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Personality and Social Psychology Review
DOI: 10.1177/1088868306294589 2007; 11; 46 Pers Soc Psychol
Rev
Gregory R. Maio and Geoff Thomas The Epistemic-Teleologic Model
of Deliberate Self-Persuasion
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46
The Epistemic–Teleologic Modelof Deliberate Self-Persuasion
Gregory R. MaioGeoff ThomasCardiff University
committee; people in the pursuit of a healthy lifestyletry to
lose their affection for junk foods; and fans of arelatively poor
sports team sometimes wish they couldavoid feeling bitterness
toward the team after the con-stant dejection of losing. In these
situations, peopleexperience a high amount of conscious, internal
conflictor ambivalence, because their attitude contains desir-able
as well as undesirable elements. People in these sit-uations may
hope that their job would become morefulfilling, their spouse would
become more responsiveto their needs, or their team would start
winning. Peoplemay even take concrete steps to help bring such
changesabout. They might try talking to their boss, convincingtheir
spouse to change, or cheering more vociferouslyfor their team.
Often, however, people find that none oftheir interventions work:
They are stuck in their job,their spouse won’t change, and their
team keeps losing.Thus, people may remain mired in situations that
arereminders of their ambivalence.
According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,1957), this
situation should elicit an aversive state oftension. Indeed, there
is evidence that ambivalencetoward ethnic groups in particular is
associated withincreased aversive arousal (Britt, Boniecki,
Vescio,Biernat, & Brown, 1996; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey,
&Moore, 1992). As a result, people are often motivated
Authors’ Note: This research was supported by a grant from
theEconomic and Social Sciences Research Council of the
UnitedKingdom. The authors thank Eliot Smith, Geoff Haddock,
MariaLima, Jim Olson, Ulrich von Hecker, and three anonymous
reviewersfor their comments on prior versions of this article.
Please address cor-respondence to Gregory R. Maio, School of
Psychology, CardiffUniversity, Cardiff, Wales CF10 3AT, United
Kingdom.
PSPR, Vol. 11 No. 1, February 2007 46-67DOI:
10.1177/1088868306294589© 2007 by the Society for Personality and
Social Psychology, Inc.
Although past theory and research point to the impor-tance of
understanding deliberate self-persuasion (i.e.,deliberate
self-induced attitude change), there have beenno empirical and
theoretical efforts to model this process.This article proposes a
new model to help understand theprocess, while comparing the
process of deliberate self-persuasion with relevant theory and
research. The corefeature of this model is a distinction between
epistemicprocesses, which involve attempting to form new
validattitudes, and teleologic processes, which involve
self-induced attitude change but with minimal concerns forvalidity.
The epistemic processes employ tactics of reinter-pretation,
reattribution, reintegration, retesting, changingcomparators, and
changing dimensions of comparison.The teleologic processes include
suppression, preemp-tion, distraction, and concentration. By
mapping theseprocesses, this model helps to generate many novel
andtestable hypotheses about the use of deliberate self-persuasion
to cope with ambivalent attitudes.
Keywords: Self-persuasion; attitude change;
persuasion;ambivalence; reasoning; suppression
I know of no more encouraging fact than the unques-tionable
ability of man to elevate his life by a consciousendeavor.
—Henry David Thoreau
People frequently find themselves possessing attitudesthat are
disconcerting and uncomfortable: Individualswith low self-esteem
wish they could like themselvesmore; unhappy employees want to like
their jobs; dis-satisfied romantic partners want to feel more
positivelyabout each other; minority opinion holders in a
com-mittee may wish they held the same opinion as the
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to resolve ambivalent attitudes in a positive or
negativedirection (Bell & Esses, 2002; I. Katz & Hass,
1988;MacDonald & Zanna, 1998) and more carefully
processrelevant persuasive information that can help them toachieve
this aim (Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997; Maio,Bell, & Esses,
1996).
Nonetheless, such unbiased resolutions of attitudesin a positive
or negative direction do not help peoplewho have a preference for a
specific nonambivalent atti-tude. For example, people know that
they would ratherlike their job, their partner, and their favored
sportsteam; their preference is to rid themselves of the unde-sired
(negative) attitude elements rather than reducetheir ambivalence in
either direction. How can peoplecope with their ambivalence when
they have a specificattitudinal preference? This situation is
difficult because,in general, ambivalence occurs when the negative
andpositive dimensions of the attitude are coactivated frommemory
(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; M. M.Thompson, Zanna,
& Griffin, 1995), and this coactiva-tion makes it difficult to
focus on one dimension to theexclusion of the other.
On occasion, people expect that they can escape thispredicament
with help from others, such as family,friends, religious
authorities, or even psychologists. Atother times, people may try
diverse internal coping tech-niques without seeking external
guidance. For example,people can consciously decide to hold in mind
aspects ofthe job that they like, mentally elaborate on the ways
inwhich the spouse is great, or contemplate the team’sadmirable
persistence in the face of repeated losses.Sometimes, people may
even receive explicit cues toattempt these processes. For instance,
one of the authorsrecently opened a fortune cookie containing
relevant(yet unnecessary) advice, “Try to value useful qualitiesin
one who loves you.” The advice was obviouslydirected at people who
are experiencing at least somelevel of ambivalence in a close
relationship. While heed-ing such advice, people are aware of their
ambivalenceand their attempts to deal with it, and if these efforts
aresuccessful, their attitude will become less ambivalentand more
consistent with the preferred attitude.
Such covert, self-directed, intentional attitude changemay be
labeled deliberate self-persuasion, and this processis the focus of
our article. To our knowledge, this arti-cle is the first to
examine deliberate self-persuasion.Hence, it is useful to begin by
giving a brief overview ofthe concept and of our model and then
move quickly toa full description of the model. Next, we consider
howit compares to several models in attitudes and socialcognition
that examine relevant but distinct processes(e.g., dissonance,
self-control). Finally, we summarizesome of the model’s features
and several implicationsfor further research.
OVERVIEW
Deliberate self-persuasion can occur only when peopleconsciously
recognize a discrepancy between how theyactually evaluate aspects
of an object and how theywould like to evaluate it. If people are
motivated andable to resolve this discrepancy, then they can employ
avariety of covert mental strategies, and these strategiesvary in
how they balance the need to possess a correctattitude and the need
to possess a desired attitude.
According to our model, some strategies simultane-ously aim for
the correct and desired attitude by usingreasoning processes to
alter mental representations ofthe object of judgment and the
standard of comparison.These epistemic strategies include processes
that reinter-pret undesired attributes of the attitude object or
thatchange the comparators of judgment.
Other strategies, however, are not constrained by themotive to
be accurate. These tactics focus solely on thedesired outcome and
use mental control processes tosimply raise the accessibility of
desired feelings, beliefs,and behaviors or to inhibit the
accessibility of undesiredfeelings, beliefs, and behaviors. There
are several dis-tinct ways in which people may manipulate this
accessi-bility, and we label these strategies as teleologic
tactics.
The pursuit of epistemic tactics does not rule out theuse of
teleologic tactics: People can alternately use epis-temic and
teleologic tactics in the deliberate pursuit ofself-persuasion.
Nonetheless, we expect that teleologictactics will be preferred in
circumstances that make theepistemic processes unnecessarily
effortful (e.g., becauseexposure to the attitude object is
fleeting), unimpor-tant, threatening, or ineffective and when the
teleologicstrategy can be supported by the existing attitude
struc-ture and ego-control resources. Nonetheless, the epis-temic
processes may exert more powerful and long-termeffects.
These aspects of our model are elaborated below.Our description
begins by outlining the conditions thatact as prerequisites to
deliberate self-persuasion. Next,we describe our distinction
between the epistemic andteleologic strategies. Finally, we
describe factors thatshould predict which type of strategy is
chosen and theprobable outcomes of each strategy.
PREREQUISITES TO DELIBERATESELF-PERSUASION
Self-Recognition of an Attitudinal Discrepancy
For deliberate self-persuasion to occur, people mustconsciously
recognize a discrepancy between how theyactually evaluate aspects
of an object and how theywould like to evaluate it.
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A volitional process initiates deliberate self-persuasion.That
is, there is some self-awareness of a gap betweenundesired
attitudinal elements and desired attitudinalelements, which permits
self-regulation toward reduc-ing the gap.
Provocative support for a role of awareness wasobtained in
Murray and Holmes’s (1993; Murray &Holmes, 1999) investigations
of the effects of experi-mentally induced concerns about partners’
faults onsubsequent efforts to reorganize beliefs about the
part-ner in a more positive manner, which is one of theroutes to
deliberate self-persuasion that we describebelow. Not only did the
experimentally induced con-cerns spontaneously increase these
reorganizationefforts, the induced concerns also led, first, to
lowerreported feelings of relationship closeness and satisfac-tion.
Thus, the conscious perception of undesirable atti-tude elements
existed prior to the use of the deliberateself-persuasion
strategy.
More recently, Doria (2005) examined awareness ofself-persuasion
more directly and across more attitudeobjects. In her study,
participants were given detaileddescriptions of three scenarios
that involved resistingtemptation. These scenarios involved either
resistingchocolate while on a diet, resisting social pressures
todrink alcohol, or being attracted to an alternativeromantic
partner in an intimate setting. Participantschose a scenario that
was closest to their own past expe-rience and then answered using
Likert-type scalesassessing how they dealt with it. Responses to
the itemsrevealed that participants had experienced similarepisodes
in the past, were highly aware of “trying topersuade yourself to
dislike” the tempting object, andfelt that they were generally
successful at this self-per-suasion. Also of interest, the
questionnaire asked par-ticipants whether “they considered this
self-persuasionto be a good or a bad thing,” and the majority of
par-ticipants (71.4%) chose “a good thing” over “a badthing”
(11.4%) and “don’t know” (14.1%). From theseresults, it was clear
that participants were highly awareof their efforts to talk
themselves into a more negativeattitude toward the tempting object
and felt justified indoing so.
Two additional hypotheses are relevant to thisawareness
prerequisite. First, as noted above, deliberateself-persuasion
should occur only when the desired atti-tude is held as a personal
goal, over and above any feltcompunction from rules or from others.
This emphasison the personal goal is important because, if the
per-sonal goal is not formed, people can merely alter all out-ward
demonstrations of their attitude, thereby meetingrules and other
people’s wishes. Second, although delib-erate self-persuasion
involves a conscious and intendedgoal of attitude change, elements
of this process can
occur outside of awareness. The gap between the actualand
desired attitudes may be bridged very quickly andnonconsciously by
any routes to deliberate self-persua-sion that have become highly
practiced and automaticfor the individual. This prediction is
consistent withabundant theory and research demonstrating
theautomatization of psychological processes (Chartrand& Bargh,
1996). The gist of this prediction is that,despite being aware of
the gap between their undesiredand desired attitude elements,
people may not be com-pletely aware of every way in which they are
movingtoward their desired attitude.
Ability and Motivation
Deliberate self-persuasion processes occur when peopleare able
and motivated to reduce the discrepancy betweentheir actual and
desired attitude elements.
Deliberate self-persuasion is not the only means ofdealing with
an attitudinal discrepancy. Just as peoplechronically experience
discrepancies between how theyactually see themselves and how they
would like to be(Higgins & Spiegel, 2004), people may often
decide toabide discrepancies between their current and
desiredattitudes toward other people, objects, and issues.
Alter-natively, extreme disillusionment may cause people toabandon
the desired attitude altogether, as when indi-viduals leave a
relationship or revoke membership of agroup that consistently fails
to meet expectations. Insome circumstances, the current attitude
may become sosalient and compelling that the previously desired
atti-tude is changed to conform to the person’s currentexperience
of reality. For example, Fletcher, Simpson,and Thomas (2000) found
that satisfied couples in theearly stages of a new romantic
relationship changedtheir ideal standards for a partner to meet the
attributesof their current partner. Consistent with numerousprocess
models in research on social judgment and atti-tudes (e.g., Chen
& Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener,1999; Sanbonmatsu &
Fazio, 1990; E. P. Thompson,Kruglanski, & Spiegel, 2000), our
second postulateasserts that the decision to pursue deliberate
self-per-suasion over these other options depends on the
indi-vidual’s ability and motivation to achieve the
desiredattitude: People will accept an attitude discrepancywhen
they cannot change the discrepancy or are nothighly motivated to
change it.
The effects of ability on deliberate self-persuasiondepend on
the way in which ability is conceived, becausepeople’s subjective
perceptions of the ability to changetheir actual attitudes may
differ from their objective abil-ity to do so. People often have
limited awareness of manyof the factors that actually shape their
attitudes (Nisbett
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& Wilson, 1977). This lack of meta-awareness may causepeople
to feel that they can change their attitudes evenwhen their
attitudinal knowledge and ongoing situa-tional factors (e.g.,
unwanted distraction) do not allowthem to consolidate a new
attitude. Alternatively, thelack of meta-awareness may cause people
to feel that theycannot change their attitudes even when their
relevantknowledge and ongoing situational factors (e.g., abilityto
concentrate) do support a change. Perception of highsubjective
ability initiates deliberate self-persuasion, butthe success of
deliberate self-persuasion also depends onthe person’s objective
ability to sustain it. Factors thatcan inhibit this objective
ability include unintended dis-traction, time constraints, and
arousal. When these fac-tors are present, the effect of the
elements of the desiredattitudes should be diminished, because the
elementsmust compete with conflicting reactions and cannot
befurther elaborated and sustained in memory. Thus, thepresence of
these factors favors the status quo, whereasthe absence of these
resources facilitates the use of mentalprocesses to support the
desired attitude.
Support for this reasoning has been obtained inresearch on
forgiveness and on dissonance-induced atti-tude change. With regard
to the research on forgiveness,people who are motivated to forgive
a relationship part-ner are less likely to do so when they lack
time to reflecton the positive elements of their attitudes
(Kachadourian,Fincham, & Davila, 2005). In addition, early
research onpostdecision dissonance effects revealed a role for
subjec-tive ability. This research found that attitude change
wasgreater when participants were led to believe that theyshould be
highly competent at making the dissonance-inducing decision than
when they were led to believe thatthey lacked the relevant
expertise (Gerard, Blevans, &Malcolm, 1964). In other words,
self-persuasion in thiscontext was set in motion by participants’
high subjectiveability to justify their decision, regardless of
their actualability. Nonetheless, attitude change also depended
onthe absence of distraction after making the choice (seealso
Ebbesen, Bowers, Phillips, & Snyder, 1975; Johnson,Maio, &
Smith-McLallen, 2005; Zanna & Aziza, 1976).
The performance of deliberate self-persuasion shouldalso depend
on the motives that underlie the actual andthe desired attitudes.
Perhaps the most basic determinantof the motivation to pursue
deliberate self-persuasion iswhether people expect the attitude
object itself tochange. People possess many implicit theories
aboutchanges in themselves and others (Dweck & Legget,1988;
Ross & Wilson, 2000). If a person’s implicittheory about an
object is that it will change positively inthe future, the need for
deliberate self-persuasion is elim-inated because the discrepancy
between the actual anddesired attitudes will be reduced as the
positive changeoccurs. Deliberate self-persuasion processes
should
ensue primarily when the individual expects no
naturallyoccurring positive change to the attitude object and
nofuture exposure to more desirable information about it.
In such cases, deliberate self-persuasion can be elicitedby
several motivations. Relevant motives are highlightedin theories of
attitude function, which examine the psy-chological needs that
attitudes fulfill (Maio & Olson,2000). Among these needs are
strivings to (a) hold atti-tudes that separate the things that hurt
us from the thingsthat help us, (b) preserve the self-concept, (c)
enhancesocial relations with others, and (d) affirm personalvalues
(D. Katz, 1960; M. B. Smith, Bruner, & White,1956). Attitudes
may be based on all of these motivationssimultaneously or more on
one type of motivation thanon others. The role of each motive
depends on thechronic (DeBono, 2000) and acute needs
(Murray,Haddock, & Zanna, 1996) of the individual. Whenthese
chronic and acute needs support the desired atti-tude more than the
actual attitude, deliberate self-per-suasion should ensue. For
example, relationship partnerswho have joint financial interests,
strong family values,feelings of mutual esteem, and a public life
in the com-munity should be more motivated to retain their
positiveattitude toward each other than partners who have onlyjoint
financial interests (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996).
TACTICS FOR DELIBERATE SELF-PERSUASION:EPISTEMIC VS. TELEOLOGIC
STRATEGIES
Overview of the Strategies
Many theories of social cognition distinguish betweentwo motives
that guide reasoning processes: the motiveto reach a correct
conclusion and the motive to reach adesirable conclusion (Chaiken,
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen,1996; Kruglanski, 1989; Kunda &
Oleson, 1995;Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). Self-persuasion is
not anissue when the only goal is accuracy, because accuracydoes
not imply a particular attitude a priori. Althoughpeople might
occasionally feel that their current attitudeis inadequate because
it is based on dubious or insuffi-cient information, their attempts
at seeking more validinformation would not guarantee arrival at a
differentattitude. The primary goal in such instances is the
pur-suit of an accurate attitude, per se, and not attitudechange.
Thus, the adoption of a more desirable net atti-tude as a personal
goal is the unique ingredient in theprocesses of deliberate
self-persuasion.
Nonetheless, an important issue is whether this goalis
incompatible with the pursuit of an accurate attitude.Arguments
concerning the predominance and effects ofthese two motivational
sets have been endemic in psy-chology over the past few decades, in
the literature on
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self-appraisals, in particular (Colvin & Block, 1994;Fiske
& Taylor, 1991), and relationship appraisals(Gagne & Lydon,
2004; Mussweiler, 2003). It is nowclear that both motives can
operate simultaneously andseparately. For example, people appraise
themselves,their relationships, and their future in a relatively
even-handed and accurate manner when they are in situa-tions that
require a deliberative consideration of positiveand negative
aspects; yet after decisions are made, suchimpartiality is reduced
as people focus on ways toimplement and service their desired goals
(Gagne &Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). Prior
theoryand research have also indicated that people often pur-sue a
desired conclusion while maintaining an “illusionof objectivity”
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda &Oleson, 1995). That is,
people seek a desired attitude,but not with the belief that this
attitude will be whollyinaccurate.
Our model encompasses these simultaneous strivingsfor the
correct and desired attitude and labels them asepistemic tactics.
Epistemic judgments are influenced bymental representations of the
object of judgment andthe standard of comparison (Kahneman &
Miller,1986). They use reasoning processes to comprehend(a) the
undesired attitude elements in some way thatweakens their perceived
validity or (b) the desired atti-tude elements in some way that
strengthens their per-ceived validity. In other words, epistemic
tactics attemptto understand the currently experienced reality in a
waythat promotes the more desirable net attitude. Thesetactics
employ biased reasoning to achieve this aim andwill push this
reasoning as far as possible, until obviousmismatches with reality
are detected.
People’s attempts to support the desired attitude neednot always
be constrained by the motive to be accurate,however. Our second
route to deliberate self-persuasionincludes strivings for the
desired attitude alone and labelsthem as teleologic tactics.
Teleology refers to an empha-sis on final causes or ultimate
purposes. These tactics arefocused solely on the desired outcome;
they use mentalcontrol processes to bring about the desired
attitude andavoid the undesired attitude elements, without any
con-cern for the validity of the desired attitude. By
mentalcontrol, we mean processes through which people try
toincrease accessibility of desired feelings, beliefs, andbehaviors
or inhibit the accessibility of undesired feelings,beliefs, and
behaviors. According to Wegner (1994),mental control is “a
paramount function of human con-sciousness, an ability we have that
arises from our capac-ity to reflect on our own mental activities
and influencetheir operation” (p. 35). With such control, we can
suc-cessfully perform a variety of activities, such as studyingnew
material, managing our moods, and restraining neg-ative impulses
(Wegner, 1994). Teleologic tactics attempt
to implement a new reality altogether, based on theimplicit
assumption that a valid judgment is one that ispsychologically and
pragmatically useful (Swann, 1984);that is, the end justifies the
means. Indeed, in one self-help guide to attitudes, motivation, and
lifestyle change,this idea is stated explicitly: “The belief that
becomestruth for me . . . is that which allows me the best use ofmy
strength, the best means of putting my virtues intoaction” (Gide,
cited in Robbins, 1991).1
Another example of teleologic processes is providedwithin
Gottman and Silver’s (2000) best-selling book, TheSeven Principles
for Making Marriage Work. Drawing ontheir extensive research on
married couples, Gottman andSilver suggest that most couples have
gripes or complaintsabout each other and that the key difference
between mar-riages that work and those that fail is whether the
partnerscan draw on positive sentiments to outbalance the
nega-tive. These researchers outline several steps to help
couplesbuild and maintain their “love maps,” which subsume
theattitudes that partners have toward each other. As inmany
self-help books, the emphasis is not on helping part-ners derive an
accurate appraisal of whether their rela-tionship should succeed or
fail; the emphasis is onbuilding positive attitudes (love maps).
People who under-take the steps within the book are explicitly
striving tochange their relationship attitudes from their current
stateto a more positive state. In contrast, an accuracy goalwould
require some openness to “hate maps,” which arenot proposed, nor
would married partners find themattractive and useful. Other forms
of clinical therapy, suchas cognitive behavioral therapy, also rely
directly on tele-ologic tactics (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1969).
Extant dual-process models provide part of the ratio-nale for
this distinction between epistemic and teleo-logic processes. The
introduction of a distinctionbetween epistemic and teleologic
strategies is consistentwith extant dual-process distinctions
between proposi-tional and associative processes (see Smith &
DeCoster,2000, for a review). The epistemic processes focus
onaltering propositions, that is, assertions about the valid-ity or
invalidity of links between an object and variousattributes (E. R.
Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack &Deutsch, 2004). The aim is
to reject undesired proposi-tions and accept desired propositions.
These proposi-tions can have implications for spontaneous
associations,which do not involve assertions of truth or
falsehoodbut may nonetheless be desired (e.g., positive
feelingstoward a spouse) or undesired (e.g., negative
feelingstoward a spouse). Nonetheless, these associations arenot
the direct targets of the epistemic route; any effecton them is
simply a by-product of propositional changes(e.g., creating an
unfavorable belief can elicit negativeemotional associations). In
contrast, the teleologicprocesses focus on reducing the activation
level of the
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undesired propositions and associations linked to theattitude.
In this route, all that matters is that undesiredattitudinal
elements of any type are kept from con-sciousness and that desired
attitudinal elements are keptin consciousness; it does not
prioritize assertions thatimply claims of validity or
invalidity.
Other aspects of our model are distinct from theextant
dual-process approaches. In particular, the modelmay be unusual in
its argument that both constructs aresubjected to meta-cognitive
control. Most extant dual-process models emphasize ways in which
propositionalprocessing is more effortful than associative
processing(E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). In contrast, the
teleo-logic strategy focuses on a special case where people
are“effortfully” attempting to activate or deactivate
associa-tions. This focus does not deny that associations
typicallybecome influential in an automatic, effortless fashion;
itsimply draws attention to a context wherein this effort-lessness
is disrupted, similar to the way that automaticmotor sequences can
be disrupted when people attemptto learn new motor habits (Wegner,
Ansfield, & Piloff,1998). In fact, this difference is relevant
to the frequentdual-process assumption that greater effort
followshigher motivations to be accurate or valid (see E. R.
Smith& DeCoster, 2000, for a review). Conversely, our
modelassumes that a high degree of effort occurs both whenvalidity
concerns are prominent (epistemic route) andwhen they are not
prominent (teleologic route).
In the text below, we describe tactics within eachroute and
highlight evidence that helps to describe them.The model includes a
variety of routes within eachprocess, which are considered together
for the first time.
Epistemic Tactics
One set of epistemic tactics attempts to reach a moredesirable
net attitude by changing the current mentalrepresentation of the
object of judgment. People attemptto achieve this change by (a)
reinterpreting undesiredattributes of the object, (b),
reintegrating undesired withdesired attributes, (c) reattributing
undesired attributesto unstable factors, and (d) retesting the
validity of unde-sired attributes. Other epistemic tactics involve
changingthe standards for evaluating the object of judgment by(a)
changing the comparators of judgment or (b) chang-ing the
dimensions on which the judgment is based.
To discover epistemic strategies, our theoretical start-ing
point was that evaluations of an object depend on(a) perceptions of
its attributes and their causal historyand (b) comparisons of it
with other objects. This assump-tion was derived from classic
perspectives on social judg-ment. Heider’s balance theory indicates
that attitudes arebased on perceptions of the properties of the
attitudeobjects and beliefs about the objects’ relations to the
broader social context. This principle helped to spawnseveral
major approaches to the study of social judg-ments, including
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957),attribution theory (Heider,
1958), and social comparisontheory (Festinger, 1954). Across these
theories, percep-tions of the object can be changed by adding or
subtract-ing attributes from it, and these additions and
subtractionscan be achieved either by adding new information
(rein-tegration below), by reinterpreting the meaning of
theattributes (reinterpretation below), or by explaining
theattributes in a congenial way (reattribution below). Inaddition,
comparisons can be shaped by changing theobject of comparison or
the dimension on which thecomparison is made. In our view, this
scheme works wellfor most of the research that we have examined.
How-ever, one epistemic process—motivated hypothesis test-ing
(below)—is unique and potentially relevant to all ofthe other
tactics we expected (because people’s hypothe-ses could focus on
and reinitiate any of them). Thus, thisepistemic tactic was also
added to our model.
There is abundant evidence relevant to understand-ing these
tactics. This evidence illustrates how the tac-tics work, although
not always in the context ofdeliberate self-persuasion. Below, we
describe howthese mechanisms may also be used in a deliberate
man-ner (see also Table 1).
Motivated interpretation. People idiosyncraticallyinterpret
their own behaviors in ways that enable themto maintain a positive
attitude toward the self (Dunning,Meyerowitz, & Holzberg,
1989). For example, peoplewho like to visit museums alone are more
likely to denythat this behavior is aloof than are people who
wouldprefer to go with someone else (Dunning, Perie, &
Story,1991). In addition, people can interpret their relation-ships
in ways that facilitate a positive conception of theself or the
relationship (Cameron, Ross, & Holmes,2002; Dunning et al.,
1989). Similarly, Murray andHolmes (1993) found that seemingly
negative partner
Maio, Thomas / DELIBERATE SELF-PERSUASION 51
TABLE 1: Components of the Epistemic Route
Epistemic Tactic Description
Motivated interpretation reinterpret undesired attributes into
moredesired attributes
Motivated integration reintegrate undesired attributes
withdesired attributes
Motivated attribution reattribute undesired attributes to
benigncausal factors
Motivated hypothesis retest the validity of undesiredtesting
attributes
Changing comparators change the comparators for evaluatingthe
attitude object
Changing dimensions change the dimensions on which thecomparison
is based
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attributes (e.g., argumentative) can be interpreted as pos-itive
characteristics (e.g., partner’s willingness to con-front important
issues), and this process may increaserelationship positivity over
time (Murray et al., 1996).
In addition, research has examined how reinterpreta-tions can be
employed to shape emotions (Gross, 1998).Specifically, people can
change how they understandtheir emotional responses as a function
of their situation.For example, athletes may attempt to cope with
anxietybefore an important competition by focusing on
thecompetition’s potential to yield success, thereby helpingto
reinterpret arousal as excitement (Skinner & Brewer,2004). In
fact, Gross and John (2003) have predictedand found that people are
aware of such consciousmanipulation of emotion, because they can
reportchronic tendencies to engage in this reinterpretationprocess
on self-report items (e.g., “When I want to feelless negative
emotion, I change the way I’m thinkingabout the situation”). In
theory, this same process can beused to change affective responses
to attitude objects,above and beyond more diffuse emotional
reactions.
Reinterpretation can even be applied in the con-text of very
salient and strong stimuli. For example,although people with
chronic or acute pain tend toattempt pain management by
self-distraction (see below),they can also focus on the pain and
reinterpret it in away that makes it less threatening (Ehrenberg,
Barnard,Kennedy, & Bloom, 2002; Spanos, Horton, &
Chaves,1975). This reinterpretation can involve a process
ofaccurate reality testing, wherein people manage to rec-ognize
that the painful stimulus (e.g., a cold-pressorstimulus) is less
self-threatening than it feels (Lazarus &Folkman, 1984). As a
result, they can self-generate amore positive attitude toward the
stimulus than theyhad beforehand.
The process of reinterpretation might be understoodwith
reference to Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) descrip-tion of how
attitudes can change when people alter theperceived desirability
and likelihood of consequencesthat they associate with the attitude
object. A painfulstimulus may be perceived as evoking a highly
undesir-able sensation, but after concentrating on and
reinter-preting the symptoms, people can downplay theundesirability
of the pain. For other stimuli, it may beeasy to alter the
likelihood with which a consequencewill arise. For instance, people
who want to give upfatty foods might attempt to exaggerate the
likelihoodthat the foods will immediately “hit their waistline”
orbe visible as body fat. This type of exaggerated percep-tion is a
hallmark of various eating disorders (Fairburn,1995; Polivy &
Herman, 2000). Thus, reinterpretationmay affect the perceived
desirability and likelihood ofattributes of the object, in addition
to affecting thesemantic meaning of these attributes.
Of course, it is not always possible to relabel unde-sired
attributes without seeming grossly inaccurate. Theundesired
attribute may be patently obvious on occasion,and relabeling the
attribute would be psychologicallydifficult. For instance, it may
be difficult (and maladap-tive) to label a spouse’s lasciviousness
as evidence ofgregariousness or to reinterpret a painful stimulus
thatis serious and life threatening (e.g., cardiac pains).
Ingeneral, some attributes cannot be flexibly interpreted(Hayes
& Dunning, 1997), and people must decide topursue other routes
to deliberate self-persuasion or toabandon this goal
altogether.
Motivated integration. When it is not possible to rein-terpret
an attribute, it may still be possible to reconstruethe attribute
by placing it in a broader context. As notedby Murray (1999), this
process is akin to saying, “Yes,but. . . .” In other words, the
attribute is acknowledgedbut directly embedded among desired
attributes that min-imize the effect of the undesired attribute.
Murray andHolmes (1993) described examples of this process in
thecontext of intimate relationships. They asked couples towrite
narratives about the development of their relation-ships and about
their partners’ greatest faults. The narra-tives revealed many
serious personality faults, such asjealousy, inexpressivity, and
immaturity. Yet these faultswere recast by integrating them with
virtues (e.g., caring).
Such integrative thinking has important conse-quences for views
of the attitude object. In Murray andHolmes’s (1999) research,
individuals who linked theirpartners’ greatest faults to virtues
exhibited the strongestpositive views of their partners and more
stable rela-tionships than did individuals who clustered the
faultsand virtues separately. In addition, Showers (1992) hasfound
that people who link their own faults to virtueswithin a specific
domain report higher levels of self-esteem in that domain, when
negative information isrelatively important or frequently accessed.
Thus, bene-fits of an integrative self-structure occur when the
neg-ative self-aspects are central to the self.
Another interesting example of reintegration comesfrom research
examining persistence on boring tasks.Long ago, the famous
fictional character of MaryPoppins instructed the children in her
care to turn theirchores into games by adding fun elements to them.
Itturns out that Mary Poppins’s advice was sage, becausethis
addition of fun elements enables workers to derivemore satisfaction
from their jobs (Sansone, Weir,Harpster, & Morgan, 1992). In
other words, couplingan undesired attitude toward a task with
desired attri-butes can aid the formation of a more positive
attitudetoward the task and, as a consequence, facilitate
persis-tence on the task. The Mary Poppins effect, and
reinte-gration in general, work by creating linkages to desired
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attributes that color the perception of the undesiredattributes
(Asch & Zukier, 1984; Murray, 1999). Asstated by Murray (1999),
“stubbornness combined withcaring may not be the same attribute as
stubbornnesscombined with selfishness” (p. 29). The more
highlyintegrated representations may also make the
desiredattributes accessible when the undesired attributes
areprimed (Showers & Kling, 1996). As a consequence, theeffect
of salient undesired attributes might be automati-cally muted when
they are linked in memory to desiredattributes. Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, there issome evidence that people are aware of
using this tactic(Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1999).
Motivated attribution. Undesired characteristics of theattitude
object can be discounted by attributing them toanother factor.
Rather than using the “yes, but . . .”approach described above,
this approach is akin to say-ing, “Yes, because. . . .” Sometimes
the cited explanationcan be a desired attribute. For example,
Murray (1999)describes how some people attribute their romantic
part-ner’s greatest faults to important virtues. For instance,one
woman indicated that her partner’s jealousy revealed“how important
my presence is in his life” (p. 28). Peoplecan also discount the
flaws in attitude objects by findingevidence that the flaws are
reflections of some temporary,extraneous causal factor. For
example, a person who hasjust bought a car might attribute some
mechanical break-downs to bad luck or a missed tune-up, rather
thanaccept that the car is a lemon. The general tendency tomake
such congenial causal attributions is well docu-mented (Pollard,
Anderson, Anderson, & Jennings, 1998;Reiss, Rosenfeld, Melburg,
& Tedeschi, 1981).
More relevant, such congenial attributions can resultfrom an
extensive consideration of relevant information.According to
several models of attributional processes,people spontaneously draw
dispositional inferences fromsalient behavior, and people correct
these automaticinferences only when they are sufficiently motivated
andable to conduct a systematic consideration of
relevantinformation (Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993;
Trope& Alfieri, 1997).2 Thus, when undesired attributionsoccur,
one way to “correct” them (i.e., make them morecongenial to current
motives) involves a more exhaustiveconsideration of the extent to
which different people dis-play the attribute in different
situations across time(Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953).
Motivated hypothesis testing. The desired attitudemay be
achieved when salient motivations inspirepeople to form and test
particular hypotheses (Kunda &Oleson, 1995). For example,
people who desire to seethemselves as introverted should be likely
to test thehypothesis that they are introverted. As described
by
Kunda and Oleson (1995), this motivated selection ofhypotheses
is important because people tend to testhypotheses by looking for
evidence that supports them(Klayman & Ha, 1987). For example,
people who havebeen motivated to see themselves as introverted are
morelikely to recall their introverted behaviors and less likelyto
recall their extroverted behaviors than are people whohave been
motivated to see themselves as extroverted(Sanitioso, Kunda, &
Fong, 1990). People also tend torecall instances of an
acquaintance’s introverted behav-iors to test the hypothesis that
the person is introverted,whereas people tend to recall instances
of an acquain-tance’s extroverted behaviors to test the hypothesis
thatthe person is extroverted (Gordon, Baucom, & Snyder,2000).
This hypothesis confirmation process extends toactual social
interactions: People who are interactingwith a stranger tend to ask
biased questions that helpconfirm their prior hypotheses about the
stranger(Gordon et al., 2000). Thus, people gather evidence
tosupport the hypotheses that they are motivated to form,which may
help people to gain confidence in the valid-ity of the hypothesis
that they are testing (Kunda &Oleson, 1995). Not only did the
participants reportmore happy responses and fewer unhappy
responseswhen they were asked whether they were happy (asopposed to
unhappy), the participants rated themselvesas happier after
responding to the question about hap-piness than after responding
to the question aboutunhappiness. These results indicate that the
leadingquestions affected evaluations of the object of
judgment(i.e., one’s social life) by making
hypothesis-confirmingthoughts, feelings, and behaviors more
accessible.
Changing the comparators of judgment. All of theabove processes
may alter mental representations of anattitude object relative to a
salient standard of compar-ison. For example, when evaluating the
reasons forpoor performance on a test, students might
constructattributions that explain their performance relative to
acomparison that is salient in the situation (e.g., “I hadless
sleep before the exam than John Smith”). Theirstandards of
comparison may range from being a closefriend or an unknown group
of people (e.g., Mensamembers) to being simply the person himself
or herselfat another point in time. In situations where the
salientstandard of comparison elicits undesired elements of
anattitude, the standard of comparison can be shifted toanother
person, group, or even the self at another pointin time (Albert,
1977; Masters & Kiel, 1987). Forexample, to facilitate a
positive self-view, people com-pare themselves with others who make
them look good(Wills, 1981). Thus, failed students may choose to
com-pare themselves to students who performed worse thanthey did
(i.e., downward comparison). It is also possible
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that they will choose to compare themselves withstudents who
performed slightly better, as a means ofself-improvement (i.e.,
upward comparison; Collins,1996; Huguet, Dumas, Monteil, &
Genestoux, 2001).Similarly, people in relationships can sustain
positiveattitudes toward their relationships by
retrospectivelyperceiving improvement in them (i.e., backward
com-parison; Sprecher, 1999). These choices of comparisonare often
uniquely suited to salient goals.
Changes of comparators are also described withinTesser’s (1988)
Self-Evaluation Maintenance (SEM)model, which illustrates how
perceptions of relationswith others can be used to maintain
positive attitudestoward the self. In the SEM, people’s
self-evaluationsdepend on judgments of their performance relative
toothers who may be close friends or distant acquaintances,and
these judgments are formed for tasks that are rele-vant or
irrelevant to self-conceptions. Tesser has pre-dicted and found
that people may alter the perceivedcloseness of others to maintain
a positive self-evaluation:If a person performs worse than someone
else on animportant task, the person may diminish the sense of
con-nection with the other individual to maintain self-esteem.This
process is assumed to occur because the person isuncomfortable with
the other individual as a standard ofcomparison, and increasing
psychological distance mayhelp make this comparison less
salient.
Changing the dimensions of judgment. The SEMmodel also indicates
that people can change the per-ceived self-relevance (or
importance) of an attributewhen other individuals possess higher
levels of theattribute, in particular when the other individuals
arepsychologically close to the subjects (Tesser, 1988).Tesser and
Paulhus (1983) tested this prediction by giv-ing participants
information that another participanthad performed better or worse
on a task assessingcognitive–perceptual integration. To manipulate
the psy-chological closeness of the other individual,
participantswere given information that the other person was
simi-lar or dissimilar to themselves. Participants then com-pleted
self-report and behavioral measures of their beliefin the
importance of this ability. Results indicated thatparticipants saw
the task as less important when a simi-lar participant performed
better than when a dissimilarparticipant performed better, whereas
participants sawthe task as more important when a similar
participantperformed worse than when a dissimilar participant
per-formed worse. Presumably, participants shifted theirjudgments
of the relevance of this ability dimension tofacilitate a positive
attitude toward the self.
Early cognitive consistency theories are also consistentwith
this notion that people can shift standards of judg-ment to suit
them (within accuracy constraints). Cognitive
dissonance theory posited that people can reduce the per-ceived
importance of conflicting cognitions, therebyreducing the
dissonance arising from internal conflict, andseveral experiments
have found that people can adroitlymanipulate the perceived
importance of conflictingelements (J. Aronson, Blanton, &
Cooper, 1995; Simon,Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995). In addition,
people supporta positive self-view by valuing the positive
qualities thatthey possess and devaluing the positive qualities
that theylack (Frey & Stahlberg, 1987; Hill, Smith, &
Lewicki,1989; Kling, Ryff, & Essex, 1997), and they can sustain
apositive view of their relationships by valuing the
positivefeatures of the relationship and devaluing the
negativefeatures (Neff & Karney, 2003). Similar processes
areevident at a group level. To feel positively about thegroups to
which they belong, low-status group membersmay change the
importance that they attach to dimen-sions of comparison between
groups (Blanz, Mummendey,Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Mummendey,
Klink, Mielke,Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; H. J. Smith & Tyler,
1997). Forexample, East Germans are prone to devaluing the
impor-tance of the material resources dimension of their
socialidentity, due to unflattering comparisons on this dimen-sion
with West Germans (Mummendey et al., 1999). Thecommon feature of
all of these processes is a flexible shiftin dimensions used to
compare between the focal attitudeobject (e.g., the self) and some
other attitude object (e.g.,friends).
Summary. There are at least six epistemic tactics avail-able for
downplaying undesired attitude elements andenhancing desired
attitude elements. All of these processesare compatible with the
epistemic need for validity. Thiscompatibility is revealed by the
fact that the processes areconstrained by the available evidence
(Kunda & Oleson,1995). For example, people espouse desired
views of them-selves only to the extent that their prior
self-knowledgefurnishes enough evidence to support the desired
views(Sanitioso et al., 1990; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch,
1993).People also retain some fear of invalidity during
theseprocesses. For instance, hypothesis testing is biased
whencomparing questions of similar diagnosticity, but peopleprefer
diagnostic questions over nondiagnostic ones(Devine, Hirt, &
Gehrke, 1990). The fear of invalidityshould constrain the epistemic
routes to deliberate self-persuasion because these routes all
involve musteringdesired evidence. People can persuade themselves
only tothe degree that the available evidence supports the
desiredpoint of view without seeming wholly inaccurate.
Teleologic Tactics
Teleologic tactics attempt to reach the desired attitudeby one
of four mental control processes: (a) suppression
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of undesired attitude elements, (b) distraction fromundesired
attitude elements, (c) concentration on desiredattitude elements,
and (d) preemption of the loss ofdesired attitude elements.
The four teleologic routes that we propose integratecurrent
models of regulatory focus (Carver & Scheier,1998; Higgins
& Spiegel, 2004) and ironic processes(Wegner, 1994; Wenzlaff
& Wegner, 2000). The fourteleologic routes are exhaustive of
the possibilities con-veyed by the extant models. In our
description of theseroutes, we show how they yield a useful
integration ofboth models.
Each of these routes may use two psychological mech-anisms for
achieving mental control: (a) an operatingsystem to activate
particular cognitions, emotions, orbehaviors and (b) a monitoring
system to detect theintrusion of other cognitions, emotions, or
behaviors(Wegner, 1994). Each system is analogous to similarcontrol
systems that exist in the physical world. Forexample, an effective
home heating system requires acomponent process that elicits heat
(i.e., a burner/boiler)and a component process that monitors the
actual heatobtained (i.e., a thermostat). Consistent with this
view,our model suggests that the four teleologic routes
varyaccording to their use of an operating and monitoringmechanism
(see Table 2).
Attitudinal suppression. The effects of people’s con-scious
attempts to avoid activation of undesired attitudeelements are
revealed in research that has examined theeffects of suppressing
particular emotions, cognitions,and behaviors. Because emotions,
cognitions, and behav-iors are the basic building blocks of
attitudes, suppress-ing undesired attitude elements requires an
attempt toactivate emotions, cognitions, and behaviors that arenot
part of the undesired attitude (a distracter), whilemonitoring for
intrusions of emotions, cognitions, andbehaviors that are undesired
(the suppression target).We label these attempts as attitude
suppression.
Some research on this process has examined the sup-pression of
emotions in particular. For example, Wegner,Erber, and Zanakos
(1993) asked participants to remi-nisce about a sad event or a
happy event. Participantswho were asked to think about a sad event
were thenasked to try not to be sad, were asked to try to be sad,or
were given no additional instruction. Similarly, par-ticipants who
were asked to think about a happy eventwere asked to try to be
happy, were asked to try not tobe happy, or were given no
additional instruction. Asexpected, results indicated that
participants who wereasked to suppress a sad mood became less sad,
whereasthose who were asked to suppress a positive moodbecame less
happy.
It is important, however, that this experiment includeda
condition that asked participants to perform an irrele-vant
cognitive task (e.g., rehearsing a number sequence)while attempting
to control their emotions. Participants inthis condition were
unsuccessful at controlling their emo-tions: Those who were asked
to suppress a sad mood sub-sequently became sadder, whereas those
who were askedto suppress a positive mood subsequently became
happier.Similar ironic effects have been obtained in studies
ofpeople’s attempts to control their beliefs and behavioralimpulses
(Czopp, Monteith, Zimmerman, & Lynam,2004; Wegner et al., 1998;
Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).When cognitive resources are consumed,
people find it dif-ficult to avoid specific feelings, beliefs, and
behaviors.Instead, people simply become more aware of them.
By implication, suppression may often be only aneffective
stopgap or short-term strategy. However, it isworth noting that
resources may often be sustained overtime, and other real-life
contexts can ensure that post-suppression rebound is not inevitable
(Czopp et al.,2004). For example, Simpson, Ickes, and
Blackstone(1995) created an experimental setting in which
datingcouples experienced differing levels of threat to
theirrelationship. They found that when individuals viewedtheir
relationship as close but insecure and threatened bythe situation,
they seemingly tried to protect themselvesby avoiding or otherwise
failing to attend to their part-ner’s true feelings of attraction
to potential alternativepartners (i.e., suppressing elements of the
undesired atti-tudes). Furthermore, all of the highly
threatened/lowaccuracy couples were still dating 4 months
later,whereas 28% of the remaining couples in the sample hadbroken
up. These findings suggest that such suppressionmay occur over time
and be an effective strategy.
Moreover, there is ample precedent for believing thatthe use of
suppression can be quite deliberate and pur-poseful. For example,
researchers examining emotionregulation have assumed that people
can be highly awareof their motivated use of suppression. This
assumptionled Gross and John (2003) to develop self-report items
tomeasure individual differences in attempts to suppressundesired
emotions, in addition to aforementioned itemsto measure attempts at
reinterpreting the context of anemotion. For example, one item for
assessing emo-tion suppression indicates, “When I am feeling
negative
Maio, Thomas / DELIBERATE SELF-PERSUASION 55
TABLE 2: Components of the Teleologic Routes
Regulatory Method
Regulatory Goal Operating Monitoring
Undesired elements out of awareness distraction
suppressionDesired elements in awareness concentration
preemption
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emotions, I make sure not to express them.” These self-reports
exhibited predictive validity; as these investiga-tors expected,
people who report high use of thisstrategy tend to hold negative
views of others and areless liked by them. Thus, self-driven
suppression doesnot always have positive consequences; when it
involvessuppression of emotional communication with peers, itmight
actually prevent positive social interactions.
Attitudinal distraction. People may avoid any activi-ties that
elicit the current, undesired attitude elements,and they can do so
by occupying their mind with irrele-vant goals, thoughts,
behaviors, or stimuli. Numerouscolloquial expressions refer to the
general process, suchas “I want to take my mind off things” or “I
need to getaway for a while.” We label these attempts as
attitudi-nal distraction.
Yet as with attitudinal suppression, attitudinal dis-traction
requires an attempt to activate cognitions, emo-tions, or behaviors
that are not part of the undesiredattitude, while monitoring for
intrusions of cognitions,emotions, or behaviors that are undesired.
Nonetheless,suppression and distraction differ in their focus on
theoperating versus monitoring processes. In the suppres-sion
route, people primarily exercise vigilance againstthe undesired
attitude elements, while also pursuingcontent irrelevant to the
undesired attitude elements. Indistraction, however, primary effort
is focused on occu-pying the mind with material that is irrelevant
to theundesired attitude elements, while less energy is devotedto
vigilance against intrusions of the undesired attitudeelements (see
Table 2).
Evidence indicates that even nursery school childrenappear
capable of using distraction to lower the activa-tion of undesired
attitude elements: They resist tempta-tion and delay gratification
longer when they use overtor covert distractions to stop thinking
about the attrac-tive object (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, &
Raskoff-Zeiss,1972). In theory, this approach should work as long
asthe distraction is maintained, and potentially longer. Ifthe
distraction lasts long enough for the undesired ele-ments of the
current attitude to fade, then the desiredattitude elements can be
reasserted more easily. Thisfading process can occur through
natural decay in recallof cognitions and behaviors that contribute
to the atti-tude and the natural ebbing of relevant emotions
(e.g.,A. E. Wilson, Smith, Ross, & Ross, 2004). After
thisebbing has taken place, elements of the desired
attitudeelements might potentially be reasserted through
otherteleologic or epistemic routes.
Attitudinal concentration. The above teleologic tacticsfocus on
avoiding elements of the undesired attitude,but people can instead
choose to focus on elements of
the desired attitude. That is, people may specificallyseek
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that support themore desirable
attitude, and attitudinal concentration isa useful label for this
process. Approach of desired atti-tude elements is different from
avoidance of the unde-sired attitude elements because these
mechanisms fordeliberate self-persuasion differ in the content of
theoperation versus monitoring processes. As describedabove, the
suppression and distraction routes devotedifferent amounts of
effort to the pursuit of thoughts,feelings, and behaviors that are
irrelevant to the unde-sired attitude elements and vigilance
against the unde-sired attitude elements. In contrast, the
concentrationroute involves the pursuit of the desired attitude
ele-ments and vigilance against intrusions of thoughts, feel-ings,
and behaviors that are irrelevant to the desiredattitude elements.
This difference in content is impor-tant because the elements that
are subsumed in thedesired attitude should be narrower in scope
than thevariety of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that
areirrelevant to the undesired attitude. Thus, the use of
theoperating process to focus on elements of the desiredattitude
(i.e., a feature-positive search) in the concentra-tion route
should be simpler and easier than the use ofthe operating process
to focus on irrelevant elements(i.e., a feature-negative search) in
the suppression route.
This concentration process is easily applied to
achievedeliberate self-persuasion. Self-help volumes are
repletewith tasks that help people to retrieve and
elaborateinformation that supports their desired (usually
positive)attitudes toward themselves, their lives, or their
partners(Gottman & Silver, 2000; Robbins, 1991). Note thatthis
process is different from the epistemic strategy ofbiased
hypothesis testing. In motivated hypothesis test-ing, the aim is to
answer a question: Are there feelings,beliefs, or behaviors that
support a desired attitude? Inthe teleologic strategy of
attitudinal concentration, theaim is to bring to mind feelings,
beliefs, or behaviors thatsupport a desired attitude because of
their utility—noquestion is posed and the retrieved elements are
notcompared with oppositely valenced elements.
There is ample evidence that people spontaneouslyretrieve and
elaborate information that is congenial totheir motives, and this
process may often reflect the tele-ologic process of attitudinal
concentration. For example,people recall positive feedback or
self-aspects that mayelevate their current self-esteem and mood
(Boden &Baumeister, 1997; McFarland & Buehler, 1997).
Inaddition, people seize an opportunity to elaborate theirvalues
following a self-esteem threat, presumably to reaf-firm their
self-esteem (Tesser, Crepaz, Beach, Cornell, &Collins, 2000).
Furthermore, people selectively exposethemselves to new information
that supports their priordecisions, provided that the decisions are
nonreversible
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and that new dissonant information is not useful andnonrefutable
(Frey, 1986; Jonas et al., 1997). The evi-dence of selective
exposure to new information supportsthe notion that people
concentrate on information sup-porting a desired attitude when (a)
it is useful to do soand (b) questions of attitudinal validity have
becomeirrelevant (e.g., because of decision irreversibility).
More important, there is also evidence that sustainedmental
rehearsal of information can bring about changesin attitude. For
example, some research has used tasksthat elicit counterstereotypic
mental imagery as a meansof reducing prejudice on measures that tap
automaticstereotyping (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). The
imagerytasks appear to function by strengthening new connec-tions
with the desired, but relatively inaccessible, coun-terstereotypic
attitudinal elements (Blair et al., 2001).Direct training in
stereotype negation has a similareffect (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll,
Hermsen, & Russin,2000). From our perspective, mental imagery
and stereo-type negation training both focus simply on
increasingthe simple activation of particular information,
withouteffortful attempts to understand the meaning of
theinformation. We also suspect that both methods canpotentially be
self-directed, although this speculationremains an issue for
further research.
Attitudinal preemption. Some thoughts, feelings, orbehaviors may
be avoided because they lead to theabsence of the desired attitude,
and this process can belabeled attitudinal preemption. Preemption
differs fromthe previously described strategy of concentration in
itsfocus on the operation versus monitoring processes.
Theconcentration route devotes effort primarily to the pur-suit of
the desired attitude elements, while also exhibit-ing low vigilance
against content that is not desired. Inpreemption, however, primary
effort is focused on beingvigilant against intrusions of material
that is not part ofthe desired attitude, whereas less energy is
devoted tooccupying the mind with the desired attitude
elements.
In the domain of close relationships, partners proac-tively
employ a range of overt and covert tactics thatconsciously or
unconsciously help them to avoid orminimize potential threats that,
if left unaltered, coulddestabilize the relationship (Hovland,
Harvey, & Sherif,1957; Simpson, Ickes, & Orina, 2001). Such
preemptiverelationship maintenance acts as a veritable “first line
ofdefense” that perceivers can use to avoid the erosion ofthe
desired attitude. For example, Miller (1997) foundthat satisfied
partners in a relationship are unlikely tothink about and look at
attractive alternative partners.Presumably, satisfied couples worry
that merely lookingat an attractive alternative partner may lead to
feelingsof attraction that could have a detrimental effect
onfeelings about one’s current partner. Notice that the
positive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward some-one else
may be seen as reducing positivity toward one’scurrent partner but
not necessarily as leading to nega-tivity. Potential negative
outcomes may not be salientfor satisfied couples; they may simply
be concernedabout creating a less positive state for their
relationship.Thus, this avoidance of a challenge to the desired
atti-tude involves some degree of vigilance, but it is
differentfrom the simple avoidance or suppression of an unde-sired
attitude element.
Summary. We have outlined four teleologic routes formoving from
an ambivalent attitude to a more desirablenet attitude. As shown in
Table 2, the strategies possessdistinct goal orientations and
distinct methods. Peoplewho strive to keep specific, undesired
attitude elementsoutside awareness can do so by suppression of them
or byachieving distraction from them. Alternatively, peoplewho
strive to keep desired attitude elements in awarenesscan do so by
concentrating on them or by preemptingtheir absence (i.e., by being
vigilant against any but thedesired elements). In both pairs of
routes, one routefocuses on operating processes that maintain
sought-afterinformation in awareness (distraction,
concentration),whereas the other route focuses more energy on
moni-toring processes that guard against information that isnot
sought in consciousness (suppression, preemption).
All of these processes attempt to maintain the accessi-bility of
particular content as an end in itself. Unlike epis-temic
processes, the teleologic processes do not check thevalidity of the
sought-after attitude, because there is noconcern about potential
inaccuracy. For example, aperson who is stuck in an undesirable job
might attemptto keep the good aspects of his or her job in
awarenessbecause they are reassuring but not because they
aredefinitive evidence. Similarly, a person might attempt tokeep
negative facts about his or her job outside of aware-ness because
they are disconcerting and interfere withfunctioning but not
because the facts are faulty or inac-curate. In contrast, epistemic
processes require thatpeople are wary of obvious invalidity and use
reasoningprocesses to assuage concerns about invalidity.
Comparing the Strategies
As shown in Table 3, the differences between thesetwo routes are
varied. First, as described above, the useof mental control tactics
can be functionally indepen-dent of any need to achieve epistemic
validity. Forexample, although it is likely that people who engage
instereotype inhibition or activation occasionally believethat they
are being objective, the inhibition or activationof stereotypes can
be elicited by task demands (e.g.,direct instruction to inhibit)
that have nothing to do
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with epistemic validity (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne,&
Jetten, 1994). Similarly, there is evidence thatchildren devalue
forbidden toys as a means of mentalcontrol (to resist temptation),
contrary to assumptionsthat this devaluation occurs because of
dissonancereduction (Ebbesen et al., 1975). Such uses of
mentalcontrol are reflected in classic distinctions between
real-ist and pragmatic approaches to social judgment: Adher-ents to
the realist approach maintain that an objectivetruth exists but can
only be perceived via multiple cuesthat possess uncertain validity;
pragmatists define accu-racy in terms of the successful completion
of the desiredgoal (Funder, 1995; Swann, 1984).
The difference between the epistemic and teleologicapproach is
akin to two ways of negotiating an accordbetween warring parties.
One method attempts to getthe parties to understand each other
positively (seeTable 3). A second method focuses on setting a basis
forthe future, rather than explaining the past, by askingthem to
“bury the hatchet” and focus on how they cancoexist peacefully in
the future. The goal of movingfrom an ambivalent attitude to a more
desirable attitudeis central to both strategies, but they move
toward it indifferent ways: People may use reasoning to
discounttheir undesired attitude elements and validate theirdesired
attitude elements, or they may try to put theundesired attitude
elements out of mind, while rehears-ing and acting out their
desired attitude elements.
Both strategies require effort, but the epistemic strat-egy is
infused or somewhat constrained by an attempt tounderstand reality
(albeit in a biased manner), whereasthe teleological strategy
simply attempts to manipulatethe accessibility of relevant thoughts
and feelings. Inboth processes, there is a meta-awareness of the
need tochange the person’s attitude and the bias that this
needcreates, but only the epistemic processes retain a
simul-taneous check with reality. A pithy example of this will-ing
pursuit of bias and truth is the anecdote about twowomen who notice
a very attractive woman walk pastthem and then laughingly quip,
“fat ankles.” This pre-sumably makes them feel better; they know
it’s a biasedcomment, and they feel no remorse about responding
this way. In other words, they deliberately shape thecomparison
with the full realization (and hope) that itwill make them feel
better. The epistemic strategyattempts to change the organization
and meaning of atti-tude elements in a similar way. In contrast,
the teleologicstrategy merely attempts to strengthen the activation
andchronic accessibility of the elements of the desired atti-tude
(e.g., by trying to ignore the woman’s presence alto-gether). In
essence, then, the epistemic strategy attemptsto recomprehend
elements in the undesired attitude,whereas the teleologic strategy
simply tries to reduce theaccessibility of these elements and
potentially increasethe accessibility of elements of the desired
attitude.
This distinction between epistemic and teleologicalstrategies
encourages researchers to consider that prag-matic,
association-focused thinking is a potential meansof achieving
deliberate self-persuasion. Previously,researchers have assumed the
existence of epistemicprocesses in self-persuasion, without
recognizing thepotential for people to strive (with great effort)
to alterthe level of activation of their undesired and
desiredattitudinal elements. By juxtaposing the epistemic
andteleologic routes, we can achieve a more complete pic-ture of
how people perform deliberate self-persuasion.
DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGY
Choosing Between the Epistemicand Teleologic Tactics
People who undertake deliberate self-persuasion mayalternately
use epistemic and teleologic tactics, but teleo-logic tactics will
be preferred when (a) exposure to theattitude object and the
undesired elements of the attitudeis fleeting, (b) people believe
that epistemic processes maybe unimportant, too threatening to the
self, or ineffective,and (c) the teleologic strategy can be
supported by theexisting attitude structure and ego-control
resources.
In general, people should prefer to begin
deliberateself-persuasion with epistemic strategies because
thisapproach strategy simultaneously satisfies the goals
ofachieving a desired as well as an accurate attitude,rather than
simply achieving either goal alone. Thus, theteleologic route
becomes more feasible primarily whenthe epistemic route fails to
yield the desired outcome.Nonetheless, several additional factors
should influencethe choice between epistemic and teleologic
tactics.
People should move toward the teleologic route whenthey face
only fleeting exposure to the attitude object. Inthis context, the
epistemic processes entail an unnecessarydegree of effort and some
added risk. The effort is unnec-essary because it should be easier
to employ a temporary
58 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW
TABLE 3: Characteristics of the Epistemic and the
TeleologicRoutes
Epistemic Teleologic
Attitudinal objectives truth and desired desiredattitude
attitude
Philosophical orientation realist and pragmatic
pragmaticTemporal orientation explain past support futureMental
process comprehension attentionFocal constructs propositions
propositions and
associations
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shift in attentional focus (i.e., teleologic route) than
todeliberately “unpack” and re-form their attitudes. In addi-tion,
this unpacking entails added risk because it mayinadvertently yield
information that is noncongenial to thedesired attitude, whereas
the temporary shift in atten-tional focus would not risk this
exposure.
People should use the teleologic route when epistemicvalidity
seems unimportant. Epistemic questions mayappear unimportant when
there are no objective criteriafor the questions of evaluation.
Indeed, many problemsof evaluation can appear intractable because
answers toglobal evaluative questions (e.g., “Is my partner
worthloving anymore?”) can depend on the chosen compara-tors and
dimensions of comparison, and people canmanipulate these factors
endlessly. Situational factorsand individual differences can
influence whether peopleperceive this difficulty and give up on the
idea of validityaltogether, endorsing the notion that the correct
answeris whatever is right or useful for them (i.e., whatever
feelsgood or desirable). For example, after reading a bookabout
philosophical problems with the value of art,people might
experience heightened awareness of prob-lems finding objective
criteria for favoring some pieces ofart over other pieces. A person
might wish to share his orher romantic partner’s positive attitude
toward anabstract painting but know that it is impossible to drawon
logical, verifiable arguments to support one attitudeor another—all
that matters is that the desired attitude isheld. Furthermore,
individuals may not care as deeplyabout epistemic validity when
they are low in personalitydimensions that predict thoughtfulness
and the system-atic scrutiny of information, such as
conscientiousness(McCrae & Costa, 2003), need for cognition
(Cacioppo,Perry, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), need for
closure(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), or the desire to
ensureoptimal judgment quality (Kruglanski et al., 2000). Inthese
instances, people can choose to attain the desiredattitude through
any of the teleologic routes, withoutattempting to unpack and
recreate their attitude.
People should move toward the teleologic routewhen epistemic
processes potentially threaten the self-concept. Experiments
testing Sedikides and Green’s(2000) inconsistency–negativity
neglect model are con-sistent with this hypothesis. In these
experiments, partic-ipants showed little evidence of detailed
processing oftrait stimuli that were self-threatening; instead,
there wasevidence that the self-threatening trait information
waskept from active attention (similar to our teleologicroute of
suppression; see below). In theory, this self-threat should be
elicited in situations that provide nega-tive feedback about the
self or by chronically lowself-esteem (Sedikides & Strube,
1997; Steele, 1988). We
expect that such situations’ effects on self-threat shouldact to
inhibit epistemic deliberate self-persuasion.
People will be more likely to use the teleologic routewhen they
possess higher levels of ego-control ability.Deliberate
self-persuasion can work only if people pos-sess sufficient
self-control reserves. Several studies indi-cate that self-control
processes tap a reserve of energythat helps people to overcome a
dominant response infavor of an alternate response (Baumeister
& Heatherton,1996). Presumably, this energy is required because
self-control requires sustained attention on the task; oncethis
attention has lapsed, habitual responses take over(Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996). The epistemic routesneed sustained attention
until the chosen routes havemanaged to embed new content into the
attitude,whereas the teleologic routes need sustained attention
atmany points in time. Initially, they can help drive theundesired
content from awareness, but this attitudecontent might reemerge
later. Such reemergence mustagain be met with sufficient use of a
teleologic route.Factors such as distraction and an inability to
delaygratification, which is positively related to
self-controlabilities (Funder, Block, & Block, 1983), may
interferewith people’s attention to and deployment of theseroutes
and cause the routes to fail (Wegner, 1994).
OUTCOMES OF DELIBERATESELF-PERSUASION
Epistemic deliberate self-persuasion should affect
attitudescores on explicit and implicit measures of
attitude.Teleologic deliberate self-persuasion should affect
explicitmeasures, but its effect on implicit measures shoulddepend
on the extent that these measures are tapping onlythe evaluative
associations in long-term memory.
The process of deliberate self-persuasion may takelittle time or
a long time. In situations where deliberateself-persuasion is
relatively easy to accomplish, the unde-sired attitude elements
will gradually be supplanted bythe desired attitude elements or at
least made less acces-sible from memory. In other situations, the
undesiredattitude elements may be activated frequently and
peoplemay experience little success at replacing them. Forexample,
prejudice reduction has been conceptualizedas a gradual, rather
than all or none, process (Devine,1989; Devine & Monteith,
1999). This process may begradual because people often encounter
situations thatreactivate the prejudice (e.g., stereotypic media
cover-age, disparaging humor).
Some outcomes should differ for epistemic and teleo-logic
processes. Independent of the time used for delib-erate
self-persuasion, success at implementing epistemic
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processes should often be evident in both explicit andimplicit
measures of attitudes. Explicit measures assessattitudes using
self-report scales, whereas implicit mea-sures assess attitudes
without relying on participants’introspective access of their
attitudes (Fazio & Olson,2003). After epistemic deliberate
self-persuasion, paral-lel change should occur because the desired
attitude ele-ments are consistent with conscious desires,
therebypermitting their expression at the explicit level. If
thesedesired attitude elements are also acceptable to others
ingeneral, explicit measures of attitude should detect theattitude
(Fazio & Olson, 2003). The desired attitudeshould also be
evident in implicit measures of attitude,because the epistemic
processes involve mental changesthat should affect the long-term
mental representationof the attitude object and its undesired and
desired ele-ments. Thus, although some amount of
explicit–implicitdiscrepancy may occur after deliberate
self-persuasion(cf. Gawronski & Strack, 2004), epistemic
self-persuasionshould tend to exert parallel change in attitudes
that aremeasured explicitly and implicitly.
In contrast, teleologic processes involve changing therelative
accessibility of the undesired and desired atti-tude elements.
These processes should move the unde-sired elements to a lower
level of accessibility and causethem to be less evident in explicit
measures of attitude.Nonetheless, the elements should be detectable
by mea-sures that tap their presence in long-term memory. Inother
words, the teleologic processes should lead to thekind of
self-deception envisaged by Sackheim and Gur(1979), resulting in
divergent attitude elements at non-conscious and conscious levels
(A. E. Wilson et al.,2004). After repeated and successful attempts
at thisdifferentiated storage, conscious attempts at
deliberateself-persuasion should cease, but the discrepancy in
con-tent at conscious and nonconscious levels shouldremain.
Nonetheless, it is not yet clear that any particu-lar implicit
measure taps this long-term memory storeand not recent, short-term
interventions (Blair, 2002;Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). If an
implicit measure wereto tap only the long-term memory store, then
teleologicdeliberate self-persuasion should have less of an
effecton it.
An important outcome of both routes to self-persuasionis a
reduction in feelings of ambivalence toward theattitude object. As
the undesired attitude elements arereplaced by desired ones, the
conflict within the individ-ual’s attitude decreases, resulting in
lower feelings ofambivalence. This effect is important because
ambiva-lence has its own important consequences. For example,people
who are highly ambivalent toward an object aremore strongly
influenced by features of their environ-ment that make salient its
positive or negative attributes,causing them to behave much more
favorably toward it
when the positive elements are salient than when thenegative
elements are salient; nonambivalent people areless strongly
influenced by the acute salience of the pos-itive or negative
attributes (Bell & Esses, 2002; I. Katz &Hass, 1988;
MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). In theory,then, successful deliberate
self-persuasion should causeattitudes to become more stable across
contexts.
Of course, attempts at deliberate self-persuasion couldfail
altogether. This outcome will depend on the precur-sors described
above (e.g., ability and motivation). In thisevent, the person’s
attitude should appear unchangedusing implicit and explicit
measures, as the individualgrows to accept the current attitude
rather than fight it. Aperson may then accept the current attitude
as unchange-able and adapt in other ways. In particular, people
maytransfer the motivational goals that are the basis of thedesired
attitude to other attitude objects. This processcould occur in any
situation where the attitude object hasbeen linked with an extreme
undesirable attribute. Forexample, a switch in motivational goals
may occur whiletrying to forgive a romantic partner who has had
anaffair. The victim may have tried to restore a positive atti-tude
toward the partner because the victim has a strongneed for romantic
affiliation. If the attempts at deliberateself-persuasion are
unsuccessful at fulfilling this need, thevictim may accept the new
negative attitude and resolveto channel the need for romantic
affiliation elsewhere(i.e., “rebound” to someone else who fulfills
this need).Thus, the motivation that drove deliberate
self-persuasioncan be transferred to another target, thereby
fulfilling themotive in a different way.3
RELEVANCE TO OTHER RESEARCH ONATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION
Our description of the model helps to lay the founda-tion for
describing ways in which deliberate self-persuasionis relevant to
and distinct from research examining thebroader notion of
self-persuasion, self-regulation, andmotivated social cognition.
First, research on the tradi-tional notion of self-persuasion has
focused on the man-ner in which behaviors can shape attitudes. This
emphasisbegan with classic experiments on the effects of
role-playing. These experiments found that self-derived argu-ments
in support of a role-play caused attitudes to changein the
direction of the arguments (Janis, 1954; King &Janis, 1956),
even 18 months after the role-play (Janis &Mann, 1965). There
is a variety of theories that can helpto explain such effects. One
of the more prominent expla-nations is provided by dissonance
theory (Festinger,1957), which proposes that people are motivated
to formattitudes that are consistent with their past
actions,because inconsistency elicits an aversive internal
arousal
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(Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1978). Another prominentexplanation
is provided by self-perception theory (Bem,1972), which suggests
that people logically infer attitudesthat are consistent with their
actions. For example, “If Ilaughed, I must find it funny” (Olson,
1992). Current evi-dence supports both the dissonance (Fazio,
Zanna, &Cooper, 1977; Hamilton & Zanna, 1974; Zanna,
Higgins,& Taves, 1976) and the self-perception
explanations(Brinol & Petty, 2003; Petty, Wells, & Brock,
1976),while also indicating that the effects of behavior are
par-ticularly likely to occur when the behavior is threateningto
the self-concept (e.g., Brody, Stoneman, & McCoy,1994; Cohen,
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Holland,Meertens, & van Vugt,
2002).
Although attitudes researchers have routinely labeledboth
perspectives as theories of self-persuasion, there areimportant
differences between the focus of these theoriesand the current
focus on deliberate self-persuasion.Although both processes involve
self-induced changes inattitudes, the traditional analysis of
self-persuasion hasfocused on the change in attitudes following a
specificbehavior, whereas the process of deliberate
self-persuasionfocuses on how people might change their
attitudesthrough covert mental processes. Behavior change isonly
one theoretical antecedent of change identified inthe attitude
research. Changes in affective and cognitiveresponses are also
important in contemporary models ofattitude (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993; Maio, Haddock,Watt, & Hewstone, in press; Zanna &
Rempel, 1988)and, therefore, a model of deliberate
self-persuasionmust consider all of the covert mediators of
self-inducedattitude change from diverse sources. In addition,
thetraditional processes of self-persuasion have not shown(or
needed to show) that participants fully recognize thatthey are in
possession of undesired attitude elements andthen deliberately
attempt to change them. In contrast,deliberate self-persuasion
requires awareness of theundesired feelings, beliefs, and behaviors
that contributeto the individual’s attitude.
Deliberate self-persuasion is also unique from modelsof
self-control and self-regulation. Some research onself-control
focuses on situations wherein a cool, cogni-tive response to the
object of temptation is in competi-tion with the more attractive,
hot, affective properties ofit. For example, a person might have a
cognitive repre-sentation of the properties of chocolate (e.g.,
sweet, fat-tening) and an affective representation (e.g.,
craving,desire). Metcalfe and Mischel’s (1999) model of
self-control describes how people can deal with this conflictby
overtly or covertly reducing the salience of the hotaspects, and
this is achieved through suppression anddistraction mechanisms that
are similar to ones wedescribe above. They also describe a
mechanism thatdeals with this conflict by altering the salient
meaning
of the stimulus, similar to an approach that we describeabove
(i.e., our epistemic route). However, the key dif-ference between
this model and the pursuit of deliberateself-persuasion is that the
notion of self-persu