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PHILIPPINE PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST: Rebuilding the Philippine
Political System
by
Ralfhee Blake Barrios
The simple logic in dealing with an ineffectual system is to
dump and change it. Adapting a
structure that brings more harm than benefit will only
exacerbate the already sorry state of the
society. There is no sense keeping a volatile scheme, one that
is prone to explode on the head
of the persons who have engineered the scheme itself. A wrong
system breeds poor results and
poor results are manifestations for the need to change.
Philippines has been groping in the dark for far too long,
rummaging in drawers and boxes for
the match that would flicker the necessary light. This is
apparent in the miserable political,
economic, and social crises that have badgered the nation. To
put it succinctly, the Philippines
is a weak state. The Philippine state is a weak state because
its apparatus has constantly been
under the control of a powerful family, clan, or prevailing
group for the primary purpose of
personal aggrandizement (Banlaoi, n.d). Of the three (politics,
economy, society), politics, of
course, is the ultimate cause for the mayhems of the other
two--economy and society. It is the
root of the problems. This is true especially because politics
is equivocal to power and he who
has power has the ability to control the government system from
which all men and institutions
depend. Although the need seems mutual for a government without
its people is nothing, still
the people exist at the mercy of the government primarily
because power resides in the hands
of those in the government. All government machineries and
resources are then open for their
disposal. State apparatus are available for the incumbents
disposal. History speaks fairly. In
2004, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was alleged to have
sabotaged election results
by ordering then Commission on Elections Commisioner Garcillano
to pad and shave the results
and win over her rival by a million votes. The infamous
Ferdinand Marcos is known for his wits
and cunning in manipulating the law and government machineries
to work in his favour from the
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dissolution of the Congress to the empowerment of the military
forces and then to turning into
an absolute dictator. A premature and weak Philippine state has
produced weak institutions of
governance; thus, it is unable to manage the ethnic, religious
and socioeconomic diversities in
its society (Banlaoi, nd.). These historical events being
proving facts, it is therefore only
reasonable to alter the political system in order to affect
better changes to the Philippine
economy and the society as well. This is the need for a
Philippine Perestroika.
The term perestroika is more familiar as a Russian economic
policy that intended to increase
mechanization and labour efficiency. However, the etymology of
the word perestroika is
reconstruction or reformation. This etymological definition is
exactly what the Philippines
needsa reconstruction, a reformation, a renovation in its
political arena. A Philippine
perestroika aims to ouster the existing and ineffective
political system in order to construct a
new one that will guarantee effective governance and unsoiled
political actions. These
reconstructions will provide better safeguards as well as
eliminate those that are unnecessary
and prove only to be cumbersome in the performance of executive,
legislative, and juridical
functions. Glasnost is a related concept of the Russian
perestroika but deals more with
transparency, or its English translation, openness. Glasnosts
were Russian policies that dealt
with preventing graft and corruption. Policies on this very
premise are what the country needs to
inhibit graft and corrupt practices in the government.
In order to achieve this rebuilding and openness, a set of
literature relating to the Philippine
political system and governance by different authors has been
reviewed by this writer. It has
been found out that these authors have various opinions as to
the ultimate cause of the
countrys impoverish state. Some relate the problem to political
dynasties, some to questions of
legitimacy, most to corruption, while still a few others to the
electoral system. Each cause will be
analyzed in order to determine the weight and substance that
they bring into the problem. The
reviews have been organized in order of political system so that
the article on election comes
first, then on good governance and the rule of law and so on.
Furthermore, this paper will
identify the ultimate cause of the state's pandemonium through a
comparative approach.
A study of the different apparatus of the Philippines shall
increase state capacity and even
transform the predatory nature of the state into what can be
legitimately classified as
developmental. State capacity was first used by Charles Tilly to
refer to the states ability to
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raise revenues but this paper uses this to mean the wider range
of competencies that the state
acquires in the development process, which includes the power to
enforce contracts and
support markets through regulation or otherwise as have been
used by Bersley and Persson
(2009) in their paper entitled State Capacity, Conict and
Development.
Contrary to popular prejudices regarding the cumbersome nature
of third world states and the
presence of predatory governments therein, Peter Evans (1989)
attributes the levels of state
developments to state structures and points out that third world
states are not necessarily
predatory but may also be classified as developmental. The
predatory classification of the state
has been easy with the emergence and popularity of an ideologue
that is neoutilitarianism.
Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a
rational entity and in being so
would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of
power, security, and welfare so that
the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said
maximization of utility, the more
likely would rational entities venture out to claim this
utility. This then creates a system of
predation where, when the government is entrusted with a vast
power, the easier it is for it to
prey its people and to gain for himself. Evans (1989) points out
that the emergence of
neoutilitarianism makes it easier to condone predatory
activities as the very barest essentials of
this precept assumes that it is the nature of rational entities
such as the state is to maximize its
resources even at the expense of the lives of its people. This
maximization may come in the
form of corruption or rent-seeking. Some states may extract such
large amounts of otherwise
investable surplus and provide so little in the way of
"collective goods" in return that they do
indeed impede economic transformation. It seems reasonable to
call these states predatory"
(Evans, 1989).
On the other hand, developmental states are not exactly the
opposite of predatory states for the
former is neither a paragon of virtue nor of honesty but the
ends are different from those of
predatory states so that even with the existence of corruption
and informal networks in the
former, their economic progress, unlike those of predatory
states, graph positive slopes. In fact,
in some cases, developmental states may have historically been
more predatory than
developmental.
Hutchcroft (1998) classifies the Philippines as a predatory
state based primarily on its history of
crony capitalism and rampant corruption which are most
manifested in the Marcos, Estrada, and
Arroyo regime. Some political scientists even argue that the
Philippines is not only a predatory
state but a predatory regime because the whole state apparatus
connive in order to maximize
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their utility. It is then the burden of the government to shift
the predatory nature of the state to
one that is developmental as have been the case with Japan,
Korea (North Korea, and Taiwan).
This paper will operate on both rational and institutionalized
approaches.
This paper, Philippine Perestroika and Glasnost, aims to attain
the developmental shift by
renovating the political sphere on which all government
institutions and the polity exist.
Unless and until the state recognizes the problems and applies
curative measures upon the
pandemic hitches that go against development and progress, the
nation will remain in the hollow
crater of poverty and discontent.
A study of these articles leads us to the building blocks of the
new edifice of this nation, that with
glass facades and solid pillars. These literatures, when
amalgamated, shall be the blueprint of
the new political destiny.
On INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE by S. HIX AND M.
WHITING
Before this paper argues on the specifics towards the path of a
Philippine Perestroika and
Glasnost, it is only proper that a short discussion on political
science, on which this paper will
operate, be made.
Political science is not a school work, it is a field of study
that involves all aspects of human life
and affects all life form. It is indispensable to reality life
because politics itself is indispensable to
the real world. Politics is everywhere and to detach its
systematic means to comprehension is
similar to detaching a body from a brain.
The birth of political science could be traced back from Ancient
Greek as a brainchild of no less
than Aristotle himself. He was the first featherless biped to
relate the different forms of
governments with different state status or political outcomes in
a systematic way, hence the
science. Aristotle has then influenced great mind like Cicero,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Madison.
Political science as it is known today is a product of several
theorizing and logical thinking by
the aforementioned people. In ones study of political science,
one would notice how much
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philosophy the discourse involves. This is primarily because of
the empirical nature of politics.
That is, it tends to lean more on experiences rather than on
futuristic circumstances. To put it
bluntly, political science is the mistress of history.
This paper will implore the following organization and
identification schemes; political behavior,
political institutions and political outcomes. This literature
review will work in the context of
identifying the key factor that has affected or that is
affecting political actions; whether it is the
behavior, the institution or the culture. At the offset, this
writer will also identify which among the
three has contributed greatly to the problems held at status
quo.
According to Hix and Whiting (2012), political behavior refers
to the beliefs and actions of
political actors, be they citizens, voters, party leaders,
members of parliaments, government
ministers, judges, civil servants, or members of interest
groups. These actors have political
preferences: their political interests, values and goals. Issues
like what the people want
prioritized; education, armed forces, or labor, fall under
political behavior. Political institutions
have been defined as the sphere or arena on which political
behavior manifests. Later on, this
writer will identify whether a certain issue could be resolved
by altering political institutions say
from a presidential government to a parliamentary government or
from a bicameral legislature to
a unicameral legislature. Finally, political outcomes cover a
broad range of issues, from specific
policy outcomes such as economic growth or higher public
spending or better protection of the
environment, to broader political phenomena, such as political
and economic equality, social
and ethnic harmony, or satisfaction with democracy and
government (Hix and Whiting, 2012).
Succinctly, political outcomes are the results or the sum of
behaviors, institutions, and actions.
Hix and Whiting (2012) also discussed several approaches in the
study of politics, which the
writer deems pertinent to the analyses to be rendered. The first
approach is the rational-choice
approach which considers men as rational beings who will decide
in favor of the option that
gives them the highest satisfaction or utility, which is
equivocal to saying that rational men
choose options that serve them best. Hence, the rational-choice
approach does not mean that
men rationalize decisions through a conscious effort of
introspection and deductions, rather this
means that rational being have innate preferences and will
choose according to their
preference.
This approach will be utilized in this study as political actors
act on the premise of deriving
satisfaction for themselves. The rational-theory approach in
this paper will be furthered by
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identifying state actions in the context of the re-emerging
neoutilitarian paradigm.
Neoutilitarianism assumes that the state (the government) is a
rational entity and in being so
would maximize its utility, which are guised in the form of
power, security, and welfare so that
the more resources or apparatuses are available for the said
maximization of utility, the more
likely would rational entities venture out to claim this utility
even at the expense of illicit actions.
A famous illustration of the rational choice approach is the
prisoners dilemma.
Another approach is the institutional approach which deals with
role of institutions in state
actions. According to Hix and Whiting (2012), there are two
types of institutions; formal
institutions and informal institutions. Formal institutions
include the various provisions in a
constitution, the rules of procedure in a parliament, an
electoral system, campaign finance
regulations, rules governing how a party chooses its leader, and
so on. Informal institutions,
meanwhile, encompass social structures (such as class), social
norms and cultural practices,
metaphysical beliefs and ideological values, and so on. Both,
however, restrict behavior of
political actors such as the guarantee of the laws to penalize
corrupt officials restricts the
commission of graft and corrupt practices. To a certain degree,
institutions are more important
than behavior in explaining political phenomena because the
former could restrict political
behavior licitly so that behaviors may not be carried out.
DEMOCRACY
The Philippines prides itself as not only a Republican but a
Democratic country while U.S.
parties contend on both ideologies.
Democracy is a very complex idea. Whether it is even an idea is
debatable. Regardless,
democracy has had a bitter history in the hands of philosophers
such as Aristotle. The
sentiment of Aristotle was valid. He argued that a democratic
state would eventually cause
chaos because state affairs and the decision process are
bestowed upon the less educated
gentry. This was the principal characterization given to
democracy. That it was the direct rule of
the people, which was composed of the lesser mortals so to
speak. He feared that giving
such a group of people power equal to that of the more educated
and economically independent
citizens would most likely lead to chaos and populism (Hix and
Whiting, 2012) but because
politics is dynamic and ever-changing. Democracy has had a new
definition. The famous line
from Gettysburg Address in 1863 exemplifies what democracy is in
its new form, a government
of the people, by the people, for the people. This shows that
democracy has evolved into a new
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form where the needs and aspirations of the people are
represented in the government by
electing political actors in their stead. Democracy has become
indirect hence avoiding the fear
of Aristotle to what is currently considered as a mobocracy.
Robert Dahl (1971) believes that democracy is about political
equality and giving everyone an
equal voice in saying how a state should be governed. Thus the
essence of democracy has
been synonymous with political equality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p.53) and Clark et al. (2012,
p.180), in a previous study, found
out that as the countrys wealth increases, it is more likely to
become a democracy. Although
the line of correlation has not been established, the fact is
that a states economy and its
democratic nature have a bilateral relationship. Seymour Martin
Lipset (1959) proposed a
modernization theory stating that as a state modernizes, it is
bound to tread on only one path,
that is democracy, and he also believed that less modernized
state who are automatically of low
level of education are more prone to be ruled by a dictator.
These claims have been disproved,
however, by political phenomenon such as the economic
development of non-democratic
countries especially those in the Middle East and the
non-modernization of democratic countries
such as India.
POLITICAL PREFERENCES AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
The most popular and widely accepted reason behind preferences
is the economic determinist
perspective which argues that a persons political preference is
determined that persons
economic class. According to this perspective, the way of
understanding an individual and his
decisions is by identifying the class he belongs in. Up until
this day and age, the primacy of
economic conditions stands to be undisputed.
There are other factors that determine political preferences
though, such as gender, religion,
ethnicity, or nationality.
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On PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES, ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND POLITICAL
REFORM by
JOEL ROCAMORA
According to Rocamora (1998), the most important characteristic
of Philippine political parties
is that they are parties of the elite1. They do not compose of
elite men and women but of men
and women who are retainers or followers of the elite. They are
not the elite themselves but
the people who support them and their causes are. In fact, men
who run for office are usually
lay people or ordinary men who have been influenced and promised
to be supported by wealthy
families. This is not an unusual practice. Wealthy families have
been supporting political
candidates for the apparent reason that once seated in the
office and vested with powers, these
officials will come in handy in whatsoever political actions the
elite family wishes to undertake.
No need even to lobby, everything is an i-Phone away. Obviously,
they wouldnt spend money,
time, and effort without meaning to do business. Electoral
supports given by elite families are
more or less what one might consider as investments for a
business venture.
According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society
there is always a class that rules
and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that
is composed of individuals who
are capable of performing all political functions and
monopolizes power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the
ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are
organized and are composed of
superior individuals. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is
always the Iron Law of
Oligarchy in all forms of human organization be it a club, a
council, or a political party.
However, Rocamora sees the iron law of oligarchy working behind
politicians. Instead of them
controlling the government and performing political functions,
they have politicos at work to do
that for them.
This posits a serious problem on the purity of intention and
integrity of the politicos. Do they alot
land A to resettle 200 homeless families or do they allow the
wealthy to build commercial
buildings? Do they give away the lands to the dying farmers or
do they strategically place
delaying tactics on the plenary and mask them as laws or
petitions or motions? Most of the time,
the presence of elite support does not even give room for
dilemma. Unsurprisingly, why would
1 During the 17th century, the word elite refers to commodities
of special excellence. Later, the word is used to denote superior
social groupslike crack military units. In the social sciences, the
concept of elite gained prominence through the writings of Vilfredo
Pareto and Gaeteno Mosca who were both reacting to Marxs concept of
class (Magno, n.d).
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politicians create policies that go against the will of the
families that funded their campaign, that,
in effect, place them to office?
Furthermore, despite the elite classes towering political
parties and candidates who then
become government official, Rocamora (1998) points out that,
what has kept the Philippine
state weak is that no one class has been strong enough to bend
the state to its will. That is,
despite strong hold of elite families to politicians, the elite
class themselves do not have a power
strong enough to bend the state to their will. This is primarily
because the elite class have
divided themselves each to their own fancy. Each of them has
their own personal agenda. They
are not unified which makes it impossible for the government to
create and implement a solid
and coherent economic development strategy or an institution
capable of providing a reliable
regulatory agenda for the Philippine economy. However this
argument of Rocamora could not
hold water, for even with a unified elite with their shared
goals, there is no assurance or
guarantee that policies and legislations will be for the best of
the majority if not the entirety of
the Filipinos. For one, the elite class may agree among
themselves decisions that are gratuitous
to them but onerous to the working class and the proletariat.
Centralizing power on one class
has been one of Marxs greatest struggles. Powerful elite does
not automatically accelerate the
social positions of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat to a
degree. In fact, direct benefits are
vested only to the elite themselves and everything will occur at
elite Canutes behest. This point
of Rocamora also fails to take into account the ability of the
masses to establish their own
political destiny via their conscious self-organization.
Anchored on the same premise of elite support, Rocamora
identifies yet another problem with
political parties in the Philippines, the shifting character of
membership and absence of
ideological or programmatic differences. This problem is
actually a combination of two
problems. First is the shifting character of membership and
second is the absence of ideological
or programmatic differences. Albeit, the two are related for the
shifting character of membership
is usually brought about by the absence of ideological or
programmatic differences. This says a
lot about our politicians for not only do they have high
tendencies to of being unresisting and
susceptible; they are also without principle or word of honour.
The persistence of political
butterflies in the Philippines is a manifestation of the
shifting character of membership.
Politicians change from one political party to another every
election primarily on the basis of the
partys reputation and popularity and not on the principles by
which the party has been founded
or the ideology it advocates. These political butterflies are
often considered guest candidates
that can belong to more than one party. In effect, they are
playing safe. The more apt term for
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this shifting character of membership is political prostitution.
In fact, political prostitution has a lot
of similarities with prostitution itself. For one, prostitutes
are euphemised as GROs or Guest
Relation Officers, close enough to be guest candidates. And
secondly, in both prostitutions,
there is the want of ideologies or principles.
Political ideologies2 are essential in a political party. These
are the sets of beliefs or principles
on which all party programs, policies, and decisions must be
grounded on. These are the very
basic beliefs that lead politicos to their shared goals. Without
ideologies, party policies,
programs, and decisions become arbitrary and personalistic. A
party without an ideology or
program does not have a true objective; it runs about the globe
aimlessly, pointlessly. It is lost
easily in a grey forest, it is weak and without purpose; a
complete cipher, engineered only to
exist in the eyes of the public. Hence, it is a mere facade, a
surface, and inside it is hollow.
Without ideological differences, parties do not clash about
anything other than the personalities
that represent them. Election then turns into a popularity
contest rather than a contest of
leadership, skills, abilities, programs. The purpose of
election, which is to put into office
individuals capable of governance, is thus defeated. However,
the question of the nature of
ideologies advocated and their role in political life is another
question.
According to Grossholtz (1964, p.163), those who have power are
expected to use it to
promote their own interest and that of their family. There is no
moral contempt for those who
benefit from their power. It is as it should be, and a man would
be a fool to ignore his
opportunities. Those who have power lead interesting and
eventful lives. And those without
seek to establish close contact with those who do. This is what
happens in the Philippine
electoral system, there happens a series of power perpetuity by
those who have it and those
who do not struggle to have such by clinging on those who do.
This is one of the weaknesses of
Philippine political parties as pointed out by Rocamora; the
desperate effort of those who need
power to cling and ride along those that are powerful.
What Rocamora has not mentioned is the non-permanence of parties
in the Philippines, which
is a manifestation of the weakness of political parties. They
are created in a year and cease to
exist on the next elections unlike the established parties in
the United States-the Republicans
and the Democrats. The birth and death of major political
parties show that, indeed, parties
2 The word ideology was first used by French Philosopher Destutt
de Tracy (1754-1836) and originally referred to a
new science of ideas (literally an idea-ology). It was Tracys
hope that ideology would eventually be at par in popularity with
established sciences as zoology and biology.
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have no concrete foundations such as ideologies or programs, or
strong membership. These
absences qualify the Philippines as a state that possesses a
weak and poor electoral system
and then, of course, administration.
Another electoral problem cited by Hix and Whiting (2012) that
Rocamora was not able to
identify is the following;
For example, some citizens would like the government to spend
more money on education and
healthcare while others would like the government to reduce
taxes. Then, how do these
preferences translate into actions? For example, when voting in
elections, do most citizens vote
expressively, for the party whose policies most closely match
their political preferences; or do
they vote strategically, for a party which they prefer less but
which has a higher chance of
winning? And, how do parties respond to voters? Do they stick
with their policies and try to
persuade the voters to support them or do they adapt their
policies to try to win as many votes
as possible?
THE PHILIPPINE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
In the Philippine electoral system, nobody loses. Cheating is so
rampant, its either you win or
youve been cheated. In 2012, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo has been (hospital)
arrested for allegedly committing Electoral Sabotage during the
2004 elections where she won
over famous movie actor Fernando Poe Jr. Allegations of padding
and shaving directed to Mrs.
Arroyo have begun when some of her conversations with then
Commissioner Garcillano were
wiretapped and recording thereof have been released. After 8
years, and now without
Presidential immunity, Mrs. Arroyo undergoes trial and denies
allegations.
During the 1992 election, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
contested before the Commission of
Election and the courts the results of the Presidential election
claiming that she has been
cheated by Fidel Ramos who has lagged behind her by a
significant margin in the first four days
of the vote-counting. Until today, whether or not cheating did
occur, nobody can tell. During the
snap-elections between Marcos and Aquino, the former was alleged
to have manipulated the
results of the election in order to stay in the Palace.
During the 2013 midterm election, a display of poor electoral
system persisted; from shifting
membership of parties to the lack of ideological differences.
For one, the prevalence of guest
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candidates such as Loren Legarda, Grace Poe, and Chiz Escudero
manifested the shift of
membership in political parties. There may be nothing
unconstitutional or immoral in guest
candidates but it allows the electoral system to be perceived as
a battle of party colours and
jingles. Another manifestation of the electoral weakness was the
existence of a group
organized for electoral ends but did not really exist as a
political party but with the functions
thereofthe team Pnoy. Evidently, the team subscribed to what
Grossholtz described as the
need of the inferior to cling to those who are in power. The
undeniable popularity of President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III who has had impressive trust ratings
(compared to his
predecessors) enabled politicians eying government seats to have
earned significant numbers
of votes. Those who trust the President have surely chosen
whosoever the latter deemed
deserving to the government. The problem that sits with this
scenario is the weak party chain it
cuffs among its members who are united solely on the bass of
patronage and popularity. They
belong to a team primarily because the team-leader is popular
and can harvest them enough
votes to win regardless of their stands and differences during
elections3. This incoherent
membership and lack of shared goals (except to win elections)
aggravated by the lack of
ideological or programmatic differences nulls the very reason
for the existence of political
parties.
A TWO PARTY SYSTEM?
One of the comparisons cited in this paper earlier was the
Philippine electoral system vis-a-vis
the U.S. electoral system that follows a two party system. With
the existing problems raised by
Rocamora in his paper, the next logical step is to identify a
solution. That is, will a two party
system counter the flawed political tradition of shifts and lack
of ideological differences?
Apparently, a two-party system regulates the roster of
candidates who could run for office and a
clearer demarcation between parties and party platforms will be
drawn. When there are only two
parties, the difference of one party from the other will be
highlighted and it will allow the parties
to select their best contender for election rather than
presenting before the pool of voters
different candidates who may prove to be liabilities rather than
assets of the nation.
This writer proposes that the major difference between the
parties in a two-party system should
be based on the extent of government functions. On one end of
the pole, is the socialist
3 However, the point of the Presidents popularity and its
ability to influence people was not mentioned by
Rocamora.
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perspective that the government should provide for its people
and that it must handle major
economic affairs and institutions. On the other hand is the
neo-utilitarian perspective of minimal
state intervention where the state intervenes as less as
possible leaving most of state and
economic affairs to private individuals or institutions. The
former should be called the
Conservatives while the latter the Liberals.
The question then is whether or not a two party-system
eliminates the elite power over
politicians or as Rocamora puts it, creates a more coherent goal
among the elite. Logically, a
two-party system concentrates elite support so that if a
division should occur, division occurs
only on two major parties rather than one that is distributed
unequally. Should there be a clash
between elite goals; the clash exists only two-fold. But whether
or not total elimination of elite
rule is achieved is a question of ideological preferences and
party-platforms of the winning
candidates.
The existence of close ties between a President and a candidate
or an appointee which is really
a patron-client relationship is hardly dispensable. This writer
argues that choosing kin to run an
office is not so much a detrimental act as long as it is backed
up by meritocracy. In fact, the
beauty of having closely bounded people in the government is
that there becomes an internal
coherence and a corporate identity. Internal coherence in that
the executive is more able to
dispense its duties with people who have parallel perspectives
with that of the President, thus a
coherent government goal, and corporate identity in that the
government becomes a single
unified entity.
What the country needs is a stronger Omnibus Election Code that
will regulate all candidates in
party membership so that stern requirements based on beliefs and
philosophies are imposed. It
should also be the directive of the Commission on Elections to
prohibit the existence of political
parties without any clear mandate or advocacy and inhibit
commercials that are personalistic
and particularistic as may be defined by law.
In a morsel of logic, what Rocamora shows is the importance of
political parties in
reconstructing a new political landscape. Elections, afterall,
are the outsets of good governance.
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On GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
The prime reason this country has not been able to flourish in
the Post-Martial Law era
is because it lacks good governance. The administrations that
have held the government after
the Marcos regime have attempted, but in vain, to put the
countrys economy back where it had
been before, that was next to Japan. Even the economists and the
great minds that have ruled
this nation have faltered what they have overseen although the
key is to focus on the countrys
quality of governance. The quality of governance affects the
participation of the people; their
reactions and responses, and the political, economical and
administrative institutions and
services and so in order to effectively carry out the duties of
the government, its shall be rooted
on the basic principles of good governance and the rule of
law.
The article on good governance and the rule of law points out
that in order to achieve national
development, an amalgamation of good governance and a stable and
predictable rule of law
that shall exercise proper justice regardless of social status
of political considerations shall
occur. To put it simply, national development equals good
governance plus the rule of law. The
question then is how to determine good governance and the rule
of law and how does one
achieve both.
The irony that embodies this article is that the Philippine
Constitution explicitly states that the
Philippines is a democratic and republican state. As a
democratic country, the people expect
good governance in return of the trust they have vested upon the
elected candidates and as a
republican state, the rule of law should be strictly implemented
without favour or prejudice. This
is apparently lacking in the current political state that the
Philippines is in.
One of the beautiful features of the article is its honest
assessment of the challenges that
badger this nation and thwarts its development. The first
challenge identified was the question
of legitimacy. In a query of power residence, power lies where
men believe it resides. That is to
say that in the outset of a legitimacy question, power slips
from the hands of those who have
engineered the process of attaining it. During the 2004
elections, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo was accused of sabotaging election results by
padding and shaving by a
million votes. This accusation has exacerbated when a wire-taped
conversation of the former
President and a former commissioner was released to the public.
Although the tape was
inadmissible to the court by the principle of the fruit of the
poisonous tree, it has dispersed
enough poison on the pool of people from whom all government
power emanates. Perhaps so,
-
the exacerbation of this legitimacy question is due to the very
fact that we are a democratic
state and power comes from the people. It seems only logical
that a person whose power
allegedly did not come from the people should be unloved and
unpopular. As a point of
digression, a historical approach on the Gloria Chronicle will
show the ill-effects of election
engineering, which are the weak support system of the government
and the elusive recognition
of authority and legitimacy on the part of government. We can
account the legitimacy question
to the downfall of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Another challenge that the country faces is the predatory nature
of its government. As a third
world state, the presence of rent seekers becomes acceptable and
yet it is primarily because of
rent-seeking that we are left in this lowly state. Corruption is
so rampant in the Philippines, it has
become a standard operating procedure, an SOP, in a
non-standardized form. Corruption is not
a standardized commodity, it comes in different sizes and shapes
and so to think of corruption
as a purely monetary issue is a mistake. According to the World
Bank (1997) and the UNDP
(1998), corruption is the misuse or the abuse of public office
for private gain. It can come in
various forms and a wide array of illicit behaviour, such as
bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism,
graft, speed money, pilferage, theft, embezzlement,
falsification of records, kickbacks, influence
peddling, and campaign contributions (Balboa and Medallon,
2006). Incidentally, Balboa and
Medallon (2006) identify political legitimacy for the state
through democratic elections and
transfer of power and an effective political opposition and
representative government as the
first requisite for good governance.
The Philippine Development Plan of 2011-2012 further identifies
lack of accountability as a
major issue concerning good governance. Without the governments
assurance that it will be
accountable and transparent in all its decisions and dealings,
there will always be an easy
pocket to be thieved, an accessible cheque to be filled out, a
poor and ignorant Filipino to be
preyed.
These challenges have brought about several other aftermaths
especially on the investment
climate. Thus, these challenges have collectively created a
political instability in the country.
Albeit, the main concern of the article is eliminating
corruption in all its forms. The Global
Competitiveness Index Report for 2011-2012 listed corruption and
inefficient government
bureaucracy as the top most problematic factors for doing
business in the Philippines (Philippine
Development Plan, 2011-2006). The article has provided different
statistical data that prove
that corruption is one of the major problems of the country such
as the Corruption Perception
-
Index of 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the
Global Competitive Index, which
all indicate the need of the government to strengthen its
anti-corruption campaign and formulate
a more substantial course of action for good governance. This
writer believes that this course of
action should be able to eradicate corruption systematically and
logically in order for it to attain a
long-term effect.
The effects that corruption has upon good governance are
apparent in the gutters and streets of
Manila but there is more to corruption than meets the eye. First
of all, corruption, along with
political instability and weak rule of law, has scurried
investors away from the country. Because
of this, the country experiences low capital formation, lesser
job opportunities, lower household
income, lower household spending, and thus a lower Gross
Domestic Product. In an article I
have written in 2011, I pointed out that,
The 5.9 increase in GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2011 was
attributed to several conditions
including remittances and employment. However, the ultimate
condition (sufficient condition)
that has caused the increase is the increase in household
spending. Without this, growth would
have contracted. In the study of economics, the most important
determinant of an economic
condition is production and supply. An increase in household
spending shows direct relationship
between production and supply such that the greater the demand,
the greater the revenues and
incomes generated and a greater supply means maximization of
resources and employment at
the elementary level. This ostensibly delivers direct positive
results unto the values of goods
produced and services rendered that is the GDP of the country.
GDP growth must happen when
household spending increases. This is so because household
spending augmentation happens
only when economic stability is significantly increasing. One of
the contributing factors for this
augmentation is the high employment rate. Because employment
increased, individuals tend to
spend more. In economics, there is a direct relationship between
income and normal goods.
This increase in employment then is caused by the increase in
public investments. Public
investors create more job opportunities. However, these public
investors are swayed into the
Philippines due to the increase in confidence.
This writer along with several other members of the government
identifies confidence of public
investors to the government as the prime necessary conditions
that brought about the increase
in GDP.
-
Moreover, public services are not carried out properly when
corruption occurs; government
projects do not have the quality they ought to have because
funds have been manipulated
amongst the implementing agencies, the suppliers, and the rest
of the other who have connive
for a kickback or they have been diversified for other purpose.
Poverty-reduction programs have
also been pockets thieved by predators or rent-seekers, hence,
if minimal, decrease of poverty
rate of the country. Private investors are not except from the
corruptive tendencies of the
government. Most of the private investors shudder to invest in
the Philippines primarily because
of the uncertainty of investors whose legitimacy is questioned
and secondly because of the
prospect and reality of biased rules and extortive practices4.
These second-thoughts are
understandable considering the amount of money that may be lost
when all these individuals
really aim to do is serious business. Or as President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III puts it, Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap.
The ways of eliminating corruption provided in the article could
be identified into two; one is
curative while the other one is preventive, which very well
proves that indeed corruption may be
eliminated although it has been endemic in the country and that
it may indeed cease to exist.
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY
The first solution provided by the article is an effective
delivery of public service. A morsel of
logic will show us that the harder the procedures to deliver a
public service are, the harder it is
for that service to be delivered. This is one of the
reconstructions a Philippine Perestroika must
consider. When in order to deliver service A, steps 1 to 50 must
be followed, it is more likely that
service A will not be delivered at all. In fact, fifty steps
only provided 50 avenues for corruption
on the part of the implementing agency and the receiver of the
service. On the part of the
recipient of the service, in order to avoid the cumbersome
process, he/she resorts to illicit
bureaucratic standard operating procedures of paying in money to
hasten the delivery of service
without undergoing proper procedure or more commonly called as
lagay5 by Filipinos to avoid
the bureaucratic red tape.
The first solution to avoid corruption in this form is to
prohibit predators from coming near easy
preys and temptations from nearing victims. That is, government
agencies are better off
4 Ibid.
5 The term lagay can be translated as placement or more
appropriately as placement fees. Although this is
illegal as it is paid to a government official to skip and not
consider proper procedures, this has become permissible in
different government institutions in the Philippines.
-
applying impersonal transactions. This way, corruption can
easily be monitored and identified
and bribery is less likely to happen. Reasonably, these forms of
corruption such as bribery and
extortion are easier done in a face-to-face transaction rather
than impersonal transactions
where procedures are dealt and followed online or via Short
Message Services (SMS). By using
online procedures, consideration of not following proper
procedures and resorting to illicit
placement-fees or bribery is instantly extinguished. Not only
will this prevent corruption, this
will also give ease and convenience to the people since they no
longer have to wait for hours in
a file in the Land Transportation Service or Department of
Foreign Affairs. The problem with this
system of online transactions is that it goes proportionately
with computer literacy. Unless and
until everyone is literate, manual transactions cannot be
totally removed and so then is
corruption. Hence, impersonal transactions should come hand in
hand with a perestroika of
manual government procedures that shortens but efficiently
delivers the process until finally
everyone is literate enough to access online services.
Regardless, impersonal services
decrease modes of corruption significantly. The article strongly
upholds the implementation of
an Anti-Read Tape Act (ARTA) in order to eliminate corruption in
government agencies.
Another solution is the increase in compensation of civil
servants, which aims to improve their
economic wellbeing and raise their morale6 but in real terms
attempt only to make them
satisfied enough to avoid corrupt practices. In relation to
corruption, salary increase may have
insignificant effects. This writer believes that corruption is
pervasive and continuous as
opportunities to corrupt are pervasive and continuous.
Regardless of the amount that a corrupt
official earns from his salary, as long as there are
opportunities to corrupt, these opportunities
will not be allowed to slip off. So this writer believes that
salary has little, if not zero, effect upon
corrupt acts. What wage increases does however is that it
encourages qualified people to work
for the government thereby increasing the chances of achieving
good governance and quality
public service. In this time where the Philippines is allegedly
experiencing brain drain with the
migration of experienced and qualified workers to other
countries, the need to attract workers to
work in government offices increases. To use salary or wage
increase as an incentive to work
for in government offices for the Filipino people is an
effective incentive. One of the factors why
the government cannot carry out its duties and obligations
properly is because those that are
bound to carry them out are not qualified to do so. In executive
services, for instance, 47
percent of the occupied positions are held by non-eligible
individuals. This is partly due to the
vast appointive powers of the President who could appoint
officials in his discretion even if he
bases his decisions on political accommodations rather than on
merit and fitness and partly
6 Ibid.
-
because those who are qualified to work in government
institutions choose to work for private
employers or international companies for the greener pasture. On
the point of vast appointive
power of the President, the best regulation not to limit it but
to hold the President accountable
for the misgivings of his appointee and to hold the appointee
responsible, if not automatically
discharged from office should he be deemed incompetent, and with
enough proof of non-
performance of duty.
As a take on Philippine perestroika and glasnost, this writer
believes that one way of regulating
government agencies delivery of service thus guaranteeing
efficient public service and
eliminating corruption is to hold heads of the offices
accountable for the workings in their
departments by discharging the from office should there be a
presence of corruption in any kind
and inefficient public service. This writer recommends that an
annual human perception survey
on the performance of the different departments of the
government be made and the three to be
considered most corrupt or the three least efficient be
subjected to investigation by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Should irregularities be found to have occurred
in one of these offices (if not in
all), the department head will be immediately removed from his
post in place of a new one who
knows his fate should he tolerate corruption and inefficacy
under his nose. This writer also
believes that compensation increase should be made alongside a
scrap and build policy for
those that are ineligible are in effect given incentives for
their incompetence and will then grip
tighter on their seats lest they not enjoy the wage-increases.
This has made the clearing and
qualifying process more complicated but a systematic policy of
identifying the under-qualified
and encouraging the qualified must be executed.
Another factor is attributed to the poor public service delivery
in the country; this is the inability
of Local Government Units (LGUs) to meet the expectations of the
public regarding service
delivery. This is what this writer wishes to call the economics
of politics where a service
shortage occurs when the service supplied does not meet the
services demanded. In order to
achieve service equilibrium, local government units shall have
both the ability and the
willingness to dispense public service. As to the question of
willingness, this is usually an innate
characteristic that is quantifiable only through actions but
ability is another question. One can be
willing and not have the ability or one can have the ability and
not be willing. One of the
common impediments for public service delivery by LGUs is their
failure to raise sufficient funds
for local developments. LGUs have become unduly dependent on
Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) transfers from the national government and have failed to
manage their financial
resources effectively and sustainably (Philippine Development
Plan, 2011-2016). While the
-
Local Government Code has vested LGUs a semi-local autonomy and
administrative powers for
local governance, the national government through its agencies
still delivers services that
should have been the LGUs. This overlap and redundancy of
functions confuses the system of
accountability for local services and encumbers the national
government with more tasks
therefore making it spend more money that should have been
allotted for national development
plans.
INTEGRITY
Seemingly, the problem with integrity is that it is
non-quantifiable. There are no hard and fast
rules to quantify the degree by which an act or an actor has
integrity. But what integrity is is that
it is pure. There are no other shades of integrity, it is
monochromatic. The maintenance of the
purity of a persons or an institutions integrity is where the
challenge lies and a stained integrity
must be treated with stiff penalties.
As clich as it is, the Constitution explicitly qualifies a
public office as a public trust and,
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with
the utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
In order to keep the integrity of a public office, the integrity
of those run it must also be kept.
The law assigns the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a pivotal role
in ensuring integrity and
deterring corruption in the public sector7. The sanction against
corruption is the prosecution and
conviction of corrupt government official who although some may
have shields of immunity may
be impeached. The problem with the Office of the Ombudsman is
that the Ombudsman and the
deputies are appointed by the President. After the
administration of President Arroyo, no
investigations were made by former Ombudsman Merceditas Guiterez
regarding the anomalous
transactions the former President incurred during her
incumbency, reason for the filing of
impeachment case against Guiterez and her resignation during the
Aquino incumbency.
Nevertheless, the damage has been done and for several years,
the unpopular President was
able to scram from the law. Even during the Aquino
Administration, the same effect of
appointment is seen. During the offset of the impeachment trial
against former Chief Justice
Renato Corona, opposition groups believed the Office of the
Ombudsman was used as an
7 See page 210 of Philippine Development Plan, 2011-2012.
-
apparatus by the raging President in order to ascertain the oust
of the Chief Justice. As long as
the Office of the Ombudsman exists at the appointing power of a
political entity such as the
President, this writer believes that the office will never be
always immune to bias and political
accommodations. But then again, the office exists as a
constitutional commission that assists
the President in his performance of executive functions.
RULE OF LAW
There is a reason why the United States of America is a
Republican state and nowhere in their
Constitution could one find their claim to democracy. The reason
is simple; their history is a
victim of democracy. When one studies American History, it is
seen that once upon a time,
when they followed the precepts of democracy and the liberality
it entailed, they turned into a
mobocratic state and the people abused the privileges of
democracy. There were times when
the people decided whether a man should be executed or not and
how the execution was to be
performed. This has made a lot of people even the government,
most specially the government,
unsafe and unsecured and so when the Constitution was drafted,
its framers made sure that the
bitter history will not repeat itself by choosing to be a
Republican rather than Democratic state.
To this day, US remains to be a Republican state, nothing more
and nothing less, although
political parties are either Republicans or Democrats.
Republicanism adheres to the rule of law
rather than the rule of majority. It is then on the premise that
the rule of law should triumph over
the desires and the actions of the people that Republicanism has
been founded.
Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution identified
this nation as both a Democratic
and a Republican. Evidently, the political paradox is
extinguished. The Philippines is a
Democratic state in that the key players in the government are
elected by the people by a
popular vote and a Republican State in that in all aspects the
rule of law should be upheld
regardless of political considerations or popular opinion. The
rule of law is essential is
administering justice to the people.
Justice is thought of as the proper administration of law; the
proper and perpetual disposition of
legal matters or disputes to render every man his due1. But
before it has become what is now
known as a universal hope for victims and prosecutors, it has
first been a victim to different
perspectives and a prosecutor to different scholars. Plato,
Aristotle, Rousseau, Kant, and
Aquinas, among others, had something to say about justice, what
is just and what is unjust.
Plato identified justice as the universal virtue, the single and
greatest good, and injustice as the
-
universal vice, the single greatest evil2. Aristotles narrower
valuation of justice is fair equality
which is to be remembered forever in legal philosophy.
However, one of those whose words truly marked is Glaucon who,
although appeared only in
Platos masterpiece that is the Republic, has presented a unique
perspective nevertheless.
What makes his idea of justice unique is that it is for him only
a lesser evil and not an absolute
good nor a universal virtue as what other philosophers claim.
Glaucon believed that to do
injustice is good but to suffer injustice is evil and that
justice, being only in the middle, a
compromise, is neither good nor evil but only a lesser evil.
Glaucon presents this idea on an egoistic point of view that
sees men as essentially selfish. This
is to say that men only do something from the motive of
self-interest. For Glaucon, as for
everyone who adheres to this theory, when a person does
something good, it is only because
he intends to benefit from that good. So that, when a person has
an opportunity to benefit
unfairly and not be punished in the process, that person will
seize the opportunity even at the
expense of violating moral dogmas. It is on this very principle
that Glaucon directs his concept
of justice that he expounds with the legend of the Ring of
Gyges.
Should Glaucon be right then all the more should a tough rule of
law be implemented, that
which could resist the desperate efforts of egoistic individuals
to gain incognito.
By upholding the rule of law, corrupt practices are prevented
for would-be offenders would see
the consequences in stored for them should they act against the
rule of law and should they
challenge the very barest essentials of etiquette and conduct.
Corrupt officials act with
discernment. In the process of selecting the most appropriate
methods of corruption, the would-
be offender will also consider the penalties to be imposed upon
him especially if he sees that
many others like him have been punished severely. He will also
have lesser connivances
thereby making corruption degrees more difficult that it was
when nobody seemed to care
whether or not corruption takes place.
CITIZENS PARTICIPATION
The active role that the citizens have played in the three
People Power Revolutions that
occurred indicates a positive status of citizens participation.
In fact, the country prides itself with
citizen participation. According to the Philippine Development
Plan (2011:16), Citizens
-
participation has been one of the strengths of Philippine
Governance. This may not be entirely
true as the existence of the other issues in the Philippines
could only be attributed to the
citizens apathy such as those issues concerning political
dynasties and/or patronage politics.
But the active participation of Civil Society Organizations in
aid to the government is one of the
most remarkable political phenomena that the Philippines can be
proud of.
In the simplest terms, CSOs, including NGOs, fill in the
shortcomings of the government. It is
only apt that the government provide more incentives for CSOs in
performance of what should
be an executive function of the government. These CSOs must also
be protected from militant
forces that deters peoples participation
POLITICAL PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS
According to the article, the current state of the country can
be attributed to the different
historical phenomena that have stormed this nation. These
include; (a) the dominance of elite
interests both local and nationalin politics and political
contests, this is very similar to what
Rocamora cited as a major problem in the Philippine Electoral
System and had thus been
discussed in this paper; (b) the absence of political parties
that exact accountability from
individual politicians based on principled party platforms, this
too has been identified during the
previous article; (c) the weakness and subservience of the
bureaucracy relative to political
class, this subservience can be attributed to the Philippiness
culture of patronage and
clientelism which will be discussed further later; (d) the
unprecedented power and discretion of
the executive branch that encourages both patronage politics and
grand corruption, and finally
(e) the corruption of elections through patronage and money
politics.
Of all the areas identified by the article to need mending, this
writer believes that priority should
be given to the political process and system.
The dominance of elite interests both local and nationalin
politics and political contests.
As have been discussed, the ability of the elite group to
support political candidates and the
need of the candidates to be supported equates to the dominance
of elite interests during and
even after elections. Unfortunately, these elite interests do
not really serve well for the people.
In fact, the interests of the elite are usually contradictory to
the interests of the proletariats for
-
the owners of lands cannot simply divine to doll out their lands
to the peasants who have
worked hard for them.
This writer believes that in order to eradicate the dominance of
elite interests in the government,
an electoral reform should take place.
The absence of political parties that exact accountability from
individual politicians based on
principled party platforms.
From north to west, a platform-based political party is elusive.
An average Filipino may not even
know the difference in platform of one political party from
another. Usually, its just the difference
in colour, the difference in jingles, and the difference in
names that parties highlight and a cross-
cut difference is not really apparent. This is bad already in a
university election, what does that
make local and national elections?
This writer believes that the precedence of popularity,
name-recall, or physique over ideologies,
platforms, and track-records has been an indispensable part of
the Philippines political culture.
Political Culture is the system of empirical beliefs, expressive
symbols and values which
defines the situation in which political action takes place
(Verba, 1965). This culture has been
born out of years of practice and custom. So much of the
problems that this country faces are
brought about by the political culture we have. The choice, for
example, of electing popular
government officials rather than deserving government officials
has caused the government to
collapse and threatened this nation to an unredeemable fall.
In order to address this issue, this writer believes that an
anti-political dynasty law should be
legislated and that political parties should not be allowed to
exist unless clear platforms and
ideologies are in place. This writer does not see why this is
hard as it does not even violate any
democratic principle. Furthermore, a two-party system must be
adopted in the Philippines in
order to empower political parties and in order for them to not
exist at the favour of popular
candidates.
The weakness and subservience of the bureaucracy relative to
political class.
Political classes have crossed their borders. But doesnt
anything political do? Apart from the
prior recommendations of this writer to establish a clear and
stern political system, this writer
-
also recommends the organization of non-elite individuals into
manageable and ordered groups.
The government should encourage the formation of labour unions
and other organizations of
similar nature in order to empower and create a group that will
ouster political elite.
Moscas (1964:9) elite theory states that, in every society there
is always a class that rules and
a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that is
composed of individuals who are
capable of performing all political functions and monopolizes
power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the
ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are
organized and are composed of
superior individuals.
The best counter then is to organize another group that will be
ruled by individuals superior to
their class. The very basic principles of simple arithmetic show
that an organized many could
easily ouster an organized few, ceteris paribus that is.
The unprecedented power and discretion of the executive branch
that encourages both
patronage politics and grand corruption.
This writer agrees that the power and discretion of the
executive branch have stretched to an
unreasonable parameter. This vast power has deeply contributed
to the downfall of the nation
as different Presidents have abused the powers granted unto them
by the constitution and have
even gone as far as making a constitution that is favourable to
themselves. Because the
President can easily manipulate the apparatuses of the state,
the Philippine has repeatedly
morphed into a Zairan state.
For one, there is the existence of what is seemingly a
Philippine version of the Zairian
presidential cliques (especially during elections). Members of
this clique usually seek the
favour and approval of the patron who is the President. This
culture of patronage is prevalent in
the Philippines and is most likely due to the said vastness of
executive power. According to
Kimura (1992), one of the most dominant political cultures is
patron-client relationship where
the socio-economic status (patrons) uses his own influence and
resources to provide protection
or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who,
for his part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal
services, to the patron. Carl Lande
(1965) extends this idea to the Philippine context where he
observes that patron-client
relationships exist from great and wealthy political leaders to
leaders in each province down to
-
lesser gentry politicians in the towns, down further to petty
leaders in each village, and down
finally to the clients of the latter: the ordinary peasantry
According to Evans (1989), because
decisions are eminently up for sale to private elites, the state
lacks autonomy.
The persistence of patronage politics has brought about several
political phenomena that have
brought this country to shame such as the martial rule of an
uber-powerful dictator, the electoral
fraud of then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and even the
impeachment of former Chief
Justice Renato Corona who has been prey to the cosmic power of
the President to use
government apparatuses in his favour.
Unfortunately, although the Constitution guarantees protection
against grave abuse of
discretion, the persistence of patronage politics puts the
provision to shame.
The corruption of elections through patronage and money
politics.
Politics starts at the moment a political candidate appears on
TV. to say Gusto ko happy ka. In
order to carry out good governance, a clean and honest election
must take place. Campaigning
period is probably the filthiest time of the year; convoys and
families are massacred, people are
paid for their vote, and worst of all, Loren Legarda starts to
prostitute herself (if thats even a
valid verb).
On FAMILY AND POLITICS: DYNASTIC PERSISTENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
by Pablo
Querubin
From the age of consciousness, we have been taught that the
family is the basic unit of the
society. It is essentially where society begins; even the most
essential institution in a polity. This
same belief could not be understated in Political Science
especially in the field of Political
Dynamics where the family is qualified as the starting point of
influence and power. As Querubin
(2010) puts it, not only can families exercise their power
outside formal institutions of
government, but they can also take over these institutions and
capture the political system.
Even in the study of the Philippine electoral system, it is
clear that candidates aim to affect
families instead of individuals for it is more common for
families to have a single decision rather
than the arbitrary desires of individuals. However, this is not
just the case in the most political
systems such as in the Philippines where more than 50 percent of
the elected
-
Congressmen8 and governors have had a previous relative in
office (Querubin, 2010) and two of
the Presidents are children of former Presidents, Macapagal and
Aquino. Here, families play a
larger role and this role aims to centralize power among
themselves and distribute it to their
heirs. Instead of candidates simply influencing families,
families in the Philippines take on their
political destinies and pass them from one generation to another
and sometimes even taking
on government positions simultaneously.
This is a system that has been going on in the Philippines.
Politicians who win power seek to
maintain it for generations and even generations not certain. In
a dynastic culture, power is
centralized only on one family. We have been born out of a
history of political dynasties. In the
pre-colonial times, we were ruled by Datus and Rajas who hold
power based on lineage rather
than meritocracy. Traditionally, the first sons of these Rajas
or Datus are the direct heirs to the
thrones. During the Spanish colonization which lasted for almost
400 years, political power was
concentrated to a small mestizo elite commonly referred to as
principalia[9]9. Instead of
establishing a strong centralized state, power at that time was
disseminated among the various
elite families in the provinces. These families have the right
to hold land, vote, and serve in
positions of local political power. The most important position
at the local level was the
gobernadorcillo (petty governor), elected by the principalia
class from its own ranks and put in
charge of collecting taxes and administering justice (Querubin,
2010).
The problem that arises with this system in a time of
modernization, globalization, and
McDonalization is that it violates the constitutional provision
of equal opportunity to public
service10 which veers away from the precepts of democracy and
justice. The framers of the
Constitution have seen to it that the oligarchic feature of a
dynastic system is prohibited in the
Philippines. However, despite this constitutional mandate for
equal opportunity, the existence of
political dynasties is prevalent for this provision is
considered a dead provision, a non-self-
executing provision that is inactive until backed up by a
sanctioning law. In fact, the law explicitly
states that the state shall... prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined be law11. That means
that this provision of the constitution needs another law to
define it and to set its penalties.
Without this law, the provision regarding political dynasties
has no teeth and thus cannot
8 Compared to USs 7%.
9 Simbuhan (2005) and Cullinane (2003) claim that principalias
were the maharlikas of the pre-colonial
Philippines. When the encomienda system was eliminated, the
maharlikas became the principalias. It was a hereditary status.
10
Section 26, Art. 2 of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. 11
Ibid.
-
penalize its offenders. This is why political dynasties have
been multiplying at a frequency that
is seemingly faster than the speed of light. There is a
persistence of political dynasties in the
Philippines.
According to Moscas (1923:9) elite theory, in every society
there is always a class that rules
and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is the minority that
is composed of individuals who
are capable of performing all political functions and
monopolizes power while the rules class is
always the majority that is directed and controlled by the
ruling minority. Furthermore, the
minority always triumphs over the other because they are
organized and are composed of
superior individuals. Unfortunately, these minorities refer to
the dynastic families in the
Philippines. As Robert Michels (1977) puts it, there is always
the Iron Law of Oligarchy in all
forms of human organization be it a club, a council, or a
political party. According to Querubin
(2011) a more recent literature by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
emphasize the way by which
elite persistence may undermine attempts to reform institutions,
leading to captured
democracies" wherein economic institutions and policies
disproportionately benefit the elite12.
It is called a dynasty for its very nature; it entails power, it
is driven to ruling, and it is
meticulously designed to stand the tests of time. Because of
this and the toothless provision of
the law seeking to eradicate political dynasties is challenged.
What makes things worse is that
legislators do not pass the law to back up the provision with
its necessary dentures. If you think
about it, no person would annihilate themselves especially if it
talks about power, wealth, and
fame. This is the very reason why no law has been stipulated
regarding political dynasty since
1986.
According to Timberman (1991), the Philippines exists in a
culture of tradition. The masses
prefer to follow the tradition that they have been accustomed to
which accounts to why Filipinos
tend to vote based on the popularity of a personality rather
than on the bases of ideologies,
beliefs, or philosophies, which is what modern political culture
is. Because of this, we see a
problem with the credibility of choice by which Philippine
politicians have been elected to office.
This aggravates the problem of political dynasty since the
choice of the masses mostly favours
those that come from families that the people are already
accustomed to govern them leaving
out those that are new to politics behind the line. In a study
conducted by Querubin (2010) in his
thesis entitled Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the
Philippine, it has been found
that,
12
Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and
Political Dynasties in the Philippines by Pablo Querubin.
-
Non-dynastic candidates who win their first election by a small
margin are 4 times more likely to
have a posterior relative in office than those who lost their
first election by a small margin and
never serve... Moreover, in 40% of the 79 provinces, the
Governor and the Congressmen are
related.
This data show that there is not only the existence but also the
persistence of political dynasty in
the Philippines especially in the local levels. This persistence
is continued as politicians
perpetuate their bloodline in politics. One of the major
concerns of Querubin (2010) is the
tendency of families to use political power to further their own
interests and appropriate rents at
the expense of the majority of the population. According to
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
(2006), power brokers tend to have the upper hand in
manipulating political as well as
economic resources to their advantage. This use of political and
economic resources for private
gain is what Balboa and Medalla (2006) call corruption. This is
to say that the concentration of
power on one family makes the system prone to corruption or John
Dalberg-Acton says it best,
power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
In fact in Robert Klitgaards
Strategies Against Corruption (1998), he identified monopoly of
power as a factor that results
to corruption along with discretion and absence of
accountability thus the formula C=M+D-A,
where C is corruption, M is monopoly of power, D is discretion,
and A is the absence of
accountability. In Alfred McCoys An Anarchy of Family, he shows
that in fact it is really just a
few that accounts for this strength and power. Who have shaped
its past, who are determining
its present, who are charting its future (De Quiros,
2012)13.
Furthermore, Querubin (2010) notes that the poorest provinces in
Cavite are those that have
been ruled by dynastic clans. This literature shows that there
is a relationship between the
persistence of political dynasties and the economic status of
the province, which will be
measured in this study in terms of GDP and perception surveys.
The same literature shows that
incumbents have higher advantages in winning government office,
results of Querubins study
shows that incumbents vote share is 36 percentage points larger
than that of non-incumbent
opponents.
The inclusion of the anti-dynasty provision itself has been
subject to a formidable debate during
the drafting of the constitution. As constitutionalist Joaquin
Bernas recalls in his article entitled
Political Dynasties published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(2012);
13
Family Bonds by Conrado de Quiros, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer
-
The political dynasty provision was authored by Commissioner
Jose N. Nolledo. A similar
provision had already been rejected under the article on local
governments, but Nolledo
entertained the hope that the Constitutional Commission might
still approve one because, as he
said, It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision
in the Constitution is very popular
outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity inside
the Constitutional Commission.
He was also faintly hoping that Congress would do what the
commission would not do. Hence
his impassioned plea: And so I plead with the members of the
Commission to please approve
this provision. . . . [W]e leave it to Congress to determine the
circumstances under which
political dynasty is prohibited. The commission will not
determine hard and fast rules by which
political dynasty may be condemned. But I think this is a very
progressive provision and, in
consulting the people, the people will like this provision. I
hope the commission will hear the
plea of the people.
The thrust of the constitutional provision is to impose on the
state the obligation of guaranteeing
equal access to public office. Although the provision speaks in
terms of service, it is meant to be
a blow in the direction of democratizing political power.
Nolledo had the support of
Commissioner (now Comelec Commissioner) Rene Sarmiento, who
explained the rationale of
the provision thus:
By including this provision, we widen the opportunities of
competent, young and promising poor
candidates to occupy important positions in the government.
While it is true we have
government officials who have ascended to power despite accident
of birth, they are exceptions
to the general rule. The economic standing of these officials
would show that they come from
powerful clans with vast economic fortunes.
But strong contrary views were also expressed. Commissioner
Christian Monsods was brief: I
just want to make the motion to delete Section 20 [now 26],
first, because it has been argued
and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments and this
body has already made a
decision on the same point; and, secondly, for the reasons I
have stated, that I do not think we
should curtail the right of the people to a free choice on who
their political leader should be.
Commissioner Blas Ople for his part argued that what were called
dynasties were in fact not
the causes of social evils but the result of socio-economic
imbalances. He concluded that the
commission should address these socioeconomic imbalances
instead.
-
He also noted that even under present conditions, less
privileged citizens have succeeded in
establishing themselves politically. He added: In my own
province there are no longer any
dynasties. There are other provinces where you find the word
dynasty probably misapplied to a
distinguished family, let us say, to the Cojuangco and Aquino
family in Tarlac or the Padilla
family in Manila and Pangasinan, or the Rodrigo family in
Bulacan, or the Laurel family in
Batangas, and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in Rizal, the
Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya,
and Peps Bengzon has been calling my attention to the existence
now of a Bengzon line of
political officeholders in Pangasinan. This is not to say, Mr.
Presiding Officer, that the Philippine
society has been immobile. We see lots of evidence that, in
fact, people disadvantaged by the
accident of birth have indeed risen through their own efforts to
become successful competitors
of entrenched political dynasties in their provinces and cities.
I can sympathize with
Commissioner Nolledos concern about dynasties because he comes
from a province which
tends to be governed by political dynasties. Is that not right,
Mr. Presiding Officer?
Indeed, the question of an anti-dynasty law or provision
challenges the right of a citizen to vote
and be voted in the spirit of democracy, it essentially curtails
the right of the people to a free
choice on who their political leader should be (Monsod, 1986).
At a certain extent, the framers
of the constitution have posited a valid question. Does not an
anti-dynasty law discriminate
politicians who are born of politician family or parents?
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago attempted to answer this
question in the abstract portion of
the Anti-Dynasty Act which she has filed during the first
regular session of the upper legislative
chamber in 2011.
The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26
The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and
prohibit political dynasty
as may be defined by law.
To give force and effect to this provision, the playing field of
the political arena should be
leveled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to
aspire on even terms with those
from ruling politically dominant families.
Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the
system of extended families.
However, this extended family system, an beneficial concept when
applied to the social aspects
-
of human behavior, finds its pemicious effects in the political
arena where public office becomes
the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are
well entrenched in Philippine
politics. The monopoly of political power and public resources
by such families affects the
citizenry at the local and national levels.
The socio-economic and political inequities prevalent in
Philippine society limit public office to
members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for
convenience and out of cultural
mindset look up to these ruling families as dispensers of
favors, and thus elect relatives of these
politically dominant families.
The same bill defines political dynasty as a situation when an
incumbent official's spouse or his
or her second-degree relatives hold or seek office together, or
when a spouse or relative
succeeds him or her. It also happens when spouses or relatives
run for or hold public office
together even if they are not related to an incumbent
official14. According to Defensor-Santiago
(2012), the parameter of the anti-political dynasty bill shall
be to prohibit relatives from
occupying office in the same agency. Defensor-Santiago believes
this to be a fair compromise
for the counter-arguments of those that see no reason to rule
out dynastic individuals from
exercising the rights vested unto them by a democratic
state.
This writer believes the compromise to still be defective and
detrimental to the polity and,
although may decrease the existence of political dynasties, does
not really eliminate its