Family expenses cf. FC 100 (3), FC 121(5) and FC 94 (1), (4), (5) G.R. No. 177667 September 17, 2008 Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco, represented by their grandmother Dra. Maida G. Uriarte as their Attorney- in-Fact, Petitioners, - versus - Spouses Jorge C. Gonzales and PURIFicacion W. Gonzales. Respondents. FACTS: Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M. Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte Francisco (Michele). In a Partial Decision Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the Compromise Agreement entered into by the estranged couple was approved. The Compromise Agreement contained is to the effect that the spouses will transfer the conjugal property consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala Alabang, shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to petitioners. Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment filed by spouses Gonzales (respondents) was decided against Matrai and Michele,. An order was issued granting respondents' prayer for the execution MeTC Decision.[4] A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff covering the real property in the name of Spouses Francisco. Petitioners' grandmother filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[6] and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Execution[7] but this was denied. Petitioners argue that: they are the rightful owners of the property and the adjudged obligation of Michele in the ejectment case did not redound to the benefit of the family ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property may be held answerable for the judgment debt of Michele HELD: The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property. The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone,[15] in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai.
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Family expenses cf. FC 100 (3), FC 121(5) and FC 94 (1), (4), (5)
G.R. No. 177667 September 17, 2008
Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco, represented by their grandmother Dra. Maida G. Uriarte as their Attorney-
in-Fact, Petitioners,
- versus -
Spouses Jorge C. Gonzales and PURIFicacion W. Gonzales. Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M. Francisco (Cleodualdo)
and Michele Uriarte Francisco (Michele).
In a Partial Decision Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the Compromise Agreement entered into by the estranged couple was
approved.
The Compromise Agreement contained is to the effect that the spouses will transfer the conjugal property consisting of a
house and lot located in Ayala Alabang, shall be transferred by way of a deed of donation to petitioners.
Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment filed by spouses Gonzales (respondents) was
decided against Matrai and Michele,.
An order was issued granting respondents' prayer for the execution MeTC Decision.[4] A notice of sale by execution was then
issued by the sheriff covering the real property in the name of Spouses Francisco.
Petitioners' grandmother filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[6] and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by
Execution[7] but this was denied.
Petitioners argue that: they are the rightful owners of the property and the adjudged obligation of Michele in the ejectment
case did not redound to the benefit of the family
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property may be held answerable for the judgment debt of Michele
HELD: The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone,[15] in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai.
On its face, the title shows that the registered owner of the property is not Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to
Michele. This describes the civil status of Cleodualdo at the time the property was acquired.[17]
Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. As such, their property relations are governed by the Civil Code on conjugal partnership of gains.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when
she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum;
when administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband;
or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's
personal obligation.[20]
Considering that the foregoing circumstances are evidently not present in this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose
from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer case against her and her partner Matrai.
It should be noted that the judgment debt for which the subject property was being made to answer was incurred by
Michele and her partner,[25] Matrai.
By no stretch of one's imagination can it be concluded that said debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the family.
Respondents’ bare allegation that petitioners lived with Michele on the leased property is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that the judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the family of
Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners.
To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going against the spirit and avowed
objective of the Civil Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9)
G.R. No. 145222
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda). Said
action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander.
Trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages.
The trial court issued a writ of execution.
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, a notice of levy was issued which was annotated
on the title of the subject property.
The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder.
Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale.
Petitioners maintain that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the husband is
liable for the tort committed by his wife.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: Whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
HELD: We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code[16] explicitly provides that
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Joint Administration, FC 96; FC 90
[G.R. No. 143016. August 30, 2000]
MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS. RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY CONSTANTINO and MR. & MRS. LIBERTY
CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 41, Quezon City and NENITA CO BAUTISTA represented by
VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Petitioners Ronnie Dar, Randy Angeles, Joy Constantino and Liberty Cruz signed the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, their respective spouses did not sign the same.
It appears from the records that herein private respondent Nenita Co Bautista filed a case for unlawful detainer against herein
petitioners.
They were sued as “Mr. and Mrs.” in the said case. Petitioners now contend that since what is involved in the instant case is
their common rights and interest to abode under the system of absolute community of property, either of the spouses can
sign the petition.
HELD: We find merit in the petition.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly,
or as “Mr. and Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them
in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
Sole administration - incapacity, FC 96 (2) – no court order
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L.
JARDELEZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. had stroke which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner
Teodoro Jardeleza filed a petition. The petitioner averred that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of
the Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.
It was prayed therein that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza,
wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
It was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise
alienated to third persons.
Respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same.
RTC rendered its Decision, finding that it was convinced that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole
powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code
HELD: Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
“ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
“In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (165a).”
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article
124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned
the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In such
case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of
the conjugal property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the
procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Causes for dissolution of ACP, FC 99 - (a) Death, FC 103 cf. Rule 73 Sec. 12 ROC
G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRINE: The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation
mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or
extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not
prejudice vested rights.
FACTS: On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver whereby he affirmed under oath that
it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).
The petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand.
They sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the property.
PETITIONERS: Following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property
to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own
money.
RTC’s RULING: Affirmed the validity of the sale.
O However, declared the property was the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there
were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr.,Rito, and Dina).
O The participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta.
O Under Article 160 of the Civil Code: the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse
during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation? – NO
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains
shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 256.
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by
the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 106878
finding that Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
For marriages before FC, FC 104
G.R. No. L-32820-21 January 30, 1976
DOROTEA DE OCAMPO VDA. DE DELIZO and her nine (9) children, named REGINO, CRISPINA, CARMEN, BASILIO, HILARIO, MACARIO, SENDON MARCIANO and HERMOGENES, all surnamed DELIZO y OCAMPO, petitioners-appellants, vs. URBANA DELIZO, assisted by her husband, AMBROCIO FLORA, SEVERINO DELIZO and the Heirs of FRANCISCO DELIZO, namely, RANCIVILLANO SOLTRIFILO, JOSEFINA, EUPROCINA, AUREA, EDITA and FE all surnamed DELIZO, and ROSENDA GENOVE VDA. DE DELIZO, respondents-appellees.
Leandro C. Sevilla for petitioners-appellants.
Romeo J. Callejo respondents-appellees.
ANTONIO, J.:
These two cases involve the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo. The first, was with Rosa Villasfer, which lasted from April 20, 1891 until Rows death on December 7, 1909, or a period of eighteen (18) years; and the second, with Dorotea de Ocampo, which existed for a period of forty-six (46) years, or from October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas Delizo on May 3, 1957 at the age of ninety (90) years. The action for partition was instituted on April 15, 1957 by a daughter and a son of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo and Severino Delizo, and the heirs of Francisco Delizo, another son, who died in 1943, specifically, Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe, all surnamed Delizo (the last three being minors were represented by their mother, Rosenda Genove) all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine (9) children, the herein petitioners-appellants, namely Regino, Crispina, Carmen, Basilio, Hilario, Macario, Sendon, Marciano, and Hermogenes, all surnamed Delizo.
The aforesaid defendants opposed the partition, claiming that the properties described in the complaint were those of the second marriage. On May 3, 1957, Nicolas Delizo died and was substituted by his children in the second m as party defendants. In the meantime, Special Proceedings No. 1058 (Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea de Ocampo on June 3, 1957. Thereafter, or on August 23, 1971, Severino De died intestate and is now represented by his children, namely, Federico, Severina, Angelina, Segundina and Brigida, all surnamed Delizo. Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are sixty-six (66) hectares of agricultural lands in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; fifty-eight (58) hectares of riceland in
Muñoz of the same province; and a square meter lot at 1056-M P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila. The properties are specifically described as follows:
(1) Lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 389, 390, and 407 of the San Jose Cadastre situation in Rizal, San Jose with a combined area of about sixty-six (66) hectares covered by OCT No. 6176-N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. F or 11);
(2) Lot No. 1915 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 1,056 square meters and covered by OCT No. 5783 in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. G or 12);
(3) Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of about 3,366 square meters and covered by OCT No. 5622, N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. H. or 13);
(4) A parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija containing an area of 13.2948 hectares and covered by TCT No. 2985-N.E. (Exh. I. or 13-A);
(5) An agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares situated in sitio Rangayan, Muñoz and covered by TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14);
(6) A parcel of land in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares and covered by TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10);
(7) A cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 5476;
(8) Riceland in Barrio San Andres, Muñoz of about 5,083 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7083;
(9) Riceland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about 17.4755 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 812;
(10) Lot No. 847-a riceland in Barrio Bayan, Muñoz, with an area of about 13.0902 hectares and covered by TCT No. 3585 issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo on April 25,1929 (Exhs. L or 15 & 15-A);
(11) A camarin of strong materials, with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, about eight (8) meters by twelve
(12) meters; (12) A residential house and lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija;
(13) Lot No. 1790 of San Jose Cadastre of about 2,840 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in the names of spouses Silvestre Batara and Maria Soriano issued on November 16, 1927 (Exh. M or 16), superseded by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-29524 issued in the name of Juan T. Gualberto on May 25,1959 (Exh. N or 17) claimed by the heirs of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo pursuant to deed of sale (Exh. N1);
(14) An urban lot and coconut plantation in San Fabian, Pangasinan;
(15) A lot and residential house consisting Of a two-door accessoria at No. 1056-58 (formerly 562) P. Campa, Sampaloc, Manila;
(16) A sawmill with accessories, bulldozers, etc. in San Jose, Nueva Ecija (bulldozer is now in Gordon, Isabels in the possession of Regino Delizo and Basilio Delizo); and
(17) Several heads of carabaos. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment on April 27, 1964, distributing the aforesaid properties as follows: (a) onehalf (½) pro indiviso to the three (3) children of the first marriage, namely, Urbana Delizo, Severino Delizo, and the heirs of the deceased Francisco Delizo, viz.: Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita, and Fe (b) one-fourth (¼) pro indiviso to the surviving spouse, Dorotea de Ocampo; and (c) one-fourth (¼) pro in equal shares to the children of both marriages, nine (9) of whom were begotten during the second marriage, or into thirteen (13) parts.
From said judgment. petitioners-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 12, 1970, the Appellate Court rendered judgment, affirming with modifications the trial court's decision. The facts as found by the Appellate Court are as follows:
As regards the Caanawan lands situated in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, comprising some 66 hectares, defendants capitalize on the undisputed fact that Original Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11) issued on August 21, 1924, covering these lands is in the name of Nicolas Delizo, ma to Dorotea de Ocampo. Defendants further point out that the testimonies of defendant Dorotea de Ocampo and octogenarian Moises Patricio prove that these lands were acquired during the second marriage.
However, the fact that the disputed lands situated in Caanawan were registered in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo's no proof that the property is owned by the second conjugal partnership. The phrase 'married to' is merely descriptive of the civil status of Nicolas Delizo (Gonzales vs. Miller, 69 Phil. 340; De Jesus vs. Padilla, CA-G.R. No. 12191-R, April 19, 1955; Muñoz & Tan Go Inc. vs. Santos CA-G.R. No. "27759-R, October 3, 1963; Pratts vs. Sheriff of Rizal, 53 Phil. 51, 53). Neither is the testimony of Dorotea de Ocampo that the said lands were acquired by her and her spouse, altogether clear and persuasive. For while the admitted fact is that she and Nicolas Delizo were married in 1911, she declared on the witness stand that the aforesaid properties were given by Pedro Salvador to her and her spouse in 1908 (t.s.n., p. 288, March 8, 1963), thereby leading the trial court to infer an admission that these lands were acquired during the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo. It may likewise be noted that as per her testimony, she and her father arrived in Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, when Rosa Villasfer was still alive. That would be sometime before 1911. But she admitted that her father then was not able to acquire lands from Pedro Salvador, their grantor, because he had no more lands to distribute to settlers. Accordingly, it is farfetched that after Rosa's death and the subsequent marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Dorotea de Ocampo, Pedro Salvador would still have those 67 hectares which
defendants claimed were acquired by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo by grant from Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., pp. 459-46, March 15, 1963).
Moises Patricio tried to confirm the widow, declaring that Nicolas Delizo was married to defendant Dorotea de Ocampo, when he was given lands in Caanawan by Pedro Salvador (t.s.n., p. 493, June 7, 1963). However, he placed the acquisition sometime during the founding of Barrio Sto. Tomas, San Jose, Nueva Ecija (Id., p. 492) which took place some four years after the Spanish-Filipino revolution of 1896 (t.s.n., pp. 548-549, June 21, 1963), or approximately 1900. Therefore, it could not be Dorotea de Ocampo, but Rosa Villasfer, who was admittedly still alive and the wife of Nicolas Delizo at the time of the acquisition.
Ranged against these unreliable testimonies for the defendants, is the testimony of Lorenzo Delizo, who being a brother of deceased Nicolas Delizo, stands in equal relationship to the plaintiffs, who were Nicolas' children by the first marriage, and the defendants, who were children of Nicolas in his second marriage. His testimony therefore carries great weight. This witness averred that 16 hectares were acquired as homestead by his deceased brother, Nicolas Delizo, from Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador who were then 'cabecillas' distributing lands to homesteaders in 1905 (t.s.n., p. 12, January 20, 1961); that Nicolas acquired by sale the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel in 1906, another 16- hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin in 1907 and the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua in 1908 (id., pp. 14-15). Lorenzo's declarations are supported by the testimonies of (1) Urbana Delizo, a daughter of Nicolas by his first marriage and who was already 17 when her mother, Rosa Villasfer, died in 1909 (id., p. 19); (2) Sabiniano Villanueva, a son of one of Nicolas' tenants on the controverted Caanawan lands (id., pp. 93-168) and (3) Raymundo Eugenio, a former clerk in the municipal treasurer's office who u to collect taxes on the land belonging to Nicolas and later became municipal "president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija (t.s.n., pp. 367-368, Jan. 31, 1964), although these Caanawan lands cannot be traced back to TD 431, Exhibit P-9 issued in 1906, cited by appellants (see notations at bottom of reverse side of alleged succeeding TDs) aside from the fact that the notations on the reverse side thereof are suspicious (see years when tax commenced and when issued) and the discrepancy between areas (8 Ha. in Exhibit P-9 and 57 Ha. for lots 210 and 211).
Accordingly, we find with the trial court that the Caanawan lands, comprising lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 390, 398 and 407.1-under Original Certificate of Title No. 6176 (Exh. F or 11) were acquired during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. So with the lot and house at 562 P. Campa St., Sampaloc, Manila, known as Lot 47, Block 83 covered by TCT No. 9616-Manila which was ceded during the second marriage in payment of, or substitution for, the Caanawan property, because the Asiatic Petroleum Company to which it had been mortgaged as bond for Juan Par as agent foreclosed the mortgage, when the agent defaulted in his obligation to the company, Exhibits 6, 7 & 19 (Art. 153 [formerly, 140], par. 1, new Civil Code).
However, with regard to the other properties in question, like lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under Original certificate of Title No. 5622, likewise issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13)' and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muñoz Nueva Ecija under TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); another parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares under TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a coin land in barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square me ' quarters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in barrio San Andres, Muñoz Nueva Ecija, of about 5,083 square meters under Tax Dec. 7083;
another riceland in Rangayan, Muñoz, of about 17.4755 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 812; a riceland, lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by TCT No. 3585 issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'(Exh. L or 1.5)-, a camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, about 8 meters by 12 meters; a residential lot at Sanches Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre consisting of 2,840 square meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 in another name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar cane mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although adjudicated in the name of Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso, respectively; lot No. 494-A, of the San Jose Cadastre, adjudicated in the name of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo (RA, pp. 96-97),-there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
But the trial court held that because there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership property of the first marriage, upon the death of the first wife, 'the conjugal partnership was converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the first marriage .... Hence, all the fruits or increase of the properties acquired thereafter shall belong to such co-ownership.' We cannot agree with this legal conclusion. One-half of the conjugal properties of the first marriage constituted the separate property of the husband at the formation of the second conjugal partnership upon his remarriage in October 1911 (Art. 145, NCC). Moreover, the fruits of the Caanawan property were acquired through the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; and indeed, two witnesses for the plaintiffs admitted that at the time of the death of Rosa Villasfer, only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had been cleared and cultivated (pp. 22-23; 113, 117, 383-4, t.s.n.). This property was practically virgin land, and the rest thereof or about 47 hectares were therefore cleared and cultivated only during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. This is impliedly admitted in plaintiffs' complaint that 'from the time of death of the said Rosa Villasfer, the defendants ... have WORKED upon, TILLED and CULTIVATED, or otherwise offered in tenancy the whole of the agricultural lands described' (par. 2). The Caanawan property left to itself could not produce any fruits for they did not have any permanent improvements thereon. What was produced according to the evidence was palay, and the production of palay requires tilling, cultivation, seedlings, gathering, preservation and marketing. It was thru the labor and industry of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo that the Caanawan property was able to produce fruits. Whatever it produced thru the labor and industry of the spouses belongs to their conjugal partnership. While it is true that to the owner of the land belongs the fruits, whether natural, industrial or civil (Art. 441, NCC formerly Art. 354, Spanish Civil Code), this does not mean that all that is produced belongs to the owner of the land. The owner, according to Art. 443, NCC (formerly Art. 356, Spanish Civil Code) who receives the fruits, has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a person in their production, gathering and preservation. When Dorotea Ocampo admitted that the Muñoz property was purchased partly with the fruits of the Caanawan property, she was referring to the gross production, not deducting therefrom what could have pertained to the person who produced the fruits. So it seems "that if we are to determine with mathematical certainty what portion of the Muñoz property and other properties acquired during the second marriage should pertain to the first marriage as corn spending to the value of its share in the fruits of the Caanawan property, and what should belong to the second marriage as corresponding to the value of the labor and industry of the spouses Delizo and Ocampo, we have to find how much was produced during the second marriage and determine what will be the share of the owner of the land what will correspond to the one who produced the fruits. The burden of proof lies upon the plaintiffs under the rules of evidence. But, of course, this is an impossibility. For no
records have been kept and it is not in accordance with the Filipino customs for the surviving spouse-whether he remarries or not-to keep the record of the produce of the properties left by the deceased spouse. tradition thereto, according to Dorotea Ocampo, part of the price used in the purchase of Muñoz property was the proceeds of a loan which, together with the properties purchased with it, belongs to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to determine with mathematical precision what portion of the properties acquired during the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo should belong to the second conjugal partnership and what portion should belong to the heirs of the first conjugal partnership, one half of which pertains to the husband. However, considering that —
1. At the time of the dissolution of the first marriage or about five years after acquisition, according to plaintiffs' evidence, only about 20 hectares of the Caanawan property had been cultivated, the remaining 47 hectares were therefore cleared and improved during the second marriage thru the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo for 46 years (1911-1967). These improvements were made in good faith considering that Nicolas Delizo administered the properties of the first marriage. The second marriage is entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of these 47 hectares (Art. 516, NCC Even the Muñoz property acquired during the second marriage had to be improved by the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo.
2. The one-half of the fruits of the Caanawan property which should pertain to the heirs of Rosa Villasfer refers only to one-half o f the net after deducting the expenses of clearing the land, cultivating, gathering and preservation. Forty-seven hectares of the Caanawan property were cleared and cultivated only during the second marriage. Even under a liberal apportionment of the produce, the heirs of the second marriage could not be entitled to more than 30% of the produce.
3. Part of the price used in the purchase of the properties acquired during the second marriage were the proceeds of a loan. This is conjugal property of the "second marriage (Palanca vs. Smith, Bell and Co., 9 Phil. 131,133; Castillo Jr. vs. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102, 106-7).
4. The improvements on 47 hectares of the Caanawan property and on the Muñoz property were made at the expense of the second conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo, and thru their labor and industry which lasted for 46 years, whereas the first conjugal partnership had the Caanawan property for less than 6 years.
Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances and equities of the case, an adjudication of 20% of all the properties acquired during the second marriage, including the Muñoz property, to the children of the first marriage, and 80% to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo is fair and equitable. So the properties of the estate should be partitioned thus:
One-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street, Manila, covered by TCT No. 9616 as the share of Rosa Villasfer in the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer or 1/6 thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. To Nicolas Delizo should be adjudicated one-half of the Caanawan property and the house and lot on P. Campa, but in view of the death of Nicolas Delizo his share descends to all the children, both of the first and second marriages and the surviving spouse, Dorotea Ocampo, and should therefore be divided by the number of children plus one or 1/26 thereof for each heir. tightly per cent of all the properties acquired during the marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo constitute the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea Ocampo; one-half thereof is the share of Nicolas Delizo, to be divided
among his heirs in accordance with the preceding statement, or 2/65 thereof for each heir; the other half constitutes the share of Dorotea Ocampo in the conjugal partnership, or 2/5 thereof.
WHEREFORE, paragraph 1 of the judgment appealed from is hereby modified as follows:
1. Declaring that (a) of the Caanawan property and the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street, Manila covered by TCT No. 9616-8139 (1/6 + 1/26) thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the children of Nicolas Delizo "of the first marriage, namely: Urbana, Severino and the late Francisco Delizo (the last represented by his children Rancivillano Soltrifilo Josefina, Eufrocina, Aurea, Edita and Fe and 1/26 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the children of the second marriage and their mother Dorotea Ocampo; (a) of all other properties required during the second marriage-19/195 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the three children by the first marriage, 2/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to each of the nine children of the second marriage, while 28/65 thereof pro indiviso shall pertain to the widow Dorotea Ocampo. The rest of the judgment particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 are affirmed; without pronouncement as to costs in both instances.
From this adverse judgment, petitioners-appellants interposed the present petition for review. The thrust of petitioners- appellants' petition is that the Appellate Court acted under a misapprehension of the facts or decided the legal issues in a way which is not in consonance with law and with the applicable decisions of this Court, (a) since, the 67-hectare Caanawan properties could not have been properties of the first marriage because they were then public lands being homesteads, and while the first conjugal partnership may have had possessory rights over said properties, it was only during the second marriage that the requirements of the public land law were complied with, resulting in the confirmation, registration and issuance of the Torrens Title over said properties to Nicolas Delizo and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo; (b) apart from the fact that the legal presumption that all properties of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo were not sufficiently rebutted, these properties were actually. In the adverse possession under claim of title of petitioners-appellants continuously for a period of 47 years (1911 to 1957), and consequently, the claim of respondents-appellees for partition should have been considered barred by acquisitive and extinctive prescription, laches and estoppel; d (c) in any event, there being serious doubts as to whether. said properties belong to the first marriage, it would have been more equitable if the said partnership properties were divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and the capital of the spouses,-pursuant to Article 189 of the Civil Code.
From the findings of the Appellate Court that sixty-six (66) hectares of the Caanawan properties w ere acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, thus: sixteen (16) hectares as a homestead from the Government in 1905; and the 16-hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel, the 16-hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin, and the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua by purchase in 1%6, .1907 and 1908, respectively, it does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the
Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer.
Under Act 926, 1 which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered ... (Section 3 of Act 926, italics supplied). Prior to the fulfillment of such requirement, the- applicant has no complete equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell and convey, mortgage for lease. 2 Until a homestead right is established and registered under Section 3 of Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation as such. 3 Conversely, when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof." 4 The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. 5
As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the latter's wife, Rosa Villasfer, arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, from Barrio Ungag, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, during the year 1905. It was during that same year that Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador, who were then the cabecillas were distributing lands to homesteaders in Barrio Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel, Mariano Antolin and Francisco Pascua must have received their respective homesteads from the same officers of the government that same year, considering that their respective homesteads are all adjacent to the homestead of Nicolas Delizo and according to the evidence, this was the time when the homesteads in that barrio were parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was then of recent vintage, having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by authority of the United States Government, only on October 7, 1903.
Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his homestead for barely a year when he transferred his rights in 1906, Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to his homestead in 1907, and Francisco Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his homestead, at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is, therefore, obvious that not one of them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle any one of them to the issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or assigned their rights to Nicolas Delizo. The law was quite specific, that "No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until the motion of five year. From the date of the filing of the application and if, at the expiration of such time or at any time within three years thereafter, the person filing such application shall prove by two credible witnesses that he has resided upon
and cultivate the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been I alienated or encumbered, and that he has borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States and that of the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten pesos, Philippine currency to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case there be no such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, he shall be entitled to a patent." (Section 3, Act No. 926, italics supplied). Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what was transferred by them to Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Similarly, having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. Buttressing the conclusion that Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights to the four homesteads before 1909 is the specific limitation imposed by section 3 of Act No. 926 which provides that "No person who is the owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits of any gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the Islands by the United States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter."
The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.
II
In connection with the other properties, such as Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under Original Certificate of Title No. 5622; a parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2985 (Exh. I or 13), and agricultural land of about 17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muñoz Nueva Ecija, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); a parcel of land in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354 hectares, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a cornland in Barrio Rangayan, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a riceland in Rangayan, Muñoz of about 17.4755 hectares, under Tax Declaration No. 812; a riceland, Lot No. 847, of about 13.0902 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3585, issued on April 29, 1929 in the name of "Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo" (Exh. L or 15); a camarin of strong materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva Ecija; a residential lot at Sanchez Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; Lot No. 1790 of the San Jose Cadastre, consisting of about 2,840 square meters, more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131 "in another name but claimed by the heirs under deed of sale, Exhibit N1 a sugar mill in San Jose, Nueva Ecija and several heads of carabaos (Exh. 0); Lots Nos. 495 and 496 of the San Jose Cadastre, possessed by defendants although adjudicated
in the name of Marcelo Tomas and Guillermo Cabiso respectively; and another lot, Lot No. 494A of the San Jose Cadastre adjudicated in the ' C, name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo, the Appellate Court decision penned by Justice Arsenio Solidum held that "there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo"
The same opinion, however, held that since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. The two concurring Appellate Justices, although of the view that the legal presumption that those properties acquired during the regime of the second conjugal partnership belong to said partnership has not been rebutted by respondents-appellees and, therefore, would hold that such after-acquired properties should belong to the second conjugal partnership, concurred nevertheless in the result aforesaid, in order to reach a judgment in the case. It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). 6 There are, however, important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition of these properties, and We have held that the children of the first marriage, as a matter of equity, should share in the Caanawan properties. To deny the respondents-appellees a share in such properties would have exacerbated discord instead of enhancing family solidarity and understanding.
Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership. 7 Under this criterion, the second conjugal partnership should be entitled to 46/64 or 23/32 of the total mass of properties, and the first conjugal partnership. to 18/64 or 9/32 thereof pro indivision. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is one-half (1/2) pro indiviso of the net remainder 8 of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first and second marriages, which would amount to 32/64 or 1/2 of the whole estate. This should be distributed in equal shares to his children of both marriages, 9
with the widow having the same share as that of legitimate child. 10 The widow. Dorotea de Ocampo, is entitled to one-half (½) of the net remainder of the second conjugal partnership and to her share as heir of her deceased husband which amounts to 23/64 of said properties, plus 1/13 of 32/64 pro indivision. The share of the heirs of Rosa Villasfer would be 9/64 thereof. The foregoing is recapitulated as follows:
Share of Rosa Villasfer, lst wife 9/64 of whole estate to be
divided among three (3)
children
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo, 23/64 of whole estate plus her
2nd wife share in Nicolas
Delizo s estate.
Share of Nicolas Delizo, husband 32/64 of whole estate to be
divided into thirteen
(13) equal parts.
Whole Estate 64/64
Computation of Sharing
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664]
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] - Share of each child of
3/64 + 1/26 = 142/1664] lst marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664] - Share of each child of
1/26 = 64/1664] 2nd marriage
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
1/26 = 64/1664]
23/64 + 1/26 = 662/1664 - Share of Dorotea Ocampo.
32/64 + 13/26= 1664/1664 - Whole Estate
In the partition of the properties, the probate court should take into account the fact that the respondents-appellees are in possession of the Muñoz lands, while the petitioners-appellants have been in possession of the Caanawan properties as well as the house and lot at 562 P. Campa Street. Sampaloc, Manila, as directed in the trial court's order of April 23, 1958 record on Appeal, pp. 76-77). Should it be convenient for the parties,
their respective shares should be taken from the properties presently under their custody.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions. it is unnecessary to resolve the other legal questions raised in the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases should be, as they are hereby, remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this judgment. No costs.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
G.R. No. 89667 October 20, 1993
JOSEPHINE B. BELCODERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
Jaime I. Infante and Joanes G. Caacbay for petitioners.
Lamberto C. Nanquil & Associates Law Office for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued during the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.
Let us begin by paraphrasing the factual findings of the appellate court below.
The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. A few days later, or on 09 November 1959, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ."
On 06 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 march 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's supposed one-half (1/2) interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth (1/4) interest as heir, was conveyed
to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby completing for herself, along with her one-fourth (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of the property. The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on 04, 05 and 06 November 1970 in the Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of he above facts, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that —
. . . Josephine Bosing executed a deed of reconveyance of the property in question to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of attorney's fees and expenses in litigation, TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, pus TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS exemplary damages to prevent future frauds.
The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's order for reconveyance but reversed the decision on the award for damages, thus —
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendant Josephine Bosing is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property granting the same to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and REVERSED insofar as it awards actual, moral and exemplary damages.
1
Hence, the instant petition for review 2 submitting that —
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT, THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE IS BASED UPON AN IMPLIED OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE PETITIONERS.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, AND LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF A NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED THE SAME WOULD NOT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.
We rule for affirmance.
The first three issues are interrelated, and the same will thus be jointly discussed.
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the
legal results would be the same. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.
It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4) interest as "surviving widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the issue of the deceased. Observe that the above adjudication would have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.
The appellate court below, given the above circumstances, certainly cannot be said to have been without valid basis in concluding that the property really belonged to the lawful conjugal partnership between Alayo and his true spouse Juliana.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family Code).
It was at the time that 'the adjudication of ownership was made following Alayo's demise (not when Alayo merely allowed the property to be titled in Josefa's name which clearly was not intended to be adversarial to Alayo's interest), that a constructive trust was deemed to have been created by operation of law under the provisions of Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
Article 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the property by the beneficiaries thereof is ten (10) years (Article 1144, Civil Code). Ordinarily, that period starts from the establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of action would be considered to have accrued (Article 1150, Civil Code). Unfortunately
for Josefa and Josephine, however, the property involved in this case is a realty titled under the Torrens System. The prescriptive period is thus to be counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. 3 Between the time Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974, and the filing of the action for the reconveyance of the property with the court a quo on 30 October 1980, barely a period of six (6) years and four (4) months had elapsed. The case has accordingly been initiated seasonably.
The four-year prescriptive period, mentioned in passing by the petitioners, would have had some value and relevance had the private respondents or their predecessor in interest been parties to the extrajudicial partition and sale. In that event, the latter's action could only then be predicated on a vitiation of consent 4 where the applicable statutory limitation would be four years. 5
The last issue raises the supposed error in the rejection of a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. We concur with the resolution of the appellate court below (on appellants' [petitioners herein] motion for reconsideration thereat), thus —
Appellants' prayer for a new trial based upon what they claim is newly discovered evidence deserves scant consideration.
Appellant proposes to prove (1) that Josefa Bosing sold certain property for P8,000.00 in 1948 and was therefore in a financial position to make the payments to Magdalena Estate Inc. and (2) that appellee Juliana Bosing got married in 1961 to one Burayos Ballit, and thus, "forfeited" her right to the conjugal partnership.
The first ground is not meritorious. It is not newly discovered evidence. As described in appellants' Motion the documents were "not discovered or considered as necessary evidence during the trial of the case below" by the former counsel; it is therefore more properly considered as forgotten evidence, which the appellant knew or should have known during the trial (Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296; Republic vs. Vda. de Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336). Moreover, assuming the sale is proven, it does not follow that the proceeds were used to pay the lot in question; the payments were made in installments, not in one lump sum.
Neither is the second ground deserving of merit. Assuming that the marriage to Ballit in 1961 is duly proven, and that this provided a cause for legal separation and consequent disqualification of the guilty spouse to succeed to the husband's intestate estate under Article 1002 of the Civil Code, the fact remains that no action for legal separation was brought by the husband during his lifetime and within the period provided by law. It is too late to raise the issue at this time.
Accordingly, assuming that the Motion for New Trial complies with the formal requisites for such motion (See Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., G.R. No. 62662, prom. November 12, 1987), a question We don't find necessary to decide, a new trial would not serve a useful purpose in altering the result of the questioned decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in the instant petition for review on certiorari is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111547 January 27, 1997
SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO, MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
The instant controversy involves Lot C of the amended plan Psu-22983 Amd., situated in Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna with an area of 273 square meters. The said parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19175 issued in the name of Santiago Garcia who died on October 2, 1967. Some six years after Santiago Garcia's death, or on March 10, 1973, the then Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order granting Trinidad Estonina's application for a writ of preliminary attachment in Civil Case No. 88430 entitled "Trinidad Estonina et al., plaintiffs -versus-Consuelo Garcia et al., defendants". Consequently, a notice of attachment was inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance at the back of TCT No. T-19175 in favor of Trinidad Estonina covering all the rights, title, interest, and participation that Consuelo Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, may have in and to the parcel of land covered by the said title.
As a result of a prior sale made by Santiago Garcia to Anselmo Balasoto of a sixty square meter portion of the said parcel of land, TCT. No. T-19175 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 77215 was issued on July 25, 1975 in the name of Santiago Garcia covering the remaining 213 square meters. TCT No. 77215 was in turn cancelled on June 27, 1977 because of another sale purportedly made during his lifetime by Santiago Garcia to his wife's niece, Ofelia Garcia, and TCT No. 82229 was issued in the name of the latter.
On August 14, 1977, the children of Santiago Garcia with his first wife, Adela Isoreta, namely Ofelia, Remedios, Elvira and Castor, all surnamed Garcia, executed a deed selling, transferring and conveying unto the spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Atayan for brevity) their "title, rights, interest and participation which is four tenths (4/10) pro indiviso share" in the said parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. About a year after, Santiago Garcia's second wife and widow, Consuelo Garcia and their children, Virgilio, Marilou and Lolita, all surnamed Garcia, followed suit and also sold to the spouses Atayan, their four-tenths (4/10) pro indidviso share in the same parcel of land. On February 22, 1980, Estrella R. Garcia, the widow of Santiago Garcia, Jr. (Santiago Garcia's son from his first marriage), and
their children, Roderick, Elizabeth, Dorothy and Erlinda, likewise sold to the spouses Atayan, their one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. 1
Subsequent to a favorable decision obtained by Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430 against Consuelo Garcia, execution pending appeal was made on the parcel of land formerly covered by TCT No. T-19175 (now covered by TCT No. T-82229) on July 20, 1979. The said parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad Estonina was the highest bidder. Consuelo Garcia appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 88430 before the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, however, ruled in favor of Trinidad Estonina. Thus, on February 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision declaring "owner's copy of Certificate of Title No. T-82229 a NULLITY and/or CANCELLED". Upon the finality of the said decision, TCT No. T-82229 was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Laguna and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-99961 was issued in favor of "Trinidad Estonina married to Paulino Estonina". 2
On July 25, 1985, the spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, impleading as defendants therein the spouses Trinidad and Paulino Estonina (hereinafter referred to as the spouses Estonina for brevity), Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier, Edmund R. Solidum, the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and the heirs of Santiago Garcia who sold to the spouses Atayan their pro indiviso shares in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-82229. The complaint prayed:
that the sale at public auction of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 77215 . . . and the Sheriff's final deed . . . be declared null and void; that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel TCT No. T-99961 in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina married to Paulino Estonina . . . ; that the plaintiffs be declared owners of nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso interests, shares and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-77215, . . . , and the Register of Deeds ordered to issue a new certificate of title corresponding thereto; and that the defendants Nicanor E. Silvano, Reynaldo G. Javier and Edmund R. Solidum be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs spouses and (sic) amount of P30,000 for attorney's fees, P15,000 for litigation expenses incurred, P20,000 for moral damages and P15,000 for exemplary damages . . .
3
In their amended answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the spouses Estonina claimed that:
the plaintiffs (spouses Atayan) had acted in bad faith in allegedly purchasing the parcel of land, they being aware that it was the subject of a lawful and valid attachment; that there was no valid extrajudicial settlement of agreement executed by the heirs of Santiago Garcia by which their rights could have been adjusted and settled before doing anything with his property; that the deeds of sale executed by his heirs were anomalous, fictitious and simulated intended to defeat the adverse judgment rendered by the Court against them and the writ of attachment issued pursuant thereto as they were derived from a falsified deed of sale purportedly executed by Santiago Garcia on June 23, 1967; that the property in question is presumed to be conjugal answerable for obligations and liabilities of the conjugal partnership incurred during the existence of the partnership; and that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches (pp. 90-99, rec.).
4
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. It found, among others, that the property covered by TCT No. T-19175 and now covered by TCT No. T-82229, was acquired during the marriage of Santiago Garcia and Consuelo Gaza, and is presumed to be conjugal in nature. Upon the death of Santiago Garcia on October 2, 1967, his conjugal share of one-half (l/2) of the said parcel of land was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his nine children, five by his first wife and four out of the subsequent marriage, and Consuelo Garcia, his second wife and widow, inherited the same at one-tenth (1/10) each pro indiviso. The remaining one-half (1/2) pertained to the conjugal share of Consuelo Garcia. Thus, inasmuch as Consuelo Garcia inherited one-tenth (1/10) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 55% (or 1/10 plus 1/2) of the said parcel of land. 5
Finding as such, the RTC held that what could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. Thus, the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99961 in the name of TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA, married to Paulino Estonina, and issue another one, also in her name, married to the same person, stating therein that said person is the owner of the property therein covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of Santiago Garcia pro indiviso. 6
Both the spouses Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia appealed to the herein public respondent Court of Appeals. After a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals concluded that contrary to the finding of the RTC, the parcel of land in question was not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the former's exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago Garcia's estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcia's one-tenth(l/l0) pro indiviso share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached, levied and sold in execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in favor of Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430. On August 12, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99961, covering Lot 2-C (LRC) Psd 223486, situated in Sta. Cruz, Laguna issued in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, married to Paulino Estonina . . . , is hereby ordered cancelled and nullified and the Register of Deeds of Laguna ordered to issue another in lieu thereof covering the same parcel of land in the name of Trinidad S. Estonina, widow, one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share, and spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban, nine-tenths (9/10) pro indiviso share.
7
Aggrieved, the spouses Estonina filed this petition and raised the following issues:
I.
The Court of Appeals, in declaring the property in question as exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, DISREGARDED the long established doctrine that the trial court's findings especially as to the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.
II.
The Court of Appeals, in issuing the questioned decision, solely centered on the nature of the property in question, and conveniently brushed aside the following legal issues raised on appeal (thereby leading to an erroneous judgment), to wit:
(a) That the plaintiffs-appellant (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) have no cause of action and/or lack cause of action against Estoninas (now petitioners). Assuming, arguendo that they have, the same is now barred by laches. The same is true with the appellants Garcias (now also private respondents). Hence, the title of Estonina should have been declared valid.
(b) That the plaintiffs-appellants (Sps. Atayan and now private respondents) are not parties to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of attachment was issued and which resulted in the execution pending appeal. Hence, they cannot attack the validity of the execution in this proceedings especially so when judgment therein had already attained finality.
III.
Consequently, by virtue of the foregoing errors, the Court of Appeals erred in not granting herein petitioners' prayer that the trial court's findings be modified by upholding Estonina's title to the property under TCT No. T-99961, and affirming in all other respect the order of the trial court.
8
The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court are deemed conclusive. 9 Thus, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
generally limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. As such, this Court is generally not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 10
This is, however, subject to several exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, as in this case, warranting a review by this Court of such factual findings. 11
In concluding that the parcel of land in question was the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, the trial court relied solely on the fact that when TCT No. T-19175 covering the said land was issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo Garcia, thus giving rise to the presumption that the same was indeed conjugal. It found the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said property was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother to be self-serving and completely disregarded the said testimony. And as regards the inscription at the back of the TCT No. T-19175 that:
[t]he property described in this title is subject to the claims of the heirs of the deceased Eugenia Clemente, within two (2) years from January 27, 1961, in accordance with the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
12
the trial court held that "there is no showing at all from said inscription that said property came from the parents of Santiago Garcia." 13
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in taking the stance that the said land was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, gave credence to the unrebutted testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the said parcel of land was inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother Eugenia Clemente and that it used to be part of a big tract of land which was divided among Santiago and his sisters.
The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter, lead us to concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago Garcia. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 14
In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo. They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza". This, according to the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the property. The foregoing contention has no merit. In the case of Jocson v. Court of Appeals 15
we held that:
The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim in insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already erdsting . . . . It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so because the words "married to" preceding "Alejandra Poblete" are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson . . . . In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
16
Being the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, it was the entire parcel of land in question that formed part of his estate and which passed to his ten heirs by compulsory succession upon his death. And as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, what could therefore be attached and sold at public auction in Civil Case No. 88430 was only the one-tenth (1/10) pro indiviso share of Consuelo Garcia in the said parcel of land. The sale at public auction of the disputed property in its entirety by the Sheriff in favor of Trinidad Estonina over and above the one-tenth (1/10) share of Consuelo Garcia is null
and void, belonging as it does to the other heirs of Santiago Garcia and later to the spouses Atayan. Worth reiterating is the basic precept that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties uncluestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under the authority of the court only when the property levied upon belongs to the defendant. 17
For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. 18
The right of a third-party claimant to file an independent action to vindicate his claim of ownership over the properties seized is reserved by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If property levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or his right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of his right or title, and serve the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or the keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any other proper action.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
As stated in the case of Sy v. Discaya, 19 this "proper action" would have for its object
the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages resulting from the allegedly wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the third party claim and it may be brought against the sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful execution proceedings, such as the judgment creditor himself. Such "proper action", as above pointed out, is and should be an entirely separate and distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the latter suit. 20
In the case at bench, the filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other than the one which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to Civil Case No. 88430. Such an independent action cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court. 21
While it is true that property in custody of the law may not be interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has proprietary interests. But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule
does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's custody. 22
The foregoing puts to rest any and all questions raised regarding the propriety of the course of action taken by the spouses Atayan in vindication of their claim over the land in question. Anent the contention that the spouses Atayan are guilty of laches, suffice it to state that this residual argument deserves scant consideration. Being strangers to Civil Case No. 88430 where the writ of execution over the land in question was issued, they cannot be faulted for filing the "proper action" only in 1985 or six (6) years after the levy on execution. Besides, it was only in 1984 that the Court of Appeals rendered a decision finally cancelling the title of their predecessors-in-interest and issuing another one in favor of Trinidad Estonina. The action filed by the spouses Atayan seeking the annulment of the sheriffs sale and the transfer certificate of title with damages immediately thereafter or on July 25, 1985 cannot be considered as undue delay nor does it imply a lack of interest to enforce their claim over the disputed property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178611 January 14, 2013
ESTRELLA ADUAN ORPIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO C. TOMAS and MYRNA U. TOMAS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Considerations of expediency cannot justify a resort to procedural shortcuts. The end does not
justify the means; a meritorious case cannot overshadow the condition that the means employed
to pursue it must be in keeping with the Rules.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the May 7, 2007 Decision
2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 97341, and its June 28, 2007
Resolution3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Estrella Aduan Orpiano (Estrella) is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano (Alejandro). Part
of their conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-23468 (the lot).
In 1979, a Decision was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC)
of Quezon City declaring Estrella an absent/absentee spouse and granting Alejandro the authority
to sell the lot. The JDRC Decision was annotated on the back of TCT No. RT-23468.
On March 19, 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses Antonio
and Myrna Tomas (the Tomas spouses) for P12,170,283.00. That very same day, a new title –
TCT No. N-152326 – was issued in the name of the Tomas spouses despite the fact that the
purchase price has not been paid in full, the spouses having been given until December of that
same year to complete their payment.
On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed Civil Case No. Q-96-29261 (the collection case) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 226 (the collection court), seeking
collection of the balance of the price in the amount of P4,314,100.00 supposedly left unpaid by
the Tomas spouses, with damages.[4]
During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His heirs, Estrella included,
were substituted in his stead in the collection case. Estrella moved to amend the Complaint to
one for rescission/annulment of sale and cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion.
She next moved to be dropped as party plaintiff but was again rebuffed.
On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed Civil Case No. Q-05-56216 (the annulment case) for annulment
of the March 1996 sale and cancellation of TCT No. N-152326, with damages, against the
What is excluded from CPG (a) Brought as exclusive property
G.R. No. L-16991 March 31, 1964
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
William H. Quasha and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw Katigbak.
Ramon L. Katigbak in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring the property
covered by TCT No. 57626 in the City of Manila to be the separate or paraphernal property of
the defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw. Plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Laperal, disagree with
the said finding. Hence they appealed from the said decision. They maintain that the realty in
question, with its improvements and income, are conjugal assets of the spouses Evelina Kalaw
and Ramon Katigbak.
This litigation is a sequel to the one instituted by the Laperals against Katigbak and Kalaw way
back in August, 1950. In that case, Civil Case No. 11767 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the Laperals sought from the therein defendants "recovery of P14,000 evidenced by
various promissory notes executed in favor of the Laperals by Katigbak, and for the return of
jewelry valued at P97,500.00, delivered by the Laperals to Katigbak for sale on commission, or a
total of P111,500.00." On November 1, 1950, upon a confession of judgment by Katigbak, the
trial court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the sum of P14,000.00, and to
return the jewelry involved, or in lieu thereof, to pay plaintiffs P97,500.00, with interest from
August 8, 1950.
About a month after this decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband
Katigbak, for "judicial separation of property and separate administration," docketed as Civil
Case No. 12860, of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Prior to the trial, Katigbak and Kalaw
submitted an agreement or stipulation of facts on the basis of which, the court granted the prayer
for the "judicial separation of property and separate administration."
On February 1, 1955, the Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and Katigbak, Civil
Case No. 25235 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking among other things, annulment
of the proceedings had in Civil Case No. 12860 for "judicial separation of property and separate
administration," to enforce the judgment secured by the Laperals in Civil Case No. 11767 on the
fruits of Kalaw's paraphernal property, and to secure a ruling declaring the real property covered
by TCT No. 57626 as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. After trial, the court dismissed
the complaint, which dismissal the Laperals appealed to this Court. Acting on the same, We
rendered judgment under G.R. No. L-11418, promulgated on December 27, 1958, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
However, our holding does not write a finis to the case. Because the trial court held that
the conjugal partnership was not liable, it naturally, saw no reason or necessity for ruling
upon the other issues involved, such as the legality of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
12860 for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and whether or not the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57626 belongs to the conjugal partnership.
In conclusion we hold that while the fruits of the paraphernal property of Kalaw are not
liable for the enforcement of the obligations contracted by Katigbak, nevertheless, the
conjugal properties are.1äwphï1.ñët
The case is hereby ordered remanded for further proceedings to make trial court, the
latter to make the necessary findings indicated and then render a decision on the basis of
said findings in accordance with our decision. No costs.
In compliance with the above endorsement, the trial court, after submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda, there being already sufficient evidence in the record rendered judgment
declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 as paraphernal. Hence, this appeal.
The facts upon which trial court predicated its conclusion that the realty in question is
paraphernal are as follows:
For the reason that it established, without contradiction in the records that the spouses Ramon
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married in 1938 (tsn, p. 20, hearing of Jan. 31, 1956) and
neither of them had brought properties unto the marriage that Ramon's occupation was that of
Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the Phil. Islands wherein his monthly salary P200.00 (id); that the
property under TCT No. 57626 was registered in the name of "Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, married
to Ramon Katigbak" on December 6, 1939, only two years after marriage and the property was
and is in Calle Evangelista, which was and is a business district; the Court, not withstanding the
presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal, is led to believe that,
as Evelina declares, her mother Pura Villanueva was the one that had bought property for her and
had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother; that is, buying properties placing
them directly in the names of her children; and this is recognized by Article 1448; and the Court
is all the more led to the conclusion when it sees that Ramon Katigbak, in the same year 1939,
that is, long before the spouses had come to the parting of ways, made a manifestation that he
had no interest in the properties —
Ramon Katigbak, the husband of the vendor signed this document only for the purpose of
assisting his wife but he has no interest in the property.
(Sgd.) Ramon L. Katigbak
(Exh. 5-a, p. 189, Record)
As this case is before Us now, therefore, the issue is whether or not the above findings warrant a
rejection of the presumption that the property disputed, for the reason that it was acquired during
the marriage, is conjugal.
We find for the appellee.
There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed
conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, for the same law is un equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the
property) belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife." And, examining the records and
evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and
convincingly disproven.
The facts recited by the trial judge in explanation of his view that the property in dispute is
paraphernal despite its having been acquired during coverture, impress Us as adequate and
conclusive. As a matter of fact, the factors he took into account in rejecting the presumption, on
the whole, tally with Our own views in the cases of Casiano v. Samaniego, 30 Phil. 135 and
Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284.
In the Casiano case, the deeds to the property in question were in the name of the defendant who
testified that they were "purchased by her mother for herself" and that the purchase price was
paid with money furnished by her mother. On the foregoing, the trial judge rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant, and declared the real properties to be paraphernal. On appeal to this
Court, declaring the ruling as essentially factual, We said:
We do not question the correctness of the doctrine contended for, but we think it is
sufficient to say that the legal presumption established by article 1407 of the Civil Code
has been overcame by the evidence of record. There is nothing in the record which would
justify us in disturbing the findings, of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses
called by the defense, and if we believe the defendant herself there can be no doubt the
land in question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds.
It should be further noted that the husband in the aforecited case, apart from relying on the
presumption established by the Civil Code, sought to show the conjugal nature of the disputed
property by presenting a number of documentary evidence. He exhibited, for instance, "certified
copies of reports on file in the City Assessor's Office showing that the land was assessed in his
name; a certified copy of an inspector's report in which the name of the husband appears as the
owner; and, a tax declaration made in November, 1905, relating to the property in dispute, in the
name of the husband." Yet, even then, this Court declined to give effect to the presumption as the
wife's evidence to the contrary were more preponderant. In the present case, on the other hand,
We note that other than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so
presented was shifted to the appellant. In this latter task, the appellant failed completely.
Again, in the Coingco case, We ruled:
The second question raised in the motion for reconsideration is, whether the presumption
that the properties in litigation are conjugal properties because they were acquired during
the coverture may be sufficiently rebutted by any one of the following facts: (1) the titles
to them are in the name of wife alone; (2) that the husband gave his marital consent to
their being mortgaged by the wife; (3) that the wife financially able to buy those
properties. While it is true that each one of them, taken separately, may not be sufficient
to overcome the above-quoted presumption established by Art. 14 of the Civil Code, it is
nonetheless true that all of them taken together, with all the other facts and circumstances
established by the evidence, might be, and were, considered by the lower court as
sufficient to rebut the same presumption.
In the case before Us now for review, the deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At
the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the
husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income
then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the
defendant herein testified, and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnish
by her mother so she could buy the property for herself. Furthermore, it was established during
the trial that it was a practice of defendant's parents to so provide their children with money to
purchase realties for themselves.
These facts, quite obviously, more than measure up to the circumstances obtaining in the two
cases previous cited wherein We held the conjugal presumption to have been rebutted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court declaring the property
covered by TCT No. 57626 of the Register of Deeds of Manila as paraphernal is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-16991 March 31, 1964
ROBERTO LAPERAL, JR., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
RAMON L. KATIGBAK, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
William H. Quasha and Associates for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw Katigbak.
Ramon L. Katigbak in his own behalf as defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring the property
covered by TCT No. 57626 in the City of Manila to be the separate or paraphernal property of
the defendant-appellee Evelina Kalaw. Plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Laperal, disagree with
the said finding. Hence they appealed from the said decision. They maintain that the realty in
question, with its improvements and income, are conjugal assets of the spouses Evelina Kalaw
and Ramon Katigbak.
This litigation is a sequel to the one instituted by the Laperals against Katigbak and Kalaw way
back in August, 1950. In that case, Civil Case No. 11767 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, the Laperals sought from the therein defendants "recovery of P14,000 evidenced by
various promissory notes executed in favor of the Laperals by Katigbak, and for the return of
jewelry valued at P97,500.00, delivered by the Laperals to Katigbak for sale on commission, or a
total of P111,500.00." On November 1, 1950, upon a confession of judgment by Katigbak, the
trial court rendered judgment against him to pay the Laperals the sum of P14,000.00, and to
return the jewelry involved, or in lieu thereof, to pay plaintiffs P97,500.00, with interest from
August 8, 1950.
About a month after this decision was rendered, Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband
Katigbak, for "judicial separation of property and separate administration," docketed as Civil
Case No. 12860, of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Prior to the trial, Katigbak and Kalaw
submitted an agreement or stipulation of facts on the basis of which, the court granted the prayer
for the "judicial separation of property and separate administration."
On February 1, 1955, the Laperals filed another complaint against Kalaw and Katigbak, Civil
Case No. 25235 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking among other things, annulment
of the proceedings had in Civil Case No. 12860 for "judicial separation of property and separate
administration," to enforce the judgment secured by the Laperals in Civil Case No. 11767 on the
fruits of Kalaw's paraphernal property, and to secure a ruling declaring the real property covered
by TCT No. 57626 as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw. After trial, the court dismissed
the complaint, which dismissal the Laperals appealed to this Court. Acting on the same, We
rendered judgment under G.R. No. L-11418, promulgated on December 27, 1958, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
However, our holding does not write a finis to the case. Because the trial court held that
the conjugal partnership was not liable, it naturally, saw no reason or necessity for ruling
upon the other issues involved, such as the legality of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
12860 for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and whether or not the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57626 belongs to the conjugal partnership.
In conclusion we hold that while the fruits of the paraphernal property of Kalaw are not
liable for the enforcement of the obligations contracted by Katigbak, nevertheless, the
conjugal properties are.1äwphï1.ñët
The case is hereby ordered remanded for further proceedings to make trial court, the
latter to make the necessary findings indicated and then render a decision on the basis of
said findings in accordance with our decision. No costs.
In compliance with the above endorsement, the trial court, after submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda, there being already sufficient evidence in the record rendered judgment
declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 as paraphernal. Hence, this appeal.
The facts upon which trial court predicated its conclusion that the realty in question is
paraphernal are as follows:
For the reason that it established, without contradiction in the records that the spouses Ramon
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw were married in 1938 (tsn, p. 20, hearing of Jan. 31, 1956) and
neither of them had brought properties unto the marriage that Ramon's occupation was that of
Asst. Atty. of the Bank of the Phil. Islands wherein his monthly salary P200.00 (id); that the
property under TCT No. 57626 was registered in the name of "Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, married
to Ramon Katigbak" on December 6, 1939, only two years after marriage and the property was
and is in Calle Evangelista, which was and is a business district; the Court, not withstanding the
presumption that all properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal, is led to believe that,
as Evelina declares, her mother Pura Villanueva was the one that had bought property for her and
had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother; that is, buying properties placing
them directly in the names of her children; and this is recognized by Article 1448; and the Court
is all the more led to the conclusion when it sees that Ramon Katigbak, in the same year 1939,
that is, long before the spouses had come to the parting of ways, made a manifestation that he
had no interest in the properties —
Ramon Katigbak, the husband of the vendor signed this document only for the purpose of
assisting his wife but he has no interest in the property.
(Sgd.) Ramon L. Katigbak
(Exh. 5-a, p. 189, Record)
As this case is before Us now, therefore, the issue is whether or not the above findings warrant a
rejection of the presumption that the property disputed, for the reason that it was acquired during
the marriage, is conjugal.
We find for the appellee.
There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed
conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, for the same law is un equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the
property) belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife." And, examining the records and
evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and
convincingly disproven.
The facts recited by the trial judge in explanation of his view that the property in dispute is
paraphernal despite its having been acquired during coverture, impress Us as adequate and
conclusive. As a matter of fact, the factors he took into account in rejecting the presumption, on
the whole, tally with Our own views in the cases of Casiano v. Samaniego, 30 Phil. 135 and
Coingco v. Flores, 82 Phil. 284.
In the Casiano case, the deeds to the property in question were in the name of the defendant who
testified that they were "purchased by her mother for herself" and that the purchase price was
paid with money furnished by her mother. On the foregoing, the trial judge rendered judgment in
favor of the defendant, and declared the real properties to be paraphernal. On appeal to this
Court, declaring the ruling as essentially factual, We said:
We do not question the correctness of the doctrine contended for, but we think it is
sufficient to say that the legal presumption established by article 1407 of the Civil Code
has been overcame by the evidence of record. There is nothing in the record which would
justify us in disturbing the findings, of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses
called by the defense, and if we believe the defendant herself there can be no doubt the
land in question was purchased for the wife with her own separate funds.
It should be further noted that the husband in the aforecited case, apart from relying on the
presumption established by the Civil Code, sought to show the conjugal nature of the disputed
property by presenting a number of documentary evidence. He exhibited, for instance, "certified
copies of reports on file in the City Assessor's Office showing that the land was assessed in his
name; a certified copy of an inspector's report in which the name of the husband appears as the
owner; and, a tax declaration made in November, 1905, relating to the property in dispute, in the
name of the husband." Yet, even then, this Court declined to give effect to the presumption as the
wife's evidence to the contrary were more preponderant. In the present case, on the other hand,
We note that other than invoking the presumption, the burden of denying the evidence so
presented was shifted to the appellant. In this latter task, the appellant failed completely.
Again, in the Coingco case, We ruled:
The second question raised in the motion for reconsideration is, whether the presumption
that the properties in litigation are conjugal properties because they were acquired during
the coverture may be sufficiently rebutted by any one of the following facts: (1) the titles
to them are in the name of wife alone; (2) that the husband gave his marital consent to
their being mortgaged by the wife; (3) that the wife financially able to buy those
properties. While it is true that each one of them, taken separately, may not be sufficient
to overcome the above-quoted presumption established by Art. 14 of the Civil Code, it is
nonetheless true that all of them taken together, with all the other facts and circumstances
established by the evidence, might be, and were, considered by the lower court as
sufficient to rebut the same presumption.
In the case before Us now for review, the deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At
the time of its purchase, the property was already of such substantial value as admittedly, the
husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that singular source of income
then was his P200.00 a month salary from a Manila Bank. As in the Casiano case, supra, the
defendant herein testified, and was believe by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnish
by her mother so she could buy the property for herself. Furthermore, it was established during
the trial that it was a practice of defendant's parents to so provide their children with money to
purchase realties for themselves.
These facts, quite obviously, more than measure up to the circumstances obtaining in the two
cases previous cited wherein We held the conjugal presumption to have been rebutted.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court declaring the property
covered by TCT No. 57626 of the Register of Deeds of Manila as paraphernal is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998
TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate court's decision 1 promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court which ruled, 2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed
to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS, HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
3
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue "whether or not Article 116 of the Family Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 158 5 and 160 6 of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article 254 7 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the Family Code. Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 8 in relation to Article 105 9 (second paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force. 10 Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. 11 We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as "conjugal" are capital properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either
through inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. Moreover, they stress that Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioner's allegation.
We find petitioner's contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. 12 Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 13 The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. 14 Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. 15
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly, petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law, pursuant to Article 148 16 of the New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. 17
Acquisitions by lucrative title refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 18 Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." 19
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:
. . . . And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of the sari-sari store (Exhibit "F-3"; Exhibit "G", pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed applicant for a building permit does not establish that these improvements were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her exhibits ("D-1", "E", "E-I", "T", "T-1", "T-2", "U", "U-l" and "U-2"; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN, January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4. Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (second paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence of evidence on the source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this particular case again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page 421).
20
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership over said property in as much as the title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco."
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. 21 It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. 22 The phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco. 23
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. 24 Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer themn inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to a leg injury sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated
when petitioner pushed him to the ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the Court's view, incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
What is excluded from CPG - (b) Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage
G.R. No. L-8715 October 24, 1914
MARIANO VELOSO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUCIA MARTINEZ, personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo Franco, deceased-appellee.
Martin M. Levering for appellant.
Pantaleon E. del Rosario for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 1st day of July, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cebu to recover of the defendant, personally and as administratrix of
the estate of Domingo Franco, deceased, the possession of a certain parcel of land particularly
described in the second paragraph of the complaint, together with the sum of P125 per month,
from the 1st day of June, 1911.
The defendant presented a demurrer to said complaint, which was overruled. No exception
was taken to the ruling of the court upon the demurrer. Later the defendant answered, setting up
a general denial and a special defense. The special defense consisted —
First. Of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500, as attorney's fees for services rendered by
the deceased, Domingo Franco, to the plaintiff; and, second, for the recovery of certain jewelry,
of the value of P6,000, particularly described in the answer of the defendant, alleged to be in the
possession of the plaintiff.
The first special defense, relating to attorney's fees, was later withdrawn by the defendant.
The only questions left for litigation were: .
First. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the recovery of the parcel of land in question;
and, second, whether the defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the jewelry
described in her answer.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Adoph Wislizenus, judge, in a carefully
prepared opinion, found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the land in
question, together with the sum of P100 for each month from the month of June, 1911, until the
possession of the land was returned to him.
The lower court further found that the defendant was entitled to the possession of said
jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return the same to her and in case of the plaintiff's failure to
return said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for such
failure, the sum of P6,000.
From the judgment of the lower court, each of the parties, plaintiff and defendant,
appealed to this court. Later the defendant withdrew her appeal, thereby allowing that part of the
judgment relating to the plaintiff's right to the possession of the land in question, together with
damages, to become final. The only question remaining, therefore, for this court to decide is as to
the ownership and right of possession of said jewels. It is admitted that the jewels in question,
before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally
and that she had inherited the same from her mother. The defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the
widow of Domingo Franco, and after the death of her husband she was appointed administratrix
of his estate. The record further shows (Exhibit C) that a short time before the death of Domingo
Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of
said sum the jewelry described in the complaint. The money was borrowed on the 7th day of
April, 1911, under promise to repay the same, with 12 per cent interest, on the 7th day of May,
1911. It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document
(Exhibit C), was in fact delivered to the plaintiff. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was
contained "dentro de una caja que queda cerrada despues de demonstradas las alhajas a D.
Mariano Veloso" (in a box which remains closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano
Veloso). The document further admits the "la llava quedara en poder de D. Domingo Franco"
(the key shall remain in possession of Domingo Franco). After the death of Domingo Franco it
appears that said jewelry was found in the same "caja" and that the key was in the possession of
the defendant. It is very doubtful, indeed, under the facts, whether the plaintiff ever obtained the
actual possession of the jewelry. His possession, however, seems to be admitted by the defendant
in the present action. So far as the record shows the jewelry was in the same box where it was
found at the time of the execution and delivery of said Exhibit C and that the defendant still has
the key to said box.
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show that the jewels in question
were pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the defendant.
And not only that, the plaintiff further attempts to show that after the death of Domingo Franco,
the defendant promised to pay the amount for which the said jewels were pawned. The defendant
positively denies that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to
redeem the same by paying the amount due. No explanation is contained in the record why the
jewels were placed in said box (presumably a money safe). In view of the fact, however, that the
record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her
mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same.
(Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and
unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the
husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record
that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That
being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.1awphil.net
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is entitled to the possession of said
jewels, or to their value, amounting to P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed, with costs.
What is excluded from CPG, FC 109
(a) Brought as exclusive property, FC 109(1)
*Laperal v. Katigbak, 10 SCRA 493
*Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. 102330, Nov. 25, 1998
(b) Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage, FC 109 (2) of FC 113, FC 115
*Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil 255
*Berciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53, cf. FC 115
(c) Acquired by redemption/exchange, FC 109(3), NCC 1601,