps we would do this if we

were used to building fences ofsome sort so that we interpreted

all graphic s"uares/

.

in terms of fence slats. %t a

glance even if there were noseparating lines we might see it

as ? fence slats or three

components to a compositefence.

#or e$ample in terms of slats

can't you imagine seeing that

wheresas the above s"uare wascomposed of ? slats the one

below has B1



.



%phorism A23AF from



Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis in bold is inserted byShawver to enhance commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

A2 In describing language3game+@6, I said that the words -)- -(-

etc. corresponded to the colours of

the s"uares. (ut what does thiscorrespondence consist in5 in what

sense can one say that certain

colours of s"uares correspond to

these signs1 #or the account in +@6,merely set up +sic, a conne$ion

between those signs and certain

words of our language +the names

of colours,.

What is the account in @61 Itis where LW says/

The s"uares form acomple$ lie a

chessboard. There are

red green white and blac s"uares. Thewords of the language

are +correspondingly,

-)- -<- -W- -(-and a sentence is a

series of these words.

They describe anarrangement of

s"uares in the order/

Jsee +@6,K

=an you see how this sets upwhat we are going to call the

components of thechessboard1 We are told

specifically that -there are

red green... s"uares.- So we

have been told what we areto consider the parts of the

chessboard.

33 Well it

was presupposed that the use of thesigns in the language3game would

be taught in a different way in

particular by pointing to paradigms.

Our %ugustinian mythology

about language says that weare taught how to use words

+signs, by pointing and

naming and here we are

being -taught- conte$tuallywithout our noticing.

7ery well5 but what does it mean to 9otice this phrase -certain








say that in the techni"ue of using

the language certain elements

correspond to the signs1 33Is it thatthe person who is describing the

comple$es of coloured s"uares

always says -)- where there is ared s"uare5 -(- when there is a

blac one and so on1

elements correspond to the

signs.- It's a common wayof putting things but what

does it mean1 Is there a

universal meaning to this phrase1

(ut what if he goes

wrong in the description and

mistaenly says -)- where he seesa blac s"uare 33what is the

criterion by which this is a mistae1

33Or does -)-s standing for a reds"uare consist in this that when the

people whose language it is use the

sign -)- a red s"uare always comes before their minds1

If someone mistaenly calls

a blac s"uare -)- in what

sense is this a mistae1 Ifyou have been drawn into the

language game of @6 by the

account and you recogni8ethat someone is mistaen in

calling a blac s"uare -)-how do you now this1 Is it

the case that a red s"uarecomes before your mind1

In order to see more clearly here

as in countless similar cases we

must focus on the details of whatgoes on5 must loo at them from

close to.

!ere LW is teaching us not

to accept the answer above

without e$amining whathappens in these situations.

A;. If I am inclined to supposethat a mouse has come into

being by spontaneous

generation out of grey rags anddust I shall do well to e$amine

those rags very closely to see

how a mouse may have hidden

in them how it may have gotthere and so on. (ut if I am

convinced that a mouse cannotcome into being from thesethings then this investigation

will perhaps be superfluous.

!ere LW is continuing with his

last comment from A4. 0ven if

we see that we have bought intoa certain cultural mythology that

distorts our vision this does not

mean that we can find our way

out of it. !ow do we do it1 ifwe thin that mice spontaneously

generate in gray rags and we'reconvinced of this it might besuperfluous to e$amine the rags

(ut first we must learn to

understand what it is that

opposes such an e$amination of

The first thing we have to do is

understand what gets in our way

seeing what is happening.

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details in

philosophy.

A?. Our language3game +@6,has various possibilities5 there is

a variety of cases in which we

should say that a sign in thegame was the name of a s"uare

of such3and3such a colour. We

should say so if for instance wenew that the people who used

the language were taught the use

of the signs in such3and3such away. Or if it were set down in

writing say in the form of atable that this element

corresponded to this sign and ifthe table were used in teaching

the language and were appealed

to in certain disputed cases.

!ow do we now that -)-means that a particular s"uare

should be colored -red-1 We

can imagine it coming aboutthat -we now this- in a variety

of ways +other than the

insidious account we havediscovered above,. We might

say this on the basis of certain

%ugustinian language practicesthat we had observed in the

tribe. That is we might havenoticed that the tribe points and

names s"uares -)- until thechildren learn to do this. Or if it

were set down in writing that

red s"uares should be called-).- Then this is how we would

now that this is what they

should be called +imagine adictionary,.

We can also imagine such atable's being a tool in the use of

the language. :escribing a

comple$ is then done lie this/the person who describes the

comple$ has a table with him

and loos up each element of thecomple$ in it and passes from

this to the sign +and the one who

is given the description may also

use a table to translate it into a

picture of coloured s"uares,.

The comple$ is lie the grid we

say in @6 it is a cluster ofelements arranged in a

predefined way. !ow will one

describe the comple$ to another

who must arrange say a copy1One might loo at the comple$

and then loo up each element

in a table.

This table might be said to tae

over here the role of memory

and association in other cases.+We do not usually carry out the

order -(ring me a red flower- by

looing up the colour red in a

Whereas ordinarily we rely on

our memories to recogni8e

simple colors lie -red- we dosometimes use a tool such as

this when we are trying to get

the e$act shade.








table of colours and then

bringing a flower of the colour

that we find in the table5 butwhen it is a "uestion of choosing

or mi$ing a particular shade of

red we do sometimes mae useof a sample or table.,

If we call such a table thee$pression of a rule of the

language3game it can be said

that what we call a rule of alanguage3game may have very

different roles in the game.

Wittgenstein is setting up this

table as a model of rule in a

language3game and he will usethis model in subse"uent te$t.

A@. Let us recall the inds ofcase where we say that a game

is played according to a definite

rule.

% definite rule is one that is set

out e$plicitly that everyone

agrees on.

The rule may be an aid in

teaching the game. The learner

is told it and given practice in

applying it.

Say I e$plain before we begin

that the rule is that when youtype your comments you should

enclose them in bracets with

your initials. The rule is an aid I

devise in assisting our study butit is not a part of the language3

game in the sense that we couldeasily devise other devices that

would wor *ust as well. It

would not change the playing ofthe language game in any

important way if we used a color

code to eep trac of who wrote

which comment.

33Or it is an instrument of the

game itself.

(ut an rule that is an instrumentof the game itself cannot be

changed without changing the

game. If the rule is that we canas each other "uestions and get

answers then it would change

our language game if we

changed the rule.



33Or a rule is employed neither

in the teaching nor in the game

itself5 nor is it set down in a listof rules. One learns the game by

watching how others play. (ut

we say that it is playedaccording to such3and3such

rules because an observer can

read these rules off from the

practice of the game3lie anatural law governing the play.

33(ut how does the observer

distinguish in this case between players' mistaes and correct

play1 33There are characteristic

signs of it in the players'

behaviour. Thin of the behaviour characteristic of

correcting a slip of the tongue. It

would be possible to recogni8ethat someone was doing so even

without nowing his language.

Imagine a new reader noticing

that everyone encloses theircomments within bracets that

contain their initials andconforming to this implicit rule.In that case too can we not say

that this is -playing according to

the rules-1

(ut in this case how do wenow when people are playing

correctly according to the rules1

Perhaps by the way peoplecorrect themselves or other such

recogni8eable signs that peopleshow they feel they have

violated the rules even theimplicit rules +apologies1,

AA. -What the names in language

signify must be indestructible5

for it must be possible todescribe the state of affairs inwhich everything destructible is

destroyed. %nd this description

will contain words5 and whatcorresponds to these cannot then

be destroyed for otherwiseQthe

words would have no meaning.-I must not saw off the branch on

which I am sitting.

AA. !ere LW is speaing again

with his aporetic voice from

within the fly bottle. (ut thereis you can see +can you not1, acertain distance from this

aporia. !e is listening to what

he is inclined to say here.

!e is inclined to say that there

must be ob*ects in the world

that are simple and

indestructible +which are eithertrue or false,. 0ven if I destroy

0$calibur it must be the casethat I at least have somethingleft that I can say is destroyed

fragments smoe something.

If we do not have these simple

indestructible truths that we can point to and name then how can



we continue1 Our entire logic

depends on this. Or so it seems

from within the fly bottle.

One might of course ob*ect atonce that this description wouldhave to e$cept itself from the

destruction.

That is if we destroyedeverything and then describedthe destruction we could not

destroy the description itself.

33(ut what corresponds to theseparate words of the description

and so cannot be destroyed if it

is true is what gives the words

their meaning 333 is that withoutwhich they would have no

meaning. In a sense however

this man is surely whatcorresponds to his name. (ut he

is destructible and his name

does not lose its meaning whenthe bearer is destroyed

LW is still within his aporetic

voice e$pressing wonder at

these parado$es he isentertaining. In this frame of

mind it seems that what

corresponds to the separate

words cannot be destroyed ifthe words are true -The =hair

is in the corner.- If the wordsare true then the chair cannot

have been crushed until it is no

longer a chair. Still and here's

the perple$ity a name still hasmeaning once the ob*ect is

destroyed. !ow can this be1

33%n e$ample of somethingcorresponding to the name andwithout which it would have no

meaning is a paradigm that is

used in conne$ion with the name

in the language3game.

The standard meter in Paris

gives us an e$ample of this paradigm. Or a sample of

-sepia- that serves to define our

naming of colors. Samples lie

this can give meaning to aword. %s yourself/ !ow long

as a griset1 If we had a sample

in Paris that told us that wordwould have meaning.

AB. (ut what if no such sample

is part of the language and we

bear in mind the colour +for

instance, that a word stands for133-%nd if we bear it in mind then

it comes before our mind's eye

when we utter the word. +sic, Soif it is always supposed to be

possible for us to remember it it

This is LW's aporetic voice.

9otice that he often puts his

aporetic voice in "uotes but he

is inconsistent. I put a +sic,after the -word- because I

believe it should have a

"uestion mar there. This isthe cultural reasoning that puts

the indestructible simple in the



must be in itself indestructible.-mind. It is what gives Plato his

essences or eternal ideas.

33(ut what do we regard as the

criterion for remembering itright1

!ere LW is "uestioning his

own aporetic voice. This is a

significant "uestion and he willmae much of it in other

conte$ts. If we have a sample

of -red- say in our minds andno e$ternal sample how do we

now that we have remembered

the right color1 The color that-red- is1 =an you see that this

would be problematic1 ou

can hold the red sample up tothe apple and see that the apple

is the same color but thatwors because the red sample

you are using is dependable.What if you have gotten

confused and the red sample in

your mind is now distorted youare thining of it as -rust.-

!ow would you now1

33When we wor with a sample

instead of our memory there are

circumstances in which we saythat the sample has changed

colour and we *udge of this by

memory. (ut can we notsometimes spea of a darening

+for e$ample, of our memory3

image1 %ren't we as much at themercy of memory as of a sample1

+#or someone might feel lie

saying/ -If we had no memory

we should be at the mercy of a

sample-., 33Or perhaps of somechemical reaction. Imagine that

you were supposed to paint a particular colour -=- which was

the colour that appeared when the

chemical substances E and combined.3Suppose that the

colour struc you as brighter on

!ere he is further e$ploring the

"uestion of whether we can rely

on memory as if it were asample. We do sometimes

notices that colors have

changed he tells us but we donot entirely trust our

observations. So if we rely on

memory as a sample we oftendo not feel very secure about

it.



one day than on another5 would

you not sometimes say/ -I must

be wrong the colour is certainlythe same as yesterday-1 This

shews that we do not always

resort to what memory tells us asthe verdict of the highest court of

appeal.

AD. -Something red can be

destroyed% but red cannot be

destroyed and that is why themeaning of the word 'red' is

independent of the e$istence of

a red thing.-

The aporetic voice. %gain theemphasis is mine. This is a

paradigm +sample, case of the

Platonic3%ugustinian muddle.What is it that cannot be

destroyed1 The color1 Whatcolor1 In what way does the

color e$ist apart from things thatare so colored1

3=ertainly it maes no sense to

say that the colour red is torn up

or pounded to bits. (ut don't wesay -The red is vanishing-1 %nd

don't clutch at the idea of our

always being able to bring red

before our mind's eye evenwhen there is nothing red any

more. That is *ust as if you

chose to say that there wouldstill always be a chemical

reaction producing a red flame.3

#or suppose you cannotremember the colour any

more.53When we forget which

colour this is the name of it

loses its meaning for us5 that is

we are no longer able to play a particular language3game with

it. %nd the situation then iscomparable with that in which

we have lost a paradigm which

was an instrument of ourlanguage.

!ere's LW's clarifying voice.

!e is not really giving us ananswer here to the above

"uestion but he is directing our

attention. If we are inclined tosay +confusedly, that the redwould e$ist because it would

still e$ist in our minds +because

we could imagine a red s"uarestill, then this neglects the fact

that we sometimes cannot recall

the color. Suppose you suffered brain damage and it did not

destroy your color vision but

you could no longer remember

which color was which. Wouldred then still e$ist1



A6. -I want to restrict the term'name' to what cannot occur in

the combination 'E e$ists'.33Thus one cannot say ')ede$ists' because if there were no

red it could not be spoen of at

all.-

%gain LW is using the "uotes to

indicate his aporetic voice. Thisis the aporetic voice trying to

patch things up so that they

wor as our cultural picture saysthat they should. %ccording to

this patch up *ob we are going

to say that the word -red- will

lose its meaning when there areno red ob*ects. Will this wor1

33(etter/ If -E e$ists- is meant

simply to say/ -E- has a

meaning

In other words if the statement

-)ed e$ists- is true then this

means that -)ed- has ameaning.

3then it is not a proposition

which treats of E but a

proposition about our use oflanguage that is about the use

of the word -E-.

(ut notice this proposition doesnot tal about the e$istence of

-red-. It is a move in setting up

the language game. It hasnothing to do with the e$istence

of red apart from this new

language game.

It loo#s to us as if we were

saying something about the

nature of red in saying that the

words 0ed e+ists do not

yield a sense 9amely that reddoes e$ist 'in its own right'.

Important passage In 2;; LW

notices that our grammar is

lacing in a certain ind of perspecuity that would enable us

to more easily see what is goingon. !ere it is. The phrase -)ed

e$ists- can be either a

negotiation of the meaning ofthe term -)ed e$ists- or it can

be a statement about the world

33 but if it's a statement about

the world it has to be within a particular language game.

We get confused however

when we see that the statement

-)ed e$ists- maes a ind ofsense to it. The sense it seems

to mae when we conflate the

two possible uses of this phraseis that -)ed- e$ists apart from

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any ob*ect that is red. Still this

seems perple$ing to us. It is

hard to imagine how red e$ists.

This is our aporia here.

The same idea 33that this is ametaphysical statement about

red 33finds e$pression again

when we say such a thing as thatred is timeless and perhaps still

more strongly in the word

-indestructible-.

That is there are many ways toe$press this metaphysical

thought that -red e$ists- beyond

red ob*ects and particularlanguage games. Sometimes we

say that it is -timeless- or

-indestructible.-

(ut what we really want is

simply to tae -)ed e$ists- asthe statement/ the word -red-

has a meaning. Or perhaps better/ -)ed does not e$ist- as -

')ed' has no meaning-.

In other words if we are

tempted to say -red e$ists- then

we are pointing out that theword red has a meaning. Or if

we say that -grue- does note$ist- this is a way of saying

that the word -grue- has no

meaning.

Only we do not want to say thatthat e$pression says this but that

this is what it would have to be

saying if it meant anything. (utthat it contradicts itself in the

attempt to say it 33*ust because

red e$ists 'in its own right'.Whereas the only contradiction

lies in something lie this/ the

proposition loo#s as if it were

about the colour% while it is

supposed to be saying

something about the use of the

word red.

(ut it seems as though the

statement -)ed e$ists- isasserting a truth about red not

*ust giving us the rules of the

language +that the word 'red' hasmeaning. The formulation fools

us because it is so similar to the

formulation we would use if we

were taling about a thing andnot about meaning as if I would

say -The document you have

been looing for I have foundout that it e$ists- it would be

clear that I am not taling about

word definitions but about the

document e$isting. Still theformulations seem so similar.

33In reality however we "uite

readily say that a particular

colour e$ists5 and that is as muchas to say that something e$ists

that has that colour. %nd the first

(ut our language does not mae

a distinction between these ways

of using the phrase -red e$ists.-Within the rules of our

language both uses are e"ually



e$pression is no less accurate

than the second5 particularly

where 'what has the colour' isnot a physical ob*ect.

correct.

AF. -% name signifies onlywhat is an element of reality.

What cannot be destroyed5 what

remains the same in allchanges.-

The %ugustine's voice again.

This voice tells us/ If -red e$ists-

it signifies something that cannot be destroyed.

33 (ut what is that1 33Why it

swam before our minds as we

said the sentence> This was the

very e$pression of a "uite particular image/ of a particular

picture which we want to use.#or certainly e$perience doesnot shew us these elements. We

see component parts of

something composite +of achair for instance,. We say that

the bac is part of the chair but

is in turn itself composed ofseveral bits of wood5 while a

leg is a simple component part.

We also see a whole which

changes +is destroyed, while itscomponent parts remain

unchanged. These are the

materials from which weconstruct that picture of reality.

This is the aporetic voice

speaing. It says /isn't there a

way in which this seemscompelling1 #rom within the fly

bottle1 :oesn't it sometimeshappen that when you say -chair-

you see something lie a chairflash before your mind's eye1

Well then maybe we should say

that this ghostly image is whatthe word 'chair' refers to. It is the

idea perhaps that Plato had in

mind when he constructed histheory of ideas.

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%phorism B43B@ from



Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis in bold is inserted by


Shawver commentary:

B4. When I say/ -&y broom is inthe corner-3is this really a

statement about the broomsticand the brush1

What else could a statement lie

this be1 )emember that in A2 LW

introduced the notion that we canintroduce the account into the

remars so that this accountdefines the terms to be used setsup the language game rules.

Well it could at any

rate be replaced by a statementgiving the position of the stic and

the position of the brush. %nd this

statement is surely a further

analysed form of the first one.

This is the voice of tradition

noticing that the word -broom-could be replaced with something

lie -brush plus stic-1 This

phrase -brush plus stic- it says

is an analy8ed form of -broom.-

3(ut why do I call it -further

analysed-1

The voice of aporia ass why this

is so.

33Well if the broom is there that

surely means that the stic and brush must be there and in a

particular relation to one another5

and this was as it were hidden inthe sense of the first sentence and

is e$pressed in the analysed

sentence.

The voice of tradition answers andgives its reasons. This T voice

says in effect -(room- and

-brush plus stic- are the same

thing e$cept -brush plus stic-gives a more detailed listing of

what we actually have.

Then does someone who says thatthe broom is in the corner really

mean/ the broomstic is there andso is the brush and the broomstic is fi$ed in the brush1

Perhaps this will remind you of anearlier discussion of whether

-Slab>- in languge game ; reallymeans -(ring me the slab>- +cf2F, It is in ways lie this that

Wittgenstein teaches us going

over these points in one conte$tand then in another using a

different versions of a basic model

to familari8e us with the problem



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in a variety of cases.

3If we were to as anyone if he

meant this he would probably saythat he had not thought specially

of the broomstic or specially of

the brush at all. %nd that would bethe right answer for he meant to

spea neither of the stic nor of

the brush in particular. Suppose

that instead of saying -(ring methe broom- you said -(ring me

the broomstic and the brush

which is fitted on to it.->3Isn't theanswer/ -:o you want the broom1

Why do you put it so oddly1- Is he

going to understand the further

analysed sentence better1

The point is that the speaer whohad ased for the broom wasasing for the gestalt whole not

the parts even if they were

attached to each other. ou don'tsee a person's face by noticing the

constellation of features. The

whole is more than the sum of itsindividual parts.

Is he going to understand the

further analysed sentence better13

This sentence one mightsay achieves the same as the

ordinary one but in a more

roundabout way.

%ctually it might be harder to

understand. Imagine it/ -Wouldyou had me the brush attached to

the broomstic1-

3Imagine a language3game in

which someone is ordered to bring

certain ob*ects which are

composed of several parts tomove them about or something

else of the ind. %nd two ways of

playing it/ in one +a, thecomposite ob*ects +brooms chairs

tables etc., have names as in

+2A,5 in the other +b, only the partsare given names and the wholes

are described by means of them.3

In what sense is an order in the

second game an analysed form ofan order in the first1 :oes the

former lie concealed in the latterand is it now brought out byanalysis.'3

True the broom is taen to

pieces when one separates

broomstic and brush5 but does it

Poof> There goes our great

distinction between names and

descriptions. If we call the ob*ect

a broom then it is a description tosay it is a brush with a broomstic

attached because the composite

ob*ect has a name +i.e. -broom-,.(ut if only the parts have names

then the whole must be described

by the means of the parts and eachof the parts become names.

So what looed lie a comment

about the unanaly8ability of the

broom +or the brush, is really a

comment about whether I canfurther analy8e the language. If

invent ways to name moreinfintesimal aspects of the ob*ect

then the ob*ect can be analy8ed

further. The s"uares can be

divided into triangles and then

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follow

that the order to bring the broom

also consists of corresponding parts1

each s"uare is a composite of

triangles.

B2. -(ut all the same you will

not deny that a particular order

in +a, means the same as one

in +b,5 and what would you callthe second one if not an analysed

form of the first1-

The %ugustinian voice again. =an

you see where he's coming from1Practically speaing it seems that

asing for the 'brush' and the

'broomstic' means the same thingas asing for the broom. If the

instructions were followed in each

case the same ob*ect would befetched.

3=ertainly I too

should say that an order in +a, hadthe same meaning as one in +b,5or as I e$pressed it earlier/ they

achieve the same. %nd this means

that if I were shewn an order in +a,and ased/ -Which

order in +b, means the same as

this1- or again -Which order in +b,

does this contradict1- I shouldgive such3and3such an answer. (ut

that is not to say that we have

come to a general agreementabout the use of the e$pression -to

have the same meaning- or -to

achieve the same-. #or it can beased in what cases we say/

-These are merely two forms of

the same game.-

I have corrected the electronic

version of our te+t which has theword strewn when it should

have had -shewn- when in

%merican is -shown.-

(ut the "uestion is *ust becausethey have the same practical effect

of resulting in the broom being

fetched doesn't mean that they are

the same game. I can get you toturn around by saying -turn

around- perhaps but I can lielyachieve the same effect by saying

your name.

B;. Suppose for instance that the person who is given the orders in

+a, and +b, has to loo up a

table co3ordinating names and

pictures before bringing what isre"uired.

Let this remind you of the table

discussion for the color of the grid

in A?3AB.

:oes he do the same when he

carries out an order in +a, and thecorresponding one in +b,13es and

no. ou may say/ -The point of

the two orders is the same-. I

Why are we tempted to say

however that the point of a lampis that it gives light1 :on't you

thin we are1 et in a given case

in a particular situation the point

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should say so too.3(ut it is not

everywhere clear what should be

called the 'point' of an order.+Similarly one may say of certain

ob*ects that they have this or that

purpose. The essential thing is thatthis is a lamp that it serves to give

light53that it is an ornament to the

room fills an empty space etc. isnot essential. (ut there is not

always a sharp distinction between

essential and inessential.,

may be entirely different. We are

inclined to thin of a paradigm

case +as if the situation has beenset up for us, and ignore

alternative possibilities. We

recogni8e that they are there butwe let them slip under the rug to

eep things simple +or for some

reason,.

Why do we do this1

B?. To say however that asentence in +b, is an 'analysed'

form of one in +a, readily seduces

us

into thining that the former is themore fundamental form5 that it

alone shews what is meant by theother and so on.

%h here it is again. The account

in the language set us up. It is thesame point he made in A2

#or e$ample we thin/ If you

have only the unanalysed form

you miss the analysis5 but if younow the analysed form that gives

you everything.

The %ugustinian voice says that

the more minute the analysis themore accurate things are.

3(ut can I not say that an aspect of

the matter is lost on you in thelatter case as well as the former1

(ut the level of description is *ust

different. Something may begained but something is also lost.

We lose the forest for the trees.

This relates to the point in 2F inwhich we compared the language

game that said that in +;, -Slab>-

was not an abbreviated form of

-(ring me a slab>- anymore that-(ring me a slab>- was a

lengthened form of -slab>-

9evertheless we are somehowseduced into thining that -Slab>-

is abbreviated.

(ut in each case we have a

different language game adifferent -form of life.-

B@. Let us imagine language game

+@6, altered so that names signifynot monochrome s"uares but

2

;







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rectangles each consisting of two

such s"uares. Let such a rectangle

which is half red half green be

called -C-5 a half green half whiteone -7-5 and so on. =ould we not

imagine people who had names

for such combinations of colour but not for the individual colours1

Thin of the cases where we say/

-This arrangement of colours +saythe #rench tricolor, has a "uite

special character.-

?

@

Imagine it. a sentence lie C 7

7 C would result in the grid beingcolored in thusly/

.

.

. .

.

=ouldn't we imagine a culture

having such names1 Thin of the

#rench flag or any flag andimagine these rectangles looing

lie flags one flag on top of

another.

In what sense do the symbols of

this language3game stand in need

of analysis1 !ow far is it even

possible to replace this language3game by +@6,13It is *ust another

language3game5 eventhough it is related to +@6,.

%h but you say it would be soinconvenient> yes in 0nglish it

would be. (ut what if nothing

really mattered but the flags.Women wore greenQwhite +or C

flags, and men wore greenQred or

some other division between

classes of people were designatedlie this. %side from these flags

there was no concern with color.

es it would be a different formof life and the person who

thought that these different

statements were translatable tostatements that coded these flags

not as units +C or 7 but as s"uares

<reen White and )ed, would be

missing the forest for the trees.






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%phorism BA3BF from



Wittgenstein:

+0mphasis in bold is

inserted by Shawver toenhance commentary.,

Shawver commentary:

BA. !ere we come up

against the great

"uestion that lies behind all these

considerations.3#orsomeone might ob*ectagainst me/ -ou tae

the easy way out> ou

tal about all sorts oflanguage3games but

have nowhere said

what the essence of alanguage3game and

hence of language is/

what is common to all

these activities andwhat maes them into

language or parts of

language. So you letyourself off the very

part of the

investigation that oncegave you yourself most

headache the part

about the general form

of propositions and oflanguage.-

We have now shifted to a new topic that heannounces straightforwardly. The topic is

presented in the form of an %ugustinian voceor a -somone.- This someone wants

Wittgenstein to defie the essence of the

concept of a language game. 9otice withinthe %ugustinian frame the 'essence- is e"ual

to -what is common to all these activities.-

This idea goes bac to Plato who tals of theessence of various things or the

transcendental idea behind their various

sensual manifestations.

So the "uestion is/ What is the essence of alanguage game1 and hence to all of

language1 What is the essence of language1

%lso notice that in the last part of this

passage the 7oice reminds LW that thissearch for the essence was once something

that he tried very hard to do and it gave him

considerable trouble.

%nd this is true.3Instead of producing

something common to

all that we call

It is true LW is saying that he hasn't yet presented this essence that is common to all

language +or all language games,. !is answer

here in this passage is very famous and it is a



language I am saying

that these phenomena

have no one thing incommon which maes

us use the same word

for all3but that theyare related to one

another in many

different ways. %nd itis because of this

relationship or these

relationships that wecall them all

-language-. I will try

to e$plain this.

powerful move in developing theWittgensteinian framewor. (efore this

move it seems imperative that we define the

essence of what we are taling about. 9ow

LW is going to show us another way to seethings.

BB. =onsider for

e$ample the proceedings that we

call -games-. I mean

board3games card3games ball3games

Olympic games and so

on. What is common tothem all1 33 :on't say/

-There must be

something common or they would not be

called 'games' -3but

loo and see whether

there is anythingcommon to all. 33 #or

if you loo at them you

will not see somethingthat is common to all

but similarities

relationships and awhole series of them at

that. To repeat/ don't

thin but loo> 33

This aphorism has a little different structure

than some of the others that we are reading.!ere LW is e$plicitly guiding our reading and

he does such a good *ob of it I am not goingto offer much commentary.

(ut a few notes/ 9ow notice your inclination

to say certain things has become the

Wittgensteinian voice. 9ow we can begin tolisten to this voice within ourselves. The

voice speas within us when we want to say

-there must be something common among

-games.- There must be an essence if wehave a concept.

LW says in a manner of speaing -don't say

to yourself that this must be the case and thengive yourself a headache trying to see what is

not there. Let's loo at specific ind of cases

and as if the essence is there in those cases.

Loo through these aphorisms while puttingthe point that he is maing out of mind. :on't

thin so much or ponder what you're looingfor *ust loo at your memories and

understanding of games and detail what youobserve.

Loo for e$ample at

board3games withtheir multifarious

relationships.

(oard games what are some1 =onsiderchess of course but thin also of monopoly.



9ow pass to card3

games5 here you find

many correspondenceswith the first group

but many common

features drop out andothers appear.

=ard games. What about poer1 %nd whatabout Old &aid. )emember that children's

card game1 !ow are these card games alie

and different from each other1 %nd how do

they compare with board games1 What aboutthe element of strategy1 Or how many

players can play and whether or not there is asingle winner or as in &onopoly +I believe,

there are different degrees of winning.

When we pass ne$t to

ball3games much that

is common is retained but much is lost.33 %re

they all 'amusing'1

=ompare chess withnoughts and crosses.Or is there always

winning and losing or

competition between players1 Thin of

patience. In ball games

there is winning andlosing5 but when a

child throws his ball at

the wall and catches it

again this feature hasdisappeared. Loo at

the parts played by

sill and luc5 and atthe difference between

sill in chess and sill

in tennis.

Thin of the way one wins or loses in tennis.

Winning is hierarchical. One can win a point

but lose the game. One can win the game butlose the set. %nd one can win the set but lose

the match. One can win the match but lose

the tournament. =ompare this with baseball+also hierarchical, or with checers. %nd

howabout board games that revolve around a

throw of the dice1

Thin now of games

lie ring3a3ring3a3

roses5 here is theelement of amusement

but how many other

characteristic featureshave disappeared>

sometimes similarities

of detail.

Then we have children's ritual games. :o

they have a winner1 What about drop the

hanerchief1 Or London (ridge is falling

down1 !ow about -spin the bottle.-1 %re

you winning or losing if the bottle stops pointing to you1

What about *acs1 Gacs is a girls' game that

was popular when I was a child and I was intothe game. ou have 24 little ob*ects called

-*acs- that you toss onto the ground as the

other girls sit in a circle. Then each girl has a



turn. She starts with a ball in her preferred

hand and she tosses the ball up and lets it

bounce and before it bounced again she picsup one *ac and then catches the ball before it

bounces again. She does that with each *ac.Then she does -twosees- which means she pics up two *acs in one sweep. She

continues that until she has done all ten

*acs. Then if she completes that round

without difficulty she starts again with amore difficult rule. Perhaps she doesn't let

the ball bounce at all or she not only pics up

the *acs but she puts them in a particular place before she catches the ball. There are a

few of these rounds that are already invented

but it is common for the winning player toinvent the ne$t game.

!ow does -*acs- compare with chess1 Or

with ring3a3ring3o3roses1 !ow are they

different1 !ow does it compare with tennis1Or %merican football1

%nd we can go through

the many many other

groups of games in thesame way5 can see how

similarities crop upand disappear.

:on't children invent games on the spot1 See

who can spit the furtherest1 Or see who can

solve a particular pu88le first1 Or who canfollow a rule the best +thin of Simon Says,.

%nd the result of this

e$amination is/ we seea complicated networ

of similarities

overlapping and cries3

crossing/ sometimes

overall similarities.

%nd what you'll find I thin if you go

through a careful study of these various types

of games is that there are similarities and

differences. Poer is lie chess in certainways. They both have clear rules and the

winner is liely to have practice and sill.(ut they are different in some ways too andif you loo at how they are different you'll

find other games that are not different in these

ways but different in other ways.

BD. I can thin of no !ere is the ey move and the new metaphor



better e$pression to

characteri8e these

similarities than-family

resemblances-5 for the

various resemblances between members of a

family/ build features

colour of eyes gaittemperament etc. etc.

overlap and cries3cross

in the same way.3%nd Ishall say/ 'games' form

a family.

that LW e$tends to replace the old Platonic

metaphor of essence. The concept is one of-family resemblance.-

9otice %land Gac

have the

sameeyebrows

while 0lmer

and (ob

have thesame ears

and %l and(ob have thesame smile.

There is no

commonfeature

among them

yet they all

resembleeach other.

Wittgenstein #amily

)esemblance

%nd for instance the

inds of number form

a family in the same

way. Why do we callsomething a

-number-1 Well

perhaps because it hasa3direct3relationship

with several things that

have hitherto beencalled number5 and this

can be said to give it

an indirect relationship

to other things we call

I suppose what LW means here is that we call

positive numbers negative numbers realnumbers or a se"uence of characters

+abc...8, numbers +see 6,. !ow are these

-numbers- lie and unlie a series ofcharacters that we would not consider

numbers1

%lso consider phone numbers and the

numbers on football *erseys social securitynumbers numbers that are rans verus

numbers that can be added and subtracted.

Or let's tae an e$ample that re"uires less

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the same name. %nd

we e$tend our concept

of number as inspinning a thread we

twist fibre on fibre.

%nd the strength of thethread does not reside

in the fact that some on

e fibre runs through its

whole length but inthe overlapping of

many fibres.

mathematical sophistication. Tae the word

-food.- Imagine a plate of food composed of

only vegetables or a food concoction made of cheese and tomato sauce or food for the

dogs or for the goldfish. %lso imaginespoiled food or raw food or petrified food. Isthere some single feature in these foods that

runs through all of them1 Thin of artificial

food +lie wa$ apples, and playfood +for

children's tea,. %nd don't say that the singlefeature is that they are all related to eating

because that is a way we frame -wa$ food-

and -play food- but it is not a characteristic of this -food.-

%nd what a closer e$amination shows is thateven if there isn't a single thread that runs

through everything +and there may be in somecases of course, there is a family

resemblance between these different items.

Some are edible. Some are animal flesh.Some are vegetable. (ut there need not be a

single aspect that is common to all the

varieties.

=an you thin of another e$ample that can be

analy8ed in this way1 Tae the concept of-thought.- :o all the different acceptable

uses of this term have a common feature1 Ortae the concept of -nothing.- Is the meaning

of -nothing- the same in these two sentences/

2. There is nothing in the bo$.

;. There is nothing for me to do.

(ut if someone wished

to say/ -There is

something common toall these constructions3

namely the dis*unction

of all their common properties- 33I should

reply/ 9ow you are

only playing withwords. One might as

This is an important passage too. It points to

the trics we play to eep ourselves in the fly3

bottle.

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well say/ -Something

runs through the whole

thread3 namely thecontinuous

overlapping of those

fibres-.B6. -%ll right/ the

concept of number is

defined for you as the

logical sum of theseindividual interrelated

concepts/ cardinal

numbers rationalnumbers real numbers

etc.5 and in the same

way

the concept of a gameas the logical sum of a

corresponding set ofsub3concepts.-

!ere's the %ugustinian voice again. It

always seems to have a combac. To returnto the concept of -number- remember LW

had said that there need not be a single

common feature in all -number- systems.

--It need not be so

.or I can give the

concept 'number'

rigid limits in this

way% that is% use the

word number for a

rigidly limited

concept% but I canalso use it so that the

e+tension of the

concept is not closed

by a frontier %nd this

is how we do use theword -game-. #or how

is the concept of a

game bounded1

!ere is another important passage.Wittgenstein is pointing to the way in which

we can locally and provisionally define aconcept. !ow do we do this1 In numerousways. Sometimes we set things up e$plicitly.

We say -I am using the word number here to

mean 'rational number.'- %nd sometimes this

slips in without our awareness. +We studiedthis A23AF and see especially A2,.

What still counts as agame and what no

longer does1

I thin we can count this as the %ugustinian

voice.

=an you give the

boundary1 9o.

It is very hard to delineate what the boundaries of a game are to define it so that

it includes both tic3tac3toe and )ugby.

ou can draw one5 for (ut in a local and provisional conte$t you

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none has so far been

drawn.

might say -(y game I mean something in

which one eeps score and there is a definite

winner.-

+(ut that never

troubled you beforewhen you used theword -game-.,

(ut ordinarily you use the word -game-

without trying e$plicitly to define it locally

and provisionally. ou *ust say -Is this someind of a game1- and you tae it that people

will understand you.

-(ut then the use of

the word isunregulated the 'game'

we play with it is

unregulated.-

9ow the %ugustinian feels uncomfortablewith where we're going. It seems we need to

eep things more tied down than this.

It is not everywherecircumscribed by rules5

but no more are there

any rules for how highone throws the ball in

tennis or how hard5

yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules

too.

The rules of the game can't control every lastdetail of the action. There is always a

considerable amount action that is beyond the

rules of the game.

BF. !ow should wee$plain to someone

what a game is1

If we don't have a common thread running

through everything we call a -game- it seemsvery chaotic> !ow on earth do we teach

people to use this term -game-1

I imagine that weshould describe games

to him and we might

add/ -This and similar

things are called'games' -. %nd do we

now any more

about it ourselves1 Is itonly other people

whom we cannot tell

e$actly what a game

is1

Still don't we teach this term -games- tochildren1 %nd don't they learn it1 =an it

really be as diffficult as all that if we manage

to teach it so easily1

3(ut this is not

ignorance. We do not

now the boundaries because none have

been drawn. To repeat

we can draw a boundary3for a special

The term -game- is not a difficult term for a

child to learn and the fact that it seems that it

should be is a flag for this being a confusionleft over from our %ugustinian muddle.

The situation is that we imagine that we have

one term here and the different senses are *ust



purpose. :oes it tae

that to mae the

concept usable1 9ot atall> +0$cept for that

special purpose., 9o

more than it too thedefinition/ 2 pace R DA

cm. to mae the

measure of length 'one pace' usable. %nd if

you want to say -(ut

still before that itwasn't an e$act

measure- then I reply/

very well it was an

ine$act one.3Though

you still owe me adefinition of

e$actness.

variations on a common theme but in practice we tae these vague concepts that are

loosely defined and we tie them down to

more particular definitions. It *ust taes a

moment to do this and the practice is allaround us. It is *ust that we fail to notice that

we do this. We have a theory of terms having

essential meanings +based on transcendentalessences, and this belief in the theory of

language is so strong we simply overloo the

way in which we negotiate the language thatwe use when other people do it and when we

do it ourselves.

JSomeone says to me/

-Shew the children a

game.- I teach them

gaming with dice andthe other says -I didn't

mean that sort of

game.- &ust thee$clusion of the game

with dice have come before his mind whenhe gave me the

order1K

This is a footnote in which LW reminds us

how we teach this ostensibly difficult concept

of -game.- 9otice how we have practices ofcontinuously clarifying our local and

provisional meanings.



%phorism D43DA from



Wittgenstein:



Shawver commentary:

9ow we will dip into the reason

that our local negotiation of

language games +the setting up ofthe accounts in +A2, through +BF,

do not always wor and why wehave disagreements andconfusions. What is it about

langauge that maes it difficult for

us to accept any definition of thingsat all1

D4. -(ut if the concept 'game' is

uncircumscribed lie that youdon't really now what you mean

by a 'game'.-

!ere is the %ugustinian +actually

his positivist descendant,

speaing. The point is simple. ouneed to define terms to be able to

use them. (ut Wittgenstein isn't

defining -language game- in anyclear way recall that captures the

essence of language games.

Language games form a familyresemblance. There is no essence

to tie them together.

33 When I give the description/

-The ground was "uite covered

with plants- 33do you want to say

I don't now what I am talingabout until I can give a definition

of a plant1

(ut notice mostly we don't have

ready definitions for terms. 0venwhen we set up the language game

by giving accounts we don't

typically now that we are doing it.We all learned to tal "uite a bit

before we were even able to

generate definitions for the terms

we used.

&y meaning would be e$plained

by say a drawing and the words

-The ground looed roughly lie

Imagine it. I say -The ground

looed roughly lie this- as I point

to a front yard of someone's. (ut













this-. Perhaps I even say -it

looed e$actly lie this.-3Then

were *ust this grass and these

leaves there arranged *ust liethis1 9o that is not what it

means. %nd I should not accept

any picture as e$act in thissense.

what does -this- mean. )ecall our

problem in defining -this- before.

Or pointing to anything.in an effortto define it. What am I pointing to

here1 This is the whole problem

with teaching ostensive definitionsthat we faced in 2324 and that

Wittgenstein elucidated in his

remars ;6 and ;F.. Gust as it ishard to tell if I am pointing to the

circle or the color of the circle so it

is hard to tell what I am pointing tohere. %nd I said that the similarity

beteween this front yard and the

one one I am describing is rough

but rough in what way1 =an I be

e$act in how it is rough1 Withoutmaing this -rough- e$planation an

e$act one1

D2. One might say that the

concept 'game' is a concept with

blurred edges.3

!ere LW breas his usual form and

he begins this aphorism in his own

voice. !e is suggesting a way to

thin about things that will bechallenged in the ne$t passage.

-(ut is a blurred concept a

concept at all1-3

There's the challenge// The

imaginary interlocutor says ineffect -:on't I have to pin my

meaning down in order to be precise1-

Is an indistinct photograph a

picture of a person at all1 Is it

even always an advantage toreplace an indistinct picture by a

sharp one1 Isn't the indistinct one

often e$actly what we need1

The "uestion is whether you wantto call an indistinct picture a

-picture.- <enerally I thin we do

unless it is more than *ust a littleindistinct. (ut with concepts don't

we often operate with -indistinct

meanings- of terms1 %nd in the

case of -language game- isn't thatwhat we need1

#rege compares a concept to an

area and says that an area withvague boundaries cannot be

called an area at all. This

presumably means that wecannot do anything with it.

Well here's a real case of the positivist descedent who maes the

complaint that forms the problem

for this aphorism to handle.

3(ut is it senseless to say/ -Stand =learly we do this all the time. -I'll

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roughly there-1

Suppose that I were standing

with someone in a city s"uareand said that. %s I say it I do not

draw any ind of boundary but perhaps point with my hand3as if I were indicating a particular

spot.

be finished about noon- I might

tell someone. =an I call you after

that1 -Well- that person says -Ihave to leave somewhere around

one o'cloc. I'm not sure e$actly

but something around one. So tryto call before then.-

The communication seems sensible

and useful in a conte$t lie that.

%nd this is *ust how one might

e$plain to someone what a game

is. One gives e$amples andintends them to be taen in a

particular way.

Isn't this how we e$plain thingsoften enough1 There are

provisional e$planations that

prepare a place and then more amore sophisticated understandings.

Imagine trying to e$plain -chess- to

a child. ou say -It's the game thatyou have seen :addy play withCncle Paul. ou now the one

with those funny figures that ove

around a board that loos lie thefloor in our itchen1- Oh the child

says -the one that has soldiers1-

-es ind of.- %nd that's the firste$planation. Obviously the child

does not yet have a very solid

understanding of chess but this

initial rough e$planation lays agroundwor prepares a place.

+?2,

33I do not however mean bythis that he is supposed to see in

those e$amples that common

thing which I 33for some reason33was unable to e$press5 but that

he is now to employ those

e$amples in a particular way.

!ere giving e$amples is not an

indirect means of e$plaining 33 indefault of a better.

This is what he does not mean/ !edoes not mean that somehow this

e$planation of chess to the child

will give the child the essence ofchess or that I even new the

essence of chess at the time but

simply could not thin of it. &y

e$planation to the child was not

merely a faulty e$planation either.The child could not have

understood a fuller one. <ivinghim the e$planation that I did will

however prepare a place for a fuller

e$planation. Over the ne$t year orso imagine him watching his dad

and Cncle Paul playing chess and

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learning a little at a time until

gradually he has woring

definition but still does not now"uite what a chec3mate means

and after that he has a woring

definition but does not now whata ueen's <ambit is and so forth.

33 Wittgenstein is showing us how

we can understand language beinglearned in terms other than the

unambiguous pointing and naming

that %ugustine imagined in +2,

#or any general definition can

be misunderstood too.

9o matter how I point at the bluecircle and say -blue- you might

misunderstand me +cf. ;6,. %nd no

sentences either are so accurate

and so apt as to prevent allmisunderstandings.

The point is that this is how we

play the game. +I mean the

language3game with the word

-game-.,

What language game1 The

language game of showing otherswhat we mean. We introduce the

concept by preparing the place.

Listeners cannot understand ourlanguage until a place is prepared

for it..

D;. Seeing what is common.

Suppose I shew someone variousmulti3coloured pictures and say/

-The colour you see in all theseis called 'yellow ochre' -.3This is

a definition and the other will

getto understand it by looing for

and seeing what is common to

the pictures. Then he can loo atcan point to the common thing.

This voice is persistent isn't it1

The voice that says we learn byseeing what is common. Well we

sometimes seem to learn by seeing

what is common. The problem isthat we give this way of learning

language altogether too much

credit. There are other ways oflearning language and LW is

showing us a few.

=ompare with this a case inwhich I shew him figures of

different shapes all painted the

same colour and say/ -What

these have in common is called'yellow ochre' -.

This is the ind of e$ample the%ugustinian in this passage was

pondering. ou can imagine it.

There are various shapes and they

are all the same color. 0ven if the person wasn't "uite sure about the

concept of 'color' +say didn't now

the difference between the concept











of 'color' and the concept of 'shade',

surely she would understand if she

could see the different shapes hereand be told -What these have in

common is called 'yellow ochre'-.

Isn't this how we learn to nowcolors1 by seeing what is

common1

%nd compare this case/ I shew

him samples of different shades

of blue and say/ -The colour thatis common to all these is what I

call 'blue' -.

(ut here things are a bit different.

:ifferent shades of blue might notall be seen as -blue- especially if

one didn't now that ordinarily we

treat different levels of saturation asthe -same color- even though they

are different -shades.-

In other words some situations ofe$planation are easier to grasp perhaps than others. If we imagine

the case of different ob*ects having

the same color as being useful toteach people the concept of 'yellow

ochre' are we imagining that these

different ob*ects have precisely thesame shade of 'yellow ochre'1 (ut

don't we use the word in a rougher

ind of way to individate a variety

of shades1 Tae the color blue andnotice the vast difference between

midnight blue ice blue robin's egg

blue babyblue and so forth.

In other words we can convince

ourselves that we detect the essence

of the concept by seeing e$amples

only by thining of e$treme casesin which the ambiguity of what we

are pointing to is minimi8ed. It is

hard to imagine what that e$tremecase would be in the case of

-games.-

D?. When someone defines the

names of colours for me by pointing to samples and saying

-This colour is called 'blue' this

'green' ..... - this case can be

Well this is a familiar e$ample.

Thin of all of our tal of the tableor the file cabinet in the mind. et

it is true that we do teach these

words in situations that amount to



compared in many respects to

putting a table in my hands with

the words written under thecolour3samples.3Though this

comparison may mislead in

many ways.3

attaching labels to things it is *ust

that we have seen that this e$ample

as seductive as it seems to be ismisleading if it leads us to thin

that such a table must be present in

the mind.+cf A@3A6,

One is now inclined to e$tend

the comparison/ to haveunderstood the definition means

to have in one's mind an idea of

the thing defined and that is asample or picture. So if I am

shewn various different leaves

and told -This is called a 'leaf' -

I get an idea of the shape of aleaf a picture of it in my mind.3

(ut what does the picture of a

leaf loo lie when it does notshew us any particular shape but

'what is common to all shapes of

leaf'1 Which shade is the 'samplein my mind' of the colour green3

the sample of what is common to

all shades of green1

!e continues to show us the

problem with the idea that we

deduce the essence of the concept

from e$amples in which the onething held constant is the essential

feature of the concept +as in

differently shaped ob*ects allhaving the color -yellow ochre- in

common.

!e is countering this %ugustinian presumption by referring to someearlier discussions. In ?6 for

e$ample he taled about our

tendency to solve the pu88le of howwe do things by presuming we do

things half3unconsciously +or even

unconsciously, in the mind thatcorrespond to what we might do

physically. If we can loo up a

table to see what a color is we

imagine doing this in the mindunconsciously.

-(ut might there not be such'general' samples1 Say a

schematic leaf or a sample of

pure green1-

This is the ne$t move after the

%ugustinian voice reali8es that wedo teach general concepts that

include considerable variation +and

families of variation, under theirrubric. -&aybe- the %uegustinian

says we have a ind of schematic

leaf in the mind roughly drawn.

Would that wor1- That is ind of

lie a table in the mind +cf. lwref pictures before the mind.,

3=ertainly there might. (ut forsuch a schema to be understood

as a schema and not as the shape

of a particular leaf and for a slip

of pure green to be understood as

-es- LW is saying there could besuch a schema but how would we

now that it was such a schema and

not the shape of a particular leaf1-

%nd I might add how would we




http://users.rcn.com/rathbone/lwref.htm#pictures%20before%20the%20mind








a sample of all that is greenish

and not as a sample of pure

green3this in turn resides in theway the samples are used.

now how diverse a group of things

this schema would apply to1

%s yourself/ what shape must

the sample of the colour green be1 Should it be rectangular1 Or

would it then be the sample of a

green rectangle13So should it be

'irregular' in shape1 %nd what isto prevent us then from regarding

it3that is from using it3only as a

sample of irregularity of shape1

Or let's reverse the e$ample here to

the earlier one/ What color would

the schematic leaf be1 %nd how

would we now that the term didnot apply to the color of the leaf1

D@. !ere also belongs the idea

that if you see this leaf as a

sample of 'leaf shape in general'you see it differently from

someone who regards it as say a

sample of this particular shape. 9ow this might well be so 33

though it is not so 33 for it would

only be to say that as a matter of e$perience if you see the leaf in

a particular way you use it insuch3and3such a way or

according to such3and3suchrules.

!ere I thin LW confuses things a

bit. !e is using the phrase -see the

thing in a particular way- in one of

its possible senses. I see him assaying you don't -see things

differently- unless it is something

lie a gestalt picture of the duc3rabbit where it appears lie a duc

sometimes and lie a rabbit at

others. I thin we have a relatedlangauge game in which we say

that we -see things differently-

without this meaning that weactually e$perience the visual

image differently. (e that as itmay Wittgenstein is I believe

taling about -seeing thingsdifferently- as seeing a different

aspect as in the case of the duc3

rabbit. %t least to me this is theinterpretation that maes the most

sense.

Of course there is such a thingas seeing in this way or that5 and

there are also cases wherewhoever sees a sample lie thiswill in general use it in this way

and whoever sees it otherwise in

another way. #or e$ample if yousee the schematic drawing of a

cube as a plane figure consisting

%nd an important point. The world

around us has many aspects andsome of those aspects may be

noticeable if we see the world in acertain way and not if we don't.(oth ways may be e"ually correct

+as in the case of the duc3rabbit,.

(ut how we see the world will havean impact on what we do and on

our form of life.



of a s"uare and two rhombi you

will perhaps carry out the order

-(ring me something lie this-differently from someone who

sees the picture three3

dimensionally.

DA. What does it mean to now

what a game is1 What does it

mean to now it and not be ableto say it1 Is this nowledge

somehow e"uivalent to an

unformulated definition1 So thatif it were

formulated I should be able to

recogni8e it as the e$pression of

my nowledge1 Isn't mynowledge my concept of a

game completely e$pressed in

the e$planations that I couldgive1 That is in my describing

e$amples of various inds of

game5 shewing how all sorts ofother games can be constructed

on the analogy of these5 saying

that I should scarcely include thisor this among games5 and so on.

I understand this on the model of

people learning to mae *udgments

without nowing the criteria they

use to mae those *udgments andeven without there being

formulateable criteria. I learn to

drive steer a car turning thesteering wheel a little this way or

that in response to how the car

moves and I learn to ride a horse

by doing something similar even balance on my feet as I'm standing

still by doing little corrections butthis doesn't mean that I would

recogni8e the rule or even that the

rule could be stated in a single

formula no matter how comple$.This is especially clear to me if the

*udgment is obviously comple$ lie

whether my boss is in a good moodgood enough to as for a raise.



%phorism DB364 from



Wittgenstein:



Shawver commentary:

DB. If someone were to draw a

sharp boundary I could not

acnowledge it as the one that Itoo always wanted to draw or had

drawn in my mind. #or I did notwant to draw one at all. !isconcept can then be said to be not

the same as mine but ain to it.

The inship is that of two pictures one of which consists of

colour patches with vague

contours and the other of patchessimilarly shaped and distributed

but with clear contours. The

inship is *ust as undeniable as the

difference.

=onsider again the concept of a

schematic leaf In setching such a schema one

creates something that was notinitially there. I do not picturesuch a schematic leaf in my mind

each time identify a leaf and if I

were to do so the one that I

pictured might not be e$actly lieyours. Still if we were each to

create such a schematic leaf

representing all leaves ourcreativity would be constrained by

our similar understanding of what

counted as a leaf.

DD. %nd if we carry this

comparison still further it is clearthat the degree to which the sharp

picture can resemble the blurred

one depends on the latter's degreeof vagueness. #or imagine

having to setch a sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one.

!ere is a schematic

leaf. Is that the one

you would havedrawn1 !ow

similar to a real leaf

must this leaf be in

order to be aschematic leaf1 Will the point on

the right side be enough to mae it

serve for a maple leaf1 Or should

it be more pointed1 %nd if it weremore pointed would it it also

wor for a smooth3sided leaf 1

!ow would you setch a sharplydefined picture corresponding to

this blurred one1






In the latter there is a blurred red

rectangle/ for it you put down a

sharply defined one. Of course3several such sharply defined

rectangles can be drawn to

correspond to the indefinite one.3(ut if the colours in the original

merge without a hint of any

outline won't it become a hopelesstas to draw a sharp picture

corresponding to the blurred one1

Won't you then have to say/ -!ereI might *ust as well draw a circle

or heart as a rectangle for all the

colours merge. %nything3and

nothing3is right.- %nd this is the

position you are in if you loo fordefinitions corresponding to our

concepts in aesthetics or ethics.

%nd here is a

blurred

rectangle.suppose your

tas is to draw a

definite one thatcorresponds

with this indefinite one. %nd if

you imagined it even more blurred1 %t some point wouldn't

the tas become hopeless1

In such a difficulty always as

yourself/ !ow did we learn themeaning of this word +-good- for

instance,1 #rom what sort of

e$amples1 in what language3games1 Then it will be easier for

you to see that the word must

have a family of meanings.

The situation is similar when we

try to envision the essential

features of a game or of any other

concept. To thin in terms ofessences we must visuali8e a

blurred concept and yet when we

try to apply such a concept to acase before us we will have the

same ind of difficulties we havewith the schematic leaf orrectangle.

D6. =ompare nowing and

saying/

how many feet high &ont(lancis3

how the word -game- is

used3how a clarinet sounds.

If you are surprised that one cannow something and not be able

to say it you are perhaps thiningof a case lie the first. =ertainly

not of one lie the third.

If one nows how high a mountain

is then one would surely nowhow to say it. (ut isn't it possible

to now how a clarinet sounds or

how coffee smells without beingable to say what one nows1 %nd

isn't the case of nowing what a

game is rather lie the case ofnowing how a clarinet sounds1 It

is easy to now such things

without now how to say what onenows.

DF. =onsider this e$ample. If one

says -&oses did not e$ist- this

The sentence -&oses did not

e$ist- has blurred boundaries



may mean various things. It may

mean/ the Israelites did not have asingle leader when they withdrew

from 0gypt or/ their leader was

not called &oses or there cannothave been anyone who

accomplished all that the (ible

relates of &oses 33 or/ etc. etc.33

much lie the blurred boundaries

of a schematic leaf or a blurred

rectangle. Gust as a number ofdifferent leaf shapes could have

been taen from the blurred

schema so a number of differentmeanings might be drafted onto

the statement -&oses did not

e$ist.-

We may say following )ussell/the name -&oses- can be defined

by means of various descriptions.

#or e$ample as -the man who ledthe Israelites through the

wilderness- -the man who lived

at that time and place and was

then called '&oses' - -the manwho as a child was taen out of

the 9ile by Pharaoh's daughter-and so on. %nd according as we

assume one definition or another

the proposition -&oses did not

e$ist- ac"uires a different senseand so does every other

proposition about &oses.3%nd if

we are told -9 did not e$ist- wedo as/

-What do you mean1 :o you wantto say ...... or ...... etc.1-

0ven the name -&oses- is not as

clearly defined as we are apt to

presume. What if someone not3named &oses was still a person

who had done all that &oses is

repored to have done. Would that be the same as &oses1 Or what if

he had done some of the ghings

but not all1 !ow much different

from the story of &oses could thehistorical man have been in order

to *ustify the statement -&oses did

not e$ist1-

(ut when I mae a statement

about &oses33 am I always ready

to substitute some one of thesedescriptions for -&oses-1 I shall

perhaps say 33 (y -&oses- I

understand the man who did whatthe

(ible relates of &oses or at any

rate a good deal of it. (ut howmuch1 !ave I decided how much

must be proved false for me to

give up my proposition as false1

!as the name -&oses- got afi$ed

and une"uivocal use for me in all

possible cases1 33

(ut if I were to mae a statementabout &oses all of these

considerations are not in my

mind. I haven't decided beforehand which features of the

story of &oses are essential in

order for us to say that &oseslived. (ut perhaps you want to

say that most of it must be true in

order to say that &oses e$isted.

(ut how much1



Is it not the case that I have so to

spea a whole series of props in

readiness and am ready to lean onone if another should be taen

from under me

and vice versa1

Suppose there were @4 stories of

&oses. If stories @ through ?;

were false would this be differentthan if stories 23;6 were false1

%re there any essential stories1 Or

can I fall bac on any1 =onsider another case. When I

say -9 is dead- then something

lie the following may hold for

the meaning of the name -9-/ I believe that a human being has

lived whom I +2, have seen in

such3and3such places who +;,looed lie this +pictures, +?, has

done such3and3such things and

+@, bore the name -9- in social

life. 33%sed what I understand by-9- I should enumerate all or

some of these points and differentones on different occasions. So

my definition of -9- would

perhaps be -the man of whom all

this is true-.3(ut if some pointnow proves false1 33Shall I be

prepared to declare the

proposition -9 is dead- false3evenif it is only something which

stries me as incidental that hasturned out false1 (ut where arethe bounds of the incidental133 If I

had given a definition of the name

in such a case I should now be

ready to alter it.

%lthough it may seem to us when

we spea that our language isunambiguous even the phrases

that at first seem without

ambiguiuty are on reflection very

e"uivocal that is sub*ect tointerpretation 33 much lie the

blurred leaf that was to serve as a

schematic leaf. Is -9- dead1 #or-9- to be dead -9- must have

lived but how will we decide that

the person I am referring to is aspecific person1 If someone lived

who had some of the features I

imagined for -9- but not all was

that -91-

%nd this can be e$pressed lie

this/ I use the name -9- without a

fi$ed meaning. +(ut that detractsas little from its usefulness as it

detracts from that of a table that it

stands on four legs instead ofthree and so sometimes wobbles.,

So we are driven to notice that

words do not have fi$edmeanings. %t first glance you may

thin this would reduce their

usefulness to us. (ut it is not so.

Should it be said that I am using a

word whose meaning I don't

now and so am talingnonsense1 3 3Say what you

choose so long as it does not

When we notice that language is

never unambiguous that is much

lie the blurred leaf we might as-can I use a word JdorrectlyK

whose meaning I do not now1-



prevent you from seeing the facts.

+%nd when you see them there is a

good deal that you will not say.,

There is a sense in which our

understanding of the term is

limited. Shall we count this as acase of not3nowing1

The problem is that we can seewhat is nown and what is not3nown. Our confusion comes not

from not3nowing what the facts

are but rather from the fact that

the rule that would determine howwe should spea is not definitive

enough to tell us how to answer.

It is the same as if I were to as/

-Is it cold outside1- +since you

were standing outdoors, and youmight now it was B; #ahrenheit

+imagine having a thermometer,and yet not now whether to count

this as -cold- because the word

-cold- does not have such welldefined boundaries.

Still your understanding of the

temperature would limit how you

answered the "uestion +truthfully,.

+The fluctuation of scientific

definitions/ what to3day counts as

a observed concomitant of a phenomenon will to3morrow be

used to define it.,

Scientific definitions reduce thisambiguity somewha. What counts

as water in the vernacular is

different from what counts as!;4. In he creation of the concept

of !;4 there has been the

systemtic e$clusion of seawater or dishwater from the concept. Still

if there are a few molecules that

are not -!;4- shall we stillconsider the vial to contain !;41

0ven here there is ambiguity thattends to escape us.

64. I say -There is a chair-.What if I go up to it meaning to

fetch it and it suddenly disappears

from sight.1 33-So it wasn't achair but some ind of illusion-.

33(ut in a few moments we see it

The rules that determine the rightway to use language in any given

language game are never defined

with absolute precision. We allcomfortably call the ob*ects we sit

on chairs but we have no rules to



again and are able to touch it and

so on. 33-So the chair was there

after all and its disappearance wassome ind of illusion-. 33(ut

suppose that after a time it

disappears again3or seems todisappear. What are we to say

now1 !ave you rules ready for

such cases 333rules sayingwhether one may use the word

-chair- to include this ind of

thing1 (ut do we miss them whenwe use the word -chair-5 and are

we to say that we do not really

attach any meaning to this word

because we are not e"uipped with

rules for every possibleapplication of it1

label them if they stop behaving as

chairs. Language is simply not

that precise. There are blurred boundaries that we fail to see andthat often do not bother us.



%phorism 62366 from



Wittgenstein: +0mphasis in bold is

inserted by Shawver

to enhance

commentary.,

Shawver commentary: This section isconcerned with rules and precision of rules

and suggests that precision is not always

better than imprecision.

62. #. P. )amseyonce emphasi8ed in

conversation with me

that logic was a'normative science'. I

do not now e$actly

what he had in mind

but it was doubtlessclosely related to

what only dawned on

me later/ namely thatin philosophy we

often compare the

use of words with

games and calculiwhich have fi$ed

rules but cannot saythat someone who is

using language must

be playing such a

game. 33$ut if you

say that our

languages only

appro+imate to such

calculi you are

standing on the very

brin# of a

misunderstanding.

#or then it may loo

as if what we were

taling about were anideal language. %s if

our logic were so to

62. This is an important aphorism. 0arly

Wittgenstein the Wittgenstein of the

Tractatus thought of language as something

lie a calculus. The idea was that if younew the rules of language you could apply

the calculus to understand it.

#or e$ample suppose you had the following

four sentences/

%. &ary went to the store

( Gac went to the barber.

= &ary is tired: Gac earns lots of money

%nd suppose you also had four ways of

connecting those sentences/

v 3 meaning either or both

H 3 meaning -and- 3 meaning if 3then

3 meaning if and only if

%nd suppose you could also modify any

sentence by negating it and symboli8ing thatnegation with a tilde lie this/

%nd let's enrich this calculus. ou can also

use parentheses. Csing the character namesabove to name the four sentences couldn't

you figure out the following statement lie



spea a logic for a

vacuum. 33Whereas

logic does not treat of language 33 or of

thought 33 in the

sense in which anatural science treatsof a natural

phenomenon and the

most that can be saidis that we construct

ideal languages. (ut

here the word -ideal-is liable to mislead

for it sounds as if

these languages were

better more perfectthan our everyday

language5 and as if it

too the logician toshew people at last

what a proper

sentence looed lie.

one would figure out a calculus1

+%H(, H %

It would mean

While it is true that

-&ary went to the store

and Gac went to the(arber- is a true

statement it is not true

that &ary went to the

store.

%nd as you can see this would not be possible because it is not true for &ary to

have both gone to the store and not to have

gone to the store. So we can see that thesymbolic phrase

+%H(, H %

is nonsense. because to be true it would

re"uires % to be both true and false.

9ow consider the following/

J+%H(, v +(=,K v +:(,

=ould this statement be true1

ou could figure this out using the same

process that we used above and it would feel

very much lie performing a ind ofmathematical calculus.

This was the sort of vision of language that

inspired early Wittgenstein +and the logical

positivists, but now he is saying that it willnot wor.

One might want to say that if it were a

misunderstanding that language wored as a



calculus then it was because language isdefective in some way. (ut Wittgensein is

telling us that the failure of langauge to

conform to a calculus does not imply that it isdefective.

%ll this however can

only appear in theright light when one

has attained greater

clarity about theconcepts of

understanding

meaning and

thining. #or it willthen also become

clear what can lead

us +and did lead me,to thin that if

anyone utters a

sentence and meansor understands it he is

operating a calculus

according to definite

rules.

%nd these concepts of understanding

meaning and thining are conceptsWittgenstein will e$plicate.

6;. What do I call'the rule by which he

proceeds'1 33The

hypothesis thatsatisfactorily

describes his use of

6;. Suppose you are playing chess and youmove your night. % child who does now

how to play chess ass you how you were

able to move the piece in such an odd way. If you now chess the rule is probably clear in

your mind and you can state it



words which we

observe5 or the rule

which he loos upwhen he uses signs5

or the one which he

gives us in reply ifwe as him what hisrule is1 33(ut what if

observation does not

enable us to see anyclear rule and the

"uestion brings none

to light1 33#or he didindeed give me a

definition when I

ased him what he

understood by -9- but he was prepared

to withdraw and alter

it.3So how am I todetermine the rule

according to which

he is playing1 !edoes not now it

himself. 33Or to as a

better "uestion/ Whatmeaning is the

e$pression -the rule by which he

proceeds- supposedto have left to it

here1

unambiguously. ou can say what the rule isthat guides and constrains the movement of

the bishop compared to the movement of the

night. There is no ambiguity here.

(ut if you were ased the rule you used todecide if a sentence were a well formed

sentence or grammatically flawed you

might find that you do not now the answer

immediately. ou feel you have to thinabout it a bit. It may be that you can choose

which sentence has a flaw but not now

immediately what the rule that this correctuseage obeys.

Similarly you might now how to use a word

in a sentence and use it regularly and

meaningfully yet still not be now its useagewell enough to give a definition

spontaneously and easily.

So as yourself are you following a rule inthe cases in which you cannot easily and

spontaneously state the rule1 In what sense

are you following one1 %re you

subse"uently *ust trying to discover a statedrule that wold capture the behavior you are

engaging in without any sense of trying to

conform to a defined rule1

6?. :oesn't the

analogy between

6?. See how far this new model of language

is from the model of language as a calculus1



language and games

throw light here1 We

can easily imagine people amusing

themselves in a field

by playing with a ballso as to start variouse$isting games but

playing many without

finishing them and in between throwing the

ball aimlessly into

the air chasing oneanother with the ball

and bombarding one

another for a *oe and

so on. %nd nowsomeone says/ The

whole time they are

playing a ball3gameand following

definite rules at every

throw.

es there are rules but the rules are not

binding in the same way that they are in

calculus. The rules of langauge do not

confine every movement that is made. Inlanguge one can stop metaphorically

speaing to toss the ball up into the air.

%nd is there not alsothe case where we

play and3mae up the

rules as we go along1%nd there is even one

where we alter them3

as we go along.

This is a particularly significant observation.

In language we will find ourselves maing up

meanings for words as we go along. -What

do you mean by that1- someone ass you.Then you say -I mean...- and you give the

word a definite sense not a sense that is "uitewhat it is in the dictionary but a definite

sense. ou are maing up the rules of this

language game as you go along.

6@. I said that the

application of a word

is not everywhere bounded by rules.

(ut what does agame loo lie that is

everywhere bounded by rules1 whose rules

never let a doubt

creep in but stop upall the cracs where it

might1 33 =an't we

6@. %m I right that games are not completely

bounded by rules1 Sure there are gaps in the

stated rules. (ut can't we imagine some sortof implicit rule that guides us in the spaces

between the rules1



imagine a rule

determining the

application of a ruleand a doubt which it

removes3and so on1

(ut that is not to

say that we are indoubt because it is

possible for us to

imagine a doubt. I

can easily imaginesomeone always

doubting before he

opened his front door whether an abyss did

not yawn behind it

and maing sureabout it before he

went through the

door +and he might

on some occasion prove to be right,3but

that does not mae

me doubt in the samecase.

Sure we can imagine such a thing but we

need not. It is not a re"uirement of games

that they be everywhere bounded by rules.

6A. % rule stands

there lie a sign3 post.33:oes the sign3 post leave no doubt

open about the way I

have to go1 :oes itshew which direction

I am to tae when I

have passed it5

whether along theroad or the footpath

or cross3country1 (ut

where is it said whichway I am to follow it5

whether in the

direction of its fingeror +e.g., in the

opposite one1 33%nd

if there were not a

single sign3post but a

6A. %nd even if we stated rules +lie sign3

posts, every space this would not leave uswith some fle$ibility in how we played thegame. 0ven sign3posts have to be

interpreted. 0ven if a hand

points in a certain direction where is the rule

that says I must follow it in the direction of

the finger1

%nd even if we assume that the hand pointstowards the flag is it pointing to the stripes

or the stars1 Or the flag as a whole1 Or to



chain of ad*acent

ones or of chal mar

s on the ground33 is

there only one way of interpreting them133

So I can say the sign3 post does after all

leave no room for

doubt. Or rather/ itsometimes leaves

room for doubt and

sometimes not. %nd

now this is no longera philosophical

proposition but an empirical one.

the colors1 Is there not room for

interpretation here1 Is everything completely

bound by rules1 %nd if we have thisfle$ibility in pointing is there not room for a

similar fle$ibility in how we interpret the

rules of a game1

6B. Imagine a

language3game lie

+;, played with thehelp of a table. The

signs given to ( by %

are now written ones.( has a table in the

first column are the

signs used in the

game in the second pictures of building

stones. % shews (

such a written sign5 (loos it up in the

table loos at the

picture opposite andso on. So the table is

a rule which he

follows in e$ecuting

orders.3One learns toloo the picture up in

the table by receiving

a training and part of this training consists

perhaps in e pupil's

learning to pass with

Imagine the worers in a language3game lie

+;, having the following table to use to maetheir selection of stones.

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his finger

hori8ontally from left

to right5 and so as itwere to draw a series

of hori8ontal lines on

the table.

Suppose differentways of reading a

table were now

introduced5 one timeas above according

to the schema/

If we did include arrows in our own cultureit would liely loo lie this/

#or the most part however the action thatthe arrows prompt is so common in our own

culture that the arrows are not needed. We all

approach such tables with our eyes alreadytrained to loo in the way the arrows are

intended to guide us.

another time lie

this/

or in some other

way.

#or this ind of looing however we would

need arrows/

33Such a schema is

supplied with the

table as the rule forits use.

(ut what Wittgensein had in mind for this

tribe is two tables. #or e$$ample imagine

one being up on a wall and the other being inone's hand.



!owever if their mythology re"uired a more

comple$ the rule might be/

Or imagine things more comple$ still.

Perhaps this language game is not for the

purpose of building but for the purpose ofassuaging the temper of the gods and

supppose too that the paths the gods want

their servants to tae to read these tables

re"uires them to wor through a ma8e ofarrows such as this/

in order to read a table lie this/



=an we not now

imagine further rules

to e$plain this one1

9ow suppose the various rules in the

networ of arrows was tied to a mythology so

that each arrow represented a sacred path thatmust be followed e$actly. 9ot only did this

sacred path guide how one's eyes were to

move but also how one stood and thee$pression one put on one's face/

%nd on the other

hand was that firsttable incomplete

without the schema

of arrows1 %nd are

other tablesincomplete without

their schemata1

The initial table seemed easy to us/

(ut the ease we felt

surely reflected the

years of training we

had in reading such atable. We no longer

needed guidance to

loo from left toright. The straight

arrows may have

provided



such guidance to one uninitiated but only if

that person had already had training in how

to read arrows how to follow a line with theeyes. ears of reading mae it natural for

0nglish speaing people to follow the line

from left to right but of course there areother traditions. We could complicate thingsfurther by a re"uirement that the reader of the

table must *ump from line to line or move

the eyes bac and forth or up and down theline. There is no end of complicating

possibilities. et these possibilities do not

confuse us. We have been trained to see andread such tables so we do with ease *ust as

we have been trained to read the words on

this page and do that with ease 33 even

though it was not always so.

%ll these implicit rules seem to guide our

behavor and rules we can no longer state

that no longer guide us in a concscious way.:o we want to say that the table needed to

include such rules in order to be complete1

If so would any table ever be complete1

6D. Suppose I give

this e$planation/

I tae '&oses' to

mean the I man

if there was such

a man who ledthe Israelites out

of 0gypt

whatever he wascalled then and

whatever he

may or may nothave done

besides.- 33

6D. LW is going to try to show us +or remind

us, how difficult it can be to tie down the

meaning of even an apparently simplesentence. This may seem to you lie a

change in sub*ect because we are no longer

taling about tables and arrows but thesub*ect is much the same. We are noticing

how many gaps there are in the rules we

might use to interpret things how much ofour understanding taes place without our

noticing how it all wors.

(ut similar doubts to

those about -&oses-

are possible about

%s soon as you try to pin down these words

you can see how hard it is to mae sure the

person in history that we tal about refers to



the words of this

e$planation +what are

you calling -0gypt-whom the -Israelites-

etc.1,. 9or would

these "uestions cometo an end when wegot down to words

lie -red- -dar-

-sweet-.

-&oses.- &aybe the real person had a

different name and maybe his story has beenmodified through the years. !as it been so

modified that the person we thin of as

-&oses- is no longer congruent with thehistorical figure1 It is possible to doubt all of

these things.

-(ut then how doesan e$planation help

me to understand if

after all it is not thefinal one1 In that case

the e$planation is

never completed5 so Istill don't understand

what he means and

never shall>- 33

%s though ane$planation as it were

hung in the air unless

supported by anotherone.

This is Wittgenstein's "uestioning voice

voice of aporia wondering. If I can't tie

these things down with an e$planation I notonly fail to understand who &oses is but I

fail in all similar attempts. 0$aplanationscannot help me understand> +or so it seemsto the aporetic voice,.

It seems +when in this apoetic mood, that we

must be able to use e$planations to tie down

all the ambiguities or else nothing will ever be nown.

Whereas ane$planation may

indeed rest on

another one that has been given but none

stands in need of

another 33 3unless were"uire it to prevent a

misunderstanding.

That is we may be able to use onee$planation to e$plain another 33 but no

additional e$planation is needed e$cept to

prevent misunderstanding. ou do not needan e$planation for the statement -The chair I

am sitting in is uncomfortable- unless you

don't understand it +and you might not fore$ample if it looed o you that I was not

sitting at all.,

One might say/ an

e$planation serves toremove or to avert a

misunderstanding 33

one that is thatwould occur but for

the e$planation not

every one that I can

imagine.

The confusion comes about because we

imagine that e$planations contain a completerule that re"uire no training to interpret.

0$planations canavert misunderstandings but

only for those whose training is sufficient tounderstand the e$planation. %nd we cannot

find sufficient e$plnations to replace that

history of training.


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It may easily loo asif every doubt merely

revealed an e$isting

gap in thefoundations5 so that

secure understanding

is only possibleif we first doubt

everything that can

be doubted and then

remove all thesedoubts.

This is reminescent of :ecartes' -=artesian

doubt- or -methodological doubt.- !is idea

was you'll recall that he could doubteverything e$cept that he was thining +I

thin therefore I am,. 0verything that came

after that point in the =artesian te$t was theresult of his reasoning things out and thus proven ostensibly by the reasoning. It loos

as though we must pin things down

completely. We must find a way to prove for e$ample that historical person I call &oses is

indeed he -real &oses- or else it is all a

sham. (ut how many stories about &oseswould have to be a little wrong in order to

call it all a sham1 %nd even if the stories

were "uite a bit wrong would it be a sham1

What does it mean in fact for any name torefer to an historical figure with accuracy1 It

seems it does not mae sense if we cannot

pin things lie this down. On the other handthe assertions do mae some ind of sense to

us given our training in this story of &oses

33 even though we cannot pin things lie thisdown without becoming aware of the

enormity of doubt about all the details.

The sign3post is inorder 33 if under

normal

circumstances itfulfills its purpose.

When does the e$planation the reasoning

come to an end1 )emember we may notneed an e$planation at all. If we are already

trained or practiced in how to interpret some

sign then the e$planation is no longerre"uired. If there is a stop sign or some

strange sign it needs no e$planation if we

have been trained in its interpretation.

=onsider the e$planation I gave those readingover our shoulder at the top of this note. I

e$plained our tradition that we put our

initials in bracets around the te$t. (ut I did

not e$plain that Gudy uses small charactersfor her initials or that 9ic sometimes uses

no bracets at all. Will they understand1 Is

it possible that they will simply mae senseof it even if I don't e$plain these details1 %t

what point will the e$planation be more than

is necessary1



66. If I tell

someone -Stand

roughly here-33 maynot this e$planationwor perfectly1 %nd

cannot every other

one fail too1

66. If I want to tae a photograph of

someone I might say -stand roughly here-.

That means I am liely to be satisfied if the person stands somewhere withina range of

places. Of course the person might stand

outside my preferred range or I mightdiscover that the range of places I thoughtwould wor will not wor. On the other

hand I cannot guard against this ind of

problem entirely by being more specific.Imagine my saying -Stand on this blade of

grass.- =ouldn't I find this positioning not

"uite satisfactory too1

(ut isn't it an ine$act

e$planation1 3

This is really the voice of )amsey again or perhaps the voice of early Wittgenstein or

one of the positivists who tried to reduce

language to a ind of calculus. This voicehas been very influential in the development

of modern psychology. This voice says

-=an't we find a way to represent our

thoughts and wishes very precisely so thatthere can be no misunderstanding1 The

usefulness of phrases such as -stand roughly

here- helps disenchant us with this "uest byshowing us

es5 why shouldn't

we call it -ine$act-1Only let usunderstand what

-ine$act- means. #or

it does not mean-unusable-.

that non3e$act e$planation can be veryuseful indeed.

%nd let us consider

what we call an

-e$act- e$planation

in contrast with thisone. Perhaps

something lie

drawing a chal lineround an area1 !ere

it stries us at once

that the line has breadth. So a colour3

edge would be more

In this paragraph Wittgenstein argues that

not only is non3precise language often useful

but that more precise statements +e.g. stand

precisely on this blade of grass, adds nothingto the usefulness at times of less precise

statements. ou could stand on a precise

blade of grass if I stand -stand roughly overthere- but it wouldn't be more useful than if

you stood in a slightly different place. This

is what Wittgenstein has in mind when hesuggests that this e$actness does not have a

function in some conte$ts.

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e$act. (ut has this

e$actness still got a

function here/ isn'tthe engine idling1

%nd remember toothat we have not yet

defined what is tocount as overstepping

this e$act boundary5

how with what

instruments it is to be established. %nd

so on.

0ven when we try to be more precise +youmust step on this precise blade of grass, we

do not elminate all imprecision. 0ven here

we must define what will count as not doing

what the precise rule calls on us to do.

We understand

what it means to set a

pocet watch to thee$act time or to

regulate it to bee$act. (ut what if it

were ased/ is this

e$actness ideal Ofcourse we can spea

of measurements of

time in which there is

a different and as weshould say a greater

e$actness than in themeasurement of time by a pocet3watch5 in

which the words -to

set the cloc to thee$act time- have a

different though

related meaning and

'to tell the time' is adifferent process and

so on.33

0ven when we tal about precision it is notclear how precise precision must be in order

to be precise enough.

9ow if I tell

someone/ -oushould come to

dinner more

punctually5 you nowit begins at one

o'cloc e$actly-33

!ere's another e$ample to e$amine to help

us understand the function and limits of our

ideal of precision. !ow precise would such a

statement be1



is there really no

"uestion of e$actness

here1 because it is possible to say/

-Thin of the

determination of timein the laboratory orthe observatory5 there

you see what

'e$actness' means-1e$actness or how

nearly does it

approach the ideal13

The first thing to notice is that the ind of

-e$actness- that would be re"uired for

someone coming to dinner punctually is notof the same level as that is re"uired in alaboratory or an observatory. The conte$t

lets us now that different levels of precision

are involved in these different situations.

-Ine$act- is reallya reproach and

-e$act- is praise. %nd

that is to say thatwhat is ine$act

attains its goal less

perfectly than what is

more e$act. Thus the point here is what we

call -the goal-. %m I

ine$act when I do notgive our distance

from the sun to the

nearest foot or tell a *oiner the width of a

table to the nearest

thousandth of aninch1

Language is often implicitly loaded toconvince us that something is good or bad.

People who call someone -youthful- fore$ample are using loaded langauge to

communicate a positive "uality about behavior or appearance that $ome might refer

to more negatively as -childish-. Sometimes

it is hard to find the negative loading for a positive term +or the positive loading for a

negative term, and our languuge simply

doesn't appear to have the resources forthining about the ob*ect without this

particular evaluative loading.

That may be the case for the notion of

-e$actness- has that ind of positive loading.+see my comments on -transvaluation-,

9o single ideal of

e$actness has been

laid down5 we do not

now what we should be supposed to

imagine under this

head 33 unless youyourself lay down

what is to be so

called. (ut you willind it difficult to hit

upon such a

convention5 at least

any that satisfies you.

What all of this study of exactness seems to be teling us is that how much -e$actness- we

need depends upon the conte$t. Sometimes

demands for -e$actness- can *ust be a botherwith nothing useful to add. (ecause they

would be a -bother- this e$cessive precision

is not so universally ideal as our languagesuggests to us.

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%phorism 6F3244 from



Wittgenstein: +0mphasis in bold is inserted by

Shawver to enhance

commentary.,

Shawver commentary

and supplementary notes:

6F. These considerations bring us

up to the problem/ In what sense islogic something sublime1

#or there seemed to pertain to

logic a peculiar depth3a universal significance. Logic

lay it seemed at the

bottom of all the sciences.33 #or

logical investigatione$plores the nature of all things. It

sees to see to the bottom of

things and is not meant to concernitself whether what actually

happens is this or that.

In 6F The "uestion is/ !ow did

we come to believe that logic is

sublime1 Why do we thin that it

is sublime1

The people of our culture have believed that logic is sublime for a

long long time. +SCPPL0&09T%)

%)TI=L0, Since %ristotle at least

philosophers have been inspired

with the idea that logic is

something something lofty and iffollowed carefully can lead us to

a more accurate understanding. In

fact thining this way it seems ifwe could only get logic right

define things precisely enoughthen we could mae sense of allthings.

33It JlogicK taes its rise not from

an interest33 in the facts of naturenor from a need to grasp cause

conne$ions/ but from an urge to

understand the basis or essenceof everything empirical. 9ot

however as if to this end we had

to hunt out new facts5 it is ratherof the essence of

our investigation that we do not

see to learn anything new

by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain

view. #or this is what we seem in

some sense not to understand.

This glorification of logic

emerges not from our need tograsp particular connections

+such as what specifically causes

what, but a desire to find a eythat will open up the secrets of the

world for us mae it all mae

sense. The "uest is not to uncoversomething new detail but to

understand something that is

already before us but confuses us

because its mysteries aresomehow veiled.

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%ugustine says in the =onfessions

-"uid est ergo tempus1 si nemo e$

me "uaerat scio5 si "uaerentie$plicare velim nescio-.

this translates as/ -What therefore

is time1 If youdon't as me I now 3 if you as

me I don't now.- In other wordsthe loftiness of logic is something

we understand until we are asedabout it. Then suddenly we see

how confusing it is to us.

3This could not be said about a"uestion of natural science

+-What is the specific gravity of

hydrogen1- for instance,.

Something that we now when noone ass us but no longer now

when we are supposed to give anaccount of it is something that weneed to remind ourselves of. +%n

it is obviously something

of which for some reason it isdifficult to remind oneself.,

There are many scientific problems that we either now the

answers to or we don't. (ut there

are other thngs we to undestand sowell we tae our nowledge for

granted until we are ased. Thenwe are pu88led. It is as though we

now the answer but can't "uiteremember what it is and need to

be reminded.

F4. We feel as if we had to

penetrate phenomena/ our

investigation however is directednot towards phenomena but asone might say towards the

'possibilities' of phenomena.

When we feel that logic is lofty

we feel as though we had to

penetrate the mysteries of what is before us with the power of logic

but we do not actually loo at

what we are studying in order totry to do this. We simply thin

about things or study them in our

"logical" reflection.

We might as about our sub*ectfor e$ample in relationship to

certain possibilities. If time is the

sub*ect of our study we might ponder for e$ample if time

would continue to e$ist if the

world stopped turning.

We remind ourselves that is to

say of the ind of statement that

we mae about phenomena.

Csing logic we try to recall things

about our sub*ect. We might say

to ourselves for e$ample that-time seems to pass more "uicly

when you're busy.- %nd we



would as ourselves -What does

that mean about time1- This ind

of logical reflection then is morereflective than observational.

Thus %ugustine recalls to mind the

different statements that are madeabout the duration past present or

future of events. +These are of

course not philosophical

statements about time the pastthe present and the

future.,

Our investigation is therefore a

grammatical one. Such aninvestigation sheds light on our

problem by clearing

misunderstandings away.

So our investigation is not based

on observations of new data.Instead it is a study of the things

we say or have said about this

sub*ect. Our purpose is to clear

away certain misunderstandingsthat seem to bloc clarity about

whatever interests us. This means

that our study is a grammaticalone in the sense that we might

ponder the meaning of certain

terms or the connection between

different terms and remindourselves of the criteria for

different application of theseterms. If we wanted to now

what time is we might remind

ourselves of the way we name

time differently in different time8ones for e$ample.

&isunderstandings concerning the

use of words caused among other

things by certain analogies between the forms of e$pression

in different regions of language.

&any of our misunderstandings

result from the fact that there aresuperficial similarities between

different regions of language. If Isay -love- when I am scoring

tennis this does not mean thesame thing as when I spea

endearingly. These things

continuously confuse us.supplementary note

3Some of themJmisunderstandingsK can be

removed by substituting one form

of e$pression for another5 this may

be called an -analysis- of ourforms of e$pression for the

process is sometimes lie one of

taing a thing apart.

Some of this confusion can beremoved by replacing words with

other words that seem less

confusing. -Love- we might say

-means 8ero- so instead of sayingthe score ?43love. We might say

that the score is ?438ero in order

to be less confused andconfusing. There are many

multiple uses of most terms that

get confused this way and we arescarcely aware of them. When we

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do study them unravel the

e"uivocations this we might call

-analysis.-

F2. (ut now it may come to loo

as if there were something lie a

final analysis of our forms oflanguage and so a single

completely resolved form of every

e$pression. That is as if our usual

forms of e$pression wereessentially unanalysed5 as if there

were something hidden in them

that had to be brought to light.When this is done the e$pression

is completely clarified and our

problem solved.

When we analy8e the

e"uivocations straighten thingsout it sometimes begins to appear

as though we could finally get a picture of the accurate meaning

that we could invent even ways

of taling that allowed tus o spea in ways that are completely clear

so that the problem

at hand is solved.

It can also be put lie this/ we

eliminate misunderstandings by

maing our e$pressions more

e$act5 but now it may loo as ifwe were moving towards a

particular state a

state of complete e$actness5 and asif this were the real goal of our

investigation.

When we are mystified lie thiswe thin we can find a way to put

things that will eliminate all

misunderstandings. It will *ustre"uire so we thin more

e$actness. It even seems that

e$actness not clarity is the realgoal of our investigation.

Somehow we have become

infatuated with the idea thate$actness will bring us closer to a

final picture of the hiddenmysteries around us.

F;. This finds e$pression in

"uestions as to the essence of

language of propositions of

thought.

Our infatuation with e$actnessshows itself when philosophers

as about the essence of language

in that they often strive for moree$actness.

33#or if we too in these

investigations are trying tounderstand the essence of

language 33 its function itsstructure 33yet this is not whatthose "uestions have in view.

It may seem that this is what we

in this boo are trying to do as

well. (ut the "uestions we asare different.

#or they see in the essence notsomething that already

lies open to view and that becomes

surveyable by a rearrangement

We need to use differentmetaphors for their "uestions and

for ours. While they are seeing

something deeper that will be



but something that lies beneath the

surface. Something that lies

within which we see when weloo into the thing and which an

analysis digs out.

unveiled as the mystery structure

of language we are seeing

something that might be clear tous by a certain rearrangement of

the details.

'The essence is hidden from us'/

this is the form our problem now

assumes. We as/ -What islanguage1-

-What is a proposition1- %nd the

answer to these "uestions is to begiven once for all5 and

independently

of any future e$perience.

If we are in their frame ofreference and we as "uestions

about the essence of things we

loo for answers that can be given

now and for all time regardless of what happens in the future. %fter

all the essence of language

cannot change. If langauge has anessence so they thin it e$ists

everywhere and whenever

langauge e$ists. 9ot so for us.

We will loo at changeableaspects of language that happen to

create patterns during our culturale$perience. #or e$ample

whereas they will loo for what

-truth- really is apart from any

true statement we will be inspiredto notice the ways in which this

term is used in our culture and in

particular language games and practices.

One person might say -% proposition is the mostordinary thing in the world- and

another/ -% proposition 3

that's something very "ueer>-33%nd the latter is unable simply to

loo and see how propositions

really wor. The forms that we usein e$pressing ourselves about

propositions and thought stand in

his way.

When they are looing foressences they do not loo at the

way the statements actually worand how we use them. They loo

for something hidden from us.

We loofor something we can watch and

see.

Why do we say a proposition issomething remarable1 On the one

hand because of the enormousimportance attaching to it. +%nd

that is correct,. On the other hand

this together with a

misunderstanding of the logic of

When this logic of propositionsseems remarable it is for two

reasons. One I endorse/ There ismuch importance attaching to

language and why and how that is

so is worthy of our reflection.

The second reason we thin logic



language seduces us into thining

that something e$traordinarysomething uni"ue must be

achieved by propositions.

is remarable is that we are

seduced by certain illusions that

tell us that language is alien toother things in the world. We will

find the distinction between

language and non3language "uite blurry. Our culture tends to

polari8e the world mistaenly I

feel into language and not3language failing to see that the

distinction is not so complete as

we at first thin.

33 % misunderstanding maes itloo to us as if a propositions did

something "ueer.

Our recognition of the importanceof language plus our having been

seduced into seeing it as

something completely different

from non3language maeslanguage propositions

+statements, seem very oddindeed.

F@. '% proposition is a "ueer

thing>' !ere we have in germ

the subliming of our wholeaccount of logic.

This -subliming- of our logic is a

way of seducing ourselves into

this mystification that treats logicas something "uite mystical.

The tendency to assume a pure

intermediary between the

propositional signs and the facts.Or even to try to

purify to sublime the signs

themselves.

When we sublime the logic of our

langauge in this way we turn it

into a ind of ghost which isseems to wor as an intermediary

between the statements we mae

and the words we say. We try toget rid of the words +signs,

themself and stare at the essence

this linguistic ghostso to spea that connects our

words with the facts they are

meant to portray.

3#or our forms of e$pression prevent us in all sorts of ways

from seeing that nothing out of the

ordinary isinvolved by sending us in pursuit

of chimeras.

Seduced by the ghost of language

into seeing apparitions betweenwords and things +into seeing-selves- -minds- -schi8ophrenia-

as things for e$ample, we are

distracted and do not notice theordinary that is involved.

FA. -Thought must be something FA begins with LW taling

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uni"ue-. When we say and mean

that such3and3such is the case we

33 and our meaning33 do not stopanywhere short of the fact5

but we mean/ this3is3so. (ut this

parado$ +which has the form of atruism, can also be e$pressed in

this way/ Thought can be of what

is not the case.

indirectly about the fly3bottleQ

That is he is e$ploring the

cultural thoughts that weavetogether and bloc our path out of

the fly3bottle. !ere at the source

of this impasse we find ourselvessaying things lie -Thought must

be something uni"ue-. This is not

an innocent statement. Itrepresents our willingness to

imagine -thought- as something

mysterious and beyonde$planation at the same time that

that we loo for e$planation. This

is a path into thining of language

as tied to metaphysical mysteries

such as Platonic forms.supplemental article.

!ere is my paraphrase of the last

part of this aphorism/When I say, "This is a cup." my

words seem to point directly to

this cup. I am pointing right toit. y words don't fall short of

the cup and point !ust to a

concept. This is a cup, I say. It is

so.

ut words can only point to what

is true# Isn't this a truism# If I

say "This is a flower" and it isreally a cup before us, then my

words are not really pointing to

anything. That is fine. y words

are !ust pretending that there is a flower there. I can't really point

to what is not here.

$r can I# If I loo% for my cupand find a bare shelf and say, "y

cup is not here", aren't I pointing

to its absence# &nd how is this

different from loo%ing at the bare shelf and saying, "The flower is

not here#" What would be

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different about the shelf and what

I point to in the two cases# It

must be that there is somethingelse that I am pointing to other

than the cup itself.

FB. Other illusions come from

various "uarters to attachthemselves to the special one

spoen of here. Thought

language now appear to us as theuni"ue correlate picture of theworld. These concepts proposition

language thought world stand in

line one behind the other eache"uivalent to each. +(ut what are

these words to be used for now1

The language3game in which theyare to be applied is missing.,

I point here to this bare shelf andsay -The cup is not here- but

what am I pointing to1 I might

say perhaps I am pointing to thethought of the3cup3that3is3not3

here1 Or if not the thought then

to the proposition -This is a cup-or to the web of language that

reflects this meaning or to the

-world- +as LW used the term inthe Tractatus when he said in the beginning -The World is all that is

the case,. These are all more or

less synonyms. %s soon as younoc one down I have a bacup

concept that stands between the

word and the fact. These wordsmay loo a little different to you

but they function in the same

way. They are place holders that I

use to tal about these ghostlyPlatonic images as i thin about

my difficulties in e$plaining the

way langauge seems to me towor.

Is that any better1

(y having a string of abstract

concepts we construct in order tohave something to point to we

create a mysterious ob*ect of

meaning that language seems toaddress. It suddenly appears

when we are pointing to that

thought whatever that shouldmean.Then language begins to

appear to be something

remarabe almost magical.



FD. Thought is surrounded by a

halo. 33Its essence logic present

an order in fact the a priori orderof the world/

that is the order of possibilities

which must be common to bothworld and thought. (ut this order

it seems must

be utterly simple. It is prior to ae$perience must run through all

e$perience5 no empirical

cloudiness oruncertainty can be allowed to

affect it 33It must rather be of the

purest crystal. (ut this crystal

does not appear as an

abstraction5 but as somethingconcrete indeed as the most

concrete as it were the hardestthing there is +Tractatus Logico3

Philosophicus 9o. A.AAB?,.

In this aporia it seems that

thought is surrounded by a ind of

halo. This halo of thought is-essence- or -logic- and this

logical3essence3halo seems to

hold the world in some ind oforder to organi8e it. Without that

organi8ing halo the world would

appear chaotic. (ut thisorgani8ing halo must be

completely simple perfect in

someway. It would not wor forthis metaphysical3halo of essences

to

have something confused about it

something fu88y. %nd we must

have this organi8ing principle prior to our being able to mae

sense of anything. Without thisorgani8ing principle all if

confusion.

We are under the illusion that what

is peculiar profound essential in

our investigation resides in itstrying to grasp the incomparable

essence of language. That is the

order e$isting between the

concepts of proposition word proof truth e$perience and so on.

This order is a

super3order between 33so tospea33 super3concepts. Whereas

of course if the words -language-

-e$perience--world- have a use it must be as

humble a one as that of the words

-table- -lamp- -door-.

%nd so in this state ofmystification we are under the

illusion that there is some essence

of langauge some magicalessence and that we are trying to

grasp this essence which is *ust beyond our grasp. This essenceconsists in the organi8ing

principles concrete almost

ghostlie organi8ing principles.

%nd these appear to be permanentfi$tures in the world. !ow can

they change we say in our

illusions they are the principlesthat control the world of human

understanding1 See F2

F6. On the one hand it is clear that

every sentence in our language is

in order as it is'. That is to say we

are not striving after an ideal as ifour ordinary vague sentences had

not yet got a "uite

une$ceptionable sense and a

(ut there is aporia while in this

mystification because for

e$ample we now that it is a bit

odd to say that we can point tonothing and yet it seems we can.

It seems with my concepts I can

point to the fact that Gohn is not in

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perfect language awaited

construction by us.33 On the otherhand it seems clear that where

there is sense there must be perfect

order. So there must be perfect

order even in the vaguest sentence.

his seat. I see the seat empty.

!ow can I do that1 Then

noticing this aporia and we thinthat the problem is

that the language that we use is

not "uite perfect enough so wewant to mae it more perfect

more e$act. This perfect language

awaits our construction. Whatwill it be lie1 Well it seems it

will be much lie the one we

have only more e$act more perfect. Thining lie this

we say to ourself that the

organi8ing principle that controls

everything is there even in the

fu88y imperfect principle butstill things do not "uite wor

correctly. The organi8ing principle is perfect we *ust have a

language that is an imperfect

picture of it. There are a fewflaws and we must figure them

out and fi$ them.

FF. The sense of a sentence 33one

would lie to say33 may of courseleave this or that open but the

sentence must nevertheless have adefinite sense. %n indefinitesense33 that would really not be a

sense at all. 33This is lie/ %n

indefinite boundary is not really a

boundary at all. !ereone thins perhaps/ if I say -I have

loced the man up fast in the room

33there is only one door leftopen-33 then I simply haven't

loced him in at all5 his being

loced in is a sham. One would beinclined to say here/ -ou haven't

done anything at all-. %n

enclosure with a hole in itis as good as none. 33(ut is that

true1

In this perfect language that in

our mystification it seems wemust construct +if we are to gain

any clarity, we may of courseallow for a sentence to have somefle$ibility. We might have a

structure lie -The boo is on the

table- that could be adapted to

-The pen is on the table.- (ut itseems there must be something

"uite definite in the

boundaries of it all. We can't havethe basic rules be fle$ible. If I

leave any of the basic rules

fle$ible it seems I might as wellnot have any rules at all. +Thin

how this relates to Lyotard and his

notion that we negotiate the basicrules of our language in paralogy.

We can say now in our

postmodernism -This is what I

mean by E- and sometimes



people can follow us.,

244. -(ut still it isn't a game if

there is some vagueness in therules-. 33 (ut does this prevent its

being a game1 33

-Perhaps you'll call it a game butat any rate it certainly isn't a

perfect game.- This means/ it has

impurities and what I am

interested in at present is the purearticle.

3(ut I want to say/ we

misunderstand the role of the idealin our language. That is to say/ we

too should call it a game only we

are da88led by the ideal andtherefore fail to see the actual useof the word -game- clearly.

%nd so let me as you must there be e$act rules in order for us to

have a -game-1 Or is this *ust an

illusion of our logocentrism1 Themystified voice responds well

you can call this game without

precise rules a game if you wish but it is not a perfect game. (ut

now as I thin through this

finding my way out of the fly bottle Wittgenstein says I want

to say that we misunderstand the

nature of our tas here. We are far

too da88led by the dream thatincreased precision will show us

clarity to see any other prospects

clearly..

Philosophical Investigations - Wittgenstein With Commentary

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