PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REFORM IN NIGERIA: SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF ITS IMPACT ON DEEPWATER E&P ECONOMICS OMOWUNMI O. ILEDARE, PH.D. PROFESSOR OF PETROLEUM ECONOMICS & POLICY RESEARCH DIRECTOR, ENERGY INFORMATION & DATA DIVISION BATON ROUGE, LA 70803, USA 29 th USAEE/IAEE NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT: Conventional and Unconventional Solutions 14‐16 OCT 2010, CALGARY CANADA OOILEDARE 1
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PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REFORM IN NIGERIA: SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF ITS IMPACT ON DEEPWATER E&P ECONOMICS
OMOWUNMI O. ILEDARE, PH.D.
PROFESSOR OF PETROLEUM ECONOMICS & POLICY RESEARCH
DIRECTOR, ENERGY INFORMATION & DATA DIVISION
BATON ROUGE, LA 70803, USA
29th USAEE/IAEE NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCEON ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT:
Conventional and Unconventional Solutions
14‐16 OCT 2010, CALGARY CANADAOOILEDARE 1
Presentation Outline
• Nigeria’s petroleum economy overview• Nigeria petroleum industry reform objectives
• Fiscal & non fiscal reform legislative instruments
• Diagnosis of fiscal legislative instruments
• Impact deepwater project economics
• Concluding remarks and questions
OOILEDARE 2OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria
• Nigeria ranks among the top 10 nations in proved oil and natural gas reserves worldwide.
• The largest oil producer in Africa; 7th in OPEC; but fifth largest economy in OPEC.
• As of January 1, 2010, the estimated crude oil and natural gas reserves are 37.2 billion barrels and 185.4 trillion cubic feet (TCF). – The target to expand its proven oil reserves to 40.0 billion barrels and
increase its production capacity to 4 million barrels per day by 2010 is impracticable with less than three months to go.
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Reform Legislation in Nigeria
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Describes the legislative, tax, contractual and fiscal elements under which petroleum operations are conducted in a petroleum province, region on nation.
Defines the relationship between federal government of Nigeria and the oil and gas companies (IOC, NOC, & DOC).
Explains how costs are to be recovered and profits are to be shared between firms, the host governments, and the host communities
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Broad Objectives of the Reform
• Provides petroleum industry operational strategies and guidelines.
• Proffers solutions to petroleum fiscal problems and community issues affecting oil and gas operations in the upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors of the Nigerian petroleum economy.
• Aligns the oil and gas industry in Nigeria with international best practices in order to facilitate good governance and transparency in the industry.
• Assigns separate functional responsibilities to institutional structures in order to manage the commercial and operational aspects of the oil and gas sector as well as the policy‐making and regulatory aspects effectively.
OOILEDARE 5OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Broad Objectives of the Ongoing Reform
• Revamps the petroleum revenue system in terms of revenue collection, revenue enhancement, and wealth creation and restructures the taxation system for the oil and gas industry inNigeria.
• Repositions the national oil company to a level comparable to the status of other prominent national oil corporations (NOCs)
• Defines a new joint venture structure to address the funding problems of industry projects with a new indsutry structure termed incorporated joint ventures (IJV).
OOILEDARE 6OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Nigeria Sliding Royalty Scales
Water Depth 0‐100 100‐200 201‐500 501‐800 801‐1000m >1000m
Onshore: 20%
Swamp/Shallow water
18.5%
Shelf PSC 16.67%
Deep Offshore PSC 12% 8% 4% 0
7
Fiscal System InstrumentsRoyalty B4 Reform Legislation
7OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Nigeria Taxation Examples
8
Fiscal Instruments for Deepwater PSC:Pre‐Reform for 1000m Water Depth
8OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Nigeria Taxation Examples
9
Proposed Fiscal Instruments for All Deepwater PSC in Nigeria
Proposed Fiscal InstrumentsSliding Scale Royalty by Value
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Modeling Reform Legislation Impact on Deepwater Economics—DCF Approach
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Where:NCFt = After‐tax net cash flow in year t,GRRt = Gross revenue in year t,ROYt = Total royalty paid in year t,CPXt = Total capital expenditures in year t,OPXt = Total operating expenditures in year t,BNSt = Bonus paid in year t,PO/Gt= Government profit oil in year t,TAXt = Total taxes paid in year t,OTHt = Other costs or taxes paid in year t.
Production Sharing Contract Model Stochastic Variable Assumptions
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Instruments DistributionAssumptions
Distribution Parameters
Real Oil Price, 2010$/Bbl
Triangular (Min, Mode, Max)
60.00 75.00 90.00
OPEX, 2010$/Bbl Triangular (Min, Mode, Max)
5.00 6.00 7.50
Actual OPEX Abroad, %
Triangular (Min, Mode, Max)
0 50 100
Actual CAPEX Abroad, %
Triangular (Min, Mode, Max)
0 80 100
Capacity, Bbl/Day
Lognormal(Mode, Mean, Std)
40,000 50,000 500
Inflation,% Triangular (Min, Mode, Max)
1.0 2.0 3.0
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Production Sharing Contract Model Decision Variable Base Assumptions
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Decision Instruments Distribution Parameters
Cost Recovery Limit, %
80
Profit Oil Split/G,% 20
Eligible Foreign CAPEX, %
80
Eligible Foreign OPEX, %
80
Hydrocarbon TaxCITA
3030
Allowance Cap, $/Bbl Min (7, 0.3*P)P=real oil price
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Standalone Deepwater Project : 100 MMB Deterministic Model Results
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Metric Systems Measures (Real 2010$)Host Govt. BIT $MM
Contractor BIT $MM
Host Govt. AIT $ MM
Contractor AIT $MM
Net Present Value @12.5% $ 573.94 $ 597.06 $ 815.93 $ 220.95 Internal Rate of Return 37.6% 25.7%Growth Rate of Return 16.1% 14.1%Undiscounted Take Statistics 44.4% 55.6% 71.7% 28.3%Discounted Take Statistics 49.0% 51.0% 78.7% 21.3%
Metric Systems Measures (Nominal$)Host Govt. BIT $MM
Contractor BIT $MM
Host Govt. AIT $ MM
Contractor AIT $MM
Net Present Value @12.5% $ 751.46 $ 777.36 $ 1,065.83 $ 293.40 Internal Rate of Return 40.0% 27.5%Growth Rate of Return 16.3% 14.3%Undiscounted Take Statistics 45.1% 54.9% 72.4% 27.6%Discounted Take Statistics 49.2% 50.8% 78.4% 21.6%
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Incremental Deepwater Project: 100 MMB Deterministic Model Results
OOILEDARE 17OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Metric Systems Measures (Nominal$)Host Govt. BIT $MM
Contractor BIT $MM
Host Govt. AIT $ MM
Contractor AIT $MM
Net Present Value @12.5% $ 722.95 $ 805.87 $ 1,014.13 $ 345.09
Internal Rate of Return 44.9% 38.7%
Growth Rate of Return 16.4% 14.5%
Undiscounted Take Statistics 44.8% 55.2% 72.2% 27.8%
Discounted Take Statistics 47.3% 52.7% 74.6% 25.4%
Metric Systems Measures (Real 2010$)Host Govt. BIT $MM
Contractor BIT $MM
Host Govt. AIT $ MM
Contractor AIT $MM
Net Present Value @12.5% $ 547.20 $ 623.80 $ 768.10 $ 268.79
Internal Rate of Return 42.5% 36.7%
Growth Rate of Return 16.2% 14.4%
Undiscounted Take Statistics 44.0% 56.0% 71.4% 28.6%
Discounted Take Statistics 46.7% 53.3% 74.1% 25.9%
Sensitivity of Nominal IRR vs. HGT to Stochastic Variables‐‐Standalone
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Sensitivity of Nominal IRR vs. HGT to Decision Variables‐‐Standalone
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Sensitivity of Nominal IRR vs. HGT to Stochastic Variables‐‐Standalone
OOILEDARE 20OOILEDARE USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Sensitivity of Nominal IRR vs. HGT to Decision Variables‐‐Standalone
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Deepwater 100 MMB PSC Project: Simulation Model Output Standalone
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Economics System Output Measures
Mean Minimum Most Likely Maximum
NPV @12.5%, $Million 290.80 135.05 299.29 419.83
IRR, Percent 27.3 19.8 27.6 32.0
HGT, Percent 78.6 75.9 78.6 83.4
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
Internal Rate of Return: Fifty Percent Certainty—Standalone
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Government Take StatisticFifty Percent Certainty Range—Standalone
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Conclusions
OOILEDARE 25OOILEDARE
• Ongoing petroleum industry reform legislation in Nigeria has fiscal instruments and terms that enhance government access to gross revenue and still makes E&P operations profitable in Nigeria.
• There is a fifty percent likelihood that the legislation will give 78‐79 percent of total profit from a 100 MMB deepwater oil project to the hostgovernment.
• Justification for this high government take is being tied to high hydrocarbon prospectivity in Nigeria, but undue fiscal burdens may also disenfranchise investors as evident in the sensitivity of IRR to selected decision variables.
• If contractors spend low proportion of its expenditures abroad, project profitability, ceteris paribus, tend to increase
• Allowing all CAPEX to be expensed in NHT and CITA calculations increases project profitability as expected.
• Deep water profitability is higher for existing operators in deepwater than new comers because CITA and NHT are allowed to be consolidated rather than being ringfenced.
USAEE 2010, Calgary, Canada
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY REFORM IN NIGERIA: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF ITS IMPACT ON DEEPWATER E&P ECONOMICS
OMOWUNMI O. ILEDARE, PH.D.
PROFESSOR OF PETROLEUM ECONOMICS & POLICY RESEARCH
DIRECTOR, ENERGY INFORMATION & DATA DIVISION
BATON ROUGE, LA 70803, USA
29th USAEE/IAEE NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCEON ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT: