PBMR Fuel Development Laboratories - Lessons Learnt · · 2015-08-24PBMR Fuel Development Laboratories - Lessons Learnt ... and lessons learnt. ... This was a chemical process plant
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PBMR Fuel Development Laboratories - Lessons Learnt Dieter Zimolong
The Quality Assurance System. This system complied with the ISO 9001 (ISO, 2009) and ASME
NQA‐1 (ASME, 2008) requirements to ensure compliance to NNR, international and US nuclear
quality requirements. The system was established, implemented and maintained by experienced
staff that had previously been involved with such systems in South Africa’s fuel plants that had
produced Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel for the Koeberg Power Plant and is still producing
Material Test Reactor (MTR) fuel for the SAFARI‐1 reactor. One part of this system that was complex
was the traceability system. It was able to make up a full trace of any product down to all the
sources, including materials, operators and inspectors, work instructions used, appropriate masses
and any and all splitting and combining of production lots. This system can also do an upward trace
from any source material or operator, etc. to all final products affected thereby. During a successful
audit by a US DOE, QA expert, the FDL received compliments on the good QA management and the
expert was impressed by the traceability system; which was so well developed and implemented.
The US DOE QA audit was a prerequisite for loading any of FDL’s fuel into the US test reactor for
irradiation testing.
The Safeguards System. This system which accounts for all the uranium in all the facilities is
overseen and annually physically inspected by experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) from Vienna. The requirements for this system are defined in numerous IAEA documents. The
system was established, implemented and maintained by experienced staff that had previously been
involved in such systems in South Africa’s nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities. There were some
challenges for the FDL with respect to establishing an acceptable Material Unaccounted For (MUF)
value. This was a value made up of sampling errors, analysis errors, as well as material lost in filters
and cleaning equipment. The challenge in general for the FDL accounting was the handling of the
millions of small masses (individual kernels and coated particles contain on average 0.62 mg uranium
and being electrostatic were often difficult to control).
Project Management. This was handled in a very effective manner using MS Projects as a tool. There
were two levels of scheduling and the approach was to manage the overall project carefully ensuring
that the essential activities were reviewed and discussed regularly. During regular project meeting
solutions were always found to prevent delays. One of the most critical dates was the delivery of
9,6% enriched uranium coated particles for irradiation tests in the US. Due to the US AGR ‐ 2 Reactor
outage date the particles had to be ready for loading at that point. This date could not be delayed
and it was made very clear by the US DOE in regular project telephone conferences that the FDL test
fuel would be excluded from the New Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project if not delivered on
time. Similarly the Russian irradiation tests samples had to be on time. The fuel for both the US DOE
and Russian irradiation tests were delivered on time.
The NNR Licensing. The licensing of the laboratories included maintaining and amending the licence
for the laboratories. This was a time consuming process requiring many submissions to obtain
approvals for commissioning new facilities and processes. Due to selected plant scale equipment for
some processes, the FDL was not treated strictly as a laboratory by the NNR. The enriched uranium
campaign was a once off approval for the manufacture of three lots. The licensing process was
complicated since it had to flow via Necsa and there were many delays and communication
challenges. The flow of information was formalised and apart from the RD 0034 (NNR, 2008)
requirements the NNR approached its involvement on the basis that FDL had to make submissions
for changes and generate the applicable documents required after which the NNR would respond.
FDL developed a one week introductory course on HTR fuel for PBMR, ESKOM and NNR client
representatives that covered presentations on everything including the history, organisation,
management systems, raw materials, fuel equivalence, qualifications and the project status as well as
afternoon visits to each of the laboratories. The intention was to be pro‐active to get all stakeholders
informed on the product, processes, challenges and intentions but this was declined by the NNR
shortly before the course since this may have biased their independence.
Staff
The FDL staff. The staff complement was the most valuable asset which was developed over 10
years and was a great success. The management style was based on empowerment and a strong
team approach. Throughout, the management structures changed as required and this also provided
opportunities towards the latter years for some of the promising young talent to move into
management positions. The FDL staff complement (Figure 13) consisted of staff 14 Scientists and
Engineers; 26 Technologists and Technicians and 26 mostly experienced Support and Administrative
Staff.
The objective to transfer and establish the HTR Fuel technology as soon as possible in South Africa
required an appropriate philosophy for staff development. The project had two distinct requirements
for human resources, namely the ones that could be sourced locally with exactly the required skills
for the support systems, and the other being the fuel technical staff that had to be developed. This
presented the opportunity to develop and empower a new young generation of technical staff in a
well‐defined nuclear environment making every effort the meet the Government’s transformation
targets. This approach had the advantage that the project could focus on the technology
development and empowerment without being burdened with the development and
implementation problems of the support systems. The entire FDL staff complement was South
African.
The Support Staff. The support staff implemented, maintained and managed the security,
conventional and radiological safety, uranium accounting, quality assurance, licensing and the
normal project management systems. The staff primarily responsible for these functions included
persons that had spent many years in Necsa’s nuclear facilities and needed no support. They adapted
and implemented these systems which included the training of the young generation engineers and
scientists who were not yet used to this nuclear culture.
Figure 13 FDL staff complement
The Technical Staff. There was a core of experienced technical staff involved in PWR and MTR
nuclear fuel activities in the past that were part of this group. This core of 8 had 200 years of
cumulative experience in nuclear fuel manufacturing. The remainder of about 70% of the technical
staff had just finished their studies and some had a few years of experience. This had the distinct
advantage that they were open to new cultures and technologies and not focussed on specific fields.
The great advantage for the development of the young staff was the time constraints of the project.
Technology had to be transferred, technical documentation generated, equipment and processes
specified and designed, equipment and processes commissioned and qualified and operating the
laboratories. The staff had the opportunity to be involved in all of these steps. And this took place in
a well‐controlled nuclear facility environment. The result was a mainly young, ambitious and
enthusiastic technical group that had adopted a good culture to work under systems controlling
nuclear plants and becoming experts in their areas of processing or quality control for high
temperature nuclear fuel.
The Fuel Development Project Objectives The Objectives of the FDL were:
• To transfer and establish the German HTR fuel manufacturing technology in South Africa
• To manufacture “Advance Fuel” for irradiation testing
• To manufacture “Qualification Fuel” for irradiation testing
• To support the commissioning and operations of PBMR Fuel Plants
• The development of commercial manufacturing processes in order to reduce the fuel
manufacturing and fuel cycle costs as far as possible
• To perform development of future fuel.
Project Plan
The Project Plan. The project for the Fuel Development Laboratories was managed by an integrated schedule using MS Projects as a tool. A high level project plan (Figure 15) is presented below followed by a short paragraph on each activity. These activities do not include the maintenance and improvement actions following the initial establishment of the systems and staff appointed.
ID Task Name
1 Human Capital Development
2 Licence Approvals
3 Management Systems Development
4 Transfer of Technology (HTR GmbH Archive)
5 Transfer of Technology (Nukem Experts)
6 Fuel Technical Package Development
7 Material Supplier Qualification
8 Design, Procurement & Comissioning of Equipment
9 Implementation, Commissioning and Testing of Processes
10 Qualification of Processes
11 Manufactur Advamce Irradiation Fuel
12 Irradiation Tests at the AGR - 2 Reactor in USA
The Advance Fuel Performance . The Advance Fuel was test fuel in advance of the qualification fuel. Irradiation testing of FDL advance production coated particles is progressing as planned in US irradiation test AGR‐2. In this test SA, US, and French coated particle compacts are being irradiated in a single irradiation rig in the ATR at Idaho National Laboratory. No failure due to irradiation has occurred to date and measured R/B values indicate that SA fuel is performing very well. The R/B values are the release‐to‐birth ratios of selected nuclides which provide initial fuel performance and quality indicators. Irradiation testing of fuel spheres in the Russian Federation was terminated when the SA government brought the PBMR project to an end. However, two fuel spheres were irradiated for about three weeks in order to test and calibrate the full scale irradiation rig. R/B values measured over a wide temperature range during calibration were found to be comparable to values for similar measurements on German fuel. SA fuel spheres intended for EU irradiation tests were never delivered, since they were the last in line and by that time the SA government had terminated the PBMR project. The design input for the Commercial Fuel Plant . This was an ongoing activity in the form of participation at reviews within the fuel plant design phase and also hands‐on reviews in the laboratories to ensure that the design engineers understood the processes. It was vital that the plant processes would be equivalent to the laboratory ones and that the equipment that was deemed critical and established in plant size capacity in the laboratories would be used in the plant. This was important since the laboratories planned to produce qualification fuel for the PBMR reactor which would represent the fuel from the future fuel manufacturing plant.
The Lessons Learnt
Human Capital. The human capital developed over ten years was a great success empowering the people involved
and meeting the government’s transformation requirements at the same time. If approached
properly, it is possible to develop human capital in South Africa for any high technology industry
meeting transformation targets provided that adequate time and resources are made available. This
was a positive lesson learnt from the PBMR FDL project.
The termination of the PBMR project on the other hand resulted in this human capital that was so
competent and devoted to work in the nuclear industry being left to their own devices. They were
very disappointed after pursuing a career path for ten years of their working life expecting a good
future in the nuclear industry. Most of them have left the nuclear industry. After the announcement
to terminate the PBMR project a small group was tasked to document and package the PBMR know‐
how and assets over a two and a half year period, as an intellectual property for the company. In
contrast, the human capital asset which is vital to the project was literally disposed of with a
retrenchment notice of one month. There was no plan in place for any preservation of this human
capital asset. The nuclear business is of long term nature and countries like Korea (Byung‐Koo, 2009)
spent two decades after 1958 as a seeding period for their nuclear science, centred around their
TRIGA research reactors, which clearly demonstrated that a long term plan had to be in place to
develop the human capital for the industry to make it a success which they certainly managed.
Although possible solutions and alternatives were communicated on numerous occasions for the
continuation of the nuclear fuel laboratories, as local and international fuel research facilities, this
was not heeded. It could have ensured the maintenance of the human capital and established a
technology core for nuclear fuel research and development which could have supported present and
future fuel as well as other nuclear related programs. The lesson learnt is that nuclear projects need
a long term strategy to be successful and should only go ahead if they are confirmed and ratified by
Government and stakeholders. Developing human capital for the nuclear ventures must fit into the
country’s nuclear plan to become a long term sustainable human asset contributing to the country’s
nuclear future.
Nuclear Regulator (NNR) Any nuclear project or program in SA will have to comply with the requirements of the NNR. Since
there are many uncertainties in the process before a licence is approved very good management of
this process is required. The process required FDL to make a submittal and thereafter a response had
to be awaited. The response to submittals usually required additional information and/or
documentation to be submitted. There were no clear guidelines for this process. Communication had
to be carefully tracked since there were literally hundreds of letters linked to corresponding
responses by the NNR. There were no firm commitments on response times by the NNR and if not
followed up regularly could take as long as a year if not urgent. This is not unique to the PBMR
project, but an aspect of licensing. It was vital to have experienced persons that could generate these
submissions and a meticulous follow up system to track the communication and elevate late
responses.
In addition, it was vital to have constant communication with the Necsa Licensing function as well
as the NNR to maintain the chain of interaction from the FDL via Necsa to the NNR. In FDL the
resources were limited for the licensing function. Only towards the end of the project did FDL
establish a management unit to look after the licensing. The lesson learnt was that an activity such as
nuclear licensing has many schedule risks, most of which had to be managed as best possible and
required a very well‐resourced function with experienced staff from the start of the project. An
interactive approach with the regulator designed to still keep them independent in order to avoid
unnecessary time delays should be strived for. This licensing risk is not unique to South Africa, as was
recently observed at the delayed European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) that is being built in Finland
(Laaksonen, 2009). The main lessons learnt included amongst others the risks of new technologies,
correctly resourcing the project and communication between entities; both between contracted
parties / suppliers and with the regulator. All three these, to a greater or lesser degree, resonate with
the FDL’s experience.
Transfer of Technology
The transfer of technology was a great success. It could be attributed to the very detailed logical
approach that was followed. It was recognised that there are three components to the success, firstly
the well‐defined reference data base available as a baseline. The second was the engagement with
experienced staff from the German program that provided invaluable support but had to be
managed properly to keep the “old wise men” satisfied by scheduling the interactions professionally
and not wasting their time. This ensured a good constructive human relationship with them, which
was supported by some of our team speaking their language. Thirdly, the team that interacted from
FDL’s side was young, motivated, interested and keen to learn in order to transfer the technology.
The cold and hot results of the irradiation fuel were the proof that the technology transfer was a big
success. The lesson learnt was that transfer of technology, if properly planned and based on a good
data base with supporting experts and competent staff, can be very successful.
Defining Equivalent Fuel
This was the basis of the project to be able to use the German fuel design and manufacturing
processes to licence the first PBMR reactor in South Africa. After many meetings and discussions with
technical experts, safety experts, fuel experts, reactor experts, client experts, the NNR and
international experts, it became very obvious that PBMR had moved into a very debatable situation
of what equivalent fuel could be defined as. The challenge was that every different discipline
focussed on their requirements of what was important for equivalence and a common agreement
could not be easily found. Once an agreed upon definition was presented to NNR, who had no
experience in high temperature reactors fuel, a very cautious approach was followed. The lesson
learnt was that the equivalence definition of fuel required a very specific project driven by very
experienced experts in the field and being able to constructively engage the stakeholders in this
process.
Sustainability of Nuclear Projects
The establishment of HTR fuel technology was not just a first in South Africa’s nuclear history but also
a first for Africa and the southern hemisphere. Attempts to continue in a constructive way with the
technology established and skills developed, after the announcement of closure of the PBMR project,
included numerous communications to executive management of both Necsa and PBMR, other
decision makers and stake holders, including government, about the value that had been created and
the opportunities that could have been pursued for the Fuel Development Laboratories. This
communication included options such as continuing with the laboratories as a nuclear fuel research
and development laboratory in South Africa, expanding the research and development activities to
PWR and MTR fuels presently being used in the Koeberg and SAFARI ‐ 1 reactor respectively. The spin
off from this project was much larger than perceived or understood and included a world class
technology transfer and human capital development of young scientists and engineers in the nuclear
field, almost all of whom had to change career direction after the project’s termination. The lesson in
this case was that the stakeholders in a country need to commit to and finance such long term
nuclear projects only if these fit into the country’s long term nuclear strategy ratified by Government
and that all the assets developed fit into the bigger picture and are sustainable.
"Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it." George Santayana
ReferencesASME. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME NQA-1-2004. Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications. 14 March 2008. Byung-Koo, K. Nuclear Silk Road. ISBN: 1456422588. 2009. ISO. International Standards Organisation, International Standard ISO 9001 – 2008. Quality Management Systems Requirement. 15 July 2009.
Laaksonen, J. Regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto 3 (EPR) construction lessons learnt. SMiRT 20 Nuclear Power Technology Conference at Otaniemi. 10–14 August 2009.
Nabielek, H., Tang, C., Müller, A. Recent Advances in HTR Fuel Manufacture. Proceedings of HTR 2010 Prague, Czech Republic. 18-20 October 2010 Paper 094.
NNR. National Nuclear Regulator, RD 0034. Quality and Safety Management Requirements for Nuclear Installations. 15 September 2008.
Biography
Dieter Zimolong is a mechanical engineer with more than 27 years of experience in the nuclear fuel industry. He was involved in the establishment and management of the PWR (Pressurised Water Reactor) and MTR (Material Test Reactor) nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities at Necsa (South African Nuclear Energy Corporation). Dieter Zimolong headed the HTR (High Temperature Fuel) fuel technology transfer and establishment of the FDL (Fuel Development Laboratories), for PBMR, on the Pelindaba site in South Africa. He is currently involved in Necsa’s nuclear materials program and localisation of PWR fuel manufacturing in South Africa.