Parshall Tank Production

8/9/2019 Parshall Tank Production

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Presented by Jonathan Parshall at the “2013 International Conference on WWII,” The National WWII Museum, New Orleans,November 23, 2013.


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Why Tanks?

So, why discuss tanks, and tank production, beyond the obvious that tanks are big, bad, and bodacious?


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Most of us probably began learning about WWII by reading books about famous generals...


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or accounts of the common soldiers...


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or books about our favorite tank or ship or airplane...


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But most of us would acknowledge at some level that WWII was a much larger affair, and that at it’s core, it was really a clash ofsystems.


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At the level of the battlefield, we have competing systems of doctrine...


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Command and Control...


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and military intelligence.


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As we work our way up through the apparatus of the state, we begin to encounter things like systems of national mobilization...


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Logistics...


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Wartime finance...


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Scientific research and development


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And, of course, a battle between the factories.


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And this is a very important battle indeed, because the war of production undergirds a number of these other competing systems.


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Industrial “Style”

• Tank production serves as an analog for

larger national production models

• If we can understand how these

countries manufacture tanks, we can

understand how they approached their

production wars in general

As such, if we can understand tank production, we can get a glimpse into how the major wartime combatants approached theirlarger wars of production. And that’s the reason for this talk.


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Production Figures

Let’s take a quick look at the numbers.


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In 1940, everybody’s basically pootling along at about 1,000 - 2,000 armored fighting vehicles per year. (AFV refers to not onlyproper “tanks”, but also self-propelled artillery, self-propelled guns, tank destroyers, etc. Anything that is fully tracked, armored, andcarries heavy weaponry can be considered an AFV.)


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In 1941, production steps up across the board by a bit. You’ll notice that Germany still isn’t producing all that many AFVs, mostlybecause the Wehrmacht is so much better at the operational level of mobile warfare that they don’t really need that many newvehicles.


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Things change drastically in 1942, as the U.S. enters the war, and both America and the USSR put the hammer down in terms ofproduction. Even Great Britain is outbuilding Germany at this point. Yet it is not until September of 1942 that the Germans reallypush the panic button and start to get serious about producing more vehicles.


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By 1943, the U.S. is now fully geared up, and produces the astonishing total of more than 37,000 vehicles. Germany is now out-producing Britain, but still lags far behind its two main competitors.


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In 1944, the Germans are now finally producing a respectable total of vehicles. The U.S. actually deliberately cuts back onproduction, because we realize that we aren’t going to have as many armored divisions in our table of organization as we originallythought.


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And the war ends.


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Cumulative production of AFVs thus falls very neatly into three tiers. At the top, you have the US and USSR, who each producemore than 100,000 vehicles. In the middle are Britain and Germany, who produce between 36,000-46,000 vehicles. And very muchon the bottom rung are Italy and Japan.

Prod ction Inp ts


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Production Inputs

Tank production basically requires four inputs: Money, Labor, Energy, and Steel. Let’s take a look at those.


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In terms of money, the U.S. has by far the largest economy on the planet. Intriguingly, though, the USSR’s economy takes anenormous hit in 1941-1942, meaning that during this crucial period of the war, the Germans actually have an economy that is about40% larger than the Soviets.

Population


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Population

In terms of population, the Russians come into the war with a marked advantage, but by 1942 about 65 million Soviet citizens arebehind enemy lines, and thus removed from the labor pool.

Coal Production


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Coal Production (mil. metric tons]

In terms of coal production, which is another way of quantifying energy usage, both the U.S. and Germany are major coalproducers. Germany outproduces the Soviets by better than 4:1 during 1942 and 1943.

Steel Production ( il i ]


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Steel Production (mil. metric tons]

In terms of steel production, the U.S. is by far the world’s largest producer. Again, the Germans are outproducing the USSR byabout 4:1 in this category as well.

Two Questions Emerge


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Two Questions Emerge

• Why did the USSR over-perform so

dramatically?

• Why did Germany under-perform so

badly vis-à-vis the USSR?

The questions that emerge from the foregoing are basically two-fold. How did the USSR, laboring under such huge disadvantageseconomically, manage to outproduce the Germans so decisively? And conversely, why did Germany under-perform as badly as itdid? Or, put in graphical terms...


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Why didn’t the picture look more like this, with Germany a clear #2 producer, and the USSR relegated to a ranking somewherecloser to Great Britain? The answers to those questions have a lot to do with how Russia and Germany approached themanufacture of their vehicles.

American Production


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American Production

So let’s take a look at American production.

American Priorities


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American Priorities

• Unique position of strength

• Enormous warmaking potential, but

equally enormous wartime demands

• We’re going to play to our strengths:

mass production

– Long production runs

– Little variation in models

– Capital intensive / hard-tooling

Obviously, from the foregoing slide, you can see that the U.S. was in a unique position of strength. Particularly in terms of money,the U.S. could throw piles of money at its production problems, in quantities nobody else could dream of. But we also haveenormous demands on that potential, because we need not only a huge army, but also an enormous navy and air force. As such,we’re going to play to our strengths in mass production. And we’re also going to invest heavily in the specialized tools needed tospeed up production.

Problem is…


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Problem is…

• As late as spring 1941, we have zero

tank production infrastructure

Our biggest problem is that up until mid-1941, we don’t have a single factory producing tanks in any real quantity. In June 1940,the Army goes to Chrysler. And Chrysler gives the job to this guy...


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Albert Kahn, the greatest industrial architect of the 20th Century, and the go-to guy when you need a big factory put up fast.


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Ground is broken in September 1940. By January 1941, much of the steel is up; in comes the locomotive to heat the place. By April 1941, 1st prototype tank built.


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July 1941, serial production of the M3 Grant medium tank begins. But one modern tank factory isn’t going to get it done, so who dowe turn to who also has the large assembly plants, big overhead cranes, and expertise with big heavy castings?


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The railroad companies.


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So in 1942, we have an improvised tank production industry composed of re-tooling automotive plants, and the railroad companies.


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By 1944, though, we no longer need to produce as many tanks. And now that Detroit is fully converted, we furlough all the railroadfirms except Pressed Steel. Our tank industry is now firmly centered in Detroit, and particularly on the Chrysler Arsenal, which buildsmore than 25% of our total AFVs during the war.


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Shot of the Chrysler arsenal. Classic automotive-style mass production. Huge plant; very well organized.


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A shot of one of the machining halls.

Russian Production


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Now let’s look at the Russians.


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The Russians come into the war with the advantage of having a fairly well-developed tank industry. This map shows not only tankassembly, but also gun and armor factories.

Prewar Tractor Factories


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The Soviets had been very clever in making sure that their tractor factories could be converted to tank production in time of war.Many Soviet factories were actually built by the Americans. In fact, the Stalingrad tractor plant was built by none other than...


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Albert Kahn. Work was hard to find during the Depression. Kahn and his firm built hundreds of Soviet plants. And the Russians werehiring more than just American architects. They were also bringing over American production engineers and machine tools as well.So, there was a lot of knowledge transfer happening during this time.


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The problem for the Russians is that the 1941 invasion rips up their industrial infrastructure. Scores of Russian factories are thrownon trains, along with their workers, and literally dumped at railway sidings in the Urals. For the tank equipment, most of it ended upin towns that already had an existing tractor or railroad plant.


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The same thing, to a lesser extent, happens in 1942.

Russian Priorities


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• Vertical Integration; Centralization

• Use American mass-production

methods, but take things a step further

• Relentlessly focus on simplicity and

driving down costs

Leaving the USSR with a tank industry with factories in Gorky, and then four enormous factories in the Urals. At the same time, theextremely heavy strain on the Soviet railway system is driving a need for centralization and vertical integration at Soviet tank plants.These factories can assemble a much higher percentage of the total vehicle than an American or German plant. That’s not asefficient, but it makes sense from the standpoint of taking strain off their railroad network.


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• By 1942, only three types of tanks werebeing produced

– KV-1 Heavy, T-34 Medium, T-60/T-70 Light

• All Soviet tanks and SUs used thesethree chassis for the remainder of WWII

Soviets strive to simplify their models. For the remainder of the war, they build all their AFVs on just three chassis.

Planned Obsolescence


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• A manufactured product has a certain(hopefully planned) lifespan

• Putting sub-components in the product

that have a longer lifespan is wasteful

Another concept the Soviets adopt from the Americans (with a vengeance) is planned obsolescence.


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The Russians weren’t dumb. They realized very quickly that the vast majority of their tanks were going to end up like this...


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Not here, in a museum...


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But like this. They’d done the math, and they realized that the average lifespan of a tank was less than 6 months, and once it wasin combat, it was less than 14 hours. These were disposable vehicles with disposable human beings inside them. And once youget your head around that fact, and come to peace with it, it clarifies everything about the design and manufacture of theseproducts.


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It makes no sense to build an engine or transmission that’s going to last any longer than 1000-1500km. The tank will be wrecked bythen. This means you can manufacture those components with lower-quality parts, less machining, lower quality materials, etc.

Driving out Cost


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• 770 T-34 parts simplified in 1942 alone

• Reduction in overall parts: 5,461

• Cancellation of 206 outside contracts

for sub-components

• Development of submerged automatic

arc-welding of hulls at Plant No. 183

– Reduction in man hours to machine hull

from 240 to 80

The Soviets are maniacal about driving cost out of the product. So they’re eliminating unique parts, reducing overall number ofparts, etc. At the same time, though, they are experimenting with innovative manufacturing processes--anything to reduce time andcost.


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The result is that you see the cost of a T-34 drop by half. Time is money, as everybody knows. But the inverse is also true, in that ifwe’re spending less money on a tank, we’re probably getting it off the line more quickly, too.


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Gorky, Red Sormovo Plant No. 112. Note the chain drive on the floor. Classic automotive-style mass manufacturing.


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Probably Plant No. 183 in Nishij Tagil. Note how cramped the space is in comparison with the Chrysler plant. But still, standardassembly-line style manufacturing.


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Most likely Plant No. 183. Note the air quality. These were dirty, dangerous, nasty places to work, but they poured out the tanks.Plant No. 183 produced more than 5,600 T-34s in 1942 alone.

German Production


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And now let’s look at the Germans.


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German Priorities


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• Specifications driven by the military(Heereswaffenamt)

• Very high quality product

• Lots of models

• A preference for “flexibility” in

manufacturing

• Skilled craftsmen for assembly

German priorities are completely different. The specifications for their vehicles are controlled by the military, who want a very highquality product. They have a preference for lots of different models. And they like to work with manufacturers who will be “flexible,”that is, willing to put up with a constant stream of modifications. And they want very skilled craftsmen involved in the process.

Many, Many Models


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• 14 different models of Pz III– largest model run: 2,158 units, across six

different factories

• 10 different models of Pz IV• 8 different models of StuG III

• 14 different types of AFVs built in 1942

– smallest run: 16 units

Lots of models, and yet very low production per model.

Henschel Facility


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Dr. Erwin Aders, head of Henschel's Panzer program and the Tiger's chief designer, tours shop 5 at the Kassel works with highranking army officers on Sept. 5, 1942. (Dr. Aders is in the dark suit on the right)

Production Levels


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• On paper, Henschel works shouldproduce about 240-360 tanks / month

• Highest monthly production goal was 95

• Highest monthly production was 104

• What is going on?

On paper, this factory should be producing about 240-360 tanks / month, but for most of its career, it’s producing about 60 / month.What is going on with this factory?

Engineering Marvel, but…


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• Manufacturingnightmare!• ~250 modifications during a 2-year, 1,347-unit

production run

– Not including redesigned turret and engine• No block phasing of modifications

• Blizzard of tiny alterations

– Commander’s rain cover, “large truck” camouflage

mounting points, reshaped turret traverse lever,

yada yada yada

The Tiger is a fabulous combat vehicle, but it’s a nightmare to put together. With 250+ mods in the course of its production, thatmeans that *on average*, the tank at the end of the line was probably different from the one that was just six units behind it. TheHenschel factory was having to deal with a couple design modifications a week. And they weren’t managing these changes in“blocks” or “flights”. From a production engineering standpoint, this is just insanity--these things are practically all being hand-built.And there were other things happening on the shop floor, too...


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Note the large rolling stairways. This tank isn’t going anywhere for a while, because this is not really an assembly-line process. It’smore what we might term “station-based” or “stand-based” assembly, wherein a group of workers performs a very large number ofoperations on the vehicle. You typically find this mode of assembly for things like yachts or aircraft manufacturing, which maybemakes sense, because the Germans paid more for a Tiger than the U.S. paid for a B-24 heavy bomber.


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Memo to Henschel: If your workers have to scribble notes to themselves on the side of the tank, that may be a clue that yourmanufacturing process is too complex.


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Note the large vertical lathe being used to manufacture both drive sprockets and their hubs. Now, this may not be a bottleneck in theoverall production process. But any time you use a general purpose tool to produce different types of parts, in small batches (as wesee here), it’s always the setup times that eat you alive. This is an example of a lack of dedicated tooling, and we see that in thenumbers: the Kassel plant had 1,000 machine tools. The Chrysler Arsenal had 8,000.

Further Suspicions…


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• Very complex assembly• Lack of dedicated hard tooling =

bottlenecks from tool setups/teardown

• Lots of re-work at the end of the line

• Lots of fiddling with fit and finish

• ALL of this reduces throughput

So, it seems clear that this was a very complex tank to put together. There was a lack of dedicated hard-tooling (which makessense, given the number of design mods.) I would lay any amount of money that there was lots of re-work happening at the end ofthe line, to fix problems during assembly (and probably back-fit new design modifications as well). I’d also wager that there was a lotof fiddling around with achieving a perfect fit and finish of parts. All of these things reduce factory efficiency.


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Conclusions


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• USA had winning hand; improvised very well

• Soviet weapons may have been crude, but

their production strategy was anything but

• Soviets made the most rational (if callous)

assessment of the true nature of the war theywere fighting, and built AFVs to match

• The Germans failed to overcome prejudices

against mass production until way too late• More important, they failed to understand the

nature of what the war had become by 1942

Summarization. The Americans played their winning had very well. Creating the world’s largest tank industry almost overnight was atremendous feat. For their part, the USSR’s performance was nothing less than brilliant, particularly in terms of the underlyingthought process that went into their production strategy. Meanwhile, the Germans made the wrong calls completely, by not realizingthat the scope and intensity of the war had changed completely in 1942, which required a major overhaul to how they producedAFVs. This same “style” of manufacturing applied to many different types of products (particularly aircraft) and it simply wasn’teffective for the sort of warfare that WWII required.


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Downloadable at:www.combinedfleet.com/ParshallTankProduction.pdf

My Thanks To:

Randy Talbot (US Army TACOM), Eugene Kovalev,

Dr. William O’Neill, Alan Hamby, Patrick Stansell,

Kurt Laughlin, Steven Zaloga

Thank you!

Parshall Tank Production

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