University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Honors eses Philosophy, Politics and Economics 2015 Philosophical Foundations of Physician-Assisted Death and Euthanasia Legislation in Oregon and the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis Rebecca F. Stein Follow this and additional works at: hp://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors Part of the Constitutional Law Commons , and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons is paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. hp://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors/2 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Stein, Rebecca F., "Philosophical Foundations of Physician-Assisted Death and Euthanasia Legislation in Oregon and the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis" (2015). Honors eses. Paper 2.
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University of PennsylvaniaScholarlyCommons
Honors Theses Philosophy, Politics and Economics
2015
Philosophical Foundations of Physician-AssistedDeath and Euthanasia Legislation in Oregon andthe Netherlands: A Comparative AnalysisRebecca F. Stein
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors/2For more information, please contact [email protected].
Stein, Rebecca F., "Philosophical Foundations of Physician-Assisted Death and Euthanasia Legislation in Oregon and the Netherlands:A Comparative Analysis" (2015). Honors Theses. Paper 2.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH AND
EUTHANASIA LEGISLATION IN OREGON AND THE NETHERLANDS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
By
Rebecca F. Stein
Senior Honors Thesis in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
Advisor: Dr. Alexander Guerrero
University of Pennsylvania
May 5, 2015
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
II. TERMINOLOGY .................................................................................................................................. 3
III. THE DEBATES OVER PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH AND EUTHANASIA ....................... 6 THE OREGON DEBATES ............................................................................................................................ 8 THE DUTCH DEBATES ............................................................................................................................... 9
IV. CURRENT POLICIES AND USAGE .............................................................................................. 11 THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT .............................................................................................. 11 THE DUTCH EUTHANASIA ACT ............................................................................................................... 12
V. PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVATIONS ................................................................................................ 14 OREGON’S AUTONOMY BASIS ................................................................................................................ 14 THE DUTCH SUFFERING BASIS ............................................................................................................... 21 COMPARISON: OREGON’S AUTONOMY BASIS VERSUS THE DUTCH SUFFERING BASIS ......................... 25
VI. AUTONOMY VERSUS SUFFERING: CHARACTERIZING THE ACCOUNTS ..................... 29
VII. AUTONOMY VERSUS SUFFERING: TWO PHILOSOPHICAL CAMPS .............................. 32 AUTONOMY-BASED ACCOUNTS ............................................................................................................. 32 SUFFERING-BASED ACCOUNTS .............................................................................................................. 35
VIII. ASSESSING THE AUTONOMY ACCOUNT ............................................................................. 41 ADVANTAGES OF AN AUTONOMY-BASED ACCOUNT ............................................................................. 41 DISADVANTAGES OF AN AUTONOMY-BASED ACCOUNT ........................................................................ 44
IX. ASSESSING THE SUFFERING ACCOUNT ................................................................................. 47 ADVANTAGES OF A SUFFERING-BASED ACCOUNT ................................................................................. 47 DISADVANTAGES OF A SUFFERING-BASED ACCOUNT ............................................................................ 49
X. TOWARDS A HYBRID PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH ............................................................ 52 SUGGESTED PAD AND EUTHANASIA CRITERIA ..................................................................................... 54 POLICY REVIEW ...................................................................................................................................... 61
XI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 63
hydration, or the failure to use “extraordinary means” to keep a patient alive. The distinction
between passive and active euthanasia is a debate in itself, and in general, American law has
been willing to permit passive, but not active, euthanasia under certain circumstances.3 The key
point of controversy at this point in time, and the debate that will be our focus throughout this
paper, is the controversy surrounding the permissibility of active euthanasia and the closely
related act of physician-assisted death.
Physician-Assisted Death:
Physician-assisted death would typically involve a physician prescribing a patient with a
lethal agent for the patient to ultimately administer to herself. Physician-assisted death would
then fall somewhere in between active and passive euthanasia. For, the physician is the one who
prescribes the lethal dose, but it is the patient who takes the medication on her own volition, at
the time of her choosing. The American Medical Association, which officially disapproves of the
act, defines “physician-assisted suicide” as occurring when “a physician facilitates a patient’s
death by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the
life-ending act.”4 The means that enable this life-ending act typically involve the prescription of
some sort of lethal drug that the patient can then choose to take to end her life. Despite the
AMA’s use of the term physician-assisted suicide, for the purposes of this paper I will refer to
that act as physician-assisted death, as proponents of Death with Dignity generally do. 5
Similarly, although many of the philosophers and theorists discussed in this paper use physician-
3 For more on the U.S. Passive Euthanasia discussion, see the Supreme Court case Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health. 4 American Medical Association. “Opinion 2.211 - Physician-Assisted Suicide,” http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page?. 5 The debates over the terms physician-assisted suicide and physician-assisted death are part of a larger
discussion that will be expanded upon later on in the paper.
5
assisted suicide terminology, I will consider their notions of physician-assisted suicide to fall
within my established definition of physician-assisted death.
6
III. The Debates over Physician-assisted Death and Euthanasia
The debate over physician-assisted death has arisen as a highly controversial issue only in
the past few decades. In the United States, debates over PAD have generally revolved around the
question of a right to die, and to what extent individuals have the Constitutional right to
determine the times and manners of their deaths. Those who argue in favor of such a
Constitutionally protected right generally base their views on the liberty interest that is included
in the Due Process Clause, claiming that individuals should have the freedom to make important
end-of-life decisions, such as the decision to request physician-assisted death. Opponents of a
legalized right to physician-assisted death and euthanasia have used a variety of arguments,
including claims about the sanctity of life and the Constitutional protection of life. In this
manner, these counter-arguments might be comparable to pro-life advocates in the abortion
debates, who base their arguments upon the presumed Constitutional protection of life.
Although there is not a clearly established right to die under the Federal Constitution,
many U.S. states have implemented legislation related to the practice of physician-assisted death,
both permissive and prohibitive. With no Constitutional rule against the general practice of
physician-assisted death, these state-level laws related to the practice have been at the core of
many conflicts that have risen to the Supreme Court level. In recent history, several cases
surrounding the issue of PAD have been brought forth to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in general,
the Court has been unwilling to support physician-assisted death, mainly by maintaining that a
right to die is not included in the Constitution.
In 1997, in the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court
made two important rulings affirming state prohibitions against physician-assisted death. In the
Washington v. Glucksberg case, the Court held that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause does
7
not protect the right to physician-assisted death, as supporters of the practice claim. The same
year, in Vacco v. Quill, the Court upheld New York State’s prohibition against physician-assisted
death. Despite these two Supreme Court cases affirming prohibitions against the practice, state-
level laws granting patients the right to die through PAD are currently in place in Oregon,
Washington, and Vermont, with related discussions in place in other states such as New Mexico
and Montana. As the first U.S. state to implement physician-assisted death legislation with the
adoption of the 1994 Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the state of Oregon has lead the rest of the
country’s Death with Dignity initiatives, with Washington and Vermont adopting similar
versions of the Oregon policy.6
Discussions regarding physician-assisted death and euthanasia have also played out
extensively across Europe. As opposed to the closely related Death with Dignity laws that are in
place in America, there are major differences amongst the various physician-assisted death and
euthanasia laws that have been implemented throughout Europe. For the purposes of this paper, I
will be examining physician-assisted death and euthanasia laws in the Netherlands, and in
particular, how the basis of the Dutch legislation contrasts with that of the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act. Of course, there are many more examples of physician-assisted death and active
euthanasia legislation that I will not be discussing in this paper. I have selected Oregon and the
Netherlands as samples to compare because of the long-established histories of their respective
euthanasia and physician-assisted death legislations, and the strong contrasts that are present
between these two policies.
6 Howard Ball, “The Pioneering PAD States,” In At Liberty to Die the Battle for Death with Dignity in
America (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 131.
8
The Oregon Debates
The Oregon debates over physician-assisted death began in the late 1980’s, when
Hemlock Society USA founder Derek Humphry began campaigning in favor of the practice.
Humphry’s efforts were aided by the Oregon Compassionate Choices group in the early 1990’s,
and in 1994 voters approved the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. The Oregon DWDA went into
effect in 1997, in response to the aforementioned Washington v. Glucksberg ruling that the Due
Process Clause does not protect the right to assisted-death. Between its approval and
implementation, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act was fiercely challenged by groups such as
the Roman Catholic Church and various Oregon health care organizations.
Many other challenges against the act were posed following its implementation, including
a notable attempt by the U.S. Attorney General to punish Oregon physicians who prescribed
lethal drugs to their patients. In the 2006 Gonzales v. Oregon decision, the Supreme Court ruled
against the Attorney General’s attempts to enforce the Controlled Substances Act against
physicians prescribing life-ending drugs to their terminally ill patients. The Gonzales case was
heard in response to an Interpretive Rule issued by Attorney General John Aschroft in 2001,
stating that physicians prescribing lethal agents to their patients for the purpose of physician-
assisted death were in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Ashcroft claimed that
physician-assisted death was not a legitimate medical purpose, and that it therefore violated the
9
Act. Aschcroft’s rule was successfully challenged by the state of Oregon, backed by a group of
terminally ill patients, a doctor, and a pharmacist.
Since the 2006 Gonzales case, the Death with Dignity law in Oregon has been upheld
despite the many debates that surround the issue. The law has continued to withstand the
numerous challenges that have been raised against it, and is still in place almost 20 years after its
implementation. The issue of PAD gained America’s attention in November of 2014 when 29-
year-old Brittany Maynard published an article about her decision to move to Oregon to use the
state’s Death with Dignity law to end her battle with terminal brain cancer.7 The American PAD
debates continue to gain national press coverage, even as recently as March 2015, when the New
York Times publicized an article dedicated to the topic that features a detailed examination of the
Oregon Death with Dignity Act.8 We will be looking at Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act in
greater detail in Section IV.
The Dutch Debates
The euthanasia9 debates in the Netherlands began gaining their force with the 1973
“Postma Case,” when a physician was convicted for murder after euthanizing her dying mother.
Although this was not a “win” for legalized euthanasia, this case opened up the country’s
7 Brittany Maynard, “My Right to Death with Dignity at 29,” CNN, November 2, 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/opinion/maynard-assisted-suicide-cancer-dignity/. 8 Clyde Haberman, “Stigma Around Physician-Assisted Dying Lingers,” The New York Times, March
between the physician and the patient.13 Unlike the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the Dutch
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act does not require
that the patient be terminally ill with a required life expectancy in order to be eligible for PAD,
but instead states that the patient must be facing interminable suffering, a category which might
include mental and physical suffering with a long or even unknown life expectancy.
Under the Dutch Euthanasia Act, there are also significant requirements detailing reports
that the physician must submit to one of five regional review committees. In fact, much of the
text of the Dutch legislation is dedicated to the details of the required reporting practices, with
physicians using PAD and euthanasia viewed as violating the Criminal Code until the case has
successfully passed through the extensive review process that the law puts in place. The review
committees—each of which must include at least one legal specialist, one physician, and one
ethicist—are tasked with reviewing every euthanasia and PAD case to ensure that the attending
physician has acted in line with the due care criteria outlined in the Act.14 As of a 2012 report
from CBS StatLine, the country saw close to 4,000 deaths by euthanasia, and almost 200
physician-assisted death cases.15
13 G. K. Kimsma, “Death By Request In The Netherlands: Facts, The Legal Context And Effects On
Physicians, Patients And Families,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 355-61. 14 “Review procedures for the termination of life on request and assisted suicide and amendment of the
Criminal Code and the Burial and Cremation Act (Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
(Review Procedures) Act),” Online.
http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Dutch_law_04_12.pdf 15 CBS StatLine, Statistics Netherlands, “Deaths by medical end-of-life decision; age, cause of death,”
quoting legal expert Arthur LaFrance saying that the statute “acknowledges the autonomy of the
individual, and that autonomy is a centrally protected constitutional concept.”19
Throughout the text of the Oregon legislation, there appear many examples of safeguards
that the law puts in place on order to protect patient autonomy. Firstly, the statute requires that
eligible patients be 18 years or older, which might be based upon the belief that a person lacks
some degree of decision-making capability before the age of 18. In requiring that the patient be
18 or older, the Oregon legislation is limited to only those patients who have reached an age at
which they are capable of autonomous decision-making. Although it is difficult to measure the
formation of individuals’ value systems, it is certainly reasonable to claim that an individual does
not have a fully formed set of values until reaching adulthood, at which point it is generally
believed that peoples’ core principles and motives are cemented. Therefore, this age requirement
incorporates the value of autonomy, as we couldn’t expect an individual to make an autonomous
decision that is in line with the “reasons and motives that are taken as ones own,” as Stanford’s
definition puts it, if that individual has not yet reached the age at which those values are
crystallized.
According to the Oregon DWDA, a patient must also make two requests for physician-
assisted death spaced no less than 15 days apart, which ensures the certainty of the patient’s
request by requiring that the patient take due time to fully reflect on the decision and evaluate
whether he still chooses PAD even after the passage of some time. This requirement seems to be
based on the value of patient autonomy, because the required 15-day gap between requests
reflects how autonomy, by definition, does not just value an individual’s temporary preferences.
Rather, the value of autonomy concerns the idea of an individual making choices that are
19 Patrick O’Neill, “Physician-Assisted Suicide Law Has It’s Day in Court,” The Oregonian, December
19, 1994.
17
consistent over time, in that they are in line with that individual’s fundamental values, which are
more firmly established than his ever-changing momentary preferences. Together, the age
minimum and the two-request requirement emphasize the Oregon lawmakers’ apparent
intentions of ensuring that a patient who chooses PAD not only be fully capable of making
intelligent decisions for himself, but also that the decisions he makes are well-thought-out over
an extended period of time. These requirements can therefore be viewed as protecting patient
autonomy, as they ensure that the patient is old enough to make an autonomous decision, and
that such decisions with this autonomous quality can withstand the passage of time and still
remain in line with that patient’s core beliefs or fundamental values.
Further protecting patient autonomy is the Oregon DWDA’s requirement that a patient’s
depression is not influencing his decision to die. The Oregon law requires that a patient be
evaluated psychiatrically if the physician fears that depression or any other mental impairment
may be impacting his decision-making capabilities. Therefore, according to the law, a patient’s
depressed state is a possible interference on a patient’s autonomy, and a safeguard must be put in
place in order to avoid this potential infringement. Depression is viewed as a threat to autonomy,
in that it may cause an individual to act in a manner that is out of line with his fundamental
values. This view of depression as a condition that undermines autonomy is generally held in the
bioethics community, as outlined by Paul Biegler.20 Therefore, Oregon’s requirement that the
patient requesting physician-assisted death not be influenced by depression is a reflection of the
value of patient autonomy, in that it secures a patient’s autonomy from the potential threat of
depression.
Beyond outlining these details of the characteristics that PAD-eligible patients must
possess, the Oregon law also requires witnesses to ensure that the patient is fully autonomous in
20 Paul Biegler, “Autonomy And Ethical Treatment In Depression,” Bioethics 24, no. 4 (2010), 181.
18
making his decision to die. Witnesses are required to make sure the patient is “capable, acting
voluntarily, and is not being coerced,” three qualities which are repeated throughout the text of
the legislation. 21 It is interesting to also note that the law protects not only the patient’s
autonomy, but the physician’s autonomy as well. The law reveals this respect for physician
autonomy when it states that no physician may be forced to assist his patient in dying. Just as a
patient may not be coerced by another person or by a skewed psychological state to engage in
PAD, a physician, too, can only assist in his patient’s suicide if he independently wills to do so.
This protection of the physician’s autonomy further emphasizes the important role that autonomy
plays throughout the Oregon legislation, as it ensures that all parties of every PAD decision are
acting out of their own volitions.
Beyond this respect for patient autonomy, there are certainly other significant motivations
behind the Oregon legislation, namely, an attempt to distinguish physician-assisted death as it is
laid out in the Oregon legislation from typical cases of suicide. In particular, the requirement that
the patient be suffering from a disease that will kill him in six months or less reveals the
lawmakers’ attempt to separate the cases of physician-assisted death made possible by this law
from the characteristics that are generally associated with suicide. When compared with the form
of physician-assisted death that is legalized by the Oregon DWDA, most cases of suicide are
associated with people who would have lived average lifespans bringing about their own deaths
earlier than would have been natural.22 Suicide is therefore viewed as something irrational or
21 Oregon Death with Dignity Act revised Statute, Chapter 127,
https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/lawsstatutes/2013ors127.html. 22 According to the CDC, in 2013 the U.S. suicide rate is highest for people aged 25 to 64 (16.25 deaths
per 100,000 people), an age group whose members, we can assume, would have otherwise lived to the
average U.S. life expectancy of about 79 years. The suicide rate in this 25-64 age group surpassed the 65+
age group in 2004 and 2006, and has been increasing since. See the CDC’s “Trends in Suicide Rates
Among Both Sexes, by Age Group, United States, 1991-2009.”
This requirement that the patient have a life expectancy of six months or less is also
particularly telling because it reveals that mere suffering is not the top criteria that is considered
in these cases of physician-assisted death. For, two patients might be experiencing equivalent
amounts of interminable suffering, one with a short life expectancy (say, a pancreatic cancer
patient) and the other with many years ahead of her (an ALS patient for example), but only the
pancreatic cancer patient would be permitted to request this life-ending prescription under the
Oregon DWDA. Therefore, even if a person is suffering from an illness that is irreversible, if the
disease will not kill the patient imminently, then physician-assisted death is not a permissible
option under the Oregon law. In contrast, in the cases of physician-assisted death that would be
permissible by the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, the patient’s forthcoming death is an
unavoidable element of his condition. The six-month life expectancy qualification therefore
indicates that regardless of the level of suffering that a patient is experiencing, precautions must
be taken to avoid physician-assisted death from entering into the realm of the act of suicide as
committed by someone with a normal life expectancy.
A final element of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act that reveals the ethical motivations
underlying the legislation is the requirement that PAD-eligible patients must be proven residents
of Oregon. The reasoning behind this requirement might be an attempt by the lawmakers to keep
the state Oregon from becoming a destination for death by making it difficult for people to come
to Oregon for the sole purpose of dying. 24 Such a provision might serve to quell possible
concerns raised by the federal government about individuals from other states entering Oregon to
take advantage of this state-level law.25 The residency requirement responds to these concerns by
24 Of course, the law cannot completely avoid this, as it is possible for people to resettle in Oregon with
the intention of using physician-assisted death soon after. 25 Kathy T. Graham, “Last Rights: Oregon’s New Death With Dignity Act,” Willamette Law Review 31,
no. 3 (1995), 614.
21
acting as a logistical barrier. For, even if individuals from other states were to move to Oregon
and establish residency there, it is clear that establishing residency somewhere is a decision that
takes more time, thought, and planning than the decision to briefly visit a particular place. As
David S. Ford, spokesman for the San Francisco AIDS Foundation said in a 1994 interview with
The Oregonian, “I can't imagine that someone would want to pack up their belongings, close up
their apartment, leave their friends and move up to Oregon in order to establish residency and
find two doctors who will pronounce them as having six months to live – all in order to have a
doctor-assisted suicide.”26
Therefore, in putting the residency limitation in place, the Oregon legislation emphasizes
that the decision to request PAD ought not be made on a whim, and it also acts as a hurdle that
ensures that aside from Oregon residents who will face a number of other safeguards and filters
down the line, the only people who may begin the process of requesting PAD are those who have
put significant thought and effort into the decision to die. This residency requirement therefore
limits PAD eligibility to a small group of Oregon residents (whether they’ve already been
established residents or they’ve made the decision to become residents) who meet the specific set
of criteria that are outlined throughout the legislation—most significantly, the numerous
autonomy safeguards that I have detailed above.
The Dutch Suffering Basis
When considering the motivations behind the Dutch Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, it is important to first mention that the requirements
included in the legislation apply for both the act of physician-assisted death (which the
legislation calls assisted-suicide), and euthanasia performed by a doctor. The Netherlands law
26 Spencer Heinz, “End Game,” The Oregonian, December 5, 1994.
22
makes no moral distinction between euthanasia and physician-assisted death, grouping them
together within the same piece of legislation. As I assess the Netherlands’ euthanasia law, I will
be arguing that the primary basis of the Dutch legislation is an attempt to avoid patient suffering,
which strongly contrasts with the Oregon autonomy-basis that we have just seen.
With regards to the characteristics that an eligible patient must have, according to the
Dutch law, any patient aged 12 years or older can be eligible for physician-assisted death or
euthanasia, although there are more safeguards for patients on the younger end of the spectrum.
In order to receive physician-assisted death or euthanasia by the Dutch Euthanasia Act, patients
ages 12 through 16 must have a consenting parent or guardian, and patients between 16 and 18
years of age must have a parent or guardian at least consulted. Philosophically, it seems that if
the law states that a parent ought to be consulted, this would imply that a patient under the age of
18 is viewed as incapable of making a fully autonomous decision that carries legal weight. For,
even in the case of a patient between 16 and 18, if no guardian is available for consultation, there
is no weight given to her decision to die.
The details of this age requirement imply that in the view of the Dutch law, a legal
minor’s decision, absent of parental consultation, is not enough to make PAD or euthanasia
permissible. It might therefore be inferred that so long as parental consent or consultation is
required, a patient is not viewed as autonomous enough to make a decision independently. This
is an interesting point of distinction, because whereas the Oregon statue would never permit a
less-than-capable patient to make the decision to undergo PAD, the Dutch law does permit such
a decision, as long as it is bolstered by parental consent or consultation.
Another important note on the Dutch legislation is the strong emphasis that the law places
on the suffering that the patient is undergoing. Interestingly, the Dutch law makes no distinction
23
between short-term and long-term suffering as the Oregon law does. Regardless of the patient’s
life expectancy, as long as there is no chance for the patient’s condition to improve, a hopelessly
suffering patient can be legally eligible for physician-assisted death or euthanasia. This detail
reveals the essential role that patient suffering plays in the Netherlands law. For, an eligible
patient’s suffering does not necessarily have to be accompanied by imminent death, but even
prolonged suffering with no chance of improvement makes one eligible for PAD or euthanasia in
the Netherlands. The Netherlands is therefore more concerned with the patient’s degree of
suffering than with the patient’s particular physical condition and the life expectancy that is
associated with such a condition.27 This focus on the degree of patient suffering is revealing of
the motivations behind the Dutch law. In particular, it seems as though according to the
Netherlands legislation, a key philosophical basis of euthanasia and physician-assisted death is
the avoidance of patient suffering, even if this means ending a patient’s life at a point much
earlier than death would have naturally occurred.
With regards to the type of suffering that a patient must be experiencing in order to be
eligible for physician-assisted death or euthanasia in the Netherlands, the Dutch legislation has
an expansive definition of suffering that extends beyond just physical suffering. The Netherlands
euthanasia law doesn’t include a depression or mental illness safeguard as the Oregon law does.
In this way, the Dutch legislation does not limit eligibility for physician-assisted death and
euthanasia to only those people who are experiencing physical suffering. Rather, it expands its
definition of suffering to include mental suffering as well. A 1994 Oregon newspaper references
the Netherlands’ wide definition of suffering, mentioning the 1993 Dutch case in which “a court
of three judges acquitted a psychiatrist in the assisted suicide of a physicially [sic] healthy but
27 The avoidance of patient suffering is consistently mentioned as a key element of the Dutch debate over
PAD and euthanasia. See Raphael Cohen-Almagor's article “Why the Netherlands?”
24
emotionally disturbed woman grieving over the death of her two sons.”28 This broad definition of
suffering further reveals the Netherlands’ strong emphasis on the value of avoiding patient
suffering of all types.
Although suffering seems to be the key basis of the Netherlands legislation, the law does
not fail to mention patient autonomy. The Dutch law requires that the patient fully understand
her condition and prospects, which ensures that the patient is knowledgeable enough to make an
autonomous decision that is also informed. This requirement, however, may not reveal a
significant value of autonomy, but is rather in line with general consent requirements for medical
procedures in the Netherlands, which are outlined in the Dutch Medical Contract Act.29 Buiting
et al. mention the common Dutch requirement that the patient fully understand her situation and
prognosis, which is part of the country’s normal medical practice.30 Therefore, although the
Netherlands legislation does incorporate the value of autonomy, it does not emphasize this value
any more significantly for cases of PAD and euthanasia than it does with most other medical
procedures, where informed consent rules require some degree of patient autonomy, in that they
similarly demand that the patient fully understand her condition and prospects.
Another important requirement of the Netherlands legislation is the requirement that the
patient initiate the request to die on her own, which seems to be an attempt to keep other forces
from interfering with the patient’s autonomous decision to die. It is, however, difficult to place
this requirement as definably autonomy valuing or suffering valuing. Given the important
decision-making role that this requirement gives to the patient, it appears as though this
28 Mark O’Keefe, “Dutch Courts Provide Loophole for Doctors,” The Oregonian, December 19th, 1994. 29 Ewoud Hondius and Annet Van Hooft, “The New Dutch Law on Medical Services,” Netherlands
International Law Review (1996). 30 Hilde Buiting, Johannes Van Delden, Bregje Onwuteaka-Philpsen, Judith Rietjens, Mette Rurup,
Donald Van Tol, Joseph Gevers, Paul Van Der Maas, and Agnes Van Der Heide, “Reporting Of
Euthanasia And Physician-assisted Suicide In The Netherlands: Descriptive Study,” BMC Medical
Ethics 10, 8.
25
requirement reflects the value of patient autonomy, but it very well may be that this actually
shows a valuing prioritization of patient suffering. For, this patient-initiated request requirement
emphasizes the fact only the patient can know and evaluate the degree of her own suffering, and
such an important evaluation should not be tainted by other opinions.
A final important element of the Dutch euthanasia legislation is that although the law
does not have a residency requirement like Oregon does, it does require that there be a well-
established doctor-patient relationship in cases of physician-assisted death and euthanasia.31 This
requirement is believed by the legislatures to similarly keep the Netherlands from becoming a
death destination, as many opponents of physician-assisted death fear. It therefore seems that in
outlining the due care requirements that imply a close and well-established doctor-patient
relationship, the Netherlands legislation is crafted for a specific group of physician-patient pairs
with preexisting clinical relationships. Thus, the Netherlands puts safeguards in place to avoid
abuse of the euthanasia act, but the act’s overall motivations seem closely tied to an avoidance of
pain and suffering, all within the boundaries that the act puts in place.
Comparison: Oregon’s Autonomy Basis Versus the Dutch Suffering Basis
In comparing the motivations behind the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the
Netherlands Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act, a
few major points of distinction arise. In particular, it seems as though the key motivation behind
the details of Oregon’s physician-assisted death laws are an intention to protect patient
autonomy, a motivation which is more secondary in the Netherlands legislation. Oregon’s
31 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: FAQ – Euthanasia 2010: The Termination of Life on Request
and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act in practice. http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/wp-
autonomy emphasis can be seen through the requirement that the patient make multiple requests
for a lethal prescription over an extended period of time. This autonomy basis is also revealed
through the requirement that a patient’s depression not be influencing his decision to die, and the
repeated insistence that a patient be “capable” and that his request is “voluntary.” Furthermore,
the many technical safeguards that the Oregon DWDA puts in place—such as the age minimum
of 18 years and the residency requirement—reveal the Oregon legislation’s significant emphasis
on the protection of patient autonomy.
The requirements surrounding the type of pain and suffering that the patient is
undergoing seem, in the case of the Oregon laws, to be secondary to the requirements related to
the patient’s level of autonomy. For, the Oregon legislation does not include suffering from
depression as a type of suffering that could necessitate PAD, and it instead views it as a possible
interference with autonomy, prioritizing this possible interference over the possibility that mental
suffering might warrant a need for PAD. Thus, this fear that mental illness might interfere with
autonomy reveals that a respect for patient autonomy is the driving force of the Oregon
physician-assisted death legislation.
On the other hand, an avoidance of suffering seems to be the key motivation underlying
the Netherlands PAD and euthanasia legislation. This can be seen by the fact that whereas the
Oregon legislation requires that a patient be suffering from an illness that will kill him within six
months, the Netherlands’ Euthanasia Act permits physician-assisted death or euthanasia for
people who will be experiencing irreversible suffering, regardless of the life-expectancy
associated with the condition. It seems to be that the primary goal of the Dutch euthanasia
legislation is to provide an opportunity for relief for those who are experiencing suffering, be it
near-death suffering or a more extended span of suffering.
27
Further revealing that suffering is the leading basis for the Netherlands legislation is the
fact that the Netherlands doesn’t set up any safeguards for depressed or otherwise mentally
impaired patients as the Oregon law does. Rather, the Netherlands defines suffering as widely as
possible, not limiting the eligibility standards to only those undergoing physical suffering. The
Netherlands’ lack of these two safeguards—on mentally ill patients and on patients who will be
suffering indefinitely—reveal its expansive definition of suffering and its valuing of an
avoidance of suffering over other values such as autonomy.
Another strong point of distinction between the Netherlands euthanasia and PAD laws
and the Oregon physician-assisted death legislation are their contrasting treatments of the ages of
eligible patients. For the Netherlands, there are age windows at which the patient is not legally
able to make the decision to die without parental consultation or consent, and this implies that
the Netherlands law recognizes a lack of decision-making autonomy for patients between the
ages of 12 and 18, and for this reason requires parental involvement. In permitting these
decisions to be made with parental consent, the Dutch legislation permits patients who are not
viewed as fully autonomous to request PAD or euthanasia. In contrast, the Oregon legislation
only allows an individual to request a life-ending prescription once he is at an age where parental
consent would not be required for legal decision-making. This point of distinction might suggest
that the Oregon legislation takes greater measures to ensure that a fully autonomous decision to
end one’s life is being made, avoiding any possibility of PAD for someone who has not reached
the age of full autonomy, even with parental consent.
Thus, in assessing each piece of legislation, as well as some of the surrounding public
debates, it is clear that these two distinct themes arise in each policy. Whereas the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act is ultimately focused on a respect for patient autonomy, the Netherlands
28
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act is driven by an
attempt to avoid patient suffering at all costs. Hilde Buiting et al. point out this important
distinction in their study on the physician-assisted death reporting practices in the Netherlands.
In comparing the American model with the legislation in selected European countries, the
authors note, “for the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg Acts, addressing the patient's suffering is
the most important principle underlying the Act. The Oregon and Washington Acts, on the other
hand, put emphasis on patients' rights and on helping patients to maintain control and
independence.”32 Having provided evidence for these two ethical motivations, we will see that
there is strong philosophical support for each of the distinct foundations that seem to drive the
Netherlands and Oregon legislations.
32 Buiting, et al., “Reporting of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands: descriptive
study,” 3.
29
VI. Autonomy Versus Suffering: Characterizing the Accounts
Thus far, I have shown that the Oregon and Netherlands physician-assisted death and
euthanasia legislations are based in these two distinct philosophical foundations: Oregon, on a
respect for patient autonomy, and the Netherlands, on an avoidance of patient suffering. Having
identified these contrasting bases, I will now begin expanding upon the details of these two
philosophical values, and exploring their uses as ethical foundations for opinions on the issue of
physician-assisted death. In approaching this comparative philosophical examination, it will be
necessary to briefly distinguish between the autonomy basis for physician-assisted death and
what I will call the suffering basis for physician-assisted death. Before characterizing these two
accounts, it is important to note that both the suffering-based account and autonomy-based
account contain philosophical motivations that could be used to argue in support of a whole set
of life-ending acts beyond just physician-assisted death. However, because my ultimate policy
discussion is framed around PAD33, this is the practice that I will refer to in characterizing the
autonomy-based and suffering-based accounts.
On the autonomy-based account of physician-assisted death, PAD should be legally
permissible if and only if doing so furthers or respects autonomy better than a prohibition on
PAD. As we’ve previously seen, when it comes to clinical decision-making, a respect for
autonomy can be characterized by the attempt to ensure that treatment decisions made by an
individual patient are in line with that person’s fundamental values, uncoerced and undistorted
by external forces. Proponents of PAD who use an autonomy-based argument generally base
their arguments on the idea that an individual should have the right to determine the time and
manner of his own death, and therefore that prohibiting a person to make the decision to die
33 In my policy formation, I do suggest permitting euthanasia under some specific circumstances, but in
most cases, physician-assisted death is the treatment that my policy permits.
30
through physician-assisted death is an interference with that individual’s autonomy. This
argument is based on the idea that part of an individual’s self-determination and autonomy are
decisions related to the course of that individual’s own life and to the treatment of his body, and
thus a right to determine the time and manner of one’s death is a necessary part of autonomy,
included in the right to bodily self-determination.34
On the suffering-based account of physician-assisted death, PAD should be legally
permissible if and only if it is done as a means of avoiding patient pain and suffering in a manner
that other treatments could not. Those who argue in favor of physician-assisted death with a
suffering basis would claim that when a person is suffering with no relief, it is more
compassionate to let the patient end her life and put an immediate end to her pain than to force
the patient to continue suffering hopelessly. Therefore, as opposed to a respect for autonomy, the
driving force of these suffering-based accounts is the prioritization of an avoidance of misery and
pain. In valuing the avoidance of suffering above all, these suffering-based accounts are
generally founded in the philosophical principle of beneficence, which is described by the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as the “moral obligation to act for the others’ benefit,
helping them to further their important and legitimate interests, often by preventing or removing
possible harms.”35 Proponents of this view might argue about the human responsibility to reduce
the harm experienced by other humans by acting with compassion toward those who are
experiencing pain. In addition, proponents of a suffering-based view of PAD might base their
34 Monika Ardelt, “Physician-Assisted Death,” C. D. Bryant et al. (eds.): Handbook of Death and Dying,
Volume One: The Presence of Death, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 425. 35 Tom Beauchamp, “The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics.” Stanford University, January 2,