-
People vs Abrazaldo
The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses
are as follows:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, at
Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant, then
intoxicated,[4] attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but
instead, hit the post of the latters house.[5] The incident was
reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban,
Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the
barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon
reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his
uncle, I will kill you! Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming
out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his forehead.[6] At
that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban
tried to assist accused-appellant. However, for unknown reason,
accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled face
to face. Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at
the abdomen[7] and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the
latter said, I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.[8] Fajardo,
together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov.
Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr.
Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours,
Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating
that the cause of death was stab wound, epigastrium, massive
hemothorax right.[9]
Gregorio Guban, the victims father, testified that he was the
one who spent for his sons funeral expenses. For the burial, he
spent P10,000.00;[10] for the 10-day funeral wake,P10,000.00;[11]
for the 9
th day
novena, P3,000.00;[12] and for the hospitalization,
P4,000.00,[13] or a total of P27,000.00.
On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by
accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay, Pangasinan.
Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of
Francisca Velasquez, accused-appellants aunt, and recovered the
knife. [14]
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different
version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening, he was
making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan.[15] His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and
Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then
drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, Get out Feding
I will kill you![16] When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him
with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house and got
his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and
they
-
grappled for its possession. In the course thereof, both fell
down.[17] It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit
him. Accused-appellant did not know which part of Gubans body was
hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the
police.[18]
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his
brother.[19] On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening,
accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a drinking
spree.[20] At about 10:00 oclock in that evening, accused-appellant
caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto.[21] He
attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the
latters house.[22] While running away from his uncles place, he
bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his forehead.[23]
Afterwards, accused-appellant killed Guban.[24]
The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, asserts that in
pleading self-defense, accused-appellant admitted he killed the
victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.
Moreover, accused-appellants version of the incident is completely
contradicted by the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating
circumstance, under par. (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was
clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as the
Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance
of peace and order.
The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that
there was no treachery. Evidence shows that he and Guban shouted at
each other and struggled face to face before the stabbing incident.
Thus, the assault was not sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor General
is convinced that accused-appellant did not purposely and
deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the
crime.
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is
invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;(2)
there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. On
appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must
show that the court below committed reversible error in
appreciating the evidence.[26]
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To
show that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he testified that it
was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him,[27] hit
him with an iron pipe,[28] and attacked him with a knife
-
The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but
also isolation. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by Marites,
accused-appellants own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his
testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe, Marites
declared that accused-appellant sustained the wound on his forehead
when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying
her brothers defense, she virtually affirmed the prosecutions story
by testifying that he created trouble in their compound, attempted
to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. [31]
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is
extremely doubtful.[32] In the present case, accused-appellants
tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony
dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to
preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally
stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack
of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes
voluntariness, induced only by necessity.[33] Indeed, if there is
truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was to
assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the
authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot
be appreciated considering accused-appellants flight from the crime
scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.
Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities
is inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his
culpability of the crime charged.[35]
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, accused-appellant
assails Fajardos testimony as tainted with inconsistencies and is
contrary to the normal course. Accused-appellant cannot invoke
these alleged weaknesses in view of the principle that one who
pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.Even if the
prosecutions evidence is weak, it is still credible considering
accused-appellants admission that he killed the victim. It bears
emphasis that Fajardos testimony clearly points to him as the
culprit. Not only did he pull out his knife, stabbed Guban[36] and
ran away.[37] Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him,
i.e., I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.[38]
As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge
the truth on his demise had been lost, we cannot but cast a
quizzical glance on accused-appellants uncorroborated testimony.
More so, when such testimony was contradicted by his own witness
who happened to be his sister. Standing alone against the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-
-
appellants own account of the killing must necessarily fail. We
hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral
certainty. The trial court did not err in relying on the testimony
of Fajardo, an eyewitness. Time and again, we have said that we
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on
record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which
have been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.[39]
Dela Cruz vs People
Doctrine of rational equivalence. [The] reasonable necessity of
the means employed [to repel the
unlawful aggression] does not imply material commensurability
between the means of attack and
defense [but] [w]hat the law requires is rational equivalence,
in the consideration of which will
enter the principal factors of the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is
exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done,
but rests upon the imminent
danger of such injury.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an
Information3
dated March 2, 2005, which
alleged:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30
in the afternoon, petitioner went to the
office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th
Floor of Robinson's Summit Center, Ayala Avenue, Makati
City.
When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the
work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey
Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the
eyewitness Antonette Managbanag's sketch,
was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards
the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey
from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at
the back of Jeffrey's head. At the last second,
Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the
gun, and a short struggle for the possession of
the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and
remained in possession of the said gun.
Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey's face, pulled the
trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally
discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead,
eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey,
petitioner fled the office.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought
with her their two (2) young children.
Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit
relationship when he received a copy of the blog
of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE
PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is left for determination by this
Court is whether the elements of self-defense exist to exculpate
petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide. The essential
requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of
-
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.10
In other words, there must have
been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life
of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.11
chanrobleslaw
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused
from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when he
invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that
he indeed acted in defense of himself.12
The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that
he
incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13
As such, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if
the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot
be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the
killing.14
chanrobleslaw
Measured against this criteria, we find that petitioner's
defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's
contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him. Unlawful aggression is the
most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and
intimidating action.15
There is aggression,
only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
his life.16
The peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17
In the case at bar, other than petitioner's testimony, the
defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey
condescendingly responded to petitioner's questions or initiated
the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled
a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an
assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life. Even
assuming arguendo that the gun originated from Jeffrey and an
altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact
existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter.
After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer
any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated
the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner
had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but
refused to do so, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of
the gun. Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim.
From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard",
then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression
coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away.
Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun
initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased
when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is
settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor,
otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs.
Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right
to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased
(PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609). Accused alleged that the victim was
about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused's) head but he
parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as
nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it. In
contrast, the two (2)Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was
not impeached, both
gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to
shield himself from the accused who was then already in possession
of the gun.
18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer
exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has
no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19
To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object
of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful
aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of
the
offender.20
Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of
self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict
excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when
the allegedly unlawful aggression had already
-
ceased. More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution
witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful aggression in
the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In addition, other than
petitioner's testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that
the alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued
when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to
run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree
with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that
Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on
petitioner's head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses
maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield
himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a
deadly weapon. Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is
indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds inflicted
by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot
be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from
the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was
not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged
attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v.
Obordo:24chanrobleslaw
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that
the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The
means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was
trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant)
stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately
stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the
victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as
alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist
in throwing a punch at him.
25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as
correctly pointed out by the RTC,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second
was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof was
unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression
with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means
employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense
(Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98). It was the accused who was in a
vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim
who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not
a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accused's alleged fear
was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined
impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is
sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security
Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule
that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril
sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary
(Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).
26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to
kill him, he should have just run, despite any obstruction,
considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could
have also immediately sought help from the people around him,
specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting
incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to
the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was
indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner
never did any of that. We find it highly specious for petitioner to
go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey, and
in the end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but
four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no
intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
-
Moreover, the Prosecution's eyewitnesses were consistent in
declaring that while there was prior struggle for the possession of
the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the
time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005;
TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that
while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire
extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other,accused
pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on
the 4
th, the gun
fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances,
it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired
accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led to the victim's
death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or
struggle for the possession of the gun
27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may
have been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire
was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner
may not have intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he
clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or
even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in
the past that the nature and number of wounds are
constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which
disprove a plea of self-defense.28
Thus,
petitioner's contention that an accident simultaneously occurred
while he was in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and
preposterous at best. There could not have been an accident because
the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital
part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved
to end the life of the victim. Besides, petitioner's failure to
inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey
and to
surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates
against his claim of self-defense.29
chanrobleslaw
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss
further the third element of self-defense since it is recognized
that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding
the justifying circumstance of
sell-defense.30
If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two
requisites of self-defense will have no
basis.31
Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner's argument that
a privileged mitigating circumstance
of self-defense is applicable in this case, because unless the
victim has committed unlawful aggression
against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, on the part of the latter.32
chanrobleslaw
People vs Apolinar
rt. 11: Defense of property People vs. Apolinar Facts: Midnight
of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio
Apolinar alias Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of
land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan,
Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land
when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his
shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendant
called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the
air and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras,
was able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to
Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the
back by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side
of the spinal column - which wounds were circular in form and a
little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical
report of Dr. Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he sustained.
The defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the
incident and gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice
of Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.
Issue: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of
property
-
Held: No; the right to property is not of such importance as
right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a
justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on
the person of one entrusted with said property. --------
PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ 121 SCRA 389 (1983) FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has
been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot
Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a
fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and
rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and
asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could
talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed,
go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with
his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep
where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting,
Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved
in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the
shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid
trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract
because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to
remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after
letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to
pay for moral damages. ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
although he acted in defence of his rights. 3. WON he should be
liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the
civil indemnity due to
the offended party.
HELD: 1. NO. The courts concurred that the fencing and
chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a
form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on
his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err.
However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the
courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right
of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in
dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the
article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into
question. It is accepted that the victim was the original
aggressor. 2. YES. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these
requisites: a. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was
unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher
had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and
putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that
possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while
Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be
respected in his possession
-
b. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel
attack - In the case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending
himself. - Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep. Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited
with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense,
pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are:
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405
explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because
treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the
deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to
kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct
evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three
degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor. 3. NO. He is not liable to be
subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity. RA 5465
made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only
after its conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the
accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC. Defendant was
found guilty of homicide but with mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Appellant has
already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when
coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the
case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to
prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he
should be released.
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BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (RA NO. 9262)
PEOPLE V. MARIVIC GENOSA
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his
wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter,
Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors
who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing,
appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room.
Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged
that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the
use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of
her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the
penalty of death. On automatic review before the Supreme Court,
appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination
of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the
inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case
for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted
the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
-
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome,
Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the
trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part
of the records. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not appellant herein can
validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self
defense. 2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben
Genosa. Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant
failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome. A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once.
If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she
is defined as a battered woman. More graphically, the battered
woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence,
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase. The Court, however, is not discounting
the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time
of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established. The
defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of
violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the
third phase of the cycle. In any event, the existence of the
syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our
jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense
must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be
avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of
self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of
self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack
-- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had
already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape
to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
-
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion
and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It
should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological
paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from
the same set of facts. The first circumstance arose from the
cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over
a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. As to the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it
has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is
an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity. 2. NO. Because of the
gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked. The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful
as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her
batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the
aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and
impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for
parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating
circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty
is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau
of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being
held for some other lawful cause. NOTE: After this case was decided
by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26
of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not
incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence
of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
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C. STATE OF NECESSITY
TY V PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]
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Tys mother and her sister were confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital for almost 2 years. Since the bill
reached 1,075,592.95, Ty drew 7 PDCs covering 30k each against
Metrobank payable to the hospital. However,
they were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Soon
thereafter, the complainant hospital filed 7 counts of
violation of B.P 22. For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued
the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the
checks to obtain release for her mother whom the
hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge
unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged
that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the
air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and
subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the
telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and
refusal to change the latters gown and bedsheets. The hospital
also suspended medical treatment of her mother.
ISSUE: WON the justifying circumstance of state of necessity
under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may
find application in this case.
HELD: No. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to
exempt the actor from liability under this
paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated, thus, the defense is not
applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option
to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of
security instead of postdated checks to secure her
obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,
the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the
willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own
failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.