Pentagon Papers Part VI A

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VI.A Settlement ofthe Conflict (6 Vols.)Negotiations , 1965-67: The Public Record


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PART VLA.NEGOTIATIONS 1965 - 1967:

THE PUBLIC RECORD .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Public Attempts Toward a Negotiated End to Conflictin Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

November 1963 September 1964.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1February 1965 - June 1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

July 1965 - December 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11February 1966 - June 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

July 1966 - December 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24January 1967 - May 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

July 1967 - September 1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 642. Chronological Details of Publicly Discl osed U.S. andThird-Party Vietnam Peace Efforts (The 27 Ini t ia-

t i ves ) ........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 683. Summary of Negot i ation Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

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1. PUBLIC ATTEMPTS TOWARD A NEGOTI..4TED ENDTO CONFLICT IN VIETNAM

November 1963: FRANCE proposed talks l ea ding toward the establishmentof a neutral, independent South Vietnam . According to the New YorkTimes of 9 March 1965, Hanoi was then willing to discuss the establishment of a coalit ion, neutral ist government in Saigon . But the US rejec -t ion of de Gaulle ' s proposal is as understandable as Hanoi's interest .Diem had just been assassinated, the poli t ical and military si tuat ionswere chaotic.

20 May 1964: FRANCE proposed the 14-nation Laos Peace Conference1962 be reconvened in Geneva to discuss events in Southeast Asia .US and UK turned dOlm this offer; Russia, Poland, Cambodia, IndiaCommunist China accepted .

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May 1964 : THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL considered a Cambodian complaint ofSouth Vietnamese armed incursions into Cambodian terr i tory . The UnitedStates and South Vietnam suggested a UN-sponsored peacekeeping or observation group be created to stabil ize conditions in the . border area .A Mission of the Security Council visi ted Cambodia and South Vietnam and. reported such a group might prove useful . Hanoi and Peking condemnedthis UN involvement in the Vietnam situation .

July 1964 : U T I ~ N T called for reconvention of the 1954 Geneva Conference.The US decl ined to participate .

August 1964 : THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, spurred and pupported by the US ,invited Hanoi to join in discussions of the Gulf of Tonkin incidentand/or other matters . North Vietnam ' s foreign minister restated hisgovernment ' s position tha t the UN had no competence to dea l ,.,rith theVietnam s i tuat ion and said any dec i sions taken by the Council would beconsidered "null and void."

September 1964NORTH VIETNA.M relayed an offer through U TMNT to meet ,ri th US

off icials in Rangoon to discuss ways of ending hos t i l i t i es in SouthVietnam . The US waited unt i l la te November -- af te r the presidentia lelect ions -- to rejec t the of fe r .

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U THANT continued to t ry to arrange a cease-fire on any terms theUS might want to propose (including extension of a truce l ine throughbothlYietnam and Laos). The Administration did not pick uptnis o f f i ~ cer._ERIC SEVAREID commented on these peace feelers on 28 July 1965(CBS Radio London) and again in Look Magazine, 15 November 1965. TheNew York Herald Tribune of 10 August 1965 also speculated on the story .Official acknowledgement did not come unt i l 17 November at a pressconference. State Department spoke sma n Robert McCloskey said we hadrefused to ta lk with Hanoi because "vle did no t believe North Vi etnamwas prepared for ser ious ta lks ." Dea n Rusk elaborated on this a '-leek

l a te r during a 26 November news conference. Mr. Rusk exp." 3.ined thatin the autumn of 1964, i t seemed. clear "beyond a peradventure of doubttha t Hanoi was not prepared to discuss peace in Southeast Asia basedupon the agreements of 1954 and 1962 and looking tOl-lard the l i f t ing ofaggression against South Vietnam ."February 1965

INDIAN PRESIDENT SHASTRI asked Russian and mnerican leaders todiscuss the problems of Southeast Asia; the Indian foreign ministrysuggested the Geneva Conference be reconvened.PRESIDENT DE GAULLE, reportedly a t Hanoi's urging, suggested anew Geneva Meeting to discuss ~ h e future of both Southeast Asia and

the United Nations. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria supported the Frenchidea; there were indications of Commun is t China's willingness to attendsuch a conference. (Yet on 19 February , Chen Yi reportedly said therevlOuld be no negotiatioris unt i l the US withdrew from South Vietnam; her idiculed the US insistence that a cease-fire come f i r s t . )HANOI said (25 February 1965) negotiations vlOuld be considered i f

American troops were I-lithdrawn from South Vietnam. (Drew Middletonreported US withdrawal was not a prerequisi te to ta lks i f eventual evacuation of US military forces from South Vietnam would be st ipulated ina f ina l sett lement. ["New York Times , March 1965J . -.The US suggested the French had been given no mandate to act asmediator and said i t was not interested in a return to the conference

table at this time. The New York Times (17 February) reported bothPresident Johnson and Vice President .Hlllnpbrey publicly indicated they

.l:/ According to UN sources, the US did not see an active r o l ~ forU Thant unti l 1965, when Assistant Secretary H. Cleveland suggestedhis "good offices ! be used. to secure a settlement.

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saw no al ternat ive now but to support South Vietnam mil i tar i ly . Officials r private reply to appeals for negotiations was "when and with .whom?1JU TRANT called for international negotiations on Vietnam, withinor without the UN; he suggested prelnninaries to a Gen eva-style Conference might include " interlinked dialogues" among those directly involved in the war or an informal, seven-nation conference of the US,USSR, Britain, France, C o ~ m u n i s t China, North and South Vietnam (or,a l l 1954 Geneva part icipants except Laos and Cambodia).L1itial US response was negat ive . The White House said there were"no authorized negotiations underway '\{ith Mr . Thant or any other government" ( New York Tnnes , 25 February 1965 ). Dean Rusk said the US would

agree to no conference unt i l after North Vietnam stopped sending menand arms into South Vietnam; he . insisted a peace se t t lement had toensure the "s ecurity and indEfpendence" of South Vietnam. ( Press Conference, 25 February 1965 ). g;On 10 March the US formally rejected U Thant rs rep eated proposalfor a seven-p ower conference ins is t ing there could be no negotiations

unt i l North Vietnamese aggression stopped . SOUTH VIETNAM deferred adirect ans,ler , asking U Thant for clarif icat ion.North Vietnam f i r s t apparently notif ied U Thant that i t would be.receptive to informal negotiations, then showed l i t t l e in teres t in theproposal. The National Liberaiion Front refused to negotiate as longas US forces remained in South Vietnam ( New York Times , 9 March 1965 ).The military situation in South Vietnam continued to deterioratein February and March 1965. On 7 February, guerril las attacked an

American outpost at Pleiku, ki l l ing eight men and wounding 62. Thiswas follOl{ed by Viet Cong raids on a military barracks at Qui Nhon ,vil lages, government buildings, roads . Terrorism in rural and urbanareas i ncreased . The US retal iated to Pleiku as i t had to the TonkinGulf incident by bombing military targets in North Vietnam. I t wasannounced that l imited a ir attacks against northern mili tary instal la-t ions would continue. Adlai Stevenson explained the . objectives of th e'5.1 On 29 February, the State Department '\{hite paper "Aggression from

the North " was published, documenting Hanoi rs control and supportof the National Liberat ion Front, inf i l t ra t ion of North VietnameseArmy regulars into South Vietnam - some 400 NVA troops were said tobe part of the 140,000 estimated enemy force - and other evidenceof foreign aggression.

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bombing in a 7 February l e t t e r to the President of the UN SecurityCouncil to "arrest. reinforcement of the Viet Cong by inf i l t ratorsf:som North Vietnam, to bols ter th e morale of the South Vietnamesearid support their war effor t , to resis t systematic and continuingaggression, to help bring about a negotiated settlement to the con-f l ict .1I .

On 6 March, two Marine Corps battal ions (3,500 men) were sent toSouth Vietnam for a IIlimited " support mission . North Vietnam calledMarine Corps landings and bombings in the North an open declaration0 "" war .

Peking (13 March 1965) said the deployment of more US troopsblocked a pol i t ica l settlement to the Vietnam situation , charged theUS planned a "Korea-type" war and said China was not afraid of anyUS bombing of her land. Jenmin Jih Pao (People ' s Daily) called theICC an instrument of the US. Five days la ter , the newspaper calledUS ta lk of peaceful settlement "flagrant shameless blac:kmail" andsaid North Vietnam would not be bullied. The Chinese position tha tUS troops must withdraw prior to talks was emphasized.IMarch 1965

POLAND, CANADA and INDIA called for an expanded international' peace-keeping agency. They map.e no headvray.PRESIDENT JOHNSON, a t . a 13 March press conference, barred negot ia t ions unt i l North Vietnam halted aggress io n an d said there hadbeen no such sign to date. He conceded a change in US strategy and

tac t ics , but no t in basic policy.PAKISTANI PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN vis i ted Peking (4-8 March) andurged Chinese l eade rs to accept a negotiated settlement. He made noprogress.On 17 March, Foreign Ministers GROMYKO and STEWART met in London

to discuss a UK appeal of 20 February tha t Britain and the USSR worktogether as Geneva Co-Chairmen to find a common ground for negotiat ions. The US supported the British proposalj for some weeks i tappeared that Russia would agree to i t . But in April , Stewart announced the UK alone would canvass opinions of countries representeda t Geneva because the USSR ha d declined to part ic ipate . Moscow fe l ti t was not her position to arrange an international conference and aslong as US a ir attacks on North Vietnam continued, any conference wouldbe impossible anyway.

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Communist China ( 6 April ) rebuffed the UK effor t , attacked Britain 's"dir ty role as an accomplice of US aggression" and renelled h ~ r oppositionto any ta lks before the US had pulled out of South Vietnam.JV

April 1965On 1 April, diplomats of unnamed NON-ALIGNED NATIONS reported the

DRV had indicated a willingness to agree to a new C ~ n e v a Conf erenc e withou t demanding prior withdr8'\val of US troops or other pre-conditions .They reported the North Vietnamese fe l t b omb in g attacks damaged thei rprestige and had to be ans,\lered by counter -blmvs (apparently in SouthVietnam ) . The report indicated Hanoi I-ranted to avoid direct USSR orChines e intervention on their so i l and said the Russian offer of volun t eers had been turned dOlln.

LABOUR MPIHLLIAH vJ.ARBEY, in a l e t ter to The Times of London,1 April 1965, reported on a Harch meeting with Ho Chi Minh and Pham VanDong. Warbey said they indica ted only one pre -condition to negot iat ionson Ilhich North Vietnam would insis t : cessation of the bombing. He saidHanoi seemed Ililling to accept an autonomous regime in South Vietnam i fi t "genuinely represents a l l major sections of the southern population, "and that both governments should have the r ight to "enjoy economic,cul tura l and fraternal relations" Ilith countries of the ir 0\(11 choice .

PRESIDENT JOE}JSON said the US had no information that North Vietnam. Ilas "ready and Ililling" to negJ)tiate under "productive conditions "; hesaid bombing Ilould continue and stressed US eagerness for an honorablesettlement.

]/ Jenmin Jih Pao announced on 25 March tha t Communist China was readyto intervene with men and ma t eria l i f the Viet Cong Ilanted i t , saidthe USSR would not be allolled to demonstrate more militancy thanChina and charged the US could not stop the South Vietnamese fromfighting by escalating tp e war. (A Brezhnev statement of 24 Marchthat the Soviet Union would send volunteers to Vietnam probably inspired Peking s blas t . ) The next day, Chou En-lai rejected de Gaulle sFebruary ca l l for a five-pol-ler Paris Conference and repeated his Ilarnin g that intensification of the Ilar could not force North and SouthVietnam into negotiations. Chou said the US was violat ing theGeneva agreements and fe l t Britain. and the USSR should ask the US tohal t aggression . In a subsequent statement reportedly delivered toU Thant by Algerian diplomat Bouattoura, Chou said the US must ta lkdirectly with the NLF, not with Communist China or North Vietnam.

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IT NON-ALIGNED NATIONS meeting in Belgrade appealed for a peacefulsolution in Vietnam through negotiations without pre-conditions (1 April ).The US (8 April ) welcomed the appeal, ' expressed agreement "\Vith theprinciples and r ea diness "for unconditiona l discussions." The US note

"\Vent on to sa y the war should end by ensuring the i ndependence of SouthVietnam, tha t the "basic cause of the conflict . . i s the attack by NorthVietnam on the independent nation of South Vietnam, or tha t we "seek onlythe securi ty and peace of South Vietnam and we threaten no regime" in"answering the plea of South Vietnam" for assistance .

Hanoi rejected the IT-nation appeal on 20 April , terming inappropria te any approach other than one based on the Four Points enunciatedby Premier Pham Van Dong on 8 A p ~ i l Demands. fo r US withdr8\{a1

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enactment of the NLF program of lnternal affal rs were repeated.-PRESIDENT JOHNSON f i r s t made public the US negotiating position ina T April speech at Johns Hopkins University. The Adm inis t rat ion 'sat t i tude toward negotiations had been prixqte unt i l this time - - the

off ic ia l policy stance had been "secret . "2/ President Johnson's statement included these points:The "f i rs t real i ty" is tha t "North Vietnam bas at t acked the

Pham Van Dong did not c l e a r ~ y demand prior US withdrawa l no r recognit ion of the NLF. ' He did demand recognition of the NLF Program, abroad ca l l for c iv i l r ights independence, freedom, neutral i ty andso on.TheDRV Four Points:1. The basic r ights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence,unity and te r r i to r ia l integrity must be recognized; the US mustwithdraw troops, dismantle a l l mili tary bases in South Vietnam

and cease acts of war against North Vietnam;2. Pending the peaceful reunif ication of Vietnam and while thecountry is s t i l l temporarily divided into tvlO zones, mili taryprovisions of th e 1954 Geneva agreements must be s t r ic t ly re

spected. Thus there can be no foreign mili tary bases, troops ormilitary personnel in either N9rth or South Vietnam.3. ~ 1 e in t erna l affai rs of South Vietnam must be settled by the SouthVietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of theNational Liberation Front of South Vietnam an d free from foreigninterference.

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in dependent nat ion of South Vietnam". Some South Vietn ame seare pa r t ic ipat ing in the attack on the i r mm government but"trained men and supplies, orders and arms flow in a constants tr eam from north to south. This support is the heartbeat ofthe ,.,ar."The US is there ''b ecause vre have a promise to keep" and tostrengthen world order. To l eave Vietnam to i t s fate wouldshake world confidence in the value of an Amer ica 's word."The r esul t would be increased unrest a nd instabil i ty, andeven ~ i d e r war."The US is prepared to ent er into "unconditional discussions"with the other goverllments concerned in the Vietnam problem.Our object ive in Vietnam is the "independence of South Vietnam and i t s freedom from attack."We ,.,ant nothing for ourselves but will not withdraw "under thecloak of a meaningless aggression."South Vietnam should be f r ee from outside interference, t iedto no all iance, a military base for no other country.

Allied reaction: France welcomed Johnson's proposals -- "lithreservat ions. Britain, Aust r a l i a , Italy, Japan and Indonesia supported. them. U Thant called the sp eech "for.-rard looking and generous."Opposition reaction: MAl VAN BO, senior Hanoi diplomat in Parissaid negotiations in the pres ent situation '1lould amount to surrender,that any se t t lement must involve an end to US aggression, withdrmral ofUS forces and recognition of Vietnam's r ight to set t le her own problems.He said Johnson cannot "buy" Hanoi ,.,ith an aid project . Bo also rejectedthe 17 non-aligned nations plea. (New York Times, 10 April)

V (Continued)4. Peaceful reunif ication of Vietnam is to be sett led by the Vietnamese people alone, free from foreign interference.But the public cal l for "unconditional discussions" did not representa major change of policy according to Dean Rusk (25 November 1965,Press Conference). Mr. Rusk said we have consistently welcomed"discussions without conditions, without pre-conditions ", adding"there ha s never been any lack of opportunity to bring this matterof peace to th e conference table i f the other side is prepared tostop t rying to impose the i r wil l by force on South Vietnam. "

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The National Liberation Front rejected the Baltimore proposals .The President had labeled Hanoi the principal antagonist, tenned supportfrom North Vietnam the heartbeat of the war and offered to negotiatewith other "governments " concerned in the conflict , statements interpre-ted as proof of US refusal to deal with the Front.

Peking called Johnson's offer a "trick . . . fu l l of l ies and decep-t ions" designed to induce the Viet Cong to disarm while the US preparedfor var. Conditions proposed by the US were called "comple t ely unaccept-able I the aid offer an at t empt to "buy over the Vietnamese people; ','Pravda (11 April) called Johnson's offer "noisy propaganda" which

changed nei ther US policy no r US determination to continue aggressionin Vietnam.

Also in April 1965U TRANT was r e p o r t ~ d l y eager to vis i t various foreign (mainlySoutheast Asian)capitals to explore prospects for a negotiated set t le-ment. Hanoi refused to meet with U Thant, terming any UN injection intothe Vietnam issue "inappropriate".Peking 's J enm in J ih Pao agreed: "The Vietnam question has nothingto do with the United Nations . . no meddling by the UN is called for no rwill i t be tolerated . . "British state sma n PATRICK GORDON-WALKER visited several SoutheastAsian nations to ta lk about an end to war. Hanoi and Peking refused

to meet with him.Jenmin J ih Pao (13 April ) lauded a statement attributed to Ho ChiMinh in the Japanese Communist Party publication, Akahata, which calledfor the vlithdrawal of US forces as a condition for any settlement andcalled US ta lk of negotiations "meaningless". But on 14 April, NorthVietnam asked the US to recognize i t s Four Points as a basis for aninternational conference. prior US withdrawal was no t made a conditionfor negotiations.On 18 April, BREZHNEV and LE DUAN, Firs t Secretary of th e VietnamWorkers Party, in a coramunique reporting on recent Moscow ta lks , said

the Soviet Union would send volunteers i f North Vietnam requested themand i f the US intensif ied aggression. The communique demanded an endto the bombing, withdrawal of US forc'es and declared the NLF the onlylegitimate representative of the Vietnamese people.

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PRESIDENT JOHNSON (17 April ) rejected proposals that he suspendbombings over North Vietnam to enhance peace prospects. He said hewould ,{il l ingly hold "unconditional discussions" with any governmentinLrnediately, but \.;rarned North Vietnam and th e NLF that there is no'human power cap able of forcing us ' f r om Vietnam and said the US aimto make South Vietnam free vTaS unchanged. The next day, propagandaleaf lets dropped over North Vietnam carried excerpts from the President 's Johns Hopkins speech as well as a Saigon statement rejectingrecognition of the National Liberation Front.

The INDIAN GOVERNMENT suggested both sides cease f ire and an AfroAsian force be created to police the borders which would not changeunt i l the Vietnamese people elected to do so . The US expressed interest in the proposal and discussed i t with the Indians. Hanoi and Pekingrejected i t .

A CONFERENCE on CAMBODIA was discussed seriously in April . The USwas interested, thinking i t might l ead to ta lks on Vietnam ; Moscow andSaigon showed some in teres t in i t ia l ly . But Sihanouk announced he vlOuldno t participate in any conference convened as a pretext to discussVietnam and saw no need for the US, Thailand or South Vietnam to attend .China also opposed the idea -- and i t died. On 3 May, Cambodia brokediplomatic re la t ions with the US.

TITO and NASSER urged an end to US a ir raids and negotiations toend the confl ic t . FRANCE and RUSSIA called for an end to foreign in terventj_on. U THANT fe l t th e s i tuation was worselilling and asked for peaceta lks. SAIGON began a diplomatic offens ive to garner support for bothwar and peace from non-aligned nations (although on 29 April, PremierKy had called for an immediate invasion of the DRV by South Vietnameseforces). ALGERIA and the UAR advocated Hanoi's acceptance of US proposals. Calling again for lli1conditional peace ta lks on 13 May,PRESIDENT JOHNSON charged China's opposition to a poli t ical solution-- which would be in Hanoi's' in t eres t - - was meant only to d iscredi tAmerican abi l i ty to prevent Communist ' Chinese domination of Asia.

From 13 to 17 May: US bombing of North Vietnam was halted (fivedays, 20 hours). At the time it was knmm tha t some US effor t to finda way out of the conf l ic t was underway but few deta i ls were revea led.In an edi tor ial of 30 December 1965, however, th e New York Times reported Secretary Rusk had sent a message to Hanoi through the NorthVietnamese Embassy in Moscow, explaining the bombing suspension couldor would be extended i f there were "signif icant reductions" in Corrnnunist

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armed attacks in South Vietnam. A !!permanent end!! to the bombing, i twas said, could come only through a permanent end to armed attacks byViet Cong units in South Vietnam.One day before a ir attacks were resumed, Hanoi reportedly askedthe French Government to t e l l the US tha t Hanoi would negotiate on,thebasis of the Four Points -- without demanding prior withdrawal of USforces. (New York Times, 19 November 1965; State Department PressConference, 17 November 1965 ) Apparently, France was given a le t te r

from Rusk to Hanoi, but never relayed i t . Sources in both the StateDepartment and French Governnlent sa y the North Vietnamese message wasnot transmitted before bombing was resumed, tha t Hanoi ' s word gotthrough a few hours af ter a ir action had been resumed . Other sourcessa y the !!harsh reaction!! by Hanoi to the US offer ,,18S !!fully knownbefore the a ir operations Ivere resumed . !! France maintains that bomb-ing could have been halted again af ter Hanoi 's message became available .

On 18 May ( the day boniliing resumed) Hanoi Radio broadcast a DRVForeign Ministry statement call ing the bombing pause a !!trick !! meantto !!cover up (America ' s ) extremely dangerous acts intensifying the wa rin Vietnam . . . and to deceive world opinion .!!

June 1965The CANADIAN r epresentative on the ICC discussed prospects forpeace with a North Vietnamese representative . According to theCanadian Foreign Minister 's report , prospects were not good.The BRITISH COMMOMfEALTH PR]ME MINISTERS meeting in London (17-25June ) formulated a plan -- and a four-nation mission (Britain, Ghana,Nigeria, Trinidad-Tobago) - - to vis i t countries involved in the war and

!!expl ore the circums t ances in ,vhich a conference might be held to endthe f ighting in Vietnam.!! Prime Minister Wilson said their objectiveswere to achieve : (1 ) a . suspension of a ir attacks on North Vietnam;(2 ) a halt in North Vietnam's movement of military forces and materia lto South Vietnamj and (3) a- tota l cease f i re .

Washington and Saigon re acted favorably to the proposal and we l comed any vis i t from the Commonwealth Miss ion.The NLF rejected a Carrmonwealth vis i t on 27 June. Hanoi refusedto adm i t the representatives on 1 July. Hanoi Radio sa i d North Vietnam 's leaders doubted the goodwill of the group , considering i t "onlya repeti t ion of I{yndon Johnson's peace negotiations swindl e ." Peking

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called Prime Minister Wilson a "nihTit for making trouble for himself"and refused to meet i-Tith the mj_ssion (25 June). MOSCOl-l at f i r s t seemedreceptive, then rejected the Commonwealth idea on 24 June 1965. Kosyginsaid he would conduct no negot iat ions or effor ts to get them started ;he s g ~ g e s t e d the British delegation consult directly with Hanoi or theNLF.-

July 1965HAROLD DAVIES, a junior l eft -wing Minister of the British Government, visi ted Hanoi in July (9-13) to discuss the Commonl-lealth Ministersplan. Wilson reported (15 July) tha t Mr. Davies had been unsuccessfuland that part of Hanoi's disinterest stemmed from what Davies termed a

conviction among the leaders that victory was imminent: to leave thebat t lef ie ld for a conference table would be senseless.DEAN RUSK, on a Voice of America broadcast of 4 July, said the UShad asked through intermediaries, "What i-ToVld be stopped i f we stoppedthe bombings . . -Ie I ve never had a reply "In mid-July, Governor HARRJMAN and Premier KOSYGIN held "informal"ta lks about Vietnam in Moscow. Results were not announced . (Harrima n,interviewed on te levision during A u ~ u s t , said the Soviet Union andYugoslavia believed North Vietnam would negotiate i f the US halted a ir. raids. Harriman said he saw no sign this ioTas Hanoi's position andurged the US to stand firm. Harriman said the USSR wanted an end tothe war but did not l-lant to seem "soft" in Communist China's eyes.Tito was said to be sympathetic to the US posit ion. Harriman added boththe USSR and Yugoslavia would retain the division of Vietnam a t the 17thPara l le l . LNe'-l York Times, 8 August_7On 28 July PRESIDENT JOHNSON announced an addit ional 50,000 menwould be committed to Vietnam, raising the to ta l to 125,000 men. Alsoon 28 July, President Johnson asked U Thant to employ a l l his "resources,energy and immense prest ige" in finding a way to "hal t aggression andbring peace in Vietnam." He asked UN members, singly or jOintly, to t ry

to "bring to the table a l l governments involved, in an attempt to hal ta l l aggression and evolve a peaceful solution."On 30 July, ARTHUR GOLDBERG wrote to the UN Security Council. He

emphasized the Council 's part icular responsibil i ty to persis t in the6/- Patr ick Gordon Walker urged the US to negotiate with the NLF a monthla ter ; the Administration reportedly held Hanoi responsible for thewar and was unmoved by pleas to deal with the Front.

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search for peace, said the US "ras ready - - as always -- to collaborateunconditionally with members of the Security Council in searching foran acceptable formula to restore peace and securi ty in Southeast Asia.He.' said the US hoped the Council "somehow finds the means to respondeffective ly to the challenge raised by the s tate of affairs" in thatarea . On 11 August, the Soviet Union rejected an y part icipation in UNefforts to exert influence in Vietnam. 'Hanoi, Peking and the NLFf llo,ved sui t , revoicing opposition to any UN intervention in theVletnam situation.

gust 1965, NASSER reportedly sounded Communist China and North Vietnamprospects of negotiat ions. Also ' reportedly, China and the Viet Cong

were confident of victory and barred talks; North Vietnam was allegedlywi l l ing to ta lk at one time, then announced firm opposition to the idea., SHASTR I and OBOTE (Uganda); NASSER and TOURE (Guinea) urged a l l -~ u t peace efforts, an international conference and cessation of thebombing.

An INDIAN-YUGOSLAV communique called for a conference of part iesconcerned in Vietnam including the NLF -- and a cessation of bomb-ing while efforts to find peace in the UN continued.Nhan Dan condemned the c o n ~ u n i q u e , leveled heavy cr i t ic i sm at

Tito and said UN effor ts to find peace would fa i l .LeMonde'(14 August) quoted an interview with Ho Chi Minh a t whichhe ruled out negotiations unt i l the US gave tangible proof tha t i taccepted the Four Points as a basis for negotiations.DEAN RUSK (22 August) said the US would agree to a pact restoringth e military balance called for in the 1954 Geneva agreements; he sug-gested this would involve the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces

from below the 17th Paral le l and a hal t to inf i l t ra t ion. Rusk indi-cated the US might be will ing to end direct military involvement andmake other concessions. Rusk also said the US made regular soundingsto see i f - - or how - - North Vietnam would respond to a new hal t inbombing.

On 26 August i t was reported that the US had offered to exchangemoves showing a desire to curb the war in "unpublicized and indirectapproaches to North Vietnam. II The US suggested Hanoi withdraw a l l or

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part of the 325th Division in exchange for a cut in US military action,including a cut in a ir raids against North Vietnam. Hanoi reportedlyreceived these offers wi th an interest not previously shown. (U Thantapparently t r ied contacting North Vietnam and China through Algeria;Algerian Minister Bouteflika reportedly conferred with the DRV, NLFand Peking representatives in Algiers.)

LORD B R O C ~ N A Y , Brit ish Labour Peer, met with the North VietnameseAmbassador and the NLF representative in Moscow, (24 August ) . . Accordin g to Broclu18Y, they had never insisted on to ta l US "\{ithdrawal as acondition for peace, were prepared to make concessions beyond theGeneva Accords and would insis t on NLF inclusion in any Vietnam con-ference. The US was "interested but suspicious" of r e p o r tha t slightshi f t s in position were evident at the Brockway meetings; the StateDepartment asked for a confidential account and appraisal of the ta lks.

Hanoi and the National Liberation Front denied Lord Brockway 'sstatements . DRV Ambassador Van Tran So did say "contacts" had beenmade in Algiers, but tha t they "I.J"ere not off icial ly from the US Government.

November 1965Nhan Dan rejected Tito 's ca l l for a hal t in US bombing of North

Vietnam, implementation of the Geneva Accords and an invitation tothe NLF to peace ta lks . Tito ~ n d Sihanouk had exchanged le t ters inAugust 1965; Sihanouk agreed with Tito's basic proposals but added" f i r s t of a l l , the US occupations and attacking forces must be "I-rithdrawn . . or a t least there must be a formal agreement on the principleof evacuation before negotiat ions." (VNA, 14 November )*

HO CHI MINH, in reply to a l e t t er from eight American Nobel PeacePrize Winners, called US peace statements "but deceitful ta lk" becausethe US policy is "to negotiate from a position of strength " He saidthe Four Points were the "most correct way to a peaceful sett lement."(VNA, 17 November )11 November to 15 Dec embe r: The IA PIRA-FAl\1FANI INITIATIVE.According to reports released after the fact , Girgio La Pira, formerMayor of Florence, and another I ta l ian emissary, met with Ho Chi Minh

and Pham Van Dang in Hanoi on 11 November . They emerged with the im-pression that the two conditions required by Hanoi for any peace ta lkswere: (1) a to ta l cease f i re in both North and South. Vietnam, withoutprior evacuation of US troops; (2 ) recognition and acceptance of the1954 Geneva Agreements as the basis for negotiations. The North

*Vietnam (North) News ~ g e n c y

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Vietnamese leaders consistently maintained the Four Points were anaccurate embodiment of the Geneva Agreements.I tal ian Foreign Minister Fanfani relayed this information toPresident Johnson in a l e t t er of 20 November 1965. Two weeks l a te r(4 December) Rusk replied to Minister Fanfani. His l e t t e r raisedsome questions about the I ta l ian version of Hanoi ' s offer , di sagreedtha t the Four Points were an "authentic interpretation" of the GenevaAccords and asked Fanfani for further clar i f ica t ion.Fanfani replied on 13 December, saying his government had askedfor such clar i f ica t ion on 8 December, that Hanoi's response would begiven the US as soon as i t arrived .But on the same day, US a ir attacks struck closer than before toHanoi and Haiphong. From 13 to 15 December, major industrial targets

were h it for the f i r s t time including the Vongbi thermal power p lan t14 miles from Haiphong.US Government sources publicly confirmed reports that Hanoi hadrelayed an offer to hold talks l eading to negotiations through two. I talian intermediarie9 on 17 December. I t was also confirmed that nota lks had been held.1iNorth Vietnam denied issuing peace feelers, called such reports"s heer groundless fabricat ions" and reiterated that the Four Points

were the only basis for settlement of the Vietnam problem.

D e c e m b e ~ 1965UN sources said the DRV showed no interest in peace talks pro-

posed by U Thant but that the US was receptive. U Thant said he hadhad no direct contacts with th e parties involved for some time. (New York Times,1 December)

USSR FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO told Bri ta in ' s Michael Stewart(3 December) tha t peace talks on Vietnam would be conditioned on acessation of US bombing of North Vietnam and th e withdrawal of US

Secretary Rusk, in a 26 November press conference, had said Hanoihad indicated i t would not consider ending aggression against SouthVietnam, tha t unconditional talks would be acceptable to the US butthere was now no sign of Hanoi's willingness to compromise. Rusksaid the bombing might stop i f the DRV would halt some of i t s waract ivi t ies . .

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troops. Whether troop withdrawal pad to be prior to ta lks or a resul tof ta lks was lef t vague by Gromyko.EO CHI MINH said Johnson's offer of unconditional talks vms insiXfcere and "absol1..J..te lY unacceptable." Ho r idiculed charges of North

Vietnamese aggression and denied tha t pressure from Peking preventedHanoi f r om holding peace ta lks . (24 November TV interview ( in English )1'lith British Jo urna l i s t Felix Greene, made public 7 December)Mr. Rusk ruled ou t compromise with the Viet Cong saying thereCGcl ld be no pol i t ica l or ter r i to r ia l gain for them as part of a peacesettlement . (New York Time s , 8 December)The UK proposed a l2-nation appeal be made to North Vietnam to stop

f ~ g h t i n g and negotiate a peace. Britain separately called on the Soviet,Union to sign and circulate such a message among nations repres ented a tthe 1954 Geneva Conference as well as those on the International ControlCommission. (New York Times, 9 December)

Hanoi Radio announced, "The DRV Government categorically rejectsa l l Bri t ish plans and proposals made under the pretense of peace. Onceag ain the DRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs solemnly reaffirms that th ef our-point stand of the DRV Government is the only basis for a correctsettlement of the Vietnamese problem; any solution contrary to thisstand is nul l and void and unable to bring about genuine peace in Viet-,nam ." (VNA, 17 December);

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A one-day Christmas truce in ground and a ir action wasobserved on 25 December. The next day, f ighting inSouth Vietnam resumed, but the ha l t in bombing continued.roPE PAUL VI had appealed publicly for a Christmas holiday truceand efforts by a l l sides were made to move toward negotiations. On19 December, a private appeal was sent to Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh's replyof 28 December charged U. S. l eaders ''1-rant 1var and not peace. I He saidtalk about "unconditional negotiations" is a "maneuver to cover up"plans for fur ther "war intens if ica t ion and extension." The Pope's

message of 1 January 1966 to Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and Saigon, askingfor an end to conflict met with similarly unsuccessful resul t s .The concentrated U.S. peace drive began on 29 December. Air actionover North Vietnam, halted a t Christmas, was suspended unt i l 31 January

(36 days, 15 hours). Governors H A R R ~ ~ N and WILLIAMS, AmbassadorGOLDBERG and three other representatives were dispatched to 34 capita ls ; the U.S. position was discussed with some 115 governments. Hanoiwas contacted indirec t ly. The f a r - f l u ~ ~ public effort failed.

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In a le t te r to world leader$ (24 January), HO CHI ~ r r N H repeatedear l ier cri t icisms of th e U. S. peace drive (a "noisy propaganda drive ,"an effort to fool public opinion) and termed Johnson's State of th eUnion statement that the U.S. 'Iill not withdra'l'l from Yietna.m. ','a n im- ,pudent threat ." He said the DRY 's Four Points were the basis fornegotiations . And a f i f th po in t was made : Ho said the U.S . mus trecognize the National Liberation Front as th e "sole genuine repre sentat ive of th e South Yietnamese people and engage in negotiat i ons'Idth i t . " (Ho's l e t ter i 'l aS released on 28 January. On 12 January 1966,Quan Doi Nhan Dan had declared i t "absurd" that "other proposals " -l ike the U.S. 14 Points -- be discussed . I f th e U.S . accepts the GenevaAgreements , i t should accept the Four Po i nts vlhich are the II sum andsubstance" of Geneva . )

ALEXANDER SHELEPIN , Secretary of the COmTQunist Party ~ e n t r a Committee , headed a five-man mission' to Hanoi (7 to 12 January 1966).The resul t : increased Soviet aid to North Vietnam . (Unremi t tingChinese attacks on USSR "peace plots" during and afte r Shelepin 'svis i t may indicate Shelepin discussed - an d urged - a negotiated endto the ",ar while in North Vi etnam . )The NLF rejected U.S . peace offers made t p ~ o u g h i nt ermediar i es ,according to a 13 J anuary r eport carried by the offic i al Algerian new sagency . The report followed a meeting behleen President Boumed i enneand the NLF representative in Algiers . However , a Viet Cong sourcein Algiers reportedly hinted tha t Hanoi might drop th e demand for wi th-drawal of U.S. troops pr io r to talks i f th e U.S . agreed to talk direct ly,to th e NLF . The source said there could be no change in the NLF posi t ion unt i l the U.S. granted it offic ia l r ecogni t i on . Some Front di f f i -

cul ty with Hano i was indicated, according to American journal i s t s .U TRANT suggested (20 J anuary) t hat a l l elements of the SouthVietnamese people -- presumably including the Viet Cong -- should ber epr esented in a postwar government. DEAN RUSK (21 January) said hecould not report on "any positive and encouraging re spons e (from .theother side ) to th e hopes of . . mankind" for negotiations to end th ewa r in Vietnam. Rej ec ting U Thant ' s proposal to promise , or to concede th e possibi l i ty in postwar government to the NLF , Rusk said theissue must be decided in free elec t ions.Japanese PREMIER SATO urged (25 January) an internat i onal conference be held and appointed M. Yokoyruna his special emis sary in a peacedrive. Sato said the rec ent mission of Foreign Minister Shi i na to

}.10S CO\'l, to secure Soviet support for efforts to be gin negot i ations , hadfa iled.On 31 January, PRESIDENT JOHNSON ordered the r enewa l of a ir attacksaga ins t North Vietnam. He said efforts of U.S. a l l i es had be en rebuffed

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and effor ts of neutral nations had come to nothing during the 37-daypause ; he said "our own private approaches have a ll been in vain ."Johnson called Ho Chi Minh ' s l e t t e r of 24 January th e answer to peaceeffor ts , adding that the North Vietnamese "pers is t in aggression . . .insis t on the surrender of South Vietnam to corrnnunism" and tha t"there i s no readiness or Hillingness to ta lk, no readiness fo rpeace in that regime today ."

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG , in a l e t t e r to Security Council PresidentSeydoux of 31 January , summarized the U. S. posi t ion on negotiationsand r e ~ u e s t e d an urgent meeting of the Security Council to considerthe Vietnam s i tuat ion . Goldberg said the U. S. was ready to talkHi thout prior conditions , ready to ,.;ithdra"\" troops as soor as SouthVietnam is free of outs i de interference . He asked th e Council toseek an internat.ional conference to end the war -- mak i ng a cease -f ire the f i r s t order of business -- and establish a permanent peacein Southeas t As i a . Goldber g said the U. S. would help in a l l appro -priate ways , including ar t ibrat ion or med i ation . /

/ Ru sk sa id (11 Febr uary) t he U.S. had not sought UN a c tion earl i erf or f ear debat e viO uld in ter f ere wi t h private move s. Pres id ent

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On 1 February , HO CHI MINH wrote French President de Gau l le , askingfor his help in preventing any "new perfidious US maneuver 'J The follow in g day, the North Vietnam foreign min i stry formally rejected -- as i tha d several times in the past -- any UN interference in the Vietnam s i tuation . The resumption of bombing raids aga inst North Vietnam revea ledthe "hypocrisy " of Johnson's peace drive, according to a message deliveredto ICC members in Hanoi .

The NLF said any UN decision on Vietnam would be null and void on3 February.Governor HARRIMAN said the US I-lould agree to NLF part icipation in

negotiations as an independent group . He stressed the US refusal t oaccept the Front as a g o v e r n ~ e n t delegation . (New York Times, 7 February )During early Februa ry, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee opened hear ings on Vietnam: high level US andVietnamese l eaders met a t Honolulu ( the conference stressedpacif ication, economic, social and other non-mili tary prob l ems ). At the conclusion of the conference, both Ky andThieu said they r efused to recognize or negotiate with theNLF; they showed l i t t l e eage rn es s to meet wi th Hano i butreportedly t r ied not to disassociate themselves from theUS sta nd .

NKRUMAH and NASSER met in Ca iro (15 February) in a new effortin i t ia te peace ta lks. Nkrumah then vis i ted R a n g o O ~ y Peking, HanoiMoscow, urging negotiations. He was unsuccessful .-toand

HANOI (15 February) rejected a Somali proposal of January 1966 tha tan Asian-African committee explo re poss ibi l i t ies for peace. Hanoi calledthis interference in in t erna l affairs .

'9../ (Cont inued)Matsui summarized the resul ts of the Council 's work on 26 February.He said th ere was "a degree of common feeling among many members ofthe Council" tha t (1) there is gener a l and grave concern over thecontinuation of host i l i t ies and a strong desire for a peaceful solut ion and (2 ) a 'termination of the conflict should be sough t throughnegot ia t ions in an appropriate forum in order to work ou t the implementation of the Geneva Accords. The l e tt er s tated i t was Matsui 'sunders t andin g that the Council r emained seized of the Vietnam probl em " But the Council accomplished nothing.2/ He was l ess successful at home . A coup executed by Ghanian mili tary. officers ousted Nkrumah from the Pres id ency in la t e February.

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PRESIDENT DE GAULLE (1 6 February), in his reply to Ho Chi Minh 'sl e t ter of 1 February, offered to playa role in set t l ing the war whenever feasible. He did no t think i t feasible at that time. De Gaullesaid a return to-and implementation of-the Geneva Accords '\-ras the onlypossible solution to conflict . He urged creation of a representativegovernment in Saigon. U Thant supported de Gaulle 's proposals; theUS '\-78 s si lent .

A North Vietnamese reply to U Thant's peace efforts was reportedby the New York Tim es on 17 February. I t f i r s t appeared that Hanoihad posed three conditions for talks: (1 ) a new pause in bombing raidsagainst North Vietnam; (2) an end to US escalation of the ground war inSouth Vietnam; (3 ) NLF representation at a peace conference. The noteindicated the US need not announce a halt in escalation publicly.

UN sources said (18 February) that the conditions were U Thant's,no t Hanoi 's ; off icials denied any knowledge of new or changed pointsissued by North Vietnam.20 February: Senator Robert F. Kennedy suggested a USoffer to the Viet Cong of a Share of power in SouthVietnam would be the best hope for an eventual accord.Vice President Humphrey, George Bal l and McGeorgeBundy scored Kennedy's suggest ion.

PRIME MINISTER WIJBON and PREMIER KOSYGIN met in Moscow, 22-24February. Wilson urged a reconvening of the Geneva conferencej Kosyginurged a return to the Geneva Accords and US acceptance of Hanoi's peaceterms. The Russians insisted North Vietnam and the US -- not th e USSRand Britain -- must arrange a conference.British LORD CHALFONT met with Li Chang, a North Vietnamese envoy

to Moscow at the same t ime. Li Chang reportedly pledged to clar i fy ,Hanoi's peace terms. Wilson la te r said Britain had succeeded in "gettinga l ine open" to Hanoi -- apparently through Lord Chalfont -- but Hanoisaid Wilson had distorted the facts.

March 1966Ho Chi Minh reportedly rejected a proposal from INDIAN PRESIDENT

RADHAKRISHNAN that an Asian or African peace-keeping force be createdto replace American troops in South Vietnam (New York Times, 4 March).A similar proposal from President Radhakrishnan in April 1965 had alsobeen rejected: the DRV Foreign Ministry told the Indian Consul Generalin Hanoi on 5 May 1965 tha t the idea to create an Afro-Asian force tosupervise the 17th Paral le l was unacceptable.

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During the winter and early spring of 1966, the SinoSoviet dispute became more and more vitr iol ic . JenminJih Pao (7 March ) charged that Russian leaders we redetermined to le ad Vietnamese communists to th econference table to bring about another "Munich. IIHamburg VJelt published a purported secret le t te r fromthe USSR to a l l Communist Party units , charging Pekingwith t rying to prolong the war for thei r own nat ionalinterests . Peking hotly denied this -- as ,,,rell asreports of (Russian ) dif f icul ty sending aid throughChina to Vietnam. Chinese Party leaders spurned USSRpleas for united action, refused to attend th e USSRParty Congress and repeated charges of USSR-US collaboration in a "plot I to arrange peace talks.

Canadian CHESTER RONNING met 'Ivi th l eaders in Saigon and Hanoi inearly March. Commenting on the mission, Ronning said he saw a majorrole for the ICC in arranging pes.ce talks but that India and Poland didnot feel the time was ripe for successful ini t ia t ives . (Nel>[ York Times,17 March )IApril 1966

U TRANT said he would advocate UN Security Counci l involvement inth e Vietnam s i tuation i f North Vietnam and Communist China could -- orwould -- pres ent their side of the issue. Thant noted thei r reluctanceto do so. He called for a unif ied Vietnam and neutral ization of thearea guaranteed by the big powers, including the U.S. and China. Thantrei terated his three point proposal (cessation of U.S. bombing of NorthVietnam; a scaling down of a l l military act ivi ty in South Vietnam; awillingness of a l l parties to the conflict to meet with each other todiscuss peace).

On 18 Apri l 1966, SENATOR MANSFIELD proposed the U.S., Hanoi and"elements in South Vietnam" meet at a peace conference (of foreignministers or higher off icials) in some Asian country. The Administrat ion supported and agreed with Mansfield's suggestion.Radio Hanoi (23 April) called this a "new peace t r ick," part ofAmerica's "two-faced" policy of talking peace while escalating war.Nhan Dan said the U.S. must recognize the NLF as the genuine and only

representative of the South Vietnamese people and accept the DRV FourPoints, t h e only correct basis to set t le ' the Vietnam problem. RadioMoscow said U.S. actions in Vietnam belied Washington's professed desirefor peace; Peking denounced the Mansfield move in similar but morevitr iol ic terms.

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DRV PREMIER PRAM VAN DONG, addressing the Third Na t iona l Assemblyin Hanoi (22-26 Apr i l ) , r eportedly said the US had never of f i c i a l lya nnounced i t s recogni t ion of the four points an d it objected to the .th i rd point . "To obj ec t to the t h i rd point is to object to the wholefour-point s tand, according to Dong. He demanded the US prove i t srecogni t ion of Hanoi 's posi t ion by ac tua l de eds, which might includecessat ion of bombing "def ini t ive ly an d uncondit ional ly" as well ascessat ion of "a l l other acts of war aga l i s t the DRV!'"

HO CHI MINH reportedly to ld the Assembly the "only correct solut ionto en d th i s war n was contained in his 24 January l e t t e r to world leaders .Cai ro ' s A l Mus B:vlar_ (2 8 Apri l ) quoted an in terview with Ho Ch i Minh ,invlhich Ho expressed s imi la r views. He did not spec ify whe" her recognit ion of the NLF vrould e x c l u d ( ~ the Saigon government from p ea ce t a lks ,however.

Canadian PRIME MINISTER PEARSON proposed a cease- f i re a nd gradualt roop withdrawal as s teps toward p eace (2 9 Apr i l ) . The c ease- f i r e Hou ldbe the "f i r s t par t of a 'I-rider pat t e rn of pe ace n egotiat ions ,l i thoutpr io r condit ions; '" As negot iat ions progressed, "equivalent an d phasedvlithdravrals f r om South Vietnam by North Vietnam and by the forces ofother governments could take place under in te rna t iona l supervis ion . (with) concurrent a r r a ngements to ensure tha t the people of SouthVietnam vlere enabled . . . to choose t h e i r own form of governmen t and tha tthe withdraHal of t roops vlOuld not simply crea te a po l i t i ca l vacuum inwhich terror ism and coercion could continue . " Pearson suggestedvlorking through the Geneva Conference an d Internat ional Control Commission would be most appropriate . . ..

. .The US and South Vietnam backed Pearson 's suggest ions.A New Delhi dispatch of 4 May referred to Eastern European sourceswho said no immediate prospects of success fo r Pearson 's in i t i a t ive

were evident in Hanoi. Previous Canadian ef fo r t s to organize a newGeneva Conference through the ICC had "equal ly fa i led" to receive theaccord of a l l par t i es concerned. The report noted Ronning's March v i s i tto HanOi, saying . . "the r esu l t s of his mission are unknown but nothingha s reached New Delhi t ha t indicates any change in the-pos i t ion of thepar t i es c o n c e r n e d ~ '! Agence France-Presse (3 May) repor ted the ChineseForeign Minis ter said Pearson 's in i t i a t ive " . . i s an old American maneuver which does not meri t c o m m e n t ~ l 1

Danish PRIME MINISTER KRAG urged the US to seek a peaceful solut ionin Vietnam through negot iat ions with the Viet Cong and others involvedin the conf l ic t j he recommended a t r ans i t iona l government be composed ofa l l elements in South Vietnam. (Hashington Post , 29 April)

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May 1966


In a joint communique issued 22 May 1966, GUINEA and ALGERIAcalled for an end to US bombing of North Vietnam and s t r ic t r espec tfor the Geneva Agreements as a means toward a peaceful settlement inVietnam.THE NETBERLANDS I FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS announced his governmentwill us e every opportunity to contribute to a peaceful solution tothe wa r but that every effort should also be made to prevent furtheresca lation of the conflict . Luns said the f i rs t step toward a cease

f ire and prevention of further escalation should be a reciprocaldecrease in acts of war . Luns said The Netherlands would favor abombing hal t i f there were concrete indications th is might induc eHanoi to be will ing to negotiate. (New York Times , 20 May)

U T I ~ ~ ~ , speaking before the hnalgamated Clothing Workers ofP ~ e r i c a Convent ion on 24 May, said peace can be restored only U ~ y a return to the Geneva Agreements . . . and . . . as a preparatory measurei t would be necessary to s tar t scaling down mili tary operations andto agree to discussions which include the actual cQmbatants. Perhaps . . . i t will s t i l l be possible to arrive a t an agreement betweena l l powers c o n c e r n e d . ~ ' U Thant said the f ive major powers -- including Commun is t China -- were among those powers concerned . He added,"the solution l ies in the hands of those who have the power an d theresponsibili ty to decide . . . " riot the United Nations . ( New York Times,. 25 May)June 1966

Newsl-Teek Magazine, on 6 June, reported Communist diplomats inWashington as saying North Vietnam had made a move toward in i t ia t ionof peace talks using ROMANIAN intermediaries. (A high-level Romaniandelegation vis i ted Hanoi from 5-11 May and stopped in Peking an d Moscowla ter in the month.) Le Duan reportedly told Romanian off ic ia l BODNARASthat the DRV wou ld not come. to a peace table "on i ts knees" but wasinterested in exploring a peaceful set t lement.

Le Monde (31 May) reported an "important UN personality" had hintedthe Romanian government was t rying to persuade Peking to accept negotiat ions on Vietnam with the United States. The ar t ic le said the Romanianshad taken soundings in Peking and would continue to work towalu agree ment even though they had l i t t l e hope of success.

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An Agence France-Presse report of 11 June m e n t i . o p ~ d anatmosphere of optimism in Hanoi that th e DRV ,could i- in . .peace on i ts terms . "Informed sources" reportedly saida l l of North Vietnam's a l l ies except China desired anend to conflict . The forthcoming vis i t of Jean Saintenymay provide an opening for peace moves, according to thereport . And Pham Van Dong reportedly said Vietnam is infavor of neutral ization but feels th e time is not r ipefor this solution .

In early June, Canadian AMBASSADOR RONNING told the Canadian Parliament he had t r ied to persuade Hanoi to make a "corresponding move"in response to a US cessation of bombing, but had received a negativeresponse . Agence France-Presse (22 June) reported '\lell-informedsources in Hanoi" said North Vietnam had rejected US proposals t ransmitted by Ronning . Agence France-Presse said this conformed with DRVhard- l ine policies and objectives of resistance an d victory . Thesesources did no t fee l Hanoi was "intransigent", however, although negot ia t ions at this time were rejected, negotiations a t another time wereno t imposs ible.

An optimistic interpretation of the Ronning Mission in the Wash jngton Post (26 June) held that "informed Canadians" feel Ronning cameback with a "speck of hope, with a possible opening, with somethingmore than nothing". But the art ic le added, in terms of hard substanceth e Ronning v is i t produced no change and yielded no suggestion of anacceptable basis for peace t a l l s . Offsetting this report, George Ballsaid f la t ly the Ronning Mission produced "no encouragement that theNorth Vietnamese are prepared to come to the conference table." RobertMcCloskey, speaking for the State Department on 23 June, said neitherora l reports no r public statements indicated any change in the basicelements of Hanoi's position. "No acceptable basis for talks has yetbeen found." And Dean Rusk told the SEATO Conference in Canberra,Australia: "There would be peace when Hanoi gave up i ts intention .(to) . . . seize South Vietnam by force . . I se e no prospect of peace atthe present moment." (Washington Post, 27 June 1966)

French off icial JEAN SAINTENY vis i ted Hanoi and Peking (June toearly July 1966) in an attempt to find some basis for a conference.A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of 24 June said the "Frenchoff icial" then in Peking had not succeeded in talking with Chineseoff icials . Agence France-Presse reported from Hanoi that Saintenyhad "friendly conversations" with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong, butdid not know results of the ta lks. Sainteny told Paris Match hethought Hanoi would reduce aid to the Viet Cong i f the US r ~ a d e agesture:" (Reuters, 26 July) And in September, Drew Middleton reported Sainteny had said i t was his impression that the DRV "might

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accept the opening of negotiations providing the US commits i t se l f towithdraw i ng i t s forces according to specified schedules ." Saintenyadded he thought a US acceptance of U Thant ' s proposals would el ic i ta 'favorab l e reaction from North Vietnam and the NLF . (New York Times,26 September 1966)

On 30 June , fuel depots near Hanoi .and Haiphong were bombedj on

June, P R E S I D E J I J ~ .JOHNSON spoke in Des Moines and Omaha of the USi r e to meet with North Vietnam, to discuss a means to end the conf .l i c t in Vietnam. Peking ca lled his statements "more US var blackmail."(New China News _Agency , 1 July 1966) The bombings were said to have" 2moved a l l rest raints on the Chinese ." (People 's Liberation ArmyOaily , 19 July)

Hanoi called the bombings "criminal acts of aggreSS ion, " a newstep in escalat i ng the wa r" and an exposure of the "deceitfulness ofUS ta lk about peace ." (VNA , 30 June) NLF Centra l Committee PresidentNguyen Huu Tho termed the bombings a n "ac t of suicide . . . another frenf"ied step of escalat ion ." Moscm.r cailed the a ir at tacks a "part icular lydangerous act ion" vhic h demonstrated the US commitment to escalat io npnd proved US ta lk of peace to be "mere empt ly verbiage." (Tass , 3 June)July 1966

I During June and July i t vas frequent ly speculated that private" efforts were underway to arrange a peace conference. The New York Times(1 July) sa id hints of a new British peace move were borne out by theannouncement of Wilson's August t r ip to Moscow and reported the peaceeffort would'be related to Britain's role as Geneva co-cha irman

The French magazine Enterprise reported that during a b r ief personalvis i t to Pek ing, Ho Chi Minh had told the Chinese , "If there are no newdevelopments, we will have to come to t erms (,,,ith the US) toward themiddle of 1967." Ho reportedly asked both China and the USSR for"approval ," to explore the possib i l i ty of a negot ia ted se t t lement.Enterprise said, "contrary to Pek ing, Moscow did not answer no."(Ent erprise, 7 July 1966j W a s h i n ~ o n Post, 6 July 1966)

According to Seymou r Topping, senior American off icials fe l t anotherdiplomatic approach will be made to persuade Hanoi t o negotiate, probablyaf ter the furor over bombing raids against Hanoi and Haiphong fuel depotshad subsided. (New York Times, 6 July)

President Johnson said diplomatic reports indicated the oppositionno longer rea l ly expected a mil i t a ry victory in South Vietnam but addedhe was "aware of the dangers of speculation" -- that this might make the

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opposition m ~ r e amenable to cease-fire talks. (New York Times, 6 July)But U Thant said he knew of no recent developments l ikely to lead to apeace conference. ' (Ne,{ York Times, 6 July) And George Ball cautionedthat i t may be "quite a long time t before the changed att i tude in Hanoiis translated into a poli t ical decision wh ich could lead to an end towar . A Washington Post report (7 July) said Mr. Ball was trying to keepPresident Johnson's optimism wi thin bounds and noted tha t other officialsf Lt Hanoi was t rying to build the kind of public morale necessary forplolonged confl ict .

Indian PRIME MINISTER GANDHI made a detai led proposal for negotiat )ns within the framework of the Geneva Agreements on 7 July. Shetren visi ted Cairo, Belgrade and Moscow to discuss Vietnam and otherissues. Mrs. Gandhi called on the UK and the USSR to immediately convene a meeting of the Geneva Conference and appea l ed for an immediateend to bombing in North Vietnam followed by a "ces sation of host i l i t iesas ,{ell as of host i le movements and act ions on a l l sides throughoutVietnam." She sa id the ICC "lvould have to safeguard a standstill military arrangement, suggested the Geneva Conference might guarantee theindependence and t e r r i t o r i a ~ integri ty of a neutral Vietnam and neigh-boring Laos and Cambodia. lOj .

The State Department Iolelcomed this ini t ia t ive , stated J\.merican support for " . the reconvening of the Geneva Conference to bring about asettlement on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962". and saida "cessation of hos t i l i t i es in both North and South Vietnam could bt; thef i r s t order of business" a t a new conference. South Vietnam also reactedfavorably.TITO and NASSER supported the Gandhi proposal. PRIME MINISTERWIISON welcomed i t , but added, "I would not feel that ,{e ought to insiston a cease-fire as a pre-condition." (London Reuters, 7 July}

10/ The Gandhi-Kosygin communique issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi'sMoscow vis i t expressed concern a t the dangerous situation in Southeast Asia, noted the intensification of host i l i t ies in Vietnam andthe extension of a ir raids to the vicini ty of Haiphong and Hanoi.The communique called for an immediate end to bombings and said a"solution to the problem can be found only within the framework ofthe 1954 Geneva Agreements." Asked a t a 29 July New Delhi pressconference why communiques issued after her talks with Nasser andTito (and Kosygin) had not supported her Vietnam proposals, Mrs.Gandhi said Hanoi had specifically asked the UAR and Yugoslavia notto discuss anything unt i l bombing was stopped. A New York Timesreporter (Lucas) said her statements confirmed a shif t in positionon Vietnam to one closer to the Soviet stand: that cessation of thebombing must precede negotiations. (New York Times, 20 July)

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According to a Prague report , "respon.sible (Soviet) quarters" _believed"talks with Wilson on Vietnam ",ould be senseless" v ~ ~ his 1present at t i tude. (London Reuters, 7 July)Hanoi dismissed each point in the Gandhi proposal as imposingunacceptable obligations on North Vietnam. (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 19 July)Any bargaining or concessions granted in exchange for a US hal t in bomb. in g was rejected. There is "no alternative" to the four point and fivepoint stands, said the ar t ic le .Chou En-lei and Foreign Minister Chen Yi berated the Gandhi proposal. Chou called i t "rendering service to the US"; Chen Yi denouncedthis new evidence of US-Soviet collusion - - now aided by "Indian reactiona r ies" -- and stressed the "Till of the Vietnamese people to f ight

and the 2flnese readiness to help them. (New China News Agency,10 July)- - Recent peace efforts by the USSR, Britain, ICC and Indiawere termed a "new Munich plot" by Peking on 11 July. (New China NewsAgency)

A 19 September report in Bl i tz , a left-,.,ring Indian weekly, saidthe Indian proposals had received lIa good reception" but had no t beenadopted because Cairo, Belgrade and Moscow had fe l t the ini t ia t iveshould come from Hanoi.Following PRIME MINISTER WILSON's t r ip to MoscovT , the SovietForeign Ministry issued this statement: "'rhe Bri t i sh Government cont inues to proceed from support of the American aggression . . . althoughi t disassociates i t se l f from the American bombings of the suburbs of

11/ Jenmin Jih Fao (10 July) wrote: "The people should and can onlyrely on themselves to make revolution and wage people's war inthe i r own country, since these are the i r own affa i rs . No outsideaid can replace the i r struggle . . " This is a b it different fromChen Yi's pledge of willingness to ass is t th e Vietnamese peoplewage war. On 16 July, Ho Chi Minh spoke in Hanoi reaffirming NorthVietnam's determination to continue "until f inal victory. If He saidthe DRV four points and the NLF's five point stand were the onlybasis for settlement and denounced the US "peace ta-lk swindle. IIQuasi-mobilization of reserve units \.,ras ordered the same day.Peking praised this speech: Chou En-lai promised China would take"any necessary action f to support Vietnam. (VNA, NCNA, 19 July)Pravda also noted Ho's speech, re i tera ted Soviet support for Hanoiand said there was "only one \"ray to solve the Vietnam prOblem": UScessation of a l l acts of war and withdrawal of a l l forces. (20 July)


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Hanoi and Haiphong . . . . 1ne Soviet Government, on the other hand, proceedsfrom support. of the Vietnamese people's just struggle . . strongly condemnsthe U.S. criminal actions in Vietnam and believes that the solution ofthe Vietnames e question must be based on the well-knO"lffi proposals (oftJ::le) DRV and the NFLSV." (Tas s, 18 July)

A 20 July GVN proclama t ion described Saigon's posit ion. I t saidSouth Vietnam is prepared to cease a l l military activi ty i f th e Com-Ir" .nis ts , with the approval of North Vietnam, hal t thei r expansionist

i t i o n s supported by arms. Tnis requires that Hanoi ( i) withdrawtroops an d pol i t ica l cadres operating covertly in the South; (2 ) dissolve the so-called NLF and cease a l l military activi ty and sabotagec d renounce a l l subversion in the South; (3) respect th e spir i t of then e v a Accords to allow the population of the South freely to determine.i t s own fate according to democratic principles. Bombing of the DRV

would be halted i f these conditions are met an d effectively guaranteed.J apanese PREMIER SATO, during a vis i t from Soviet FOREIGN MINISTER

G R O ~ 1 Y K O , said Japan was r eady to hold an international conference on apeaceful settlement in Vietnam and indica ted he would seek Gr omyko'shelp in instigating a pe ace move. (Tokyo ; Kyo do , 21 July) Buty k o rejected Sato 's appeal, saying, "The Soviet Union is not acountry involved in the Vietnam conflict; i t is not in tending to con

vene a conference on i t s own accord." Tokyo's J iJ i of 26 July reportedGromyko had urged Sato to press th e United States to pul lout ofVietnam be cause this was the only way to end the conflict .

French newspaper Figaro (2.7 July) interviewed the Agence FrancePresse Hanoi correspondent, Jean Raffaell i . R ~ f f a e l l i said the DRVleadership foresa,'"i" a military victory in Vietnam. The recent mobilizat ion indicated Hanoi ha d not exhausted her manpower, tha t there weres t i l l enough men to fight a war of ground resistance; he fe l t offersof foreign "volunteers" .would be refused as long as possible becauseHanoi did not want to internationalize the war. Raffaell i said U.S.bombing of o i l depots (29, 30 June) made resistance the only course

But in U.S. News and World Report, 25 July, Premier Ky is quotedsaying he thought an invasion of North Vietnam was needed to winthe ..rar: "Sooner or l a te r , we, as free men, will have to facethe Chinese Communists. And I think i t ' s bet ter to face themr ight now than in five or ten years." Kyadded, "We have nodesire to invade North Vietnam because this is a war of sel f defense" but i f Hanoi "insists on continuing aggression" i tmust be "punished and i t s sanctuary destroyed."

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of action open to North Vietnam: ' capitula t ion v laS impossible and negot iat ions undesirable when they might appear dictated. The DRV leadership was said to be united in the desire to see a "Vietnamese Vietnam"and the North Vietnamese confident in the i r leaders. Raffaelli sa id 'aid from communist countries had greatly increased and fe l t the nationswith greatest influence in Hanoi were Russia, China, the DAR and France.(Raffaell i l a t er said he thought Peking!s influence was so dominant inHanoi that Russia could only act as a brake against China.) AlthoughHanoi was probably w'orking tOvrard peace, said Raffaell i , attainment ofa favorable and tough posit ion f i r s t was considered i n d i s p e n s a ~ l e .

In a vlrit ten response to questions posed by Harrison Salisbury ofthe New York Times, Cambodia!s PRINCE SIFlNOUK suggested the key tosettlement lay with the Viet Cong, not China or North Viet lam . He saidthe U.S. might Hell find tha t a means of resolving the conflict " . . isperhaps \vithin your hand! s reach, not far :from Saigon i t se l f . " Sihanouksaid th e NLF might prove to be an appropriate partner for negotiatingan end to the conflict because they had the largest popular support ,best represented the aspirat ions of South Vietnam and were thus qualified to be an t!inter locut eur valable" or valid part icipant in negotiat ions. Salisbury noted that de Gaulle!s recognition of the AlgerianLiberation Front as an I: inter locuteur valablet! had paved th e ,yay forthe end to the war in Algeria. (New York Times , 4 August)

An emissary of Philippine FOREIGN MI IUSTER MARCOS reportedlyinterviewed Peking!s Foreign Ministe r Chen Yi in la te July to discuss,the possibi l i ty of a Chinese ca l l for an Asian peace conference.Chen Yi reportedly accepted Mal'cos I sincer i ty in desiring to end thevlar but said Hanoi had repeatedly told Peking that third party mediat ion would be f rui t less unless DRV and 1 ~ F conditions were met. Theconditions reportedly included withdrawal of U.S. forces and Ifrecognit ion of the NFLSV!s pol i t ica l personality.1! (Agence France-Presse,Singapore, 1 August) .

August 1966On 6 August, Foreign Ministers of Thailand, Malaysia and thePhilippines ( the Association of Southeast Asia, or ASAf called forAsian nations to join in a peace appeal directed to the leaders ofa l l countries involved in the Vietnam conf l ict . Diplomatic notes were

sent to 17 Asian countries following the public announcement of thisAsian in i t ia t ive .Hanoi immediately denounced th e ASA a:ppea l , call:i,.ng i t a Ifcheapfarce staged by third-class henchIDen of U.S. imperialism. 1I The U.S.was charged with reviving the ASA "to cater for the U.S. aggression in

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Vietnam" and with "cynically playing the dirty peace fraud by meansof their henc]:l.men in ASA while stepping up their 1-rar act ivi t ies inboth North and South Vietnam. . . " ( Nhan Dan, 8 August) Peking hadscored the Asian conference idea in similar terms in a 7 Augustbroadcast. The NLF, Cambodia and North Korea also refused to attendan Asian conference.

The US, South Vietnam and Japan supported the Asian ini t iat ive;other invitees were rather lukewarm. No conference was held.On 17 August, Le Monde reported on speculation tha t the UnitedNations would be the forum for ne'{ peace efforts. Rumors allegedlyvaried on th e form of ini t iat ives to be token but neutral, especiallyAsian, nations were expected to play ke y roles. Certain Asian delegations '{ere supposedly prepared to put forward resolutions calling

for a cease- f i re and negotiations in Vietnam; they were assured ofsupport from U Thant and Afghanistan diplomat Pazhwak. Other rumorssaid U Thant himself had recently set up contacts to make one las tt ry for peace in Vietnam before deciding whether to be a candidatefor re-election as Secretary General. According to Le Monde, a l lthese efforts, through non-aligned nations, were designed to achievea de facto cease-f ire or de-escalation which would be accepted unoff icial ly by both Washington and Hanoi.September 1966

'- . POPE PAUL VI, in a 19 September encyclical, issued a plea for. peace in Vietnam; he restated this appeal at the UN General Assemblyon 4 October. The US supported Papal efforts to encourage a conference and/or mediate between disputing part ies . But Radio Hanoitermed "pathetic" the appeals for peace made by "certain rel igiouscirc les which have always chorused the US imperalists ' peace song ."(VNA, 23 September)

At a September meeting, French FOREIGN MINISTER COUVE de MURVILLEand Yugoslavia's PRESIDENT TITO agreed that peace ta lks could not beginunti l the US stopped increasing military pressure in South Vietnam andhalted the bombing over N o r ~ h Vietnam. Tito disagreed with the Frenchestimate that the US alone held the key to peace, however, and maintained that China and North Vietnam -- in that order -- were equallyat faul t . Couve reportedly said China could not block negotiations i f 13/Washington wanted them to begin. (Washington Post, 16 September 1966)--

13 / Theodore Draper, and others, mention a background press brief inggiven by Couve de Murville in Paris during mid-September 1966.These points were made:

Hanoi and Peking were will ing to negotiate in 1964 and againin early 1965, but Washington refused to ta lk.

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About 18 months ear l ier (April/May 1965) Hanoi asked France tot e l l 'VTashington that actual withdrawal of US forces was not apre-condition to negotiations.France had reservations about acting as an intermediary (apparently during the May 1965 bombing pause), but had agreed to doso. At tha t time, the contents of a le t ter from Secretary Ruskto the DRV had no t been conveyed to Hanoi because Rusk had no tspecifically asked France to do so. Couve said the le t terchanged nothing, that i t arrived toward the end of the sessionand tha t France thought some points needed clar i f ica t ion . Forexample, Couve wondered what the US meant by communist evacuat ion of South Vietnam: just North Vietnamese regular army troopsor a l l of those in South Vietnam fight ing against the US?The US wanted to pre-judge the outcome of negotiations by sayingi t would evacuate South Vietnam when i t s objectives had beenattained -- or, when the rebell ion had been quashed and Saigonpreserved . Couve said in any settlement, neither the presentgovernment nor the present non-communist alignment could bemaintained . He fe l t no one knewvlhat government in South Vietnam would be l ike i f the US le f t except tha t i t would be neitherthe Ky government nor tha t of Hanoi . He fe l t i t would be communist but not North Vietnamese communism.Because the DRV and NLF have no fai th in US statements, they needfirm evidence of US intentions -- such as a US declaration towithdraw unila tera l ly accord ing to a timetable. Couve defendedthe DRV military position (the US could turn on and off i t s mili tary machine a t will; guerril las could not stop and s ta r t fightin g the same vray).The US was not taking sufficient advantage of differences betweenHanoi, Peking, and the Front. Peking was sa t is f ied with the present Situation, but Hanoi , ...as not unalterably opposed to negotiat ions . Hanoi/said C o u v ~ is also aware of the long-range threatto Vietnam posed by Communist China. This awareness explainsDRV in teres t in a solution which includes a guarantee of Vietnamese neutrality. The NLF does not want to be taken over byHanoi; i t wants to maintain a separate status) at least for theforeseeable future. (See Draper's The Abuse of Power)

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011

Le Monde quoted a 19 September radio broadcast in 'vhich Couvede Murville said France has never proposed and Ildoes not in tend inthe future in any way to propose her mediation betvleen the governments of the United States and North Vietnam" because France doesnot feel i t would be useful. He said that because Communist Chinaand North Vietnam do not belong to the United Nations, he did not seei t possible to engage in discussions of Vietnam - - either in theSecurity Councilor the General Assembly.

On 22 September, AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG outlined U.S. peace proposalsin a speech to the UN General Assembly. He said : "He are prepared toorder a cessation of a l l bombing of North Vi etnam the moment we areassured , privately or otherwise, that this step wil l be answeredpromptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the otherside." Saying there need be no fear tha t the U.S. vmuld establish military bases in Vietnam, Goldberg sai d " . . . the U. S. stands ready to vlithdraw i t s forces as others vTithdraw thei rs ." He asked i f North Vietnamwould be will ing to agree to a " t imed schedule for a supervised phasedHi thdra,,,al of a l l external forces, including those of North Vietnam."On the question of Viet Cong representation in negotiations, Goldbergreferred to President Johnson's statement that this u,vould not be aninsurmountable problem."

Radio Hanoi, 23 September, called "hypocri t ical t1 Goldberg's sayingthe U.S. was prepared to hal t bombing because that was followed bythe "slanderous statement " calling for a corresponding and appropriatede-escalation on the other side. The broadcast scored the U.S. for,fai l ing to reconcile i t s e l f "to NFLSV as the sole genuine representat ive of the South Vietnamese pEtople," to admit tha t "any question andsolut ion concerning South Vietnam should be discussed with the NLF."Goldberg was accused of trying to secure UN intervention so the U.S.could continue i t s aggression against Vietnam. Pointing to severalincidents (including Secretary MCNamara's announcement of 22 Septemberthat the U.S. would invest $7 million more in new plane production),Hanoi claimed there was enough evidence ", . . to lay bare the real natureof the new U.S. peace negotiations proposal." On 24 September, PremierPharo Van Dong said: "The UN has absolutely no r ight vlhatsoever to intervene in the Vietnamese issue." I f the U.S. wants peace, he said,i t must "recognize the four-point stand of the DRV government ' and showi t s good wil l by acts , that is , to put a definite and unconditionalend" to bombing and other acts of ,var against the DRV. And th e U. S."must recognize the NFLSVas thei r (South Vietnam's) interlocuteur tosolve a l l questions in South Vietnam."

Despite the seeming contradictions bebveen U.S. and DRVstands, AFP's Raffaelli r eported from Hanoi on 25 September that observers there fe l t a t1step toward peacehas seldom seemed as feasible as today, following the

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proposals put forward by Goldberg and the reply by PhamVap Dong." Raffaell i fe l t the two men co nfined themselves to three key points: the four- po in t DRV stand,Americaq raids over North Vietnam and representation forthe NLF. He said vlashington and Hanoi were s t i l l fa rap ar t on these points but a t the same time , closertogether than before -- part icularly on th e ~ u e s t i o n of NLF representat ion at p e a c ~ talks. Raf fae l l i alsoclaimed " Pham made a remarkable omission from thel i s t of North Vietnam's conditions for peace . For thef i r s t time, there was no mention of the demand thatAmerican troops should be withdra,ill f rom South Vietnambefore negotiations can begin."

The NLF said Goldberg's proposals "brought :for th no t ruly new factor"and "refuted the role of the NFLSV, which is the true and sole representat ive of the . . . South Vietnamese people." (Liberation Radio, 27 Septe mbe r )W

Peking interpreted Goldberg's speech as a new U.S. peace talk"swindle" in collusion with the "Soviet revisionis t le ading groupo " (NCNA ,25 September) Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, addressing the GeneralAssembly on 23 September, said Goldberg's speech me ant there were s t i l lno s igns " . test ifying to the seriousness of the intention of Washingtonto seek for a s e t t l e m e n t . ~ . a n d to stop th e aggression agains t theVietnamese people." (New York Times, 23 Septembe r)

Couve de Murville, also a t the UN, echoed French President De Gaulle 's' ca l l for the U.S. to se t up a ~ c h e d u l e for withdrawa l of i t s forces fromVietnam in an attempt to find a peaceful solution to th e wa r . (New YorkTimes, 28 September)

October 1966In early October, U.S. bombing in the eastern part of the Demil i t a r izedZone was halted temporarily. On 11 October, the DRV Foreign Ministrycalled this a "deceitful maneuver and cunning t r ick . " The spokesmanclaimed the U.S. intends "to us e the I n t e r n a t i o n Commission to legalize

their criminal acts" in the DMZ. Hanoi demanded a l l bombing raids andother military act ivi t ies in the ~ r h o l e of the D ~ ~ be halted by th e U.S.

On 15 September, Saigon's Vietnam Press President Thieu assaying negotiations with the DRV are not pos s ible now "because Hanois t i l l believes tha t it wil l be victorious." lie said the GVN "doesnot advocate invading the North but whenever th e situation r e ~ u i r e s , we may send troops over the 17th para l le l . If Thieu did not mentionthe NLF.

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Peking called the bombing cessation a "clumsy t r ick" designed to "putacross (the) big s,rindle of inducement to peace ta lks by a cessationof bombing" and accused the Soviet Union of collusion in the swindle.Joining Hanoi in charging the US with t rying to enlis t the servicesof the ICC, Peking observed that "the US ha s already torn the GenevaAgreements to shreds . . . Has i t an y more r ight to ta lk about supervisionor the International Commission? (NCNA, 13 October)

At a 13 October press conference, PRESIDENT JOHNSON said he wouldbe interested in a bombing pause i f assurances were given tha t i t wouldb reciprocated. He noted the lack of reciprocation during two ear l i erp,duses and said US troops could not be asked to "sta nd there with thei rhands in the i r pockets" unless there is some sign tha t the other sidewould respond posit ively to a pause. (New York Times, 14 October)

Bombing in the eastern DMZ was resumed on October 14 . The followin g day, the Vietnam People's Army high command sent a message to theICC calling attention to this fact, claimed tha t the US had continuedto step up military act ivi ty in the DMZ and thus the "US announced suspension of the bombirg . . . is but a swindle aimed a t deceiving worldopinion." The message demanded cessation of a l l a ir raids and othermilitary act ivi t ies in the DMZ , a halt to bombing of North Vietnam andto aggression in the south.

Canadian EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER MARTIN said resumption of bomb-" in g in the D

Pentagon Papers Part VI A

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