7/17/2019 Perfect Goodness http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/perfect-goodness 1/22 Perfect Goodness First published Tue Oct 1, 2013 Reflection on perfect goodness is most commonly carried out as part of the project of philosophical theology. One prominent methodological strand of philosophical theology is perfect being theology, in which the nature of God is made more explicit by identifying God as an absolutely perfect being and working out what features an absolutely perfect being must exhibit (Morris !"!c# Rogers $%%%# &agasawa $%%"'. s it is a commonplace that one of the perfections that would ha)e to be exhibited by any being that would *ualify as absolutely perfect is perfect goodness, it is ob)ious why philosophical theologians employing perfect being theology would be moti)ated to reflect in some detail on the character of perfect goodness and to consider )arious challenges to the )ery idea. +his article will take for granted the importance of situating reflection on perfect goodness within philosophical theology. ut it should be noted that one need not proceed in this way. One might instead attempt to reflect on the character of perfect goodness in a way that entirely abstracts from theological concerns, or indeed any concerns about the particular being by whom, or by which, perfect goodness is reali-ed (McGinn !!$# onee !!/'. ut typically such reflection focuses specifically on perfect goodness as reali-ed in God , a being that exhibits not only perfect goodness, but e)ery other perfection as well. One might also wonder whether there is any such thing as a general standard for perfect goodness# perhaps perfect goodness is kind0relati)e, such that there is nothing that pri)ileges the *uestion of what counts as perfect goodness for God o)er the *uestion of what counts as perfect goodness for humans, or angels, or Martians, or any other particular type of rational being. (1ndeed, one might go further, asking why we should pri)ilege the goodness of rational beings o)er that of hedgehogs, mo)ies, or landscapes.' ut this article will take the perfect goodness of God as pri)ileged, and will treat as a crucial difficulty for some conception of perfect goodness that it cannot be exemplified with other features that an absolutely perfect being would ha)e to exemplify. • . 2erfect goodness as perfection in general )ersus perfect goodness as a specific perfection • $. 2erfect goodness as a necessary or contingent feature of the absolutely perfect being • 3. 1s perfect goodness, whether necessary or contingent, actually exemplified4
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Reflection on perfect goodness is most commonly carried out as part of the projectof philosophical theology. One prominent methodological strand of philosophical
theology is perfect being theology, in which the nature of God is made more
explicit by identifying God as an absolutely perfect being and working out what
features an absolutely perfect being must exhibit (Morris !"!c# Rogers $%%%#
&agasawa $%%"'. s it is a commonplace that one of the perfections that would
ha)e to be exhibited by any being that would *ualify as absolutely perfect is
perfect goodness, it is ob)ious why philosophical theologians employing perfect
being theology would be moti)ated to reflect in some detail on the character of
perfect goodness and to consider )arious challenges to the )ery idea.
+his article will take for granted the importance of situating reflection on perfect
goodness within philosophical theology. ut it should be noted that one need not
proceed in this way. One might instead attempt to reflect on the character of perfect
goodness in a way that entirely abstracts from theological concerns, or indeed any
concerns about the particular being by whom, or by which, perfect goodness is
reali-ed (McGinn !!$# onee !!/'. ut typically such reflection focuses
specifically on perfect goodness as reali-ed in God , a being that exhibits not only
perfect goodness, but e)ery other perfection as well. One might also wonderwhether there is any such thing as a general standard for perfect goodness# perhaps
perfect goodness is kind0relati)e, such that there is nothing that pri)ileges the
*uestion of what counts as perfect goodness for God o)er the *uestion of what
counts as perfect goodness for humans, or angels, or Martians, or any other
particular type of rational being. (1ndeed, one might go further, asking why we
should pri)ilege the goodness of rational beings o)er that of hedgehogs, mo)ies, or
landscapes.' ut this article will take the perfect goodness of God as pri)ileged,
and will treat as a crucial difficulty for some conception of perfect goodness that it
cannot be exemplified with other features that an absolutely perfect being wouldha)e to exemplify.
• . 2erfect goodness as perfection in general )ersus perfect goodness as a
specific perfection
• $. 2erfect goodness as a necessary or contingent feature of the absolutely
perfect being
• 3. 1s perfect goodness, whether necessary or contingent, actually
that being would not only be omniscient and omnipotent, but would also
be perfectly good .
<hat is this perfect goodness, a particular perfection exhibited by any absolutely
perfect being4 1n recent work in philosophical theology > understandably, primarily in contexts in which the problem of e)il is at issue > perfect goodness is
understood as a practical excellence, an excellence concerned with desire,
character traits, and action. perfectly good being has the best desires that a being
can ha)e, and exhibits the best traits of character, and acts in an unsurpassably
excellent way. +his practical excellence is, furthermore, typically understood
as moral excellence (Morris !"!b, p. $7# <ierenga !"!, p. $%$'. ?o when one
says that any being who counts as God must be perfectly good, the claim is that
any such being would ha)e desires and traits of character and perform actions that
are those of a being that exhibits moral perfection. +he idea, then, is this. <e maycall all of these practically0oriented features of a being > that being@s desires,
character traits, actions, etc. > its 9agency:. being@s agency might be morally
better or morally worse. morally perfect being, though, has morally
unsurpassable agency.
+he perfect being theologian who appeals to moral perfection as part of the nature
of the absolutely perfect being inherits all of the uncertainty in metaethics about
the proper formal characteri-ation and demarcation of the moral and all of the
uncertainty in normati)e ethics about the proper criteria for assessing moralgoodness. 1n this article we will not attempt a comprehensi)e account of such
disputes, but will simply take for granted a few widely0made assumptions. Airst,
we will assume that there are truths of the matter about the extent to which a
being@s agency exhibits moral goodness. ?econd, while the considerations that are
rele)ant in assessing moral goodness are disputable, and it is e)en disputable
whether the criteria for moral goodness are relati)e to the kind of being in
*uestion, it seems clear that the sort of moral goodness that is typically ascribed to
the perfect being is moral goodness of a familiar, welfare0oriented kind. 1n
particular, it is assumed that morally good beings treat the welfare of humans andat least some other sentient beings as practically rele)ant considerations, so that,
other things e*ual, morally good beings fa)or the promotion of well0being and
disfa)or setbacks to it. ?o it is taken for granted that perfect moral goodness cannot
in)ol)e opposition or indifference to the flourishing of sentient beings# the claim
that perfect moral goodness might be so different for God than for humans that
God@s perfect moral goodness might in)ol)e God@s being indifferent to the
suffering of creatures would be taken as a rejection of the claim that God must be
perfectly morally good, not a gloss on it. s Mill writes,
1f in ascribing goodness to God 1 do not mean what 1 mean by goodness# if 1 do not
mean the goodness of which 1 ha)e some knowledge, but an incomprehensible
attribute of an incomprehensible substance, which for aught 1 know may be a
totally different *uality from that which 1 lo)e and )enerate B what do 1 mean in
calling it goodness4 B +o say that God@s goodness may be different in kind fromman@s goodness, what is it but saying, with a slight change of phraseology, that
God may possibly be not good4 (Mill "75, pp. /$C/3'
2. Perfect goodness as a necessary or contingent feature of the absolutely
perfect being
<hat is the modality with which perfect goodness is exhibited by an absolutely
perfect being4 1s any absolutely perfect beingnecessarily perfectly good, or is such
a being only contingently perfectly morally good4 (+he necessity in *uestion hereis de re# it is far less contro)ersial that it is a de dicto necessary truth that an
absolutely perfect being is perfectly good.' One might think that an absolutely
perfect being must be essentially perfectly good, for a being who is perfectly good
in all possible worlds is better than a being who is perfectly good in only some
worlds. +his is the standard thinking behind the idea that the di)ine perfections are
exhibited by God not only contingently, but necessarily= a perfect being is not only
omniscient, but necessarily omniscient# a perfect being is not only omnipotent, but
necessarily omnipotent# and so forth. s it is better to ha)e a perfection necessarily
rather than only contingently, if ha)ing some feature is a perfection, then ha)ingthat feature necessarily is a perfection as well.
ut this argument is not decisi)e. 1t works only if ha)ing the perfection in *uestion
necessarily is itself a coherent notion, and it may be that there is some sort of
incoherence in)ol)ed in the notion of necessary perfect goodness that is not
in)ol)ed in the notion of perfect goodness simpliciter . (Aor an endorsement of this
line of argument, with a recognition of the needed *ualification, see Morris !"!d,
p. 73C75.' ?ome arguments to this conclusion are considered below. One might,
then, argue that the best that a being could possibly exhibit with respect to perfect
goodness would be to actually, though only contingently, exhibit it.
?ome defenders of perfect being theology ha)e suggested that it is antithetical to
the )ery idea of perfect being theology that there be perfections that could be
exemplified only contingently. 1t is true that certain ambitions that some perfect
being theologians ha)e harbored > for example, to pro)ide an a priori argument,
in the style of nselm@s ontological argument, for the existence of an absolutely
perfect being > would ha)e to be abandoned if any di)ine perfection is exhibited
at most contingently (Guleserian !"5'. (8)en if there are some sound a
priori arguments for contingent truths, this sort of proof of God@s existence is not a
case in which this is a li)e possibility.' n absolutely perfect being might exist, and
e)en exist necessarily, but it would not be essential to it that it is an absolutely
perfect being. (+hat is, if A is an absolutely perfect being, then A might exist
necessarily, but it would not be necessary both that A exists and is absolutely
perfect.'
?ome defenders of perfect being theology ha)e ridiculed the idea that an absolutely
perfect being might be only contingently perfectly good, for e)en if a being were to
exhibit all of the marks of perfect goodness up to a certain time, we would ha)e no
basis to think that the absolutely perfect being would not break bad at some point
in the future (Rogers $%%%, p. $$'. ut it is not clear why the contingency of the
fact@s (the being's being perfectly good ' holding precludes our knowing that it
holds# and it is )ery plausible that perfect goodness is, for God at least, what
Morris calls a DstableE property, such that if God has it at some time in a world,then God has it at all times in that world (Morris !"!e, pp. !$C!F'.
1f we were to become con)inced that necessary perfect goodness is incoherent, it is
unclear why we should take that to be any more problematic for the notion that
God is perfectly good than our becoming con)inced that water is necessarily
identical to ;$O would be for the notion that God@s perfection includes
omnipotence. ust as we do not take God@s omnipotence to be threatened by God@s
not being able to make water that is not ;$O, we need not take God@s perfect
goodness to be threatened by the fact that God cannot exhibit that featurenecessarily. 1f the upper limit of perfect goodness is to ha)e it contingently, then it
is not as if a being who is actually morally perfect is surpassable in moral goodness
merely by ha)ing its perfect moral goodness only contingently. (+hough see arter
!"$ and Garcia !"F for attempts to show that God cannot be contingently
morally perfect# on these )iews, God is either essentially morally perfect or
essentially morally defecti)e.'
3. Is perfect goodness, whether necessary or contingent, actually
exemplified
<e are in)estigating perfect goodness in the context of its exemplification in an
absolutely perfect being. <hether we should think perfect goodness is actually
exemplified in an absolutely perfect being will depend not only on whether we
think that some being exemplifies perfect goodness but also on whether we think
that being exemplifies the other perfections, say, omniscience and omnipotence.
(One might think that perfect goodness presupposes omniscience and omnipotence
> that perfect goodness re*uires complete knowledge, perfect freedom, and full
effecti)eness.' +hat task would re*uire consideration of the )arious arguments
within philosophical theology for the existence of an absolutely perfect being >
theontological , cosmological , teleological , and moral arguments, among others >
as well as )arious arguments that no such arguments are re*uired for such belief to
be rational and perhaps e)en warranted. (?ee the entries on ontological arguments,
the cosmological argument, moral arguments, and teleological arguments for God@s
existence.'
1t is worth noting, though, that there is a crucial argument that typically relies on
perfect goodness (understood as perfect moral goodness' as a perfection in order to
argue that there is no absolutely perfect being. +his is the argument from e)il,
which holds that because the world contains e)il (or e)il of some specific type, or
of some amount, or distributed in some way', then this world is not under the
control of an absolutely perfect > at least, omniscient, omnipotent, and morally
perfect > being. +here is a massi)e classical and contemporary literature on the
problem of e)il# consideration of formulations of the argument from e)il and ofattempts to reconcile the existence of e)il and the existence of an absolutely perfect
being is beyond the scope of this article. (ut see entry on the problem of e)il.
+he argument from e)il typically employs a lemma that an omniscient, omnipotent
being is not justified in allowing the sorts of e)il that we find in the world. ut one
might make an e)en stronger claim, and hold that e)en if an omniscient,
omnipotent being were fully justified in creating the world as it is, that being is
ne)ertheless not morally perfect, just because that being@s agency is marred by
being the acti)e or permissi)e cause of that which is intrinsically dis)aluable(Gra)es $%$'. 1t is a contro)erted *uestion whether one@s agency can be judged to
be in any way morally worse simply because it brings about something bad, e)en
something )ery bad. &o one should doubt that one can judge facts in)ol)ing
agency to be in some way bad if the agency brings about something bad# one
might regret that the bad was brought about, or that the world was such that the
bad@s being brought about was the best of the options a)ailable. <hat is doubtful is
that this is any basis for judging the agency in *uestion to be in any way morally
bad.
onsider an analogy. <e look at the career of an executi)e and we see that her
career includes an occasion on which she laid off a do-en workers, costing them
their jobs with the company but offering them an extensi)e se)erance package.
6oes that fact all by itself show that she was in any way less than a perfect
executi)e4 6oes it mar her career4 1t is hard to see how# if she was brought on
board to deal with a company in se)ere trouble, and laying off that do-en workers
while offering them an extensi)e se)erance package really was the best possible
response that the executi)e could ha)e made to a problem not of her own making,
it is hard to see how this e)ent counts against her perfection as an executi)e. <hat
marks one as a good executi)e is how one deals with the opportunities and
challenges that one has a)ailable to one# it is not affected by the range of
opportunities and challenges themsel)es (except, of course, insofar as that range is
up to one@s one making'.
?imilarly, what makes agency morally good, one might say, is its responsi)eness towhat is )aluable# it is in no way made worse simply because the options a)ailable
each contain some regrettable features. ut the idea that God@s agency is marred
simply because the world contains bad presupposes that God@s agency is in some
marred on account of features of the options of choice rather than on account of
God@s orientation to what is )aluable. (<e will consider issues related to this one in
the next section in the context of the possibility that there is no intrinsic maximum
of moral goodness of agency.'
!. Is perfect goodness possibly exemplified
+he argument from e)il, noted in the pre)ious section, appeals to contingent facts
about the world in order to call into *uestion the existence of a being of perfect
goodness (who exhibits perfect knowledge and power as well'. ut one might call
into *uestion the existence of such a being without appeal to supplementary
premises about contingent facts concerning the existence of e)il. One might say
that perfect goodness is not e)en a real possibility.
1s perfect goodness a possibility4 One might think that it is ob)ious that it is. fter
all, whate)er standard of moral goodness that one puts forward as the ideal, it must
be a standard that is possible for agents to meet, for 9ought: > at least, the moral
9ought: > implies 9can.: ut one might claim that the standard for moral goodness
is not really like that. 1nstead of putting forward an ideal, the standard of moral
goodness is a comparatie standard= with respect to cases of appropriate
comparison, the standard of moral goodness tells one how the two items being
compared > whether desires, traits of character, actions > are ordered with
respect to one another. ?o the standard of moral goodness declares one set of
desires morally better than another, or declares them e*ually good# or declares one
set of character traits better than another, or declares them e*ually good# or
declares one career of actions better than another, or declares them e*ually good.
(2ut to the side the possibility that some such items are simply incommensurable.'
Hnderstood in this comparati)e way, the standard of moral goodness could still
honor 9ought implies can:= perhaps if A@s performing action ! is morally better
than A@s performing action " , this comparison presupposes that performing ! is
possible for A and performing " is possible for A. ut the key point is that,
understood in this comparati)e way, it is not at all ob)ious that perfect moral
goodness is possible. Aor it may be that the facts about what it is possible for A to
do and the comparati)e moral standard together entail that for e)ery action
that A might perform, there is a morally better action that it is possible for A to
perform.
+his possibility has been most intensi)ely discussed with respect to 9no best world:
scenarios. ?ay that God 9actuali-es a world: when some maximal state of affairsobtains as a result of God@s choosing to create or choosing to refrain from creating.
(<hether God actuali-es a world is thus not an open *uestion# God actuali-es some
world, and the only *uestions are whether they will include items other than God
and if so, which ones.' ?uppose that there are infinitely many possible worlds, each
of which is within God@s power to actuali-e. Aor each of these worlds, there is
another that is better from a moral perspecti)e, i.e. for each world, one who takes
the moral point of )iew will prefer some other world@s being actual to its being
actual. ?ince a possible world is a maximal state of affairs, God cannot actuali-e
more than one of these. ?o whiche)er world God chooses to actuali-e, it will betrue that God could ha)e actuali-ed a morally better one. One might think that it is
clear that an action of actuali-ing a world that is better from a moral point of )iew
is morally better than an action of actuali-ing a world that is worse from a moral
point of )iew. 1t follows that in a 9no best world: scenario, there is no agency that
God could exhibit that is unsurpassable. ?ince God is perfectly good only if God@s
agency is unsurpassable, necessarily, God is not perfectly good.
+he argument is as follows=
. &ecessarily, God actuali-es some world
$. &ecessarily, for each actuali-able world #, there is an actuali-able
world #$ such that from the moral point of )iew one would prefer #$ to #
3. &ecessarily, for whate)er world that God actuali-es, there is a morally better
world that God does not actuali-e yet could ha)e (from ($''
/. &ecessarily, for whate)er world that God actuali-es, God@s act of actuali-ing
that world is not as morally good as some other act that God does not perform but could ha)e (from (3''
5. &ecessarily, for whate)er world that God actuali-es, God@s agency is not as
morally good as it could ha)e been (from (/''
7. &ecessarily, God@s agency is not perfectly good (from (', (5''
?ome ha)e found the reasoning from no0best0world to no0perfect0goodness
persuasi)e, while drawing different morals from that entailment. Ieibni- concludes
that, because there is a God, there is a best world (D8ssays on the ustice of God,E
J"'# Rowe and <ielenberg, by contrast, conclude that this entailment can ser)e as
part of an argument against God@s existence (Rowe $%%/, pp. ""C5%# <ielenberg
$%%/'. Others ha)e been unmo)ed.
+he main sticking point in this argument is the mo)e from (3' to (/'. 6etractors ofthis argument wonder whether it follows from the fact that any world actuali-ed by
God is morally surpassable that any act of actuali-ing a world is morally
surpassable. 1t is easy to be tempted by the following line of thought. 1f we think of
an action as a state of affairs to be e)aluated in terms of moral goodness in the
same way that any other state of affairs is to be e)aluated, then there is a pretty
straightforward argument for the )iew that any act of actuali-ing a world will be
surpassable. Aor if one prefers from a moral point of )iew the obtaining of possible
world #$ to the obtaining of possible world #, then it seems )ery plausible that
one would, from the moral point of )iew, prefer God@s actuali-ing #$ to God@sactuali-ing #.
+his line of thought re*uires the assumption that the standard of moral goodness
that applies to actions, in )irtue of which a being@s agency counts as morally good,
is the same as the standard that applies to states of affairs generally. ut this is not
ob)ious. One might think that while the standard of moral goodness applying to
states of affairs is third0personal in character > one considers )arious items, and
asks what one would prefer from a particular perspecti)e, the moral point of )iew
> the standard of moral goodness applying to actions is first0personal in character,more closely tied to *uality of the agent@s deliberation in deciding what to do. <e
can put things in a slightly different way. <e can consider an agent@s action as
simply an e)ent in the world, and e)aluate whether we prefer the agent@s ha)ing
performed it to the agent@s ha)ing performed some other action. Or we can
consider an agent@s action as the outcome of deliberation, as a decision of what the
agent is to do as a result of considering the )arious reasons in play. 1t may be that
e)en though, considered as an e)ent, God@s actuali-ing a world is necessarily
surpassable, considered as an action, as a choice to carry out a plan, God@s
actuali-ing that world is unsurpassable.
1f we think that the e)aluation of worlds is distinct from the e)aluation of actions,
then there is room to resist the mo)e from (3' to (/', and this is indeed the standard
point at which to resist. One might object that this resistance is bound to come to
nothing. world is a maximal state of affairs# e)erything that is morally rele)ant,
and thus can gi)e God reason to choose to actuali-e one world o)er another, is
included in its )alue. ?o it of course follows that, from the deliberati)e perspecti)e,
God must ha)e more reason to reali-e a world with more )alue, and gi)en the no0
best0world scenario, it will follow that God ne)er does what God has most reason
to do, and thus God@s action is ne)er supremely morally good. ut again, there is
plenty of room for resistance. 1t does not follow from the fact that all of the )alue
to be reali-ed in God@s acting is included in the world actuali-ed that these are the
only reasons that bear on God@s choice. Aor there may be, in addition to these first0
order reasons, second0order reasons (Ra- !!!, p. 3!'. second0order reason is a
reason to act for, or not to act for, a reason# and that there are such reasons makes adifference in assessing actions in terms of their moral worth.
8ngage in a bit of picture0thinking. ?uppose we imagine God trying to choose
which world to actuali-e in a no0best0world scenario. <e imagine God trying to do
so on the basis of first0order reasons of the )alue of )arious worlds that might be
actuali-ed. ut God of course would know that this would be to no a)ail. God
cannot treat the fact that one world reali-es more )alue than another world as a
difference0making consideration, for if it were, that would render God unable to
make any choice. +he fact that relying on some consideration would undermine the possibility of reaching a decision is itself a consideration rele)ant to deliberation# if
one has good reason to reach a decision, and relying on some consideration
precludes one from reaching a decision, that )ery fact constitutes a reason rele)ant
to one@s deliberation. 1t is a second0order reason, a reason of sort that oseph Ra-
calls an DexclusionaryE reason= an exclusionary reason is a reason that directs one
not to treat a first0order reason as rele)ant in one@s deliberation (Ra- !!!, p. 3!'.
1f this account is right, then the reasons rele)ant to God@s decision about which
world to actuali-e are not exhausted by the first0order reasons constituted by the)alue of the worlds actuali-ed# these reasons also include second0order reasons,
reasons that direct God not to make the choice by comparing worlds@ first0order
)alue. God@s decision to actuali-e a world might then be morally unsurpassable, in
that it correctly responds to the reasons rele)ant to the choice in precisely the way
that those reasons call for, e)en if the world that is thereby created is surpassable
(;oward0?nyder and ;oward0?nyder !!/# Iangtry $%%", pp. F/0F"'. God might
make this decision on the basis of some personal, non0morally0objectionable
considerations rather than on the basis of considerations salient from the moral
point of )iew, or God might just pick, in Hllman0Margalit and Morgenbesser@ssense (Hllman0Margalit and Morgenbesser !FF'.
". Is necessary perfect goodness possible
?uppose that it is allowed that there is no obstacle to the coherence of the notion
that God is perfectly good. <hate)er the morally rele)ant reasons that bear on
di)ine agency, that agency is perfectly responsi)e to those reasons. s we saw
abo)e, it is standard within perfect being theology to conclude from the fact that
exhibiting some feature is a great0making feature that necessarily exhibiting that
feature is a great0making feature as well. s we also saw, an impediment to this
+hat holy wills in)ariably perform the actions that the moral norms call for does
not show that these moral norms do not apply to them. Aar from it= that they
apply e%plains why the holy will acts in accordance with them, for if ( per
impossibile' those norms did not apply, the holy will might well not act in
accordance with them. +here seems to be little justification for thinking that God@s
goodness could not be moral goodness simply from the fact that God is necessarily
perfectly good. (?ee ?tump !!$ and Ieftow !"! and $%3.'
".2 $ivine freedom
nother fre*uently0raised objection to the prospect of necessary perfect goodness
concerns the relationship between freedom and moral goodness (see, for example,
2ike !7!, p. $5# Reichenbach !"$, pp. 33C3/'. &ot all beings are subject to
moral assessment# we do not judge rocks to be dutiful because they ne)er )iolate a
moral duty. 1t is plausibly thought that one of the features that a being must exhibit
in order to be subject to moral assessment is freedom. <e fre*uently take as anexcuse for morally bad beha)ior that the agent was not really free not to act badly#
such excuses function by claiming that the conditions under which the agent acted
preclude the agent@s beha)ior from being used as a basis for morally assessing the
agent. Generali-ing from thoughts such as these, it is plausible to hold that God is
subject to moral assessment > including the assessment 9perfectly good: > only if
God acts freely. nd e)en apart from the connection between being free and beingsubject to moral assessment, it seems to be a great0making feature of a being that
its agency is free agency. (?ee the entry on di)ine freedom.'
1t seems, then, that we must think that God is free. +here seems to be no conflict
between holding that God is free and that God is perfectly good. free being may
ha)e a perfectly good set of desires, slate of character traits, and career of actions.
1t may e)en be true that e)ery counterfactual about what that agent would freely do
were circumstances somewhat different in)ol)es that agent@s agency being
perfectly good. ut there may be a conflict between holding that the agent is freewith respect to issues of moral rele)ance > what has been called being
DsignificantlyE free> and necessarily perfectly good. Aor many hold the )iew that
freedom of action in)ol)es a capacity to act otherwise > that if an agent is free
with respect to L0ing, then it is possible that Ls and it is possible that refrains
from L0ing. ut if freedom in)ol)es the possibility of acting either way with
respect to matters of moral rele)ance, then a free being cannot be necessarily
perfectly good. Aor there is no possible world in which a necessarily perfectly good
being acts wrongly# but for e)ery significantly free being there is a possible world
in which that being acts wrongly.
+here are )arious ways to resist this argument. Many compatibilists about free will
deny that this sort of ability to do otherwise is a re*uirement on freedom# e)en if
they insist on there being some possibility of the agent@s acting otherwise gi)en
some alternati)e possible set of desires, they do not hold that at the point of action,
with all held constant, it must be possible for the agent to act otherwise. (?ee the
entry on compatibilism.' ?o gi)en compatibilism, we cannot object that God is
unfree simply because at the point of di)ine choice the only real possibility is that
God declines to choose to do wrong. Aurthermore, God@s willing is not constrained by anything other than the constraints of logical possibility, and there is nothing
that can (efficiently' cause God to choose one way rather than other# God is the
ultimate source of God@s action, such that nothing is causally explanatorily prior to
God@s choice. 1f compatibilism is the true )iew about the relationship between
freedom and the capacity to act otherwise, then it seems that the fact that there is
no possible world in which God acts in any but the best way does not call into
*uestion that action@s being free and thus subject to moral assessment.
&ncompatibilists about free will > those who hold that free will is incompatible
with determinism > ha)e not been of one mind about whether the ability to act
otherwise is a condition of free will, and if so, in what sense, or whether there is
some other re*uirement on free action in the )icinity. (?ee the entry on arguments
for incompatibilism.' +hose who hold to a strong )ersion of the incompatibilist
)iew might claim that for an action to be free, then at the )ery point of decision to
perform the action, holding e)erything else constant, it must be possible for theagent to choose to act one way or the other. ?uch a )iew would indeed be
incompatible with necessary moral goodness on the assumption that only free
action is creditable to the agent. ut other incompatibilists ha)e held that e)en
gi)en a strong libertarian account of free will, it is possible for there to be beings
whose orientation toward the good and )i)id awareness of it is such that acting
wrongly is not a real possibility for them. On such )iews, it is possible for an agent
to L or not to L only if the agent judges there to be good reason to L and good
reason not to L or there is some feature of that agent that is interfering with that
agent@s orientation to act on what that agent judges there to be good reason to do.?o on *uinas@s )iew, while humans in their natural state are capable of freely
acting wrongly because they see some good in acting that way, in their glorified
state in hea)en they are unable to sin, for they see no point in sinning and they are
not such that their agency can be interfered with by external factors. 1t would be
misleading to say that the glorified in hea)en act rightly, but unwillingly# rather,
they are hyper0willing to act rightly, and sinning is simply unthinkable, off the
table, not a serious deliberati)e possibility for them (?tump !!%# Kret-mann
!!# see also ?winburne !!3, p. $%$'.
+his condition of free perfect agency is reali-ed to the greatest extent in God, it
may be argued= nothing external to God can interfere with God@s willing, and God
sees immediately and completely what is worth doing and why. On this )iew,
God@s choices against e)il are free, e)en though doing wrong is not a serious
deliberati)e possibility for God, and so there is no possible world in which God
acts wrongly.
1f one insists upon a libertarian account of free will in which to be free with respect
to an action re*uires the possibility of acting otherwise, then the connection between freedom and moral assessability entails that God@s lack of freedom to do
e)il precludes God@s being perfectly morally good. 1t is unclear how damaging that
outcome would be. 1f one is con)inced that moral goodness is a great0making
feature that God must exhibit, then there is a deep problem for perfect being
theology, as it seems that God must be free and God must be perfectly morally
good, yet these cannot be co0reali-ed. On the other hand, one might take this as
occasion to reconsider whether di)ine perfection re*uires moral goodness= perhaps
while moral goodness in the human case re*uires freedom, special features of the
di)ine case make that sort of freedom unnecessary (see, for example, ergmannand o)er $%%7'# or perhaps the perfection of God@s agency need not be moral
perfection. (<e will consider some suggestions toward this latter possibility
below.'
".3 $ivine freedom and divine rationality
?uppose that we allow that God cannot act wrongly, and that this does not threaten
the di)ine freedom, gi)en the best account of di)ine freedom. One might
ne)ertheless think that there is a difficulty concerning how to reconcile God@s
necessary moral goodness with God@s being both perfectly free and perfectly
rational. 1t seems that we must ascribe to God perfect rationality= God is a rational
agent, and it seems ob)ious that if we hold that God is in any way suboptimal,
rationally speaking, then that would count as a defect in God.
+o be perfectly rational is to ha)e one@s agency shaped by the reasons that bear on
one@s agency in the way that those reasons dictate. 1t is not assumed by this
characteri-ation of perfect rationality that reasons are the only thing that shape
one@s agency# the only re*uirement here is that one@s agency does not flout what the
rele)ant reasons re*uire.
6o God@s perfect rationality and God@s perfect moral goodness cohere4 an one be
perfectly rational and perfectly morally good4 1f the re*uirements of rationality can
re*uire an action that is ruled out by the re*uirements of morality, or )ice )ersa,
then we ha)e a problem= the absolutely perfect being cannot be both perfectly
rational and perfectly morally good. ?o anyone who wishes to defend perfect moral
goodness as a feature of the absolutely perfect being must hold that what moral
goodness re*uires is at least compatible with the re*uirements of rationality.
+he compatibility of the re*uirements of rationality with the re*uirements of moral
goodness is a relati)ely weak constraint, one that could be satisfied by holding
merely that what rationality re*uires is relati)ely thin compared to what morality
re*uires= perhaps rationality lea)es a lot of open space within which agents are not
rationally constrained to choose one way or the other, and one of the ways that they
might choose is the way re*uired by morality. ut one might argue that this weakconstraint is not enough, gi)en that God is morally good necessarily. Aor what is to
explain why God necessarily acts in accordance with the re*uirements of moral
goodness, if God is perfectly free4 2erhaps a perfectly free being will conform to
the reasons that are rele)ant in the situation of choice# but is it compatible with
perfect freedom to hold that God must act in a certain way, e)en though there are
(e% hypothesi' entirely ade*uate reasons to act some other, incompatible way4
+he tension being discussed here could be resol)ed if we were to accept a certain
sort of internalist thesis about moral norms, a thesis that Michael ?mith callsDrationalismE (?mith !!/, p. 7$', though it would need to be affirmed in a
somewhat stronger form than that which ?mith affirms. +he rationalist thesis as
?mith describes it holds no more than that the fact that an act is morally right for
an agent to perform entails that the agent has a good reason for performing it. +he
strengthened rationalist thesis holds that the fact that an action is the morally best
action for an agent to perform entails that it is the action that the agent has mostreason to perform. <hat is being supposed here is that rationality, )is0a0)is
morality, is )ery demanding= moral re*uirements just are rational re*uirements, so
that a failure to act morally is a failure to act rationally.
+his strengthened rationalist thesis is of course a contro)ersial metaethical )iew=
some would deny that there must be any reason at all for an agent to do what
morality re*uires, much less that there is decisi)e reason to do so. ut it is one
route to the reconciliation of di)ine rationality and freedom with perfect moral
goodness.
+hose who incline toward a compatibilist account of di)ine freedom might think
that there is less of a problem here. <hy must we try to preser)e di)ine freedom by
holding that God@s adherence to the norms of morality is a matter of God taking the
route most supported by reasons4 <hy not just say that the structure of di)ine
character > God@s )irtues > is that of a morally perfect being4 ?ince di)ine action
proceeds from the di)ine nature itself, one might say, it counts as free# and since
that nature is morally perfect, the action that proceeds from it will be perfectly
good as well. <e do not need to ad)ert to any contro)ersial metaethical thesis,then, to explain how di)ine freedom and rationality fit with perfect moral
goodness.
<hile this is an open strategy, there are some worries that can be raised with
respect to it. +he first is that it is unclear whether di)ine freedom is really being
ade*uately respected. One might wonder how it could be that God@s agency counts
as free if God is unable to take seriously in choice options that God ne)ertheless
recogni-es that there are ade*uate reasons to perform. ut that is an implication of
the )iew as described= because rationality does not rule out immoral options, yet
the structure of God@s desires precludes God from taking those options, God is
unable to take seriously options that there are perfectly sufficient reasons to carry
out. +his has an appearance of a lack of freedom, not the perfection of it.
+he second is about how we should think about the perfection of moral goodness
on this )iew. One of the key issues within the methodology of perfect being
theology is how the presence of certain items on the list of perfections is to be
justified. +here are some uncontro)ersial ways of ruling items off the list > if the
perfection presupposes an imperfection, for example > but whether some feature
that passes these negati)e tests counts as an intrinsically good0making feature is a
more difficult *uestion. 1f moral goodness is a re*uirement of rationality, it seems
much easier to make a case that moral goodness is a di)ine perfection. Aor it seems
undeniable that rationality counts as a perfection for God, as it must for any agent.
nd so if moral goodness is itself a matter of responding appropriately to reasons,
as it is on the strong rationalist thesis described abo)e, then moral goodness mustcount as a perfection as well. ut if moral goodness is not a re*uirement of reason,
is it so clear that moral goodness is a di)ine perfection4 <hat considerations might
one forward for the )iew that moral goodness is a perfection, if God has ade*uate
reasons not to act in the morally best way4
1n order to s*uare perfect moral goodness with perfect rationality and perfect
freedom, one must either (a' affirm a strong account of the reason0gi)ing character
of moral norms or (b' explain both why God@s freedom is not compromised by not
being able to make a choice fully supported by reasons and why moral goodnesscounts as a di)ine perfection (Murphy forthcoming'.
%. Is moral goodness a pure perfection
<e ha)e seen that there are resources to defend the coherence of the notion of
perfect goodness and e)en necessary perfect goodness, though making use of those
resources re*uires one to take on further contro)ersial commitments. 1t is worth
asking, in light of these further commitments that one would ha)e to make, how
strong the reasons are to ascribe perfect goodness, understood as
perfect moral goodness, to the absolutely perfect being in the first place.
1sn@t it ob)ious that perfect moral goodness is to be ascribed to God4 fter all, we
would think of a human being who fails to li)e up to the standards of moral
goodness as being imperfect in some way# surely, a fortiori, we ought to think of
an omniscient and omnipotent being as imperfect if that being fails to be perfectly
morally good. ut e)en if it is ob)iously true that an absolutely perfect being must
be morally perfect, this is a bad argument for that thesis. Aor the fact that a
perfect ! must exhibit feature F does not show that F is among the perfections of an
absolutely perfect being. perfect frog has webbed toes, but the absolutely perfect
being need not ha)e any toes at all, much less webbed ones.
1t is now traditional within perfect being theology to distinguish, following ohn
6uns ?cotus, between pure perfections and impure, or mixed, perfections
(Ordinatio .3., found in hilosophical (ritings, p. $/'. 2ure perfections are
those that do not presuppose limitation of some sort, while impure perfections do
so presuppose. Only pure perfections are features that it is simply better to ha)e
rather than not to ha)e. 1mpure perfections presuppose some limiting factor that
sets the perfection in *uestion > for example, membership in some natural kind.?o being a frog is a rele)ant sort of limitation, and sets a range of features that
?ome writers ha)e argued that the idea that the goodness of God@s agency is not the
moral goodness to which human agents ought to aspire is a familiar one in the
history of philosophy. 6a)ies argues that it is a mistake to think that in *uinas@s
)iew, God is Dwell0beha)edE according to the system of moral law that binds
humans (6a)ies $%, p. F$'# and Mcord dams makes similar claims regarding?cotus@s )iews (dams !"F'. ?o here the disagreement is not simply by
implication# arguably, there is explicit rejection in these major figures of the notion
that moral goodness of a familiar sort is a pure perfection.
1f moral goodness is rejected as a pure perfection, it does not follow that there is no
sense in which perfect goodness is a specific perfection. fter all, we might
understand perfect goodness as the specific perfection of di)ine agency without
taking the rele)ant standards to be the familiar welfare0oriented moral standards.
God@s being perfectly good might in)ol)e God@s responding perfectly to )alue in away appropriate for an absolutely perfect being to do so. 1t was a common notion
in the medie)al period to hold that God must lo)e Godself but that God is not
necessitated to act by the prospect of the well0being of humans or other sentient
creatures. (+hus God did not ha)e to create at all, and needs no reason not to
promote the well0being of creatures more than God in fact does.' +his )iew is
compatible with the notion that God might place Godself under certain norms
contingently, by promises, for example. ut it would reject the notion that God is
by nature subject to the same system of norms to which we humans are subject.
&ibliography
• dams, Marilyn Mcord, !"F. D6uns ?cotus on the Goodness of
God,E Faith and hilosophy, /= /"7C5%5.
• dams, Robert M., !F$. DMust God reate the est4,E hilosophical
*eie#, "= 3FC33$.
• lmeida, Michael, $%$. God, Freedom, and (orlds, Oxford= Oxford
Hni)ersity 2ress.
• lston, <illiam 2., !!%. D?ome ?uggestions for 6i)ine ommand
+heorists,E in eaty !!%= 3%3C3$7.
• nselm, !!7. )onologion, in )onologion and roslogion, ed. and trans.
+homas <illiams. 1ndianapolis= ;ackett.
• eaty, Michael (ed.', !!%. +hristian Theism and the roblems of
hilosophy, &otre 6ame= Hni)ersity of &otre 6ame 2ress.