Peace and Security Council Protocol

8/20/2019 Peace and Security Council Protocol

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PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

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Nigeria

Previous AU/PSC

Communiqués and

Recommendations:

Following the spate of terror attacks

by the Boko Haram at the end oflast year, on 26 December 2011 theAU Commission released a strongstatement condemning the groupand its activities. In the statementthe Chairperson stated that ‘BokoHaram’s continued acts of terrorand cruelty and absolute disregardfor human life cannot be justified byany religion or faith’. Dr Ping furtherreaffirmed the AU’s total rejectionof all acts of intolerance, extremismand terrorism.

The AU also released another press

statement following the deadlywaves of attacks by the group onJanuary 20-21 that killed around200 people in the nation’s secondbiggest city of Kano. The 22January statement expressed theAU’s condemnation of the attack‘in the strongest terms’. The AUpledged to support the efforts bythe government of Nigeria to bringan end to ‘all terrorist attacks in thecountry’ and combat terrorism in allits forms.

The AU also reacted to the August2011 bombing of the United Nations(UN) office in Abuja, Nigeria. In apress release, issued on 26 August2011, the Chairperson of the AUCommission condemned the suicidebomb attacks on the UN Office.The Chairperson underscored theabhorrent and criminal nature of theattacks, which he said could not be justi fied under any circumstances.Dr. Ping reaffirmed the AU’stotal rejection of extremism andterrorism in all its manifestations,and its determination to combatthe scourge in accordance withthe relevant AU and international

instruments. He encouraged thegovernment of Nigeria to spare noefforts in bringing those responsiblefor the horrific attacks to justice.

spokesman, Abul Qada, told journalists that it had carried out theattacks because the authorities hadrefused to release group membersarrested in Kano.

As Nigeria suffers from theseattacks, leading to rising sectariantensions, many fear that the nationmay become engulfed in a civil war.The government’s response appearsto be unable to stop the attacks andseems to require a more effective

and comprehensive strategy to solvethe root causes.

Key Issues and Internal

Dynamics:

According to a 2004 BBC survey,Nigeria is the most religious countryin the world. 90 percent of thepopulation believe in God, prayregularly and affirm their readinessto die on behalf of their beliefs.Nigerians, both Muslims andChristians, take their respectivereligions very seriously. Many

attribute the present security crisisin Nigeria partly to the politicizationof religion and the earnest quest bymany religious zealots to entrenchIslam in Nigeria and promote areturn to Islamic orthodoxy.

A charismatic Muslim cleric,Mohammed Yusuf, formed BokoHaram in 2002. Boko Haram, acombination of Hausa and Arabicwords denoting ‘Western educationis sinful’, is the popular name for agroup officially known as, Jama’atu

Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad ,which in Arabic means ‘People

Committed to the Propagation ofthe Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’.In 2009, Boko Haram came toprominence following its attackson police stations and othergovernment buildings in Maiduguriin Northern Nigeria. In the violencethat followed, hundreds of BokoHaram supporters were killedand thousands of residents fledthe city. Nigeria’s security forceseventually seized the group’sheadquarters, capturing its fightersand killing Mohammed Yusuf. Hisbody was shown on state televisionand the security forces declared

Boko Haram finished. However,its fighters have regrouped under

Crisis Escalation Potential:

On 9 January 2012, NigerianPresident Good Luck Jonathan saidthat the terror threat posed by theBoko Haram was worse than thecountry’s civil war in the 1960sthat killed more than a millionpeople. The president stated thatthe nation knew where the enemywas coming from during the civilwar while the challenge Nigeriafaces today is more complicated.

Following the spate of attacks bythe Boko Haram on 1 January 2012,President Jonathan declared a stateof emergency in 15 areas as partof his response to the unrest. Thepresident also deployed extra troopsto the affected areas. Nonetheless,attacks have continued in anintensified manner. During the pastsix weeks Boko Haram’s deadlyattacks have claimed the lives ofhundreds and triggered a rise insectarian tensions.

On 2 January 2012 Boko Haram warned Christians living in the

country’s predominantly Muslimnorth that they had only threedays to evacuate the region beforeattacks would target the community.The group’s spokesperson, AbulQada, also threatened that thedeployment of Nigerian soldierswould only intensify the attacks. Ina Hausa language video statementon You Tube dated 11 January2012, the head of the Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, defended recentattacks on Christians, saying theywere revenge for killings of Muslims.In his first video message, the headof the group referred to attacks on

Muslims in recent years in severalparts of northern Nigeria andwarned President Jonathan thatNigeria’s security forces would notbe able to defeat the group.

In the most deadly attacks bythe Boko Haram so far, a wave ofcoordinated gun and bomb attacksin the northern Nigerian city ofKano killed more than 185 people.The series of bomb blasts andshootings on 20 January, mostlytargeting police stations, terrorisedthe residents of Nigeria’s secondbiggest city of more than 10 million

people. Police stations and thestate police headquarters wereamong the targets. Gunfire washeard across the city. Boko Haram’s

COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Côte d’Ivoire

In Côte d’Ivoire, constitutional orderwas restored after the accession topower of democratically electedPresident Alassane Ouattara on7 May 2011. The holding of theDecember 2011 legislative elections,as provided for by the election-related aspects of the Ouagadougou

Political Agreement, ensured theconclusion of the institutionalnormalization process followingseveral years of conflict and a brutalpost-electoral crisis. The countryremains however deeply dividedand still faces important challenges.The legislative elections were heldin a fragile social, political andeconomic context and attracteda relatively low turnout (36 %). As

the country embarks on a post-conflict and reconstruction phase,national reconciliation, disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration(DDR) of former fighters, securitysector and judicial reforms as well asthe humanitarian situation are amongthe remaining challenges.




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Obasanjo, in what turned out tobe a failed mediation attempt thatresulted in the death of the BokoHaram Leader, Babakura BabaFugu, in a reprisal attack by otherBoko Haram members. A furtherapproach by the governmentinvolved the deployment ofapproximately 20 000 militarypersonnel across the country witha full mandate to deal with the

increasing security challenges,but even this failed to effectivelycounter Boko Haram.

The scale and coordination ofBoko Haram’s attacks reveal anorganisation growing in confidenceand ambition, and seeminglycommitted to a long-terminsurgency. Although it is hard togauge the level of public supportthe group enjoys, many believe thata significant number of residents inthe north may share its goal of anIslamic state, but few have endorsedits violent tactics, and many

moderate Muslims have also beenvictims of Boko Haram.

The Nigerian authorities, who areroutinely accused of mishandlingand fuelling the insurgency throughthe heavy-handed actions ofsecurity forces, have reportedlyallocated 25% of the 2012 nationalbudget to defence. Many fearthat a strategy skewed towardsconfrontation, rather than dialogue,will condemn the region to long-term instability. Boko Haram is amurky organisation with a rangeof targets and agendas, having

attacked Christians, and the UnitedNations Office in recent months,but its main focus remains thegovernment security institutionsand the police in particular, whichit blames for the 2009 death of itsformer leader, while in custody.

Boko Haram should not beunderestimated and its threat totake the fight southward needs tobe dealt with effectively.

Geo-Political Dynamics:

Pan-African and RECs Dynamics:

On 4 October 2011 the Committeeof Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS)of the Economic Community ofWest African States discussed theBoko Haram threat at its meetingin Abuja. The meeting emphasizedthe need to bring about a lastingsolution to the terrorist attacks byaddressing the deeply rooted social,political and economic factorscausing the threat. ECOWAS statedthat the security efforts should beaccompanied by socio-economic

and political development.Claims of regional links of theBoko Haram with other local and

a new leader, and in 2010 theyattacked a prison in Maiduguri,freeing hundreds of the group’ssupporters. The group has alsostaged several audacious attacks indifferent parts of northern Nigeria,thereby deepening its operationsacross the region and fuellingtension between Muslims andChristians.

However, many have criticised theway the government has respondedto the Boko Haram challenge,particularly its present approachto the current crisis. Oppositionparties, in particular those in thenorth, such as the Congress forProgressive Change (CPC), believethe government is underestimatingthe amount of support BokoHaram has among the population.Leaders of the CPC have saidthat many people in the northfeel marginalized and excludedfrom wealth and opportunity,emphasizing the economic gap

between the mostly Christiansouth and the Muslim north. Thecountry’s economic hardship hasalso added to the rift betweenthe largely Muslim north and thepredominantly Christian south. Asthe north is poorer, the Boko Haram finds it increasingly easy to recruityoung men to commit bloodysectarian violence.

On 9 January 2012, PresidentGoodluck Jonathan accused somemembers of his government ofbeing supporters of the BokoHaram. The president stated that the

group had sympathisers at all levelsof the government. Particularly,the effectiveness and disciplineof the Nigerian security forces incombating the Boko Haram threat isunder serious scrutiny. Many accusemembers of the security forces of abrutal crackdown against the groupand its supporters. The problems ofthe security institutions were furtherhighlighted when the principalsuspect of the Christmas bombingsthat killed at least 44 people, KabiruSokoto, who was arrested on 14January, managed to escape frompolice custody. On 17 January,Nigerian authorities suspended a top

police officer for alleged negligencein the escape of Kabiru Sokoto.Subsequently, on 25 January 2012,President Jonathan released thepolice chief and six of his deputiesfrom their duties. The Presidentappointed another police chief andnamed a committee ‘to oversee theurgent reorganisation of the police’.

Boko Haram has increasinglyembraced suicide bombing, aterrorist strategy that inflicts oftenindiscriminate casualties. Followingthe failure of the Amnesty offer of2010, the government launched

a controversial attempt to startnegotiations. Subsequently, thegovernment engaged the servicesof the former president, Olusegun

international terrorist groups havebeen made. Security reports claimthat Boko Haram fighters havetraveled to Somalia and Afghanistanfor training. There are also reportsstating that the Boko Haram haverecruited fighters coming from otherwest African countries like Benin,Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

On 24 October, a spokespersonfor Boko Haram, officially claimedthat the group had links with theNorth African chapter of Al- Qaeda,AQIM. Foreign ministers fromthe Sahel countries of Algeria,Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,Burkina Faso and Chad held asecurity meeting in Nouakchottin December 2011 on regionalsecurity, including the threatposed by the collaboration ofthe two groups. On 24 January,Mali’s Foreign Minister BoubeyeMaiga said there was a “confirmedlink” between Boko Haram andal-Qaeda’s North Africa franchise, at

a security meeting of Sahel states inMauritania also attended by Nigeria.

UN Dynamics:

The United Nations has been amajor victim of the Boko Haram asit lost eleven of its staff membersin the attacks on the UN Office inAbuja that killed 23 people andinjured over 100 others in August2011. The UN has condemned therecent attacks by the group and itsSecretary-General, Ban Ki-moon,called the action ‘unjustifiable’ and

urged an end to all acts of sectarianviolence.

The U.N. Human Rights HighCommissioner Navi Pillay alsocalled on Nigerian political andreligious leaders to conduct jointefforts to halt sectarian violence inthe country. The UN Human Rightschief noted that it was especiallyimportant for Muslim and Christianleaders to ‘condemn all violence,’including retaliatory attacks.

Following the most deadly attack bythe Boko Haram in Kano which led

to the killing of over 200 people theUN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moonsaid he was “appalled” by theattacks and he called for transparentinvestigations. The UN statementwhich condemned the multipleattacks in the strongest termsaccused the group of ‘unacceptabledisregard for human life.’

Wider InternationalCommunity Dynamics

As the international links andprofile of the Boko Haram grows,

the concerns of the internationalcommunity about the group’s




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Scenario Planning:

The threat by the Boko Haram andthe security dynamics in Nigeriacould take a number of coursesbased on the actions taken by thevarious parties to the crisis in thecoming months. The following arethe possible scenarios:

Scenario 1:

The attacks by the Boko Haram willexpand and continue to destabliseand divide Nigeria, triggeringretaliatory attacks and therebycreating the risk of civil war alongreligious lines.

Scenario 2:

The indiscriminate attacks ofBoko Haram together with the

strengthening of its ties withregional and international terroristgroups could erode whateverpopular support the group has inthe country.

Scenario 3:

The weaknesses of the Nigeriansecurity institutions and theirheavy reliance on a brutal securityapproach to the crisis could inspirefurther attacks from Boko Haram.

Scenario 4:

Genuine negotiation efforts coupledwith improved security measures, bythe Nigerian government, involvingthe local community and civilsociety, could result in reducingtensions.

Early Response Options:

Given the above scenarios,the following options could beconsidered:

Option1:

The PSC could discuss the matterin-depth and issue a press statementor a communiqué condemningthe acts of terrorism that BokoHaram has perpetrated in Nigeriaand call on Nigerian authoritiesto operationalize and effectivelyimplement the Terrorism PreventionBill with a view to vigorouslyapplying the law against BokoHaram and its activities. In thisregard, Boko Haram would be

officially designated as a terroristgroup, making it a criminal offenceto be a member or to support thegroup, whether directly or indirectly.

regional and global reach are rising.The US sent its military chiefs toNigeria on 18 January 2012 todiscuss Boko Haram with theirNigerian counterparts. In January2012, the Nigerian Ambassador tothe United States, Prof AdebowaleAdefuye, stated that Nigeria wasopen to international assistance onthe issue of Boko Haram, because of

its international dimension and theglobal condemnation of terrorism.On 17 January 2012, U.S. Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton alsoexpressed her deep concern aboutthe terrorist attacks in Nigeria.

The French Foreign Minister, AlainJuppe, also condemned the deadlyattacks on the eve of the Christmascelebrations in Nigeria. In an officialstatement posted on the ministry’swebsite, the Minster statedthat France supported Nigerianauthorities in their fight against

terrorism. Nigeria is France’s biggesttrading partner in sub-SaharanAfrica.

Civil Society Dynamics

The reaction of Nigerian civilsociety towards the series of violentBoko Haram attacks has beenstrong. Some associations, includingthe Christian Association of Nigeria,have urged their members toprotect themselves against theattacks, which they referred to as‘systematic ethnic and religious

cleansing’.

The head of the ChristianAssociation of Nigeria condemnedthe government for its failure toprotect citizens from the attacksand make a ‘convincing high profilearrest’ to demonstrate its intent tocurtail the group.

The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC)strongly condemned the terroristattacks on Christians, describing theattacks as vicious acts. However thecongress urged the government to

address the root causes of insecurityin the country by providing massemployment, mass educationand mass enlightenment for thepopulace. The NLC stated that thebombings are a manifestation ofthe failure of the political leadershipthat throws money at problems likesecurity, rather than solve them.Other members of the Nigerian civilsociety like the Action Congressof Nigeria (ACN), Congressfor Progressive Change (CPC),Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF),Campaign for Democracy (CD),

Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC),Muslim Public Affairs Centre(MPAC) and the Muslim Congress(TMC) also condemned the attacks.

Option 2:

The AU PSC could also urge theNigerian government to empowerand protect moderate Islamicleaders and members of civilsociety in northern Nigeria toencourage local initiatives againstthe group. These could includeconfidence-building dialogue

between Muslims and Christiansparticularly in Northern Nigeriaand the implementation ofpolitical, legal, economic and socialprograms, intended to dissuade anddeter individuals from engagingin terrorism as the most effectivemeans to eliminate the threat ofterrorism in the long-term.

Option 3:

The PSC could request the AUCommission to investigate theregional dimensions of BokoHaram’s terrorist acts and submita report on a coordinatedregional response that the AU, inconsultation with ECOWAS andother relevant regional groupings,could adopt. The PSC could alsorequest the African Centre for theStudy and Research on Terrorism(ACSRT) to facilitate cooperationamong states as well as the effectiveimplementation of regional,continental and international legalinstruments.

Option 4:

The PSC could coordinate itsefforts with the UNSC and otherinternational players to developa joint response anti-terrorismstrategy, which would be based on aclose partnership with UN missionsin the affected countries.

Documentation:

Relevant AU Documents:

Press Release (22 January 2012)

AU Commission Press Statement

condemning the Terrorist Attacks

in Kano, Nigeria

Press Release (26 December

2011) AU Commission Press

Statement condemning the

Terrorist Bombings in Nigeria

Press Release (August 2011) AU

Commission Press Statement

condemning suicide bomb

attacks on the United Nations

Office in Abuja, Nigeria




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COUNTRY ANALYSIS

South Sudan:

Previous PSC and AU

Commission Communiqués

During its 301st meeting held on 20October 2011, the PSC receivedthe AU Chairperson’s report onthe African Union High-levelImplementation Panel (AUHIP). Inthe communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM./ (CCCI), issued after the meeting,the PSC encouraged ‘the AUHIP towork closely with the Government ofSouth Sudan in support of its effortsto meet the challenge of governancein a context of diversity’.

The PSC further ‘underlined thecritical role that the internationalcommunity can play in theattainment of the objective oftwo viable States, including …the provision of aid and technicalassistance to the new state of SouthSudan, as well as political support tothe holistic approach to peace.’

Crisis escalation potential

In late December 2011, the Republicof South Sudan witnessed the worstand largest of the inter-communalclashes that were on the rise in thecountry during the course of theyear. The violence, involving the

Lou Nuer and the minority Murlecommunities, particularly affectedJonglei State, one of the ten statesmaking up the new country ofSouth Sudan. On 23 December2011, violence started whenarmed members of the Lou Nuercommunity launched attacks againstthe Murle community. According toUN estimates, at least 60,000 peoplehave been displaced in the conflict.

Although there are no confirmedfigures on the number of peoplewho lost their lives, at one pointthe Commissioner of Pibor County

said over 3000 people were killedand 1,790 women and childrenwere abducted. Apart from humancasualties and the humanitariancrisis that ensued from the violence,UN reports estimated that 50,000-80,000 cattle were also seized in theviolence.

This is not the first time that thetwo communities have fought oneanother. Instead, it is a continuationof a cycle of conflict that took placeover the past year between the twocommunities. Similar clashes werereported in April, June and August

2011. In these earlier conflicts, UNreports indicated that more than1,100 people lost their lives andsome 63,000 people were displaced

by inter-communal violence inJonglei during 2011.

Additionally, this is only one of themany reported incidents of violencethat took place in the conflict-prone state of Jonglei. While suchconflicts are present in many partsof South Sudan, Jonglei appears tohave suffered the most. Of the 440

various conflicts reported in SouthSudan during 2011, more than a third(179) took place in Jonglei. The vastmajority of these conflicts were inter-communal.

In the light of the prevalence ofsimilar conflicts in other parts ofSouth Sudan, it would not be anexaggeration to say that inter-communal violence involving andarising from cattle raiding andcompetition over scarce resourcesis one of the most serious internalsecurity challenges facing the newly

established state of South Sudan.

Although the Lou Nuer launchedthe attacks in retaliation forearlier attacks by Murle armedmilitias, the violence also reflectsdeeper problems related topoverty, proliferation of weapons,competition over scarce resourcessuch as water and land, and lackof independent state securityinstitutions and local governmentstructures.

Before these underlying causes of

the conflict are effectively addressedand a comprehensive reconciliationprocess is implemented, violencebetween the communities is sure tocontinue. Not long after Lou Nuer’sattacks, Murle fighters started toregroup and counter attack. Severalincidents of revenge attacks by theMurle were reported. While theMurle killed 24 people in AkoboCounty in a revenge attack on 8January 2012, eight more peopledied in a similar attack on 10 January.Similar incidents took place on 11and 16 January 2012.

Apart from the potential forfurther clashes between thetwo communities, what is moretroubling about this violence is thehigh risk of a genocidal massacreand ethnic cleansing. The lack ofany independent state securityinstitutions and the high level ofsmall arms and weapons involvedhave made this risk a realisticpossibility. Indeed, the planningand execution of the recent attackssuggest that the armed Lou Nuerwere acting with genocidal intent.

Therefore, despite its appearance,the risk in these conflicts is far moreserious than that of an ordinarycattle raid.

Key issues and

internal dynamics

The major violence that devastatedJonglei took place between 23December 2011 and 5 January2012. It is estimated that between6,000 and 8,000 armed Lou Nuerwere involved in the attacks andraids against the Murle. The LouNuer militants, who have designatedthemselves as the White Army, area local militia that was involvedin the massacre of thousandsin South Sudan after the 1991split within the Sudan PeoplesLiberation Army (SPLA). Althoughthis militia eventually lost its militarystrength through a combinationof disarmament and armed defeatby the SPLA in May 2006, it seemsthat the White Army has sincebeen reactivated. This presents awider security problem for the newcountry as the White Army couldalso challenge the authority of the

SPLA.

As part of their efforts to mobilizea large group of militants, the LouNuer made preparations, whichincluded warning the SPLA and UN.While launching their attacks, theyreleased a statement outlining theirplans and warning the SPLA andthe United Nations Mission in SouthSudan (UNMISS). In the statementthey declared: ‘we call on the SPLAsoldiers who do not want to die thisyear to stay out of our way. The NuerWhite Army is well armed and nopower can stop it.’ The statement

similarly warned the UNMIS statingthat ‘they should not leave the areaif they don’t want to die. We haveheavy weapons that can bring downand anybody standing on our waywill be a casualty.’

The large and heavily armed LouNuer militias have marched onvillages and towns unleashingviolence and destruction withimpunity. On 23 December, armedLou Nuer fighters advanced onLopilod village in Likuangole districtin Pibor County, burning villages inthe area. On 26 and 27 December,

the village of Likuangole wasrazed, with houses burnt to theground, an NGO clinic providingessential medical support to thecommunity looted and destroyed,and all boreholes destroyed. On 31December, the Lou Nuer reachedthe periphery of Pibor town, lootingand burning a number of huts,including two NGO compounds.In the following days, the armedattackers marched south towardsFertait and Bilait. The rampagecontinued until 5 January 2012.

Aerial views of some of the areas

affected by the violence revealedthat entire villages were destroyed.

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The New York Times reported thatmany people were brutally killed.According to the New York Timesarticle, ‘there is an old man on hisback, a young woman with her legssplayed and skirt bunched aroundher hips, and a whole family – man,woman, two children – all facedownin the swamp grass, executedtogether. How many hundredsare scattered across the savannah,

nobody really knows.’ As in mostsimilar kinds of conflicts, most of thevictims were vulnerable membersof the target community, namelywomen and children.

In addition to the human casualties,the violence also resulted in hugematerial losses. It was reported that50,000 to 80,000 head of cattlewere taken away from the Murle. It isfeared that this would seriously affectthe livelihood and food security ofthe community. Without their cattle,the communities will have nothingto sell or exchange for food. The sale

of one cow alone can buy a familythree months worth of grain. Giventhe number of cattle stolen, manymembers of the Murle lost theirmeans of survival and would requirefood aid.

The major consequence of thislatest inter-communal violenceresulted in a major humanitariancrisis in Jonglei. The Governmentof South Sudan declared JongleiState a disaster zone on 5 Januaryand asked humanitarian agenciesto accelerate life-saving assistance.According to UN reports, at least

60,000 people were displaced. Apartfrom the loss of cattle, on whichpeople depend for their livelihood,the affected communities losttheir houses and villages and theirpersonal belongings. Many were inneed of medical assistance. Over150 injured people had been airliftedto Juba, Bor and Malakal for medicaltreatment by 5 January. Althoughpeople started returning to theirlocalities, they had no shelter. Thehumanitarian assessment made inthe affected areas indicates that themost urgent needs of the affectedpeople include high-nutritional food,

clean water, health care and shelter.

Some of the hardest hit areas suchas Likuangole, Fertait, Bilait, Walgakand Boma are very remote andinaccessible by road. Accordingly,while aid organizations begin todeliver life-saving relief to peoplein need, a lack of aircraft and thelimited number of aid workers onthe ground is impeding access to thelarge number of people in need ofassistance.

The recent inter-communal attacksare the latest in a series of large-scale

conflicts between the Lou Nuer andMurle that have taken place overthe past several years. Althoughthe White Army was disarmed or

otherwise integrated into the SPLAin 2006, an opportunity for itsreactivation was created with therearming of the Lou Nuer from 2008in response to Murle attacks andcattle raiding. In 2009, there was aseries of clashes between the twocommunities. Clashes in Akobo andPibor counties have resulted in morethan 1,000 casualties, including aweeklong battle that left some 750

dead. The two communities engagedin deadly clashes in March, April,May and August 2009.

The cycle of conflict between thetwo communities has also continuedduring the past year, with lethalconsequences. There were clashesin April, June and August 2011. InApril, Lou Nuer attacks against theMurle in Pibor County brought aboutthe deaths of more than 200 people,the abductions of 91 women andchildren and the displacement of4400 people. In June, the Lou Nueragain attacked the Murle killing

over 400 people, abducting 147and displacing over 7,000 people.In August 2011, the Murle attackedthe Lou Nuer in Uror County, killingseveral hundreds and displacingover 28,000 people. As the numberof people affected by the violenceindicates, the December violencecaused more destruction anddisplacement than all of the otherconflicts of 2011 combined.

Of course, these conflicts are notunique to the two communities.They are also not limited to Jonglei,although Jonglei has experienced

the most instability in South Sudan.The conflicts between the Lou Nuerand the Murle are part of a widerproblem of inter-communal conflictsin South Sudan, often associatedwith cattle rustling.

Cattle are the main source oflivelihood for many communities inSouth Sudan. The wealth of a personin many communities is measuredby the number of cattle the personowns. Cattle are also used incompensation of wrongdoing. Cattleare the primary currency amongpastoralist communities in many

parts of the South. News mediasources have reported that an oxor a cow that is in good conditionsells for more than 1000 USD. Theanimals also have important socialand cultural value. Cattle are theprice that young men pay in order toget married. The rise in recent yearsin the number of cattle requiredfor the price of a bride is increasingthe pressure on local communitiesto use violence to acquire cattle.In Addition, there is considerablepressure on young men to conduct‘successful’ cattle raids to qualify forthe title of ‘warrior’.

Consequently, cattle rustling is arising security problem in manyparts of South Sudan. Traditionally,

sticks and spears have been usedto carry out rustling and the violentdisputes it often causes. With armsproliferation during and after the civilwar, small arms and weapons havebecome the most common meansof conducting raids. The shift fromsticks and spears to small arms andlight weapons is also associated witha prevalent practice in South Sudanwhere the ownership of a firearm is

considered normal for every male ina household in order to defend hiscommunity and cattle, as well as toparticipate in local cultural activities.This development has transformedthe nature of cattle rustling, makingit more frequent, far more deadlyand brutal and in some waysundercutting traditional practicesand authority.

It is in this context that cattle rustlinghas become one of the most seriousinternal security challenges facingthe newly established state of SouthSudan. What is more troubling

about this inter-communal violence,particularly in the context of thetotal reliance of rival communitieson small arms and weapons, is therisk of the occurrence of genocidalmassacres and ethnic cleansingfacing minority communities inparticular. This possibility is whatthe recent Lou Nuer attacks againstMurle communities have revealed.In a statement that the Lou Nuerreleased, they said that, ‘we havedecided to invade Mureland andwipe out the entire Murle tribe onthe face of the earth.’ Notably, thisaction, unlike ordinary incidentsof cattle raids, manifested a desire

to annihilate an entire community,illustrating that the risk of ethniccleansing and genocidal massacre isa real danger facing Africa’s neweststate. Clearly, in this and similarconflicts, much more than traditionalcattle raiding is at stake.

The proliferation of arms isassociated with serious problemsof disarmament present in SouthSudan. During and after the civilwar, most communities armedthemselves often as a means todefend themselves. Although therehave been efforts at disarming

civilians since 2005, the disarmamentcampaign not only failed, but insignificant instances also became acause of violence. In some cases,communities were disarmed whiletheir neighbours were not, leavingthem vulnerable to attacks.

A case in point that illustratesthis situation is the Lou Nuer andMurle violence. In 2006, the SPLAundertook a forcible disarmamentcampaign against the Lou Nuer.Although the SPLA collected morethan 3000 weapons from the LouNuer, this was achieved at great

human loss. According to someestimates, the campaign left roughly




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1,200 Lou Nuer and at least 400SPLA troops dead. Because theywere the only community disarmedat the time, the Lou Nuer were leftvulnerable to the neighbouringDinka and Murle. Cattle raiders tookadvantage of the newly vulnerableLou Nuer, who subsequently beganrearming themselves.

Inter-communal conflicts, includingthe current one in Jonglei, are partlyattributed to serious administrativeand leadership gaps in local andstate governments and in thesecurity sector. It is due to theabsence or serious weakness of suchinstitutions that many communitiesresort to non-state security structuressuch as young male warriors or localethnic militias for their security andsafety. Where some form of localgovernment structures exist, a lack oftransparency, lack of impartiality andan unwillingness or inability amonglocal authorities to tackle securityproblems all compound the problem

and contribute to the perpetuation ofthe high levels of armed violence.

In the absence of independent legalmechanisms for achieving justice orredress for attacks, a retaliatory raidis the only method of redress. Murlearmed men have been conductingcounter-raids against the Lou Nuer.On 8 January, a clash that resultedin counter-attacks by Murle claimedthe lives of 60 people. Similarly on 11January, at least 55 deaths, 52 injuriesand 40 child abductions werereported, in the Wek and Patuetdistricts, following a retaliatory attack

launched by young Murle assailants.On 14 January, 13 people died andfour others were injured in similarattacks. In addition, 47 people diedin similar clashes that took place inDuk Padiet on 16 January. Theseattacks brought the death toll tomore than 150 since the revengeattacks began on 8 January 2012.According to a minister of Jongleistate, the attackers were not onlyarmed civilians, but also includedSPLA defectors from the Murle.

More often than not, governmentrepresentatives are not seen as

impartial arbiters. They are seen asactively encouraging and condoningcattle raids by members of theirown ethnic groups, while seekingto punish others. Because of theirweak representation in governmentstructures and past history ofconflict with the SPLA, there is asense of marginalization amongthe Murle. Lack of capacity furtheraccentuates the weak position of thegovernment to undertake meaningfulintervention.

Other factors underlying theseinter-communal conflicts include

environmental pressures andpoverty and lack of development.Access to water sources is essentialfor communities in the region, and

the Lou Nuer are at a geographicaldisadvantage. During the dry season,they must travel with their cattle tomore fertile areas in search of waterand grazing areas. These zonesare mostly in the territory of othercommunities such as the Murle. Inthe context of a breakdown of trustand entrenched animosity betweenthe communities, such migrationsoften involve raids that trigger

violence.

The development statistics inSouth Sudan are abysmal. Onlyone in 50 children completes aprimary school education and 85percent of adults are illiterate. Thecountry lacks even the most basicphysical infrastructure. Outside ofthe capital, Juba, the country lacksroads, schools, clinics and otherbasic goods and services. Theabsence of roads in Jonglei statehas presented huge financial andlogistical challenges for deliveryof humanitarian aid for affected

communities. As there are veryfew opportunities for engaging invarious economic activities, mostpeople still rely for their livelihoodon traditional activities such ascattle rearing, pastoralism andsometimes agricultural farming. Inthe context of increasing pressure onthe environment, the availability ofresources such as grazing land, waterand cattle has increasingly becomescarce. Competition over suchresources as a means for protectinga community’s livelihood oftendeteriorates into violence.

Clearly, the cycle of conflict betweenthe Lou Nuer and the Murle isa product of the interplay of anumber of factors that are sources ofinstability for South Sudan. Withoutaddressing these broader issuesof accountability, reconciliation,political inclusion, an absence ofstate authority, and development,it would not be possible to end therecurrence of such conflicts andmost importantly to prevent thebigger risks that such conflicts entail.

Geo-political dynamics

Pan-African andregional dynamics

Despite the extensive mediacoverage that the recent violencein South Sudan received, itelicited almost no attention fromorganizations both in the sub-regionand at continental level. Althoughboth the Sudan and the Republic ofSouth Sudan remain on the agendasof both the inter-GovernmentalAuthority on Development and thePSC, much of the focus is limitedto the major conflict situations and

the unresolved issues between thetwo countries. At the level of theAU, it is mainly through the AUHIPthat the PSC addresses existing

and emerging peace and securityissues in Sudan. Since the AUHIPis mostly preoccupied with variousexisting crises in Sudan includingDarfur and the negotiations forresolving outstanding issuesbetween the two countries, it seemsto be poorly placed to promptlyrespond to emerging crises suchas the recent violence in Jonglei.Accordingly, although the PSC issued

a press release following an updateit received on the current situationbetween the two countries during its308th meeting on 16 January 2011,there was no mention of recentviolence in Jonglei and the cycleof inter-communal clashes that itprovoked. It is also curious that noteven the AU Commission issued astatement expressing concern overthe violence and the casualties itcaused.

In a statement that he made at the6th ordinary session of the PanAfrican Parliament on Peace and

Security in Africa on 19 January2011, the Commissioner for Peaceand Security, Ramtane Lamamra,noted the challenges facing SouthSudan, particularly ‘cattle rustling,proliferation of small and lightweapons, disarmament of thousandsof civilians, as well as DDR and SSRprocesses.’ In the context of therecent violence, this observationneeds to be taken a step further todevelop and encourage an initiativewith specific focus on these inter-related challenges.

UN Dynamics

The UN maintains a peacekeepingmission in South Sudan, knownas UNMISS. The mission wasestablished through Security CouncilResolution 1996 on 8 July 2011. Ithas 7000 military personnel and 900civilian police. The role of UNMISS,particularly in its military dimension,includes provision of assistanceto South Sudanese authorities toanticipate, prevent, mitigate andresolve conflict and intervention,including through deployment tostop violence and protect civilians.

Following the eruption of theconflict, UNMISS deployed abattalion of troops in the town ofPibor, to prevent Lou Nuer armedmen marching into the town. AUN official in South Sudan statedthat this was done ‘with the aimof deterring violence and helpingthe Government to protect its ownpeople.’ For UNMISS this conflictpresented various challenges.It has emerged that the missionfaces serious logistical challenges,particularly a shortage of helicopters.Because of a lack of roads, the onlyway to provide supplies to the troops

on the ground is by air. Accordingto UNMISS officials, the lack of




8

aircraft, particularly helicopters, isaffecting the mission’s operationaleffectiveness.

Additionally, members of the Murlecomplained that the UNMISS didnot do enough to protect civilians.John Boloch, a Murle leader whoheads South Sudan’s Peace andReconciliation Commission in Juba,reportedly said that the ‘UNMISSmilitary wing did nothing to protectcivilians’. According to a New YorkTimes report, ‘neither governmentforces nor the United Nationspeacekeepers left their posts in Piborto protect the civilians who had fled,and it appears that many Murle werehunted down’.

This failure was blamed on a lackof capacity and inadequate troopstrength. Hilde F. Johnson, head ofUNMISS, reportedly said, ‘protectionof civilians in the rural areas and atlarge scale would only have beenpossible with significantly more

military capacity.’ Speaking at aconference on the Responsibilityto Protect, Secretary-General BanKi-Moon admitted this failure.He said ‘we saw it (the violence)coming weeks before. Yet we werenot able to stop it.’ Explaininghow this came about, he said ‘thereason was painfully simple: wewere denied the use of necessaryresources – in particular helicoptersthat would have given us mobilityand reach in a vast region withoutroads. At the critical moment, I wasreduced to begging for replacementsfrom neighbouring countries and

missions.’

On 28 December, the UN Secretary-General expressed deep concernover the continuing ethnic tensionsin Jonglei and urged the leadershipof both groups to end the violenceand to work with the Governmenttowards a long-term solution to theroot causes of the hostilities.

On 9 January, the United NationsSecurity Council (UNSC) issueda press statement, expressing itsdeep concern at the violencein Jonglei. The statement called

on the communities concernedto immediately ‘end the cycleof conflict and engage in areconciliatory peace process’. TheUNSC additionally expressed itsconcern ‘that UNMISS had a lack ofhelicopters that seriously affectedits ability to carry out its mandateand urged the Secretary-General tocontinue efforts to resolve this issue’.

Wider InternationalCommunity Dynamics

In an effort to boost the capacity of

UNMISS that encountered difficultiesin responding to the recent violencein Jonglei, the United States ofAmerica (US) announced that five US

military officers would join UNMISS.The five officers are expected tosupport UNMISS in areas of strategicplanning and operations and willhave no combat role. The USDepartment of Defence said that thefive officers would join UNMISS inJuba, and that there were no plans toexpand the US presence in UNMISS.

Civil society dynamics

The Sudan Council of Churches(SCC) is historically the mostinfluential civil society organizationengaged in peacemaking andreconciliation efforts. Followingthe devastating July and Augustattacks and counter-attacks, whichkilled hundreds of people, the SCClaunched a reconciliation effortacross Jonglei. Over the followingmonths the SCC visited both theMurle and Lou Nuer areas, holdingcommunity level peace talks inpreparation for a joint peaceconference that was scheduled totake place on 12 December 2011.Unfortunately, due to the escalationof tension between the communitiesthis peace conference did not takeplace and was followed by thesubsequent violence.

When the conflict started, anotherorganization called Standard ActionLiaison Focus issued a statement,warning that the conflict was nolonger simply about natural resourcesharing and had moved into astate of ethnic cleansing. What is

occurring in Jonglei today has thecharacteristics of genocide.

Scenario Planning:

Given that the recent violence inJonglei is a result of the interplayof a number of factors and that itrepresents serious instability withinSouth Sudan, the following are thepossible scenarios:

Scenario 1:

If the recurrent violence betweenthe two communities in the pastyear is anything to go by, the feudbetween them will persist, resultingin further attacks and counter-attackswith more serious casualties andhumanitarian crises.

Scenario 2:

The government, together with civilsociety organizations, most notablythe Sudan Council of Churches,and in collaboration with the UNand other relevant organizations

present in South Sudan, launchesan intervention to comprehensivelysettle the feud between the twocommunities.

Scenario 3:

Another potential scenario is thata stalemate could ensue. A calmperiod with no major clashes wouldresult until another cycle of violencebreaks out again.

Early Response Options:

Given the above scenarios, thePSC could consider the followingoptions as means to contributingto ending the recurring violenceand preventing the risk of gravecircumstances envisaged underArticle 4 (h) of the Constitutive Actof the AU:

Option 1:

The PSC could request the AUCommission to help the Governmentof South Sudan develop and

implement a comprehensive politicaland development strategy to addressinter-communal violence in thecountry with particular attentionto the situation in Jonglei. Suchstrategy should be pursued alongsidea national reconciliation processthat should address past and recentviolations, which continue to fueldivisions and animosity amongvarious communities.

Option 2:

The PSC could call upon the

Government of South Sudan toundertake the investigation it haslaunched into the recent violence,with the utmost impartiality andtransparency and on the basis of aninclusive process, and ensure thatthe outcome of the investigationis implemented with the fullparticipation of the concernedcommunities.

Option 3:

The PSC could encourage theGovernment of South Sudan to

enhance the presence of stateinstitutions and call upon theinternational community to supportsuch efforts. As part of this process,the government should developan early response and interventioncapability, taking advantage of thesupport of UNMISS.

Documentation:


PSC/PR/COMM./(CCCI)

(30 November 2011) PSCCommuniqué on the Activities ofthe AUHIP




9

The January 2012

AU Summit

The AU summit took place at theend of last month in Addis Ababa

as the continental body bracedfor its ten years celebration sincethe institution’s transformationfrom the OAU. Looking back atthe past decade it is crystal clearthat most of the AU’s institutionaleffort has been focused on itsPeace and Security arm. Thepeace and security agenda ofthe AU is one of its most visibleagendas, defining the institutionand its relations with internationalpartners. The grand African Peaceand Security Architecture (APSA),a set of various institutions and

mechanisms for an effective andcoordinated conflict prevention,resolution and managementstrategy, requires constant andconsistent support from externalpartners. However there is astrong call for the next decade ofthe organisation to focus more onstructural conflict prevention.

According to an AU documentreleased at the Summit, the AUviews Shared Values, whichconstitute Human Rights, GoodGovernance, and Democracy,as a strong catalyst to acceleratecontinental integration andprosperity in the years tocome. Even though many ofthe normative frameworkshave been developed, the AUcontinues to face challenges inthe implementation and overallcompliance of these policyinstruments. In order to highlightthe importance of the conceptof Shared Values, and to worktowards harmonizing efforts tobring about peace and respect for

human rights in Africa. The January2012 summit saw the officiallaunch of the Year of SharedValues, as decided in the 16thOrdinary Summit a year ago.

At the end of January 2012the AU’s Commissioner forPolitical Affairs, Julia Dolly Joiner,announced that the AfricanCharter on Democracy, Electionsand Governance had received itsfifteenth signature when Cameroonsigned the document, therebypaving the way for its entry into

force after a month. This goodnews coincided with the AUdesignation of the 2012 as the

year of Shared Values. According tothe 2008 strategic document of theAU envisioning the organisationsactivities during 2009-2012, SharedValues is one of the four pillars of theUnion.

The 18th Ordinary Session of theSummit of the African Union (AU)took place from 23 to 30 January2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. TheSummit took place under the theme:“Boosting Intra-African Trade”, andbegan on Monday 23 January 2012,with the 23rd Ordinary Sessionof the Permanent RepresentativesCommittee (PRC). The PRCconsidered numerous workingdocuments and draft decisions inpreparation for the 20th OrdinarySession of the Executive Councilwhich took place from 26 to 27January at the headquarters of theAU in Addis Ababa which lookedat reports of organs like the AfricanCommission on Human and Peoples’Rights (ACHPR) and the AfricanCourt on Human and Peoples’Rights (AfCHPR). The ExecutiveCouncil further discussed numerouspeace and security issues for thedecisions of the Heads of States andGovernment.

The meeting of the most powerful

organ of the Union, the 18th OrdinarySession of the Assembly of the AfricanUnion took place on 29 and 30January 2012. The Heads of States andGovernment inaugurated the NewAfrican Union Conference Centeron 28 January 2012. The Presidentof Benin Thomas Boni Yayi waselected as Chairman of the AfricanUnion Assembly, taking over the one-year post from Equatorial Guinea’sPresident Teodoro Obiang Nguema.

One of the most anticipated issuesat the AU Summit has been theelection of the AUC Chairperson,the Deputy Chairperson and theeight Commissioners. The Summitalso elected 10 new members ofthe Peace and Security Council fortwo years term. The summit alsodiscussed a range of continentalpeace and security matters rangingfrom ongoing conflict in Somalia,rising tensions between the twoSudans and the implementationof the recent UN Security CouncilResolution imposing sanctionsagainst Eritrea.

Of all the agenda items of theAssembly, the one that received

the most attention and time wasthe election for the positionof the Chairperson of the AUCommission. The much anticipatedand highly contested electiontook place on 30 January 2012.

The close contest between theincumbent, Jean Ping, and theSouth African Home AffairsMinister, Nkosazana DlaminiZuma, failed to produce a winner.Despite intense lobbying andcampaigning, neither Ping norZuma managed to secure the two-thirds majority vote required forvictory. In accordance with Rule42 of the Rules of Procedure ofthe AU Assembly, since there wereonly two contestants, the electionswent into three rounds in whichPing led Dlamini-Zuma by 28 to 25in the first round, 27 to 26 in thesecond round, and 29 to 24 in thelast one.

After Zuma was forced towithdraw from the election inaccordance with Rule 42 of theRules of Procedure of the AUAssembly as the candidate withthe least votes, the Assemblyvoted to determine whether therequired two-thirds majority of themembers would support Ping tocontinue for another term. With

only 32 votes that fell short ofthe required two-thirds majority,the Assembly suspended theelection. The other electionsfor Deputy Chairperson andthe 8 Commissioners were alsopostponed until the next summit.It is anticipated that the electionswould be held during the nextsummit scheduled to take place inMalawi.

The way the election wasconducted and the outcomeof the election is believed tohave affected the morale andconfidence of the leadership. Inthe light of the deep divisions thatensued among African countriesduring the election process,there are serious concerns thatthe position of the AU and itsrising pan-African role could bethreatened unless member statesmake concerted efforts to mendthe widening divisions amongcountries and across regions.

AU Summit Analysis




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COUNTRY ANALYSIS

Côte d’Ivoire

Previous PSC and AU

Communiqués and

Recommendations

At its 288th meeting held on10 August 2011, the Councilconsidered report PSC/ PR/2(CCLXXXVIII) of the PSCdelegation field mission in Côted’Ivoire undertaken from 25 to 30July 2011. It noted the progressmade since the assumption ofpower by President Ouattara andthe establishment, on 1 June 2011,of the new Government.

The Council also reiterated itssupport to the ongoing efforts atpeace building and post-conflictreconstruction and requested thecommission to dispatch a missionto assess the situation of Ivorianrefugees, provide support forpost-conflict reconstruction anddevelopment, and facilitate jointaction among the countries of theregion to address security relatedissues. The mission was deployed

from 5 to 12 November 2011.

At its 273rd meeting held on21 April 2011, the Peace andSecurity Council of the AfricanUnion examined the report of theChairperson of the Commissionon the situation in Côte D’IvoirePSC/PR/2(CCLXXIII) . Theensuing communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.1(CCLXXIII) lifted thesuspension of the participationof Côte d’Ivoire in the activities

of the AU. It also stressed theimportance for Ivorian actorsto make sustained efforts ‘forthe promotion of nationalreconciliation, consolidation ofpeace and socioeconomic recoveryin Côte d’Ivoire’ with the supportof the AU in close cooperationwith ECOWAS, the UN, and otherpartners. The Council decidedto dispatch a PSC mission ‘toexpress solidarity of the AU to theauthorities and the Ivorian people

and assess the situation in order toallow the AU to better contributeto the crisis exit process’.

Crisis Escalation Potential

While a relapse into conflict inCôte d’Ivoire is unlikely, nationalreconciliation, security sectorand judicial reforms as well ashumanitarian challenges must beaddressed for Côte d’Ivoire to

return to peace and prosperity.

On 21 January 2012, an attackon a meeting of supporters ofthe Ivorian Popular Front (FrontPopulaire Ivoirien, FPI) of LaurentGbagbo in Abidjan left one deadand many people injured. Thoseincidents cast doubts on freedomof assembly and could furtherradicalise the former ruling partyfurther endangering the chancesof reconciliation. Moreover, thetone of pro-Gbagbo newspapers,

the boycott of the electionsby a significant portion of theopposition and the reaction toGbagbo’s transfer, albeit peaceful,illustrate the amount of workto be done in terms of nationalreconciliation and highlights theneed for a meaningful dialoguebetween all stakeholders.

In order to maintain securityimprovements, President Ouattarahas the difficult task of asserting

control over the armed forces. TheDecember 2011 deadly clashesinvolving civilians and the rebels-turned-government forces of theRepublican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire(Force Républicain de Côte d’Ivoire,FRCI), in Vavoua and Sikensi,have pointed to the limits of thepresent security architecture andunderlined the urgent need toconduct DDR and security sectorreform (SSR) processes.

From a humanitarian perspective,over the past nine months, morethan a half a million people havereturned to their homes. However,as mentioned in the DecemberUN-OCHA Côte d’Ivoire report, thereare still 186,000 internally displacedpeople and 164,000 refugees inneighbouring countries. Restorationof means of livelihood, shelter, accessto basic services and voluntary returnand reintegration of displaced personsand refugees are among the urgenthumanitarian needs.

Beyond those specific post-conflictchallenges, underlying roots of the

crisis still need to be addressed ifCôte d’Ivoire is to embark upon adurable peace-building phase. Mostnotably, the general populationidentification process must becompleted and land tenure issueshave to be tackled.

Key Issues and

Internal Dynamics

The political and military defeatof the Gbagbo regime profoundlymodified the Ivorian politicallandscape. The FPI of LaurentGbagbo and other smaller partiesassociated with him – whichcoalesced in 2006 under theumbrella of the National Congressfor Resistance and Democracy(Congrès National pour la

Résistance et la Démocratie, CNRD)– were weakened with many oftheir party leaders in exile orprison.

The CNRD parties conditionedtheir participation in the electoralprocess on specific demands,such as the liberation of Gbagboand other political prisoners, thereturn of those who are in exile,the unfreezing of assets, therestructuring of the IndependentElectoral Commission (CommissionElectorale Indépendante, CEI),restoration of security and theprovision of public funding forpolitical parties.

The FPI decided to boycottthe legislative elections on 23November 2011, on the basis thatnegotiations with the governmentwere not registering sufficientprogress. Other CNRD partiesagreed to participate, mainly to beable to negotiate with the Ouattara

government. On 9 November 2011,twenty pro-Gbagbo personalitieswere freed. Two days after theelection, on 13 December 2011,the Public Prosecutor signed adecision to unfreeze the assets offifty-one pro-Gbagbo personalities.

The radical wing of the formerpresidential camp did not feel thatthe required conditions were metfor the holding of free, open andtransparent legislative elections.

They perceived the attempts bythe government to invite them




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back into the political processas blackmail. For the moderatewing, it was rather perceived as anopportunity, although on unevengrounds, to engage with thegovernment and make progress onits demands.

The June 2011 formation of the

government, the renewal at thePrime Ministerial position of formerNew Forces (Forces Nouvelles,FN) rebel head, GuillaumeSoro, and the failed attempt tocoordinate candidate nominationsfor the legislative elections havecreated some tensions within theHouphouëtists Rally for Peace andDemocracy (Rassemblement desHouphouëtistes pour la Démocratieet la Paix, RHDP). Members ofthis coalition, which supported

Ouattara during the November2010 run-off of the presidentialelections, now feel that the RDRused the RHDP in order to achievepower, but is now less conciliatoryand even attempting to marginalizesome of its former allies.

The FN, during a September2011 conclave, decided not torestructure the former rebelmovement into a political party, butrather into a political movement.Most of those who wished to run

for election presented themselvesunder the banner of the RDR.

In substance, the new opposition,which is yet to recover from itsmilitary and electoral defeat, hadto take difficult strategic decisionswhen faced with the determinationof the new regime to promptlyrestore institutional normalization.The electoral bargaining that tookplace around the opposition’sparticipation in the elections raises

questions about whether thesenegotiations contributed to politicaldialogue within a much-needednational reconciliation process.

In this regard, although Gbagbois the first but probably not thelast to be indicted by the ICC, thetiming of his transfer to The Hague- four days before the openingof the electoral campaign - andthe fact that the Ouattara camphas so far escaped any chargeshas been perceived as unfair.

While the establishment of theDialogue, Truth and ReconciliationCommission in April 2011 is a

positive decision, it should notprevent the government fromplaying an important role in thereconciliation process.

Geo-political dynamics

Pan-African andregional dynamics

The AU and ECOWAS deployedelectoral observation missions forthe December 2011 legislativeelections. Following upon its288th decision, a multidisciplinarymission to assess the needs of Côted’Ivoire in the field of post-conflictreconstruction and developmentwas dispatched from 5 to 12November 2011. The mission’s

conclusions and recommendationsare yet to be made public.

The mission, led by FormerPrime Minister of the CentralAfrican Republic, Mr. AnicetGeorges Dologué, comprisedrepresentatives of the AfricanDevelopment Bank, the WorldBank, the ECOWAS, theInternational Organisation ofLa Francophonie, the European

Union (EU), as well as the NEPADPlanning and Coordination Agencyand different Departments of theAU Commission.

During the same period, theSub-Committee on Refugees ofthe Permanent RepresentativesCommittee also visited Côted’Ivoire. The AU has undertakena number of other initiatives,including grants to support thereintegration of displaced persons

as well as the organisation of thelegislative elections. From 25 to30 July 2011, a PSC delegation hadundertaken a field mission in Côted’Ivoire and produced report PSC/ PR/2(CCLXXXVIII).

As for the Facilitator of the DirectInter-Ivorian Dialogue, Burkina FasoPresident Blaise Compaoré, hewas asked by President Ouattarato continue assisting the IvorianGovernment in implementing

pending aspects of the peaceprocess provided for in theOuagadougou Agreement.

UN Dynamics

The United Nations SecurityCouncil resolution, S/ RES/2000(2011), of 27 July 2011,extended the mandate of UnitedNations Operations in Côted’Ivoire (UNOCI) until July 2012.

It mandated UNOCI, among otherresponsibilities, to protect civilians,address remaining security threatsand border-related challenges,monitor the arms embargo, andcollect weapons. It also taskedUNOCI to assist the governmentwith DDR and reform of securityand rule of law institutions, supporthumanitarian assistance, and theorganization and conduct of open,timely, free, fair and transparentlegislative elections.

In this regard, the resolutionalso reiterated that the SpecialRepresentative of the SecretaryGeneral (SRSG) shall certify thelegislative elections. The newlyappointed SRSG in Côte d’Ivoire,Bert Koenders, deployed efforts,in consultation with the Facilitatorand within the framework of hiscertification role, on issues suchas the negotiations surroundingthe opposition participation to thelegislative elections, the voters’ list,

justice and reconciliat ion. UNOCIalso provided crucial logisticalsupport for the 2011 legislativeelections.

Wider International Community

As illustrated and reiterated bySecretary of State Hilary Clintonduring a mid-January 2012 visit,Côte d’Ivoire’s foreign partners,notably France, the US and the EU,are also ready to play an important

role in assisting with DDR andSSR efforts, as well as economicdevelopment. The EU, the US,France, China and Japan providedfinancial support for the legislativeelections.

On 29 November 2011, LaurentGbagbo was transferred to TheHague to face four counts ofcrimes against humanity. Histransfer sent a clear message thatimpunity would not prevail, butthe impression of a partisan justicealso stoked political tensions. The




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prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, had in mid-October2011, traveled to Côte d’Ivoirefor an official visit to meet theGovernment, members of theopposition and people affected bythe post-election violence.

From an economic perspective, theParis Club of international creditorsagreed, on 15 November 2011, toreschedule Côte d’Ivoire’s debtrepayments following a meetingattended by the Ivorian financeminister, Charles Diby Koffi.

Scenario Planning

The post-conflict situation in Côted’Ivoire could take a number of

courses:

Scenario 1:

The peaceful and inclusiveorganization of local electionsand meaningful dialogue betweenthe various stakeholders leadto consolidation of democracyand national reconciliation inCôte d’Ivoire. The DDR processas well as reform of the securitysector and rule of law institutions

are conducted as cross bordermovement of armed elements andweapons is contained, leading to anenhanced security environment.

Scenario 2:

The government is unable to fosterinclusive political dialogue with theopposition and tensions rise withmembers of the RHDP coalition.Members of the coalition build

alliances with CNRD parties andchallenge Ouattara’s governmentthrough parliamentary actions. Inparallel, DDR as well as reformof the security sector and ruleof law institutional processesare conducted as cross bordermovement of armed elements andweapons is contained, leading to anenhanced security environment.

Scenario 3:

With the government consumedby the day to day activities ofconducting the affairs of the

country and with little political willto address the various political andsecurity issues, the divisions thatensued from the recent conflict inthe country are left unaddressed.

Early Response Options

The PSC could consider thefollowing early response options:

Option 1:

Even if the post-electoral crisis isover, important challenges stillremain in Côte d’Ivoire. In thatcontext, the PSC could call on thegovernment of Côte d’Ivoire toensure that freedom of associationand freedom of assembly of theformer ruling party and supporters

of former President Gbagbo.

Option 2:

The PSC could closely monitor theissue of national reconciliation,especially in the context ofthe upcoming local elections(municipal and regional councilelections). These should be seenas an opportunity to bring theopposition back into the political

process. The PSC could ask theFacilitator of the Direct Inter-Ivorian Dialogue, the Chair Personof the AU Commission or thePanel of the Wise to create anegotiation platform to facilitatethe establishment of a meaningfuldialogue between the oppositionand the government.

Option 3:

The PSC could request the

Commission to encourageand support post-conflictreconstruction in Côte d’Ivoireby fostering the implementationof the recommendations of themultidisciplinary assessmentmission.

Documentation:


PSC/PR/2(CCLXXIII) (21 April

2011) Report of the Chairperson

of the Commission on the

situation in Côte d’Ivoire

PSC/PR/COMM.1(CCLXXIII) (21

April 2011) Communiqué on the

situation in Côte d’Ivoire, 273th

meeting

PSC/PR/2(CCLXXXVIII) (10

August 2011) Report of the

field mission of the Peace and

Security Council of the African

Union to Côte d’Ivoire, 25-30

July 2011

PSC/PR/2(CCLXXVIII) (10

August 2011) Communiqué of

the 288th meeting of the PSC

4 November 2011, Press

Statement, “The African Union

dispatches a multidisciplinary

mission to assess the needs

of Côte d’Ivoire in the field of

Post conflict reconstruction and

development.

EX.CL/274 (IX) (25-29 June

2006)

AU Policy Framework on Post-

conflict Reconstruction and

Development

Relevant UN Documents

S/RES/2000(2011) (27 juillet

2011)

S/2011/387 (24 June 2011)

Twenty-eighth Report of the

Secretary General on the

United Nations Operation in

Côte d’Ivoire




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In a decision, Assembly/AU/ Dec.338 (XVI), adopted atits 16th ordinary session, theAssembly of the African Unionrequested ‘the Chairperson

of the Commission to prepareand submit to the Peace andSecurity Council (PSC) areport on the African Union’s(AU) strategic vision of thecooperation between the AUand the United Nations (UN)on peace and security matters,as a contribution to theconsideration by the SecurityCouncil of the next reportof the UN Secretary-Generalon this issue, bearing in mindrelevant AU decisions and the

need for flexible and creativeinterpretation of ChapterVIII of the UN Charter.’The Chairperson of the AUCommission (AUC) submittedto the PSC such a reportduring the 307th meeting ofthe PSC held on 9 January2012.

The Chairperson’s report,entitled ‘Towards GreaterStrategic and Political

Coherence’, comprises 36pages and 116 paragraphs.Apart from reflectingon the current state ofcollaboration betweenthe two organizations, thereport mainly focuses on acentral question: ‘What isthe appropriate consultativedecision-making framework,division of labor and burden -sharing that should be put inplace?’

Apart from calling for amore structured relationshipbetween the Security Council(UNSC) and the AU PSC andan enhanced relationshipbetween the UNSC’s Presidentand the Chair of the AU PSC,it proposes a reinterpretationof Chapter VIII of the UNCharter, emphasising the AU’spriority setting and ownershipof issues directly relating topeace and security in Africa

without prejudice to the roleof the UN Security Council.

The report also identifies theprinciples that the AU deemsnecessary for defining a strategiclevel partnership betweenthe AU and UN and proffers

the mechanisms for achievingboth strategic and operationalsynergy.

This report followed the reportthat the Secretary-Generalof the UN submitted to theUN Security Council on 29December 2011. In his report,which outlines the strategicvision of the Secretariat of theUN, Ban Ki-Moon envisaged‘closer interaction’ betweenthe AU Commission and the

UN Secretariat in order to‘assist the Security Council andthe AU Peace and SecurityCouncil in formulating cohesivepositions and strategies.’ TheSecretary-General statedthere was a need to developagreed principles governingthe modalities of cooperationand decision-making more fully.More informal communicationbetween the UNSC and theAU’s PSC and their Member

States is ‘critical in developinga common vision andcoordinating action prior tothe finalization of respectivedecisions’.

After considering theChairperson’s report, thePSC issued a communiqué,PSC/PR/COMM(CCCVII). Inthe communiqué, the PSChighlighted the issues andthemes in the report that itdeemed critical. The PSCemphasized the need for astronger AU-UN strategicpartnership as a means tomore effectively promotingpeace, security and stability inAfrica. Reiterating the argumentin the Commission’s report,the Council stated that sucha strong partnership wouldbe in response for Africa’sevolving security landscapeand the complexity of thechallenges and the development

by the AU and RegionalEconomic Communities of a

comprehensive normativeand institutional frameworkfor dealing with peace andsecurity issues. The PSCexpressed its conviction that

such a partnership would needto be ‘based on an innovative,strategic and forward-lookingreading of Chapter VIII of theUN Charter’ having regard to anumber of principles.

The first principle that thePSC identified as the basisfor a more effective strategicpartnership was support forAfrican ownership of peaceinitiatives on the continentand an African priority setting.

While this seeks to assert andassign a leadership role forthe AU on matters of peaceand security on the continent,another equally importantprinciple is ‘flexible andinnovative application of theprinciple of subsidiarity, whichis at the heart of Chapter VIIIof the UN Charter, includingconsultations prior to decision-making, division of labour andsharing of responsibilities’. This

principle emphasises that theUNSC gives proper attentionto the policy decisions andviews of the AU and that therespective roles of the twoorganizations, including interms of burden-sharing, arespecifically spelt out. Thisis indeed a theme that hasreceived mention in severalparagraphs of the PSCcommuniqué. In paragraph13, the PSC called for regularconsultations before takingdecisions on issues of commonconcern and enhancedinteraction between theChairperson of the AU Peaceand Security Council and thePresident of the UN SecurityCouncil (UNSC). Morespecifically, in paragraph 16of the communiqué, the PSCunderlined the need for theUN Security Council to bemore responsive to requestsmade by the AU regarding

specific conflict and crisis

PSC Retrospective: AU Report on AU-UN Strategic Partnership on Peace and Security




14

PSC Retrospective: AU Report on AU-UN Strategic Partnership on Peace and Security(continued)

situations in Africa. The finalprinciple but related to thesecond one is comparativeadvantage. This principle seeksto highlight the increasingrole that the AU has come toplay in the management andresolution of conflicts on thecontinent, its proximity to andfamiliarity with the issues andthe flexibility of its approach.

In urging a follow-up of theproposals in the Chairperson’sreport, the PSC emphasised‘the urgent need for theAU and the UN, both atthe level of their relevantdecision-making organs

and Secretariats, includingwithin the framework of theforthcoming JTF meeting tobe held on the margins of theforthcoming AU Summit, atthe end of January 2012, toengage earnestly in a dialogueto elaborate those principlesthat would underpin theirstrategic relationship, to betterharmonise their approachesand methods for dealing withpeace and security issues on

the continent’.On 12 January, South Africa’sPresident Jacob Zuma chaireda debate of the UNSC on theAU-UN strategic partnership.Apart from the two otherAfrican non-permanentmembers of the UNSC,Nigeria and Gabon, Ethiopiaand Kenya also participatedin the debate in accordancewith Rule 37 of the ProvisionalRules of the Council. During

the debate, Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-Moon and AU peaceand Security CommissionerLamamra briefed the UNSC.

Following the debate theUNSC unanimously adoptedresolution 2033 (2012)expressing ‘its determination totake effective steps to furtherenhance the relationshipbetween the United Nationsand regional and sub-regional

organizations, in particular theAfrican Union, in accordancewith Chapter VIII of the United

Nations Charter’. Importantly,acknowledging the need tolimit instances where the twoorganizations might adoptincompatible decisions, theUNSC decided, ‘in consultationwith the African Union Peaceand Security Council, toelaborate further ways ofstrengthening relations betweenthe two Councils includingthrough achieving moreeffective annual consultativemeetings, the holding of timelyconsultations, and collaborativefield missions of the twoCouncils, as appropriate, toformulate cohesive positionsand strategies on a case-by-case

basis in dealing with conflictsituations in Africa.’ In operativeparagraph 6, the Councilencouraged ‘ the improvement ofregular interaction, consultationand coordination, as appropriatebetween the Security Counciland the African Union Peaceand Security Council on mattersof mutual interest.’

Despite these decisions thatpromise more strategic level

synergy between the twobodies, there are still differencesbetween the two organizationson the scope and depthof the envisaged improvedpartnership. While the AU isinterested in a more structuredand formalized mechanismsfor consultations, the UNSC,particularly the five permanentmembers, show preference fora more flexible and informalconsultation process. In thisregard, Ambassador Susan

Rice of the United Statesof America said during thedebate that the UNSC ‘mustcooperate closely with regionalorganizations based on theexigencies of the issues athand, rather than simply blessand pay for decisions madeindependently by the AfricanUnion. The Council should,and would, take into accountthe views of regional and sub-regional institutions, while

recognizing any disagreementbetween them.’ Similarly, afterthe members of the UNSC

voted on resolution 2033,Ambassador Philip Pharmaof the United Kingdomstated that ‘the referencein operative paragraph 6,

concerning coordinationbetween the Security Counciland the African Union Peaceand Security Council, shouldapply in those instanceswhere such coordinationwas considered to beappropriate, and that couldonly occur in the context ofthe Security Council’s primacyregarding the maintenanceof international peace andsecurity.’

Another area of differencebetween the two organisationsis on the issue of leadershipon peace and security issueson the African continent.While the AU seeks to takethe lead in responding topeace and security issues onthe continent, the UNSC isconcerned about the risk ofsuch deference to the AUeroding the Security Council’smandate. In this regard

resolution 2033’s preamblestressed, ‘in accordance withArticle 54 of the Charterof the United Nations, theneed for regional and sub-regional organizations at alltimes to keep the SecurityCouncil fully informed of theseefforts in a comprehensiveand coordinated manner.’Ambassador Rice alsoreiterated that ‘the SecurityCouncil was not subordinate

to other bodies or toregional groups’ schedules orcapacities’.




15

Country Election Date

MauritiusRodrigues Regional Assembly 5 Feb 2012

Senegal Presidential and National Assembly 26 February 2012

Gambia National Assembly and local 24 Mar 2012

Mauritania Senate 31 March 2012

Mali Presidential 29 April 2012

Important Forthcoming Dates




© 2012, Institute for Security Studies

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