Persons and Family Relations Case Digest Batch 3

25. PADILLA vs CA

NATURE: Petition of certiorari to revise the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS

Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the public market to execute an alleged order of the

Mayor to clear the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance per se. The stall of

one Antonio Vergara was demolished pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in trade

and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. The petitioners were found guilty of grave

coercion after trial at the CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day imprisonment and

ordered to pay fines.- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI and acquitted the appellants

based on reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00 as actual damages. The

decision of the CA was based on the fact that the petitioners were charged with coercion when they

should have been more appropriately charged with crime against person. Hence, the crime of grave

coercion was not proved in accordance with the law. The petitioner filed the appeal to the SC

questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty verdict.

ISSUE

WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the

complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge

HELD

NO. The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including

PNB vs Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the

extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the

facts from which the civil action might arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty

was based on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in civil cases is preponderance of

evidence, the court express a finding that the defendants¶ offenses are civil in nature.- The Court also

tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code to larify whether a separate civil action is required

when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved

beyond reasonable doubt. The SC took the position that the said provision merely emphasizes that a civil

action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal extinguishes

the criminal liability but not the civil liability particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable

ground

26. People v. Bayotas

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 236 SCRA 239

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his

conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to

hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. The Supreme Court in its

Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal, however, it required the Solicitor General to file

its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. .

The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be

resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is

based. On the other hand, counsel for the accused-appellant, argued that the death of the accused

while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties

invoking the case of Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil

obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished

if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Issue:

Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this

regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates hiscriminal liability and only the

civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto

in senso strictiore." That the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil

liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed

without qualification.

Judgment Dismissed with costs de oficio.

27. Frias vs. San Diego-Sison

BOBIE ROSE FRIAS v. FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON

2007 / Austria-Martinez

FACTS:

On 7 Dec 1990, Bobie Rose Frias and Dr. Flora San-Diego Sison entered into a MOA over Frias’property

MOA consideration is 3MSison has 6 months from the date of contract’s execution to notify Frias of her

intention to purchase the property with the improvements at 6.4M Prior to this 6 month period, Frias

may still offer the property to other persons, provided that 3M shall be paid to Sison including interest

based on prevailing compounded bank interest + amount of sale in excess of 7M [should the property be

sold at a price greater than 7M] In case Frias has no other buyer within 6 months from the contract’s

execution, no interest shall be charged by Sison on the 3M In the event that on the 6th month, Sison

would decide not to purchase the property, Frias has 6 months to pay 3M (amount shall earn

compounded bank interest for the last 6 months only) 3M treated as a loan and the property considered

as the security for the mortgage Upon notice of intention to purchase, Sison has 6 months to pay the

balance of 3.4M (6.4M less 3M MOA consideration) Frias received from Sison 3M (2M in cash; 1M post-

dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale). Frias gave Sison

the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. Sison decided not to purchase the property, so

shenotified Frias through a letter dated March 20, 1991 [Frias received it only on June 11, 1991],and

Sison reminded Frias of their agreement that the 2M Sison paid should be considered as a loan payable

within 6 months. Frias failed to pay this amount.

Sison filed a complaintfor sum of money with preliminary attachment. Sison averred that Frias tried to

deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of the loss of her owner’s copy of TCT,

executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition[1] for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy.

RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing of a 2M bond.

RTC found that Frias was under obligation to pay Sison 2M with compounded interest pursuant to their

MOA. RTC ordered Frias to pay Sison:

2M + 32% annual interest beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid

70k representing premiums paid by Sison on the attachment bond with legal interest counted from the

date of this decision until fully paid

100k moral, corrective, exemplary damages [liable for moral damages because of Frias’ fraudulent

scheme]

100k attorney’s fees + cost of litigation

CA affirmed RTC with modification—32% reduced to 25%. CA said that there was no basis for Frias to say

that the interest should be charged for 6 months only. It said that a loan always bears interest;

otherwise, it is not a loan. The interest should commence on June 7, 1991 until fully paid, with

compounded bank interest prevailing at the time [June 1991] the 2M was considered as a loan (as

certified by the bank).

ISSUES & HOLDING:

Ratio only discusses topic of INTEREST (as per syllabus)

1. WON compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months as contained in the MOA. NO

2. WON Sison is entitled to moral damages. YES

3. WON the grant of attorney’s fees is proper, even if not mentioned in the body of the decision.

HELD:

NO. CA committed no error in awarding an annual 25% interest on the 2M even beyond the 6-month

stipulated period. In this case, the phrase “for the last six months only” should be taken in the context of

the entire agreement.

SC notes that the agreement speaks of two (2) periods of 6 months each (see FACTS—words in bold &

underline). No interest will be charged for the 1st 6-month period [while Sison was making up her mind],

but only for the 2nd 6-month period after Sison decided not to buy the property. There is nothing in the

MOA that suggests that interest will be charged for 6 months only even if it takes forever for Frias to pay

the loan.

The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money, and until the principal

sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to

use such principal amount. For a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to

continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest

constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.

CA DECISION AND RESOLUTION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION—Award of attorney’s fees deleted

[1] At first, Frias’ petition was granted, but it was eventually set aside, since RTC granted Sison’s petition

for relief from judgment (as Sison was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy).

28. EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.

G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995

FACTS:

On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents,

Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. SR 5054 for

the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits,

dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation.

Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark "so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE'

as previously registered and used in the Philippines cause confusion, mistake and deception on the part

of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods.

On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision granting private respondent's petition for

cancellation and opposition to registration. The Director of Patents, using the test of dominancy,

declared that petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is

the word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods

originated from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public is a question of

fact which is to be resolved by applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the competing trademark

contains the main or essential or dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and

deception are likely to result.

HELD:

The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive feature of the appellant's trademark and all

of the appellee's "LEE" trademarks. It is the mark which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him

to conclude that the goods originated from the same manufacturer. The alleged difference is too

insubstantial to be noticeable. The likelihood of confusion is further made more probable by the fact

that both parties are engaged in the same line of business.

Although the Court decided in favor of the respondent, the appellee has sufficiently established its right

to prior use and registration of the trademark "LEE" in the Philippines and is thus entitled to protection

from any infringement upon the same. The dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla is more acceptable.

29. Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners vs The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and

Delia Estrellanes, respondents

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

Ponente: Kapunan

Facts:

Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion

for suspension of their arraignment.

Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral

representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,

Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17,

1989.

Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said

designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives.

Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as

members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.

The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of

their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan.

Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a

prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations

issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a

determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have

rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these

reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC

later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period

they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the

appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead

Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be

cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent

Sandiganbayan the following errors:

A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the

suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case

B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the

proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved

C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that

private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue:

The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.

Held:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has

two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;

and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV

No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further

proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no

doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936)

are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and

evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives,

while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private

respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation

for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records,

from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by

petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were

received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of

office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral

representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private

respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public

officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.

30. Beltran vs People

Beltran vs. PP/Judge Juazon

GRN 137567 334 SCRA 106

Buena, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage against her wife for 24 years. Wife answered

that it was petitioner who left the family house and lived with a paramour. A concubinage case was filed

by wife and petitioner argued that the pendency of a case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a

prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not pendency of the case for nullity of marriage a prejudicial question to the

concubinage case.

RULING:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two

essential elements: 1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in

the criminal action; and 2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action

may proceed.

In the criminal case of concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his

marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than

proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

31. Yap vs Cabales

YAP VS. CABALES G.R. NO. 159186 JUNE 5, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their

company Primetown Property Group. Yap purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te.

Inconsideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter,

spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the

checks from Evelyn. Some of the checks were dishonor by reason of account closed.

Despite of the demand, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks. Spouses

Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money against Yap. Subsequently, the Office of the

City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several in formations for violation of BP 22 against the

petitioner. In the 22criminal cases, Yap filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the

existence of a prejudicial question. The MCTC denied the motions for lack of merit. On appeal, the RTC

likewise denied the petition. CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA

opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the

petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in

the MTCC.

HELD:

None. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are

both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the

latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be

determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale

behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential

elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the

criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may

proceed. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to

the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element

or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon

which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the

civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution

of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal

action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before

taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a

prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently

of each other.

32. Dreamwork vs Janiola

Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs Cleofe Janiola and Hon. Arthur Famini, GR No 184861, June 30, 2009

FACTS

Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor

of Las Piñas City for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private respondent, together

with her husband, filed a complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction

agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a

Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement

between the parties, as well as for damages.

ISSUE:

WON the court seriously erred in not perceiving grave abuse of discretion on the part of the inferior

court when the latter ruled to suspend proceddings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 on the basis o f

“prejudicial question” in Civil Case No. LP-06-0197.[

RULING:

Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree with private respondent’s

argument that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of

the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action and that there is an apparent conflict in

the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have

presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by amendment of a

provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it

originally had.” In the instant case, the phrase, “previously instituted,” was inserted to qualify the nature

of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation

is further buttressed by the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There is

no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and

criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that “a statute should be construed not only to be

consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a

complete, coherent and intelligible system.” This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et

concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and

harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, every

effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when harmonization is

impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.

In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible

of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase “previously instituted civil

action” in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The

clause “before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed” in Art. 36 of the Civil Code

may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed

during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or

during the trial with the court hearing the case.

This interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of statutory

construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect

to all the relevant provisions of law.

33. Pimentel vs Pimentel

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010

Facts:

Respondent, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner,

Joselito R. Pimentel. The Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004 and was raffled

to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004. The pre-trial and trial was set on 14 February 2005. She also

filed on 5 November 2004, a petition, dated 4 November 2004, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity Petitioner received

summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City on 7 February 2005, for the pre-trial

and trial of the Civil Case. He then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC

Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question asserting that the relationship

between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case would have

a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City held

that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the

suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals also denied the petition holding that the

issue in the criminal case for frustrated parricide differs from the issue in the civil action for annulment

of marriage. It ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared

void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged

acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. At the time of the

commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that

warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.

Ruling:

The elements of a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, which are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately

related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue

determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed, were not met. Civil action must be

instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the civil case for annulment was filed

after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. Further, the resolution of the civil action is

not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial

question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an

issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever

the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the

accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in

the crime of parricide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately

related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and

the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for

annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the

accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is

whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence

but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the

time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent

dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case is granted, will have no effect on the

alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the

marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable

since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

34. Reyes vs Rossi

TEODORO A.

REYES vs. ETTORE ROSSI G.R. No. 159823

February 18, 2013

FACTS:

On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation Construction

Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project Director, respondent

Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment

consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that

Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through

four post-dated checks. Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his

obligation under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-

dated checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid

portion of the obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and

October 31, 1998.

Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes issued

and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of P7,125,000.00 drawn against

the United Coconut Planters Bank Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No.

79125 and No. 72808) on their maturity dates in Advanced Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in

Makati. Two of the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their

payment, while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced Foundation’s

account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account Closed

stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on the assumption that they

would be similarly dishonored. In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for

rescission of contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Rossi charged Reyes

with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City

Prosecutor of Makati for the dishonor of checks and another criminal charge for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the

dishonor of Check No. 72802.

On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of

Makati, At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati

over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon City; as

well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the proceedings because

of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question

as to the criminal proceedings. On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the

preliminary investigation recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the

proceedings relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question

On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling

Assistant City Prosecutor. Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of

Justice, but the Secretary of Justice, , denied Rossi’s petition for review.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Rossi challenged the resolutions of the Secretary of

Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.

CA granted the appeal of Rossi in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is

concerned but the dismissal of the complaint for estafa was affirmed.

ISSUE:

WON there is a prejudicial question

HELD:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the

criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law

(Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with

the sale. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a

criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined

before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would

be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.16 The

rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisio.

Reyes states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of

sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal

proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.It is true that the rescission of a contract

results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment

having a retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie,

leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract.However, until the contract is

rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal

actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.

22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of

any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the

time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the

check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for

insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid

cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing

them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for

rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted

the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation

would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such

result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing

the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed the

violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was

still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them

with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation

under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance

of a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal

proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil

action for rescission of the conditional sale. As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case,

the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which

pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the

court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It

is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it

that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it

must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal

prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,

the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a

situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an

issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever

the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or

innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

35. Capili vs People

700 SCRA 443 – Civil Law – Family Code – Void Marriages – A Void 2nd Marriage is not a Defense in

Bigamy Criminal Law – Bigamy – Elements

FACTS:

In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in December

1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.

In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage between Capili

and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.

Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and

Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina

and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the

second marriage was already declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore,

there is no bigamy to speak of.

The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals

reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution for bigamy.

HELD:

No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the

absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already

consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was

subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the

determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge

of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is

contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage

assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void, he

cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as

void. The parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the

same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage

is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that

the marriage exists.

36. Consing, Jr. vs People

G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR.,

respondent.

Facts:

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz,

represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square

meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of

Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by

TCT No. 191408 from Juanito TanTeng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent

and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot. On April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and

his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po

Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No.

687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds. In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the

possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal

demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79alleged to have

been initially paid by PBI. On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,

Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital

Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John

Does.

Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and

therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions

involving TCT No. 687599.On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint

for "Damages and Attachment, "docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No.

SCA 1759.

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed

against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

Issue:

Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and

for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in

the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.

Held:

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues

raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or

characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which

the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil

action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of

the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal

action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before

taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings

in the criminal case.

37. Continental Steel vs Montano

603 SCRA 621 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Death Benefits for the Death of a Dependent – A Fetus is

a Dependent

Civil Law – Civil Personality – When does civil personality start – When does life begin

FACT:

In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused the death of their

unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, then filed death

benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation which denied the

claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty.

Allan Montaño act as the arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of Montaño.

On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under the CBA, death

benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but that in this case, no “death”

has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the mother, that a fetus has no juridical

personality because it was never born pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a

conceived child acquires personality only when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a

legitimate dependent as contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil

laws.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?

2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?

HELD:

1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in question,

hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during the marriage of the

parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it

was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).

2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no need to

discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality – that is not the issue here. But

nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly

provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those

who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life inside the

womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage.

Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit

claims as provided for in their CBA.

38. Romualdez, Marcos vs COMELEC

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of

the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent

Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and

Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement.

Imelda thus amended her COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election

supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus,

filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the

amended as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in

Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and

expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,

where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed

this ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But

the Comelec suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to

cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days

before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days

before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House

of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election

of members of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the

time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the

elections?

Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question

of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the

necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of

Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is

gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her

domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family

back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must

demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be

deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the

presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and

deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held

various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes

unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result

of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain

the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose

her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and

quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-

affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be

interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil

law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her

domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage

and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her

return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of

origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally

expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to

"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the

Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence

certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the

domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident

that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under

Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a

candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and

receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the

trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any

intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such

candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is

generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the

judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications

of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of

Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the

HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No.

119976, September 18, 1995)

- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/07/romualdez-marcos-vs-comelec-

digest.html#sthash.p6AH7GBj.dpuf