Phalanx: Withstanding Multimillion-Node Botnets Colin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy Tom Anderson University of Washington NSDI 2008.

Phalanx: WithstandingMultimillion-Node

BotnetsColin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy Tom

Anderson

University of WashingtonNSDI 2008

Why isn’t this a solved problem? Solved for static content

Replicate everywhere Large CDNs (Akamai, CoDeeN, Coral)

Potentially solved if we can replace all routers Promising “clean slate” academic research .

. . . . . but, pervasive bots require universal

deployment Unsolved for dynamic content on the

Internet today VoIP, e-govt, e-commerce, AJAX web apps,

etc. Can we use a pervasive set of machines

(i.e., a CDN) to solve the problem? Without changing every router?

Key Ideas

Tie fate of a server to a large part of the Internet

Goals Deployable – without changing all ISPs or all

routers Scalable – to terabit attacks w/millions of

attackers Mechanisms

Packet Mailboxes Secure Random Multipathing Filtering Ring

Let’s go design it!

Simple Proxy

Use nodes as proxies

They can make filtering decisions

Forward remaining traffic to server

How do they make filtering decisions?

Do we trust them?

How does the network know we trust them?

Mailbox

Use nodes as mailboxes

Hold each packet for an explicit request

Policy at destination

Don’t trust mailboxes

Explicitly express trust to the network

Still, any single node is vulnerable to attack

Secure Random Multipathing

Send traffic randomly among mailboxes

According to shared secret sequence

Secure Random Multipathing

Send traffic randomly among mailboxes

According to shared secret sequence

Botnet can take down one mailbox

Secure Random Multipathing

Send traffic randomly among mailboxes

According to shared secret sequence

Botnet can take down one mailbox

But communication continues

Secure Random Multipathing

Send traffic randomly among mailboxes

According to shared secret sequence

Botnet can take down one mailbox

But communication continues

Diluted attacks against all mailboxes fail

Secure Random Multipathing Sequence of mailboxes

Negotiate secret X at connection setup Construct a secret sequence based on X

x0 = h(X,X), xi = h(xi-1,X)

Use xi to name that packet and select mailbox

Also a lightweight authenticator Need a multipath congestion control

algorithm

Filtering Ring

Attackers can ignore the mailboxes and just attack the server

Need to drop unrequested traffic in the network

request/response framework signals the network

blacklist

whitelist

blacklist

whitelist

xi xi

blacklist

whitelist

xi

Filtering Ring

req: xi

data: xi

req: xi

data: xi

data: xi

req: xi

Connection Setup

So far, we protect established connections

How do clients initiate connections? Server issues “first packet” requests Mediate access to these requests

Computational puzzles (Portcullis-style) Per-computation fair queueing

Authentication tokens For small deployments w/known principals

Example

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Example

Get static content and applet from CDN (1)

Connection setup Get/solve puzzle

(2) Server issues first

packet request (3) First packet &

request paired and sent (4,5)

Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)

Protected comm. (7)

Evaluation

Microbenchmarks on PlanetLab (see paper)

Simulation Based on gathered topology data PlanetLab node serve as stand in for server 7200 Akamai nodes as mailboxes Attacker bandwidth from BT measurements

(avg 3Mb)

Protection vs. Deployment

All mailboxes see less than 30% “goodput”

60% of mailboxes see no loss

20% of mailboxes see high loss

Even a moderate deployment (7200 10 Mb mailboxes and only the victim AS filtering) has huge benefit against large botnets (100k nodes)

Scalability

Any fixed deployment will reach it’s limit at some point . . .

Scalability

40% of mailboxes see no loss even vs. 4 mil. attackers w/36k mbxes

. . . but, a more significant deployment can deal with botnets an order of magnitude larger than those of today. 36,000 100 Mbit mailboxes.

Related Work

CDNs (Akamai, Coral, CoDeeN)

Capabilities (SIFF, TVA) Overlays (SOS, MayDay, Spread

Spectrum) Resource Proofs (Speak Up, Portcullis) Architecture (Secure-i3, Off By Default) Filtering (AITF, dFence, CenterTrack,

Pushback)

Wireless Frequency Hopping

Conclusions

Ties one server’s fate to the fate of the Internet

Scales to deal with attacks of today and tomorrow

Deployable Use CDN for mailboxes Use upstream ISP to install filtering ring

Server is in control Explicitly asks for each packet Implements it’s own policies locally Is not required to trust any given mailbox

Questions?