Participation of Actors in Land Consolidation Activities in Bulgaria Violeta Dirimanova Bulgaria IDARI
Dec 30, 2015
Participation of Actors in Land Consolidation Activities
in Bulgaria
Violeta DirimanovaBulgariaIDARI
Structure of proposal
• Purpose of the study
• Background information for the problem
• Theoretical background
• Theoretical framework
• Possible propositions
• Methodology
The problem
• Agricultural reform in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation
• Fragmentation in ownership and land use
• The government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to solve the problem
Purpose of the study
To propose institutional options for land consolidation on the basis of analyses of land transactions, the actors’ behavior and institutional settings
• Current situation and formal legislation
• Actors’ behavior
• Land transactions
• Institutional options
• Evaluation of the effects
Objectives of study
Background of the problem
1. Agrarian reform and land fragmentation
2. Land fragmentation and farm’s structure
3. Discussed solution to the problem
Agrarian reform and land fragmentation
• Land reform started in the beginning of 1990
• Liquidation of the old cooperatives
• Reallocation of the land to original owners or their inheritors
• 1.8 million landowners
• Half of farms are less then 2 ha
Farm’s structure and land fragmentation
Fragmentation in ownership• Many inheritors on a single plot • Equal shares to all of them• Land to landless families
Fragmentation in land use• Many small and self-sufficient farms (73% of
the total number and 7.5% of the land)• Large farms (0.2% of the total number, 66.7%
of the land)
Solutions to the land fragmentation problem in the literature
Fragmentation in ownership• Land market (buy/sell)
• Land tax
• Land credit market
Fragmentation in land use• Land market (lease/rent)
• Voluntary/Compulsory land consolidation
• Establishment a State Land Bank
Theoretical backgroundThe importance of institutions
• Institutions are humanly devised formal (law, property rights, etc) and informal (custom, traditions, etc) constraints that regulates political, economic and social interactions. (North, 1991 and 1994)
• Four levels of social analysis: social embeddedness level, institutional environment, institutions of governance and marginal analysis. (Williamson, 1998)
Theoretical backgroundThe importance of institutions
• Theoretical framework for analyzing the institution related to natural resources. This framework conceptualize the relationship between the properties of transactions, characteristics of actors, property rights and governance structure. (Hagedorn, 2001)
Theoretical framework
TRANSACTIONS RELATED TO NATURE
COMPONENTS
BASICFACTORS
LOCAL SOCIAL ARENA
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS
TRANSITION PROCESS
RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS
FRAME CONDITIONS
ACTORS
PROPERTY RIGHT SYSTEM
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
TRANSACTIONS OTHER FACTORS
EFFECTS ON THE SYSTEM
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS -
INNOVATION
OTHER OPTIONS
Modified from: (Hagedorn 2002); (Sikor and Hagedorn 2000); CEESA project
Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case
•Basic factorsFrame conditions: low income level, high
unemployment
Transition process: land reform, unpredictability
Resource characteristics: spatial location, multiple use, different quality
Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case
•Local social arenaLandownersSmall farmersNew cooperatives Large farmersLocal state authoritiesGovernment
Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case
Governance structure Market - Buy/Sell; Rent/Lease
Hierarchy (governmental agencies) - land conversion,
environmental control
Cooperation - voluntary actions for land consolidation
Property rights
Private property rights on land
Inheritance law
Theoretical framework for the Bulgarian case
Land transactions
Buying/Selling land
Renting
Leasing
Division of the land between users
Interchange of land between landowners
•Effects on production and ecosystemLow productivity
Land degradation
Land abandonment
Proposition and research hypotheses
Main proposition: Agricultural reform has led to land fragmentation and the land transactions further deepened the problem.
Sub-proposition 1: Agricultural reform, low income level, and the specific land characteristic form actors’ behavior.
Sub-proposition 2: The actors’ behavior has created the existing institutional settings.
Sub-proposition 3: The established institutional settings determinate the nature of transaction among the actors.
Sub-proposition 4: Land transactions cause deeper land fragmentation
What Institutional Options?
• Land Market
• Land Tax
• Compulsory/Voluntary consolidation
• Cooperation
Methodology of analysis
• Legislation and literature• Qualitative method - semi-structural
interviews with actors
• Social network method
• Quantitative method
Proposed survey’s region
Thank you very much for your attention!