Pennsylvania -- Tombstone State for The Missing White Voter Theory

The Myth of the Missing White Voters:

Pennsylvania – Tombstone State for The Theory

February 3, 2014

By Steven M. Kamp1

Did Mitt Romney lose because white voters stayed home?

Not in Pennsylvania, even though the rightwing psepho-

commentariat thinks so now that Real Clear Politics Senior

Elections Analyst Sean Trende2 has created The Missing White1 Sacramento attorney Steven M. Kamp, a graduate of Yale Law School (1981) and the University of California at Los Angeles (1978), and a veteran of Democratic campaigns in multiple states back to 1972, is nearing completion of The New Democratic Majority, a book analyzing American voting patterns between 1788 and 2012 for President, Congress, Governors, state downballot offices, state legislatures and ballot propositions. Mr. Kamp can be reached at [email protected]

Mr. Kamp has written the California election law manual for the California Democratic Party since 1988 and similar manuals for Nevada and Kentucky in 2008-2012.

The author thanks Patrick Reddy, Scott Rafferty, Harold Kwalwasser, and James Shoch for their editorial assistance.

Maps and election return data used with permission of David Leip and theU.S. Election Atlas website, "Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections"http://uselectionatlas.org

2 The author sent an essentially identical October 21 version of this article to Mr. Trende via read-receipt electronic mail message on October 23, 2013, but as of December 6, 2013, has not received a response. In a September 4, 2013 electronic mail message, Mr. Trende promised to respond to the author regarding the Ohio article in this series, but “not for several weeks.” As of December 6, 2013, no response has been received.

This article is one in an Electoral College Junket series, starting withOhio, followed by Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Maine’s Second Congressional District, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, New

1

Voter Theory. The Theory has spawned a debate that even

became a cover story in The Week.3 Trouble is, the Theory is

not based on actual registered voters and actual voting, but

rather on a Census estimate that has both overestimated and

underestimated actual registration and voting, both

nationally and in Ohio, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, three

states essential to Republican White House hopes in 2016 and

2020. This author has already explained why the Missing

White Voter Theory will not flip the static-population state

of Ohio and the Dynamic Dominion of Virginia into the

Republican column.4 This article will now explain why the

Missing White Voter Theory will not flip the commonwealth or

Keystone State of Pennsylvania – instead, Pennsylvania is

the Tombstone State for The Theory.

One reason: the President Obama 2012 margin in

Pennsylvania is 309,840, and the increase in the number of

actual registered nonvoters in the entire Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania between 2004 and 2012 is 114,138 – 61,232 in

the 43 Rural Pennsylvania counties and 52,906 in the 24

Mexico, Nevada, Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, Indiana and Missouri. 3 July 26, 2013, page 16, “Talking Points -- Immigration: Can the GOP win as the White Party?”, and front cover. 4 “The Myth of the Missing White Voters: In Ohio, Not Registered and Not Voting –While Columbus Rocks for the Democrats.”

“The Myth of the Missing White Voters: Virginia Is For Lovers, Not Missing White Voters”

2

Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties.5 In other words, 100

percent of the registered nonvoter increase between 2004 and

2012 in all of Pennsylvania could turn out in 2016 and vote

Republican, and the Democrat is still ahead by 195,702.

Reason two: the 55 percent turnout rate used by Sean

Trende applied to the 2012 Rural Pennsylvania registered

2012 nonvoter number of 759,964 adds at most only 417,980

new actual voters in Rural Pennsylvania -- the 2016

Republican nominee would need a 100 percent turnout of

voters who have sat out most previous elections and net 87

percent of them to trump the Obama 2012 margin of 309,840, by

all of 7,826 raw votes, and would fall short of the 2008

Obama margin of 620,478 by 202,498 even if the Republican

won 100 percent.

5 It might be 156,445, based on the “Voter Turnout – Presidential Elections” chart on the Pennsylvania Department of State website (www.dos.state.pa.us), as adjusted to reflect 2012 write-in votes onthe David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website counted by the counties but not by the state:

2004 Registered: 8,366,6632004 Pres. Vote: 5,769,5902004 Registered nonvoters: 2,597,073

2012 Registered: 8,508,0152012 Pres. Vote: 5,754,857 (Penna. DOS website 5,753,670 plus 1,187 write-ins).2012 Registered nonvoters: 2,753,158

Registered nonvoter increase from 2004 to 2012: 156,085. This number misses the 2012 Obama margin of 309,840 by 153,755.

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Reason three: commonwealth-wide, between 2004 and 2012

the Democratic Presidential raw vote number in Pennsylvania

increased by 52,179, whereas the Republican number fell by

113,413, -- from a President Bush the Younger raw number that

was already 144,248 behind John Kerry, in the closest

Republican Presidential performance in Pennsylvania since

1988, the last time a Republican Presidential candidate

carried Pennsylvania. Moreover, the 2004 Pennsylvania

Republican raw number of 2,793,847 is the highest Republican

Presidential raw number in Pennsylvania history, ahead of

its’ nearest competitor, President Nixon 1972 (2,714,521) by

79,326, and achieved from a total vote that was well ahead

of 1972 – 5,769,590 versus 4,592,105. As a result, between

2004 and 2012, the Democratic margin from John Kerry to

President Obama rose by 165,592, even after the margin in

2012 fell from the 2008 post-1964 record number of 620,478

by 310,638. This eight-year Democratic margin gain of

165,592 exceeds any actual registered “missing white voter”

number from Rural Pennsylvania. If these trends hold up in

2016 and 2020, Pennsylvania will serve as the Keystone

Commonwealth of the Democratic Blue Wall of 257 electoral

votes6, insuring Democrats will win the Electoral College by

adding the 13 electoral votes from Virginia, or 18 from

6 20 from Pennsylvania, 226 from the other John Kerry 2004 jurisdictions, 6 from Iowa and 5 from New Mexico.

4

Ohio, or 29 from Florida, or 15 from the combination of

Colorado and Nevada.

Reason four: in the partisan-registration Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, there are three times as many 2012

registered nonvoting Democrats as there are 2012 registered

nonvoting Republicans. If there are missing voters in

Pennsylvania, they are more likely to be registered

nonvoting Democrats in Philadelphia or Allegheny County.

Thus, because The Missing White Voter Theory does not

work in Pennsylvania – the largest Blue Wall state seriously

targeted by Republican campaigns in 2000, 2004, 2008 and

2012 -- it does not matter in 2016 or 20207 -- except as a

secret Democratic black propaganda effort to divert

Republican resources (and this author knows nothing).

The Missing White Voter Theory: It Started With Non-Final Ohio Returns

That Did Not Include Provisional Ballots

Two days after Election Night, Real Clear Politics Senior

Elections Analyst Sean Trende, extrapolating from non-final

Ohio numbers8, opined that Romney lost the national popular 7 In the next articles in this “Electoral College Junket” series, the author will analyze New Hampshire, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan,New Mexico, Nevada, Colorado and Florida, then North Carolina, Georgia, Arizona, Missouri and Montana.

8 That did not include the 173,765 ultimately counted provisional ballots. Under Ohio law, absentees are counted first, followed by the machine ballots, but the counting of the provisionals does not begin

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vote because (nationwide) 6.5 million Caucasian Republican

eligible voters “stayed home,” including allegedly enough

rural 2004 or 2008 Republican voters to give Ohio to Obama.9

The Trende theory began in Ohio, and likely ends in

Pennsylvania somewhere on Interstate 80 between West

Middlesex and East Stroudsburg. Caucasian turnout may have

been down, but not in the magnitude Trende claims – and not

by enough to alter the Pennsylvania result, and with

Pennsylvania, followed by Virginia, went any Republican

hopes for the Electoral College. The “Missing White Voter”

route has become the proverbial yellow- or red-bricked road

for the rightwing commentariat and blogosphere. However,

The Missing White Voter Theory is more of a long dead end

road rather than a through street to victory for the

Republicans, because:

It is not based on actual registered voters or actual

voting, but on a post-election Census survey that in

2004, 2008 and 2012, did not come close to matching the

actual registered or voting population, nationally, in

Pennsylvania, or in the swing states of Ohio or

Virginia.

In Pennsylvania – along with New Hampshire, the easiest

Blue Wall state for Republicans to win -- even using

until ten days after Election Day.

9 Sean Trende, Real Clear Politics, November 8, 2012, “The Case of the Missing White Voters.”

6

the Trende linchpin Census survey estimates of the

unregistered and registered nonvoters, Republican

cannot defeat the 2008 Obama margin and can top the

2012 margin except with 100 percent turnout and a

Republican percentage of 66 percent throughout the

commonwealth. At the 55 percent turnout rate used by

Trende, 2008 cannot be topped, and 2012 is topped only

at 79 percent Republican.

In the 2004, 2008 and 2012 Presidential year elections,

between 2.5 and 2.7 million actual registered

Pennsylvania voters stayed home, and it is highly

unlikely that Caucasian solidarity appeals will

stimulate a sufficiently large Republican turnout from

this constituency that has regularly registered and failed to

vote.

Between 2004 and 2012, the number of actual registered

nonvoters in the entire commonwealth of Pennsylvania

rose by only 114,138, a number that underperforms both

Obama margins – against 2012 by 195,702, and against

2008 by a whopping 506,340.

The number of actual registered 2012 nonvoters in the 43

Rural Pennsylvania counties is 759,964, and applying

the 55 percent nonvoter turnout rate used by Trende to

this number results in a number (417,980) that facially

underperforms the Obama 2008 margin of 620,478 and

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overperforms the augmented Obama 2012 margin of 309,840

only at a Republican percentage of 87 percent.10

Of the 759,964 actual registered 2012 nonvoters in the

43 Rural Pennsylvania counties, 698,732 did not vote in

the 2004 Bush election, meaning that between 2004 and 2012,

the registered nonvoter population in Rural

Pennsylvania increased by only 61,232. In other words, 91.94

percent of the actual “missing” registered Rural Pennsylvania nonvoters in

2012 were missing in 2004 as well.

If the reach of The Theory is expanded to the

unregistered population, the Census estimates show that

the commonwealth-wide gap between the 2012 Census-

estimated citizen-eligible population and the actual

2012 total registration is only 944,000, which defeats

the 2008 Obama margin only at 100 percent turnout that

breaks 82 percent Republican, and defeats 2012 only at

100 percent turnout that breaks 66 percent Republican.

At the 55 percent turnout rate used by Trende, only

519,200 new voters are turned out, which falls short of

the 2008 Obama margin and defeats 2012 only at 79

percent Republican. In addition, these voters have to

be registered first, if they even exist.

The total number of actual net lost Republican votes

between 2004 and 2012 in the 43 Rural Pennsylvania 10 55 % of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 417,980. 2% Other = 8,359. 11% Dem. = 45,977. 87% Rep. = 363,642 minus 45,977 = net Rep. + 317,665trumps Obama 2012 309,840 by a raw 7,825.

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counties is a gross net 40,319, offset by the

Democratic loss of a net 6,025, which works out to a

Republican margin loss of 34,294, which is less than 12

percent of the 2012 Obama margin of 309,840.

Between 2004 and 2012 in Rural Pennsylvania, Democrats

actually lost fewer net raw votes than the Republicans

– 6,025 versus 40,319.

The number of 2012 actual registered nonvoters in the 24

Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties is much larger

(1,993,493) and in these dynamic and diverse population

areas (Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Suburban Quartet,

Eastern Pennsylvania, Democratic Western Pennsylvania),

even with an offset from the five Republican suburban

Pittsburgh counties, Democrats between 2004 and 2012

gained 58,204 raw votes, whereas Republicans lost 73,994

raw votes; not surprisingly, in the 24 Metropolitan

Pennsylvania counties, the highest Romney percentage is

the 59.68% in rural-exurban Wayne County (Honesdale) on

the New York border, which produced a margin of 4,500,

and the highest large-population county Romney

percentages are the plurality percentages in the one

Philadelphia suburban county carried by Romney [Chester

County (49.43%)] and in Berks County (Reading, 49.23%).

These three, plus the Romney majority wins of

Schuylkill (Pottsville), Carbon (Jim Thorpe) and Pike

(Milford), produced a combined Romney margin of 18,952,

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less than four percent of the Obama margin from

Philadelphia (492,339), and well below the Obama

margins from suburban Montgomery County (58,975) or

Delaware County (60,939). It is highly unlikely that

the nonvoting 1,993,493 is a pool of 2016 Republican

votes.

Before diving deeper into actual Pennsylvania

registration and voting statistics, let’s discuss The

Missing White Voter Theory. The Missing White Voter Theory

has been grasped by Republicans to avoid facing the

implications of what actually happened in 2008 and 2012:

back-to-back popular vote and Electoral College majorities

by a Democrat from a national total vote that was 6.921

million larger than the total vote in the 2004 reelection of

President Bush the Younger, and that flipped a net seven

states and 115 electoral votes between 2004 and 2012.

Moreover, the Democratic President was reelected amid the

worst Democratic incumbent economic environment since Jimmy

Carter in 1980, the outgoing Woodrow Wilson administration

in 1920, and the second Grover Cleveland administration in

1896, with numbers that caused two economic determinist

modelers to predict only 46 or 49 percent for Obama11, an

11 The Professor Ray C. Fair Model in Fair, Predicting Presidential Elections (Stanford University Press, 2002), and available for 2004-2008-2012 at www.fairmodel.yale.edu, and the Professor Douglas Hibbs Bread and Peace Model, available at www.douglas-hibbs.com

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economic determinist electoral vote model to predict Romney

with 33012, Almanac of American Politics founder Michael Barone to

intone Romney 315 because of “fundamentals” -- and don’t

forget Peggy Noonan and her vibrating Northwest D.C. yard

signs. Horror of horrors, 2008 may have been a realigning

election, and 2012 a confirming election . . . for the

Democrats.

President Obama’s reelection triggered a rampage of

rage on the Republican right, but the one rational response

came from Almanac of American Politics 2014 co-author Sean Trende,

whose review of non-final Ohio returns two days after the

election started him on the road to a 2013 conclusion that

6.5 million eligible Caucasian voters skipped the election.

The Missing White Voter Theory is based on the contrast

between Census estimates of eligible Non-Hispanic White (NHW)

registration and turnout for 2008 and 2012 and the Census

estimate of the actual 2012 vote – based on the Census estimates

and using a 55 percent turnout rate for nonvoting eligibles.

Sean Trende did not distinguish between unregistered and

registered nonvoters; instead, he conflated and continues to

conflate the two categories.13

12 Created by two University of Colorado professors who shall remain nameless, and who looked only at state-level economic data and ignored electoral history and everything else. The predicted Romney 330 included Minnesota.

13 In contrast, The Emerging Republican Majority author Kevin Phillips in 1972 debunked the McGovern “youth vote” theory with a three-step sequential analysis of registration, turnout and percentage breakdown:

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. Mr. Trende concluded that a national 6.5 million

eligible Caucasian voters did not vote in 2012, and

Republican opponents of immigration reform and minority

outreach14 seized upon The Theory as justification for

doubling down on the Republican obstructionism displayed in

the 2011 Debt Ceiling and 2013 Fiscal Cliff debacles and

again on display in the Republican Government Shutdown

Temper Tantrum of Twenty-Thirteen.15 The Trende series was

(according to Trende) purposely vague on policy, but

appeared to urge Republican “libertarian populist” appeals

to downscale Caucasian voters turned off by the Bain Capital

persona and reality of Mitt Romney, although in this

author’s opinion, any actual proposals will amount to little“Some 70 to 80 percent of the 18-24 year-olds will register. Of these, 70 to 80 per cent will actually vote. Thus, 49 per cent to 64 percent of those eligible will actually make it to the polls. Assume 60 percent (the national average) – or 15 million votes. Of these, McGovern will get 55 to 65 percent (8.25 to 9.75 million) and Richard Nixon will get 35-45 percent (5.25 to 6.75 million). By these calculations, then, the McGovern youth lead will range from 1.5 million to a very improbable 4.5 million”

which Phillips predicted (correctly) would be swamped by George Wallace voters and 1968 Humphrey voters switching to Nixon.

New York Times Magazine, August 6, 1972, “Why Nixon Will Win” (Kevin Phillips), pages 33-34.

14 Note that Sean Trende does not oppose either immigration reform or Republican minority outreach; see his June 21, 2013 and subsequent Real Clear Politics articles.

15 Which Sean Trende does not favor. In multiple Tweets available at “Sean Trende Twitter”, Mr. Trende expressly states the government shutdown plan had “no upside” for the Republicans, but he also stated that he did not see it having a major negative electoral impact on Republicans in the House or Senate.

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more than faux-populist flapdoodle. The electoral role model

for The Missing White Voter Theory appears to be Minnesota

Governor Tim Pawlenty, who before becoming a financial

services lobbyist was twice elected Governor of Minnesota –

but with percentages of 44.37 and 46.69 in three-way

engagements where the Jesse Ventura Independence Party

achieved 16.18 and 6.43 percentage points -- but where the

Democrats were held to 36.46 and 45.73. Pennsylvania 2010

Republican Governor Tom Corbett might also serve as a role

model – too bad he made Jerry Sandusky his role model.

Pennsylvania 1994 Class I U.S. Senator Rick Santorum likely

sees himself as a role model, except that he lost big in

2006. Pennsylvania 2010 Class III U.S. Senator Pat Toomey

probably sees himself as a role model, except that in his

one successful statewide race, he received fewer raw votes

than John Kerry in 2004 Pennsylvania, and in 2016, Admiral

Joe Sestak is waiting aboard the Philadelphia ready to launch a

Presidential year Democratic raw vote margin airdrop that

likely will pass 500,000 and increase the Philadelphia

Democratic raw margin from an off-year 289,985 to a Bob

Casey 480,525, a Barack Obama 492,339, or perhaps even

500,000 – all more than enough to swamp the 80,229 Toomey

commonwealth margin from 2010.

Now for some actual voting numbers. Between 2004 and

2012, the Republican national raw vote fell by a net

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1,107,377, from an all-time high of 62,039,572 to the

second-ever Republican total in excess of 60 million –

60,932,235. Between 2008 and 2012, the national Republican

raw number rose by all of 981,912.16

Chart I: The National Popular Vote, 2004-2012

Total Vote Republican Democratic Other

Margin

2004 122,293,468 62,039,572 59,027,115

1,226,781 R 3,012,457

2008 131,463,122 59,950,323 69,499,428

2,013,371 D 9,549,105

2012 129,215,421 60,932,235 65,917,257

2,365,929 D 4,985,022

04-12: + 6,921,953 -- 1,107,337 + 6,890,142

+ 1,139,148 D + 7,997,479

08-12: minus 2,247,701 + 981,912 minus 3,582,171 +

352,558 D min. 4,564,083

In the nine swing states – two that Romney re-flipped

from 2008 and seven that he missed – the Republican raw vote

between 2004 and 2012 rose by a net 352,719. As displayed

in Chart II below, Republicans won back Indiana even with a

16 From 62,039,572 to 59,950,323, per the David Leip U.S. Election Atlaswebsite accessed October 7, 2013. These numbers do not include the additional 6,435 votes from Kings County (Brooklyn), New York discoveredand amended into the New York official totals on August 22, 2013, but not yet posted on the David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website.

14

vote drop of 58,895 and a Democratic gain of 183,876,

because the Republican base from the Nixon-Bush era was

large enough that it held the Democratic 2008 margin to

28,391, and Democrats in 2012 crashed by 221,152. Same story

in North Carolina: Democratic increase more than double the

Republican increase, but a high enough Bush 2004 number to

hold the 2008 Democratic margin to 14,177. Different story

in New Mexico: Republicans won the state by only 5,988 in

2004, and subsequently lost 41,142 as Democrats gained

44,393. Even worse story in Iowa: Republicans won the state

by only 10,059, then lost 21,340 while Democrats gained

80,646. Horrible story in Ohio: Republicans won the state by

118,601, then lost 198,331 as Democrats gained 86,542. In

Florida, Virginia, Colorado and Nevada, Republicans added a

collective 433,352, but Democrats added a whopping 1,626,849

-- four times the Republican addition. In Virginia,

Democrats added 517,078, more than five times the 105,563

added by the Republicans. Pennsylvania is not on this list

because the last time a Republican carried the Keystone

State for President was in 1988, when Vice President Bush

the Elder achieved 50.70% and a 2.32 percentage point margin

over Mike Dukakis.

Chart II: Swing States 2004 – 2012

State, R 2004 R. 2004-2012 Dem. 2004-2012

2012 Result

15

N.C. 435,317 + 309,229 + 652,542

Repub. Margin 92,004

Ind. 510,427 Minus 58,895 +

183,876 Repub. 267,656

N.M 5,988 Minus 41,142 + 44,393

Dem.. 79,547

Nev. 21,500 + 44,877 +

134,183 Dem. 67,806

Colo. 99,531 + 83,987 +

321,376 Dem. 137,858

Va. 262,217 + 105,563 +

517,078 Dem. 149,298

Fla. 380,978 + 198,925 + 654,212

Dem. 74,309

Ohio 118,601 Minus 198,331 + 86,542

Dem. 166,272

Iowa 10,059 Minus 21,340 + 80,646

Dem. 91,927

Republicans have to carry at least six of the nine swing

states to win the White House in 2016 or 2020. The

Republicans must hold Indiana and North Carolina, and flip

Florida (29 electoral votes) plus three states with another

35 electoral votes: Ohio 18, Virginia 13, and either Iowa

(6), Colorado (9), Nevada (6), or New Mexico (5).

16

Alternatively, Republicans must dislodge the equivalent from

the Blue Wall Kerry-Obama states17 that have 246 current

electoral votes; Republicans will talk about flipping New

Hampshire (4), Pennsylvania (20), Wisconsin (10), Michigan

(16), New Jersey (14) and even Minnesota (10), even though

the last year in which any of these states gave a majority

to a non-incumbent Republican was 1988 New Hampshire,

Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey; 1960 Wisconsin, and

1952 Minnesota. However, if Republicans flip Pennsylvania’s

20 electoral votes, the Democratic Blue Wall number drops

from 257 to 237, meaning Democrats need 33 more to win

instead of 13 – meaning Virginia’s 13 is not enough, but

must be added to Florida (29) or a combination netting 20

from Ohio (18) plus Colorado (9) or Nevada (6).18 Just as

the Confederate strategy for winning the military Civil War

of 1861-1865 was taking Gettysburg and Pennsylvania to untie

the United States, the Twenty-first Century Southern

Republican strategy for winning the 2016-2020 et seq.

Electoral College likely involves taking Pennsylvania --

either to crack the Blue Wall or make The Missing White

Voter Theory the Pickett’s Charge of 2016 and 2020.

Pennsylvania 2004-2012: The Perennial Missed Republican Target State

17 Ron Brownstein, National Journal, January 17, 2009, “Dems Find Electoral Safety Behind A Wall Of Blue”

18 Or if Republican 2012 states start moving -- plus North Carolina (15), Georgia (16) or Arizona (11).

17

Thus, in addition to Ohio and Virginia, another testing

ground for The Missing White Voter Theory should be actual

registration and voting data from Pennsylvania for the

presidential elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012, with the

focus on the trend between 2004 and 2012.

Chart III: Pennsylvania, 1960 – 2012

Total Pres. Vote Winner All-Vote %, Raw Margin

Non-Phil. Margin

1960: 5,006,541 Dem. Kennedy

51.06% 116,326 R 215,218

1964: 4,822,690 Dem. Pres. LBJ

64.92% 1,457,297 D 1,026,385

1968: 4,747,928 Dem. HHH

47.59% 169,388 (Wal.378,582) R 102,227

1972: 4,592,105 Rep. Pres. Nixon

59.11% 917,570 R 829,930

1976: 4,620,787 Dem. Carter

50.40% 123,073 R 132,506

1980: 4,561,501 Rep. Reagan

49.59% 324,332 (Clark 33,263, Anderson 292,921)

R 147,187

1984: 4,844,903 Rep. Pres. Reagan

53.34% 356,192 R 122,001

1988: 4,536,251 Rep. Bush Elder

50.70% 105,143 R 125,370

18

1992: 4,959,810 Dem. Clinton

45.15% 447,323 (Perot 902,667)

D 145,747

1996: 4,506,118 Dem. Pres.

Clinton: 49.17% 414,650 D 87,007

2000: 4,913,119 Dem. Gore:

50.60% 204,840 R 143,383

2004: 5,769,590 Dem. Kerry:

50.92% 144,248 R 267,858

2008: 6,015,476 Dem. Obama

54.47% 620,478 D 141,719

2012: 5,754,857 Dem. Pres. Obama

51.96% 309,840 R 182,499

As can be seen, between 1960 and 2012, Republicans have won

the combined margin from the 66 non-Philadelphia counties in

all elections except the 1964 LBJ landslide, the 1992-1996

Ross Perot elections, and the 2008 Obama election. However,

Republicans have lost Pennsylvania in 1960, 1968, 1976,

2000, 2004 and 2012 because of the Democratic margin in

Philadelphia -- and between 2004 and 2012, a decline of

85,359 in the Republican non-Philadelphia margin. As can be

seen, the 1960 JFK Philadelphia margin of 331,544 (which

broke the FDR 1936 record) has been eclipsed by Gore

(348,223), Kerry (412,106), and both Obama campaigns closing

in on 500,000 – even though the all-time record 1960 total

19

Philadelphia vote of 915,277 has fallen to a 2008 number of

718,025 and a 2012 number of 690,776. Simple reason:

Republicans are leaving the Philadelphia they ran between

1860 and 1951, to the point that Mitt Romney underperforms

Barry Goldwater, 13.97% versus 26.24%.

Chart IV: The Philadelphia Democratic Margin and Total Vote,

1960 – 2012

Dem. Margin

Total Vote

1960: 331,544

915,277

1964: 430,912

913,472

1968: 271,615 (Wallace 63,506)

850,117

1972: 87,640

783,970

1976: 255,579

746,197

1980: 177,145 (Anderson 42,967)

718,100

1984: 234,191

772,102

1988: 230,513

674,977

20

1992: 301,576 (Perot 65,455)

638,058

1996: 327,643 (Perot 29,329, no Nader write-ins) 533,277

2000: 348,223 (Nader 8,206)

561,180

2004: 412,106 (Nader not on ballot)

674,069

2008: 478,759 (Nader 3,071)

718,025

2012: 492,339

690,776

Why compare 2004 and 2012? Because 2004 represents the

all-time high Republican raw number in the United States

(62,039,572), and in Pennsylvania, where the President Bush

the Younger 2004 number of 2,793,847 is the all-time high

Republican raw number, even outpacing Presidents Nixon 1972

(2,714,521) and Reagan 1984 (2,584,323). As for 2012, it

represents a Democratic comedown from the all-time raw

number high achieved in the 2008 United States (69,499,428),

and in Pennsylvania, where the 2012 President Obama number

of 2,990,274 is a come-down by 286,089 from the all-time

Democratic high raw number, which is the candidate Barack

Obama 2008 number of 3,276,363 – the first and thus far only

Pennsylvania Presidential elector raw number in excess of

three million. Nationally, Barack Obama between 2008 and

21

2012 lost 3,582,171 raw votes, but because Mitt Romney added

only a net 981,912, Obama won the national popular vote by

4,985,022, a comedown from the 2008 margin of 9,549,105.19

In Pennsylvania, Romney added 24,549 net raw votes to the

McCain raw number, 2.5 percent of the national net 981,912

added by Romney.

Chart V: Pennsylvania 2004-2012

Total Pres. Vote 20 Republican Democratic Other

Margin

2004 5,769,590 2,793,847 2,938,095

37,648 D 144,248

2008 6,015,476 2,655,885 3,276,363

83,228 D 620,478

2012 5,754,857 2,680,434 2,990,274

84,149 D 309,840

04-12: + 14,733 minus 113,413 + 52,179

+ 46,501 D + 165,592

19 Obama lost 33 electoral votes: 11 from Indiana, 15 from North Carolina, 1 from the Nebraska-2 U.S. House district, and 6 from Census net electoral vote losses in the double-Obama states.20

? Data taken from the David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website, www.uselectionatlas.org, which in 2008 and 2012 includes some county-counted write-in votes that are not counted on the Pennsylvania Department of State website (www.dos.state.pa.us, “Elections and Voting”) “Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections” chart. All of the write-in votes are for minor party candidates. The gap in 2012 is 1,187, and for 2008, is 4,957. The 2004 David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website total vote number of 5,769,590 is identical to the Pennsylvania Department of State chart, which charts the total Presidential vote, registered voter numbers, and Voting Age Population numbers and turnout percentages for every Presidential year between 1960 and 2012.

22

08-12: minus 260,619 + 24,549 min. 286,089 +

921 D min. 310,638

Pennsylvania does not have a sufficiently large pool of

“missing white voters” to flip the commonwealth, even though

according to the 2012 exit polls in 31 states, the

Pennsylvania electorate Caucasian percentage was 78 percent.

According to the 2010 Census website, the total Pennsylvania

population of 12,702,379 is 78.8% Non Hispanic White, 11.4%

African-American, 6.1% Hispanic, and 3.1% Asian/Pacific

Islander American. Thus, Pennsylvania is more like Ohio (79%

Caucasian per the exit poll) than Virginia (70% Caucasian).

However, Democratic raw vote margins among the Caucasian and

non-Caucasian voters in Metropolitan Pennsylvania are

soaring, whereas Republican margins in Rural Pennsylvania

are declining. Moreover, in the three largest 2012 total vote Rural

Pennsylvania counties (Lancaster, York, and Cumberland), between 2004 and

2012 the Democratic raw vote rose by 30,082 whereas the Republican raw vote

fell by 18,727, causing the combined Republican margin to fall

by 48,809, which was 29.47 percent of the 165,592 Democratic

commonwealth-wide Democratic margin gain of 165,592 between

2004 and 2012.21 Thus, the actual results in yet another 21 Lancaster numbers:

Total Vote Rep. Dem.2004 221,372 145,591 74,3282012 223,351 130,669 88,481

Change: Up 1,979 Down 14,922 Up 14,153

23

state contradicted the Michael Barone Election Eve

prediction:Pennsylvania (20). Everyone would have picked Obama two weeks ago.I think higher turnout in pro-coal Western Pennsylvania and higherRepublican percentages in the Philadelphia suburbs could produce asurprise. The Romney team evidently thinks so too. Their investment in TV time is too expensive to be a mere feint, and, asthis is written, Romney is planning a Sunday event in Bucks Countyoutside Philly. Wobbling on my limb, Romney.

Pennsylvania 2004-2012: Republicans Have Lost 113,413 Votes, Whereas

Democrats Have Added A Net 52,179

York numbers:Total Vote Rep. Dem.

2004 179,269 114,270 63,7012012 189,977 113,304 73,191

Change: Up 10,708 Down 966 Up 9,490

Cumberland numbers: Total Vote Rep. Dem. 2004: 106,082 67,648 37,9282012: 111,191 64,809 44,367

Change: Up 5,109 Down 2,839 Up 6,439

The county seat of Cumberland is Carlisle, and it is part of the Harrisburg (Dauphin County) Metropolitan Area.

The other 40 Rural Pennsylvania counties all have 2012 total vote numbers below 100,000.

The 2004 Pennsylvania Kerry margin was 144,248; the 2012 Pennsylvania Obama margin was 309,840.

24

The Republicans have lost 113,413 votes in Pennsylvania

between 2004 and 2012, whereas Democrats have added a net

52,179 to the 2004 John Kerry number of 2,793,847, which was

a 452,128 increase from the Gore number of 2,485,967. In

contrast, in 2004 the Bush campaign led by Ken Mehlman added

512,720 to the candidate Bush number of 2,281,127, but in

the next eight years, lost 137,992 in 2008, and in 2012,

gained only 14,549. Democrats came out of 2004 ahead by

144,248 (the smallest Democratic raw margin since JFK 1960),

and in 2008 added 338,268 to create the highest post-1964

and highest ever non-incumbent Democratic raw margin of

620,478 -- meaning that in 2012, Obama could lose 286,089

and still come out ahead by 309,840 and 5.38 percentage

points (national plus 1.53). When the Pennsylvania polls

closed on Election Night 2012 at 2000 hours Eastern Standard

Time the Keystone Commonwealth of the Blue Wall portion of

the Electoral College outcome was all over but the counting

– as long as New Hampshire, Iowa and New Mexico held firm,

the Blue Wall 257 was in place, meaning Democrats could

close the sale in Virginia (13), or Ohio (18), or Florida

(29), or Colorado-Nevada (9 plus 6). When John Kerry and

Barack Obama won Pennsylvania in 2004, 2008 and 2012, they

made history by achieving the fourth, fifth and sixth

straight Democratic Presidential wins in Pennsylvania –

Roosevelt and Truman achieved only three (1936, 1940 and

1944) because one of the six 1932 Herbert Hoover states was

25

Pennsylvania, and in 1948, Thomas Dewey achieved a

commonwealth-wide 50.93% by keeping the Philadelphia

Democratic margin down to an unbelievably low 6,737 (this is

not a misprint).22 In fact, the six successive Democratic

wins between 1992 and 2012 is the longest one-party

Pennsylvania Presidential string since the 1860 – 1932

Republican string of 72 years of 13 Republican wins from

Lincoln through Taft, followed by a Theodore Roosevelt Bull

Moose win in 1912 and five more Republican wins between

Charles Evans Hughes (1916) and Herbert Hoover (1932).

Historical note: in this period, the Pennsylvania Republican

base was in Philadelphia and the Democratic base was in

rural counties such as Columbia. In the closest-margin

Pennsylvania election of the 1860-1932 Republican Era –

1876, when Rutherford Hayes carried Pennsylvania by 17,980

or 2.37 percentage points -- the Philadelphia Republican

margin was 15,719, and the Allegheny Republican margin was

9,481, whereas the largest Democratic county was Berks

22 Democrats won three in a row in 1960-1964-1968, 1936-1940-1944, and 1828-1832-1836; two in a row in 1852-1856; and single wins in 1844 (James K. Polk) and 1976 (Jimmy Carter). Whig candidates won in 1840 and1848. Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans won all six elections between1800 and 1820. Andrew Jackson won in 1824. In 1796, Thomas Jefferson carried Pennsylvania by a raw 121 according to Michael Dubin who notes the missing Greene County returns that cost Jefferson two of the 15 electors (United States Presidential Elections 1788-1860: The Official Results, page 8).

As for 1948 Philadelphia, Kevin Phillips in The Emerging Republican Majority (page 66) describes it as a “last hurrah” for the Philadelphia branch ofthe 1860-1934 Pennsylvania Republican Machine, which held City Hall through 1951.

26

(Reading) by 7,592, joined by 29 rural counties including

Columbia, a county that was Democratic all but once from

1836 through 1944, but starting in 1948, Republican in every

year except 1964, 1976 (Carter 50.37%) and 1996 (Clinton

41.13%); in 2012, Romney scored 55.13%.23

The Missing White Voter Theory says Rural Pennsylvania

stayed home. In his initial November 8, 2012, article, Mr.

Trende argued that Republican Ohio turnout rose in the

white-collar suburbia around Columbus and Cincinnati, but

fell in blue-collar or rural Ohio because these voters were

turned off by both President Obama and Mitt “47 percent”

Romney. Trende stated as follows on November 8, 2012:

We can see that the counties clustered around Columbus in the center of the state turned out in full force, as did the suburban counties near Cincinnati in the southwest. These heavily Republican counties are the growing areas of the state, filled with white-collar workers.

Where things drop off are in the rural portions of Ohio, especially in the southeast. These represent areas still hard-hit by the recession. Unemployment is high there, and the area has seen almost no growth in recent years.

My sense is these voters were unhappy with Obama. But his negativead campaign relentlessly emphasizing Romney’s wealth and tenure atBain Capital may have turned them off to the Republican nominee aswell. The Romney campaign exacerbated this through the challenger’s failure to articulate a clear, positive agenda to address these voters’ fears, and self-inflicted wounds like the “47 percent” gaffe. Given a choice between two unpalatable options, these voters simply stayed home.

23 David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website, www.uselectionatlas.org, and Walter Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots 1836-1892, pages 704-721. The oneColumbia County Republican win in the 1860-1944 period was Herbert Hoover in 1928.

27

While these comments misstate the actual Ohio results that

would not be certified for another 28 days, they might apply

to Pennsylvania, because of the 67 Pennsylvania counties,

the Appalachian Regional Commission defines 52 as

Appalachian, including 40 of the 43 counties of Rural

Pennsylvania24, a subset that includes 8 of the 11

Republican small-city counties in the famous Pennsylvania

“T.”25 In addition to the Scots-Irish concentrations in

counties like Juniata and Snyder, Rural Pennsylvania also

includes the northern tier counties between Susquehanna,

Bradford, Tioga and Warren that include the U.S. House

district that elected anti-slavery Democrat David Wilmot of

Wilmot Proviso fame – the 1846 legislation that began

cracking the North-South Whig and Jacksonian coalitions into

Republican Northern and Democratic Southern coalitions.

Rural Pennsylvania consists of 43 counties in the

central Pennsylvania “T” – 11 Republican-lean small-city

metropolitan or micropolitan counties between Lancaster and 24 Plus the Eastern Pennsylvania counties of Lackawanna, Luzerne, Monroe, Pike, Carbon, Schuylkill and Wayne; the Democratic Western Pennsylvania counties of Allegheny, Erie and Centre; and all five suburban Pittsburgh Republican counties (Armstrong, Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland). See www.wikipedia.org, “List of Appalachian Regional Commission counties.” 25

? All of the 43 except the high-vote counties of Lancaster and York, andAdams (Gettysburg), but including Lycoming (Williamsport), Lebanon, Blair (Altoona), Clearfield, Cumberland (Carlisle), Franklin (Chambersburg), Northumberland (Sunbury) and Warren. As discussed infra, Lancaster and York are becoming Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington exurbs, where between 2004 and 2012, Republican raw numbers and margins fell.

28

Warren, 9 formerly Democratic counties such as Cambria

(Johnstown); and 23 small rural counties. Republicans lead

in 2012 party registration26 in 38 of these 43 counties: all

except the “formerly Democratic” counties of Beaver (Beaver

Falls), Cambria (Johnstown), Elk (Ridgway), Mercer, and

Columbia (Bloomsburg).

In 36 of these 43 Rural Pennsylvania counties, the 2012

Census estimate Non-Hispanic White (NHW) population

percentages range between 97.9 (Elk) and 90.2 (Beaver). In

six, the NHW percentage is in the eighty percent band:

Cumberland, Franklin, Lancaster, Lebanon, Union, and York,

and in Forest County, it is 79.6 percent. Forest County

(Tionesta) in the north-central rural area is the location

of as State Correctional Institution and is 19.0% African-

American and 5.7 percent Hispanic, but the 2012 total vote

was all of 2,324. In much larger Lancaster County (2012

total vote 223,351), the Hispanic percentage is 9.3 and the

African-American percentage is 4.5; in York, it is 6.1 and

6.2. As discussed infra, in the three largest total vote Rural

Pennsylvania counties, Democrats gained votes between 2004

and 2012, likely from these little-noted demographic

changes. 26 Unlike Ohio and Virginia, but like California, Pennsylvania voters can register by party. Unlike post-2010 California, however, Pennsylvania has a closed primary system, meaning party registration determines whether and in which primary one can vote. Commonwealth-wide, of the 8,508,015 registered voters as of November 2012, only 1,110,554 registered outside the two major parties, with Democrats registering 4,266,317 and Republicans 3,131,144. These statistics come from the Pennsylvania Department of State website, www.dos.state.pa.us

29

Chart VI: Pennsylvania Counties Ranked by NHW Percentage in

2012 Census Estimate

90% Elk (97.9) Adams (90.3) Armstrong (97.5) Beaver (90.2)

Bedford (97.3) Blair (95.4) Bradford (96.3) Butler (95.6)

Cambria (93.0) Cameron (97.7) Carbon (93.2)

Clarion (96.8) Clearfield (94.0) Clinton (95.6) Columbia

(94.0) Crawford (95.4) Fayette (92.7) Fulton (96.6) Greene

(94.1) Huntingdon (91.5) Indiana (94.1) Jefferson (97.6)

Juniata (95.6) Lawrence (93.0) Luzerne (92.7) Lycoming

(91.5) McKean (94.2) Mercer (90.9) Mifflin (96.8) Montour

(93.0) Northumberland (93.8) Perry (96.3) Potter (97.1)

Schuylkill (92.7) Snyder (95.8) Somerset (95.3) Sullivan

(94.2) Susquehanna (96.8) Tioga (96.4) Venango (96.2) Warren

(97.3) Washington (93.2) Wayne (91.4) Westmoreland (94.5)

Wyoming (96.0)

80% Allegheny (80.2) Bucks (86.2) Centre (87.5) Chester

(81.5) Cumberland (88.7) Erie (86.2) Franklin (89.7)

Lackawanna (88.8) Lancaster (84.1) Lebanon (85.6) Luzerne

(86.6) Pike (82.5) Union (84.8) York (85.6)

70% Berks (75.6) Dauphin (74.6) Delaware (72.3) Forest

(79.6) Montgomery (78.2) Northampton (79.9)

60% Monroe (69.5) Lehigh (69.8)

50% none

40% none

30% Philadelphia (36.6)

30

The Missing White Voter Theory Is Missing Actual Registrations and Actual

Voters

The Missing White Voter Theory has no actual voters.

Even though the final certified Ohio 2012 returns turned out

to be at variance with his November 8, 2012 article, Mr.

Trende in a subsequent four-part Real Clear Politics series27,

expanded his argument nationwide, arguing that “[t]he most

salient demographic change from 2008 to 2012 was the drop in

white voters” and claiming that a national 6.5 million

Caucasian eligible voters stayed home in 2012. Mr. Trende

stated in his 2013 articles that even if the missing 6.5

million broke 70-30 for Romney, by itself this group it

would not have won the 2012 election for the Republicans,

but in 2016 and in future elections Republican appeals that

turn them out, combined with reduced African-American

turnout, would carry the day for the GOP – because according

to Trende, it is fine that the Nineteenth Century anti-

slavery party has become the Twenty-first Century equivalent

27 Real Clear Politics, June 21, 2013, “The Case of the Missing White Voters, Revisited”; June 25, 2013, “Does GOP Have to Pass Immigration Reform”; June 28, 2013, “The GOP and Hispanics: What the Future Holds”; July 2, 2013, “Demographics and the GOP, Part IV.” The July 2 article is a replyto critics Karl Rove, Jonathan Chait, and the concerned multitudes who expressed concern that GOP emphasis on running up Caucasian percentages would lead to unhealthy racial polarization.

31

of the 1868 Democratic “White Man’s Party”28 since “from a

purely electoral perspective, that’s not a terrible thing to

be.”29 By author Kamp’s calculations, since the Obama 2012

national popular vote margin was 4,985,022, if Romney won 90

percent of the “missing” 6.500 million, he would have won

the rounded national popular vote by 345,000 -- 66.782

million versus 66.437 million30, or a two-party vote

percentage of 50.13 percent.

With respect to the outcome-determinative Electoral

College, Mr. Trende (whose initial November 8, 2012 article

was premised on Ohio) never posted in the text of any

article actual raw numbers of registered nonvoting “missing white

voters” in any state, although he does include charts based

on estimated national vote ethnic percentages (but not showing

any state breakdowns) showing Republicans using a “racial

polarization scenario” and a Caucasian 63% Republican

28 Statement of the 1868 Democratic nominee, New York Governor Horatio Seymour, quoted by Ed Kilgore, “Doubling Down on the White Man’s Party”,June 26, 2013, The Washington Monthly Political Animal blog, www.washingtonmonthly.com29 Trende stated as follows in his June 25, 2013 article: “Democrats liked to mock the GOP as the “Party of White People” after the 2012 elections. But from a purely electoral perspective, that’s not a terrible thing to be.”

30 Assuming the added 6.500 million divides 2 percent for “others” (130,000), 8 percent for Obama (plus 520,000 on top of actual 65,917,257 = 66,437,257) and 90 percent for Romney (plus 5.850 million on top of actual 60,932,235 = 66,782,235). Actual vote figures from theDavid Leip U.S. Election Atlas website, www.uselectionatlas.org, accessed September 15, 2013.

32

percentage winning between 296 and 329 electoral votes in

every election through 2036, and an exact 270 in 2040; in

his fourth article, Trende stated that the GOP Caucasian

percentage is “capped” at 70 percent.31

The numbers used in The Missing White Voter Theory do

not represent actual registered voters or voting voters in

any state. Rather, as Trende expressly states, he is using

only Census estimates of 2008 and 2012 turnout to which Trende adds

2008 exit poll ethnic percentages32:

Using the most commonly accepted exit-poll numbers about the 2008 electorate*, we can roughly calculate the number of voters of eachracial group who cast ballots that year. Using census estimates, we can also conclude that all of these categories should have increased naturally from 2008 to 2012, due to population growth.

From mid-2008 to mid-2012, the census estimates that the number ofwhites of voting age increased by 3 million. If we assume that these “new” voters would vote at a 55 percent rate, we calculate that the total number of white votes cast should have increased byabout 1.6 million between 2008 and 2012.

***

Now, the raw exit-poll data haven’t come out yet, so we can’t calculate the 2012 data to tenths: The white vote for 2012 could have been anywhere between 71.5 percent of the vote or 72.4 percent (with 26,000 respondents, analysis to tenths is very

31 Trende stated on July 2, 2013: “Whatever the cause, the trend is real, and it’s not just due to Obama (in fact, the [Alan Abramowitz TimeFor A Change] model predicts the white vote in 2012 within two points). Now, the Democrats clearly have some sort of floor with whites -- it’s why I cap the Republican share of the white vote at 70 percent even in the “polarization” scenario. I just don’t think we’re at that floor yet.”

32 In 2012, exit polls were conducted in only 31 states. The quoted language comes from the Trende June 21, 2013 article under Point 1.

33

meaningful). So the final answer is that there were 6.1 million fewer white voters in 2012 than we’d have expected, give or take amillion.**

The Current Population Survey data roughly confirm this. As I noted earlier, if you correct the CPS data to account for over-response bias, it shows there were likely 5 million fewer whites in 2012 than in 2008. When you account for expected growth, we’d find 6.5 million fewer whites than a population projection would anticipate.

The Census Current Population Survey Is Not The Best Evidence -- It

Overstated the 2012 National Popular Vote by 3.7 Million, and Understated

Pennsylvania Actual Registration and Voting in 2004, 2008, and 2012

The Census Survey used for the Missing White Voter

Theory produces numbers too far from the actual results to

be useful. The Trende series inspired a cacophony of calumny

(and some informed commentary), but one salient point never

emerged: the Census survey data is not the equivalent of

state or county-level numbers of actual 2012 registered voters who

“stayed home” rather than voting for Romney.33 These

numbers cannot be found in the Census data, because the

Census states that its’ eligibility, registration and voting

numbers are derived from self-reporting by a sample of

roughly 50,000 respondents to the Current Population Survey

(CPS) as to their citizen 18-plus status, voter

33 Pennsylvania is still one of the minority of 19 jurisdictions that donot offer no-excuses early voting or mail ballots.

34

registration34, and whether they voted. This is a

commendably large sample, but in 2012 it overstated the

national total vote as 132.948 million, when the actual

total vote for President was 129,215,421.

In Pennsylvania, the CPS for 2012 reports 9.452 million

citizen-eligible, 6.795 million registered, and 5.824

million voting. The Census CPS Voting Age population number

is listed on the Pennsylvania Department of State website

“Voter Registration Statistics” report for the commonwealth-

wide Presidential elections between 1960 and 2012; in

contrast, the California Secretary of State refuses to use

the Census 23.419 million citizen-eligible number for

California, but instead adjusts it upward to 23,802,577

based on data from the California Departments of Finance and

Corrections.35

The Census citizen-eligible number is only a secondary

source to determine the potential for expanding the

electorate. Instead, one assigned to develop a 2016

Republican strategy for flipping Pennsylvania would first go

to the state-level and county-level registered voter and actual

voting numbers, augmented by voter file data as to the number

of and type of elections in which each registered voter has

34 Not required in the Nineteenth Century, but now a requirement in every state except North Dakota.35

? California Secretary of State website, www.sos.ca.gov, “Elections”,“Prior Elections”, “Statewide Elections”, “November 6, 2012 General Election”, “Registration Statistics”, “15-day Report of Registration.”

35

participated (“flags” in the typical precinct walk sheet or

its’ Smartphone equivalent). Registered voters need only be

persuaded and turned out, whereas the unregistered first

need a registration drive.36 The Census estimates for

Pennsylvania registered voters and actual voting for 2004,

2008 and 2012 differ substantially from the actual

registration and voting statistics on the Pennsylvania

Department of State website:

For 2004, the Census estimates rounded 6.481

million registered and 5.845 million voting, but

the actual numbers are 8,366,663 registered and

5,769,590 voting for President;

For 2008, the Census estimates 6.451 million

registered and 5.747 million voting, but the

actual numbers are 8,755,588 registered and

6,010,519 votes counted by the state, plus 4,957

county-counted write-ins;

And for 2012, the Census estimates 6.795 million

registered and 5.824 million voting, but the

actual numbers are 8,508,015 total registered and

36 Trende could have done a national version of this for D.C. and the 49states other than North Dakota that require voter registration. Had he done so, he would have presented the entire universe of registered voters and registered nonvoters in the United States broken down to the county or Alaska election district level in each state. North Dakota could have simply been placed in a separate chart.

36

5,753,670 votes counted by the state, plus 1,187

county-counted write-ins.37

Every state except no-registration North Dakota reports per-

election voter registration on its’ election officer

website, and every state reports the total vote;

Pennsylvania on its’ Department of State website charts both

back to 1960, has election results back to 200038, and has

voter registration data back to 1998. In addition, there is

a fine website created by Wilkes University and Dr. Harold

Cox known as the Pennsylvania Election Statistics Project39,

which has county-level data and maps for Presidential

elections back to 1796, U.S. Senate selections and elections

back to 1788, U.S. House elections for 1788 through 2004,

and gubernatorial elections back to 1790, and last but not

least, Pennsylvania state legislature directories back to

1682 – but as yet no “row offices” such as Attorney General

and Auditor General. The David Leip U.S. Election Atlas

website in a single screen charts Pennsylvania state-level

37 Unlike many other states, the Pennsylvania Department of State website does not list a voting number reflecting persons who signed in to vote and voted for any office. Instead, it simply uses the vote castfor President, but not including write-ins counted by the counties. Thus, it is impossible to determine how many voted but skipped the Presidential engagement.38

? At the Pennsylvania Department of State website portal “View Election Returns” or at www.electionreturns.state.pa.us 39

? http://staffweb.wilkes.edu/harold.cox/

37

total vote and Presidential partisan numbers all the way

back to 1856, with county-level numbers back to 1888, and

has per-election screen state-level data back to 1824; it

also has U.S. Senate county-level returns back to 1956, plus

1914 and 1926, gubernatorial returns for 1986-2010 and many

of the gubernatorial races between 1860 and 1966 (but still

no row offices). Congressional election returns scholar

Michael Dubin has published county-level Presidential

returns for Pennsylvania for the period from 1788 through

1860.40 There is also a fine book-length state-level

realignment study of Pennsylvania between 1960 and 2008 that

concludes Pennsylvania has realigned Democratic.41 These

sources provide actual registration and voting data, not estimates, and should

be looked to first in the search for the actual 6.5 million missing white voters.

The Missing White Voter Theory Census Estimate Predicate Appears To

Assume a Highly Improbable 55 Percent Turnout of 832,000 Unregistered, Which

Cannot Defeat The Obama 2008 Margin And Defeats 2012 Only At 79 Percent

Republican

40 United States Presidential Elections 1788-1860: The Official Results (McFarland and Company, 2002). County-level results from 1836 through 1892 are collected by Walter Dean Burnham in Presidential Ballots 1836-1892; from 1896-1944 by Edgar Eugene Robinson in The Presidential Vote 1896-1932, and They Voted for Roosevelt. The Richard Scammon America At the Polls books have county-level Pennsylvania returns back to 1920.

41 Renee M. Lamis, The Realignment of Pennsylvania Politics Since 1960: Two-Party Com[petition in a Battleground State (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 2009). The book has a foreword by James L. Sundquist (at page xxiv) that describes the book as “demolishing” the David Mayhew conclusion that “the realignment genre…has ceased to be relevant.”

38

If the unregistered are the target group, Republicans

will need 100 percent turnout, not the 55 percent used in

The Missing White Voter Theory article series. The only

reason to look at the Census estimates: they provide the

only statistics available for the citizen-eligible

population and ethnic/gender breakdowns of the CPS

respondents.42 The citizen-eligible population includes

unregistered eligibles, registered nonvoters, and registered

actual voters. The gap between the Census 9.452 million

“citizen-eligible” survey response estimate and actual total

registration for 2012 Pennsylvania (rounded 8.508 million)

is a rounded 944,000. If these 944,000 exist, and:

if the 2016 Republican nominee found, registered,

persuaded and delivered 100 percent of all of

these 944,000 unregistered 2012 nonvoters at 66

percent Republican, 32% Democratic, 2% Other43;

and assuming no other changes anywhere else

(highly unlikely);

42 ? Another source for ethnic/racial breakdowns is the American National Election Study (ANES), as analyzed by Alan Abramowitz and Ruy Teixera onJuly 30, 2013, “The Missing White Voters: Round Two of the Debate.”

43 The 2012 Pennsylvania “other” percentage was 1.46%. In post-1928 years other than 1948 (Strom Thurmond), 1968 (George Wallace), 1980 (John Anderson), 1992-1996 (Ross Perot) and 2000 (Ralph Nader), the non-major collective percentage in Pennsylvania has never exceeded 3.84% (1932) or 2.28% (1936).

39

the Republican column amount goes up by 623,040,

thus topping by 11,120 the augmented 2012 Obama

Pennsylvania margin of 309,840, but not the 2008

margin of 620,478, which can only be topped at 82

percent Republican.44

However, if the turnout is the 55 percent used in the Missing White Voter

articles45, only 519,200 are added, which even at 100 percent Republican falls

short of the Obama 2008 Pennsylvania margin, and defeats the 2012 margin

only at 79 percent Republican.46 Democrats if they hold Florida plus

any one of New Hampshire, Virginia, Ohio, Colorado or

Nevada47 could still hold the White House without

Pennsylvania, but because The Missing White Voter Theory is

unlikely to flip Pennsylvania, Democrats will likely not

enjoy the irony of Republicans trying to win the election 44 The calculation assumes the 944,000 break Republican 66% = 623,040 new Republicans, offset by Democratic 32% = 302,080 = net Republican gain of 320,960, which defeats the Obama 2012 margin (309,840) by a raw 11,120, but not Obama 2008 (620,478)

For the 2008 margin: 944,000 times Republican 82% = 774,080 new Republicans, offset by Democratic 16% = 151,040 = net Republican gain of623,040, which defeats the Obama 2008 margin (620,478) by a raw 2,562.

45 In his June 21, 2013 article, Trende stated under point 1: “If we assume that these “new” voters would vote at a 55 percent rate . . .”

46 This calculation assumes the 519,200 break Republican 79% = 410,168 new Republicans, offset by Democratic 19% = 98,648 = net Republican gainof 311,520, which defeats Obama 2012 (309,840) by a raw 1,680.

47 The 226 electoral votes from the 2004 Kerry states other than Pennsylvania plus Iowa (6) and New Mexico (5), plus Florida (29) and anyone of New Hampshire (4), Ohio (18), Colorado (9) or Nevada (6), or loseFlorida (29) and New Hampshire (4), and hold all of Ohio, Colorado, and Nevada (237 plus 33 = 270).

40

among the unregistered and alienated whom Republican

Governors and legislatures across the country in 2013 have

been trying to keep from voting, even if the 2016 Republican

nominee runs a registration drive trumpeting “White People

Wake Up” – the 1950 election eve segregationist slogan in

the 1950 North Carolina U.S. Senate Democratic primary.48

When reading the Missing White Voter Theory analysis,

keep in mind that the “missing white voter” group in

Pennsylvania necessarily includes an estimated 944,000 or 519,200 who did

not even bother to register to vote, as do the 2012 Census CPS

estimates of Pennsylvania Non-Hispanic White (NHW)

populations of 7.901 million eligible, 5.779 million

registered and 4.937 million voting – all three are

estimates, and the full-population Pennsylvania Department

of State numbers for actual registered and actual voting are so

far removed from the CPS estimates for Pennsylvania as to

render the latter useless for evaluating the universe of

registered “missing voters.” In any event, the Republican

task will be easier if the Pennsylvania State Senate,

Republican-controlled since 1980, the Republican-controlled

Pennsylvania House, and Republican Governor Tom Corbett move

the registration deadline from Election Day minus 30 to the

Election Day minus 22 used in Virginia, or Election Day

48 Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (3d. ed. 1965), pages 106-113 (“Who Beat Frank Graham?”).

41

minus 1549, or even to the Election Day Registration used in

Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New

Hampshire, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and D.C.

Another Census Estimate Element of the Missing White Voter Theory Adds

Only 457,600 New Voters, Less Than The Obama 2008 Margin And Defeats The

2012 Margin Only At 83 Percent

Another estimate relied upon by The Missing White Voter

Theory is the gap between Census Non-Hispanic White (NHW)

estimated registered versus the estimated NHW voting, which

in Pennsylvania is 832,000. The Missing White Voter Theory

is premised on a 2008-2012 growth in the national eligible

NHW population offset against a national decline in NHW

registration and voting. Although the CPS has state-level

estimates, the Missing White Voter Theory articles do not

mention any of them. Here are the CPS estimates for

Pennsylvania:

Chart VII: Census CPS Estimated NHW Registering and

Voting in Pennsylvania

2004 2008 2012 04-12

08-12

Eligible 7.886 M 7.901 M 7.901 M

+ 15,000 no change

49 California law between 2000 and 2012. Election Day registration may take effect in 2014.

42

Registered 5.779 M 5.619 M 5.779 M

no change + 160 T

Voting 5.769 M 4.981 M 4.937 M

minus 832 T min. 44 T

As displayed:

NHW eligibles in Pennsylvania increased by all of

15,000 between 2004 and 2012, with no change between

2008 and 2012;

There was no change in the registered NHW number of

5.779 million;

and voting NHW decreased by 832,000 between 2004 and

2012, but 788,000 of this decline occurred between 2004

and 2008, meaning that by 2012, 94.71 percent of the 2004-2008

NHW estimated registered nonvoters fell off the registration rolls and thus

could not vote in 2012 Pennsylvania.

Between 2008 and 2012, another 44,000 estimated NHW

eligibles fell off the registration rolls.

These estimates are worthless in the context of the actual

numbers, but they “show” that in Pennsylvania, there is a

gap of only 15,000 between the 2004-2012 growth in NHW

eligibles and the growth in NHW registered. These estimates

do show a gap in the growth of NHW registered and NHW voting

– of 832,000, which at the 55 percent turnout rate used by

Trende adds only 457,600 new voters, which falls short of

43

the Obama 2008 margin by 162,878, and defeats the 2012

margin of 309,840 only at 83 percent Republican.50 At an

improbable 100 percent turnout, the Republican would need 68

percent.51 Moreover, 94.71 percent of this falloff occurred between 2004 and

2008, with the estimated persons exiting the Pennsylvania electorate after 2008.

Actual Voter Registration and Voting In Pennsylvania

To find out if enough “missing white voters” actually

exist in Pennsylvania, the best sources are the state-level

and county-level registration, total vote, and partisan vote

changes between 2004 and 2012. The party registration

statistics from the 67 counties provide additional

illumination not available in Ohio or Virginia, and unlike

in California, Pennsylvania partisan registration determines

the closed primary in which one can vote. Registration in

Pennsylvania closes 30 days before Election Day and felons

can register once their prison term ends, thanks to a

December 26, 2000 state trial court ruling that the five-

year waiting period for restoration of felon voting rights

was unconstitutional.52 Voters must re-register if they

50 457,600 times Republican 83 percent = 379,808 offset by Democratic 15percent (68,640) = net Republican gain of 311,168, which defeats the Obama 2012 margin by a raw 1,328.51

? 832,000 times Republican 68 percent = 565,760 offset by Democratic 30 percent (249,600) = net Republican gain of 316,160, which defeats the Obama 2012 margin by a raw 6,320. 52

? “VotesPA” portion of the Pennsylvania Department of State website.

44

change their address anywhere, and if they move 29 or fewer

days before Election Day, they must go back to their old

precinct to vote, even if the new Erie resident’s old

precinct is in Easton on the New Jersey border.53

Pennsylvania is in the minority of 19 states that have

neither early voting nor no-excuses mail ballots, meaning

voters are susceptible to last-minute fusillades of

falsehoods lit by secret money, not to mention “poll

position” voter suppression operations.54 The Absentee

Ballot Application on the Pennsylvania Department of State

“votespa” portal requires voters to list a specific reason,

although one of the eligible reasons is a vacation on

Election Day.55 Pennsylvania also has a strict voter ID law

that the double-Republican legislature enacted with the

express intent of enabling “Governor Romney to carry the

53 “VotesPA” portion of the Pennsylvania Department of State website.

54 The easiest way to avoid Republican polling place intimidation is to vote by mail.

55 From the “votespa” portal on the Pennsylvania Department of State website:

An individual who, because of the elector's duties, occupation or business (including leaves of absence for teaching, vacations and sabbatical leaves), expects on Election Day to be absent from his/hermunicipality of residence during the entire period the polls are openfor voting and the spouse and dependents of such electors who are residing with or accompanying the elector and for that reason also expect to be absent from his/her municipality during the entire period the polls are open for voting (7 a.m. to 8 p.m.).

45

State [sic] of Pennsylvania” but the law was judicially

enjoined for both the 2012 and 2013 elections in the

Harrisburg commonwealth court trial.56

Pennsylvania’s 67 Counties: 43Rural, 24 Metropolitan

Pennsylvania has 67 counties, including Philadelphia

which is a unitary city and county. This article and

accompanying Charts XIV through XIX divide them as 43 in

Rural Pennsylvania and 24 in Metropolitan Pennsylvania.

Metropolitan Pennsylvania consists of:

the 5 Metro Philadelphia counties (Philadelphia

and the suburban quartet of Bucks, Chester,

Delaware and Montgomery);

the ten Eastern Pennsylvania counties from Berks

(Reading) through Wayne (including Lehigh,

Northampton, Monroe, Lackawanna and Luzerne)57;

56 Applewhite et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth Court, Dauphin County, Docket No. 330 MD 2012. A complete collection of documents may be found on the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania website, www.aclupa.org 57 Plus Pike, Carbon and Schuylkill.

46

the four Western Pennsylvania Democratic counties

(Allegheny (Pittsburgh), Dauphin (Harrisburg),

Centre (Penn State) and Erie);

and the five Republican suburban Pittsburgh

counties (Armstrong, Butler, Fayette, Washington,

and Westmoreland).

Rural Pennsylvania consists of 11 Republican majority

registration small city counties, 23 small rural counties in

the “T” and nine formerly Democratic voting western

Pennsylvania counties:

Republican Small-City Pennsylvania 11: Adams

(Gettysburg), Clearfield Cumberland, Lancaster,

York, Blair (Altoona), Lebanon, Lycoming

(Williamsport), Franklin (Chambersburg),

Northumberland, and Warren;

Formerly Democratic Western Pennsylvania 9 (Elk,

Cambria (Johnstown), Greene, Beaver, Mercer,

Clinton, Indiana, Lawrence, Columbia); and,

Rural Pennsylvania “T”: remaining 23 counties

Map of Pennsylvania’s Political Regions, 2004-2012

2012 

47

2008 

2004 

Pennsylvania’s 67 Counties: _44 are 90 Percent Or More Non-Hispanic

White

The 2012 Census estimate numbers show that 44 of the 67

Pennsylvania counties have Non-Hispanic White (NHW)

48

population percentages of 90 percent or higher.58 As can be

seen, 36 of these are in the Rural Pennsylvania 43, and the

other eight are the five Pittsburgh suburban counties

(Armstrong, Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland) and

three in Eastern Pennsylvania (Luzerne, Schuylkill, and

Wayne). The least Caucasian county at 36.6 percent is

Philadelphia.

Chart VIII: Pennsylvania Counties Ranked by NHW Percentage

in 2012 Census Estimate

90% Elk (97.9) Adams (90.3) Armstrong (97.5) Beaver (90.2)

Bedford (97.3) Blair (95.4) Bradford (96.3) Butler (95.6)

Cambria (93.0) Cameron (97.7) Carbon (93.2)

Clarion (96.8) Clearfield (94.0) Clinton (95.6) Columbia

(94.0) Crawford (95.4) Fayette (92.7) Fulton (96.6) Greene

(94.1) Huntingdon (91.5) Indiana (94.1) Jefferson (97.6)

Juniata (95.6) Lawrence (93.0) Luzerne (92.7) Lycoming

(91.5) McKean (94.2) Mercer (90.9) Mifflin (96.8) Montour

(93.0) Northumberland (93.8) Perry (96.3) Potter (97.1)

Schuylkill (92.7) Snyder (95.8) Somerset (95.3) Sullivan

(94.2) Susquehanna (96.8) Tioga (96.4) Venango (96.2) Warren

(97.3) Washington (93.2) Wayne (91.4) Westmoreland (94.5)

Wyoming (96.0)

80% Allegheny (80.2) Bucks (86.2) Centre (87.5) Chester

(81.5) Cumberland (88.7) Erie (86.2) Franklin (89.7)

58 www.census.gov, “2010 Census Interactive Population Search” for Pennsylvania and each of its’ 67 counties.

49

Lackawanna (88.8) Lancaster (84.1) Lebanon (85.6) Luzerne

(86.6) Pike (82.5) Union (84.8) York (85.6)

70% Berks (75.6) Dauphin (74.6) Delaware (72.3) Forest

(79.6) Montgomery (78.2) Northampton (79.9)

60% Monroe (69.5) Lehigh (69.8)

50% none

40% none

30% Philadelphia (36.6)

1992 and 1996 Ross Perot: Average in Pennsylvania

The Missing White Voter Theory says Rural Pennsylvania

counties where Ross Perot performed best in 1992 are the

most likely missing voter pool. Perot barely missed his

national percentages in Pennsylvania. According to the 2013

Sean Trende articles, the best statistical correlation for

the “missing white voter” is a county-level Ross Perot 1992

percentage above the national Perot 18.91%. Of course, this

three-way election took place 20 years ago, but in any event

in 1992 Pennsylvania Ross Perot achieved 18.20%, 0.71 of a

percentage point below his national percentage. Perot

finished third in every jurisdiction, and finished above his

national 18.91% in 50 of the 67 counties. Perot’s best

county was Elk in western Pennsylvania at 28.09%, followed

by 44 counties between the Warren 28.02% and the Chester

20.41%. Perot’s worst county was Philadelphia at 10.26%. In

50

the 1996 Perot encore run59, Perot achieved a national 8.40

percent and a Pennsylvania 9.56% percent, and performed

above 9 percent in 59 of the 67 counties.

Actual Pennsylvania Registration Data Show That Voter Registration Rose

by 141,352 Between 2004 and 2012, But Voting Fell by 14,733

The Pennsylvania total registration increased by

141,352 between November 2004 and November 2012, but actual

voting fell by 14,733.60 Between 2004 and 2008, registration

went up by 388,925, but between 2008 and 2012, registration

dropped by 247,573. In other words, 247,573 of the

supposedly “missing white voters” actually fell off the

registration rolls between 2008 and 2012, likely because

they moved south to Florida, west to Arizona, or up to that

great focus group in the sky – and meaning that could not

have voted in 2012 Pennsylvania under any circumstances.

59 Not discussed in any of the Trende articles.

60 Registration change per the Pennsylvania Department of State website:

2004 – 8,366,6632008 – 8,755,588 (from 2004, up 388,925)2012 – 8,508,015 (from 2008, down 247,573)

Total Presidential vote change from the David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website:

2004 – 5,769,5902008 – 6,015,476 (from 2004, up 245,886)2012 – 5,754,857 (from 2008, down 260,619)

51

The partisan voter registration statistics show the

following movements between 2004 and 2012:

Chart IX: Pennsylvania Partisan Voter Registration, 2004 –

2012

2004 2008 2012 Change

04-12 08-12

Total Reg.: 8,366,663 8,755,588 8,508,015

+ 141,352 min.247,573

Dem. Reg.: 3,985,486 4,479,513 4,266,317

+ 280,831 min.213,196

Rep. Reg.: 3,405,278 3,243,066 3,131,144

min. 274,134 min.111,922

Other Reg: 975,899 1,033,029 1,110,554

+ 134,655 + 77,525

As can be seen, between 2004 and 2012, the Pennsylvania

Republican Party that ran the Keystone State from 1860

through 1932 lost 274,134 registered voters, during an eight-year

period when total registration rose by 141,352, Democratic

registration rose by 280,831, and “Other” registration rose by

134,655 – meaning 134,655 opted out of the closed primaries

while slightly more than double that number left Republican

ranks and joined Democratic ranks. Moreover, 76.12 percent

of the commonwealth registration growth occurred in the 24

Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties where The Theory is

52

irrelevant – between 2004 and 2012, registration in the 43

Rural Pennsylvania counties rose by only 33,748, whereas in

the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties, registration rose

by 107,604.

Pennsylvania Voting 2004 To 2012: Total Vote Down 14,733, Democrats

Up 245,359, Republicans Down 113,413

Between 2004 and 2012, the Pennsylvania total

Presidential vote fell by 14,733, but the Republican vote

fell by 113,413 – and the Democratic vote rose by 245,359.

The total Presidential vote between 2004 and 2012 fell by 27,484

in Rural Pennsylvania, but rose by 54,698 in Metropolitan

Pennsylvania. The Republican vote for President fell by 40,319

in Rural Pennsylvania and fell by 73,094 in Metropolitan

Pennsylvania -- in contrast, the Democratic vote fell by

only 6,025 in Rural Pennsylvania, but gained a whopping

251,384 in Metropolitan Pennsylvania.

Unlike Ohio and Virginia, the Pennsylvania Department

of State website does not have separate breakouts for

absentee and provisional ballots. According to the U.S.

Election Assistance Commission (EAC) report for the 2012

election61, Pennsylvania counties received 248,651

absentee/mail ballots for counting, and 246,716 were

61 Available on the EAC website, www.eac.gov.

53

counted, which is 4.28 percent of the total Pennsylvania

vote for President. On the provisional ballot front, the

EAC report states 49,000 were submitted, and 28,742 were

fully or partially counted.62

On the partisan vote for President front:

The Republican raw vote between 2004 and 2008 fell

by 137,962, whereas the Democratic number rose by

338,268.

Between 2008 and 2012, the Republican raw vote

went up by all of 24,549.

Between 2008 and 2012, the Democratic raw vote for

President fell by 286,089, 46.10 percent of the

2008 Obama margin of 620,478.

The total vote for “other” Presidential candidates

rose from 37,648 in 2004 (when Ralph Nader was

only a write-in, and 21,193 went to the

Libertarian or Constitution tickets) to 83,228 in

2008 (Nader on-ballot 11,483) and then rose again

to 84,149 in 2012. In 2004, 21,185 went to the

Libertarian candidate, 6,319 to the Constitution

Party, 6,318 to the Green Party, and 4,656 to

Nader write-ins. In 2008, Nader-Gonzalez won

42,917 and the Libertarian 19,912. In 2012, the

Libertarian ticket achieved 49,991 and the Green

ticket 23,341.

62 17,221 full, 11,521 partial.

54

Thus, in Pennsylvania between 2004 and 2012:

Total registration increased by 141,352,

starting with a 388,925 gain in 2008, yet

followed by a crash of 247,573 in 2012.

Republican registration fell by 273,840 –

238,699 in Metropolitan Pennsylvania and 35,141

in Rural Pennsylvania.

The total Presidential vote fell by 14,733.

The Democratic raw vote for President rose by

52,179 and the Republican fell by 113,413.

The Republican commonwealth-wide lost vote

number of 113,413 is 41.41 percent of the

Republican registration decrease between 2004

and 2012.

If in 2016 the 2012 Democratic number remains static,

Republicans need another 310,000 votes to win Pennsylvania

by a record close raw margin of 160. This could come from

flipping 155,000 Democratic votes, or under The Missing

White Voter Theory, from a Rural Pennsylvania electorate of

310,000 that “stayed home” in 2012 rather than choose

between Mitt “47 percent” Romney and President Obama.

Trouble is, the registered nonvoter increase in Rural

Pennsylvania between 2004 and 2012 is only 61,232. While

759,964 registered voters in Rural Pennsylvania did not vote

55

in 2012, 91.94 percent or 698,732 did not vote in 2004

either.

At the 55 percent turnout rate used by Sean Trende in

his articles, 417,980 of the 759,964 registered 2012

nonvoters might turn out, and the 2016 Republican nominee

will need 87 percent to defeat the 2012 Obama margin, and

mathematically cannot defeat the 2008 Obama margin of

620,478:

417,980 x .02% Other (8,359), 11% Democratic (45,977), and 87% Republican

(363,642) minus Dem. added 45,977 = 317,665, defeating the 2012 Obama

margin by 7,825 raw votes.

At a 40 percent turnout rate, The Theory mathematically

cannot defeat the 2012 Obama margin: 759,964 x .40 =

303,985, underperforming Obama 309,840

At improbably higher turnout rates above 55 percent:

65% of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 493,976. 2% Other =

9,879. 17% Dem = 83,975, 81% Rep. = 400,120 minus

83,975 = 316,145 beats Obama 2012 by 6,305

70% of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 531,974. 2% Other =

10,639. 19% Dem = 101,075. 79% Rep. = 420,259 minus

101,075 = 319,184, beats Obama 2012 by 9,344

Beats 2008 Obama margin of 620,478 only at 90 percent

turnout = 683,967. 2% other = 13,679. 3% Dem. = 20,519.

56

95% Rep = 649,768 minus 20,519 = 629,249 beats Obama

2008 by 8,771

In Every Presidential Year, Over Two Million Registered Pennsylvania Voters

Do Not Vote

Each Presidential year, more than two million registered

Pennsylvania voters do not vote. Perusal of the “Voter

Turnout – Presidential Elections” chart on the {Pennsylvania

Department of State website reveals that in 2012, 2,753,158

registered Pennsylvania voters did not vote. The fact that

between 2.597 million and 2.753 million registered

Pennsylvania voters regularly “stay home” in Presidential

years should be kept in mind when evaluating the turnout

increases needed for The Missing White Voter Theory to flip

Pennsylvania.

Chart X: Two Million or More Regular Registered

Nonvoters in Pennsylvania

Registered Voting Registered Nonvoters %

2004 8,366,663 5,769,590 2,597,073

31.04%

2008 8,755,588 6,015,476 2,740,112

31.29%

2012 8,508,015 5,754,857 2,753,158

32.35%

57

4-12: + 141,352 min. 14,733 min. 156,086 +

1.31%

8-12: min. 247,573 min. 260,619 + 13,046 +

1.06%

The Missing White Voter Theory argues that there was a

substantial drop-off in rural Republican voting between 2008

and 2012. Using the commonwealth-wide statistics on the

Pennsylvania Department of State website for registration

and the David Leip U.S. Election Atlas website for total

vote, Pennsylvania experienced a commonwealth-wide increase

of 143,079 registered nonvoters between 2004 and 2008, and

only 13,046 registered non-voters between 2008 and 2012.

These amounts total 156,085, only 50.37 percent of the 2012

Obama margin of 309,840. In other words, 100 percent of the

2004-2012 actual registered nonvoters could turn out and vote

100 percent Republican, and the 2016 Republican nominee

still loses by 153,755 against the 2012 margin. At the 55

percent turnout rate used by Mr. Trende in his articles, it

results in the addition of only 85,846 new votes, a number

that also falls short of both the 2012 and 2008 Obama

margins.

If one compares the 2004 and 2012 county-level

statistics, one finds that there was an increase of only

61,232 registered non-voters in the 43 Rural Pennsylvania

jurisdictions, contrasted by the 52,906 increase in the 24

58

Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties.63 The 55 percent

turnout rate used by Trende applied to the growth in registered

non-voters between 2004 and 2012 adds only 33,677 new Rural

Pennsylvania voters and 29,098 new Metropolitan Pennsylvania

voters – even combined, these numbers fall far short of the

2012 Obama margin, not to mention 2008.

Rural Pennsylvania and Metropolitan Pennsylvania

In 2008 and 2012, candidate or President Barack Obama

carried Philadelphia, 3 of the 4 suburban Philadelphia

counties, 5 of the 10 Eastern Pennsylvania counties, plus

the four Democratic western Pennsylvania counties

(Allegheny, Centre, Erie and Dauphin). In 2008 and 2012,

McCain or Romney carried the three exurban Eastern

Pennsylvania counties (Pike, Wayne and Schuylkill) plus 42

of the 43 Rural Pennsylvania counties. Between 2008 and

2012, only four counties flipped, all from Obama to Romney:

the Eastern Pennsylvania counties of Berks (Reading) and

Carbon (Jim Thorpe), the suburban Philadelphia county of

Chester, and Cambria (Johnstown) in the “T.”

63 As can be seen, there is a plus 41,947 gap between the commonwealth-wide numbers and the add-up of the county-level numbers. However, even with the 41,947 added, the resulting 2004-2012 commonwealth-wide registered nonvoter number underperforms both the 2008 and 2012 Obama margins.

59

The Actual Republican Lost Votes in Rural Pennsylvania Are Less Than One

Fifth of the Obama 2012 Margin in Pennsylvania -- And Democrats Are Gaining

Votes In Rural Pennsylvania

The 2012 Obama margin in Pennsylvania was 309,840; one

fifth of this number is 61,968. In the 43 Rural Pennsylvania

counties, Republicans between 2004 and 2012 lost 29,635

votes in the combined 11 small-city counties and 11,754 in

the 23 small rural “T” counties, offset by a combined net

gain of 1,070 in the nine formerly Democratic western

Pennsylvania counties. Thus, Republicans lost a net 40,319

between 2004 and 2012 in Rural Pennsylvania, so to flip

Pennsylvania in 2016 based solely on a Rural Pennsylvania

surge, Republicans would need to win back or add eight times the

number of votes lost.

To make matters worse, Democrats actually gained votes

and margin between 2004 and 2012 in Rural Pennsylvania.

Democrats lost a net 21,856 in formerly Democratic western

Pennsylvania and a net 12,356 in the 23 rural “T” counties,

but gained a net 28,350 in the 11 Republican small-city

counties, highlighted by gains of 14,153 in Lancaster, 9,490

in York, 6,439 in Cumberland (Carlisle), 2,433 in Franklin

(Chambersburg), and 1,791 in Lebanon – that were augmented

by Republican losses of 15,322 in Lancaster, 566 in York, 2,839 in Cumberland,

1,443 in Franklin, and 1,217 in Lebanon. In other words, in the only

60

three double-Republican counties in all of Pennsylvania with

2012 total votes in excess of 100 thousand (Lancaster, York

and Cumberland), Democrats between 2004 and 2012 gained

30,082 and Republicans lost 18,727 – resulting in a 48,809

Democratic margin gain that increased the 2004 Kerry margin

of 144,248 by 33.83 percent, and that accounted for 29.47

percent of the Democratic 165,592 margin increase between

2004 and 2012 – in other words, almost one in every three

votes gained by the Democrats came from the three highest-

vote counties in Rural Pennsylvania.

The 2004-2012 Democratic gains in the Republican small-

city “T” counties have gone largely unnoticed, except by

Professor Renee Lamis and her quoted source, Philadelphia

Inquirer reporter Tom Enfield, both writing about the 2008

Obama overperformance of John Kerry in Lancaster County: “yet another signal that a bigger, wealthier, and better-educated Lancaster County slowly is being drawn into the long arms of metropolitan areas to the east and south – not just Philadelphia, but also Baltimore and Washington.”64

Between 2008 and 2012, the Republican margin in Lancaster

rose by 15,206, in York by 13,684, and in Cumberland by

5,009; however, the 2012 Republican margins are below the

2004 Republican margins by 29,075 in Lancaster, 10,456 in

York and 9,278 in Cumberland – a loss of 48,809 in “non-

Philadelphia Pennsylvania” where Romney acolytes such as Jay64 Rene M. Lamis, The Realignment of Pennsylvania Politics Since 1960, pages 307-308 and footnote 52, quoting Philadelphia Inquirer, November 8, 2008, “A Surprising Bump for Obama in Conservative Lancaster County” (Tom Infield).

61

Cost believed the vote would flip Pennsylvania in 201265; in

his Election Eve article, Cost screamed “[d]rive up

[Republican] turnout in the exurban counties of Lancaster and

York while mitigating losses in the interior suburban

counties.” Trouble is, between 2004 and 2012, Democrats

added 23,643 in these two counties whereas Republicans lost

65

? In 2012, Republican acolyte Jay Cost, writing a series of “Romney willwin” columns in The Weekly Standard, in the final column two days before the election (on November 4) argued that the Romney last-week Pennsylvania push was “reasonable” because Democratic support in the Philadelphia suburbs was “hyped” and between 1988 and 2008, was more than offset by Republican gains in Lancaster and York. Cost did not mention Adams (Gettysburg), but should have, since Republican percentages in this quintessential Civil War county are still above 60 percent.

However, between 2004 and 2012, the Republican margin in Lancaster-York-Adams fell by 42,341, whereas the Democratic margin in the Philadelphia suburban quartet rose by 36,203, and in Philadelphia, by 80,233.

Responding to the 1988-2012 comparison used by Cost, the author notes that between 1988 and 2012, the Republican margin in Lancaster-York-Adams fell from 100,065 to 93,974 (minus 6,091), and in the Philadelphiasuburban quartet, went from Bush 205,732 to Obama 123,327, a Republican margin loss of 329,059; the Democratic Philadelphia margin more than doubled, from 230,513 to 492,339 (plus 261,826). These Democratic gainsin Metro Philadelphia (total 590,805) and a 6,091 Republican loss in Lancaster-York-Adams occurred as the commonwealth-wide total vote rose from 4,536,251 to 5,754,560 (plus 1,218,309), meaning the net Democraticgain (596,896) was 48.99 percent of the commonwealth total vote increasebetween 1988 and 2012.

In his Weekly Standard article, Cost compares only Lancaster and York to the Philadelphia suburbs. The author’s inclusion of adjacent Adams (Gettysburg) with Lancaster and York helps Cost, because the quintessential Civil War Republican county of Adams gave Bush the Elder 64.92% and Romney 2012 a percentage of 63.03%. In contrast, in Lancaster, the Republican percentage fell from 70.77% to 58.50%, and in York, fell from 65.16% to 59.64%.

62

15,888, and in Cumberland (Carlisle), Democrats added 6,439

and Republicans lost 2,839 – another 9,278 in Democratic

margin gain; in Lebanon, Democrats added 1,791 and

Republicans lost 1,217 (Democrats plus 3,008), and in Adams

(Gettysburg), Republicans lost 1,480 and Democrats lost

1,327 (Republican net margin loss of 153). Instead of

looking for nonexistent Missing White Voters in Rural

Pennsylvania, Republicans need to craft a strategy for

winning back the actual voters who spurred the Democratic

raw vote gains in the three “T” counties with total votes in

excess of 100,000.

In Metropolitan Pennsylvania, There Are 1.993 Million Registered 2012

Nonvoters In 24 Counties That Added A Net 58,204 Democratic Votes Between

2004 and 2012

The Metropolitan Pennsylvania registered nonvoter

population is much higher (1,993,493 in 2012), but these

Pennsylvanians live in the five Metro Philadelphia counties,

the ten Eastern Pennsylvania counties, the four Democratic

western Pennsylvania counties, and even in the five Romney-

carried suburban Pittsburgh counties – a 24-county

collection where Democrats gained a net 58,204 and

Republicans lost 73,094, increasing the commonwealth

Democratic margin by 131,298.

63

Is there an undiscovered missing Caucasian Republican

electorate in the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties? Not

according to the Missing White Voter Theory -- which

predicts these voters exist in Rural Pennsylvania, not

Metropolitan Pennsylvania. However, it deserves review,

because as displayed below in Chart XV (Metropolitan

Pennsylvania registration and voting), the total number of

2012 registered nonvoters in Metropolitan Pennsylvania is

1,993,493, which superficially seems like a large pool where

only 16 percent (318,958) need to be found, persuaded and

turned out – at an improbable 100 percent Republican share.

If 100 percent of the 1,993,493 remain on the rolls in 2016,

turn out, and break 60 percent Republican, 38 percent

Democratic, 2 percent Others, here is what happens:

2016 New Voters

Dem. 2008: 620,478 Dem. Margin + 757,527 new D =

1,378,005

Dem.2012: 309,840 + 757,527 new

D = 1,067,367

Republican New Voters: + 1,196,095 = R 128,728 margin

win against the 2012 Obama margin, but 181,910 loss against

2008 Obama margin.

If the Republican gets 65 percent and the Democrat 33

percent, the 2008 Democratic margin goes up by 657,852 (to

64

1,278,330) and the Republican adds 1,295,770, which defeats

the 2008 Obama margin by all of 17,440.

As can be seen, the Republican missing voters trump

either Obama margin, – by 17,440 against the 2008 margin,

and by 128,728 against the 2012 margin, but only after

creating a Pennsylvania total vote:

increased by nearly two million -- 1,993,493 to

8,008,969 or 7,748,350;

increased in percentage terms above 2008 or 2012

numbers by 33.13 or 34.64 percentage points,

double the 17.43 percent total vote increase

between 2000 and 2004 (the Ken Mehlman surge of

856,471), and well above the 22.64 percent

Eisenhower surge between 1948 and 1952 (up

845,821);

and in raw number terms but not percentage terms,

well above even the highest-ever total vote surge

in Pennsylvania history – the 1932 to 1936

increase of 1,279,249 – a whopping 44.74

percentage gain over the 1932 total, in the

quadrennium when the Pennsylvania Republican

Machine collapsed, or the 1,005,760 gain between

1924 and 1928, an even more whopping 46.89

65

percent gain driven by the opportunity to vote

for or against Al Smith.

Thus, there is no post-1936 Pennsylvania historical

precedent for the turnout surge required by the Missing

White Voter Theory – not even in The Missing White Voter

Theory articles, which use a 55 percent turnout rate for the

“missing voters.” Fifty-five percent of 1,993,493 is

1,096,421, and to defeat the 2008 Obama margin, the 2016

Republican ticket will need 79 percent; to top only the 2012

margin, he or (not likely) she will need 64 percent.66

Trouble is, of the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania

jurisdictions, only three gave Mitt Romney percentages in

excess of 60 percent: the Pittsburgh suburban counties of

Armstrong (67.77%), Butler (66.62%), and Westmoreland

(61.29%). However, the total number of 2012 registered

nonvoters in these counties is 12,426 in Armstrong, 33,063

in Butler, and 68,434 in Westmoreland – a total of 113,923,

which at 55 percent turnout adds only 62,657 new voters,

66 For 2008:

1,096,421 x 79 percent (Republican plus 866,172) offset by Democratic 19percent (plus 208,319) = Republican net gain of 657,853, topping the Obama 2008 margin by a raw 37,375.

For 2012:

1,096,421 x 64 percent (Republican plus 701,709) offset by Democratic 34percent (plus 372,783) = Republican net gain of 328,925, topping the Obama 2012 margin by a raw 19,085.

66

barely one fifth of the 2012 Obama margin. The highest

Metropolitan Pennsylvania Romney percentage east of

Pittsburgh suburbia is the 59.68% in Wayne County in Eastern

Pennsylvania, where the 2012 registered nonvoter number is

10,970. In other words, the linchpin of The Theory is

registered non-voter turnout or total vote increases that

has never occurred in the history of Pennsylvania.

Democratic Vote Gains and Republican Vote Losses in Metropolitan

Pennsylvania, 2004-2012

A close analysis of actual registration and actual

voting in the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania jurisdictions

between 2004 and 2012 shows that Democrats are gaining

enough new votes in Metropolitan Pennsylvania to the point

that a 100 percent registered nonvoter turnout in the 43

Rural Pennsylvania jurisdictions would not matter. In

analyzing these numbers, one should also look at the Jay

Cost “Morning Jay” column in The Weekly Standard of November 4,

2012, where two days before the election Jay Cost screamed

that President Obama would lose Pennsylvania because the

Philadelphia Democratic margin would not stay at or exceed

the 2008 number of 470,000, and that “non-Philadelphia

Pennsylvania” had been trending Republican since 1988. Cost

argued: “The political story of Pennsylvania comes down to a

battle between Philadelphia County and the rest of the

state.” Cost urged time travel back to 2004 (where Bush

67

still lost), plus an increase from the 2004 Bush margin in

suburban Chester county, a flip of Bucks County, keeping the

Allegheny County Democratic margin down to 10-12 percentage

points, winning all the McCain counties with larger margins,

improve on Bush 2004 numbers in Erie, Lackawanna (Scranton),

Luzerne (Wilkes-Barre) and Lehigh (Allentown), and “drive up

turnout in the exurban counties of Lancaster and York.”

Every actual 2012 vote movement went against the Jay Cost

arguments:

The actual Obama 2008 Philadelphia margin was

478,759, and in 2012, it went up to 492,339 even

though the Democratic raw vote fell by 7,174 –

because the Republican raw vote fell by 20,954,

pushing the Republican raw vote number below

100,000 for the first time since 1880 and the

party-split elections of 1912 (Taft) and 1996

(Perot). As displayed in Chart XIX (party

registration in Metropolitan Pennsylvania),

between 2004 and 2012 Republican registration in

Philadelphia fell by 42,863, whereas Democratic

registration rose by 60,111.

Chester County was the only suburban Philadelphia

county to flip from Obama 2008 to Romney 2012, but

the margin shift was only 23,941, with the county

flipping from Obama 23,412 to Romney by 529 –

which was 9,799 below the Bush 2004 margin.

68

Bucks County remained Democratic, albeit with a

margin drop from 2008 by 24,841 that kept the

county Democratic by 3,942, below the 2004 Kerry

number of 8,969.

In Delaware County, the Obama margin fell by only

2,658, and the resulting 2012 margin of 63,597 was

21,421 above the Kerry margin.

In Montgomery County, the Obama margin fell by

28,866, but the resulting 58,975 was 12,668 above

the Kerry margin.

In Lackawanna (Scranton), the Obama margin fell by

only 1,279, and the resulting 26,753 was almost

double the Kerry margin of 14,807.

In Luzerne (Wilkes-Barre), the Obama margin fell

by 5,383, but the resulting 5,982 was still above

the Kerry margin of 4,620.

In Lehigh (Allentown), the Obama margin fell by

12,298, but the resulting 11,409 was triple the

Kerry margin of 3,780.

In Erie, the Obama margin fell by 6,413, but the

resulting 19,011 was nearly double the Kerry

margin of 10,549.

In Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), the 2012 Obama

margin was 14.53 percentage points.

The 2012 Greater Philadelphia results are the Pennsylvania version of the Sean Trende March 18, 2011 Real Clear Politics

69

article: “Obama Should Use "Colorado Strategy" to Win Ohio”,in which Trende urged Democrats to focus on white-collar voters with college degrees, who are even more prominent insuburban Philadelphia than in Columbus, Ohio.

As can be seen, the Democratic margins from the 15

Greater Philadelphia counties and the four Democratic

Western Pennsylvania counties created a margin wall that

could not be overcome in the 5 suburban Pittsburgh or the 43

Republican “T” counties:

Pennsylvania 2012: President Obama’s and Mitt Romney’s

margins

Metropolitan Pennsylvania

Philadelphia: Obama 492,339

Suburban Philadelphia: Bucks-Delaware-Montgomery Obama

123,856, minus Chester Romney 529 = Obama 123,327

Eastern Pennsylvania: Lackawanna-Luzerne-Lehigh-

Monroe-Northampton Obama 58,658, minus Berks-Carbon-Pike-

Schuylkill-Wayne Romney 18,423 = Obama 40,235

Total Greater Philadelphia Margin: Dem. 655,901 out of

total vote of 2,679,368

Allegheny (Pittsburgh): Obama 90,648

Dauphin (Harrisburg): Obama 7,515

Centre (Penn State): Obama 175

Erie: Obama 19,011 = total

Obama 117,349 out of total vote of 937,128

70

Total 19-county Democratic margin: 773,250 out of a total

vote of 3,616,496

Remaining 48-county total vote: 2,138,361

Pittsburgh 5 suburban counties: Romney total 99,450 margin

out of total vote of 432,619

Rural Pennsylvania “T” 43 counties: total vote 1,705,742 –

Romney margin 363,960

To overcome the 2012 Obama commonwealth margin of

309,840 exclusively from Rural Pennsylvania, Republicans

would need to nearly double their 2012 “T” margin of 363,960

to 674,000, which would enable them to win Pennsylvania by

all of 200 votes. This requires adding 310,040 in margin --

either from 310,040 “missing white voters” or 155,020

switched Obama 2012 voters. There are 759,964 registered

2012 nonvoters in the 43 Rural Pennsylvania counties, but

698,732 or 91.94% went missing in 2004 as well, and the

increase was only 61,232. Moreover, in 2004, President Bush

the Elder won the “T” by 398,254 – 34,294 below the 2012

Romney margin. Far from gaining margin in the “T” sufficient

to overcome the Democratic Metropolitan Pennsylvania

margins, Republicans have been on the decline. In contrast,

between 2004 and 2012, the Democratic margin from the 24

Metropolitan counties rose by 131,298, from 542,502 to

673,800 – even though these numbers include a Democratic

71

loss of 49,995 in margin from the five suburban Pittsburgh

counties.67

The Greater Philadelphia Democratic 159,083 margin gainbetween 2004 and 2012 was recognized by the 2011 tri-Republican redistricters of the Pennsylvania U.S. House districts, who dumped as many Democrats as possible into thePhiladelphia districts 1 and 2 (Robert Brady and Chaka Fatah), Montgomery County district 13 (Allyson Schwartz), and Lackawanna-Luzerne district 17 (Matt Cartwright) so theycould nest still-Republican or marginal Berks County with Chester and Delaware counties for district 6 (Jim Gerlach) and district 7 (Pat Meehan); Bucks and part of Montgomery for district 8 (Mike Fitzpatrick); and Lebanon County with Berks and Dauphin (Harrisburg) for district 15 (Charlie Dent).

The Missing White Voter Theory Registered Nonvoter Turnout Has Never

Occurred in Pennsylvania, And Republican Caucasian Solidarity Appeals Will Turn

Off Voters in Metropolitan Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania electoral history will be made if enough

of the current registered nonvoters (or unregistered

eligibles) will both turn out in 2016 and break Republican

at the percentage levels needed to flip the commonwealth.

67 Republican + 16,394, Democratic minus 33,601.

72

Most studies of nonvoters conclude that they are similar to

the voting population, or are more liberal on economic

issues (and perhaps conservative on social issues). If the

Republican nominee in 2016 relies on white resentment

appeals to this “hidden” nonvoting (or even nonregistered)

electorate, he or (not likely) she runs the risk of

alienating existing Republican voters in Metropolitan

Pennsylvania – as Sean Trende stated at the end of in his

July 2, 2013 article, “every action in politics tends to create

an opposite one.” Trende has repeatedly noted in his The Lost

Majority and elsewhere, that adding a new element to a

coalition frequently induces existing loyalists to “head for

the exits” (this happened to the Democratic Party in fits

and starts between the 1934 election of the first African-

American Democratic Congressmember in Illinois-1 and the

post-1964 departure of most Deep Southern Caucasians).

Thus, Trende’s own coalition analysis militates against the

idea that the Missing White Voters can flip any state. In

1964, Republican Deep South appeals to registered and

unregistered segregationists flipped the 1960 Kennedy states

of Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina, plus

Mississippi, but cost the Republicans everything else.

Within 1960 Nixon states of Virginia, Florida, and

Tennessee, Republicans flipped 1960 Democratic counties full

of segregationists, but suffered decisive counterflips of

1960 Nixon counties in Northern Virginia and the

73

Shenandoahs; in 1964 Pennsylvania, Republicans lost margin

in every county from 1960, and carried only four counties.68

A 2016 Missing White Voter appeal will probably have the

same impact in Metropolitan Pennsylvania, not to mention

metropolitan areas in Ohio, Virginia, Florida, Colorado,

Iowa, Nevada and New Mexico.

Republicans Between 2004 and 2012 Lost 273,840 Registered Voters in

Pennsylvania While Democrats Gained A Net 248,103

Another illuminating statistic available in

Pennsylvania is the partisan voter registration trend. The

Pennsylvania partisan voter registration statistics

displayed in Charts XVIII (rural Pennsylvania) and XIX

(metropolitan Pennsylvania) below show Republicans lost

273,840 registered voters between 2004 and 2012 – minus

35,141 in Rural Pennsylvania, and minus 238,699 in

Metropolitan Pennsylvania, where Democrats gained 251,384,

more than enough to offset their Rural Pennsylvania loss of

3,281.

In the search for new registrants in the 11 Republican

small-city counties in the “T”, Democrats outregistered

Republicans – Democrats up 52,004, Republicans down 17,225.

Democrats outregistered Republicans in 8 of the 11 counties

– all except Clearfield, Franklin and Northumberland. In

Lancaster, Democrats added 17,884 and Republicans lost 17,799;

68 Wayne, Lebanon, Snyder and Union.

74

in York, Democrats gained 12,140 and Republicans lost 695;

in Cumberland (Carlisle), Democrats added 9,835 and

Republicans lost 548. In Blair (Altoona), which between 1836

and 2012 supported a Democratic Presidential candidate only

in 1936 and 1964, Democrats outregistered Republicans 2,558

to 153. In the nine formerly Democratic Western

Pennsylvania counties, Democrats lost 49,986, but

Republicans added only 3,410. In the 23 small rural

counties, Democrats lost 5,299, but Republicans lost 14,506.

Moving to the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania counties:

In Philadelphia, Democrats up 60,111, Republicans

down 42,863;

In the Philadelphia Suburban Quartet, Democrats up

127,760, Republicans down 141,248;

In the 10 Eastern Pennsylvania counties, Democrats

up 67,478, Republicans down 34,306;

In the 4 Democratic Western Pennsylvania counties,

Democrats up 29,800, Republicans down 30,468;

In the five Pittsburgh suburban counties (all

carried by Romney), Democrats lost 20,547, but

Republicans added only 1,305.

The Missing Voters In Pennsylvania Are Registered Nonvoting

Democrats – Such as the 267,338 in Philadelphia

75

In his pre-election mis-prediction, Romney acolyte Jay

Cost argued that Democrats have “maxed out” in Philadelphia

because the Obama 2008 percentage was 85 percent. Actually,

it was 83.00 percent, and in 2012, went up to 85.24 percent.

The margin went up by 13,580, mostly because the Republican

raw vote went down by 20,754. However, the 2012 Obama

Philadelphia raw number of 588,806 underperformed 2008 by

7,174, and it underperformed the Philadelphia November 2012

Democratic registration of 856,144 – meaning there are

267,338 “missing” registered Democrats in Philadelphia for

the 2016 campaign to turn out. If 55 percent of them voted,

it would add 147,035 to the Democratic column – just enough

to cancel the 2012 Republican margins from the six large

Romney counties, and push the commonwealth Democratic margin

from 309,840 to 456,875.

Indeed, comparing the November 2012 registration totals

on the Pennsylvania Department of State website with the

voting raw numbers on the David Leip U.S. Election Atlas

website shows that commonwealth-wide, the Romney raw number

of 2,680,434 was only 450,710 behind the Republican

registration of 3,131,144, whereas the Obama 2012 number of

2,990,274 was 1,276,043 behind the Democratic registration

of 4,266,317. If the 2016 Democratic campaign turns out 55

percent of 1,276,043 (701,823) and these new voters break 60

percent Democratic, 38 percent Republican, Democrats add a

net 154,401; in contrast, Republicans turning out 55 percent

76

of 450,710 adds only 247,890, and if they break 60 percent

Republican 38 percent Democratic, Republicans add only a net

54,536.69

Counties with the largest number of registered

partisans are displayed below in Charts XI and XII below

along with the difference between the Obama or Romney raw

votes. As can be seen, Romney overperformed Republican

registration in the Pittsburgh metro counties of Allegheny,

Westmoreland and Washington, but in the other 17 counties

ran behind registration by only 348,883 (which if turned

out, would have topped the actual 2012 Obama margin by

39,043). President Obama underperformed Democratic

registration by 471,470 in Philadelphia and Allegheny

counties alone.

Chart XI: Top Twenty Registered Nonvoting Democratic

Counties, 2012

Dem. 2012 Reg. Obama 2012 Raw Vote

Philadelphia 856,144 588,806

= 267,338

Allegheny 556,819 352,687

= 204,132

69 Democratic analysis: 701,823 x.60 percent = Democratic plus 421,093, offset by Republican 38 percent (266,692), with 2% to Others (14,036), resulting in a net Democratic gain of 154,401.

Republican analysis: 247,890 x 60 percent = Republican plus 148,734, offset by Democratic 38 percent (94,198), with 2% to Others (4,957), resulting in a net Republican gain of 54,536.

77

Montgomery 253,481 233,356 =

20,125

Bucks 189,111

160,521 = 28,590

Delaware 174,595 171,792

= 2,803

Chester 128,351

124,311 = 4,040

Westmoreland 122,432 63,722 =

58,710

Berks 120,547

83,011 = 37,536

Lehigh 112,948

78,283 = 34,665

Luzerne 110,911

64,307 = 46,604

York 101,786

73,191 = 28,595

Northampton 101,458 67,606

= 33,852

Lancaster 100,056

88,481 = 11,575

Lackawanna 96,959

61,838 = 35,121

Erie 95,438

68,036 = 27,402

78

Dauphin 81,749

64,965 = 16,784

Washington 77,923

40,345 = 37,578

Beaver 65,739

37,055 = 28,684

Cumberland 52,805

44,367 = 8,438

Monroe 52,101

35,221 = 16,880

Chart XII: Top Twenty Registered Nonvoting Republican

Counties, 2012

Rep. 2012 Reg. Romney 2012 Raw Vote

Allegheny 250,279

262,039 overperform 11,760

Montgomery 214,321

174,381 = 39,940

Bucks 178,415

156,579 = 21,836

79

Delaware 176,167

110,853 = 65,314

Lancaster 167,063

130,669 = 36,394

Chester 150,692

124,840 = 25,852

York 135,972

113,304 = 22,668

Philadelphia 132,571

96,467 = 36,104

Berks 93,598

84,702 = 8,896

Westmoreland 90,032

103,932 overperform 13,900

Cumberland 81,204

64,809 = 16,395

Lehigh 76,493

66,874 = 9,619

Dauphin 74,144

57,450 = 16,694

Northampton 70,439

61,446 = 8,993

Luzerne 63,942

58,325 = 5,617

Erie 60,196

49,025 = 11,171

80

Franklin 49,601

43,260 = 6,341

Washington 49,252

53,230 overperform 3,978

Lebanon 43,943

35,872 = 8,071

Centre 42,979

34,001 = 8,978

By Every Metric Inside and Outside The Theory, The Theory Cannot Flip

Pennsylvania

As can be seen, the 55 percent turnout rate expressly

used in the Trende articles can be applied to the Census-

estimated commonwealth-wide NHW unregistered eligible, Census-

commonwealth-wide estimated gap between NHW registered and NHW

voting, and both the actual registered nonvoters in 2012

Rural Pennsylvania and the growth in Rural Pennsylvania

registered nonvoters between 2004 and 2012, The Theory

simply does not generate enough new voters even at 100

percent Republican to flip either the 2012 or the 2008 Obama

margins of 309,840 or 620,478 except when applied to the

actual 2012 registered nonvoter number in Rural

Pennsylvania, 91.94 percent of whom did not vote in 2004

either.

81

Chart XIII: The 55 Percent Turnout Rate Applied To

Nonvoting Populations in Rural Pennsylvania

Census estimated 2012 NHW unregistered eligible minus actual

registered, commonwealth-wide: actual total registered 8.508 million, Census

eligible NHW estimate 7.901 million – The Theory does not work because there

are more actual registered voters than estimated NHW registered voters.

Census estimated 2012 gap NHW registered and NHW

voting, commonwealth-wide: 832,000 x. 55 = 457,600 – cannot

defeat 2008, and tops 2012 only at 83 percent Republican.

Actual Rural Pennsylvania 2012 registered nonvoters:

759,964 x.55 percent = 417,980 – cannot top 2008, and can

defeat 2012 Obama margin only at 87 percent Republican, 11

percent Democratic, 2 percent Others.

Growth in Rural Pennsylvania registered nonvoters

between 2004 and 2012: 61,232 x . 55 = 33,677 – cannot

defeat either 2008 or 2012.

If The Theory using its’ own estimates and as applied to

real world registration and voting numbers in Rural

Pennsylvania cannot generate enough new voters to defeat the

2008 Obama margin, and defeats the 2012 Obama margin only at

83 or 87 percent Republican, it cannot flip Pennsylvania.

If The Theory cannot flip Pennsylvania, it is irrelevant to

the 2016 or 2020 Electoral College outcome unless it flips

Iowa, New Mexico, or one of the 2004-2012 swing states.

82

Strategy for Republicans: Eliminate the Gender and Nonwhite Gaps

Instead of chasing unregistered or registered nonvoting

Missing White Voters, Republicans would be better off trying

to switch 160,000 suburban-exurban voters in the Greater

Philadelphia counties of Chester, Bucks, Delaware,

Montgomery, Berks, Carbon, Lehigh, Northampton, Monroe,

Pike, Schuylkill, Wayne, Lackawanna and Luzerne. Between

2004 and 2012, Democrats moved 78,850 in margin from these

15 counties, so Republicans will need to do more than break

even – they will need to actually flip these counties to the

point that the 2016 Republican nominee wins them by 80,000,

and hope that Democrats do not increase their Philadelphia

margin above the 2012 record number of 492,339 by

registering and turning out any (much less 80,000 to

100,000) of the 856,144 registered Democrats in Philadelphia

not included in the 2012 Obama raw number of 588,806 –

which is 267,338 “missing voters.” Thus, Republicans will

need to win back their 2004-2012 losses in all of the 11 “T”

small-city counties (totaling 29,635), not to mention

converting back the Democratic gains totaling 34,306 in

Lancaster, York, Cumberland, Franklin and Lebanon counties –

or in what was once the 12th small-city Republican county in

83

the “T” – Dauphin (Harrisburg), where Democrats have gained

9,666 and Republicans have lost 7,846.

. Republicans will also need to reduce the Democratic

margin in Allegheny County (where Democrats are down by

16,225 from 2004), except that Republicans have also lost

9,886 here as well. Republicans will look at increasing

their numbers in the five Pittsburgh suburban counties, but

Democrats have already lost 49,995 in margin, and the Romney

percentages are over 60 percent in Westmoreland, Armstrong

and Butler counties.

Republicans are no longer able to generate big margins

from high-vote jurisdictions in Pennsylvania. The only 2012

jurisdictions with 100,000 or more total Presidential votes

carried by Mitt Romney are Berks (Reading), Chester,

Lancaster, York, Cumberland (Carlisle), and Westmoreland --

and in these locales with a combined 2012 total vote of

1,117,343, the combined Romney margins totaled 145,173, less

than one third of the Obama margin from Philadelphia.

Moreover, in 2004, the combined Republican margin in these

counties was 195,006, meaning Republicans between 2004 and

2012 lost 49,833 in margin from their six big county wins

while Democrats were increasing their Philadelphia margin by

80,233.

To flip Pennsylvania, Republicans will need to

eliminate the gender gap and aim for 50 percent of the

Hispanic vote that is growing presence in Monroe, Lehigh

84

Berks, Lancaster, York and Cumberland counties. If

Republican strategists instead wish to double down on the

unregistered, nonvoting angry white male population, be my

guest as Democrats on January 20, 2017 celebrate a third

consecutive White House inauguration (the first since 1949)

-- just don’t bet on the Missing White Voter Theory to

obtain any inaugural tickets, especially to the Pennsylvania

Inaugural Ball

Next stop on our Electoral College Junket: New

Hampshire.

85

Chart XIV: 2012, 2004 TURNOUT in the 43 Rural Pennsylvania Counties

County Registered Voting Difference 04 Reg 04 Vot

04 Diff

11 Republican Small-City Pennsylvania

Adams 61,156 42,625

18,531 58,025 42,228 15,797

Lancaster 314,567 223,351

91,216 312,878 221,372 91,506

York 280,280 189,977

90,303 264,134 179,269 84,865

Blair 85,328 50,365

34,963 80,598 54,178 26,420

Clearfield 51,174 32,122

19,052 49,499 34,233 15,266

Cumberland 158,194 111,191

47,003 144,727 106,082 38,645

86

Franklin 87,406 63,320

24,086 82,081 58,569 23,512

Lebanon 81,476 56,777

24,699 73,618 55,665 17,953

Lycoming 68,064 46,669

21,395 69,433 50,081 19,352

Northumberland 54,978 33,356

21,622 51,933 37,134 14,799

Warren 29,111 17,299

11,812 28,508 19,273 9,235

Subtotal: 1,271,734 867,052

404,682 1,215,434 858,084 357,350

9 Formerly Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Beaver 115,157 80,793

34,364 122,350 82,543 39,807

Cambria 86,988 60,526

26,462 91,769 66,983 24,786

Elk 20,302 13,279

7,023 21,017 14,550 6,467

Greene 22,663 14,464

8,199 25,244 15,565 9,679

Mercer 75,238 51,039

24,199 76,073 51,564 24,509

Clinton 22,969 13,311

9,658 20,439 13,967 6,472

87

Indiana 57,378 36,444

20,934 53,670 36,248 17,422

Lawrence 61,709 39,189

22,520 59,650 43,442 16,208

Columbia 39,888 25,739

14,149 42,934 26,869 16,065

Subtotal: 502,292 334,784

167,508 513,146 351,731 161,595

23 Rural Counties in the “T”

Bedford 32,189 21,697

10,492 32,878 22,679 10,199

Bradford 40,490 23,540

16,950 37,152 25,652 11,500

Cameron 3,651 2,111

1,440 3,718 2,406 1,312

Clarion 24,120 16,269

7,851 23,832 17,184 6,648

Crawford 54,711 35,575

19,136 58,569 38,322 20,247

Forest 3,232 2,324

908 3,152 2,573 579

Fulton 9,344 6,221

3,123 8,930 6,271 1,659

88

Huntingdon 28,824 17,692

11,132 29,681 18,058 11,623

Jefferson 28,549 18,176

10,373 28,847 19,560 9,287

Juniata 13,547 9,595

3,952 13,763 10,006 3,757

McKean 25,861 15,154

10,707 27,959 17,426 10,533

Mifflin 24,445 16,416

8,029 26,523 16,802 9,721

Montour 13,518 7,859

5,659 11,787 7,624 4,153

Perry 27,245 19,128

8,117 27,282 19,427 7,855

Potter 10,913 7,242

3,671 12,046 7,962 4,084

Snyder 21,573 15,068

6,505 20,844 14,983 5,871

Somerset 51,860 33,942

17,918 52,172 36,778 15,394

Sullivan 4,242 2,949

1,293 4,578 3,285 1,293

Susquehanna 26,163 18,116

8,047 26,774 19,040 7,734

Tioga 26,001 17,094

8,907 27,239 17,571 9,668

89

Union 23,950 16,336

7,614 22,075 16,123 5,952

Venango 32,773 22,257

10,516 37,356 23,659 13,697

Wyoming 17,255 11,921

5,334 18,997 12,832 6,165

Subtotals: 544,456 356,682

187,774 556,154 376,187 179,967

Clinton 22,969 13,311

9,658 20,439 13,967 6,472

Rural Pennsylvania Totals:

2,318,482 1,558,518 759,964 2,284,734 1,586,002

698,732

2004-2012: Registration up 33,748, Voting down 27,484, Registered

nonvoters up 61,232

Beats 2008 620,478 only at 90 percent turnout = 683,967. 2%

other = 13,679. 3% Dem. = 20,519. 95% Rep = 649,768 minus

20,519 = 629,249 beats Obama 2008 by 8,771

90

Mathematically impossible to beat 2012 at 40 percent turnout

– 759,964 x .40 = 303,985, underperforming Obama 309,840

55 % of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 417,980. 2% Other = 8,359. 11% Dem. =

45,977. 87% Rep. = 363,642 minus 41,798 = net Rep. + 317,665 trumps

Obama 2012 309,840 by 7,825

65% of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 493,976. 2% Other = 9879. 17% Dem =

83,975, 81% Rep. = 400,120 minus 83,975 = 316,145 beats Obama 2012 by

6,305

70% of 2012 nonvoting 759,964 = 531,974. 2% Other = 10,639. 19% Dem =

101,075. 79% Rep. = 420,259 minus 101,075 = 319,184, beats Obama 2012

by 9,344

Chart XV: 2012, 2004 TWO-PARTY RAW VOTE In the 43 Rural

Pennsylvania Counties

County R 2012, 2004 D 2012, 2004 Difference

91

11 Republican Small-City Pennsylvania

Adams 26,767 - 28,247 15,091 – 13,764 R

minus 1,480, D minus 1,327

Lancaster 130,669 – 145,591 88,481 - 74,328 R minus

15,322, D + 14,153

York 113,304 - 114,270 73,191 - 63,701 R

minus 566, D + 9,490

Blair 33,319 - 35,751 16,276 - 18,105 R

minus 2,432, D minus 1,829

Clearfield 20,347 – 20,533 11,121 - 13,518 R

minus 186, D minus 2,397

Cumberland 64,809 - 67,648 44,367 - 37,928 R minus

2,839, D + 6,439

Franklin 43,260 - 41,817 18,995 - 16,562 R

minus 1,443, D + 2,433

Lebanon 35,872 – 37,089 19,900 - 18,109

R minus 1,217, D + 1,791

Lycoming 30,658 - 33,961 15,203 - 15,681 R

minus 3,303, D minus 478

Northumberland 19,518 - 22,262 13,072 – 14,602 R

minus 2,744, D minus 1,530

Warren 10,010 - 10,999 6,995 -

8,044 R minus 989, D minus 1,951

Subtotal: R 528,533 - 558,168 D 322,692 – 294,342

R minus 29,635, D + 28,350

92

9 Formerly Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Beaver 42,344 - 39,916 37,055 – 42,146 R

+ 2,428, D minus 5,091

Cambria 35,163 - 34,048 24,249 -- 32,591

R + 1,115, D minus 8,342

Elk 7,579 - 7,872 5,463 --

6,602 R minus 293, D minus 1,139

Greene 8,428 -- 7,786 5,852 --

7,674 R + 642, D minus 1,822

Mercer 25,925 -- 26,311 24,232 – 24,831

R minus 386, D minus 599

Clinton 7,303 - 8,035 5,734 -

5,823 R minus 732, D minus 99

Indiana 21,257 - 20,254 14,473 - 15,831 R

+ 1,03, D minus 1,358

Lawrence 21,047 - 21,938 17,513 - 21,387

R minus 891, D minus 3,874

Columbia 14,236 - 16,052 10,937 – 10,679 R

minus 1816, D + 258

Subtotal: R 183,282 – 182,212 D 145,708 - 167,564

R + 1,070, D minus 21,856

23 Rural Counties in the “T”

Bedford 16,702 - 16,606 4,788 -- 6,016

R + 96, D minus 1,228

93

Bradford 14,410 - 16,942 8,624 - 8,590

R minus 2,532, D + 34

Cameron 1,359 - 1,599 724 - 794

R minus 240, D minus 70

Clarion 10,828 - 11,063 5,056 - 6,049

R minus 235, D + 993

Crawford 20,901 - 21,965 13,883 - 16,013 R

minus 1,064, D minus 2,130

Forest 1,383 - 1,571 896 -

989 R minus 188, D minus 93

Fulton 4,814 - 4,772 1,310 -

1,475 R + 42, D minus 165

Huntingdon 11,979 – 12,126 5,409 - 5,879 R

minus 147, D minus 470

Jefferson 13,048 - 13,371 4,787 - 6,073

R minus 323, D minus 1,286

Juniata 6,862 - 7,144 2,547 -

2,797 R minus 282, D minus 250

McKean 9,545 - 10,941 5,297 - 6,294

R minus 1,396, D minus 997

Mifflin 11,939 - 11,726 4,273 -

4,889 R + 213, D minus 616

Montour 4,652 - 4,903 3,053 -

2,666 R minus 251, D + 387

Perry 13,120 - 13,919 5,685 -

5,423 R minus 799, D + 262

94

Potter 5,231 - 5,640 1,897 – 2,268

R minus 409, D minus 371

Snyder 10,073 - 10,566 4,687 – 4,348 R

minus 493, D + 339

Somerset 23,984 - 23,802 9,436 – 12,842 R +

182, D minus 3,406

Sullivan 1,868 - 2,056 1,034 - 1,213

R minus 188, D minus 179

Susquehanna 10,800 - 11,573 6,935 - 7,351 R minus

773, D minus 416

Tioga 11,342 - 12,019 5,357 - 5,437

R minus 677, D minus 80

Union 9,896 - 10,334 6,109 – 5,700

R minus 438, D + 409

Venango 13,815 - 14,472 7,945 - 9,024 R

minus 657, D minus 1,079

Wyoming 6,587 - 7,782 5,061 - 4,982 R

minus 1,195, D + 79

Subtotal: R 235,138 - 246,892 D 114,793 – 127,112

R minus 11,754, D minus 12,319

Rural Pennsylvania Totals:

Republican 2012 – 946,953

95

Republican 2004 – 987,272

Democratic 2012 – 582,993

Democratic 2004 – 589,018

Margin 2012 R 363,960

Margin 2004 R 398,254

2004-2012: Republican net minus 40,319, Democratic net minus 6,025

96

Chart XVI: 2012, 2004 TURNOUT in the 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania

Counties

County Registered Voting Difference 2004 Reg 2004

Vote 2004 Dif

5 Metro Philadelphia

Philadelphia 1,099,197 690,776 408,421

1,062,439 674,069 388,370

Philly Suburbs [1,721,871 -- 1,272,025 449,846

1,728,207 1,234,768 493,439]

Bucks 435,606 321,016 114,590

451,899 319,816 132,083

Chester 337,822 252,576 85,246

324,747 230,823 93,924

Delaware 397,338 285,564 111,774

386,603 284,538 102,065

Montgomery 551,105 412,869 138,236

564,958 399,591 165,367

Subtotal: 2,821,068 1,962,801 858,267

2,790,646 1,908,837 881,809

10 Eastern Pennsylvania

Berks 250,356 170,676 79,680

235,166 164,487 70,679

97

Lehigh 226,453 147,224 79,229

197,797 145,091 52,706

Northampton 209,414 131,044 78,370

178,699 126,849 51,850

Lackawanna 149,474 98,351 51,123

154,464 105,819 48,645

Luzerne 194,137 124,845 69,292

213,120 136,028 77,092

Carbon 39,017 25,694 13,323

36,620 25,043 11,577

Monroe 108,879 63,024 45,855

98,784 56,342 42,442

Pike 41,840 23,279 18,561

38,225 21,299 16,926

Schuylkill 86,316 58,048 28,268

91,571 65,269 26,302

Wayne 32,577 21,607 10,970

30,064 21,967 8,097

Subtotal: 1,338,463 863,792 474,671

1,274,510 829,454 445,056

4 Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Allegheny 924,351 623,827 300,524

918,877 645,469 273,408

Centre 112,949 69,886 43,063

86,832 64,374 22,458

98

Dauphin 178,924 124,301 54,623

173,227 121,208 52,019

Erie 176,851 119,114 57,737

184,618 125,898 58,720

Subtotal: 1,393,075 937,128 455,947

1,363,554 956,949 406,605

5 Republican Pittsburgh Suburbia

Armstrong 42,147 29,721 12,426

45,261 31,097 14,164

Butler 122,762 89,699 33,063

112,943 85,425 27,518

Fayette 91,681 48,649 43,032

88,934 54,707 34,227

Washington 142,331 94,978 47,353

149,716 96,177 53,539

Westmoreland 238,006 169,572 68,434

256,365 178,696 77,669

Subtotal: 636,927 432,319 204,608

653,219 446,102 252,378

Metropolitan Pennsylvania Totals:

2012 Registration – 6,189,533. 2012 Voting 4,196,040. Reg. Nonvoters

1,993,493

99

2004 Registration – 6,081,929. 2004 Voting 4,141,342. Reg. Nonvoters

1,940,587

2004-2012: Registration + 107,604. Voting + 54,698. Reg. Nonvoters +

52,906

100% of registered nonvoter increase underperforms Obama 2012 and

2008

2012 registered nonvoters: 1,993,439 x .55% = 1,096,391 2% Other =

21,927. 8% Dem. = 87,711. 90% Rep. = 986,751 – beats either 2008 or 2012

At 2% Other = 21,927, 28% Dem. = 306,989, 70% Rep. 767,473 minus Dem.

306,989 = Rep. + 460,484 – beats 2012, not 2008

At 2% Other, 33% Dem. = 361,809. 65% Rep. = 712,654 minus 361,809 =

350,845 – beats 2012 by 41,005

At 2% Other, 34% Dem. = 372,772. 64% Rep. = 701,690 minus Dem. 372,772

= 328,918 – beats 2012 by 19,078

At 2% Other, 35% Dem = 383,736. 63% Rep = 690,726 minus Dem. 383,736

= 306,990 – barely misses 2012

At 2% Other, 38% Dem = 416,628, 60% Rep = 657,834 = R net + 241,206 –

underperforms both

Romney 2012 carry only Wayne, Pike, Carbon, Schuylkill, highest % 59.68 in

Wayne, 56.04% in Washington (Kerry 2004) In 2004, Bush won these plus

Monroe

100

Chart XVII: 2012, 2004 TWO-PARTY RAW VOTE In The 24 Metropolitan

Pennsylvania Counties

County R 2012, 2004 D 2012, 2004 Difference

5 Metro Philadelphia

Philadelphia 96,467 - 130,099 588,806 -

542,205 R minus 33,632, D + 46,601

Philly Suburbs [566,653 -- 570,671 689,980 – 657,795 R

minus 4,018, D + 32,185]

Bucks 156,579 - 154,469 160,521 --

163,438 R + 2,110, D minus 2,917

Chester 124,840 - 120,036 124,311 – 109,708

R + 4,804, D + 14,603

Delaware 110,853 -120,425 171,792 --

162,601 R minus 9,572, D + 9,191

Montgomery 174,381 -- 175,741 233,356 – 222,048 R

minus 1,360, D + 11,308

Subtotal: R 663,120 -- 700,770 D 1,278,786 –

1,200,000 R minus 37,650, D +_ 78,786

10 Eastern Pennsylvania

Berks 84,702 -- 87,122 83,011 --

76,309 R minus 2,420, D + 6,702

Lehigh 66,874 -- 70,160 78,283 --

73,940 R minus 3,286, D + 4,343

Northampton 61,446 -- 62,102 67,606 -- 63,446

R minus 656, D + 4,160

101

Lackawanna 35,085 -- 44,766 61,838 -- 59,573

R minus 9,681, D + 2,265

Luzerne 58,325 -- 64,953 64,307 --

69,573 R minus 6,628, D minus 5,266

Carbon 13,504 -- 12,519 11,580 --

12,223 R + 985, D minus 643

Monroe 26,867 -- 27,971 35,221 --

27,967 R minus 1,104, D + 7,254

Pike 12,786 -- 12,444 10,210 --

8,656 R + 342, D + 1,554

Schuylkill 32,278 -- 35,640 24,546 --

29,231 R minus 3,362, D minus 4,685

Wayne 12,896 -- 13,713 8,396 --

8,060 R minus 817, D + 336

Subtotal: R 404,763 -- 431,390 D 444,998 –

428,978 R minus 26,627, D + 16,020

4 Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Allegheny 262,039 -- 271,925 352,687 – 368,912 R

minus 9,886, D minus 16,225

102

Centre 34,001 – 33,133 34,176 –

30,733 R + 868, D + 3,443

Dauphin 57,450 – 65,296 64,965 —55,299

R minus 7,846, D + 9,666

Erie 49,025 – 57,372 68,036 –

67,921 R minus 8,347, D + 115

Subtotal: R 402,515 -- 427,726 D 519,864 – 522,865

R minus 25,211, D minus 3,001

Republican Pittsburgh Suburbia

Armstrong 20,142 – 18,925 9,045 -- 12,025 R +

1,217, D minus 2,980

Butler 59,761 -- 54,959 28,550 -- 30,090

R + 4,802, D minus 1,540

Fayette 26,018 -- 25,045 21,971 -- 29,120

R + 963, D minus 7,149

Washington 53,230 -- 47,673 40,345 -- 48,225 R +

5,557, D minus 7,880

Westmoreland 103,932 -- 100,087 63,722 – 77,774 R +

3,845, D minus 14,052

Subtotal: R 263,083 -- 246,689 D 163,633 –

197,234 R + 16,394, D minus 33,601

Metropolitan Pennsylvania Summary:

Republican: 2012 -- 1,733,481

Democratic: 2012 – 2,407,281

103

Dem. Margin 2012 673,800

Republican: 2004 – 1,806,575

Democratic: 2004 – 2,349,077

Dem. Margin 2004: 542,502

2004-2012: Republican minus 73,094, Democratic plus 58,204

CHART XVIII: Party Registration In The 43 Rural Pennsylvania Counties

County R 2012, 2004 D 2012, 2004 Difference

11 Republican Small-City Pennsylvania

Adams R 32,360 - 32,137 D 19,791 –

18,100 R + 123, D + 1,691

Lancaster 167,053 - 184,852 100,056 – 82,172

R minus 17,799, D + 17,884

York 135,972 -- 136,667 101,786 –

89,646 R minus 695, D + 12,140

Blair 46,300 -- 46,047 28,771 –

26,213 R + 153, D + 2,558

Clearfield 23,443 -- 22,768 22,449 --

22,226 R + 675, D + 223

104

Cumberland 81,204 -- 81,752 52,805 -- 42,970

R minus 548, D + 9,835

Franklin 49,601 -- 48,084 25,731 --

24,235 R + 1,517, D + 1,496

Lebanon 43,943 -- 42,980 26,470 – 21,307

R + 963, D + 5,163

Lycoming 35,400 -- 37,261 24,055 – 24,756

R minus 1,861, D minus 701

Northumberland 25,532 -- 24,901 23,221 – 22,958 R

+ 631, D + 263

Warren 13,993 -- 14,577 12,056 --

10,604 R minus 584, D + 1,452

Subtotal: R 654,801 -- 672,026 D 437,191 –

385,187 R minus 17,225, D + 52,004

9 Formerly Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Beaver 37,114 – 37,538 65,739 --

73,401 R minus 424, D minus 7,662

Cambria 27,944 – 28,849 51,205 --

56,390 R minus 905, D minus 5,185

Elk 7,564 -- 7,930 10,634 –

11,026 R minus 366, D minus 392

Greene 6,541 -- 6,514 14,283 --

17,151 R + 27, D minus 2,868

Mercer 30,346 -- 31,626 35,897 --

36,745 R minus 1,280, D minus 5,119

105

Clinton 9,806 -- 9,328 10,284 --

9,018 R + 478, D + 1,266

Indiana 23,873 -- 23,699 24,884 --

23,770 R + 174, D + 1,114

Lawrence 22,762 -- 21,995 32,946 – 32,881

R + 767, D + 65

Columbia 16,759 -- 18,640 17,054 -- 18,422

R minus 1,881, D minus 1,368

Subtotal: R 182,709 – 186,119 D 228,818 – 278,804

R minus 3,410, D minus 49,986

23 Rural Counties in the “T”

Bedford 19,371 -- 19,395 10,072 – 11,033

R minus 24, D minus 961

Bradford 23,282 -- 22,509 12,163 -- 10,624

R + 773, D + 1,539

Cameron 1,764 -- 1,862 1,500 -- 1,562

R minus 98, D minus 62

Clarion 12,339 -- 12,148 9,274 --

9,638 R + 191, D minus 364

Crawford 26,700 -- 30,037 21,995 -- 23,212

R minus 3,337, D minus 1,217

Forest 1,593 -- 1,715 1,384 --

1,248 R minus 122, D + 136

Fulton 5,430 – 5,025 3,025 --

3,269 R + 405, D minus 244

106

Huntingdon 16,210 – 16,987 9,673 -- 9,782 R

minus 777, D minus 109

Jefferson 15,305 -- 15,213 10,234 – 11,289 R

+ 92, D minus 1,054

Juniata 7,850 -- 7,875 4,421 --

4,757 R minus 25, D minus 336

McKean 14,377 – 16,368 8,262 -- 8,634 R

minus 1,991, D minus 372

Mifflin 13,999 -- 14,883 8,059 -- 9,293

R minus 884, D minus 1,234

Montour 6,325 -- 5,871 5,159 – 4,428

R + 454, D + 731

Perry 16,746 -- 17,196 7,339 --

7,004 R minus 450, D + 335

Potter 6,992 -- 7,341 3,217 –

3,736 R minus 349, D minus 519

Snyder 13,324 -- 13,689 5,658 -- 5,034

R minus 365, D + 624

Somerset 26,140 -- 25,987 21,158 – 22,487 R

+ 153, D minus 1,329

Sullivan 2,266 -- 2,528 1,613 --

1,699 R minus 262, D minus 86

Susquehanna 14,205 – 15,467 8,750 -- 8,561 R

minus 1,262, D + 189

Tioga 15,139 -- 17,071 7,551 --

7,594 R minus 1,932, D minus 43

107

Union 12,411 -- 12,741 7,161 --

6,260 R minus 330, D + 901

Venango 16,973 -- 19,774 12,056 -- 13,756

R minus 2,801, D minus 1,700

Wyoming 9,340 -- 10,909 5,979 -- 6,102

R minus 1,569, D minus 123

Subtotal: R 298,085 -- 312,591 D 185,703 –

191,002 R minus 14,506, D minus 5,299

Rural Pennsylvania Party Registration Summary:

2012: Republican 1,135,595 -- Democratic 851,712

2004: Republican 1,170,736 – Democratic 854,993

2004-2012 Change: Republican minus 35,141, Democratic

minus 3,281

CHART XIX: Party Registration In The 24 Metropolitan Pennsylvania

Counties

5 Metro Philadelphia

Philadelphia R 132,571 -- 175,434 D 856,144 – 796,033

R minus 42,863, D + 60,111

Philly Suburbs [719,595 – 860,843 745,878 – 618,118 R

minus 141,248, D + 127,760]

Bucks 178,415 -- 208,639 189,111 – 173,803 R

minus 30,224, D + 15,308

108

Chester 150,692 -- 170,419 128,351 -- 98,765

R minus 19,727, D + 29,586

Delaware 176,167 -- 213,030 174,595 --

131,317 R minus 36,863, D + 43,278

Montgomery 214,321 – 268,755 253,821 – 214,233

R minus 54,434, D + 39,588

Subtotal: R 852,166 – 1,036,277 D 1,602,022 – 1,414,151

R minus 184,111, D + 187,871

10 Eastern Pennsylvania

Berks R 93,598 -- 98,170 D 120,547 –

103,541 R minus 4,572, D + 17,006

Lehigh 76,493 -- 79,364 112,948 --

88,149 R minus 2,871, D + 24,799

Northampton 70,439 -- 67,193 101,458 --

83,694 R + 3,246, D + 17,764

Lackawanna 39,358 -- 46,882 96,959 -- 96,804

R minus 7,524, D + 155

Luzerne 63,942 – 75,529 110,911 --

120,420 R minus 11,587, D minus 9,509

Carbon 14,758 -- 14,626 19,020 --

17,807 R + 132, D + 1,213

Monroe 35,579 -- 39,271 52,101 --

40,959 R minus 3,692, D + 11,142

Pike 17,842 -- 18,488 15,397 --

12,672 R minus 646, D + 2,725

109

Schuylkill 40,800 -- 47,213 36,540 --

36,200 R minus 6,413, D + 340

Wayne 17,109 -- 17,488 10,512 --

8,669 R minus 379, D + 1,843

Subtotal: R 469,918 – 504,224 D 676,393 – 608,915 R

minus 34,306, D + 67,478

4 Democratic Western Pennsylvania

Allegheny R 250,279 -- 262,692 D 556,819 –

557,900 R minus 12,413, D minus 1,081

Centre 42,979 -- 38,367 46,828

– 32,867 R + 4,612, D + 13,961

Dauphin 74,144 -- 83,699 81,749 –

67,345 R minus 9,555, D + 14,404

Erie 60,196 - 73,308

95,438 – 92,922 R minus 13,112, D + 2,516

Subtotal: R 427,598 – 458,066 D 780,834 –

751,034 R minus 30,468, D + 29,800

5 Republican Pittsburgh Suburbia

Armstrong R 20,374 -- 20,739 D 17,582 –

20,442 R minus 365, D + 2,860

Butler 62,863 -- 57,737

43,970 – 42,466 R + 5,126, D + 504

Fayette 23,640 -- 21,421

60,441 – 61,475 R + 2,219, D minus 1,034

Washington 49,252 -- 47,351 77,933 --

88,941 R + 1,901, D minus 11,008

110

Westmoreland 90,032 – 88,727 122,432 --

142,979 R + 1,305, D minus 20,547

Subtotal: R 246,161 – 235,975 D 322,358 --

356,303 R + 10,186, D minus 33,945

Metropolitan Pennsylvania Summary:

Republican 2012: 1,995,843

Republican 2004: 2,234,542

2004-2012: R minus 238,699

Democratic 2012: 3,381,787

Democratic 2004: 3,130,403

2004-2012: D + 251,384

111