People, Land and Poppy: the Political Ecology of Opium and ...

Forest and Society. Vol. 1(1): 48-59, April 2017 Received: 2017-03-13; Accepted: 2017-04-12

ISSN: 2549-4724, E-ISSN: 2549-4333

http://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/fs/index http://dx.doi.org/10.24259/fs.v1i1.1495

RegularResearchArticle

People,LandandPoppy:thePoliticalEcologyofOpiumandtheHistoricalImpactofAlternativeDevelopmentinNorthwestThailand. BobbyAnderson1,*1 ResearchAssociate,SchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,UniversityofLondon* Correspondenceauthor:[email protected]

Abstract: Thailand’s near-total elimination of opium poppy cultivation is attributed to “alternativedevelopment”programming,whichreplacesillicitcropswithlicitones.However,opiumpoppycultivationwasnotdrasticallyreducedbecausesubstitutecropsearnedthesameincomeasopium:nothingcanequalthepriceofopium to smallholder farmers, especially thosewithout land tenure. Thailand’s reduction inpoppy cultivation was achieved by the increased presence and surveillance capability of state securityactors,who, yearby year,were able to locate anddestroy fields, and arrest cultivators,with increasingaccuracy.Thiscoercionwasalsoaccompaniedbybenefitstocultivators, includingtheprovisionofhealthandeducationservicesandtheextensionofroads;bothstickandcarrotconstitutedtheencroachmentoftheThai state.Theprovisionofcitizenship tohill tribemembersalsogave themavested interest in thestate, through their ability to hold land, access health care, education andworkopportunities, amongstothers.Theseinitiativesdidnotoccurwithoutcoststohilltribeculturesforwhomasymbioticrelationshipwith the land was and remains disrupted. These findings indicate that alternative developmentprogramming unlinked to broader state-building initiatives in Afghanistan, Myanmar and other opiumpoppy-producingareaswillfail,becauseshort-term,high-yield,highvalue,imperishableopiumwillremainthemostlogicalchoiceforpoorfarmers,especiallygiventhelackofafarmer’svestedinterestinthestatewhichcompelsthemtoreducetheirincomewhilstofferingthemnootherprotectionsorservices.

Keywords: Alternative Development; Crop Substitution; Drug Control; Forest Conservation; Hill Tribes;OpiumEradication;Thailand;Zomia

1.Introduction

OpiumpoppycultivationinThailandfellfrom12,112hectaresin1961to281hain2015.Bymoststandardsofmeasurement,thecountry’s“war”ondrugproductionsucceeded,especiallyincomparison to other drug-producing countries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, Laos, Colombia,Peru, Bolivia and Mexico. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) declaredThailand“opiumfree”adecadeago,andhasnotincludedThailandinitsWorldDrugsReportsince2008. Thailand is also widely heralded as a successful example of “alternative development”programming,whichseekstoreplaceillicitcropswithlicitones,andwhichisconductedintandemwith coercive policies to eliminate the opium economy, comprised of poppy cultivation,refinementintoopium,conversiontoheroin,andexport.

This paper analyses the historical success of alternative development in Northern Thailandand finds that opium poppy cultivation was not drastically reduced because substitute cropsearnedthesameincomeasopium:nothingcanequalthepriceofopiumtosmallholderfarmers,especiallythosewithoutlandtenureandtheconsecutiveinabilitytosecurelyinvestinlonger-termcrops.Withouteradication,opiumcultivation isdeterminedbymarket forces: in1984, theyeareradicationbegan,cultivationwasagainpeaking.Butalternatecropsdidprovideincome,aidedbyamarket-distortingprice floor thegovernmentused tomakeup thedifference.Thatprice floorremains.Thenear-total reduction inopiumcultivation,however,wasaidedbymuchmore thannewcropsandpriceguarantees.Theeraoferadicationwasheraldedbytheincreasedpresenceof

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state securityactors, enhanced lawenforcementand surveillance, thedestructionof crops, andthearrestofcultivators.Butthiscoercionwasalsoaccompaniedbybenefitstohilltribes,includingthe provision of health and education services, the extension of roads, the assignment of civilservantstoadministerareastheywerepreviouslyabsentfrom.Bothstickandcarrotconstitutedtheencroachmentof theThai state.Theprovisionof citizenship tohill tribemembersalsogavethemavestedinterestinthestate,throughtheirabilitytoholdland,accesshealthcare,educationandworkopportunities,andbankcredit,amongstothers.Theseinitiativesdidnotoccurwithoutbotheconomicandculturalcoststohilltribeculturesforwhomasymbioticrelationshipwiththelandwasandremainsdisrupted.Farfrombeingastandalonehistoricalepisodeunlinkedtoothers,alternativedevelopmentanderadicationhasoccurredasapartof the centuries-longexpansionandconsolidationoflowlandThaistatepowerintoegalitarianandstate-resistanthighlandareasitwas previously absent from. This paper therefore applies the theoretical frameworks of VanSchendel(2002),andScott(2009)towardThailand’scontemporaryexpansionintoremoteareasofNorthwestThailand.

These findings indicate that alternative development programming unlinked to broaderstate-buildinginitiativesinAfghanistan,Myanmarandotheropiumpoppy-producingareaswillfail,becauseshort-term,high-yield,highvalue,imperishableopiumwillremainthemostlogicalchoiceforpoorfarmers,especiallygiventhelackofafarmer’svestedinterestinthestatewhichcompelsthemtoreducetheirincomewhilstofferingthemnootherprotectionsorservices.

ThisanalysisisbasedonfieldresearchandinterviewswithThaigovernmentofficials,HillTriberepresentatives, security actors, academics, civil society representatives, local businesspersons,ex-cultivators, and recovering opium addicts in Omkoi, Chiang Mai, and other areas, fromDecember 2015 to June 2016. These findings emerged from an earlier project at the NationalUniversityofSingapore’sLeeKuanYewSchoolofPublicPolicy, incollaborationwithChiangMaiUniversityandtheGovernmentofThailand’sOfficeoftheNarcoticsControlBoard.

2.Prologue:LowlandIntrusionsinSoutheastAsianHighlands

Putvegetablesinthebasket:putpeopleintheMuang(village).

-Thaisaying

VanSchendel (2002) coined theword “Zomia” todescribe theupland southeastAsian landmassifwhichstretchesfromVietnamtoTibet,andwhichincludesNorthwesternThailand:anareatraditionallyresistanttocentralizedruledueto itshighelevation,extensiveforestcover,ruggedtopography,andthefrictionwhichresults.UnlikemonocroppinglowlandThais,BamarsandotherswhooftencultivatePadirice,highlanders,includingThailand’sKaren,Akha,Hmong,Lahu,andLisu,cultivateawidevarietyofcropsthatarehardtoseizeandtax,suchastubers.Theirswiddeningkeeps them mobile, and their societies do not allow for the emergence of centralized rule:egalitarianismpredominatesamongsthighlanders,andMyanmar’sKachinwouldgosofarastokillemergentleaderswhoseemedtooambitious(Leach,1954).

Scott (2009),VanSchendel (2002)andotherspostulatethatmuchoftheZomiapopulation,includingKaren,migratedtothehillsinordertoescapefromthecentralizingruleoflowlandandwet-ricecultivatingstatesthatsoughttocaptureandtransportpopulationsneartowetlandriceproducingareas,putting themtoworkcultivatingmonocropswhichcould thenbe taken, taxed,and stored for long periods. In additional to monocropping, these lowland states werecharacterized by permanent settlements; uniformity of culture, language, and education; thepropagation of dynastic myths to justify rule in cosmological terms; the record-keeping madepossiblebyliteracy;thelevyingoftax;andconscriptioninpursuitofalloftheabove.Suchstatesthrived,tothebenefitoremergingelitesanddynasties,andtothechagrinofcapturedpopulationsthateventuallybecamethemembersofuniformethnicitiesandreligiousgroups.ThePadi statewhichcausedthemost flightwasHanChina,whichcausedwaveafterwaveofnon-Hanto flee,first from the river valleys of central China, and then from Sichuan and Yunnan, as changingdynastiesseizedmorelandandpeople.ThosewhodidnotfleeeventuallybecameHan.Taipeople

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originallyfledHanexpansion,buttheyreplicatedHanpracticesinthelowlandstheysettledin,andeventually the most successful of the Tai statelets, Thailand, posed the same threat to otherhighlandersthatHanonceposedtothemasthey,andtheirlowlandBamarneighbors,encroachedupon the hills. Highlanders fleeing an expanded state did not only constitute the constructedethnicitiesofhighlandpopulations;theywerealsoconstitutedbyselectBamar,Han,Taiandotherlowlanderswhosoughtfreedomintheforestsandhills.

The lowland Thai state grew from struggleswith Khmer and Bamar neighbors thatwarredagainst one another in order to capture populations rather than territories. Thailand’s positionbetween French and British colonies served as a buffer between the two and so the stateconsolidated internally, expanding rule into peripheral and highland areas not claimed byEuropeanpowers.

King Chulalongkorn, arguably the father of the contemporary Thai state, viewed highlandtribespaternally,seeingthemasnakanurakorbenignsavages(Renard,2001);healsoregardedthemasThaisubjects.ContemporaryauthoritiesmayregardKarenandotherhill tribesasa lesscivilizedformofThai,buttheyregardthemasrelativesnonetheless.Thisattitudeofbenevolentsuperiorityhaspercolatedintomuchofthecivilservice1.

3.ABriefHistoryofOpiuminSoutheastAsia

Theopiumpoppy(papaversomniferum)isindigenoustotheeasternMediterranean,andwasfirstdescribedbyHippocrates.FromAnatoliaitscultivationspreadtotheBalkans,Iran,IndiaandChina,whereitwasfirstusedasmedicineamillenniaago.

Refugees entering highland southeast Asia in flight from Han Chinese expansion andsuccessive failed rebellions likely brought opium poppy with them from Sichuan and Yunnan,where itwas longcultivatedandconsumed,byHmongandLisu inparticular2,but.OpiumusagebecameincorporatedintothehilltribeculturesofSouthwestChina,NorthernThailand,NorthernLaos,andNorthwestMyanmar,asa socialanda religiousactivity.Opiumwasusedascurrency;manyproductswereuntilrecentlypricedinjoiofopium.Opiumwasalsoameanstostorewealth:unlikeothercrops,ittravelswell,andcanbestoredforlongperiodswithoutdegrading.Itbecamearepresentationofstability,continuity,andwealth,itsseedgivenbyparentsasweddinggiftstochildrenleavingthehousehold.Opiumwasalsobroad-spectrummedicineforavarietyofphysicalandmentalailments,itspersistenceenhancedbytheremotenessofmanyhighlandcommunitiestoothertreatmentoptions.Itreduceshungerpangs.Lastly—orperhapsfirstly—peopleliketogethigh.

BritishIndiaseizeduponopiumastheiropportunityto“right”thebalanceoftradeissuewithChina,andIndia’schronicshortageofsilver,byexportingopiumtoChinaandothermarkets.LaterwavesofChineselabormigrationtoSoutheastAsia’sBritishandFrenchcoloniesaswellasSiaminthe19thand20thcenturiesbroughttheiraddictionwiththem.TheThaiKingRamaIIfirstbannedopiumin1811,butSiamultimatelybowedtoBritishpressure;RamaIV legalizedopiumagain(itwouldnotbecome illegal againuntil 1958) institutedagovernmentopiummonopoly.The statebenefitted:attheendofthe19thcentury,monopoliesonopium,alcoholandgamblingconstitutedatleast40%ofThaigovernmentrevenue(Lintner,2000).WhilstopiumwaswhollyimportedfromBritishIndia,thepossibilityofcultivatingopiumoutsidestatemonopoliesandsellingatmonopolypriceswas soon acted upon by traders, corrupt officials, and holders ofmonopoly concessions.Highlanderswereencouragedtoplantmoreopium,whichtheywouldexchangeforrice.ThisalsooccurredinChina,withillicitopiumcultivatedinYunnanfindingitswayintotheThaidrugmarket.The British increased opium cultivation in Shan state, which borders NW Thailand, after theyabsorbedMyanmarintoIndiainthreestagesofconquest.

Opium cultivation in Thailand did not begin in earnest until the 1940s. The fall of China’sGuomindang(Kuomintang,hereafterKMT)tothecommunistsin1949ledtotheremnantsofthe1 Interviews, ONCB, Chian Mai & Omkoi, December 2015/ March 2016. Many government intervieweesregardtheirworkasacivilizingmission.2 Interviews,villagers,CRSPO,ONCB,MaeTuen/Omkoitown,Omkoi,March2016.

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KMTfleeingtoMyanmar,wheretheyexpandedcultivationoftheonlycashcropinnorthernShan-opium,whichwould reach internationalmarkets via Bangkok. Systematic cultivation percolatedintoThailandwithhighlandersfleeingKMTconscriptionandtaxation(McCoy,1973,Lintner,1999);Thailand’s hill tribes in remote areas became the primary cultivators of the crop, although theprofit accrued elsewhere, with KMT and Chiu Chau3 Chinese networks. Demand for SoutheastAsian opium exponentially increased as a result of the success of eradication programs in theBalkans,Anatolia,andIran;organizedcriminalsyndicatessearchedfornewsourcesofopium,andfounditintheGoldenTriangle(McCoy,1973).InThailand,thisillegaleconomyoperatedwiththeimplicitinvolvementoftheThaipoliceandarmythatfoughtoneanotherovercontrolofthetrade;despitetheillegalityofthesubstance,lawenforcementdidnotbeginuntil1984(seebelow).HillTribe swiddening (or pejoratively, “slash-and-burn”) agriculture (Thai: RaiMunWian; Burmese:Taungya), historically a sustainable farming practice practiced by highlanders,mutated into theclearanceofentirehillsidesforpoppyinShanandnorthwestThailand.Thaicommunistinsurgentsalso profited from this trade; highlanders were their farmers and foot soldiers. Opium becamecentraltothedominantlowlandThaidiscourseonhilltribes.Itwasinthiseraespeciallythat,formany lowland Thai, highlanders—swiddeners, opium growers, traffickers, rebels—becameassociatedwith environmental destruction, crime, and threat. These stereotypes, which do notstand up to even casual scrutiny. have created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust whichcontinuestocolorthelowland–hilltriberelationship.

4.The“WaronDrugs”andtheadventofAlternativeDevelopment

NorthernThailand’sopiumeconomybegantowaneintheearly1970’s,whenUnitedStatesPresidentRichardNixondeclareda“WaronDrugs”inresponsetoarisingurbanheroinepidemicwhich was partly fueled by addicted American soldiers returning from Vietnam. The Thaigovernment, with US pressure and funding, began treating opium as an illegal substance andpoppy as an illegal crop. Elements of the Thai state once involved in cultivation and traffickingbegantheirowndisentanglementatthistime.Thegovernmentincreasedthescaleofalternativelivelihoods programs which had initially begun under the auspices of Thai King BhumibolAdulyadej’s Royal Project (est. 1969). The Royal Project’s approach to alternative livelihoodsincluded: 1. Research and development of geographically suitable alternative crops which would not

competewithlowlandproducts;2. Agriculturalextensionservicesincludingprovisionofseeds,fertilizer,training,andconstruction

ofsupportinginfrastructure(dams,irrigation,farmfeederroads,etc.); 3. Post-harvest and value-added processes, such as transportation, grading and packing, food

processing,marketdevelopment,etc.WhiletheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,workingalongsidetheRoyalProject,initially

managedmanyalternativedevelopmentprogramsonbehalfofthestate(Renard,2001),theThaiGovernment soon created a specialized agency, the Office of the Narcotics Control Board(hereafter ONCB), to oversee Thailand’s drug control policy, alternative livelihoods and (later)eradicationinparticular.Inlinewiththeimplicitmissionofalternativedevelopmentasanexercisein the consolidation of state power and the weakening of threats to the state, the ONCBestablisheditsfirstfiveregionalofficesinCommunistPartyofThailand(CPT)insurgentstrongholds(Race, 1974),where theyworked as extension agents4: earlier state prohibitions on swiddeningandloggingmademanyHighlanderseagerCPTrecruits.

TheRoyalProjectintroducedover150newcropstoopiumpoppyfarmers,includingArabicacoffeeandtea.Otherless-valuablecropsincludedapples,beans,cabbage,corn,decorativeflowers,herbs (seasoning), lettuce, peaches, and so on. Padi rice was also encouraged. Issues arose:cabbagecultivationwassurprisinglyabetterearnerthanopiumbutonlywhenfarmersover-usedchemicalfertilizersandpesticides (Renard,2001),andonlyinthefirstyearofcultivation;prices3 alt:ChaoChu/Teochew/Chaozhou4 Interviews,ONCB,ChiangMai,December2015.

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soon crashed, and chemicals were soon banned due to the contamination of water sources inwatershed areas. The samehappenedwith tomatoes; these initial failures causedmany formeropiumcultivatorstoabandontheproject5.

The government established price floors for alternative crops and became the guaranteedbuyer for Royal Project produce, in order tomatch the price farmers once earned from opiumpoppy cultivation. The Royal Project initially focused on monocropping, which served to makehighlandparticipantsmorereliantonthecashwhichtheirmonocropcouldearn,whichtheycouldthen use for further nutritional diversification. This was an aspect of lowland “best practices”transplanted to an areawhichwas not appropriate for it, and theRoyal Project de-emphasizedmonocroppingafterthefirstdecade6.

Poppyeradicationdidnotbeginuntil1984,simultaneoustodisarminganddemobilizing(and,inthePiengLuangarea,killing)thelastvestigesofKMTforcesonThaiterritory,aswellasexpellingKhunSa.Thiswasafull15yearsafteralternativedevelopmentbegan,whensuitablealternativecropswereinplace;theONCBcoordinatederadicationeffortswhichwereprimarilyconductedbythe 3rd Army. In addition to the destruction of crops, authorities began actively arrestingcultivators. Between 1984 and 1985, Thailand’s area under cultivation dropped from 8,290 to2,428Ha (Renard, 2001), andaccordingly rose inMyanmar7,where theopiumharvest, fromanaverage of 300-400,000 KG per year, would peak at 1,500,000 KG in the mid-1990s; this peakcoincided with government ceasefires with numerous highland insurgents emerging from thecollapsedCommunistPartyofBurma.Thenewgroups,especiallyWaandKokang,werethenabletoconcentrateondrugproduction.CultivationalsoshiftedtoLaos,peakingat126,654KGinthe1990s.

Cultivation persisted, however, in remote areas which the state had difficulty accessing ormaintainingapresencein.Theevasionstrategiescultivatorsdevelopedresultedinstaggeredcropswhichsproutedonthosesameplotsdestroyedbythearmy,weeksaftertheydeparted.Apoppygrowth cycle is roughly 3 months, but the annual opium-planting season is 8 months; severaloverlappingplantingcyclesoccurred.Newpoppyfieldswereestablishedfurtherfromsettlements;no information connected cultivator to crop unless theywere apprehended on site. Plots grewsmaller,ultimatelyaveraging0.25Ha.Plantingoccurredonsteepslopes,difficult todetect fromspotterplanes(andlater,satelliteimagery).Eventodaythereremainareasthatthestatecannotsee.Thefrictionofterrainremainsasimportantnowasitwasincolonialtimes.

HarmReductionwas also a late addition to Thailand’s drug control policy. Thailand’s initialresponsetoitsmultifaceteddrugproblemwasdrivenbyforeign,primarilyAmerican,concerns.Asthe problem was considered international and not local, the Thai government’s approachconcentrated only on the elimination of supply. Only in the 1990s did Thai drug control policybegintoaddressissuesoflocaladdiction,firstlyofheroin(whichforabriefperiodinthe1980sand1990s exploded in younghighlandpopulations,Hmong in particular, beforeAIDS just as rapidlykilledthehighlandinjectingpopulation),andsecondlyofopium:authoritiesbelatedlynotedthatgrassroots farmersofopiumpoppywerealsoconsumersofaculturallyacceptableproduct,andthereforedemandrequiredaddressingaswellassupply(Andersonetal.,2016).Overthecourseofalternativelivelihoodsanderadication,rehabilitationandharmreductionservicesgrewindemand

5 Interviewswithprojectparticipants,NongTao,June24,2016,andwithONCB,June21,2016. 6 Interview,PhawLuangJorniOdochao,NongTao,ChiangMai,June24,2016.7 Bythelate1980sMyanmarwastheworld’slargestsupplierofheroin,whichwasalsousedasacurrencybecauseofacollapse inthevalueof theKyat.AfghanistanwouldsoonsurpassMyanmar:USgovernmentpressureonMyanmar’s State LawandOrderRestorationCouncil to crackdownonheroin-manufacturinginsurgents,most notably Khun Sa’sMong Tai Army. Theworld epicenter of poppy cultivation and heroinmanufacture soon shifted to Afghanistan, where theMujahideen group Hizb e Islami began synthesizingheroininHelmandaftertheSovietwithdrawalin1989.TheTaliban’sdeclarationofheroinmanufactureasharamorforbiddeninthelate1990scausedcultivationtoshiftbacktoMyanmar.

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duetothereductioninheroinandopiumsupplythroughoutthe1990s:qualitativelythisisvisible,butfiguresareunavailable8.

HistoricalExperienceswithAlternativeLivelihoods:DoiLaan,Chiangrai

“Doesn’tthestatehavearesponsibilitytoprotectus,tonotletusbetakenadvantageof?”

-MimiSaejuWin9

The experience of Doi Laan is emblematic of the wider disruption in cultures and economiescausedbyalternativedevelopmentanderadication.DoiLannisaLisuvillageinChiangraiprovince.ThemajorityofLisu therewere involved inopiumcultivationandsale.Alternativedevelopmentprojectsbeganintheearly1970’sbutopiumremainedthemainstayofthevillageeconomyuntil1985,whenthemilitaryarrived.MimiSaejuWinwasachildatthetime;sherecountedthearrivalofhelicopters, followedbyuniformedmenintrucks.DoiLaan’speoplefled intotheforestwhiletheir crops were torched. The Royal Project and a German bilateral development projectintroducedtomatoesandcabbagesbuttheLisuquicklyfellundertheswayoflowlanderswhopaidbelow-marketpricesandthencashedinontheguaranteedpricefloorpaidbytheRoyalProject.Farmers switched entirely to Arabica, and grow it because it takes less effort, even though thepriceisstillfixedbymiddlemenat20to25bahtperkilo.

Eradication,fortheLisu,wasasignificantculturalandeconomicdisruption;opiumwasthesurestsignofwealthinLisusociety.MiminotesthatLisuwomenlostmuchoftheirhouseholdauthorityattheonsetoferadication:womenservedasopiumbusinessmanagersandtraders,andthelossin income from alternative crops affected their status. Doi Laan’s men became unhinged ashousehold incomes plummeted. Alcoholism increased, as did use of heroin, amphetamine-likestimulants(ALS),andprostitution;injectionandprostitutionheraldedanHIVepidemicthatsweptDoi Laanbeginning in theearly1990s.ManyLisupreviously involved inopiumbegan smugglingALSfromWaandKokangareasofShanstate,Myanmar,intoThailand,andanumberoftheseLisusmugglersanddealerswereexecutedduringThaksinShinawatra’s“warondrugs”in2003.

Intervieweesnotethat,ifmanyLisuandotherhilltribeshadachoice,theywouldcultivateopiumpoppyagain.

5.ContemporaryImpactofpastpolicy

The successof theoverall alternative livelihoodsandcrop substitutionprogram inThailanddid not result from substitute crops increasing incomes; the threat posed by eradication andincreasedlawenforcement/statesurveillance,andthepotentiallossofbothincomeandfreedom,wereprimaryfactorsinthedecisionsofformercultivatorstoswitchcrops10.Inordertoconqueraplace,onemustfirstmapitspeople(Anderson,2006;Scott,1998;Scott,2009;Winichakul,1994).Thisisdoublytruewhenastatelessarea’sresourcesareutilizedbyastatelesspeopleinamannerdifferent from what the state intends; contestations over resources are implicit challenges tolegitimacy. The state’s bureaucracy and coercive authority led to changes more than any newcrops—noneofwhichprovidedthesamelevelofincomethatopiumpoppycultivationdid.Buttheprice floor established by the Royal Project partially bridged the gap between illicit and licitincome.TheRoyalProjectcontinuestopayinflatedpricesforsubstitutecrops.

8 Interview,publichealthofficial,Omkoi,March2016.9 Interview,MimiSaejuWin,ChiangMai,June22,2016.10 Interviewswithformercultivators,MaeTuen,Feb2016;withONCBofficials,ChiangMai,Dec2015-June2016;withMimiSaejuWin,ChiangMai,June22,2016;withPhawLuangJorniOdochao,NongTao,ChiangMai,June24,2016.

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Citizenship:Animportantfactorinthesuccessofalternativelivelihoods,accordingtoRenard(2001)andothers,wastheawardingofThaicitizenshiptohilltribemembers:citizenshipofferedthe possibility of land tenure. Encouraging crop substitution is implicitly an encouragement inlong-terminvestment,particularlyforestatecropssuchascoffee,tea,andorchardfruits.Arabicacoffeeisagoodexample;itgrowsatthesamealtitudeasopium,travelswell,offersbetterreturnscomparedtoshort-termcrops,anditrequirestheshadeoflargertrees,sodeforestationisnotanissue: it is an ideal alternate crop. But Arabica takes at least 3 years to reach maturity forharvesting.Providing this tenure to farmersencouraged them to shift away froman illegal cropwithashortcultivationwindowandahighrateofreturnbygivingthemthesecurityofknowingtheywouldnotbeexpelledfromthelandtheycultivated.InareasdesignatedasprotectedbytheRoyal Forestry Department (see below), limited tenurewas also allowed, sometimes grudgingly(Renard,2001).Citizenshipgives thosewhohold it a vested interest in the stateand its laws; itprovidesminimumlevelsofsecurityandprotection,eveninareaswheretheruleoflawisstillinadaptive phases. In Thailand’s evolving state-citizen compact, it provides free education andsubsidized health care. It allows ownership of land and access to credit, and is necessary forlonger-terminvestments.Thefurtheroneentersremainingcontemporaryopiumcultivationareas(suchasOmkoi-seebelow),thelargerthepercentageofthepopulationlacksit.

Roads and electricity: The impact of crop substitution cannot be disentangled from otherforms of development, namely road building, followed by electrification. Roads served a dualpurpose:totransportadministratorsandsecurityactorsin,andtransportsubstitutecropsoutwithaslittledamagetotheproductaspossiblebeforeitarrivedatmarket.

CropsubstitutionandtheendofSwiddening:Thealternative livelihoodsmodel, focusedonstatic agriculture and livestock, was antithetical to highland swiddening traditions: whilealternative development was primarily concerned with opium poppy, it implicitly targetedswiddening as well. Alternative development projects largely ended the symbiotic relationshipbetweenhilltribeswiddenersandforests.Andintheareasitwassuccessful,itchangedtheveryreasonwhyhighlanderscultivatedcrops:fromhouseholdunitconsumptiontosaleinmarkets.

TheRoyalForestryDepartmentwas initiallycreated toprotectand regulateThailand’s teaksupply in the late1800s,afterhighlandKarenbegan“illegally”sellingteaktotheBritish inShanandtheFrenchinLaos.Atthattimeallforestsweredeclaredthepropertyofthestate.Ironically,RFD canbehistorically implicated in the introductionofopium toKaren inNongTaoandotherareasofChiangMai:theybannedKarenfromgrowingrice,whichwouldhaverequiredlarge-scaleforest clearing, but allowed them to growopium,which requiredmuch less clearing. TheKarenwouldtradetheopiumfor thericetheywereprohibitedfromgrowingdirectly; thegovernmenttaxedthetradeaswell.RFD’smandateexpandedintowatershedconservationasThailand’sforestcoverdeclinedfrom53.33%to30.92%ofoverall landareabetween1960and2006(Ongprasert, 2011). RFD’s policing of forest subcontracted Thai demand for forest products into Myanmar(Smith,1994),KarenNationalUnionareasinparticular11.Sinceitsinception,theRFDhasbeenatloggerheads with hill tribes, denouncing and seeking to end swiddening, which it and otheragenciesuniformlyopposeunderthemistakenimpressionthatit isenvironmentallyharmfulandleadstolarge-scaledeforestation,whileallavailablestudiesdemonstratethatitisarejuvenatingpractice12 (Asia IndigenousPeople’sAlliance,2012;Bruunetal.,2009;Erni,2009; Laungaramsri,2005). Karen leader Phaw Luang Jorni Odochao notes a particular irony: “The Thai governmentblamesus fordeforestation.ButwhereKaren live, thereare forests;whereThais live, therearenone."Further, thewholesale landclearancesbyKMT,Hmong,Lisuandothers in theheydayofopiumcultivationwasnot swiddening,but formany lowlanders, thepracticeswereoneandthesame.Whileopiumcultivationdeclined,sodidswiddening.

11 Interview, KNU representativeUMamChar, TaungGalay, Kayin State,Myanmar, December 2016. TheKNUhasrecentlydeclaredamoratoriumonforestryinitsareas,andsignedanMoUwiththeWorldWildlifeFoundation(Irrawaddy,2016).12 Thiswouldchangeifthepopulationspracticingitincreased,butanecdotally,theoppositeoccurred,withyoungergenerationsseekinglivelihoodsotherthanshiftingagriculturalpractice.

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However,theRFDwasforcedtoadapttothewishesoftheRoyalProject.Weretheygivenafreehandtheymayhavesimplyexpelledhighlandersfromtheareastheyweretaskedtoprotect,attheConservationLawwhichdefinedRFDdutieshaddeclaredvastswathesofhighlandterritory“protectedforest”,inwhichhumanhabitationwasillegal,eventhoughnumeroussettlementsandpeoplespre-datedthelaw.AccordingtothelateKingBhumibolAdulyadej“innationalforeststhattheauthoritiesdeclaretobereservedorrestricted,peoplehavelongbeenthere.It isstrangetoenforcethelawagainstpeoplewholiveinsuchareas,whichhavealwaysbeennon-reserved,butonly latelydeclared reservedbecauseof some linesdrawnonpaper. Theproblemoccurswhenthoseboundariesaredrawn,causingthepeopleinhabitingthoseareastobecome“lawbreakers”.In terms of legislation, theymay be seen to violate the law, because the law is legally passed.However,ifweconsidertheissuenaturallyastowhoisactuallybreakingthelaw,itbecomesclearthatthelawmakersare,becausethepeoplelivedinthearealongbeforethelawwasenacted13.”Thekingforcedacompromise:swiddeningwouldend,butpopulationswouldremain.

TheconflictbetweenRFDandthehilltribescontinuesin2017,withRFD/DNPcontinuingtoremoveKaren,Hmong,Lisuandothers from lands theyhavedwelt in forcenturies.ThecurrentThaijunta,theNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO),issuedorder64/2014toprotectandrestore existing forests; shortly after, the NCPO issued order 66/2014, to shield the poor fromt64/2014.However,DNPseemstohaveembracedtheformerandignorethelatter.

WiththepassingofKingBhumibol,asignificantrestraintontheRFDandDNPmayhavebeenlifted.

Nutrition:Thenutritionaldiversificationaccompanyingformerswiddeningtechniquesendedduetomonocroppingsubstitution,andruralfoodsecuritydeclinedasaconsequence.Thisistheopposite of claims made by alternative development practitioners14 who assert that the cashearned from monocropping allows for the purchase of varied foodstuffs which were oncecultivated. Themarketpriceof amonocrop,however, is volatile, especially forhigh-value cropssuchascoffee,andsoacollapseinitspricesignifiesacollapseinhouseholdpurchasingpower,andtherefore, a collapse in the collapse of a food supply which was previously a constant. Thisreductioninfoodsecurityisnotquantitativelymeasureableduetoalackofpreserveddatafrompast projects and a lack of previous monitoring and evaluation, but Karen and other hill tribeintervieweeswhoexperiencedthisattestedtoit.

Increasing dependence onmarkets and out-migration: The reduction in swiddening furtherintegratedhighlandcultivatorsintoThailand’s“cash”(non-opium)economy,thusincreasingtheirdependenceonthestateanditsmarkets,andnecessitatingnon-traditionalformsofworkpaidincurrency. This integration also encouraged seasonal and sometimes permanent migration ofhighlanders to townsandcities,often forconstructionandothercasual labor: inmanyhighlandareas, remittances became the primary income streams for cash-based needs. Select Chiangraiactivistsmakeaconnectionbetweendecliningopiumcultivationandincreasingtraffickingintribalwomentobrothelsinthesouth,butthisisanecdotal.

Gender imbalances: The end of opium cultivation also instigated a disruption in genderrelationsamongsttribessuchasLisu.Hutheesing(1989)reportedthat,amongtheLisushe livedwithintheearly-tomid-1980s,women’straditionalrolesasmoneymanagersforopiumincomesweredisrupted,withsignificantnegativeimpactsontheirstatusinthevillage.Opiumwascentralto Lisu life,Hutheesing (ibid.)andothersnote15, and theenforcedabsenceof it resulted inhighrates of infidelity, alcoholism, amphetamine and heroin abuse, with resultant increasing HIVtransmissioninLisuvillages.

Other Impacts:Hill tribes sawalternativedevelopmentas an imposition fromBangkok thatstrippedthemoftheircultureandsoughttoturnthemintocaricaturesoflowlandThais(Jantakadand Carson, 1998; Renard, 2001): theywere the passive recipients of such programs, and their

13 FromaspeechgivenbyKingBhumibolAdulyadej,June27,1973.TranslationbyPatamawadeeJongruck. 14 Interview,HRDI,ChiangMai,March2016.15 Interview,Lisuactivist,ChiangMai,June22,2016.

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voicesplayedno role in the shapingof them;nordid they choosewhichnew crops theymightcultivate.

All of these impacts ledMargaretMead and other anthropologists to condemn alternativelivelihoodprogramming,erroneouslyallegingaculturalgenocide(Washburn,1998).

Overall,statesurveillanceandcontrolimplicitlyincreasedinareaswhereitwaspreviouslynotpresent,throughroads,troops,andbureaucrats,andnon-stateareaswereintegratedintotheThaistateover timeby virtueof this coercion, aswell as Thai in-migration to thehighlands and thespreadingusageoftheThailanguageandtheincreasedembeddednessofitsculture.Thiserawasalsomarkedbytheeliminationofnon-staterivalssuchasformerKMTandcommunistinsurgents.

Opium,inthisera,canbeseenaslessofacommodityandmoreofaproxyindicatorforthestate of hegemonic power relations (Siriphon, 2001) between lowland and highland, shiftinginexorablyinfavorofthelowlandsbytheleverofalternativedevelopment.

This state imposition of rule on egalitarian highland areas, touched off decades before byflightoftheKMT,isreferredtoas“development”.Butinitseconomicconversionofthehighlandstomakeitservelowlandinterests,itmaybebetterdescribedas“capitalistterraforming”.

6.RemainingOpiumPoppyCultivationinNorthwestThailand

Whileopiumpoppy cultivationdeclined significantly, itdidnotend.Themajorityof knownopium cultivation in contemporary Thailand occurs in Chiang Mai’s Omkoi district: an areabypassedbyahalf centuryof alternativedevelopmentanderadication, although residentsnotethat opiumwas cultivated there since at least the 1960s. ONCB recorded significant cultivationincreases in the 1990s, but inexplicably stopped monitoring the district around 1998, onlybeginning again in 2009; since then, cultivation rates have ebbed and flowed in a mannerunconnectedtoeradicationimpacts(Jongruck,2012;ONCB,1995-2015).90%ofOmkoiisclassifiedasanationalforestC-ZonereserveareainordertoprotectawatershedsoimportantthattheThaiauthoritiesconsideritanationalsecurityissue:peopleareprohibitedfrominhabiting,cultivatingor otherwise utilizing it. But a large ethnic Karen population of swiddening cultivators has livedtheresincelongbeforethelawthatoutlawedthemwascreated.Theyresideinareasunconnectedtothestatebyroad,withlimitedornoaccesstoschools,healthcenters,andotherservices:theyarethegrassrootscultivatorsofOmkoi’sopiumsupply,soldonwardtoopaquenetworksthestateisstrugglingtoidentify.Whilepaststudies(Hinton,1983)allegethatKarendon’tcultivateopium,field research demonstrates that, not only are Karen growing opium now, but they have beengrowinginOmkoiandotherareasofChiangMaiforatleast50years.WhilemostKarennolongerengage in cultivation or consumption, in remoter parts of Omkoi their cultivation rates are thehighest in Thailand. Thai and US drug control efforts historically overlooked this district, andpossiblyothershostingdrugproductionnotyetidentifiedbythestate,becauseitdidnothostaninterrelated communist insurgency, nor were cultivation rates as high as other areas of NWThailand.Thegovernmenthasrecognizedthescaleofcultivationandsince2009hastakenanovel“network governance” approach to suppression (Jongruck, 2012), utilizing lessons from formercultivationareas(Andersonetal,2-15)

Opium’sprofithardlyaccrues to the farmer.Omkoi’sKarengrowopiumbecause theyhavelittleotherchoice.Theencroachmentof“development”uponOmkoi’sKarenhasalreadyoccurredthroughtheirgrowingrelianceonlowlandmarketswherecurrencyistheonlyformofexchange,andopium is thehighest-valuecashcroparound.Their lackofcitizenshipprecludes themfromland tenurewhichmight incentive them togrowestate cropswitha lower rateof returnandalonger cultivation period, and their statelessness also precludes them from services, credit andotherprotections.Eveniftheyhadcitizenship,theirpresenceinaC-Zonereserveareastillleavesthem“illegal”.Andiftheseissuesareallovercome,astarktruthremains:thereisnoalternativecrop that can equal the price a farmer earns from opium. Previous programs did not succeedbecauseofagriculture,butbecauseoftheincreasedpresenceofthestate.

That presence, however, is growing, most palpably in eradication, law enforcement, andmarket encroachment. Omkoi is 1960s highland Thailand in microcosm; it hosts the historical

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extensionoflowlandPadistatepowerintoanungoverned,untallied,ephemeralhighland—oneofthelastareasinThailandtoundergothistransformation.

7.Conclusion

Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan serves as the foundational text of contemporary Realist statephilosophies:peoplevoluntarilysurrenderthemselvestothemunificentstateinordertobenefitfromitsprotectionsandescapefromthestateofnature-theunceasingwarof‘allagainstall’.Buttherealityisthatstates,organizedbyviolententrepreneurs,cametodominatenotbecausetheybrought peace to a State of Nature, but because they were logistically more effective andcoercivelymore brutal than competing entities when it came to waging war, holding territory,mobilizinglabor/conscription,andlevying‘tax’(Tilly,1985):theyheld‘adecisiveadvantageinthepower to kill” (Landes, 1998: 88). Over time, firstly in Europe, and later, in the colonies, theseexploitativeentitiesdevelopedbeyondtheirsolelyviolentandcoercivebeginnings;theybecame‘legitimate’byprovidingprotectionnotjustfromthemselves,butalsofromothers,andtheybeganto provide services16: transportation and communications infrastructure, health and education,limited welfare and social protection mechanisms, a (usually) impartial police and judiciaryprotectingcitizensfromoneanotherandfromthestate,andsoon17.

NorthwesternThailand’shighlandinhabitantsonceavoidedexpandinglowlandempires,ThaiaswellasBamar,bytakingadvantageofthefrictionoftopographythatthehighlandsoffered.Inaworlddevoidofcash,wherelandwasrichandthepeoplefew,thestatewasanimposition.Butthelowlandcoerciveauthoritythatthesehighlandinhabitantsavoidedhaschanged.

TheHillTribeshavealsochanged:theirliveswouldnotcontinueinavastoutdoormuseum.Ethnic identities have always been in flux; globalization increases this process. Highlanders aredrawntothestate,andabsorbedintoitscasheconomy:theyneedthetoolsthatwillhelpthembetter navigate it. These tools did not prevent highlanders from becomingmore Thai and lessAkha,Karen,HmongorLisu;astraditional lifestyleschange,painfuldecisionsmustbemade,buteducation,citizenship,andmarketskillswerealltoolswhichhighlanderscouldusetoplaymoreofa part in thosedecisions, rather than simplyhavedecisionsmadeon their behalf, by their ownleadersorbythestate.Development,inthiscase,wasself-defense.

TheThaistateeliminateditspositionasasourceofopiumforinternationalillicitdrugmarketsdecades ago. That success occurred with a great cultural cost to the hill tribes: the symbioticrelationship between people and land ended. This was, and remains, traumatic. Eradicationworked due not only to eradication, arrests, and crop substitution; it worked because theimposition of law occurred consecutive with benefits to hill tribes such as the provision ofcitizenshipand the rightsand responsibilities itembodies; theendof inaccessibility through theestablishment of roads; increased access to schools and health care; access tomarkets and tocredit,andallmannerofotherservicesandobligationsthat,together,constituteanever-evolvingsocialcontract.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

16 StatetheoristsandpropagandistsbuiltonHobbesanddevelopedmythologiestojustifystateprimacybyexpandingthenotionofapre-statewarofperpetuitythatthestateservedasanantidotefor;the‘necessity’of stateswas expanded across the globe,with all ‘primitive’ people imagined to voluntarily surrender tonearbystatesinordertogainthepeaceandprotectiontheseentitiesoffered.Whilsttheseclaimsmayhavesome significant historical precedents (especiallyHobbes,whosewritingswere entirely shaped by the 30Year’sWar,whenthewarof‘allagainstall’killedone-thirdofthepopulationoftheGerman-speakinglandsofCentralEurope:theTreatyofWestphalia,whichendedthatwar,wasthebeginningoftheprimacyofthestatesystem),theyaregenerallyinaccurateoutsideofEuropeancontexts.17 ContemporaryThailandvariesfromakeyattributeofthecontemporarynorthernEuropeanstate,namelyamilitarythatsolelyservesastheimplementerofcivilian-drivenpolicyrelatedtoexternaldefense.

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Acknowledgments:Theauthorextendshisgreatest thanks toDr.Patamawadee Jongruckat theChiangMaiUniversitySchoolofPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministration,aswellasTianYeowTan and Francis Woodcock; all participated in a previous research project at the NationalUniversityofSingaporeandconductedfieldresearchwiththeauthorinOmkoiandfurtherafield.MicahFisherattheUniversityofHawaiialsoprovidedvaluablecommentary.Theauthorwishestothank the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) Region 5, especially JerrapanMugura,former ONCB Director of Strategy and Administration, and Karn Thaiyapirom. ONCB Region 5representatives Director Watin Damronglaohapan, Director Pipop Chamnivikaipong, ThippametSangawanna,KraivudhManeeratana,andVarisaraYasamuth;3rdArmyrepresentativesincludingColonel Suraput Numlong, 7th Infantry Division; Professor Ora-orn Poocharoen, Dean of theDepartmentofPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministrationatChiangMaiUniversity,andProfessorPanom; Raks Thai Foundation Program Coordinator Sarinthip Promrit; Pattana, Royal Projectextensiondirector;KhunTuenNoivillageinhabitantsincludingvillageleaderPamoti;BiPovillageTambon Administrative Officer Som Chai; Musa Bat Tam Village inhabitants including thetreatment camp interviewees;Mimi SaejuWin of the ChiangMai Lisu CulturalHeritage Center;NongTaoVillageLeaderPhawLuangJorniOdochao; JowaluOshiChindanai,andYonatanKeller.Theauthoralso thanksFacultyandStaffat theNationalUniversityofSingapore’sLeeKuanYewSchoolofPublicPolicy.Anyerrorsoffactorinterpretationarethefaultoftheauthor.

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