Payin it Backward: Migration and Democratic Diffusion in Latin America David Crow División de Estudios Internacionales Centro de Investigación y Docencia.

Payin’ it Backward: Migration and Democratic Diffusion in Latin America

David CrowDivisión de Estudios Internacionales

Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Mexico City)[email protected]

Clarisa Pérez-ArmendárizPolitical Science Department

Bates [email protected]

Migration and Democratic Diffusion: Theory

Our Work on Mexico: - “Social remittances”

Transmission of values, attitudes, practices: here, migrants spread values from more democratic host countries to less democratic (Levitt, 1998)

- Democratic Diffusion democracy spreads across international borders (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, Przeworski et al. 2000, Starr 1991). BUT no theory of agency

- Policy Diffusion supplies theory of agency (functionaries, social elites, members of organized civil society, etc.) applied to policy change (Kapur and McHale 2005, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2005)

New Theoretical Element: - Interpersonal Communication

people are more receptive to and put more stock in ideas they receive from people they know (e.g., “two-step flow” in which “primary reference groups” and friends and family, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Katz, 1944, 1955)

Migration and Democratic Diffusion: The Case of Mexico

- Three transmission “paths”• Return migration: Mexicans absorb values in host country

(U.S.) and retain them back home item: “Have you ever lived outside Mexico?”

• Cross-border communication: Mexicans abroad communicate values to friends and family back home item: “Do you have family members or friends who live outside Mexico?”

• Information networks in high-volume sending communities: item: CONAPO, Migration Intensity Index

- Data: Original survey, Desencanto Ciudadano , June, 2006 (N=650)

Attitudes and Behaviors

• Attitudes: – Satisfaction with Democracy– Government Respect for Rights– Composite Tolerance Indicator

(political, religious, sexual orientation)

• Behaviors: – Non-electoral individual participation

(contact authorities, handed out flyers, signed complaint, etc.)

– Organizational participation (parties, neighborhood associations, civic organizations, etc.)

– Protest

Findings• Migration increased democratic attitudes and

behaviors, but effects are differentiated– Return migration• Increased tolerance• Negative evaluations of government respect for rights

(“critical citizens”)

– Friends and Family Abroad• Less satisfied with democracy• More individual and organizational participation,

protest

– High-intensity migration community• More organizational participation

• No Effect for Remittances

Extending the Research to Latin America: Challenges

• Different migratory destinations: Central and South American migration is much more varied than Mexican migration (e.g. Peruvians go to Argentina, Chile, Spain, and U.S., Nicaraguans go to Costa Rica and U.S., etc.)

Do Nicaraguans in Costa Rica learn the same things as Peruvians in Spain and Mexicans in the U.S.? Probably not BUT, migration generally occurs from less to more democratic countries so, the general expectation is for some democratic learning

Extending the Research to Latin America: More Challenges

• Different reasons for migrating: Mexican migration has been almost exclusively economic and familial, but Central and South American migration has also been political and related to natural disasters

Do economic migrants, political migrants, family reunification migrants and refugees from natural disasters have the same predisposition toward political learning Again, probably not

Extending the Research to Latin America: Yet More Challenges!

• Different national contexts: Political institutions, histories, cultures, and economic development also influence political attitudes and behaviors

Study on Mexico holds constant not only sending country context, but (given 95% in U.S.) host country context

Ideally, the different national contexts could be measured and included in the model as variables (“turn proper names into variables”) easier said than done

Data: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008)

LAPOP 2008: 22 Countries

Argentina Haiti

Belice Honduras

Bolivia Jamaica

Brasil Nicaragua

Chile Panamá

Colombia Perú

Costa Rica Paraguay

Ecuador República Dominicana

El Salvador Suriname

Guatemala Uruguay

Guyana Venezuela

LAPOP 2008: Data Limitations– Return migration: poor measure

• Time window for living abroad (5 yrs. ago) too narrow only 1.3% of Latin Americans (and 0.71% of Mexicans)

• No item on destination (i.e., host country)• Question only asked in 10 (of 22) countries

– Family members’ host countries: little information just coarse categorization (U.S. only, U.S. and other, other)

– Communication: frequency, not content

– Reasons for migrating: no information

– Remittances/Communication: does receiving remittances count as communication? measurement error for communication

LAPOP 2008: Dependent Variables

• Evaluations of Democracy- Satisfaction with Democracy (Mucho, Algo, Poco, Nada)- Political system’s protection of “basic rights” (7-pt. scale,

“Nada” to “Mucho”)

• Political engagement

- Convince others to vote for party or candidate (4-pt. “Never” to “Frequently”)- Meet with neighbors to solve community problem (4-pt. “Never” to

“Frequently”)- Protest in last 12 months (3-pt. “Never”, “Almost Never” and “A Few Times”

LAPOP 2008: Independent Variables – Migration

• Household members residing abroad– In U.S. only (binary)

– U.S. and Elsewhere (binary)

– Elsewhere (binary)

• Frequency of communication (5-pt. ordinal “Never”, “Rarely”, “Once or Twice a Month”, “Once or Twice a Week”, “Every Day”)

• Household receives remittances (binary)

Distribution of Family Members Living Abroad

US Only US & Other Other None0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

11.4%

4.7%

8.6%

75.3%

Frequency of Communication with Family Members Abroad

Never Rarely Once or Twice a Month Once or Twice a Week Every Day0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

6.5%

30.0% 30.0%

28.1%

5.4%

Countries by % of Households that Receive Remittances

Haiti

Jam

aica

Guya

na

El S

alva

dor

Nica

ragu

a

Hond

uras

Rep.

Dom

inica

na

Guat

emal

a

Boliv

ia

Belic

e

Ecua

dor

Mex

ico

Peru

Colo

mbi

a

Cost

a Ri

ca

Para

guay

Urug

uay

Pana

má

Arge

ntina

Chile

Vene

zuel

a

Bras

il

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

49.2%

40.4%

34.8%

26.7%

22.0%20.2% 19.2%

10.9%10.8% 10.5% 10.3% 8.8% 7.8%5.5% 5.2%

3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 2.9% 1.6% 1.6% 0.7%

Countries by Dependence on Remittances Among Receiving Households

Hond

uras

Vene

zuel

a

Haiti

Para

guay

Nica

ragu

a

Rep.

Dom

inica

na

Jam

aica

Colo

mbi

a

Mex

ico

El S

alva

dor

Ecua

dor

Guya

na

Boliv

ia

Arge

ntina

Pana

ma

Guat

emal

a

Urug

uay

Chile

Peru

Bras

il

Belic

e

Cost

a Ri

ca

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 85.7%82.6%

71.3% 69.6% 69.3% 67.6%63.5%

58.0%56.9% 56.7% 56.5% 56.4% 56.3% 55.8% 54.7%

51.2% 50.4% 48.9%45.2%

40.0% 39.7%

33.3%

% of Households (Among Receptors) that Depend “A Lot” or “Somewhat” on Remittances for Monthly Income

LAPOP 2008: Controls

• Sociodemographic – Sex– Age– Income– Education– Employment

• Retrospective economic evaluations– Pocketbook– Sociotropic

Expectations• Having family members abroad will

– Make citizens more critical in their evaluations of their country’s democracy

– Increase different forms of civic engagement

• Differentiated effects among host country categories US > US + Other > Other

• Greater communication should also increase critical citizenship and civic engagement

• Remittances– Increase criticism– Decrease engagement (following Goodman and

Hiskey)remittances may substitute for goods capital, etc., one would normally get leveraging local networks, obviate need for community participation

Results: Attitudes

B p B pUS -0.038 0.057 -0.119 0.013US + Other -0.057 0.021 -0.256 0.000Other -0.027 0.180 -0.107 0.030Communication 0.018 0.032 0.032 0.104Remittances -0.020 0.173 -0.027 0.443

Satisfaction with Democracy Pol. System Protects Rights

Results: Engagement

B p B p B pUS 0.115 0.000 0.048 0.048 0.886 0.000US + Other 0.154 0.000 0.068 0.024 -0.079 0.767Other 0.125 0.000 0.037 0.144 -0.119 0.561Communication -0.032 0.003 0.027 0.007 -0.212 0.008Remittances 0.055 0.005 -0.054 0.003 -0.761 0.000

Electoral Persuasion Solve Community Problem Protest (Last 12 Mos.)

Findings• Household Members Abroad

– Makes citizens more critical, increases engagement– BUT, order different than predicted; in most cases having household

members in the U.S. and elsewhere has an effect of greater absolute magnitude

• Frequency of Communication– Some direct effects, but important as suppressor variable

i.e., effects of household members abroad become apparent (or sharper) only when comparing within each level of communication frequency.

B pUS -0.007 0.633US+Other -0.026 0.190Other 0.004 0.780Remittances -0.011 0.428

Satisfaction with Democracy

More Findings

• Remittances: – Insignificant for attitudes toward democracy– Positive for electoral persuasion– Negative for civic involvement and protest

Some evidence of remittance-induced alienation

Next Steps• What’s going on in the individual countries?

– Better statistical model: random effects model not good enough for exploring heterogeneity

between countries. 1) How do the effects of household members abroad, communication, etc., differ

across countries i.e., random slopes as well as intercepts

2) Explicitly include aggregate-level variables to account for differences in institutions, culture, history, etc.

– Case studies• Effects differentiated by host country

– Better theory: a more coherent account of why the the implantation of democratic values/behaviors should vary according to host country

– Auxiliary data: more precise idea of who’s going where, possibly imputing host countries

• Communication: frequency and content do people really talk about politics?

– Modify survey items– Qualitative interview data

• Return migrants: ???