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Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University
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Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Jan 02, 2016

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Page 1: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Password Management Strategies for Online

Accounts

Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten

Princeton University

Page 2: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Abstract

Average number of unique passwords

3.31 (n = 49, SD = 1.76)

…and average reuse3.18 (SD = 2.71)

People will reuse passwords more as they acquire more accounts

Page 3: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Abstract (continued)

Why reuse?

The reused ones were easier to remember

People rely on their memory rather than store passwords

Page 4: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Abstract (continued)

Friends have the greatest ability to attack passwords

Participants ranked those closest to them as having the greatest

ability to compromise their passwords

Page 5: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Abstract (continued)

People worry more about human guessing than

automated guessing tools

Knowing personal information about a victim was seen as advantageous

Page 6: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

OutlinePeople will reuse passwords more

as they acquire more accountsPeople rely on their memory rather than store passwords

Password Reuse

Reasons for Reuse

Perceptions of Attackers

Perceptions of AttacksPeople worry more about human

guessing thanautomated guessing tools

Participants ranked those closest to them as having the greatest

ability to compromise their passwords

Page 7: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

58

18 4049

16 33

Participants

Page 8: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Outline

•Password Reuse• Reasons for Reuse• Perceptions of Attackers• Perceptions of Attack

Page 9: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Password Reuse: Method

First Pass:• Select from 139 websites• Login to each website• Self-report summary statisticsSecond Pass:• List other websites used personally• Re-report summary statistics

(n = 49)

Page 10: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Password Reuse: Results

Unique passwordsM = 3.31, SD = 1.76 (n = 49)

Passwords reuse rateM = 3.18, SD = 2.71

Page 11: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.
Page 12: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.
Page 13: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Password Reuse: Results

People will reuse passwords more as they acquire more accounts

Page 14: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Outline

• Password Reuse•Reasons for Reuse• Perceptions of Attackers• Perceptions of Attack

Page 15: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Reasons for Reuse: Method

115 question survey• Demographic information• Explanations of password

reuse/avoidance• Descriptions of password

creation/storage• Descriptions of password

management

(n = 58)

Page 16: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Reasons for Reuse: Results

Why use a different password?• Security (12)• Website has credit card, etc (11)• Website restricts password format

(10)• Website is important (7)• Website is in a particular category (4)• Other (12)

I don’t like to think that if someone has access to one of my passwords, she or he could access all of my information for all of the pages I log into.

Why use a different password?• Security (12)• Website has credit card, etc (11)• Website restricts password format

(10)• Website is important (7)• Website is in a particular category (4)• Other (12)

Page 17: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Reasons for Reuse: Results

Why use the same password?It is easier to remember (35)

Page 18: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.
Page 19: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.
Page 20: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Reasons for Reuse: Results

Why use the same password?It is easier to remember (35)

People rely on their memory rather than store passwords

Page 21: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Outline

• Password Reuse• Reasons for Reuse

•Perceptions of Attackers• Perceptions of Attack

Page 22: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Perceptions of Attackers: Method

• Who could compromise password? Rank– Ability– Motivation– Likelihood

• Categories of people– Friend– Acquaintance (tech & non-tech)– Competitor– Insider– Hacker

(n = 56)

Page 23: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Most Able Attackers

(n = 56)

Page 24: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Least Able Attackers

(n = 54)

Page 25: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Most Motivated Attackers

(n = 56)

Page 26: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Least Motivated Attackers

(n = 56)

Page 27: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Most Likely Attackers

(n = 56)

Page 28: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Least Likely Attackers

(n = 55)

Page 29: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Likely attackers:Motivated or Able?

• Logit regression on ranking responses*

• Odds on ranking someone as likely– Motivation: 6.28 x– Ability: 3.82 x

*Thanks to Pierre-Antoine Kremp

Page 30: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Perceptions of Attackers: Results

Participants ranked those closest to them as having the greatest

ability to compromise their passwords

Page 31: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Outline

• Password Reuse• Reasons for Reuse• Perceptions of Attackers

•Perceptions of Attack

Page 32: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Perceptions of Attacks: Method

Given:13 tips for creating strong passwords

– 3 passwords– Password construction method

Task:• Rank passwords by strength• Explain ranking

(n = 56)

Page 33: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Perceptions of Attacks: Results

PrincetonNJ is too easy for someone to guess if they know where you live

One would have to know her decently well to know her favorite novel

Page 34: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Perceptions of Attacks: Results

People worry more about human guessing than

automated guessing tools

Page 35: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Good News / Bad News

• Good news: Participants understood the threat posed by those closest to them

• Bad news: They didn’t understand the threat of dictionary attacks

Page 36: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Good News / Bad News

• Good news: Participants were concerned about the weakness of poor passwords

• Good news: They relied on their memory rather than poorly secured storage (ie., paper)

• Bad news: They feel and act as if they do not have any better tools or strategies

Page 37: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Good News / Bad News

• Good news: Participants had few accounts with password authentication

• Bad news: They had even fewer passwords

Page 38: Password Management Strategies for Online Accounts Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten Princeton University.

Outline

• Password Reuse• Reasons for Reuse• Perceptions of Attackers• Perceptions of Attack