Panchapadika Vivaranam of Prakasatma Yati

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Vivaranam 321

When certain .crimes are committed, one is said to beborn in certain ways and forms. The result is the conse-quence of the present crime; and the consequence is onlysorrow which can be undergone in this life itself.

Further, certain rites do not appear to give any visibleresults. Thus in 'karinyadF rites,, one ought to obtainthem, and this is traced to some defect in the performanceof the ancillary rites. The same explanation can be extendedto all performances. And with the'help of the 'mantrasând 'oshadhis9 (medicines) we may develop this body sowell that. all the pleasures of 'svarga' can be experiencedin this life.

Hence there is no use in having a knowledge which issaid to give us the self as being different from the body.

Reply ; The"'devatadhikarana' establishes the vali-dity of mantra etc; and as such the Mimamsaka admits the^vargadiphala' which is experienced or enjoyed by the bodyin a specific place and at a specific time. The specific placeis 'meruprishthadih". The specific time is after the bodilydeath. The specific body is the 'taijasa' one. It is on thisbasis that we have said that the 'sastra vyavahara' involvespramatritva etc- viz., the self which appears in adhyasa.Through an exhaustive enquiry into'the''codana^. Saharahas come to accept a self which is distinct from the body.And only such a self would make possible the upabhogyasvargopalabdhi9 (enjovable heaven).

Objection : This is inconsistant with Sahara's ownother statements where he rejects the validity of mantraetc. Even without requiring the validity of mantra etc,

41)


First Publication : 1997

Copies Printed : 1000

Copy-right : a) Translator

b) Sadhana Grantha Maaidlaii,Tenali.

I&vara Ashadham

Price : Rs. 300/-

Printed at :

Kamala Art Printers,T E N A L I.


This bookPanchapadika Vivaranamwas printed and publishedwith the financial assistance given by gSri Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam, ^Tirupati.


3£

Reply to PrabhakaraAhankaranubhavaBimba Pratibimba vadaIllustrationsTheory of PerceptionVijnana vadaAdvaitin's ReplyVedantin speaksImmediacy and MediacyImmediacy of the selfAdhyasa

Prayojana BhashyaPramanya Vicara

Mahavakya aparokshya PrayoJakatvamJivanmukti

Sagunu Brahmopasana

Mumukshoh Pravritti

Vidhi Vicara

Statement of another objection

Reply


A Word from Sadhana Grantha Mandali

Sadhana Grantha Mandali was founded at Tenaliin 1945. Many eminent scholars have enriched the Mandaliwith their valuble contributions on Religion and Philosophy.Many more have financed the publications. One of theaims of the Institution was to bring about the major worksof Sri Sankara Bhagavatpada. We started with the minorworka attributed to Sri Sankara. So far sixteen volumesof these worke were published in TelugU with translationand commentary. We have also published ten volumes ofthe teachings of the late Sn Chandrasekharendra Saraswatiof Kamchi Kamakoti Pitha.

Works like Saundarya Lahari, Siva Sutra Vartika^Chaitanya Charitamrita, Indian systems of philosophy,Matrika Cakra viveka^ Biography of Sri Sankara, MukaPanchasati, some works ofSadasiva Brahmendra and otherswere published in Tclugu. In Mantra Sastra we brought outAmnaya Mandara, Sudarsana Kalpa, Sri Kalpa, Maha"ganapathi Kalpa, Dattatreyakalpa, Hayagreeva Kalpa,Dakshina Murthy Kalpa^ Chandi Sapta Sati, VanadurgaMahavidya Panchasati, Pratyangira, Manyusukta, Sarva-devata Pratishtha, Homasata chandi, Pratishtha Mandaraand others in Telugu script during the last 52 years.

The latest is the present work Paa-icha Padika

Vivaranam of Prakasatma Yati rendered into English bySri Potukuchi Subrahmanya Sastri, retired Professor ofEnglish, University of Nagpur. This monumetal work is^ major landmark in the evolution of Advaita Vedanta.

We invoke the blessings of the divine on all authors.

Tenali. (Bulusu Suryaprakasa S^^fri)

20—7-1997 Founder : Sadhana Grantha Mandali.


P B E F A C E.

Sri Sankara's commentary on the Vedanta Sutrasof Badarayana is a monumental work. Known as Sari-rafica Mimansa Bhashya, the commentary introducedthe concept of Adhyasa which is of the greatest significancein metaphysics. This paved the way for the classificationof the Upanishadic passages.

Relational God and Supra-relational Absolute wereintroduced- Empirical and ultimate degrees of Realitycame next. The Upanishads âre not dogmatic utterances.-They present the recorded statements of the spiritual ex-periences of the ancient wise men. Nagarjuna^s neyarthaand nitartha, samvriti satya (empirical truth) and parmar-th3, satya (absolute truth) have different terms in AdvaitaVedanta. Vasubandha's Tri Svabhava Nardesa intro-duced a third degree of truth. It is the pratibhasikasatya(transient truth) during the erroneous cognition of AdvaitaVedanta.

After Sri Sankara there came Bhaskara who expoun-ded the theory of Bheda-abheda (Identity in difference).The theory was there carrier.

Padmapada was said to be the direct disciple of SriSankara, This is debatable. His Panchapadika is acommentary on Sri Sankara's commentary on the first foursutras of Badarayana.

Soon after these arose divergent developments in 1metaphysis of Advaita Vedanta (non-dualistic Absolutism).Vachaspati Misra who wrote his Nyaya Suci Nibandha


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in 841 A. D.^ wrote a commentary called Bhamati onSri Sankara's commentary. With this starts the Bhamatischool. It starts with an empirical base and develops intoAbsolutism. This grants many concessions. It allowskarmas or Jighteous activities, multiplicity of selves, em-phasizes on nididhyasana (contemplation), and manyothers. It is more electie.

On Padmapada's Panchapadika Prakasatman wrotean elaborate commentary named Vivaranam. This is thestarting point of the Vivarana ^school in Advaita Vedanta.This provides the metaphysical basis and exposition ofAdvaita. It offers an ontological and epistemologicalbasis, admitting that in the ^final analysis epistemologyoffers only a bloodless ballet of categories. Perception,inference and implication are accepted as empirically validmeans of knowledge. The emphasis is on sound, hearing(sravana). It leads to the apprehension of Reality asExperience^ ' \ •

The dialectic followed by Prakasatman is not spiral asin Hegel. It is like Bradley's dialectic, like Nagarjuna^scatushkoti, like the Socratic dialectic.

Prakasatman criticises Bhamati, Bheda abheda andVijnanavada. His exposition of erroneous cognition(Khyati) is superb. The major opponents are the philo-sophers of Vijnana veda like Dinnaga and Dharmakirti.While Sri Sankara fought a successful battle against thethinkers of the Sankya system of Philosophy (dualism),Pragksatman destroyed the Vijnanavada system of Buddhistphilosophy. At the sams time he assimilated some of theimportant elements from that school.


Ill

The Vivarana oPPrakasaiman is a hard nut. Many ofour Professors of Indian Philosophy have not touched it sofar. It is time their eyes are opened to the golden mine ofVivarana, Indian philosophy cannot be brushed aside.

We rendered the first Varnaka of this text into Englishin 1957. Since then it underwent many revisions. Weare grateful to Sri Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam for thefinancial assistance given. We are grateful to Sri BulusuSurya Prakasa Sastri under the patronage of whoseSADHANA GRANDHA MANDALI this is being publi-shed. We wish more and more students and teachers ofIndian Philosophy delve deeper and deeper into the goldenmines preserved by our ancient thinkers.

Tenali, P. S. SASTRI20-7-199 ?• (Potukuchi Subrahmanya Sastri)


PANCHAPADIKA VIVARANAM

The first verse of the Pancapaadika offers the author'sobeisance to his deity in accordance with the traditional,convention, so that the intended work might be completedsafely and spread far and wide. It also suggests briefly thefinal import of the whote commentary to be one of (abso-lute) identity between the'self and the Absolute. The know-ledge of this identity is arrived at from a close enquiry intothe meanings of the terms subject (=tvam) and object(==tau). All the truths or conclusions that are arrived atlater on, are within the frame work of this identity.

The first verse is fully substantiated (or supported) bythe author's offering addresed to god and his preceptor.This in itself is capable of bringing into fruition the resultdesired by him. Yet with his speech, mind and body, theauthor offers his obesiance to his preceptors in the nextthree verses so that the listeners too might realize the sameresult.

The fifth verse sets forth the author's objective in cornposing the Panchapadika.

Objection : Sankara's Commentary should not becommented upon sinte it cannot be considered to be a com-mentary in the strict sense of the term. Where the meaningof an aphorism is explained (or described) in words orsentences that are dependent on the aphorism and wherethe explanations are elaborately discussed, there aloone wehave a real commentary. Let us apply this definition to thevery first sitra- "athato brahma jijnasa". Inorder thatthere canbe purusha pravritti we haveto presume here the •word 'Kartavyaa'.CThis is against theBhaamati school which


2 Panchapadika

rejects a 'Vidhi there and accepts only an 'anuvaada' by com-pleting the expresion with 'bhavati'. Jijnaasaa cones inbetween an incomplete and a complete knowledge; ie, itimplies the investigation or enquiry that comes after apreliminary cognition. So the sutra would read- One whohas the "saadhana catu-shtaya' must undertake (==Kartavyaa)the enquiry (==- Vihaara) into Bramajnana. I bus we arriveat the conclusion that Bi-hmajnaâ is the means for libera.tion of a specific adhikari. From the context it would appearthat this enquiry is into the vedaanta vakyas. Hence, onewho has the 'sadhana catushtaya9 must undertakeJthe enq-uiry into- the vedanta vakyas so that he might have theBrahma jnana which is the means .'of liberation. This is themeaning we apprehend froix the first aphorism. Nowthe âdhyasa bhaasya' of Sankara does not explain evenremotely the meaning of this aphorism; and hence it shouldnot be commented upon.

Reply : To answer this objection, Padmapada statesthat this part of the commentary explains the 'Vishaya' and^rayojana" which are implied by the meaning of ihe ahporism. That part of the commentary ending with "Loka vya-vaharah" has its full meaning only when read with the nextfew sentences ending with "Vedaantaa a rabhyante". Thesetwo parts together explain that the 'Vishaya' and 'Prayoj'an of this system are implied in the first aphorism.

Objection ; How is it then that we have then twoBhashyas propounding the 'Vishaya' and the 'prayojana9 ?The last sentence alone is giving out the 'Vishaya' and 'pra-yofana"1; and what then is the purpose of the earlier part?If both these parto are giving only the subjectmatter andpurpose, where is 'adhyaasa' propounded ? If these parts


Vivaranam 3

are to give only the subjectmater and purpose, why is'adhyasa' explained ?

Repgy : If the 'Vishaya9 and Trayojana9 that determinewhether a particular system should be studied or not; andit is the principle.of adhyaasa that determines the 'vishaya'and the 'Prayojana\ In other words, you can not knowthe subject matter,nor the purpose of the system if 'adhyasa5is not enunciated. The middle term (== hetu) always esta-blishes the relation of the major to the minor. 'Adhyasa'is the 'hetu' for the 'Visahya & pray oj ana' which in theirturn explain why the system should be studied carefullyrJust as the tilling of the field should be undertaken sinceit has an object and an turpospe, so should the enquiry intoany system of knowledge be undertaken if it has an objectand a purpose.

When we are awake, we come to understand or com-prehend the world around us. In like manner Sankara'scommen-tary reveals to us the nature of 'avaidyatmaka band-ha and how to over come it. As such here we have a specifi.subject-matter and, a definite purpose attached thereto.That the bondage (bandha) is 'avidyaatmaka5 is the importof both the parts in this 'adhyasa bhasya' And this part ofthe commentary comsequently explains the 'vishaya9 and'prayojana' of this system which enable us to study it.

Objection : We are told that the bondage of theself is due to 'avidya9. This reason ('hetu') is 'asiddha'(unproved). How can an 'asiddha hetu' establish an"asiddha sadhya' ?

Reply : In the sentence âsyaanartha prahaanaaya..."it is well established that the 'saadhya'is 'avidya nivrittf. In


4 Panchapadika

arriving at this '-'Vishaya' we fare told about the definition(laksana), conceivabilily (sambhaavanaa), possibility (sadb-haava) and the ways of establishing (pramaana)eadhyasa9. Inthis manner did the commentator establish and proveadhyasa, and then did he establish the subject matter andpurpose of his work. Thus the earlier part of the 'adhyasabhasya' is related to the main text through the latter part.This explains why Padmapada divided the âdhyapsa bha-shya' into two parts.

Objection : But the passage ending with 'asyaanarthahetoh prahaanaaya...9 does not prove'adhyasa'. lhat 'adh-yaasa5 exists is proved only by the sentence ending with^sarva loka pratyakshah'. As such it should be said that theearlir part should be read only with reference to or alongwith this part ending with 'sarva loka pralyakshah ?

Reply.; It is true. However, that part of the comment-ary ending with the sentence 'sarve vedaantaa aarabhyante'explains the 'Vishaya' and 'prayojana9 and states that theyare found in the vedaanta vaakyas. As such that sentencealone explains the relation of the 'Vichaara9 'saasfra' to theearlier part of the text. In arriving at the 'Vishaya' and"prayojana" of this^nvestigation which are given in the latterpart, we come to estarblish 'adhyaasa' through which alonewe can establish the other. This explains the relation ofthe two parts.

Objection ; Yet, the Vishaya and pray ojana expo-unded here do not seem to be implied by the first aphorism.They appear to be totally unrelated to the aphorism.

Reply ; This is answered by Padmapada when heobserved that since these are implied by that aphorism,


Vivaranam 5

the commentator begins with an exposition of those impli-cations.

The next objection takes a serious turn. It argues thatthe first aphorism itself is 'asamgata9 and hence the comm-entary need not be gone through. There is an injunction'Svaadhyaayo a dhyetavyah5 and this is a 'nitya vidhi'.According to this injunction, one has to study his own vedawhich includes the Sanhita, Braahmana, Aaranyaka andUpanisad. One who studies his own veda is surely boundto come across vedaantavaakyas which give him a knowledgeof Brahman- This • apprehension is a logical corollary ofthe 'Svaadhyaya Vidhi9, and it can not be an additionalVidhi. Some of the passages which give an understandingof Brahman and which he will go through while studyinghis own vedas are referred to. This is a passage beginningwith "Everything becomes dear or loveable only for the loveof the self. Having begun with this sentence, it is saidat the end with referenc to him that has renounced every-thing and that loves the self, 'when the self is apprehended,all this is known; this much indeed is immortally'. Theapprehension of the self is here said to be the way of real-ising immortality. In the statement 'The.self is to be seen,heard, meditated and contemplated", the word drashtavyahdoes not indicate an injunction. Any command refers tosome conation and the realization of an end which doesnot 'exist' as such prior to the conation. 'Dyshtavyah'does not imply a command since sight as such does notlead to any further conation in the present context. On theother hand 'manana' and "nididhyasana' are the essentialelements in the conation arising from 'sravana'. As suchthe command refers to sravana and it makes "manana' and^nididhyasana subordinate to it. (The Bhamati school makes


6 Panchapadika

'manana9 the central pivotal word in the sentence.) Andhe who studies his veda has to enquire into the following :

what are the specific features of an 'adhikari' ? What arethe 'pramanas' he has to follow ? What is the 'vedantavakva vihara' ? Can it be had by any other means or not ?How is 'atmajnana' the way to liberation ? What is this'atmajnana' and how can he have it ? This 'jijnasu7 desiresthe chief 'purushartha'. It is with" reference to such an onewho possesses the 'saadhana catushtaya' that Badarayanahas decreed enquiry into the 'vedanta vakyas5 so that therecan be the knowledge of Brahman v/hich is the way to liber-ation. This injunction implies the 'adhikarf, 'vishaya' and'phala' which are the three 'anubandhas'. To determine thesethree, he gave the aphorism "athaato brahma^jijnaasaa'; forit is generally admitted' that the 'sruti6 and the 'vedantasutra' are in essence identical. And it will be explainedlater on how 'manana' and 'nididhyasana' become the'angas' of 'sravana'.

Objection ; The first aphorism is said to be basedon 'sravana vidhf. But the 'sravana vidhF itself is impo-sible. This 'vidhi' cannot command 'vedaanta vakya vihaara'which leads to "moksha saadhana brahmajnana5 for onepossessing the 'sadhana catuhtaya'. This injunction can-not be an âpurva vidhi' which refers only to an 'atyantaprapta vishaya'. The 'sravana vidhi9 is said to give rise to'jnana'. This 'jnaana' can be had not only through'sra-vana'. There are other ways too, and there is no necessaryrelation between'sravana' and'jnaana'. Nor can we take'srotavyLh' to be a 'niyama vidhi' as in the case of ^vrihiiinavahanyaad9 where the removal of the husk is the 'drishtaphala' and where there is also an 'adrishta prayojana9'Since the husk can be removed by other ways also, we


Vivaranam 7

assume here an 'adrishta phala' also. No such thing can befound in the 'sravana vidhf; for if we were to take it as a'niyama vidhi' we have to find out whethr the 'saadhya' is'paramaa purva' or 'atma bodha'. It can not be the formerfor the sravana vidhi does not have any 'adrishta sadhya\Nor can it be the latter since 'atmaavagama' is 'drishtopaayamaatra sadhya9. Hence there is no 'adrishta phala9.

Reply : It is neither an 'apurva vidhi9 nor a 'parisan-khya vidhi'. But it is a 'niyama JvidhF. In the context of''sarvaa peksa ca yajnadi sruter asvavat", it is decided lateron that the immediate apprehension of the self (aatma tatLvaaparoksya) is 'sarvaadrishta sadhyatva\ It can be const-rued like 'vribin avahanyad9 as having both the 'drishta'and 'adishta phala'.

Objection = Sankara himself has rejected the veiwthat the 'vedaanta vakyas' are injunctions. If they are to betreated as 'vidhis', their object which is Brahman musthave to be a so-far non-existent entity. The rejection of'vidhitva' to these passges removes such 'asiddhF and otherdefects. Hence we cannot accept a 'sravana vidhi' here.

Reply : Sankara has rejected only a 'jnana vidhi9and not a 'sravanavidhi' there, for in the latter case those'doshas9 do not arise. Thus, in a 'darsana vidhi' we havean object called Brahman and this object is to be apprehen-ded through an action. The object becomes specific anddistinguishable, and we will then have a Brahman which is<guna bhuta' (qualified). In a 'vichara vidhi' however, theobject aimed at is Brahma darsana'. Brahman then be-comes the object which is an end in itself and not a meansto an end. Thus the ^vedaanta vaakyas' enunciate Brahmanas an end in itself, and towards the apprehension of Brah-


8 Panchapadika

man they provide the injunction for 'sravana'. This doesnot in any way vitiate the nature of Brahman.

Objection : In accordance with the 'upakramopa-samhara nyaaya, (harmony of the beginning and the end),we learn that the vedaanta vaakyas are directed towards theenunciation of the nature of the self. And if we were torely on some passages alone and come to the conclusion tha^they refer to 'sravana vidhi\ we will be going against thefinal or total import. How can the later conclusion arise inview of this final import ?

RepSy ; To this objection two lines of reply are offe-red. i) There is the passage — "Tarn vividishanti yajn-eta, danena, napasanasatkena". This is one of the passa-ges occuring in the texts and this cannot be interpreted asidentical with the final import. Yet 'yajna' and otherways referred to in the passage are esentially 'Jnaanarthaka-*(means to knowledge). Likewise in a context of 'adhodharana','we come across the injunction "upari hi deve-bhyah". Here is no 'vakyabheda"" for the latter injunctio^has an 'apurva9. In the same manner the sravana vidhi-does not come into conflict with the 'atma vakya'. Fur-ther, in the context of 'darsapurna masa9 we read "Tisroratrir vratam caret anjalinava a pah pibet" and also"malavad vasasana samvadet". From the context (pra—karana) it appears that the prohibition in the latter sentenceis 'kratvartha" and not 'purushartha\ But it has been deter-mined that it is a 'purusartha para'. A similar interpretationis to be given to 'avantaravakyas' like 'sravana vidhi'.

Or ii) take a sentence like 'Tasmad braahmanah paa-ndityam nirvidya...'. Since this refers to 'sravana', we cantake it to be 'sravana vidhaayaka'. Even the sutrakara ob-


Vivaranam 9

serves the same thing in the aphonism "sahakary antaravidhih pakshena tritiyam tadvato vidhyadiva" (3.4.47).Thus considered in any manner there is a 'sravana vidhi9 towhich ^manana' and 'nididhyasana' are 'angas'. And todetermine the three 'anubandhas' implied by this vidhi, thefirst aphorisn is given.

This aphorism declares that a proper 'adhikari' mustundertakes the enquiry into the 'vedanta vakyas' so that hemay have 'mokshasadhana brahma jnana'. This enquirycomnences with the second aphorism. The injunction of'sravana' implies, as we have said, an 'adhikari', afl;<vishaya>and 'prayojana'. In determining the last two, Sankara ex-plains that bondage ( bandha.),is 'mithya'. Thus the 'adh-yaasa bhaashyais inecesarily implied by the first aphorism.

Objection ; If however, 'vishaya' and 'prayojana' areimplied by the aphorism, then the coemmentator aught tohave first explained the purpose of the aphorism; and thenhe should have clearly and plainly explained the 'vishaya'and 'prayojana' in the form of question and-answer.Otherwise it would appear ^that the sutrakara's views arenot given by the commentator.

Rep8y : Padmapaada replies ;that a full and convinc-ing answer will be given when we come to the passagetherefore Brahman should be enquired into\

Padmapada then proceeds to explain elearly the open-ing sentences of Sankara. Padmapada raises an objection-Îf the purpose of the 'adhyasa^bhashya' is only to providethe 'visaya' and the prayojana9, it is better to have onlythe sentence "asyananantha hetoh...'. Why should Sankaracompose the eariis sentences ? If the entire 'adhyaasa

(2)


10 Panchapadika

bhashya' is only to provide the 'vishaya' and the 'prayojana9like Ihd sentence 'asyanartha hetoh...\ where is the neces-sity for the earlier sentences ?

Rep By : We have in this aphorism the enquiry(vichaarakartavyataa^'vishaya prayojana' and 'adhyasa' inthis part of the commentary. Here every succeeding thingma«es the preceeding thing necessary. As such we can arriveat vishaya and prayojana only when we have establishedshed 'adhyasa'; and we can have 'vichara kartavyatya' onlylater on.

Objection : The aphorism indicates the 'vihaarakartavyataa\whose 'prayojana' is the knowledge of BrahmanThen how can the dispelling of the bondage be the prayo-jana for the enquiry and for the knowledge ?

Be ply : The subject matter of the 'aphorisms is theknowledge of Brahman, which knowldge destroys the causeof all evil. The enquiry gives us knowledge. The'prayojana' of this knowledge is implied by or involved in,the 'vicharavidhT ; and this injunction makes us understandthat liberation for a specific 'adhikari9 is the 'prayojana'.

Objection ; 'Anartha' is generally seen to be of thenature of falling into hell. But here the 'anartba9 is saidto be the appearance of body etc for which |you are go-ing to establish 'mithyatva9. Is this proper ? How?

Reply : 'Anartha' involves the meaning that the selfis taken J:o be the subject of all actions and to be theenjoyer.


Vivaranam II

Pramatritva, kartritva and bhoktritva (knowing, do-ing and enjoying) constitute the object or the nature of theobject. Can knowledge dispel these ? These is an objecthaving specific avayavas (parts) and we have the knowledgethat it is a blue substance. This knowledge does not dispelthe substance ; nor can it dispel the properties that arenecessarly connected with it; nor can it dispel the absenceof its contradictory. What is dispelled by this knowledgeis only the absence of understanding of the object, i.e. -Theknowledgeôf an "object puts an end to the ignorance of theobject that we have.

You cannot say that by knowledge there is dispelledthat which has its 'asraya' (locus) in the self. For the know"*ledge of the pot does not dispel the properties like dharmaand adharma that are in the self.

Nor can knowledge dispel that object which is relatedboth to the 'asraya9 and to the' vishaya' for even when theself has the knowledge of the body, we do not see that therelation of the self and the body is dispelled.

Objection; From our experience we can not saythat knowledge dispels bondage ; for the dispelling of thebondage is not seen and knowledge then would have tobe 'avidyatmaka'. But it is only the scripture that tells Uathat knowledge liberates us from bondage.

Reply = It is only to make the sruti like "Tathaa vid-vaan nama mupad vimuktah" intelligible that we acceptavidyatmatva to be the nature of bondage. Eg sucheint-preation has been accepted with reference to the ,apurva ofthe 'aagneyaadi yaagas' and also with reference to the 'srutssvargapurva'.


12 Panchapadika

Objection : But there we have the karrnas which aremomentary and whose results are to be experienced aftera long time. To facilitate that many apurvas are presumedin the meanwhile; and thus they have 'surtopapatti'.

Reply : Here too we have such a concomitant relation."Knowledge can dispel only ignorance". Hence the apho-rism itself indicates that the bondage is of the nature ofavidya.As such to arrive at the 'vichara kartavyata' given bythe meaning of the aphorism, we should establish the pur-pose of the sastra. And the 'prayojana9 can arise onlywhen we have given an account of adhyasa.

"Ifkartritva and bhoktritva are brought by ajnana,then Brahmajnana alone can dispel this evil. Badarayanaindicates that Brahmajnana dispels this anartha; and in sodoing he implies that this anartha is brought by avidya.And by explaining this ajnana, Sankara makes the meaningof the aphorism consistent and intelligible". Sankara doesnot give the plain meaning of the aphorism first, but itsimplication because this part of the commentary is the gen-eral introduction to the whole system.

The identity of the Brahman and the self is the finalconclusion or meaning of the whole system.

Objection : Let adhyasa be the ground from whichwe can establish the 'prayojana'. But how can this be alsothe ground foi maintaining that final conclusion ?

Reply : "All the vedantas go to establish the realityof Brahman who is pure bliss, pure existence, 'kutasthachaitanya' (Integral consciousness) and 'asamsarin' (nonrela-tional whole). This is the ultimate nature of the self".This meaning has been propounded by the aphorisms and


Vivaranam 13

by the commentary. Since this conclusion is arrived atfrom an examination of adhyasa, Padmapada proceeds tostate why adhyasa is to be discribed first. "We have thecogntions — I am the doer, I am happy, I am unhappy—and these are immediately apprehended by us. These areopposed to the nature of Brahman. To^put an end to thiscontradiction, we should know that we are identical withBrahman and that the apparent apprehension of differ en-nce is due to avidya — which has Brahma svarupa viparitarupa\ (Other than the beign of Brahman). If the truenature of the self is not apprehended, the anartha wouldremain as it is like a meaningless sentence".

Objection: When the Sastra itself treats bondageto be unreal and propouds the identity of the self withBrahman, then why should you describe adhyasa again ?

Reply: If it is not described, the Sastra would beunintelligible like a series of nonsense syllables. ^To getrid ofbmdage we should know that it is 'avidya vilasita%that it lies in falsely taking ourselves to be different fromBrahman.

Objection : If the Sastrartha can be estabished onlyby establishing adhyaasa, then adhyasa being the moreimportant one it ought to have been rendered into an aphforism at the very outset. Otherwise adhyasa would be outof place and inconsistent with the views of Badarayana.

Reply :• "Samkara himself would explain later onunder the aphorism Tadguna saratvat' that it is not out o4place and that it is not inconsistent."

/

Objection : If so, adhyasa being the general intro-duction, it oupht to have been the first aphorism.


14 Panchapadika

Reply : The aphorism is engaged in setting anddetermining the final truths, and not in writing introduc-tions. "The first aphorism cannot be written on adhyasabecause of the purpose on hand for the aphorist. Whenthe truths are arrived at and the canflicting texts are pro-perly intrpreted, then there might arise doubts, and it isonly these doubts that are to be ^rejected later on. If thetruths are not stated, how can a doubt and its rejectionarise ?" LE the aphorism [on adhysa would come underdoubt and its rejection.

Objection : Then the commentator too ought tofollow the order of the aphorisms.

Reply : The commentator begins with adhyasa whichis implied by the first aphorism, only to make us under-stand the text easily.

MangaEacarana (Salutation at the beginning)

Objection": Yet this commentary should not be*commented upon since there is no 'mangalacarana'. If it isnot there the sastrartha may not be comprehened, may beconstrued otherwise, or may be inconsistently understood.So many obstacles go with the sastrartha. Further a Man-galasloka at the beginning is sishtacara (convention of th-wise) "which has been violated; a.nd this makes the comm-entator an 'anapta\ one on whose words we cannot keepreliance. The prayojana intended can be safely realised be •having the 'mangalacarana'. "It is generally seen that-mangalacarana' has its purpose in putting an end to or ingnietening the obstacles. This work is aimed at 'nissreyasa


Vivaranam 15

prayojana' which is very great. And when there is such agreat purpose, obstacles are found to be many. Then whydid Sankara act thus" ?

Reply : Those who have God always in their heartand those who have.always the experience with God, theyhave nothing to fear about; they have no obstacles. Thusthe Smriti proclaims. To quieten the obstacles, it is enoughto have the 'mangalacaranaîn one's own mind, and San-kara Has performed it. "Our proof for this statement isfound in the opening lines ending with the words 'sutaramitaretara bhavanupapattih'." This may also be taken to bethe 'mangalacarana".

Objection : How does this passage'give us the kno-wledge that it is 'visista devatanusmarana'. (cotinuous re-membering of a specific^deity).^?

Reply ; "This passage declares that the self is devoidof any obstacles and destruction and that it is pure thought(s= prajnana ghanah). When this reality ..appears like ano-,ther entity, this appearance is false. Sankara proceeds todeclare the mithyatva of this appearance by expounding theself to be pure consciousness and to be devoid of all 'upa-plavas' (fluctuations). When Sankara is expending the nat_ure of such consciousness, wherefrom can the obstaclearise ? This in itself is the 'mangalacarana'.,

While he is explaining the nature of adhyasa, by impli-cation he is actually referring to the pure consciounesswhich is the ground of adhyasa.

Adhyasa—Virodha

"The object and the subject are opposed to one ano-ther as darkness and light. What is this 'virodha'?


16 Panchapadika

(contrariety) and what is the nature of the 'itaretara bhava'which is said to be inconsistent with the nature of thesetwo ?

There are two forms of 'virodha' and two forms of"itaretara bhavanupapattih' (impossibility of the two nat-ures being one). When two objects cannot be at the sameplace, at the same time, or in the same stage, we have the'virodha' which refers to the nature or dharma of the obj-ects. The absence of the 'avastha laksana karya' brought'by such virodha is the incompatibility of their 'itaretarabhava\

When two objects cannot have the nature of one ano-ther, we have the second type of 'virodha\ which also i'sbased on the nature of the objects. The absence of the'itaretartvata lakshna' brought by such virodha is anotherform of the incompatibility of their itaretara bhava.

If it is said that virodha means that two entities can notcoexist, then when there is light there cannot be darkness.This is fal se. Eg when there is a faint light in the room,we cannot cognise the objects clearly. I.E. in such a roomboth light and darkness are foan?d coexisting. Like wisein the shade, we have both heat and shade in varying deg-rees. Similar is the case with cold and heat.

Then one might argue that virodha means that of twoobjects, one cannot have the nature of another. Then con-^der the universal and the particular. Though they are dis—t inct from one another, one penetrates into the other. Sucean integration ought to be impossible if the nature of theone is not to be found in the other.


Viyaranam 1.7

Vivarana proceeds to examine the nature of 'tamasdarkness) and rejects the view that it is only 'prakasaa'bhava'. (absence of light).

9. Objections cortceaTssisig adhyaasa

Objection ; There may be the natural incompati-bility of any relation between the dark (seeing) and thedrsya(seen). Yet it can not obstruct the appearance of'tadatmya' which is the cause of error. Eg; sukti (motherof pearl) a-nd silver have no relation oftadatmayaatall.Yet there appears an identical* ground for both and thisgives rise to error. And the same may hold good herealso.

The ground is only the 'this', and that which is adh-yasta (superimposed) is the silver. There is some tadatmyabetween the two. This relation between the 'this' and the'what' may be one of 'samanya viseshaabhava', (general andparticular) or of gunaguni bhava9 (quality and qualified).And we find the 'amsa' (aspectôr part) of one appearing asthe 'amsa' of the other. Such an 'anyataramsa adhyasa(an aspect of one cognising as that of another) whieh is a cas®of error is seen. Like wise we have consciousness as th6ground, and the not-salf as the adhyasta. But here we donot have such a relation as before. "Since the subject isin itself pure consciousness it can not admitôf any 'yusmadamsa' (aspect of the object) in it."

If there were to be an adhysaôfthe not-self on theself the^self as the ground must admit of the 'idam amsa-(thatness). That will have to be the 'acid aunsa" (aspect ofnon-consiousness) which may be natural or 'agantuks

(3)


18 Panchapadika

(adventitious) to consionsness. It cannot be natural sinceit is pure consicousness and consciousness alone in itself. Theobject is unconscious and is appearing as the object for congcioensness. How can the subject of an act become alsothe object of the act ? Is this not strange and fantastic <?If it is then 'agantuka5, has it a cause or no ? If it has nocause, it cannot come into existence. Ifconciousness whichis 'niravayava' (having no parts) cannot evolve itself intoa 'savayava' (having parts) entity. It can not have also acause, since consciousness is 'niranjana' (non-relational)Eg the amsa has no avayavas ; and we do not see anyevolution of it brought about by a cause.

"Nor CCL2. the not self be the ground, since the objectin itself is hot a conscious'entity. Further, if the object isa conscious entity, it would be the same as the subject; andthus it would cease to be an object." Eg one percipientcannot have any immediate experience of another percipient;

but can only befer the other. Like wise the object, that isa conscious entity, could not be directly congnised, butonly inferred.

Moreover the object cannot evolve itself into the formof consciousness, since an unconcious entity can be thecause of only that effect which is also unconscious.

Then can9! we say the not-self accepts the 'atma caita-nya9 as its own amsa ?

This is imposible since conseiousness cannot move likethat. It is 'aprati samkrama9 (motionless). Thus no wheredo we find ^tadatmya' even to a very slight extent. And


Vivaranam 19

we cannot have the amsa of one in another, whence theadhyaasa which is of the form of 'anytaraamsa" is imposible.

"The same argument will tell us that the propertiesof an object cannot appear in another object since anyproperty cannot give up its ground or locus.

"Thus there arises the impossibility of 'itaretara bhaava9.The subject is apprehended as asmat pratyaya gocara andis of the nature of consciousness. This is the 'anidamamsa'or the eifcnicnt of the not-this in the 'asmat pratyaya'On this is supposed to take place the adhyaasa of the 'yus-madartha, (the this) which involves the attachment to thebody etc. When the T and the 'this' have the mutual in-terpenetration, there is supposed to arise a single datumwhich is called adhyaasa". That this is not possible, is thecontention of the objector.

We refer to all the entities beginning with the aham-kaara (Ego) and ending with the body not as the 'this' butas the T. How are these taken to be 'yusmat pratyayagocara9 ? (aprehended as this).

The reply : Consciousness is 'asmat pratyaya gocara'Now ^ ahamkaara etc are apprehended as almost identicalwith this consciousness, Due to this strength, and due tothe fact that they are all illumined directly by consciousnessthey can not strictly be taken to be on a par with the otherobjects. Yet in so far as they are directly illumined by con-sciousness, They are in a sense objecto— objects for consci-ousness.

"Now in the 'vishayaadhyas5 (super imposiation of theobject) the properties of one object may be cognised as thsproperties of another. Yet even without any such 'vishayaa-


2o Panchapadika

dhyasa', there can be only the adhyaasa of the properties"Eg deafness is a property of the ear, but is cognised as anattribi te of the person. In the same way we can also havethe adhyasa that involves the properties of the subject.

"Now, if the subject is pure conssiousness, how can ithave properties and can there be the adhyaasa of these pro-perties ?

'Ananda' (Bliss), 'Vishayaanubhava' (experience) andîtyatva^ (eternality are the properties of conciousness.Eventhough they can not be separated there is nothingwrong in saying that the properties of consciousnes alsocan be adhyasta. These properties constitute the very natureof consciousness. Yet they appear as if they are many pJOperties only in the 'antah Karana Vrtty Upaadhf (condi-tioned psychosis).

Adhyaasa requires a similarity between the two obje-cts ; and this similarity must be found in the case of theparts of the object. But when. the self in concerned suchan 'avayava saadrisya' (similarity of parts) cannot be found.So, when we speak of Kartritva for the self, we admit thatit is due to the upaadhi called the ahankara. Though this'bhrama' (illusion) has such a cause in the upaadhi, it is afact that the 'sadrisya adhyaasa' does not have an upadhi.For the adhyaasa of the body etc., there is no 'sopadhikabhramatva'. As such it is impossible to say that the enti-ties from ahankaara to the body are adhyasta on the perci-pient. This impossibility has been accepted and recognisedby Padmapaada.

Suppose, we know the smell of the 'Ketaki gandha7and we also know that the' sarpa Gandha' is similar to it,


Vivaranam 21

When we smell the latter and when the other is absent, theargument from analogy would tell us that we are smellingonly the "sarpa gandha\ When we cognise yellow in theconch we try to find out a cause for this yellow, and weassume the reality of such a cause. In the same maimerwhen there is the congnition of the effect of the 'nirupaa-dhika bhrama' (unconditioned illusion) we have to assumethat this is due to something similar to it, or that there is acause for it That this is the proceedure is given by Padma-paada.

"Adhaasa is the appearance of a form where that formis not. This is mithyaa. Mithyaa means that which con-ceals something, or that which is inexplicable. Here it isthe former mciming intended. In reality there is no suchadhyaasa. Yet it is naisargika (Naturals*)

"Naisargika means that which is internally related tothe Tratyak Caitanya Sattaa" alone. When the defects ofKartritva and bhoktritva are related to the self, then wehave adhyaasa. To be an enjoyer, the self must be a doer,for one who is not a doer cannot enhoy the consequencesof his actions. To be a doer, the self must hove the 'samyo-gaadhyaasa9 (relational) with love and hatred. One cannotbe a doer if he does not have love and hatred. Once thereis the contact of the self with such defects, it must necess-arily become an enjoyer ; for in the absence of such anenjoying, love and hatred would be inconsistant In thismanner the adhyaasa goes on endlessly and without abeginning ; It is as beginningless and endless as the relationbetween the seed and the plant. As such adhyaasa is spo-ken of as being 'naisargika9 or natural.


22 Panchapadika

'This natural adhyaasa is manifest in "lokavyavaha-rika' as-I am this, this is nine etc. Just as we can not rejectthe existence of the I, so too we cannot reject the existenceof adhyaasa." 'Lokavyavahaara' takes the form of- 'I ama man', 'I am a human being'. Here in we are treating theI not as the self, but as something alse.

Adhyaasa is said to be the appearance of an entity ashaving the nature of another. If so, the expression 'whitecloth' ought to be a case of adhyaasa, since the white ispredicated of the cloth. The remove such instances fromthe sphere of adhyaasa, it has been said that adhyaasa ari-ses when there is the interpenetration or integration of thereal and the unreal into a single entity. There should bethe 'samyoga' of the real and the unreal. It is only suchan integrated or synthetic single entity that can be taken toconstitute avidyaa. With this in mind, Sankara has spokenof 'satyanrita mithunikritya'. "By styam is meant the con-sciousness which is the not-this; and by anrita is meant thethis, since it is to 'swaruupa9 itself that is adhyasta."

Objection : ^mithunikritya' means having conjoinedor united the two. This suffix- 'kritvaa' inflies that the actconveyed by this verb is different from the act conveyed byanother verb which alone can complete the sentence and theaction. Further, prior io this 'mithunikarana', there musthave been something etc. 'As such how can you maintainthat 'adyaasa', 'mithunikarana' and ^lokavyavahara9 are allsynonymous with one another ?

Reply ; "This suffix- 'kritvaa' does not reveal thatsomething takes place after it; it does not show that it isdistinct f rom 'likavyavahaara.9 In'bhuktvaa vrajatf also


Vivaranam 23

other hand in 'mithunikritya' we have only the suffix and nottwo different verbs. It does not simply or involve anotherverb. 'adhyasya' and 'lokavyavaharah9 and this • 'ktriaa^here only explains tbe same. We con not admit, of 'Kripa-bheda' (difference in verbs) because at the end sankara sumsup by saying 'Evam ananto naisargik adhyaash" Thusthe 'upakrama' (beginning) and the 'upasamhara' (conclu.sion). So to establish that this 'kritvaa' is not different from"adhyaasa/ and from 'lokavyavahara.9 Just as we say, 'CaLtayam purushasya gunam' even though conciousness isnot distinct from the purusa, so too is employed this'-kirtvaa' suffix. It is only an 'Aupacaarika (conventional)usage, and it does not bring out any^distiction of the succe-ssive stages.

Eg. In itself there is only one adhyaasa where oneobject is apprehanded as having the nature of another.Yet it appears as many and all these are called adhyaasaonly through 'Upacaara9. They are not really different adh-yasas having specific differences. They only appear as'aham', 'idam\ 'mamedanf. This differance is between theupaadhis of these entities. The 'paurvaaparya' (succession)of these adhyaasa is determined only from our 'pratipattior apprehension. Consequently, we can say that the suffix'-Kritvaa' has been employed by accepting the Kriyaabheda'because of the. 'Visessha bheda\

"This adhyaasa is 'mithya'; mithyaa and anrita arereferred to here. Mithyaa conveys the meaning of inexpILcability (anirvachanniyata), while ajhnana convyes the Avi-dya sakti which is of the nature of unconscious." Insteadof ^mithyajnana", if Sankara had employed only 'ajnanam/


24 Panchapadfka

it would mean only the absence of negation of knowledge.If he comployed only the word 'mithyaa\ it would meanerroneous knowledge (bhranti ajnanam). To exclude thereare two meanings, Padmapada explains the two to mean that'ajnana'' which is also 'mithya\ It means 'ajnana^, which isnot the absence of Jnana, but is a positive existent entity,It is not a merely unreal or totally false entity ; for it hassome form of reality. Such an âjnana^ is the material cause(upaadana) of entire adhya.asa.

11. Objection : How is 'mithyajnana*' the mete-rial cause (upadhana) of adhyasa ?

Reply ; It is through the method of agreement anddifference that this is established. Adhyasa arises whenthere is a "mithyajnana\ and it ceases to be in the absenceof the latter.

Objection : 'Adhyaasa' is dispelled by (is the con-tradictory of)''tattvajnanam. The absence of the latter is"ajnana9. Thus the 'pratibandhaka abhava vishayata'is adyasa. And the method of agreement and differencedoes not prove anything.

Rep By : Tratibandhaka" (obstacles) actually means'Utpatti virodhF, that which prevents a thing from cominginto existence. When there is a sifficient cause, anythingthat prevents the emergance of the effect, is called 'pratiba..ndhaka.' When there is the sufficent cause called 'adhyasa^we do not become a ware of 'tattvajnana9 as that which pre-vents the emergence of the effect and even if the sufficenfcause called 'adhyasa,1 were absent, we have the emergenpeor awakening of 'tattvajnana ? As such it is evidence tha^»


Vivaranam 25

the concomitant; relation of 'ajnana9 to âdhyasa' does not t

apply in the case of 'pratibandhaka - bhava.' f

Objection: 'Adhyasa'is not a Tratibandhaka'for (

the knowledge of truth ('tattva bodha'). Yet the former \

can be dispelled only by the latter ; and as such the latter |i

is the 'virodhi9 (contradictory) of the former. One is the |

'abhaava' "negative) of the other. One totally excludes |

the other. |

; KHepSy : But given an 'effect* it demads the knowledge ::. |

of its cause, and never its contradictory ('virodhi samsarga \ |

bhaava'). The method of agreement and difference, then' [ |

attempts at determining its cause alone at the outset, for ' |

the 'apekshjta vidhana' and the anapekshila" 'vidhana\ the 'f, |

former is the stronger and has precedence. j|

fe

Objection : Why can't we say that the 'vishaya- : I

dosha\ l^ke similarity, the 'Kaacdi indriya dosa' atta" | |

chment, to be the cause (Upadana) of 'Adhyasa' ? ^ |

'}, V

Reply : These 'dosas' (defects) constitute only the \ |

conditions and not the cause. If these 'dosas' were to be j %

taken as the cause, we have to enquire the cause of this • 'k

cause. Tn this process we will have to admit at some stage |

or other that 'ajnana' is the final cause. Everything that J

is an effect has a material cause since the effect is a 'Bhava- 1 |. ||


karya\ as the pot which is an existence has its material I j|

cause in the clay. In the absence of a maerial cause, there \ 6

can be no effect. The cause and the effect are in essence J |

non-different. The effect comes into existence along with j j

its ^gunas' (qualities) and 'Kriya\ (actjvity). The substance Iwith its ^rnas' and 'kriya' finds 'asraya' in its "Upadana^ . t

4) . j


26 Panchapadika

or Material cause ; and'the 'upadana' and the 'Upadeya'(effect) are not related to one another. This 'adhyasa musttake as its 'upadana' something which is its 'asraya' andwhich has in essence the nature of the 'upadcya/ Such anentity can be found only m 'ajnana\

Objection: The'bhranti jnanopadana' can be theself or the 'antah karana.9 Instead of consider an un-known entity like ""ajnana9 as the material cause, it is betterto consider something known in this light.

Reply ; The self which is beyond any change willhave to undergo some change or other if it were taken to bethe material cause. The self is 'niravayava9 and henceunchanging.

Next we have to consider whether the 'antahkarana'can be the material caase. Since this is 'savayava9 it canundergo some change or other. Does the 'antah karana"as the material cause imply its connection with the senseorgans, or does it not ? It cannot be the latter since theântah karana' being internal cannot come to cognise theobjects that are outside. It cannot be the former toOy sincein the case of erroneous cognition the sense organ does no1come into contact with an object like 'mithya rajaca' whichin reality does not exist. We have to admit that the 'antah-karana' alone cogness it; and this is impossible; 'Mithya-nana' is ânindriya janya* (not the out come of the sensesin general.

In the erroneous cognition there is the knowledge o;

the "this9 which is the 'adhisthana' (ground) and a specificknowledge of the ^what which does nat fit into the 'thisWithout the general knowledge of the 'adhisthana' there i


Vivaranam 27

no erroneous cognition. If the ântahkarana' (inner organ)cognises the 'this', it should be able to cognies the 'what*also. It cannot be taken to be the 'upadana/

If knowledge is the 'parinama' (transformation) of'antahkarana', we have to admit that the 'antahkarana' isnot 'jada' (insentient). This is absurd for it is not by itself"conscious" of anything ; and as such it cannot know any-thing. Pure 'antahkarana' by itself cann6t be the 'adhara'(substratum). We cannot refer error to 'antahkarana' and'tattvajnana9 to the self. Both error and truth must havethe same 'asraya' (ground) and if error is 'antahkarana-sraya\ the self has nothing to do with it. This would

imply that the &elf has nothing to do even with bondage,removal of this bondage and the true knowledge. The selfwill have to be pure ; and this is against the facts.

Neither the self nor the 'antahkarana' can be the 'Upa-dana' ofadhyasa\ Hence 'mithyajnana' alone can be the'upadana9. 'Adhyasa' is Mithyabhuta' ; and it has 'mithya-

rtha' and is 'mithyajnanaatamaka' ; and the considerationof 'upadana kaarana. Such an 'upadana karana9 cannot

be found in 'Kaacadi nimitta kaaranam' (Physical defects ofthe age) which differ from individual to individual andfrom occasion to occasion. 'Adhyasa' cannot have its'asraya9 in any of the 'dosa-s'. Further, the 'dosas' are in asense 'real', while 'adhyaasa' is not so real ; and a realentity cannot be the cause of one that does not partake ofits nature.

When the object is 'mithya' its appreciation too is'mithya\ ^


28 Panchapadika

This principle of 'ajnana' is in agreement with the nat-ure of all effects ; and it is present in all cases of erroneouscognition. This 'ajnana' has the 'asraya' (superinmposedon the self). And anything that is apprenended by it part-akes of its nature. As such the 'upadana' of ^dhyasa' canbe only 'mithyajnana' ; it can be neither the self> nor the'antahkarana', nor the 'Kaacadi dosas9.

So far we have argued for the 'atmasrayatva' (self be-ing the ground) of 'jnanadhyasa'. How can we have thesame 'asraya9 for "arthasraya5. For, in the cognition 'thisis siver", we apprehend it as external, as lying outside theself. The silver that is cognised has the mother-of-peal asits "asraya9 ; and the latter, in so far as it is cognised isactually 'idam amsaavacchinna caitanya' (consciousness asconditioned by the 'this'). That it is not really extenal willbe explained later on.

Now with reference to 'adhyasa' we find Sankara obse-rving 'mithyajnana nimittah5 and ''naisargiko 'Yam lokaVyavaharah'\ It is both 'naimtttika'or conditioned and'naisargika' or natural or inherent. Padmapada asks howis the unconditioned taken to be ;the conditioned ?

To this we have the reply that 'adhyasa' is 'naisargikaîn so for as it is a cyclical process and is in essence identi-with its material cause. It is 'naisargika' in the sense thatit is like a 'pravaha9 (process) where we can make out nei-ther a beginning nor an end. It is said to be 'naimittika9since it appears in the manifestation of the effects or produ-cts. As such there is no difficulty here. To arrive at thisconclusion Padmapaada proceeds to establish 'bhaavaru-pam ajnaanam' (positive character of nescience) in the self.


Vivaranam 29

With this in view, Padmapaada states that this (adhyaasa)necessarily 'be accepted.' Here he employs two words- (theadhyasa) and 'avasyanf (necessarily). The first word refersto Tratyaksha Pramaana' (perceptual apprehension) andthe second to 'an umaana pramana' (inference). These twopramaanas conclusively prove the positive nature of'ajnana'.

To begin with, perception. Take the expressions, <!am ignorant, 'I do not know myself and other'. The firstsentence makes the self the 'asraya' of 'ajnana9. In bothI have the immediate and direct apprehension of 'ajnana'.They establish the positive existence of 'ajnana' and takethe (the not-self) to be the object of 'ajnana'.This is a factof experience.

Objection : When I say 'I am ignorant' is it not anapprehension of the absence of 'jnana' ? Is not 'ajnana' thenegative of 'jnana' ?

Re^Sy : No. Just as in the statement 'I am happy^ Ihave an immediate awarences of a positive content, so do Ihave in 'I am ignorant This is a pure perceptual know-ledge. This is not possible ; 'ajnana' is the negation ('abh-ava') of 'jnana' for 'abhava' is cognised not by perceptionbut by 'anupalabdhi'.

Is 'abhaava' cognised by perception ? It is impossibleto apprehend perceptually the absence of 'vijnana in theself. So we experience 'jnanabhava' after experiencingthe contradictory of the ground or without experiencing ?Now in the statement 'There is no nowledge in me', wehave an experience in which we have the apprehension of^dharmipratiyogi9 and 'artha^ or a positive something. Here


30 Panchapadika

is ^nanasadhava' (being of knowledge) and as such it is im-possible to have the direct apprehension of jnanabhaava.Andifthe'dharmr etc. is not aprehended, 'abhava' cannever be cognised. 'Jnanabhava is experienced only whenthere is the 'dharmaadi pratipatti.' This apprehension isthrough 'anupalabdhi7 a new means ofcongnition. 'Abhava9may also be said to be cognised through inference. In anymanner whether Tnanabhava' is apprehended in the self ornot we cannot have 'jnanabhava pratipatti" in the self wecannot have 'jnanabhava pratipatti in the self (apprahension of the absence of knowledge).

It is generally seen that there is a conation in the worldafter apprehending ajnana in the form of(! dp not knowwhat you say'. Even when the objects are known, it isquite possible that the number may not be known and the^sastrartha" too may not be known. Here we apprehend'ajnana' which is 'visaya vyavritta"1 and then wp proceed inour activities of listening etc. with reference to it.

Then 'arthajnana' and 'abhava9 (its absence) do nothave a simultaneity or co-existence. In the same mannerwe cannot have both the knowledge and the absence of theknowledge of th.e same object at the same time.

As against this view we hold that 'ajnana' is a positiveentity and that it is perceptually apprehended. Its 'asraya'is the self and the 'pratiyogi' (contradic.tary) of the self is'ajnana'. We have said that 'jnanabhava' cannot co-exist,with 'jnana' without violating the law of non-contradictionSuch a violation does not arise when we have ths 'asrayapratiyogijnana, for it can coexist with a (diffe-rcnt positivequality).


Vivaranam

Now the 'sakshi caitnanya9 (witnessing consciousneâsraya' pratiyogi jnana bhutam (having the knowledgeits contradictory). Yet it does not dispel 'ajnana9 whicha' different positive entity, or it makes the object of kno1ledge manifest. And it is a fact that the knowledge of sonthing does not dispel that something.

Objection : The object 'gives' knowledge ; aiknowledge is the contradictory of 'ajnana". The objethen is 'ajnana'1 vyavartaka (dispeller of ignorance). Tobject is determined by a 'pramaana' ; ie., ,its validityexistence is determined or condiditioned by a valid meaof knowledge (Pramana). If so how is the object mamanifest by 'sakshi caitanya'. Does 'sakshi caitanya' mamanifest 'ajnana" as qualified by the object ? Or pure 'ajana' ? It cannot be the former, for any object is appreheded thourgh one of the pramanas only. It cannot be tpatter since mere 'ajnana' is beyond apprehension.

BepSy : We do not speak here of more and unqua]fied 'sakshi vedyatva'. It is always 'visista saksi vedyat\(known as qualified witness-courciousness)that we recognihere. Ady object is an object of 'saksi caitanya' • eitherknown or as unknown. The object as known is appreheded by one of the 'pramanas.' The object as unknownapprehended in a general or specific form as 'ajnana9 vyav,rtka\ One demands the 'pramana vyavadhana (medition by a means) while the other does not. In either w;

there is 'ajnana pratyaksa' (direct appehension of nesciencand this âjnana' a positive entity which has the self as iâsraya'. •

Now with the aid of inference the author proceeds 1


32 Panchapadika

An object that is in a dark room is not apprehended be-cause it is not visible. The first rays of light coming fromthe candle illumine the object ; ^M ^ object is distinctfrom the darkness that is dispelled by the rays of light,Likewise take an object whish is at a fixed place and whichexists for a certain period of time. Inference is to establish'ajn&na' as a positive entity. It is 'vasthvantara purvakamdistnict from the object cognised, distinct fr.)m the self. Itis at the same place as the object, but is not cognised bythe sense-organs. ]t dispels itself as the object is appre-hended ; ie.. it is not ^drsta9. The object that is not cog-nised stands as 'avrita' (coriceaiead covered) just as thecognition sublates the prior conition, we cannot say that thecognition of the object dispels the ignorance that has enve-loped it so far. It is 'svaprabhava vyatinkta" (other thanits own prior-non-existence) or brought about by nothingoutside of itself. Since there is nothing external to it, ititself is the ^.varana' (ocupying, covering). And when theobject is cognised that which is sublaled is this 'avaranaThe moment it is sublated, the object gets known ; and thisis possible only when the object and 'ajnana' are at thesame place. And since it is not an erronneous cognitionthat results, it is said tha.t it is 'vastav antara' or an objectdistinct from that which isknown.

The 'helu^ (cause) for all this is the illumination of anobject in a dark room by the first rays of light. It is saidthe raysh illumine the object which is so far u nillumined.Cognition is 'dhara vahika" (continous process). Here cog.nition is taJ:en to be a continuous stream or span spreadover successive moments. The cognition of the secondmoment does not destory the knowledge of the first mom-ent ; and by the time we come to the second moment,. the


Vivaranam 33

object is already illumined and known. Hence it is saidthat the object is so far unillumined and that it is the 'pra"thamotpanna prabha (emerging first ray of light) whichis said to illumine the object.

Is 'anatma jnana' the dharmF ? or the 'atmajnana' ?It cannot be the former since 'a jnana' is not 'anatmavarka''(concealing not we self). Nor can be accept the latter sinceit does not exclude anatmajnana as such ~ Tratipannasyaatmajnanasy anatma jnanasya cadharmitvanf. It is theground of the emerging knowledge of the self and that ofthe not- self. This would make 'ghat adhyavacchinna caita"nyam' the object of perception. That is, consciousness con-ditioned or delimited by the object, like the pot, is the obj-ect of perception. This is 'ajnanavarakam6 (enveloped mynecessence).

Thus is established the positive nature of 'ajnana' andwith jnana it has 'samanasrayavisaya' (similar ground andconsigmcnt).

Padmapada speaks of 'avidya sakti'. 'Avidya itself is'saktimattva9 (having potency). It is external to the self.And since it is capable of fulfilling the functions of the selfwhich is 'sarva kaaryaopadana' (material cause of all acti-vities) it is said that there is a 'sakti' of 'avidya.' The 'saktf(potiency) is not outisde of Avidya'. It is inherent in'avidya'. And when we speak of a 'sakti' belonging to it, weshould consider the expression to be purely metaphisical.

Padmapaada says, âvidya saktir bahya dhyaatmikesuvastushu tat swarupa sattaa ........................ This 'avidya

5)


34 Panchapadika

sakti9 is always attached only to the 'atma tattva satta' (thebeing of the self). When we cognise the objects which areoutside the self or speak of the 'ahankara' whose 'asraya'is the self. We have avidya attached to the 'atmasatta' forthe objects constituting the not-self, we have the self as the'adhisthana'.

Then Padmapaada proceeds to argue bringing in ano-ther pramana called 'artha patti ! In the absence of thisâvidyasakti' we cannot consistently and satisfactionly expl-ain 'mittyartha' (illusory object) and 'tad avabhaasa' (itsappearance). And in extablishing the 'bhaavarupajnana' wehave 'arthapatti9 as another 'pramaana'.

Now ' ahankaara' is 'adhyasta' on pure Brahman as sil-ver on the- mother-of-pearl. Both the object and the know-ledge of the object are cases of 'adhyaasa' : for knowledgepresupposes the ekistence of an object. We have to find outthe 'upadana' which also should be mithyaabhuta'. Thematerial cause is real, the effect also ought to be real sincethe effect partakes of the nature of the cause ; and in sucha case the 'adhyaasa' would have to be real. Has the 'upaa^dana" a beginning ? or no ? The former would lead to arogrees. No 'Pramana' can prove the latter. If the 'mithyo-padana' has a beginning, its cause will be another 'mittya-padana' and this will land us to a regress. As such we haveto assume that the 'mithyopadana9 has no beginning. Thatwhich is beginningless, is itself 'mithya' and 'mithopadana'is no other than 'ajnana' which is 'atmasambandhi'. Hence'mithyadhyasa' alone is 'jnanopadana'. Apart from thiswe can have nothing else.


Vivaranam 35

Objection : 'Avidya vishayatva' (nescience as object)has been maintained for 'anatman9 (not-self). Anythingthat manifests or reveals or brings its nature because ofsomething else, is the object of the latter. Then how canthere be an object for 'avidya' ?

Reply : Due to 'ajnana9 there arises an 'avarana' forthe object (the anatman). Ajnana cannot be taken to beenvaloping (the avarna of) the self, for it cannot hide it orillumine it. There is no 'pramana' to show that it enve-lopes ; and that it envelopes is inconsistent with its nature-and function. Admiting that 'ajnana9 is only 'vishayava,raka' (enveloping the object) how do we know that it exists?When we know that this is a blue pot, the 'avarna9 has cea-sed to evist for the pot ; and it is then impossible to knowthe 'avarana'. When we do not know that this is a blue pot,we cannot know the 'avarana'.

Objection : Since we apprehend the object now, wecan assume that it'was 'avrita' prior to this moment.

Reply : But in the case of 'dhaaravaahika jnana'we find that the object cognised in the second or third mo-ment is also cognised in the first or the preceeding moment.

Objection : But in so far as it is known at this-mo-ment, is there not the non-aporehension prior to this mo-ment ?

Reply : No. first we have the cognition and we knowthat it is a blue plot. Here we do not become aware of ourprior non-apprehension of the object. This awareness comesonly later on.


36 Panchapadika

Objection : But take the case of 'pratyabhijna'.(recognition). An object has been cognised some time backand it is recognised now to be the same. In the interveningtime we have to admit the non-apprehension of the object.Otherwise there ought to be this recognition even in theintervening time.

Reply : This does not establish non-apprehension(anavagati). In the case of the self which is 'dhaaravahikajnana gamya''(apprehended by knowledge which is a process)we have a situation similar to that of pratyabhijna". This'purvapara sambandha vishaya' is found even in the case ofself which is always 'avagata (apprehended).

Objection : Through 'arthapathi' (implication)one canestablish this 'non-apprehension^. In the interval betweenthe past cognition and the present recognition there is theabsence of "jnanasmriti'. As such is not non-prrehensionapprehended ?

Reply : No. Even in apprehension there is no nece-ssity of smriti.

Objection : However, âvarana" is a fact of experi-ence. How can it be rejected by reason ?

Rep By : The apprehension or otherwise of an objectis determined by a 'pramaana'. But the apprehension ofnon-apprehension is not determined by any 'pramaana ?'And this 'anavagati' along with the objects is 'adhyasta' onthe 'saaksin'. There is the 'ajnaanadhyaass' along with theobjects on 'saksicaitanya' and this explains the experience.

That which is 'adhyasta' has no 'savarana'. But theobject cannot be apprehended if the 'savarana' is not des-


Vivaranam 37

troyed and as such the 'avarana bhanga' (destruction of theenveloping) must be stated. Is the 'avarana bhanga' acco-mplished by a 'pramana' or by 'sakhin ?' It cannot be theformer for in the perception of two moons there is no'pramaanagamyatva'. Nor can it be the latter since the,^varana" arises as dependent on the 'saakhsin'.

Hence there is no pramaana which can make us saythat there is âjnaanavarana' for the not-self. The not-selfis essentially dependent and is 'prakaasahina^ (non-illumi-nant); and no purpose is served by an 'avarana" for thenon-conscious not self. And since the not-self as objec^does not get any "atisaya', from 'ajnana^ it cannot be'agnanavishaya'. Padmapada, therefore, observes, that theAvidya Sakti does not prevent the 'svarupavabhaasa' of the

non-conscious objects'. The ^varupa' (nature) of the not-self is 'ajnanatmaka'. Since the not self is âcidrupa' thereis no posibility of any ^rakaasa'; and hence it does notprevent the 'svarupavabhasa' (appearance of its form).

But, then, how do you maintain 'anatmavishayatwanf?The reply is that though 'ajnana' is not 'visayavaraka'(enveloping the object), get is has a îkshepa saktT (powerof revealing plurality). Because of 'vikshepa' we can main-tain 'anatma vishayatman\ It is 'rupantaravebhasa hetulf(cause for the appearence of another form). This will beexplained later on.

If the not-self has "avirta svarupa' (form of being enve-oped), we have to say that it is now 'ajnata' 'unknown';

since this is absurd we should say the 'ajnatatva' is due tosome other reason. But this is faulty. "Anatma visaya-


38 Panchapadika

ntah Icarana parinaamaa'' nudayalaksana vaikalyaat" (it isis due to the non-emergence of the modification of the psy-chosis having the not-self as the object.

We can interpret Padmapada's statement 'pramaanavaikalyadeva' differ entlygthus. Even though the not-self i^not by itself luminous, it might become luminous since ishas the contact with 'caitanya prakaasa' (self luminousconsciousness). Then the not-self will be like the real andif will have ^nityatva prakasa' (eternally luminous). Then'afnana' is required to function as the 'avarana' of this not-self. To avoid this conclusion, Padmapada has to give thatstatement by way of reply, 'caitanya' is 'nitya'; and it isthe 'saadhana' (means of establishing)for the not-self. Sinceit is the ^navirta caitanya* (unenveloped consciousness)which is the 'vishaya saadhaka', the object cannot be appre-hended only when the 'caitanya' is enveloped by 'ajnaana'

Hence there is no necessity to assume another 'avaranafor the not-self. This is given by Padmapada in the nex'sentence 'rajatapratibhasad' (from the appearance of silver).

If the 'ajnana* which is 'atmaasraya5 (grounded in theself) were to be 'anatmavarana', then a curious result wouldfollow. Unless the 'avarana' is destroyed, the object, can-not be apprehended; and when there is the knowledge ofthe object, then the 'ajnana" which is in the self ought to dis-appear completely. This is contrary to experience. Assuch there is 'avidya' in the self. Then in all the three per-iods (before 'rajata bhasa\ during 'rajata bhasa' and after"rajata bhasa') we have the ^vishaya svarupa pratibhasa9(appearence of the'form of the object). And this meansthat ajnana, cannot have 'anatmavarana'.


Vivaranam 39

Objection : ajnana' need not be one only- Thereis c ajnana' with reference to 'shukti9 (mother of pearl)and itis dispelled by 'sukti jnaana', There is another 'ajnaan^*which we apprehend with reference to the self. This is dis-tinct from the previous one.

Reply : No. To establish 'bhavarupaajnaana' as ex-isting ^distincly in every object apart from Lhe 'ajnana9 whichis 'atmaasraya' and âtmavishaya', we have no 'pramaana1'The object is not apprehended precisely because there doesnot arise any 'vritti' (psychosis) and because there is 'caita^-nyavarana' (enveloping consciousness).

Further 'ajnana" is âtisayaantarajaaaka' (causing a diff,erent mark) with reference to the object; and hence it i§proper to speak of 'ajnana vishayatva' for the object. Inmaintaining 'anatmavishayam ajnanam', Padmapada states'rupantaravabhasa hetur kevaellam' (merely). 'Avdiyacauses the object to appear in a form other than its own*

Objection : This too is inconsistent and impossiblewhen we have the knowledge of 'shukti' we find that silverwhich is its 'rupantara') is dispelled along with the 'ajnana'which is the 'upadana' of the form of silver. Now when the.'agnanadhyasa' isdispelled by the knowledge of 'shukii', howis it that we still have the ajnana in the self? Hence wehave to admit that there is a different 'ainana9 for everydifferent object. And if many ^jnansam" cannot be accep-ted, we cannot have 'agnana' as the 'upadana' of 'adhayasa'.But we cannot have a 'satyaopadana' (real cause) for a"mithyabhuta vishaya9, (an erroneous datum). Then we mayhave to admit that 'adhyasa nirtti1 is possibleve if thereis no 'upaadana nivritti'.


40 Panchapadika

Reply : When the pot is destroyed we speak of thepot as having its 'pravilaya' (involution) in its own "karana9(cause). In the same way, when we have the knowledge of'shukti', the 'rajatadhyasa' too has "svakarana pravilaya'(dissolved into its own cause).

We can argue that there is a 'mitijnana' (primal neschy,ence)which has a different âvastha\(status). These'avasthas'are the 'upadanas' for the cognitions of silver etc., These'avasthas' or 'upadanas' are dispelled along with 'adhyasa9and the knowledge of 'shukti' etc.

Obejction : But in ordinary experience; we do notapprehend the 'nivritti' (sublation) of 'adhyasa' along with'ajnana' though7 tattvajnana' going against this experiencehow can we say that 'adhyasa' along with 'ajnana' can bedispelled by the knowledge of Brahman'?

Reply : But 'jnana' dispels that which is not 'jnana'and this is a fact of experience. 'Ajnana' being the contra^dictory of 'jnana'it is capableof being dispelled by the latter^grahana' (non-cognition), mitthyajnana' and the like aretattvavabhasa virodhinah.' (contradictaries of the appear—ence of the real). That they are dispelled by 'tattvajnana''is a fact of experience. In the same way when we say that^havarupainana' is the contradictory (virodhi) of 'tattva—vaabhasa\ it is but proper to say that Brahmajnana can.dispel that 'ajnana'.

With reference to 'avarana' we have said earlier that ifit were for the object, it cannot be known. Such a defectdoes not arise here in the case of this 'vikshepa', for it isthrough 'bhranti jnana' that we apprehend'vishay a vyavrittarupantara' (a different form which is other than that of the


Vivaranam 41

Objection ; Then even for the self there need not" be *ajnana nimittam avarana krityam'. (caused by nesci-ence). An 'avarana' hides or conceals 'prakasa^. But the'svarupa' of the self cannot be so hidden. Nor can thereby any 'karya pratibandha' nor this 'pratikri'. There is nei-ther a pratibandha nor a ^pratikriyaTor jnana which is'visa-yavabhasatmana udita' (arising just in the appearance ofthe object). And since no useful purpose is served by this'bhavaruâjnana', it does not exists even in the self.

Reply : To this Padmapada replies : 'Pratyagatman'is of the nature of consciousness and it is ^svayam prakasa9(self-luminous). Brahmasvarupa cannot be for anyreason or factor outside of Brahman; we have to admit thatthis 'anavabhasa' is due only to the 'pratibandha^ (obstcles)' of the 'avidhya sakti' which is 'tadgata nisarga siddha' ari-sing naturally from is ground).

Now, on the one hand there is the sufficient cause foithe -avabhasa' of Brahman, for it exists and is luminous.And yet, on the other hand, there is the 'atma tattvalam-bana vyavaharah' (activity depending on the self)in the formthat it doesnot exist and that it is not luminous. Its natureis one thing and the way it is apprehended is a differentthing. This difference can not be explained unless we ass-ume an âvarana" in the form of ^jnana'^ as a positiveentity. When there is the presencs of the sufficient cause andthe absence of ^varana', the pot which is near by is app,rehended as existing. Hence empirical statements like 'Bra-hman is not' and 'Brahman is not luminous' go to implythrough rthapapattF (implication) only that 'ajnana9 which

6)


42 Panchapadika

is 'bhavarupa'. In this way 'arthapatti5 or 'anumana' go toestablish this 'ajnana.9

And with reference to the empirical statement like theself is luminous Tadmapada' proceeds to show that the selfis the sufficient cause ; 'Pratyagatman9 is of this nature ofconsciousness ; and yet there is the 'brahmasvarupa anava-bhasa' (non-appearance of the being of Brahman) for wehave such expressions as 'nasti' (is not) and 'naprakasate'(does not appear).

This consciousness is the 'adhisthana' and the form iuwhich it is apprehended is its 'karya' (product or effect). Itis only what there is a'Pratibandha for this 'adhisthana'that we apprehend its 'Karya', as other than itself. Andsince the 'avarana' has 'avidyasambahdha', it is quiteprobable that the former has Sanirupitakarata' (indetermis-nate form).

Objection : Even though it is "svayam prakasam\there is non-apprehension in the case of 'purusanatara sam-vedana' (apprehension of another person). Why can't weaccept the same 'agrahana5 here too ?

Reply : No, In the case of apprehending anotherperson that person is an other. Because of this otherness,we can speak of 'agrahana' there. But Brahaman is notother, but pratyak (immediate experience). Consequentlya cause other than 'ajnana' can not be found here. For the'anavabhasa' of Brahman there is sufficient cause in theform of 'ajnana' which functions as the 'pratibandha5 of theself and which is "tadgata naisargika siddha avidya sakti'-Since Brahman is 'pratyaksvarupa9 (the form of one's self)


Vivaranam 43

substance (murtadravya) can be its 'vyavadhayaka'. Hence'ajnana9 arises from the preception of 'Karya'. It make sthe object appear as something else. That it, the avaranakrtya is to alter (viparyaya) the object and its apprehensionby the self. And we have to assume because of anyathanu-'papatti', the existence of 'bhavarupajnana' which is thecause of the 'mithyavastu' and the 'mitthyjna' alike.

Objection : We do not find 'ajnana' as an entitydistinct from 'agrahana', ^mithyajnana' or its 'samskara'.Eventhough the 'svarupa' of Brahman is self-luminous,these three alone are capable of preventing its 'avabhasa'for the self.

Reply : No, says, Padmapada." This âjnana' remainsas 'ahankaradi viksepa samskara matrae' in deep sleep.And when we get up, due to this 'samskara', it again spri-ngs up.'.

Even in deep sleep the ^vidyasakti' remains merely asa 'samskara1. We cannot say that the 'samskaras' alone areâjnana'. In the apprehension of another, the precipientis different from being perceived there ; and in deep sleep,then, the other is not apprehended. In the same way wecannot say that in deep sleep there is the 'anavabhasa' ofBrahmaswarupa which is ^svayamprakasa', because we aretold of the identity of the percipient with psceived Braha-man (in the srutis).

It is not 'mithyajnana' which prevents us, for in deepyieep there is no 'mithyajnana.'

Nor can we say that the 'bhranti' (illusion) arises fromthe fact that 'samskaras' of this 'mithyajnana' prevent


44 Panchapadika

the 'avabhasa\ For it is not a rule that the 'samskaras*prevent the "tattvavabhasa9. Even when there are the 'sanTskaras' in the form of 'rajata bhrama\ we have the appre-hension of 'sukti'.

Nor can 'agrahana5 prevent the "avabhasa". 'Svarupagrahana' is always there. When the 'samvedana5 is self-luminous' the 'visayakadacitkaagrahana^non-apprchensionof the object) cannot prevent it*

Even the 'Karanas' or actions are not opposed to 'sva-rupaavabhasa'. If the 'kaarnas' are its -virodhis', then 'cait-anya' should cease to be luminous (prakasa) always.

Objection ; Don't we get the same conclusion evenif we admit 'ajnana9 as preventing the avabhasa9 ?

Reply ; No. 'Ajnana' has its 'asraya' in conscious-ness. It is not offered to consiousness. It is not a 'prati-bandhaka', for^svavishaya caitanyavahasa' (the apprearenceof its object).

"Aiana* is âksi caitanyavabhasaya' (illumined ormanifested by the witness consciousness). Karanas are notso, since their 'avabhasyatva is due to the 'pramanas ' If,on the other hand the karanas too are'cidbhasya^mainfestedby consciousness), then the 'saksi caitanya9 will have to bealways luminous and fire. That the karauas are the 'viro-dhis' for the 'vabhasa9 of their own 'asraya' cannot 'beestablished by any ^pramana". The 'bhranti samskara' doesnot prevent the 'sukti bodha6 ; likewise the karanas whichare 'samskara rupas9 cannot prevent the 'avabhasa^ of'Brahmasvarupa'. Hence we have to admit that the 'svaru-


Vivaranam 45

panavahasa* (non* manifestation of the form) in deep sleepis not due to 'agrahana', Wthyajnana', 'samskara^ or"karana". But it is due to 'ajnana', which is different fromthese and which alone can prevent the ^vabhasa' of Brah-man.

Objection : Then why should you assume 'ajnanaâs 'pratibandhaka' ? Why should you not assume a differentsubstance altogether ?

•Reply : No, only when the "pratibandha9 is dispelledby the knowledge of Brahman, can we have the 'svavisaya-vabhasa\ And jnana can dispel only that which is not jna-na. Such an entity is only 'ajnana'.

Objection : Here arises an objection from the stand-point of Bhedabhedavada, There is no 'ajnaria' which isdistinct from "agrahana9, 'mithyajnana^ and 'tatsamskara"*.,and which is the primal cause of die whole "samsara9, whichcontinues to remain undestroyed in 'jagrat9, 'svapna' andûshuptf, and which remains till the "samsara ceases. It isonly 'bhranti jnana' which can be called ^jnana^

But what is 'Bhranti' ? It is only the 'atmanubhuti*,(awareness of the self) in the not-self which is from ^han-kara to the body.

But this is against the tenegts of the Bhedabheda school.In'Klianhndlgant' they maintain its'abheda^non-difference)with the other cows because of "gotva^ (cowness) and its^Bheda' (difference) with them because of 'Khandatva^ Inthe same way, why should we not take âhamman'ushyah",(I am a man) also as a case of bhedabheda ? In âham


46 Panchapadika

air.sa\ there is "bheda9 with Brahman, and in the *manusy-amsa' there is 'abheda'. We cannot say that there is theapprehension 'I am not a manusya, but Brahman/ For,even in a statement like "nayam khando gauh, kintu mun-"dogauh^ (this cow-is not khand) both the Khanada9 and^munda9 agree in 'gotva' and as such are identical. Like-wise when I think of myself as being a many the self isidentical with the body and when I take myself to be Brah.man, the self is identical with Brahman-It cannot be said that âham manushyah" is a case of"bhranti^ as in "this is silver^ For even in 'Khando gauhtoo we will have to admit the same 'bhranti9' ?

But in ^nayam khandogauh, kintu mundah\ we find.that 'khandatva' is negated in 'mundogauh^ The 'gotvopa-dhr (cownesss as delimitedy it) is there. And there is noputting an end to 'vyavahara" to the latter As such ^might be argued that this is not a case of 'bhranti'. To thiswe can rep^ that the same holds good even in 'aham manu-syah\ In the state of liberation there is ^sarvatmatva9 andin this state the whole 'vyvatara' (activity) based on thelove of and attachment to the body and sense organs cea-ses to exist,

And when there is 'vyavahara uccheda" (distracted acti-vity) we have an erroneous cognition.

To this the bhedabheda vadin might say that we maynot be able to define exactly what bhadabheda is.k But the-relationships that subsist between the universal and theparticular, quality and substance, effect and cause, 'visista*and ^svarupa", âmsa' and ^msi' (part and whole)-theseare all cases of behda bheda. Such a relationship does notexist between the body and the self,


Vivaranam 47

But we have to ask how 'sarirasaririsambandha9 (body"soul relationship) differs from "gunagunyadisambandha(quality and substance relation). All these are identicalrelationships. It is meaningless not to extend that relation-ship here. Since 'brahmatva9 is admitted to the 'cetana sva-rupamsa\ we have to say that there is a causal relation bet-ween the ^cetana svarupa' and the body. Hence there is no^bhrantF in this school of Bhedabheda.

Further, if 'Bhranti jnana' is 'antahkarana parinama%then 'vidya', cannot be 'atmasraya' (self as ground); if it besaid that the ^ntahkarana parimana' (evolution of the in-ner organ) itself is ^tmani adhyasta5 (grounded in the self).Then there cannot be any 'atmavidyasambhandha', for inthe 'anyathakhyati' theory there is no relation between thereal object and the 'mithya object.

Bhranti cannot be even âtmaparinama' since the self isâparinami' (changeless),

Accordings to this school jnana is only a property ofthe self. We cannot say whose property is jnana, which willundergo a change (parinama) in the form of another 'jnanaguna\ Now the clay which is the âadhara' (basis) for thepot, cannot be the 'adhara' for some other object. Likewise the self which is the ^sraya' for knowledge, cannot bethe 'asraya7 of another knowledge. Two distinct propertiesthat differ in their nature cannot have the same identical^srya'.

This 'sarva sankara vadin" (theory that mixes up allkinds of views) does not accept the 'mithyajnana' whichis 'anadisiddha9 (beginningless) and as such there can not bâny 'samskara' of this 'mithyajnana'. He cannot have


48 Panchapadika

'avidya9. Even though there is the relationship of the selfto the 'mithyajnana' which is ânadi, yet it is only a tem-porary relationship like 'ajnana'. Just like 'ajnana' this.can be dispelled by true knowledge. 'Ajnana' is relatedto the selt like the colour blue to the sky. As such it doesnot put an end to the 'kutastha' (integrality)of the self.

Thus far we have shown that perceptiony inference and'arthapatti9 are the valid means of knowledge that establish^jnana' as a positive and beginningless entity. Such an'ajnana' is both 'naimittika' and 'naisargika'. It is mani-fest both as the cause and as the effect.

Padmapada says that the aham (I) is the first adhyasa,How is this possible ? The self is essentially pure conciou-sness itself. It is devoid of parts and is 'anandaikara" (ofthe form of Bliss alone). Ajnana etc. are made possibleby this consciousness which is the 'saksin'. They are 'sak-sibhasya'. This'ajnana' is the ûpadana" for adhyasa it-self. As such this 'ajnanadhyasa^ is anadisiddhi'; yet Pad-mapada takes up a temporary case of adhyasa nnd says that"the I is the first adyasa".

Objection : Just as in the adhyasa of this is silver'we have two entities (Viz. This and silver), similarly if'aham is a case of adhyasa, we require two entities; andhence it is apprehended as pure consciousness which is 'nir-amsi' (partless); we do not find any other 'amsa' which is'adhyasta' or 'anadhyasta'

Reply : The reply will be given later on.


Vivaranam 49

Objection ; Padmapada speaks next of 'sariradhysa^This is impossible since the body is like the 'ahamkara9 egoSL being unconscious (jada). We do not apprehend the'antahkarana' and the sense-organs as having an existenceapart Trom the self. We even take them to be practi-cally identical with the self-i.e., we cognise them as 'adhy-asta9 on the self. And when there is the 'atmatattvavabo-dha' their very 'svarupa' is lost in the nature of the self. Solet it be accepted that they are adhyasta on the self in theirown form and also as 'samsrsta' (fused) with the self. Asregards the body, however, it is apprehended by the sense-organs as the 'this^, and, therefore, not 'kevalasask-vedya.9 Even when 'the soul leaves the body we fiind thebody to be distinct from the soul and the body has its'laya9 (dissolution) in the elements. Hence it is not adhya-sta.'' By the 'this' we apprehend the 'karya karana sangh-ata" (causal complex) which is the 'bhogasadhana' (meansof experience) of the 'ahankarta' (agent). That which issaid to be mine is distinct from the body and it can not atall be adhyasta on the self. Hence we cannot take the,tbis' and the 'mine5 to be cases of adhyasa.

Reply : The 'sariradi padrthasvarupa' (body and senseorgans) is the object of the self ; and the self is taken a5'samyukta' (combined) with the doer orJkarta(doner) bhokta(enjoyer) and pramata (knawer) and these distinctions are'mithya kalpita'. For such a self there is the body consi-dered as the karya(effect) bhogya (enjoyed),prameya(object),and dvesya (hated) and the body is created only for thesepurposes. That such a body is in itself and by itself mithyacan be imf erred from ^vapna drstanta' (example fromdream). So Padmapada rites- 'When the 'ahankarta isadhyasatmaka, the upakarana' (means) too get the same

^


50 . Panchapadika

nature. When I dream myself to be the crowned king orwhen the magician creates a crowned king, the 'rajyaopa-karana'(kingship) does not become real. Thus the 'yaikvova-hara' (normal activity) which is 'ahamkartrtva pramukha"(based on I as doer) and which is 'kriya karaka phalatmaka(result- oriented) is adhyasta on the self whose nature iseternal and pure and partakes of the ought and freedom.Hence in order to have the atmanubhava (self-realization)of such a Brahman we should have knowledge which dis-pels the adhyasa ; for adhyasa is the cause of all this 'avar-tha' (evil error). As such the vedanta Mimansa is begunwith this ends in view".

The appearance of the drisya (external) is the avidyadhyasa^ on the perceiving self. Only when this is accepted-we can have the subject matter and purpose of this sastra9This sastra would explain; how the 'brahmatmanubhavaând the 'bandha nivrtti' (cessation of bondage) are possible,When the "visaya1 and the 'prayojana' are established wearrive at the 'sastra-rambha kartavyata' (activity of beginn-ing the study of this system of philosophy).

^rom 'ko5 yam adhyasarama (what is this adhyasa ?'we have the commentary that establishes 'adhyasa''. Intill the beginning of 'Katham punar avidyavad visayanf(How are these the objects like nescience ?) We have adh-yasa svarupa' and 'adhyasa sambhavana5 (possibility of adh-yasa). From that sentence we have determining the positivecharacter of adhyasa. If this is the division there is no needto give adhyasa svarupa and its sambhavana separately ;

for if the svarupa of an entity is not known and if it is<asambhavyamana' (cannot be imagined as possible) you


Vivaranam

cannot have its 'nirnaya'. 'Niraya' alrady presupposes itseifinition or nature and its possibility. In the absence ofthese two, the 'nirnaya' will become all the more difficultof obtaining specially as regards the adhyaksanubhava nir-naya5

It is the pramana itself which' is the object. The odjecthere is 'adhyasa' which is defined as "anyasyanyamana ava-bhasah' (one appearing on having the nature of another).Only after 'atma sakshatkara every thing becomes âsambha-vita3; till then everything must be 'sambhavita* (possible)*The pramana in establishing adhyasa also establishes thatadhyasa has a conceivable form having its own place, timeand upadhi and that it has also its specific and unique form.Then why should there be a separate discussion on the defi-nition and possiblity of adhyasa ?

But inference and other pramanas give us the validcognition of an object. Later on we enquire about the nat-ure and possibility of that object. This h generally the case.Why can't we say that the same is the case with adhyasaalso ?

To this the objector replies that it is very difficult tohave such a later enquiry which can specify it and distin-guish it as unique.

Reply : That the arceiving self is apprehended ashaving the nature of the perceived, is found. This much o^pramana is given later on.

Further, Avidya is that which is dispelled by know-ledge :, bhranti has only 'Pratibhasa matra sarira' (havingonly the form of appearance). Adhyasa involves the unity of


52 Panchapadika

the real with the false ; and mithya is ^sad asad vilakshana(other than the true and the untrue). In view of these dis.tinctions, "it is not possible to establish" the 'adhyasatma-kata" for those having the âham mamabhimana' regardingthe body and senseorgans, by merely piesenting the prama-trtva".

Objection : The difinition given is the appearanceof an object as having the nature of another. Since twoobjects are taken as one object here, why can't we say that^mithyatva' is established ?

Reply ; It is not through experience alone that wecan establish it. ^n the world there ie no experience ofadhyasa like that of the 'sukdrajata' or like that of the twomoons/

Objection; When there is the pramana, how canyar say that there is no such experience ?

Reply ; Suktirajata etc. are taken to be experiencesof adhyasa only when they are negated. If there is some-thing that cannot be sublated, then it is not a case of adh-yasa. The self is such an entity. But to show that there isthe appearance of the not-self superimposed on the self, wehave pramanas like perception, inference, arthapatti (impli-cation) and agama (verbal testimoney).

Objection : The erroneous cognition is sublatedwhen freed from the adhyasta. This discrimination is thecause of the sublation. In the absence of such a discimi-aation we cannot know that the cognition was a case of oneobject appearing as having the nature of another. If there


Vivaranam 53

is no discrimination, the cognition will be that of an objectappearing as having its own nature. So where is adhyasa ?It preupposes discrimination and discrimination is appliedto adhya?a,

RepSy : "The sublation is not found here^ Logicagreasoning gives us a mediated knowledge of discrimination^To establish the "parasparatmatavabhasa' (appearance ofone in another) we should depend on discrimination. Theimmediate sublation is that which puts an end to the ^bhra-nti pratibhasa'. But since there is nothing that puts an endto the erroneous cognition, the experience of mithyatva isnot clear,

The erroneou-s cognition which is immediate can besublated by that cognition which also should be immediateÂnd in the absence of the sublation, you cannot establishthe mithyatva of the cognition. But to have the 'badhakapratyaya9 it is not enough to know only the pramana. Youshould know the nature and definition of mithyatva ; andthis knowledge will tell us how and when it can be sublated^^Hence the definition of adhyasa should be given first; andthen the possibility of adhyasa in all cases to which thisdefinition applies, should be established5^,

Objection : In such a case you can establish adhy-asa clearly by presenting only the definition and the pra-mana. And the pramana will conclusively establish itspossibility and dispel all doubts reparding the possibility,As such one need not speak of 'adhyasa sambhavana' ?

"When the possibility of adhyasa is established or app-rehended from the pramanas, no doubt can arise regarding


54 Panchapadika

this very possibility. And as such nothing need be told,again on the question of possibility/9

Reply : Even though the pramanas have the capacityto establish it still we do have experiences where we rejectas impossible that which is directly and immediately appre-hended. We have the direct experience of the suktiand this has ,no conceivable-cause. We have also thedirect experience of the things produced by the magician.Yet we reject these as impossible because of the pramanaswhich aid us in drawing our conclusion.

Objection : Sometimes the pramanas make us acc&ept the impossible as real as in the movements of the bird-in the sky ; at times they make us reject even an immedia-tely apprehended object as impossible to be there. Nowwhen you say that there is the appearance of the not-selfin the seify which of the above two alternatives does it fail ?Since it is something impossible, you can't &ay that adhyasais quite possible.

Now the self is not an objecty but the subject. Theground and the coHsqcuent must be there io give rise to asimple knowledge. In the absence of a ground, you cannothave adhyasa. As such we should note that the self is Jiofan object. The entire 'Karya karana sanghata" (causalseries) which is distinct from the percipent is to be explainedas having the nature of adhyasa ; and this requires 'kacadi-dosas' in the percipent. Put the self is free from such defe-'cts and is non-relati9nal (asanga). Further there must be asimilarity between the avayava (parts) of the ground andthose of the consequent. But the self is free from all attri-*-


Vivaranam 55

butes and avayavas. Moreover, when the ground appears asin itself it really is, adhyasa ceases; and if the ground is alw,ays luminous there is no possibility of adhyasa. The selfbeing ^niskalanka caitanya" (spotless consciousness), it iscapable of dispelling all adhyasa. In such a case we arenot able to imagine any possible defect or cause that cangive rise to. this vibhrama (illusion)".

Further, if we do no apprehend or understand the selfas the subject, we can't have any âsambhavana buddhi^(awareness of an impossibility), and if we do understand i1to be the subject, there does not remain any adhyasa.

Reply ; The self is the subject; and the âsambha-vana buddhi^ arises from the 'paroksha avabhasa^ (appear-ances as external). Only when there is the immediate appre-hension, adhyasa is dispelled. As such ^not only shouldadhyasa be defined, but its possibility too should be establi-' shed." So Samkara proceeds to give the definition, sambha-vana, and pramana of adhyasa in a regular sequence.

Adhyasa Laksana (Definition of Adhyasa). '

The question is - 'Ko' Yam)adhyaso nama" (What isadhyasa ?)The word koyam'(What, refers both to a questionand to a doubt; and both are found here. The word isemployed with two meanings at the same time. These•meanings respectively refer to definition and âmbhavana^(possibility). But it is only the former that it first taken upbecause to dispel the doubt regarding its possibility weshould first have a working definition on which the questionof doubt can be raised.

The definition is to define 'adhyasa'; and the wordto be defined is not found in the difinition given. So we


56 Panchapadika

have to interpret this definition as that of adhyasa, becausethe question begs its definition.

Objection ; Adhyasa is later on stated to be theapparance of one (parasya) having the nature of another(Paratra). Then how is it that in the definition we -haveonly one word âratra". How can it complete the difini-tion ?

Reply : "The word' paratra (elsewhere) implies nece-ssarily 'parasy a avabhasamanata\ This word 'partra'is qua -îfied by the adjective 'smrti rupah" (having a form similar

to that of memory). Smrti or memory is that which is re-membered.

Objection 2 The suffix 'ghaf is exployed only in'bhavartha'. But you are explaining the 'ghai' in the word

'smurti* to refer to an object(Karma) and not to 'bhava'(be-ing).

Reply ; "PaniniV afhorism 'asamjnayam apy' statesplainly that for all the Karakas (declensions) save those of

the nominative case, we can have the 'ghai1 both in 'sanjna"and in *asanjna9 ?

Objection : If 'smrti' is that which is remembered?•why is there also the word 'rupa' attached to 'smrti' ?

Reply: It is intended for comparing that which isremembered with that which is not remembered. "So 'smrti

rupah' means the formar similar to the form of that whichis remembered^.

A khyativadin (Prabhakai-a Mimamsa) : What is thiscomparison ? This silver is only the remembered silver.


Vivaranam 57

Repiy : No, it is not merely the remembered one.Objection ; But since the eye etc. cannot have acontact with such an unreal silver, by a process of elimi--, nation we may say that it is the remembered silver.

Reply ; No. It cannot be the remembered silver sinc^"it appears or it is cognised, as being immediately^' beforeus".

In non-erroneous cognition we have the experience like^his is silver' and 'this is a pot'. In such cased the 'this'is cognised as 'silver' or as 'pot\ The 'this' is taken.to benecessarily the 'silver' or 'pot'. The 'this' and the ^wbsfare apprehended as 'samsrshta'(fused) There are notwo enti-ties cognised as two, but as one. The cognition is imme-diate and direct. Likewise in the erroneous cognition wehave the immediate apprehension of the 'this' andthe'what'as 'samsrishta'. The 'what' is not the remembered contentbut the serceived comtent.

It might be argued that the ^his' is immediately cog-nised ; and that due to non-discrimination the 'what' too istaken to be immediately cognised. As such there is no'samsarga samvid^ (unified awareness).

But is it the 'samsarga samvid^ rejected' because thiscognition is sublated later on ? or because there is no silverin the erroneous cognition ? The former (Pratibhasa vailak-sanya) is impossible since the apprehension of the real silverinvolves as much 'samsarga' of the ^his' and the 'what' asthat of the erroneous silver. In the actual moment ofapprehension there is no difference and we can not deny the^samsarga samvid\ It cannot be the latter,

8)


58 Panchapadika

How can there be an immediate apprehension in theabsence of the object ? The 'artha satta niscaya' (determi-ning the being of the object) is dependent upon samvid ava-bhasa' (appearance of aw-ireness). It is not the object whichmakes apprehension possible ; but' it is the apprehensionwhich makes the knowledge of the object possible. If theâmvit sattaniscaya* (the being of conscriousness)were to be dependent on the "artha satta niscaya\we have tofind out another 'niscaya5 on which does defend the ^thasatta niscaya'.. To avoid this regress we have to assumeontological and logical priority of 'samvit satta' (being orreality of consciousness).

Objection : But there is a later apprehension (sam-vedana) that 'this is no silver ? Does not this determine theabsence of the object even during the erroneous cognition ?

Reply ; But prior to this sublation there was an app-rehension (samvedana) which proves the existence of thatobject which is sublated later. In the later cognition w^have 'this is no silver. The silver which is the this is nega-ted. It is not mere silver that it negated but the silver whichis 'samsrishta' (fused) with the 'this'.

Objection : In the prior cognition we have the app-rehensions of 'this', 'silver', and the 'abhava" of this silver.These are not distinguished likewise ; can't we say that inthe later cognition too these are not distinguished and. as" such there is only 'samsarga samvid abhava' ? (negation ofthe fased awareness). Since there is 'vyavahara. sambhavajnana' (knowledge which is in agreement with activity) inthe later congtion, we can say that then alone there is thesamsarga' between the 'this' and the 'silver9.


Viva-nana-rEl 59

Reply : This would mean that 'artha saravit sadbhavaiscaya' is due to the knowledge of its utility. Though the^rabhakara Mimamsaka admits' samvu Pratyaksatva'(imme-liacy of consciousness) here he argues that 'samirt' is knownhrough something else. It is no longer immediate. Thiss contrary to their fundamental prmcipales. Even if we.dmit that the knowledge of its utility, determines the 'arthaamvitsadbhava\ the reality of the former is known againhrough another apprehension. In this way the argument/ill involve both the regress and the vicious circle.

There is an objection from one of the followers of theadvaita) siddhanta' to the effect that we too maintain theibsence of the object. For we are negating it later on. Butts there the absence of the object during the 'pratibhasaamya' ? (moment of appearance) or later on ? It can not>e the former, for the silver is apprehended as existing then.n the later cognition we are rejecting the 'mithyarajata^:

unless it existed earlier, we can not negate it later. (This iscloser to the view of Bhamati).

There is real silver in the world outside : and since iLS not this silver which is apprehended^ how can you negateIt and say that there was, is, or will be, no silver ? But thereLS the 'rajatabhasa prasakti' and this implies that the realsilver too is in the mind. As such the negation becomespossible. There are the -two 'samvits9 (of the real and'mithya silver) and that which is said to be non - existing;

hence in all the three tenses is the real silver as such. Ofthese two 'samvits' why cannot we leave one and thus giveupthe'ahukika^kalpanaâssuminga mysterious one)We can-not do so because during the erroneous cognition we do not

avc the knowledge of two silvers. If there wsre this know"h


60 Panchapadika

ledge, we could easily give up one. When we later on say'nasty atrarajatam'we are repeating the existence of real sil-ver in all the three times. But when we say 'mithyaivaraja-tam abhat\ we are predicating its existence. Thenisedha^ refers to the empirical silver, and the acceptanceof the reality of silver during the erroneous cognition refers

to 'mayavivartita rupya' (silver distortedly appearing thro-ugh may a).

Objection : Because of the non-discirimiation betweenthe knowledge of 'aprakasa suktF and the memory of sil-ver, we might say that silver, is apprehended immediately(This is Prabhakara's view).

BepSy : Padmapada replies, it is clear as it is imme-diately apprehended). The alleged non - discrimination iscontrary to experience. Even when there is the discrimina-ting knowledge, there is the 'pratyabhijna' (recognition) inthe form. Till this moment this was silver', 'this appeeared(abhat). Here the recognition takes the form in which the-this' is apprehended as 'samsrista" with the silver. In theerroneous cognition the silver is apprehended as 'samsrgata"with the 'this' which is immediate. And that which is neg-ated later on is not the meare silver but the 'this silver"It is this that accounts for the later' pratyabhigna. Other-wise the Tratiti (Apprehension)' ought to have been' that(remembered) silver is "avivikta"~(not discriminated) tillthis time ? The 'this silver' is the object of experience.

We can also interpret it differently. It is the knowledgeof the object (that) that gives rise to the *pravrtfi' with


Vivaranam ri

refrence to the object. Thus there is a necessary relationbetween tlie Padarthajnana' (apprehension of the c'aspectof the object) and ^tatpravrtiF (activity there after). Like-wise here too for the 'samsagajnana'the condition is 'samsa-rga pravrtti ? We have the -pravrttF with reference to some-thing because of the knowledge of that something. Andone who needs silver (rajatarthi) has his 'pravrtti' with refe-rence to the 'this'. Hence knowing that the immediatelypresent object is silver, he proceeds. This is the meaningof Padmapada^ statement.

Since the silver is apprehended as immediate and dir-ect, how can we say that the silver has the form similar tothat which is remembered? To this Padmapada says-59purvadrstava bhasah" (appearence of what was seen before)is the 'upapaur given for 'smriti rupatva\ But it is the''sukty avidya" (avidya concering the mother of pearl) thatat once brings into immediate and direct existense the sil-ver. If so how can we speak of it as ûrvadrsta" ? Thereply is that it is similar to that which was seen before.he silver was not seen earlier. There cannot be "rajata-vabhasa' (appearance of silver) when we cognise the ^sukti'

So far we have considered 'adhyasa' as 'smaryamanasadrsah anyatra anyatmana avabhasamanah' (that which issimilar to the remembered appearing else where as the formof the object). This accounts only for the superimpositionof the object. Padmapada now begins to explain the defi-nition with reference to 'jnanadhyasa' also. But when weadmit one of tjiese 'adhyasas', the other too is automaticallyimplied. As such why should there be a separate explana-.tion lor jnanadhyasa9 (super inpositian of the cognition)


62 Panchapadika

Even though when one of the two adhyasas is establi-shed, the other too is implicitly established^ yet the definitionof 'arthadhyasa' cannot cover the cases of 'jnanadhyasa'.Hence- a separate explanation is given.

But when the 'jnana' or knowledge which is 'arthavisi-sta' (qualified by the object) is taken to be a case of 'adhya-SB', then an object appearing as having the nature of ano-ther object becomes a case of 'adhyasa'. Here it becomes'smriti samana' (equivalent to memory). Thus Padmapadasays; ^The expression 'snrrti rupah'' in the definition meansthat which has a form similar to the form of memory. Itis not really a case of memory. Any case of memory requi-res a prior perception. This perception creates a 'samskara'(impression) in the mind. Since the erroneous silver is notapprehended as that which was seen earlier, we cannot takeit to be a case of memory, but one having 'smrti rupatrva'.This is possible because it has come into existence due tohe 'samskara' of a prior perception (Pramana.) or existence^How can it be "samskara gayyam arising from an impressionWhen we deny 'smrititva' (having the nature of memory)to it ? We deny 'smrtitva' because we do not apprehend itas having 'smrtirupa' and yet we cannot apprehend it so ifthere were no such 'samskara.9'

Objection : If we deny 'smrititva9 to the cognitionwe can not take it to be due lo the 'samskara'. It cannotbe 'samskarajanya because it does not have 'smrtirupa'. 1ît is not a case of memory, it is a case of 'bhranti5 and likethe preceptual knowledge it is not 'purvanubhavajanya'.

Reply ; By the method of agreeirent and differencewe conclude that this cognition too is the result (janya) Or


Vivaranam fl3

our prior experiences. In all those apprehensions wherethere is no âksusamprayaoga' (contact of the eye) withthe object in all cases of erroneous cognitionwe can-elude that this is made possible only by the impressions ofour previous evpriences.

AKHYATI (Nature of erroneous cognition accordingto Prabhakara),

Objection: Let us admit that an erroneous cogni-tion is due to this 'samskara'. Then the sense organ is incontact with one object s'nd there is the knowledge of someother object immediately. This can be only 'smrti'. andany knowledge which is mediated by 'smrti\ is called infe-rence etc. Thus knowledge arises only in two ways-expertence or 'Anubhava' (which is always true or Yathartha) and^mrti9 (memory). There can be no third type called'mithya^jnana.

Padmapada states this view thus : "When the eye is incontact with one object and there is the knowledge of ano-ther object, we have only 'smriti9. In erroneous cognitionthe 'smaranabhimana' is suppressed (pramrishta). Due tosome specific 'doshaôr other the sense organs which are thecauses of knowledge come to have the ^mriti sam udbodha'(awakening of the memory)of some one specific object. The'dosha' does not allow the sense organ which is in contactwith the object to be the cause of 'Visesha pratibhasahetu" (cause of a specific appearance). Mainly due to the'dosha^ of the sense organ we are unable to distinguish bet-ween ê perceived content and the remembered contentwhich are 'nirantarotpanna^ (arising without an interval).Just as two trees which are far away areapprehended as one»


64 Panchapadika

so here both the apprehensions are taken to constitute asingle apprehension. This is the 'uptanna bhrama" (emer-ging illusion).

When we see the 'gavaya^ and remember the cow, thecowness is given up and only its similarity with the 'gavaya9is taken note of. From the perceived 'gavaya9 the 'cow' isdistinguished and we have the experience that 'I remember'.

So if there is 'smriti6 in the erroneous cognition, it shouldbe like this. To this the reply of the Prabhakara is thatmemory is suppressed ('Pramrishta').

Why do we remember silver when we perceive 'sukti' ?Because of similarity between the two. Then since there isthe greatest similarity with another 'sukti', why don't weremember another 'suktf ? To this the reply assumes somedefect or other in the sense-organ.

Let there not be the discrimination of the object be-cause of the suppression of memory. But the perceivedobject distinguishes itself from the remembered. This toocannot be accepted for the 'dosha' does not allow the senseorgan (which is in contact with the object) to be the 'vise-sha pratibhasa hetu9.

But it is said that there is memory and then perception.These two do not come at the same time, but one after theother. Then the prior knowledge is 'vyavahita9 (has aninterval) and as such cannot bring about the 'pravritti^There is no ^pravritti' because of 'samanya jnana9 (generalknowledge) alone (idam) or because of 'Visesha jnana' (par-ticular kowledge) alone (rajatam). It ought to require both-


Vivaranam 65

To this the reply is : "Mainly due to the 'dosha' of thesense organ we are unable to distinguish between the per-ceived content and the remembered content which are •nira-ntar otpanna (successive)". It is the 'NirantorotpattF alonewhich is the cause of 'pravritti'.

But we do have the experience that this is silver ? Herewe do recognise (pratyabhijna) the 'samsarga pratyaya9 (pri-nciple of relation) between the this and the silver. The replygiven is that the 'ekatva' (oneness) itself is the 'bhrama'.

Another objection to 'akhyatF is stated by Padmapada.The experience of the past life is not remembered. Nowthe child who cannot and does not remember the experienceof its past life takes for the first time some thing that i8sour. And yet it has the experience of sourness and appre""hends it as sour. How is this possible ? The reply is thatit was experienced in the past life. Otherwise, the childought to have apprehended not any one of the six 'rasas',but a seventh one. How is it that only .a part of the pastexperience is remembered, not the whole ? Because of the'doshabala' (strength of the defect). Then how is it thatthe 'dosha' does not make the whole of the past experienceremembered ? The reply is 'Kaarya gamyatvaad hetu bhaa-vasya' (the cause is apprehended from the effect). Thatwhich is to be remembered in the act of taking in the sour?is only sourness.

But if we don't accept that there is 'ayathaartha jnaana^(untrue knowledge) also, there will be 'siddhaanta kshatF(destruction of the theory) for the Praabhaakara. The 'saa-strakaara' (Saankhya system whose cosmology etc. is acce-

9)


66 Panchapadika

pted by Prabhaakara) defines ,ayathaartha jnaana^ as 'ata-ttve tattva jnanam' (knowledge of the real in the unreal).Then how can Praabhaakara reject it ?

The reply given is that that statement has a referenceonly to^vyavahaara', and that 'samsarga bhrama' is really acase of the suppiession of the knowledge of memory. Andinstead of assuming'samsarga jnaana5 as the cause of theerroneous cognition, it is easier to assume 'akhyaati'.

Criticism of Akhyâti theory.

What is 'akhyaatF ? It cannot be the mere negation orabsence (abhava) of knowledge (khyati), for it is acceptedto be a form of knowledge. And all cases of the absenceof knowledge are not cases of 'bhrama* (illusion).

When a person has 'pravritti9 (activity) with referenceto one object, there arises a knowledge which is the causeof ^pravritti9 for another object. Can't this be the defini-tion of 'akhyaati5 ? Then there are cognitions where wehave objects with reference to which there is no 'pravritti'and no quick sublation too. How can we treat them ascases of ^bhraanti' ?

Objection: The absence of discrimination betweenthe knowledges of many 'padaarthas' (objects) may be takento be 'bhraanti'.

Reply s Take the cognition 'this is silver". The'this"is not a synonym of 'silver'. There are two words and thetwo are clearly distinguished because they are not synonyms-Further there is admitted to be also memory. Hence wecannot say that here we have ^bhrama' arising out of the


Vivaranam. 67

non - discrimination between the 'saamanya' (idam) and'visesha' (rajatam). The Praabhaakara admits the know-ledge of difference between the 'this5 and the silver ; andwhen he cannot recognise that this is only one knowledge,he cannot plead for the non - discrimination between the'saamaanya' and the 'visesha'. Further is this differencethe nature of the 'padaartha' ? Or its property ? It cannotbe the former ; for when the Padaartha is apprehended, its'bheda' (difference) too is apprehended and then there is no'aviveka9 (non-discrimination). Regarding the second alter-native it might be argued that 'bheda" can manifest itself a5mutual exclusion, or as the apprehension that there are twoor more knowledges ; and only when we have the specificknowledge that the terms are mutually exclusive or that theyare two, we have 'viveka' (discrimination).

Even this is not possible. Take the sentence 'bring thecow with the stick\ Here the cow is in the accusativa caseand the stick is in the instrumental. Their Karakas (decl-ensional suffixes)are different. And the cow is also distinctfrom the stick. And if we were to apply their definition of'viveka9 to this statement, this would become a case of'aviveka bhrama\

Objection : But even there we have the know-ledge of difference in an implicit form.

Reply : Then in 'this is silver", since the words arenot synonymous' we have to accept the implicit difference;

and then it cannot be a case of error arising from non-idiscrimination. Otherwise, there must be the non-apprehe-nsion of the distinction (viveka) between the 'viseshakaara*(particular) and the 'saamaanya kara' (general) and then thecognition ought to be only 'this is9 or 'silver is% and never<this is silver',


68 Panchapadika

Is there non-discrimination between the objects whichare 'bhaasamaanas' (appearing entities) ? or objects whichare not 'bhasamanas' ? It cannot be the former. It cannotbe the 'aviveka' between the 'pratiiyamaanaakaras' (appre-handed forms) since there is the apprehension of distinct-ion arising from the rejection of synonymity. Nor can it bethe latter since in deep sleep too 'there is the non-discrimi-nation between the 'apratiiyamaana akaras' (unapprehendedforms). Hence non-discrimination cannot be a case of'bhrama'.

It has been said earlier that 'bhrama' is 'aviviktaanekapadaartha jnaana maatram' (mere knowledge of the undis-criminated plurality). Is this an explanation of erroneouscognition ? Or is error ('bhrama'), 'grahanna smarannaa-tmaka' (apprehension and memory) ? Or is it 'samsargajnaana asamsakritatva vishesham' (not cooperated by a rela-tional cognition) ? There is the knowledge of 'sukti' whichis the 'adhishthaana' of 'rajata', and the 'sukti' totallyexcludes the silver. Is error then 'anadhikara natva visesh-itam' (that which has no ground or basis) ? Of these alter-natives, let us take the first which involves âtivyaapti'(applying to those to which it cannot apply). Take thesentence 'Khando gauh\ Here are two ^pratyayas" (terms)which are not only not discriminated, but related. Thisdoes not make this apprehension erroneous.

We cannot take up the second alternative and say thaterror is the non-discrimination between perceptual and me-mory apprehensions. For in -'aham manushyah\ we havethis non-discrimination between two perceived contents;

and yet it is a case of error.

We cannot admit the third alternative and say there isonly 'samsarga jnaana' (relational cognition in 'samanya


Vivaranam . 69

viseshe' (general and particular ede,, for, where we do notdistinguish the knowledge of the various 'padaarthas\ wemay have to recognise error. And in 'samsarga jnaana'there is no such discrimination. Further, there cannot beeven a 'samsarga pratyaya', for the "aalanabana' (support orbasis) which is required in ^samsarga' is taken to be absentin the erroneus cognition, We cannot say that for 'samsa-rga pratyaya' there is, Ihe âalambana' in ^guna guny adisambandha' (relation between quality and ubtance andso on); for in the cnse of recognition, there is 'aikyaalam-bana' (identical ground). Like the ^gunagunyaadi samba-ndha' we can say that even the relationship of similarity canbe the 'aalambana' in the cognition ^his is silver".

Let us take the fourth alternative. In the theory of"akhyaati' that which sublates the error is the knowledge ofdiscrimination. The object of this 'baadhaka jnaana' (sub-lating cogrition) is the silver which totally excludes or neg-ates the 'ssukti' that is its 'adhikarana (locus). But in 'thisis silver', the ^this' is the "saamanya ^ and it is distin-gui shed from the Silver5 which is the 'visesha' (particular).Now in'ghatasya shuklatvam (whiteness of the pot) the pos"sessiva case clearly she vs the difference of the pot from itswhiteness. The same "viveka^ is obtainable even in ^his issilvery and both will have to stand on the same level,

When we say that error is the failure to distinguishbetween perception and memory, there is another defect.Why can't we say that the perceived content is capable ofmaking the remembered silver give up its specific content ofsilverness? ; and thus, why can't it distinguish itself fromthe perceived ? One might reply that this is because thereis no 'visesha darshana'' (perceptual apprhention of the par-


70 Panchapadika

ticular or difference). But if the merely perceived 'shuktfis different from silver, then the 'visesha9 implied by thedifference will be the 'adharmy aakaara7, or the form ofsuktiy, or the 'pratiyogy aakaara' or its opposite the rajata,and none other. And thus the 'bhedaakaara" (differentform) which is perceived ought to be apprehended distinc-tly (viviktah).

Is the 'bhedajnaana' merely the knowledge of the 'dhaarmi pratiyogi' the contradictory of the locus whice is raj at-Then the "dharmi pratiyogi jnaana, (knowledge of the contr-adictory of the locus) is the knowledge of difference; thereis on the one hand this knowledge, and on the other, boththe 'dharmi9 and its 'pratiyogin are known. Then even thedifference ought to be apprehended distinctly.

Let us admit that both the 'dharmi' and its 'pratiyogi5are apprehended (perceived). They are mutually exclusiveand as such these two make us apprehend a third calleddifference. Then prior to our apprehension of the differe-nce there is the apprehension of the two terms, the this andthe silver. Then before we perceive the difference, thesetwo are undistinguished and as such it will be a case of'bhrama'. All knowledge then will be 'bhrama jnaana'.

You cannot say that in mere apprehension as suchthere is no difference of the sukti from silver; for, then wehave the knowledge of the identity of the this with the sil-ver. And 'samsarga jnaana' will have to be the 'aalam-bana\

Now let us examine 'smritF after 'grahana': We per-ceive the 'gavaya' and observe its similarity with the cow


Vivaranam 71

which is remembered. Here the difference of the 'gavaya9is suppressed and its identity alone is takea inte account,Likewise,, the perceived 'sukti' can give up its specific diffe-rence and yield only its iddentity with silver. It might bereplied that the ^smaranaabhimaana' is suppressed.

What is this ^maranaabhimaana9 ? This cannot be^mriti', for when memory is suppressed, there is the possi-bility of the very absence of knowledge.

You cannot say that ^maranaabhimaana^ is differentfrom memory; for when that which is dfferent from mem-ory is suppressed6 how cen the full knowledge that has ari-sen, to bring about the discrimination in its objects ?There cannot be a 'smaranaahimaana9 which is not 'smriti9.

Objection ; That which involves the space and timeof the previous experience, or that which is referred to as^that' (sah ity aakarena) may be called 'smarnabhimana',

Reply : Padmapaada says : "Nn tavaj jnan^nuvidd"hataya grahanam" It connot be apprehended as united withcognition. Now in the case of error arising out of recogni-tion we apprehend the ^his' as the 'that^ and we are also^ware of remembering the time and place of the earliercognition. With all these apprehensions, we are unable todistinguish the 'that' from the perceived 'this',

Further, the 'sambheda' (unity) of the past experiencedoes not take place when we -are remebering. And Padma-paada says that "the knowledge acquired in the past cannotbecome an object now by being "^the adjective of the percei-ved." The past knowledge is capable of giviag rise to the


72 Panchapadika

'smriti samskaara' for the object. This knowledge cannotbe an object to itself, for the previous knowledge has onlyan object as its object. Knowledge has an object otherthan itself, and it cannot be its own object. With referenceto that object which was not an object in the previous kno -wiedge, there cannot arise any memory which is 'tat sams-kaara janya' (arising from that impression) Experience andits memory do have only the same identical object. The'samskaara' that came in to existence by the mere experie-nce alone does not have the power to give rise to 'Visista^rnriti (specifi memary) Hence the memory whiah is a pro-duct of that experience has the same object. It is'arthamatra visaya" (merel having an object). Hence memorywhich arises from the knowledge of 'artha matra vishaya/can have only the ^rtha maatra^ as its object. It cannothave as its object that knowledge which was not the objectof the previous knowledge. Otherwise from the apprehen-sion of the blue thing we may have to obtain the memorytof the yellow thing.

Objection : Take the cognitions, 'this pot is known9and <! remember this known pot\ In the first, 'the objectis the pot; and in the second the object is the known potor the knowledge of the pot. Here we do find that theknowledge which is not an object in the second Thus,has not knowledge become its own object ? Is this not a factof our experience ?

Reply : Yes. In the previous experience ths objectis cognised and thus arises a property (according to theMimaansakaas) called 'jnaatataa' (known-ness) in the obiectand it is known. Due to this êtu' (reason) called 'jnaa-tataa' we are able to infer its cause, viz. knowledge which


Vivaranam 73

is 'aatmaasraya' (dependent on the self). The 'samskaara 'of this inferential knowledge gives rise to memory whichmakes us apprehend the object experienced. The memoryof the object is determined only by the apprehension of theobject. The knowledge of the object has its object in thememory that arises from the earlier cognition. Thus theknowledge 'this is a pot' has its own specific memory wherethe object is memory. On the other hand the knowledge-jnaato ghatah" (the pot is known) has its memory 'jnaatamghatam aham smaraami' (I remember the known pot). Thismemory cannot come in the first cognition. Each cognitionhas its own specific memory attached to it.

First we have the memory of the object. After thisthere may arise another memory which takes the form 'Iremember the pot that is known'. The latter arises afterthe former, and it has its own specific object. But thatwhich is present in the erroneous cognition is the memoryof the object as indistinguishable from perception. It isnot the latter one. As such Padmapaada states, ''memoryapprehends the object in itself, and ^not the object alongwith the knowledge of the object". Only that much of theobject as such, or that much of the object along with itsknowledge as was the object of the previous knowledge, ismade manifest (avabhaasayati) by memory. It does notmake manifest the knowledge which is its basis and source.

From the mere knowledge of the object there arises a'samskaara' because of which we have memory. This obj-ect is purely or merely an object. Any other object is aqualified or specific object. The memory of the object is'artha maatra vishaya^ This is explained in another way,

10)


74 Panchapadika

By the memory of the object we mean that 'pratyaya*which arises from the 'samskaara9 that comes from theknowledge of the object as such. And that 'pratyaya'whicharises from the 'samskaara9 that comes inferentially ormediately is called 'smrityantara' (followed by memory). Is'jnaatam ghatam smaraami5 (I remember the known pot) acase of ^rtha smriti* ? or a case of 'smrity antara' ? Howto distinguish here ? To this Padmapaada says : "While wego through the words in a sentence, each word gives us itsmeaning. But this meaning remains as a remembered con-tent till we come to the end of the sentence. When we havethe -Padaartha smriti' from the word we do not find 'JnanaSambheda' (Jnananu viddhatva== being together with know-ledge) ; for even knowledge is dependent on 'Sabdarthatva'.

The Statement of Purvapaksha :

We want to know the meaning of a sentence and wecome to the end of the sentence word by word in a regularorder. Then in this process there arises the knowledge ofthat which refers to the meaning of the words. Thus thereare as many jnanas as there axe words. Each word has itsmeaning and a specific jnana. As the related or appropri-ate word is apprehended, these jnanas come to have "Sam-bandhy antaratha Vishayah'. Their objects are other rela-ted ones. And these are retained and are called 'smriti'"So much is common ground for both the schools of PurvaMimamsa (of Kumarila and Prabhakara).

Objection : The apprahension of the word is said togive rise to the memory of the meaning. Now, what is therelation of the word to its meaning ?


Vivaranam 75

Reply: This relationship maybe said to be of thenature of having the ability to give rise to ârtha buddhi'(apprehension of meaning).

Objection : Is it of the nature of having the abilityto give rise to memory? Or is it something different ?

RepEy ; It is not something different since the wordscan .of and do not give rise to anything different from<smriti' in their 'padarthamsas'.

The relationship between the word and its meaning,we have said, is capable of giving rise to smriti. Is thisability given to a known relationship ? Or to an unknownone ? When a thing is said to be capable of producingsomething, this ability is apprehended only through theproduct or the effect. Thus when there is memory, fromthis we can apprehend the capability or power (samarthya)of the word. Then to say that memory arises when thisability is known, is arguing in a circle. We cannot arguethat memory arises from the ability of another memory?since this leads to a regfess. This ability cannot be attri-buted even to an unknown relationship, for even the igno-rant ones must then be able to understand the meanings ofthe words as soon as they hear the wcrds. Thus in any wayit is difficult to explain "Smriti Janana Samarthya laksh-ana" (nature of being able to give rise to memory). Memorycannot arise purely from the 'smriti janana samarthyasambandha'.

Further, there is another defect. When A and B aresimilar to one another (sadrisyadi sambandha), the percep.tion of the one will bring the other to memory. Here in


76 Panchapadika

the case of the word and ^"its meaning there is no relation-ship of snrilarity etc; and as such we cannot say that theword gives rise to the memory of the meaning.

Answer to this Purvapaksa ;

The ability to give rise to memory is said to be the rela-tionship between the word and its meaning. Only when thisrelationship is known, it becomes 'arthabodhaka' (cause ofthe apprehension of meaning). The samskara arises fromthe knowledge of the relationship. Bven if the ^samskara'is not apprehended, the ^rtha bodhakata' is admitted. Eventhough the 'samskara' is always there, we cannot say thafthere is always memory, for it is admitted that the 'smritihetu' is the 'samskara' that is aroused from the percption ofthe word. Thus both the 'sambandha jnana samskara9and sabda darsana constitute the 'smriti hetu"

The knowledge of the word as qualified by its relation-ship with. the meaning cannot be the cause of the memory(in giving rise to the apprehension of the meaning) If thiswere not so, the ability to give rise to memory wPl have tobe determined by this 'vaisishtya'' (speciality). Then thevaisishtya is one relationship and this would require anotherrelation with memory. Further, when we apprehend theword as qualified by its relation with its meaning, we can-not say that the word is the cause of memory, for in theapprehension of such a word, the meaning is already knov/nsince the Mord is apprehended as qualified by its relation toits meaning. Thus even before the ^mritF (which is saidto give us the meaning), the meaning is known.

It has been said that since the peiception of a relatedentity (sambandhi) is capable of giving us the memory of


Vivaranam 77

another related entity, we have âdrisyadi sambandhy an-tara\ A 'samarthya sambandha' which, does not involveany 'sambandhantara (another relationship), has the pro-perty of 'smarakatva (being remembered). Does it meanthat elsewhere too the same thing holds good ? Or sinceelsewhere the 'samarthya' involves the relationships likesimilarity, do we try to establish' sadrisyapekshatva' ? Ordo we say that since there is no original relationship, thereis only the 'anutpatti' (non-emerance) of 'buddhi' ? Thefirst two alternatives are at first rejected.

Similarity and other relationships do not have the po-wer to give rise to memory (and thus make us apprehendthe meaning of the word). That the 'samarthya sambandha9can make us apprehend the meaning of the word, is notopposed to its nature. This cannot be rejected. That theoriginal relationships like similarity etc., have the propertyof 'smarakatva' can be proved by agreement and difference.We cannot speak of âmarthya rupatva" with reference tothese. And this makes the first alternative untenable.

Regarding the second alternative we say : The originalrelationships like snnilarity etc., can give the awareness of^rthantara' (another meaning) because of ^samarthya sam-bandha' since there is no 'buddhisamarthyaeakshanantara\"Buddhi Samarthya Lakshana' means that which can givethe awareness of "arthantaratvam', asamkirnatvam\ 'sabdasamarthyena sahaanavasthitatvam, (another meaning, non-confusion, non-co-existence because of the power of theword).

Even though this memory is of a different object whenwe have the relationship like similarity, yet in the present


78 Panchapadifca

context we cannot assume a n&w relationship since it ismpossible and unnecessary.

If we refuse to admit that the ability to give rise tomemory (that enables us to apprehend 'the meaning) doesgive us the meaning of the word, then it is a self contradic-tory statement. This is how the Buddhists argue,

. Regarding the third alternative we say : Does this alter-native seek to maintain 'buddhy anutpattF (non emergence-of cognition) through the ^samarthya9 by accepting the 'bu-ddhi samarthya' of word ? or does it deny the very 'samar-thya' ? But when there is 'buddhi samarthya7 for words, itis self contradictory to argue "buddhy anutpatti'. The secondalternative cannot be maintained for the word has the abil-ity to give rise to an apprehension (buddhiJanana samar-thya'). As such it is maintained that a word has the abi-lity to give rise to memory which gives us the meaning atthe word. From the words we get the memories and thesein their turn give meanings. The 'sambandhi darsana' and"sambandhyantara smarana9 are 'sambandha siddha" for theword and its meaning. And when one is perceived, theother is re-membered. It has been said that like the memoryof *padartha', even the other memory does not involve anyrelationship with jnana. Here the author begins to doubt'drishtanta asampratipatti' (fallacious analogy). He askSywhere then is the absence or negation of the integration ofknowledge (jnana sambhanda) ? Padmapada says, ^jnana-syapi sabdarthtva prasangat'.As explained in Tattvadar-pana, "Sabdasya Sakti bheda Kalpana prasangad arthamatra vishayatvam yuktam\ The word refers to its meani-ing. The power of the word brings about a relation bet-ween the meaning and memory ; and even knowledge nece"ssarily involves 'sabdarthatva pra&anga\


Vivaranam 79

, Objection : Smaranabhimana may be interpretedas 'smaranagato dharmah" (quality present in memory) andnot as ^maryagato dharmah" (quality in the remembered),Just as in triangularity we find a specific Âvagata visesha.(inherent feature) so in (smritijnana) too we have a specificproperty and this is ^smaranabhimana5,

This is an internal property and hence is necessarilyinvolved whenever the object having it is taken into consi-deration.

Reply : Padmapada denies this by saying that we donot apprehend a new and distinct form called 'smaranabh-imana' as the 'avagata^ or internal property of knowledge;

this property is not perceptually cognised. Nor is it infer-entially cognised. Sahara, therefore says, that we have toinfer the 'buddhi^ as ânakara9 by which is meant 'anirupitaakara visesha' or "anirdishta svalakshana' (indeterminateform).

Objection ; That 'smaranabhimana' is some speci-fic internal feature of 'smriti jnana' can be maintainedinferentially. 'Vyapara visesha5 can make us infer 'vyapakavisesha' (pervasive feature). From 'linga visesha' (specificcause) we can have' hetu viseshanumaana (inference ofa specific reason.

According to the Mimansaka, knowledge is alwaysinferred. And in inference from a perceived object we caninfer that which is necessarily related to it. Further, fromthe effect of a perceived entity, we can infer the cause ofthe inferred entity. Thus for example from the sweet fra-grance coming from a smoke (linga visesha) we infer thaithere is a tree having fragrant wood (hetu visesha).


80 Panchapadika

Reply s What is 'linga visesha' ? Is it a 'grahya vise-sha' ? Or a 'phala visesha' (specific result) ? It cannot bethe former, for there is no invariable rule that only thepramana grahya (apprehended through pramana) is appre-hended by memory. The internal property must be direc-tly apprehended when the object is being cognised. Wecannot bring in the âyanf (.this) in recognition and the'sah' (that) in memory as maintaining this rule; for spaceand time are apprehended mediately and also immediately,and this does not constitute a difference in the object.

It cannot be a'phala vise&ha' also, for this is unproven.Phala visesha means that which referes to the object. Acc-ording to the Mimansakas it is jnatata which is the 'phala'of perception; and according to the Nyaya system, it isânuvyavasaya' in the form 'I know that this is a pot\ Thephala visesha is conditioned by the difference in the object;

and there is no difference in the object between the 'Pra-mana phala' and 'Smriti phala'.

Objection : There is the knowledge that I rememberCsmarami'). This may be taken to be ^smaranabhimana'.

Reply : Padmapada observes ; any knowledge that^kesthe form'I remember that../, arises at times withreference to the object and also with reference to the time ,and not every where; and the experience 'I remember' isapprehended by the explicit mention of the word 'smarami'-as such this cannot be a cau?e for its non-discriminationfrom perception. The (! remember' is a specific immediateexperience which involves 'smarya9 ^marta' and smriti'(remembered, one who remembers and memory). It may betaken to be inferential knowledge involving these three


Vivaranam 81

factors. In either theory, it is not the 'I remember', thatdistinguishes memory from perception. To have the expe-rience 'I remember', I should know all ready that it is acase of memory; otherwise I cannot say 'I remember9. Toknow that it is a case of memory I should know that theother experience is a perceptual one involving 'grahya^'grihita' and 'grahana'. ^'(apprehended object, one whoapprechends, and apprehension), Even prior to the memoryI should know that there is a perceptual experience whichdiffers from this memory experience. Therefore I cannothave either the immediate experience of memory which isdistinct from the perceptual one, or the inferential cogni-tion of memory which is distinct from the inferred knowl-edge of perception. I cannot have this or that unless I cog-nise that this experience or that cognition differs from itsperceptual correlate.

For, the tf! remember' and the <! infer' are determinedby the apprehention of the specific meaning of the given.Hence even before I have the experience of 6! remember*I should be knowing the difference between perception andmemory. I cannot bring in the e! remember' as pointingout the difference to me for the first time.

Objection : Both experience and the memory there-of have the same object |and yet that they differ is wellknown. What is this difference ?

Reply : Padmapada says that memory arises from the'saxnskara' of the earlier experience; and the function ofmemory is only to make manifest the object.

11)


82 Panchapadika

This 'samskara samutthatva" (emergence of the impre-ssion) is common to both experience and memory. But inmemory it is the mere 'samskara' that brings fourth theawareness of the object; whereas in perception there is alsothe contact of the object with the sense organ. Even thoughthey have an identical object, they have differ ent causes.

Do 'smriti jnana' and 'jnananumana' (rememberedknowledge and inferred one) differ because of a differencein their objects ? Or because of a difference in their resp-ective causes ? Or because one takes the form of a refere-nce to ^that5 (which was experienced) and the other does notto do so ?

Since both have the same object which gives knowle-dge, the first alternative is to be rejected. Since both arebased upon the same 'samskara' we cannot admit of anydifference in their respective causes.

Then there remains the third alternative. Memory issaid to have the form of reference to that ('sa ity akarah').What is this 'sa ity akarah' ? Does this mean the object asqualified by the place and time which are not the here andthe now ? Or does it mean the integration of the previousexperience ? Does it mean that which has arisen from the'samskara' of the previous experience ? The first alterna-tive is common also to inference which too involves theplace and time which are 'paroksha' (not innediate Ordirect.)

Regarding the second alternative, we have to ask whe-ther it is the integration of the mere previous experience ?Or is it the integration of that knowledge which is its cause?The former is common also to 'jnananumana' (inferential


Vivaranara 83

knowledge) while the latter is common also to the knowle-dge that arises from a 'paurusheya vakya'- (human uttera-nce). Take the sentence, 'there are flowers on the bahks ofthe river'. From this we get the apprehension of theknowledge about the flowers which are on the banks of theriver. As such here too we have the integration of theknowledge which is its cause. This second alternative can-not constitute a difference between 'smriti jnana' and'jnananumana'.

Hence we have to admit that 'sa ity akarah9 means 'that which arises 'from the 'samskara9. Then we have torecognise that memory is different from jnananumana inso far as the former arises only from the ^samskara".Padmapada rejects this argument and observes6 "in orderto assume the suppression of any entity due to 'dosha'there ought to be an additional something in the cognition.This additional something is not to be found either in theapprehension (pratiti) or in the object (artha)".

Now, take dream cognition. Is it a case of error wherethere is non-discrimination between two perceived entities ?Or between a perceived enttiity and a remembered one ? Orbetween two remembered entities ? The cognition of bluecannot be different from the cognising self. And since wedo not cognise the blue that is different from the self, thefirst alternative stands rejected. In the cognition of blue,since the blue is not different from the sell", we may have tosay 'I am blue' and this is absurd. The ^T is immediatelyapprehended and the 'blue' is the remembered entity. Thenon-discrimination between the two is there. Since the per-ceived is not discriminated from the remembered, the latterbecomes immediate ('aparoksha'). Likewise^ since the reme"


84 Panchapadika

mbered is not'discriminated from the perceived, the lattermight be 'paroksha'. Because of this difficulty the secondalternative too is faulty.

"In the erroneous cognition", says Padmapaada,''thereis no apprehension of the object 'of the previous experience;

for the object is apprehended as being before us, as beingimmediate."

It we accept the third alternative, we have to say thatthere is the non-discrimination between two rememberedentities. If there is this mutual non-discrimination, betweenthese two entities, then we have to apprehend the whole of'paroksha' (that which is not immediately or directly cog-nised).

Hence knowledge does not come only from experienceand memory. There is also a third source calles 'bhrantijnana'. Padmapada says, "when we have a contact withone object and there is the knowledge of another, it is nota case of memory but one of 'adhyasa'.

If it is nat a case of memory, what is the explanationfor the cognition ^his is silver3 ? The reply leads us toANYATHA KHYATI s- (Theory of Bhatta Mimansa andNyaya systems).

Statement ; Well it is 'anyatha khyati. When theeye has the contact with 'ShuktP, the eye, which suffersfrom some defect, receives the impression of silver which isat some other place. The silver is in its own place and itis apprehended in the nature of 'shukti' ('Shuktikatmana')by the sense organ which suffers from some defect or other.Then it might be asked-why should such an organ appreh-


Vivaranam 85

end only silver ? It can as well ayprehend something whichit has not experienced before. To this the reply is thatthe sense organ received the impression of that which bears

•a similarity with the given object. Similarity etc, are someof the "doshas". Hence this 'Anyatha Khyatf is a form cfknowledge and it is cognised ('Grahanatmaka').

CRITIC! SIVS : What is 'anyatha khyati9 ? The wordis so vague that it can mean any one of the .following fourthings :

i) The knowledge of one object appears as the formof another, ânyakaram Jnanam'.

ii) The object apprehended does not have its basis initself but in something else, ^nyalambanan^.

iii) An object appears as having the nature of ano-ther object. Vasturah vastvantaratmana avabhasah\

iv) The knowledge that arises does not agree with theîven^ but with its "parinama'* or evolute - ânyatha pari-nate vastuni fnanam'. They respectively refer to 'jnana',esphurana^ 'vishaya9 and 'parinatF,

The firsi two meanings are not correct. It might beargued that there is 'vaiparitya' (inappropriate straneness)

•whence the perceived 'shuktF appears in the form of silver',The 'alambana' or basis of the given is 'shuktp and. that

•which is apprehended is silver. Now it is the apprehensionthat determines the nature of the object or the given. Thatwhich is the form of the apprehension is always the 'alam-bana' or the object given. We cannot have one object andan. apprehension that refers to another object which is not


86 Fanchapadika

given. If the 'shuktiy were to be the 'alambana' the appre-hension cannot have the form of silver

Object ion ; We need not have the form of appre-hension and the âlambana' always. The âlambana5 isthat object with reference to which the apprehension is eng-aged ('prayukta'). Since 'shuktF is not the object with refe-rence to which there is the 'pravritti' (activity) of the appre-hension. We are not able to apprehend it even though ithas its own 'svarupavabhasa' (appearence of its own form).The apprehension is 'rajata vyavahara yogya^ (appropriateto silver) and hence the silver is apprehended. Why cannotsilver be the "alambana" ?

Reply s Take the cognitions of a tiger and a snake

which make us catch hold of a stick. But the stick is notthe 'alambana9 for our cognitions. Qne who is in need of asubstance takes it up ; and since its qualities do not existapart form it, theso qualities too are involved in the act.Similarly one who takes up a quality is involved also withthe substance. In such cases we have to say that of the sub-stance and its qualities, one is the 'alambana' for the know-ledge of the other. And this is absurd. Hence c shukti' cannot be'alambana9 for this cognition. The ^ knowledge ofone object can not appear as the form of another. The ob-ject apprehended must have its basis in itself and not insomething else.

The third view states that an object appears as havingthe nature of another object. "If the shukti appears ashaving the nature of silver", asks Padmapada, "is this app-earance real or no for the shukti ? If it is a real appearance,


Vivaranam 87

it cannot be sublated later on. And since there is the sub-lation, this view cannot be accepted".

The propounder of "anythakhyati" argues for the corn*lete difference between the given 'shukti' and the cognisedsilver. They cannot accept a real "samsaJga' between thetwo ; and since they do not accept an 'anirvacaniya sam-sarga' (inexplicable relation), the 'samsarga' must be a non-entity. And a non-entity (sunya) cannot be apprehended.Likewise even in 'Khando gautf there can be no "samsarga'

•and then it ought to be a case of error,

The Bhedabhedavadin might accept that the 'samsargais real. Then is the appearance of silver real or no ? It is

•not real because it is sublated later on. In 'Khando gauh,there is 'samsarga' and also identity-in-difference. Andsince there is identity-in-difference every where there can-not be any where an error and its sublation ; or everywherethere will be error and its sublation.

Then there is the fourth interpretation on which Pad-mapada argues thus : "It might be argued that due to some^dosha^, there is the evolution of the form of silver for the"shukti". This is faulty. Card is evolved from milk ; andif the curd stands on the sams footing as the silver thereought to be the sublation of the curd. No such later cog-nition arises. And no one can cognise the curd as milk andcall it a true cognition. Both these are found in the silver-for, we sublated it and cognise the this as 'shuktF. If the'shukti' has evolved itself in the form of silver due to some^dosha' then even when the ''dosha' disappeares, it shouldremain as silver'. We cannot compare this to the blosom-ming of 'kamala' by the rays of the sun and its closing inof its petals when the sun sets. Here we have its stages :


88 Panchapadika

and with the setting of the sun, it goes back to its earlierstate. Likewise in the case silver, we cannot say that we^parate the silver. We can only say that the silver hasgone back to its earlier state97.

The subsequent part of the Panchapadika may be in-terpreted as the refutation of the fourth interpretation, oras the refutation of Atmakhyati. The author of the Viva-rana, however, interprets it by following the second alter-native.

ATMAKHYATI :" (Theory of Vijnanavada Budd.hism).

Statement :- It is the 'buddhf (intellect) that hasthe 'rajatakara' (form of silver). There is no silver outside^since it is sublated later on. How can we attribute 'buddhyakaiata5 to silver ? This silver is not the object of know-ledge that arises from the contact of the seuse organ; andyet it is immediately apprehended like consciousuese.

Is the form of silver for knowledge natural or broughtabout by anthing else ? It cannot be the former since know-ledge is merely and purely knowledge. And for the samereason, the second alternative does not arise. And yet due'samskara samarthya (power of impressions) there arisesthe form of silver for knowledge. Some time back in ^nepast when there arose the knowledge of silver, that know-ledge remained as a 'samskara'.

This ^samskara' arises from knowledge and how canwe attribute 'jnanatva' (knowledge) to it ? Is the'samskara' which is distnict from 'jnana\ something to be


Vivaranam 89

no possible relation on this view between (jnana' and the^vedya5 (known object). It cannot be the latter due to^Vyavahara gocaratvanupapatti' (impossibility of any acti-vity). Hence we have to attribute 'jnanamatratva' to theâmskara'.

This 'samskara' arose long ago and there were many'vijnanas^ in the intervening times. How can that 'sams-kara" be the cause now ? The reply is that the 'salibija^(corn seed) is able to give rise to another seed though priorto the emergence of the new seed there are many interven-ing stages. Likewise even though the ^samskara' is 'vyava-hita's (having intervals) by many different Vijnanah it iscapable of giving rise to the knowledge of silvernow.

One seed is not the cause of another seed. But thefirst seed is the cause of those things that bring about thenext seed. In such a case these intervenning things are theimmediate causes. The first seed is thus 'Vyavahita9 andcannot be the cause. And to show that even if it is ^yava-hita' it can be a cause, another argument is given. Fromthe knowledge of silver there arose a 'jnana santana9 (seriesof cognitions) which constitute the 'samskara^. The formof silver which was in the earlier knowledge takes the formof 'buddhi' and is apprehended as it is were outside.

CRBTICBSBVI ;- We have to ask whether the silvercomes into existence or no ? If it does not come into exi-stence, it cannot be there like the 'akasa'. If it comes intoexistence, it cannot be from an object since there is noobject other than jnana. It may be said that due to some'dushta karana'(defective cause) there arises the existenceof silver from jnana.

12)


90 Panchapadika

Padmapada gives the following reply: Let us Supposethat knowledge can bring an object into existence. Is it thisapprehension that brings about the silver? Or some otherapprehension ?

The 'janaka pratiti" (or the apprehension ofjnana whichis to give rise to the silver) is prior to the silver. It doesnot have the silver as its object at that time. The 'pratiti'and the silver belong to two different times. When therewas tl:e knowledge (which is the caus.e of silver), there washo silver and also no knowledge of silver. Knowledge issaid to be momentary. Then while there is the apprehen-sion there is no silver, and when there is the silver?the apprehension has ceased to be there. As such this app-rehension cannot be the cause of the silver coming intoview.

It is some 'dushta karana^ in the jnana that has brought.about the silver. Prior to this moment there was no 'dushtakarana' in the jnana; nor is there any such defect after thesilver came out. And if the ^pratiti which îs free from alldefects were to have the silver as its object, then everythingwill have to be apprehended in every apprehension.

Does the 'pratiti' create the silver ? Or no ? Thatwhich gives us something positive is real. Since we acceptthis maxim, and since the silver too is a cause of its mean-tag or apprehension, the silver will have to be real. The^dnshta karana pratiti9 is taken to bring out the silver,whence the silver is the ^lambana' for the former. Andsince the silver gives us its apprehension or meaning it sho-uld be accepted as real.


Vivaranam 9^

Ifthe'pratiti'dêsnot create the silver, the silver isnot its object and as such it cannot be apprehended. :

The akhyativadin says that since these tow theories arefound to be illogical '-ê have to admit the suppression ofmemory as explaining the nature of erroneous cognition.But we have said earlier that this suppression itself isimpossible. ^

Panchapadika reads : "The Yoga system observes /that the non-suppression of the experienced object (or con- |tent) is memory". ;

M

AdvaitSc position : I

4"',

If this is neither a remembered silver nor a perceived têal silver, how can you maintain that this knowledge wil \ Jbe 'alaukika' ? How is this possible ? As Padmapada puts \'-the question : "What is the way out to explain the appea- ^ranee of silver when we have the contact with "shukti" ?. ^

Doe's this question refer to the 'saamagri' (totality of |factors) or knowledge, or the object ? If it refers to ^saam- |,agri' the reply is stated thus by Padmapaada- "Memory |which arises from âmskaara" and which does not involve |the awareness of the 'I remcmber\ is not distinct from the |knowledge that comes from sense-perception. It is identi-cal with the knowledgeôf sense-preception which involvesthe 'samskaaraV

If the sense-organ and the 'samskaara9 constitutethe 'saamagd' then this will be the true knowledge itselflike memory and perception. But ^the erroneous cognition


9 2 Paachapadika

involves the cooperation of the defect (dosha) also $ and thec dosha9 is the third entity in the 'saamagri5.

Though the 'sukti' is immediately before us, we do notapprehend it. For the 'kaarana dosha' or the defect in app-rehension prevents its own power in the ^kaarya5 (object);

and at the same time it also awakens the samskaara;

tor the 'kaarana dosha saktF is 'kaaryagamya'. (defect inthe causal potency is inferred from the effect).

Objection ; Defect '(dosha) appears to be involvedin the 'samagrF of knowledge. A defect is that which pre-vents the proper result from coming into existence. It doe§not create a new effect; for the seed immersed in oil doesnot only not give rise to its own plant, but it also does nobring out a new plant.

Reply ; That there is a defect in the cause is known*only from the effect. Hence there is only one 'samagri*which is constituted by the integration of 'samskara' with^dushtakarana^ (defective cause).

The dosha cannot be the cause of the prior non-exist-ence (pragabhava) of the effect, for there is nothing forwhich this can be taken to be the cause. But the dosha cangive rise to a 'viparita karya^ (a different or strange effect)just as the ^bhasmaka' disease brings about excessive hun-ger and just as the "vetra" seed burnt by the fire of the forestbrings out the plantain tree. In the same way the 'Kacadidoshas' can function as a ^viparya hetu' (contrary cause) forthe result.

Objection: If a'doAa'can awaken a 'samskara',it cannot form part of the 'samagri'. If a 'dosha1 can awa-


Vivaranam 93

ken the samskara, why can't it also give the knowledge ofthe object ?

Reply : There is no pramana to show that it is both,

As such there, is only one samagri which involves both âm-skara5 and 'dushtakaranata'.

Regarding the second viz., knowledge: In the errone-ous cognition we have only one knowledge. There are notwo apprehensions,

Objection : To say that there is only one knowledgeis against the tenets of Advaita, The sense organ has thec ontact with the this ; and there arises a knowledge of thethis. This knowledge is ântahkarana parinama' (modifica-tion of the psychosis). There is the contact of the senseorgan with the ^his' and then arises a knowledge. Thishas the "samsarga^ of silver with the ^his' as its object. Hasthe knowledge arisen from the contact with the mere ^his ?'Or from the contact with the silver ? Neither the silver norits 'samsarga' is the object of this cognition. The silver be-ing îthya' cannot have the contact with the eye. It if werethe silver which is elsewhere, even then the eye fails to haveany contact with it,

But it might be said that when I close my eyes I cannothave the cognition of silver, and that this cognition arisesonly when I open my eyes and have the contact with theobject.

This argument is faulty since what I cognise is only the"this" which is the 'adhisthana'. I cannot say that I appre-hend the silver because of the 'samskara^ that has arisen


94 Panchapadika

from my previous experience of silver ; for, memory is notrecognised or accepted to be present in the erroneous cog-nition. We cannot also say that a defect by itself ca can useknowledge. The dosha or the defect can only prevent aneffect from coming into existence. It cannot be a cause.And since a 'jnana karana' (eause of knowledge) alone canbring about the effect(the knowledge of the effect), the defectas 'Jnanakarana' cannot give rise to the knowledge of theobject.

Hence you cannot say that there is only one knowledgeof silver which is integrated with the very existence of 'shu—ktf. On the other hand, it is maintained that there is 'avi-dya\ Due .to the 'bahya doshas' (external defects) func-tioning as an instrumental cause, this âvidya' assumes theform of silver in the 'shukti' as there is some similarity bet-ween the two. Avidya which is conditioned by that cons-ciousness that is reflected in the 'Idamakaxa vritti' (psycho-sis having the form of the this) cooperates with the 'sams-kara9 that gives the knowledge of silver. This avidya evol-ves itself in the form of "jnanabhasa". The silver that con-ditions the consciousness is the cause of the 'jnanabhasa'which therefore takes the form of silver. This form;is 'sva-vishaya vyavahara ajanaka' (ineffective to give rise to theawareness of its own object) since it is 'aeetana5. As suchthis form of avidya becomes the object for the 'sakshi cai-tanya'.

In this statement of the advaitin's position, how do wehave only one knowledge ? And since the difference in thefnanas brings about a. difference between the objects, howcan we say that there is only one object ?


Vivaranam 95The reply is as follows :

We cognise an object and there is the apprehension. Itis the mere apprehension (sphurana) and it is not 'jnanavisishta9 (qualified by its knowledge). There is the âva-bhasa' for the apprehension or 'sphurana' as 'vishayavacc-hinna' and not as 'jnanavacchinna5. The c sphurana' o^-apprehension is not conditioned by any psychosis, but bythe object alone ; and the object is cognised as having the^ratiphalita caitanya* (reflected consciousness).

Now the true and the false (mithya) objects appear asone in so far as they assume each other's nature (anyonya-tmata). This is the object cognised audit gives rise to'Visha"yavacchinnaphalaikya'. In this 'Upadhi' both the trueknowledge and the false one, even though they are two, aretaken through ûpacara' to be one only.

Then we come to the third meaning which refers to theîshaya'. The ^knowledge (that is said to be one) arisesfrom the 'samagri' which includes the âmskara' that hasawakened from the dosha. For such a knowledge it is butproper to have the âvabhasa (appearance)of the 'alambana'viz., the erroneous silver in the shukti (shuktigata mithya-rajatam). Then the 'mithya jnana' is îthyalambanamjnanam\ Since knowledge as such has no sublation, knowledge in itself is not mithya.

Neither knowledge nor its negation can be treated asmithya. But in the erroneous cognition we have a know-ledge which is integrated to 'mithyatva'. Such a jnanasamavayi mithyatva is understood to be no other than<amrvacamya' (inexplicable).


0 Panchapadika

This 'mithyajnana9 is neither true nor false; and hence^ is called 'anivacaniya'.

Objection from akhyativadin :

When there is the contact of the sense organ with theobject, this contact (samprayoga) is a cause of knowledgewithout the aid of anything else (nirapekshah). The con-t;.ct with smoke by itself gives us the knowlege of fire.Likewise samskara by itself is the cause of the memory ofa past experience. Thus we have two 'nirapeksha karanas'called perception and memory. Now the erreneous cogni-tion is brought about by these two causes which are con-tinuous and simultaneous (nirantara). As such there we donot have one knowledge alone but two. There is know-ledge arising from the contact, and there is also the sam-^kara. These are two distinct entities. Then how can wesay that there is only one knowledge arising from the cog-nition of silver in the shukti ? From these knowledgeslime m the specific "pravritti (activity).

Reply; This 'visishta pravritti' itself is impossible.the apprehension of the 'samsarga jnana' (relational know-ledge) is found in the cognition 'this is silver'. If there isnot one knowlege then one knowledge ought to come afterthe other. And because of the interval (Vyavadhana) thereîmwi uriê any 'pravrittr. The pravritti is brought abouthî iSw 'avyavahitatva' which makes us apprehend the ^this'

as Silver'.

IW example, taê a word which consists of manysAlhNvs Fach syllabic being momentary, it is destroyedwn alter we utter it; and each syllable by itself cannot con'wy the meaning. Each syllable is said to give rise to aâwâr^ The last syllable, aided by these samskaras


Vivaranam 97

functions as the cause in giving us the meaning of the word,This is assumed so that all the proceeding syllables (whichare the causes) might give us the apprehension. If all thesepreceeding causes are absent in the form of samskaras therecan be no apprehension of meaning. Even ^thogh thereare many causes here, this is not a defect since the proceed-ing causes function as accessories in the form of samskarasto the last cause.

If there is a difference in the causey we can infer thedifference in the effect. Then there cannot be one know-ledge, but many. Memory and perception are differentcauses and they give'rise to different effects. But due tothe presence of the defect, there arises a distinctly neweffect. Thus even though the ^vetrabija'.can give rise to avetra plant, still it gives rise to a plantain when it is scor-ched in the fire of the forest. It cannot be said that sincethe defect is 'sapeksha' (reflexive) and since perception andmemory are 'nirapeksha' (non-reflexive), the defect cannotcooperate with the other two to bring about one effect. Thesmoke that is apprehended in infrential cognition is 'sape-ksha'; and the memory of the concommittance of smokewith fire is 'nirapeksha9. Both these cooperate with oneanother in giving us one fknowledge. Thus both the know-ledge of the cause (linga jnana) and the samskara functiontogether in giving rise to the knowledge of 'lingi' in infer-ence. And in recognition we find that perception andmemory function together. In both there is only one know-ledge which has in it memory inherently (smriti garbham),And if the samskara is not awakened, we cannot havesuch a knowledge. Hence the perception of the 'linga' it-self aw.aknes the 'sambandha jnana samskarara', and these

13)


98 Panchapadika

two together give us the knowledge of the îngi'. The sameholds good in the case of recognition also" (Padmapada).

We cannot then admit any difference in the differentcauses in this cognition. We cannot treat the perceptionof 'linga' and the memory of 'vyapti' as the causes, for thelatter is only a samskara. If the samskara is'jnot awakened,then we cannot have the knowledge. Only when the sam-skara is awakened we have the 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya'(similtaneity of knowledges).

Objection: In recognition we have perception andalso the memory of the past experience as the causes.There is 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya' here since we have thecognitions of âyam' and âh*. Then we have twoknowledges.

Reply ; No. The knowledge of the 'linga' gives usthe knowledge of the ^lingi' with which it is necessarilyconnected. And from the 'artha jnana janana sakti sam-bandha9 (relation of the power to give rise to the knowledgeof the object) we apprehend the meaning of the word. Butthere is no such relationship between memory and recog-nition. As such memory is not the cause of recognition,but only a samskara for perception in recongnition.

When the 'samskaara' is awakened, there arises recog-.nision; and here we do not find a second entity calledmemory.

Objection : The copresence of the causes whichare 'nirapeksa' is to be found only ia the cases of thepramaanas other than 'abhijnaa pratyaksa9. 'Abhijnaa' is


Vivaranam 99

the knowledge of the object which is conditioned by oneplace and by one time.

Itepiy : From the cognitions of blue etc. which arethe causes of different knowledges, we get only one speci-fic knowledge of the picture. Even in prception theseis the 'nirapeksa kaarana samaahaara" (totality of non-reflexive causual factors).

Objection : If the samskaara is necessarily involvedin the 'pramaana kaarana^ then we have the 'pramaanajnaana5 in which memory is an essential element (smrtigarbha). Then we cannot have the cognition 'this issilver9 in which we do not find this memory.

Reply : Inference and other valid means of know-ledge give rise to knowledge without having the co-opera-tion or aid of the 'dosha'. But 'bhranti jnana' is differentfrom these. "Inference, recognition and 'citrajnana' donot require'dushtakarana'; and hence we are able to app-rehend the object as it is. But in 'bhranti jnana' there is a'karana dosha' and the object is not cognised as it is'*(Padmapada). And this cognition has only one knowledgewhere we have the 'samsargz^ between the 'this' and thesilver. They are necessarily connected. The this is nece-ssarily cognised as .silver.

The 'akhyati vada' accepts two jnanas here. The silverwhich is cognised immediately and directly is taken to bethe remembered one. This is contrary to facts.

In'anyatha khyativada', the existence of the object inthe cognised' adhisthana is rejected. Though the ^his' iscognised to be the silver, the 'samsarga7 is rejected. , And


98 Panchapadika

two together give us the knowledge of the 'lingi9. The sameholds good in the case of recognition also" (Padmapada).

We cannot then admit any difference in the differentcauses in this cognition. We cannot treat the perceptionof 'linga' and the memory of ^vyapti' as the causes, for thelatter is only a samskara. If the samskara is^not awakened,then we cannot have the knowledge. Only when the sam-skara is awakened we have the 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya^similtaneity of knowledges).

Objection: In recognition we have perception andalso the memory of the past experience a& the causes.There is 'jnanadvaya yaugapadya' here since we have thecognitions of âyam' and 'sah'. Then we have twoknowledges.

Reply : No. The knowledge of the 'linga' gives usthe knowledge of the ^lingi5 with which it is necessarilyconnected. And from the 'artha jnana janana sakti sam-bandha' (relation of the power to give rise to the knowledgeof the object) we apprehend the meaning of the word. Butthere is no such relationship between memory and recog-nition. As such memory is not the cause of recognition,but only a samskara for perception in recongnition.

When the 'samskaara' is awakened, there arises recog-.nision; and here we do not find a second entity calledmemory.

Objection : The copresence of the causes whichare îrapeksa' is to be found only ia the cases of thepramaanas other than 'abhijnaa pratyaksa'. 'Abhijnaa' is


Vivaranam 99

the knowledge of the object which is conditioned by oneplace and by one time.

Reply : From the cognitions of blue etc. which arethe causes of different knowledges, we get only one speci-fic knowledge of the picture. Even in prception theseis the 'nirapeksa kaarana samaahaara' (totalily of non-reflexive causual factors).

Objection : If the samskaara is necessarily involvedin the 'pramaana kaarana9, then we have the 'pramaanajnaana' in which memory is an essential element (smrtigarbha). Then we cannot have the cognition ^his issilver' in which we do not find this memory.

Reply : Inference and other valid means of know-ledge give rise to knowledge without having the co-opera-tion or aid of the 'dosha'. But 'bhranti jnana' is differentfrom these. Înference, recognition and 'citra jnana' donot require 'dushtakarana'; and hence we are able to app-rehend the object as it is. B^t in 'bhranti jnana' there is a'karana dosha' and the object is not cognised as it is^(Padmapada). And this cognition has only one knowledgewhere we have the 'samsarga' between the 'this' and thesilver. They are necessarily connected. The this is nece-ssarily cognised as .silver.

The 'akhyati vada' accepts two jnanas here. The silverwhich is cognised immediately and directly is taken to bethe remembered one. This is contrary to facts.

In ânyatha khyativada9, the existence of the object inthe cognised' adhisthana is rejected. Though the ^his" iscognised to be the silver, the 'samsarga' is rejected. And


100 Panchapadika

the silver that is apprehended immediately and directly issaid to be the silver existing elsewhere.

In 'atma khyati', the silver that is in actually apprehe-nded as existing outside of us is taken to be in realitypurely internal.

These defects are not found in our anirvacaniya khyati.And our theory is not contrary to experience since we acc-ept the silver that appears (pratibhasamanasya).

Objection : But the silver is apprehended as realand not as 'anirvacaniya^ Is this not contrary to experi-ence ?

RepBy : Just as the thisness (idanta) has the 'sam-sarga' with the silver^ what appears (avabhasate) is the'shuktika satta samsarga' (relation of the being of shukti).This is not a new, 'sattva' of silver. The reality of the shu-kti is apprehended as the reality of silver.

Or, we accept three degrees of reality (sattvam). Ulti-mate reality (Paramartha sattvam)is that of Brahman. Thenthere is the empirical reality which has the ability to bringabout the objects and actions. This is conditioned, by mayaand it is manifested in the form of akasa etc. Then thereis a third degree of reality which is conditioned by 'avidya^;

and it is apprehended in the form of silver etc., in errone.ous cognition. Considered with reference to ultimate iea-lity, the third degree of reality is called 'anirvacamya9. Assuch it is not' contrary to experience. Following experiencewe accept the reality of the object here also.


Vivaranam luii

i) Neither the real, nor the unreal can be taken to be^bhranti jnana9 (erroneous knowledge), ii) Theother theories of error are shown to be violating the factsof experience, iii) In 'akhyatf we have to assume manythings like ârokshya9, memory, suppression of the know-ledge of memory, non-discrimination brought about by thissuppression, 'pravritti' brought out by this non-discrimina-tion ; and the memory of the [experiences of the past life;

all these are not warranted by the cognition as such. 'Anya-thakhyati' assumes many things like: an object apprehendedat one place has its reality or existence at another place ;

the sense organ can apprehend an object experienced in the 'past; the sense organ can cognise an object which is atanother place "and at another time ; the ôsh^ is said tobring about this ability to the sense organ ; ev^n thoughthere is no ^samsarga' in reality it is said to be immediatelyapprehended. All these are opposed to the pramaanas.

Hence to put an end to all these defects we have toaccept the nature of the apprehended silver to be 'mithya.tva\ In the later cognition we say "there is no silver, itappeared as mithyaa silver only\ We have to accept the^'mithyaatva' or 'anirvacaniyatva' for the silver on the basisof this experience. The 'upaadaana^ for this silver is 'avi-dyaa7 and it can be proved by agreement and difference.Hence Padmapaada speaks of the silver as 'mithyaamayam'-

A true object gets itself integrated to the existence of amithyaa object; and as such it appears. Such an appea-rance is called ^maayaa", 'mithyaa^ 'anirvacaniya khayaati'and also 'adhyaasa.


102 Panchapadika

MAYA AND AVIDYA

Objection ; The silver in erroneous cognition canbe only 'avidya mayam9 and not 'may a mayanf. Since allcases of error or illusion are dispelled by true knowledge,error has the natufe of avidya. Further Maya is differentfrom avidya. Maya cannot bring out any vyamoha' (desireor passion) to its own 'asraya", and it follows or abides bythe will of the agent (karta). Avidya functions in a totally. different way. Even in empirical experiences maya is takento be different from avidya. Thus the elephant, horse, andchariot constructed by maya cannot be spoken of as arisingfrom avidya.

Reply : Is this difference made out on the basis of adifference in their nature (lakshana) ? Or is it based on'loka vyavahara9 ? Both are faulty. To begin with, it can-not be the former.

The'svarupa lakshana' (real definition) of maya andavidya is the same. They have also the same 'visesha lak-sana\ They both prevent the object from manifesting itselfin its own form"; and they also make the object appear ina different form.

Objection ; When an object is said to be the pro"

•duct of maya, the material cause for this product consistsof 'mantra (spell)', 'oshadhi (medicine) eic. These are realentities.6 But 'anirvacaniyatva' does not admit such areality.

fêply ; No. The word maya is not applied to thematerial cause, but to the product that is immediately co.


Vivaranam w^

gnised or apprehended. The onlooker does not have anyknowledge of the mantra or oshadhi, a,nd the word mayais not applied to these. Mantra, oshadhi etc., are only theinstrumental causes like kacadi dosas.

Elephant, horse etc., produced by maya have thenature of may a; and since they are 'anirvacaniva' theirmaterial cause too must be that âjnana' which is 'anirvac-aniya9. It is the same avidya which is the material causeof adhyasa.

Mantra etc,, are brought about by a cause which is theânady avidya' or 'anadyajnana9. Maya and avidya areone and the same and they have no beginning.

But it is the object like the elephant etc. that is said tobe 'mayamaya'. How can its cause also be may a* ?

The reply is based on the text 'mayantu prakritimvidyan mayinam tu mahesvaram'. Here the word maya isemployed to convey the idea of a material cause.. Mayaand avidya are'the material causes. Their 'vikaras^ ormodifications are adhyasa and maya. These have thesame nature. Hence the cause and the effect as well arespoken of as being maya which term is identical with avidya.

Objection ; Avi-dya is seen to bring about the^vyamoha" for its âsraya' who is the agent. Maya doesnot bring out such a thing. There is at least this maich ofdifference in their natures.

Reply : No. If the âsraya' is the percipient, heou^ht to have the ^vyamoha' when he sees the maayamayaobject near by. If he is the doer or agent he does not havethe •'vyamoha^ not because he knows maya, not because he


104 Panchapadika

knows that it is all maya; but because he knows that it issurely sublated later on, and because he'knows also how tocounteract it. If this were not the explanation, he ought tohave the 'vyamoha' like the percipient.

Objects on : Maya functions in obedience to thewill of its owner, while avidya controls the will.

Reply ; This difference too is faulty. The agent ordeer has complete freedom in selecting the instrumentalcauses like mantra and oshadhi. Having secured these, hecannot prevent maya from bringing out the result. Avidyatoo functions in the same manner. If we place the fingeron the eye-ball we will perceive two moons. Whether weshould place the finger thus or no, is dependent on ourwill. But having placed it there we cannot prevent the twomoons from appearing. After we rub the eyes we have the'Kesondraka bhrama' (illusion of a woolly mass). Offeringprayeis and taking some medicines give rise to 'svapnabhramas'. All these are cases of avidya and they are on apar with maya. These appearances (pratibhasah) continueto remain even when we have true knowledge; and theyarise from the will of the doer.

Sastra vyavahara (the teaching of the system of philo-sophy) too does not maintain that maya is different fromavidya. In the sruti passage. "Tasyaabhidhayanad yajanaftattva bhavad bhuyascante visva maya nivrittih". We findthe word maya employed to denote avidya that is dispelledby "tattva jnana\ In the surti passage, "taraty avidyamvifatam hrdi yasmin nivesite Yogi mayam ameyaya tasrnaividyatmane namah". We find that maya and avidya are


Vivaranam 105

synonyms and they can be overcome by true knowledge. Inthe Vedanta Sutras we read the aphorism- "may a matram tukartsyena anabhivyakta svarupatvat", where the wordmaya is employed with reference to dream experience whichis one of avidya. Sankara often writes 'avidya maya\ "avi"dyatmika maya sakti' etc. Padmapada too observes "avi-dya maya ksharam". The author of Brahma siddhj toowrites in the same manner, 'lyam avidya, maya, mithyapratyayah'.

Thus the identity in their nature and the 'Vriddha vya-vahara' (usage by elders) go to show that maya and avidyaare identical.

Yet when we emphasize the 'vikshepa9 sakti" (power ofdiffusion, of plurality), we speak of it as maya ; and whenwe emphasize the 'acchadana sakti' (power of concealing)we call it avidya. This is only a difference in our use ofthe terms.

ERROR

Now the silver in the erroneous cognition is spoken ofas maya maya because, unlike avidya which controls thewill or 'iccha', maya is controlled by the will. If it controlsthe will, it can be called 'avidya maya\ Either way it isonly a difference arising from our use of the terms.

Objection : Then, as we appehend why should wenot accept an ultimately real silver in, .the apprehended<;adhlshthana> ? And this will put an end to the defect ofunnecessary assumption.

14)


106 Panchapadika

Reply : If it is the ultimately real silver, every oneshould be appreheding it thus.

Objection ; Only those that have the 'karana dosha9apprehend it thus. Otherwise it is an ultimately real one.

Reply : If the silver is ultimately real» it does notrequire a 'karana dcsha9 to give rise to the knowledge ofthis real entity. If it requires a "karana dosha' then in itsabsence there cannot be any apprehension. Just as in theabsence of light, form cannot be apprehended, so in theabsence of the defect silver too can't be cognised. In theabsence of the defect silver has to be cognised not only inthe shukti, but every where.

Objection : Avfdya is said to have its asraya in theself. Even if the silver is of the nature of this avidya, itought to be cognised by all. Due to the avidya which isin the 'idam amsavacchinna caitanya' (consciousness condi-tioned by the this), there has arisen a silver in front of us ;

and since this avidya is common to all, all should cognisethe silver.

Reply ; Due to the ^mantra' the eye of the spectatorgets a defect and fails to cognise the object as it is. Like-wise only those who have the dosha are able to cognise thesilver because this silver is 'mayamatra'.

This silver is 'sakshi bhasya' and as such its asraya issaid to be 'sakshi caitanya9. This witnessing consciousnessappears as silver when it is 'idam akaravacchinna'. Thisâkshi caitanya' differs from individual to individual.Now, the silver is apprehended as the same as the shukti.


Vivaranam 107

Such an integration of the two is also of the nature of avi-dya ; and it is apprehended as silver only by that personwhose 'sakshi caitanya' is responsible for this appearance.And just as my happiness cannot "be apprehended by anyone other than myself, so Is this silver.

That knowledge is not 'bhranti' needs no proof. Whenwe take the 'bhrantF to be 'mithyatva' we are assuming thebarest minimum and we are not going contrary to experi-ence. 'BhrantF enables us to apprehend its nature as"nnthyartha jnana".

BADHAKA PRARTYAKSHA. (Subiation)

There is the sublation of the erroneous cognition andit takes the form of 'this is not silver'. • The apprehensionof this sublation (badhaka pratyaksha) by itself establishesthe 'mithyatva' of silver.

Objection : The subsequent negation ('badha')makes us understand the absence of silver in the apprehen-ded 'adhishthana9.

Repiy ; No. It only implies the mithyatva of silver.Mithyatva means the 'abhava pratiyogi' (contradictory ofthe negation) in the apprehended 'adhishthana'. When wepredicate the presence of an entity at a particular placeand later negate it, this negation cannot refer to the mereabsence; for it implies something positive. When there isthe knowledge of the negation, the silver appears (avabhar-sate) as its own 'abhava pratiyogF in the apprehended upa-dhi (adhishthana); and this is a perceptual apprehension,


108 Panchapadika

The silver then comes to be the 'abhava pratiyogP ofthe apprehended adhishthana through the knowledge of itsnegation, Such a silver can be only mithya rajata. Wetherefore say not only that 'this is not silver', but that 'itappeared as mithya (Mithyaiva abhasishta). We refer to itas explicitly mithya; and this is the object of the negation.

Objection: Even if we take the silver to be thatexisting at another place and time, we can negate it and say'this is not silver'.

Reply : No. The silver is the object of negation andwe have the knowledge of this object. This object was earl.ier apprehended as being the 'this' with which we havethe sense-contact. If silver exists elsewhere, how can weapprehend it here and later nagate it here ? The negation,then, cann'ot have the form 'this is mithya silver. It oughtto have been 'that is silver' or 'the silver is only buddhyakara' (in the intellect as an image). If the error has arisenbecause of the non-discrimination between the perceivedand the remembered, then too negation cannot take theform 'this is mithya silver*. We see the 'gavaya' and rem-ember that it is similar to the cow we have seen earlier.Here the true knowledge has taken the form of the aware-ness of similarity. Likewise we should say that 'thisshukti is similar to that silver which I have seen earlier.'

What is a negation (badha) ? I. Is it the obstructionof the acitivity at one place of a person who is desirous"??something else ? Now a mendicant cognises silver in theshukti and yet he does not have any pravritti. If the deff-nition were correct, he cannot negate the silver, and yet henegates it.


Vivaranam 109

2) If it is not the obstruction to the pruvritti, can itbe the putting an end to the possibility of pravntti ? No.I cognise silver now and the possibility of my pravirttiis destroyed as I find that it is only shukti. Later on Iagain cognise silver. If the very possibility of pravntti isdestroyed, I should not have the cognistion of silver at all.Further, a thirsty person is in search of water; he seessnakes or thiever and controls his thirst. His pravntti forwater is obstructed. Does the knowledge or cognition ofsnakes etc., function as the negation of the cognition ofwater ?

(3) When two things are apprehended as 'avivikta',the later discrimination may. be taken to constitute thenegation. No, In the beginning all objects are apprehen-ded as avivikta. Laêr on we are able to distinguish them'with reference to one another. This latter 'viveka' doesnot constitute negation.

Does âviviktatva" mean not appreh.eJQ.dmg through dis-crimination ? Or does it mean the apprehension of theiridentity ? In the former case, i$ the apprehension throughdiscrimination 'padartha jnanatirikta" (other than the know-ledge of the object) ? Or is it the 'padaytha jnana' itself?When we have the padartha. jnana% we do not apprehendthis difference; and when we later on distinguish one objectfrom another, we should be able to say that this cognitionnegates the earlier one.

So we o.ught to say that the apprehension of differenceis the apprehension of the object itself. In such a case, aswe apprehend an object we are apprehending also itsdifference , and hence there is no question of "'aviveka'.


110 Panchapadika

4) Then one might say that 'avivicktatva' is cognisingthe objects as identical. An object is apprehended as hav-ing the nature of another object; and later on we come tocognise that one excludes the others. Can this be the neg-ation ? But take the first apprehension that 'the pot is white"Later on we come to apprehend that the whiteness of thepot is not a substance but a quality. This ought to be con-stituting the negation of the first apprehension.

In the theory upheld by the objection every object i^defined in terms of identity-in-difference. In such a casewhen we apprehend the identity first and later cognise thedifference, the result will be that every object negates itself.

5) Negation may than be defined as the apprehensionof the 'abhava pratiyogF in the apprehended 'adhishthana/Then, is it the 'abhva protiyogitva' (being contradictory ofnegation) of more knowledge ? Or of the difference of theobject known (Jneya) ? Negation cannot be the destruction(pradhvansa) of knowledge, since knowledge being momen-tary, is destroyed every moment. So the second alternativeremains. Here we have to ask. Is there the negation ofthe apprehended object ? Or of the unapprehended object ?If it is the negation of the apprehended objecty does thisnegation arise from the knowledge of that very object, orfrom that of another object ? It cannot arise from theknowledge of that very object, for the apprehesioa goes toestablish the validity of the prior knowledge. It cannotarise from the knowledge of another object; for the objectsor knowlepge being different,, one cannot be the negationof the other-


. Vivaranam 111

There cannot be the negation of the unapprehendedobject.

6) Can negation be the dispelling (nivriti) of ajnana ?No, for, in such a case, all the knowledges that dispel ajn-ana will have to constitute negation only.

Then what is negation ? Ajnana has brought about thecognition of an object and this cognition does not give usthe knowledge of its 'adhishthana^. Now negation not onlydispels the cognised object but also ajnana which is itscause. It gives us the knowledge of the 'adhishthana' also.

Then, is negation the dispelling of ajnana along withits product which is cognised here and now ? Or is it thedispelling of ajnana whose products has obtained its 'laya'(involution) in itself ?

There is the cognition of silver in the shukti. Let usassume that later on the mind wanders after some otherobject. Then again the eye comes back and ha? the cantactwuh shukti. There arises the knowledke of the 'adhishth-ana' and the ajnana is dispelled. Here we do not have the^hvansa' (destruction) of the immediate product (karya) ofajnana. Thus the first alternative is too narrow. Thesecond alternative is not applicable in the case of ajnanawhich is dispelled along with its present or immediate pro-duct.

But in both the cases theie is negation in so far as wehave the dispelling of ajnana whish has evolved itself in theform of the product. This is the definition of 'negation';

and negation has its meaning only in the dispelling of suchas 'anavabodha' (non-konwiedge). Hence 'badhyatva* istaken to be 'mithyatvam'.


112 Panchapadhika

DERm-nON OF ÂDHYASA'THAT IT IS TOO NARROW.

In the definition we find the word 'smriti rupa9 whichmeans 'the form similar to that of memory'. From this wededuce samskara as one element. Since similarity inovlvesdifference, we get the sense-contact as the second element.Since the cognition is that of error and these two donot give rise to such a cognition. We arrive at the defector dosha as the third element. These three elements areimplied by smriti rupa. They give rise to the erroneous co-gnition which ie the apprehension of one object as havingthe nature of another.

Objection : This definition does not apply in allcases. It is too narrow and does not cover all the ^laksh-yas" (Object). For example how can we explain the sorrowevperienced in the dream ? It is a case of adhyasa; andyet the definition does not seem to apply here. In everyadhyasa there is an object external to the individual andsome thing else is appehended there in. This apprenensionrequires the contact of the sense organ with the externalobject. New, in dream WQ cannot have suth a contact ofthe sense organ with the external object. Both the sense01 gan and the external object are absent here. In the ab-sence of any cause other than the samskara or 'vasana\we should say that in the dream cognition we have only thesmriti and not smriti rupata.

Reply ; We see the 'gavaya' and remember the cowfor it is said to be similar to the cow. Here our apprehen-


Vivaranam 113

and it is not erroneous. There is no dosha in a cognitionthat results from memory.

Further the dream cognition is not a case of memory,The object is cognised immediately and directly.

Objection: In the dream there is no contact withthe eye, for the eye has ceased to function, and also be-cause the object is not external. There cannot be anydosha since the eye itself is not functioning then. Therecannot be any 'vishaya dosha' (defect ^ in the object) also forthis dream coghition. If the 'vishaya dosha' were thecause, is it "jnaya manataya hetuh' ? or 'ajnayamanataya*(causal in the process of being known or ,not being known)*Since the eye does not 'function then and since the mindcannot have a contact with the external directly, the formeralternative is to be rejected. It cannot be the latter for thevishaya dosha that we apprenend in our waking momentshas a specific cause. Further, there cannot be any ^prama-tri dosha' during sleep. Thus we do not have all the threefactors necessary for adhyasa. As such it cannot be anerroneous cognition.

Reply ; This cognition arises from all the three fac-tors working together; and it is a cognition which appreh-*ands an object as having the nature of another. There isno contact of the object with the eye; and the object is app-rehended immediately. It is neither a case ôf perceptionnor a case of memory. And as such it must be a third typeof knowledge which is capable of giving us the nature ofadhyasa. Padmapada observes; "it has been said that theform of memory is only to make us apprehend the object ofour prior or earlier experience".. 15)


114 Panchapadika

The cognising individual of the dream world is differ-ent from the cognising individual of the waking stager-There is vijnana for this 'pramata' also, and there is his'antah karana' which is the means of obtaining knowledge.This 'pramata' suffers from the doshas like sleep and ^vata';

and he has also the samskara of the past experiences. Thusall the three factors are present here: and hence it is saidthat b'hranti jnana' is 'smriti rupa'.

"There is the mind which is overcome by the defectslike sleep, and which has all the samskaras. These J$amska-rasare awakended by the 'adrishta' karma. The mindtakes up that form which is necessitated by the 'samskara, visesha'. Such a form is 'mithyartha vishaya' and therearises knowledge" (Padmapada).

Objection : You may establish the 'tatastha laks-hana' (definition per accidents). How can you establishthe 'svarupa lakAana' (definition per se): ? In adhyasa wehave an object appearing at a place other than its own.What is its adhishthana ?

Reply: "There is the avidya sakti in the imirediate(aparoksa) consciousness of the individual (who is sleeping).This consciousness is determined or conditioned by 'antah' karana\ Such an avidya sakti appears (vivartate) as the'alambana7 for the object^ (Padm9pa4a).

The antah karana is overcome by the doshas like sleepand by the samskara. This is the instrumental cause ofthe mithyadhyasa. And there is the avidya sakti in theconsciousness as conditioned by the antah-karana.


Vivaranam 115

The 'upadana' is not the antah karana but the 'mithya-dhyasa. And the 'adhishthana' or the 'this' in the cognrtion is'manasa samyuktan* (united with the mind); andi1is the consciousnessas conditioned by the avidya sakti.Thus there is the samsarga with the sufficient instrumentalcause. As such this avidya sakti brings about the sufficientcause for adhyasa; and it becomes as if (vivartate) it is thealambana for the'mithyartha'. It is not the avidya saktithat appears as the mithyartha, for every adhyasa requiresthe samsarga of the leal with the unreal.. But it is consci-.ousness itself that appears like that through the avidyawhose 'asraya' it is. Then we have the integration of thereal object with the unreal and it is this integrated entitythat appears. Consequently we have 'paratra paravabhasah'.

The same explaanation holds good of the erroneouscognitions that arise in the waking moments. The shuktias such is not the 'adhishthana' of silver. It is that consci-ousness as conditioned by the shukti; for an unconsciousentity cannot manifest any other entity. Such a shukti isthe 'alambana' for siver.

When the sense organ has the contact with the externalobject, then thr mgh the'sense organ the 'antah karana9becomes or appears as (viparmamate) the external form,Unless the antahkatana comes into contact -with the object,there can be no apprehension. In this pure ancahkaranathere appears or arises the reflection of consciousness andthrough the antahkarana there is taken the ^vishaya samsa-rga' also.

Consciousness is 'samsrishta9 (fused) with the external •adhishthana. Since this 'adhishthana' is only the 'caitanya


116 Pauchapadika

vivarta' through avidya. It is to be treated as the 'adhish-thana' of consciousness.

This avidya sakti appears (vivartate) in the form ofsilver which is 'samsrishta^ with the external 'adhishthana^.

Hence that consciousness which is conditioned by theshukti is the 'alambana' for the silver; and as such wespeak of 'bahyalambana' (external locus).

Eveywhere the 'alambana' for the erroneous cognitionis either pure consciousness itself or consciousnessas conditioned by something. Hence it is but prope3'to say âratva paravabhasah\ (the other appearing in theexternal).

There comes an objection from one who does not takethis 'adhishthana' to be consciousness which appears every.where and which assumes a variety of shapes like the skyHe takes the adhishthana to be the ahankara and asks^Then the 'svapnartha pratibhasa5 (appearance of dreamobject) must be purely internal or inward. If this ahamkarawhich is the 'paricchinna atman' (conditioned self) is theadhishthana, we should have the cognition c! am blue^where the Y is the ^his9 of normal cognition. In such amanner we should be having our dream cognitions.

The reply is that the adhishthana is the self which ispure consciousness and which is distinct from ahankara.And everywhere we have the âmanadhi karanya9 of theobject (Cetya) with the cit or consciousness'. As suchwe admit that the apprehension is internal.


Vivaranani 117

Objecta on : If there is the ^cit samanadhikarana''for all apprehendsions or appearances, we cunnot have theexperience of 'vicchinna desa\ If the object is apprehendedhere or there, we can say that the object has ântar anubha-vasraya (having a locus of experience internally).

Reply : The object is apprehended not as here orthere, but as ^his'. The 'this' means that it is distinct fromthe self. Then the 'avabhasa' ceases to be internal.'

Objection ; Even this âvabhasa' as distinct fromthe self is really internal or inward. Reply : Even space isnot external, for its adhishthana is the self. Difference toois apprehended through the 'samsrishtF with the uncondi-tioned consciousness,

If the objector brings in the self as conditioned by aha-nkara and makes it the adhishthana, the cognition of diffe-rence will have to take the form of ^1 am differenced

All the objections are based on the view that the'ahan-karavacchinna atman9 (self as conditioned by the ego) isthe adhishthana'. The reply takes the pure consciousnessto be the adhishthana. Now Padmapada proceeds to makethis point clearer and plainer. He begins to state clearly

that pure consciousness which is the self-huminous self, isthe locus.

When the self is the basis of all cognitions, the appre-hensions can be only internal. This is true of the cogni-tions of the waking- state also. The 'pramanajnana' givesus the immediate experience with the self. This immediateexperience does not differ from the immediacy of the obj-


118 Panchapadika

ect, Both the subject and the object have the êka rupaprakasana' (one form of appearence). Hence even in thewaking stage the object is experienced as enveloped by the'antar aparoksanubhava\

The dream cognition does not differ essentially andfundamentally from the other cognition. The difference isonly one of degree, not of kind. It is 'pratibhasika bheda^(momentarily apparent difference).

Objection : Why should we think that there is only

one consciousness ? Why cannot the 'vishaya gata caitan-yani, be different and distinct from 'aham avacchinna cai-tanya' ?

Reply : If they are different, rhe object being 'Jada9(unconscious), cannot manifest itself. Just as the pot enve.loped by darkness cannot be manifested in the absence oflight falling on it, so is the object incapable of being mani-fested if it is not illumined by consciousness" (Padmapada).If the objects which are by themselves devoid of conscious-ness, do not have the samsarga with the 'atmavagati pra"-kasa (illumination of self realisation), we cannot have thesambhandhavabhasa in the form they are known by me.9

If consciousness is eveywhere, how is it we have the

apprehension of the distinction or difference between theself and the not-self as 'I' and 'this' ? The reply is that evenin the waking state this 'vicchedavabhasa (appearance ofdifference) is due to maya. The whole universe has its 'as-raya9 only in consciousness. This consciousness is devoid.of parts and as such there can be no Tradesa bheda' in it


Vivaranam 119

Consciousness appears everywhere with the distinctionsof internal and external, it is no longer akhanda and advi-tiya (non-dual). We cannot apprehend the 'svarupabheda'(difference from others in essence) unless we have the diffe-rence brought about by the differences in the objects. Thesedifferences are due to the conditioning upadhis (limitingfactors). Hence consciousness is said to be ^devoid of parts.

Such an entity which is ^niramsa' (without parts) iscither an anu (atomic) or is 'ananta' (Infinite). But it isapprehended everywhere as having 'madhyama parimana\To this we reply that the ârimana' (magnitude) of consci-ousness is the same as that of the 'upadhi9 which condi-tions it.

When consciousness thus becomes the adhishtana(locusground) even during the cognitions of the waking stage, itneed not be said again that the same holds good of dreamognitions. The upadhi which conditions it brings aboutthe empirical distinctions of internal, external etc.

Padmapada gives another explanation as an alternativeway of explaining the same phenomenon. This does notrepresent bis conclusions, for the mind, not being a sense-organ, cannot by itself come into contact with an externalobject. This is only w 'abhyupagam^vad^theory assumingthe opponent's view) presented by Padmapada.

So far we have disproved the contention that the defi-nition of adhyasa is too narrow.

Th<at it is 1,90 wide

It is argued that even though mithya, adhyasa, bhrantiand avidya are not present, we do find that there is 'anya-


120 Panchapadika

sya anyavabhasa' (other appearing as another). As suchthere is 'ativyapti' (too wide). "There is 'brahmadhyasa"on names. How is this possible? There is no Parana dosha.^here ; nor do we find 'mithyarthavabhasa\

The reply is that adhyasa is defined as apprehending anobject as having the nature of another. In the case of the^brahmadhyasa' we find that an individual 1ms his ^manasikriya" (mental action of mediation etc.) with reference tosome object. "This meditation is regulated by a 'codana9(injunction) and it demands''icchato anushthana". It is amental act and not a knowledge (or cognition). When thereis an object giving us a knowledge arising from ^dushtaka-rana'y we consider the object to be ^mithya vastu\ In adh-yasa proper we have some knowledge or other, while inupasana we have only a mental act" (Padmapada).

We cannot say that knowledge itself is the ordainedhere ; for desire (iccha) can neither create nor preventknowledge. The desire of the individual gives rise to "pra»yatna\ This desire comes into existence because of an in-junction. Where such an îccha prayatna' is not involved(nirapeksa) there we have the sufficient cause for knowledge.For even if we do not desire ity we do have the 'apishtadarsana' (unwelcome apprehension). As such the 'brahma-dhyasa' refers to a mental act. It is not a case of 'adhyasa.

ADHYASA LAKSANA

Since there is no unanimity amongst the critics in defm,ing adhyasa it is impossible to give an acceptable definition.The defferences amongst the critics, refer to the 'avarupa*,t atva' (nature), desa visesha'1 (space) and 'kala visesha\of


Vivaranam 121i

the "adhishthana* and adhyasyamana'. They all agree inadmitting that adhyasa is no other than apprehending oneobject as having the nature of another.

But such a definition is lopsided, since the cases in-volving the relationship of substance, quality etc., will haveto becomb erroneous cognitions. 'Khando gauh9 will haveto be an erroneous cognition since 'Khandatva^ is apprehen-ded in the cow, the cow is cognised as having 'Khandatva^This implies that when both the elements are real and whenboth exist together, we cannot have adhyasa. Hence wehave to say that adhyasa is the apprehension (avabhasa)o'f a content which unites a real object with an unreal one.With this in mind, the commentator states the view oferror held by others.

Of the three views stated, the first is Atmakhyati andAnyathakhyati;' the second is Akhyati; The third is Sunyakhyati if we interpret it to mean that shukti is congtiised ashaving the nature of silver which is 'asat' or 'abhava' (non-existent). This third is Anyatha Khyati' if we interpret itto mean the co'gnitiori of the nature of silvet whidi is thenegation of shukti.

Padmapada ; "To present his own view in a clearerand purer form, Sankara is stating the views of others onthe nature of adhyasa. According to the first view, thesilver is distinct from shukti; there is the cognition of theproperty of silver in the shukti. This silver has the formof knowledge, or it exists elsewhere. The second viewstates that adhyasa is an erroneous cognition arising fromthe non-apprehension of discrimination between the adhis-

16)


122 Panchapadika

hthana and the adhyasta. There is the 'ekatva Bhrama. Ac"cording to the third view silver is adhyasta on the shukti."Rajatadi rupatva'; is the 'viparita dharmatva' of theshukti. This 'kalpana' is assumed here. 'kalpana' meansthe appearance (avabhasamanata) of the non-existing. Allthese views agree with ours in holding that adhyasa is thecognition of an object as having the naturu of another. Thisdefinition does not deny the 'paravabhasa' which is conveyedby the word âratra9 (externally) in the original definition.How ? In the first view the silver which is of the form ofknowledge or which is elsewhere, is [cognised as the natureof the shukti. In the second view, shukti and silver have adistinct and independent existence and they are Uaken to beappearing as indistinct (aprithak). This meaning we haveto derive from their statement. For in this theory theyhave to accept a 'samsarga jnana' (relational cognition)which is mental (as in sankhya); or they have to acceptâmsargabhimana9 (as in the Prabhakara system). In thethird view, there is the 'pratibhasa' (momentary appe-arance) of the form of silver for the shukti.

Since ^mriti rupa' has been found in all the views tobe so significant, and since this implies only perceptual-contact and dosha, does it mean that we need not empha.size the three factors ? No. "For, smriti rupatva' and"purva drishtatva* are factors common to all the theories ofadhyasa.

Nir adhishthana bhrama

Objection : An erroneous cognition is the knowle-ge of the padartha (object) itself arising from the dosha

like avidya and from the samskaras of the previous errone"


Vivaranam 1:23

ous cognitions. The erroneous cognition does not standin need of a real object and in need of the 'pramana karanalike the sense-contact. As such this cognition, says thenihilist Buddhist, has no 'adhishthana'.

RepBy s In the absence of the 'adhishthana9 conveyedby the word ^paratva" of the definition, we have to accept'niradhishthanadhyasa which is illogical. To avoid suchan illogical conclusion this word 'paratra* (in the 'external)is employed. We can neither perceive nor^conceive suchan adhyasa which is devoid of an adhishthana. Even theappearance of the ^kesondraka^ has its basis (locus) in the'tejo avayava'.

Is error the mere knowledge of the 'padartha' ? Or isit the product of causes like avidya? If the first alternativeis true, then i,even the knowledge of 'sunya9 would hav6to be a case of error. It is the knowledge of an object ata place other than its own. The Buddhist argument is'nir upapattika\ (unfounded). If the second alternativeis taken, then by the method of agreement and differencewe can say that the locus too'is cognised.

Objection : There is the 'samvit' (consciousness)which apprehends the silver, and there is the silver whichis apprehended only by the ^samvit'. From this it can beargued that it is a case of 'sadhishthana bhiama' whereone is the locus for the other. As such we need not bringin as the locus a third real entity. The seed is the locus ofthe plant, and the plant is the locus of the seed.

Now, the locus is "always different from that which isadhyasta. If one is the locus of the other they ought to


124 Paachapadika

imply mutually one another and this is impossible. Butsuch is seen in the relationship between the seed and theplant.

Reply : In the 'bijankura' (seed and plant) rela-tion we do not find that one is the cause of the other in amutual relation. For this seed gives a plant and' the plaingives rise to a new seed. The new seed gives rise to adifferent plant. In îlis way we [do not |have 'anyonyasra-yata* (vicious circle) but only a 'karana parampara' (aninfinite causal series). On the other hand the samvit whichapprehends the silver is taken to be the locus of the silver;

and, the silver is the locus of the same samvit. This isimpossible.

Obiect5osn : The silver has its. locus in the samvitThe silver has its locus in the previous samvit; and thesamvit has its locus in its own object. In this way we canassume a?i infinite series here also.

Reply ; Then the present samyit is the locus of thesilver which comes in the next moment; and the silver ofthat moment is the locus for the samvit of the nextipoment. In this way we have to argue; and this will putan end to the momentary nature of, cognition or knowledge.For, the samvit of the previous moment must continue tobe there so.that tiie silver of this moment may be adhyastaon it.

Objection ; Even in the 'bijankura', we do not findbotjh, the seed and its 'ankura" coexisting even though, oneis the 'upadana' (material cause) of the other,


Vivaranam 125

B<tply : Here too it i§ not the mere ^bijankura para-mpara' (causal series or chain) that cm bring about theânvayi karanatva siddhih'. In bringing about the plant,th^ seed as a cause functions not by it^lf hut by undergoinga series of changes. And by the time the plant comes up,the seed is w longer there as t,he seed. The $e^d is 'anvita9(involved) with the plant. It exists in the plant and as theplant. If this were not there?, there. c?w bo TO plwt Thatit is not the mere 'bijîkura pâ,mp9.r^'i.s established by the^ratiti' (apprehensipxi) and by the factual data also. Thoseentities (avayayah) which function together (anugatah) asgiving rise to th^ 'byady arambtia\ they c.ons.titute the^p^dana'. This does xiot mean t^t the seed etc., isuseless. The seed ai^cl1^ 'ankuya' h^ve the mutual 'nimi-tta naimittikata sambandha' (casual relationship).

Ohiection : Just like this, we may say that thesamvit is prior "anyita9 (fused) wtth the latter, viz., thesilver ; and that the former is the âdhyasa nimitta* for thelatter.

Reply : There is no pramana for this. We acceptthat the seed is the cause and that the 'ankura9 (plant) isthe effect because thi& i& seen (drishtatvat). No such rela-tionship is seen between the samvit and the silver. The rela-tionship between the seed and the 'ankura' i& seen in cer-tain cases and we extend it to all seeds in so far as they areseeds. Since this is seen to* be a fact thesis no fallacy ofinfinite regress. As regards the relationship between thesamvit and the silver, we have to assume their casual rela-tion in the very beginning. It is not an assumption based onexperience, but on a faulty, analogy. As such this relation--hip is not a "drishta parampara' (proven serves) but an


126 Panchapadaka

andha parampara (unproven series). The andha parampara.alone involves the infiinite regress-All erroneous cognitions are of the form *this is silvery"this is a snake9. Here we have two entities conveyed by the'this' and the 'silver'. The 'this' is the locus ; and as suchit is said that error is ^paratra paravabhasah' (an other app-earing as another elsewhere). Even if we examine the latternegative judgmenty we will have to admit the 'adhishthana^We find that the object which is apprehended as giving theerroneous cognition, does not admit the 'bhranty amsa' be-cause of the knowledge of another 'visishtamsa7. This ne-gation too implies that the previous cognition is a ^sadhi-shthara bhrama' (of error grounded in a fact),

First there is the cognition ^this is silvery and later wenegate the silver. If there is no 'avadhi' in the form of the'this\ there cannot arise such a negative judgment'.

Objection ; Instead of the negation taking the formof'this is not a snake', it is also seen to have the form of'nota snake\ Inference and the word of elders do thus give u&merely the 'sarpabhava' (non-snakes) and not the âmsan-tara' as qualified by the 'abhava' of the snake.

Reply ; But even in such caseSy there arises the ques-tion 'what is this' ? We then find the locus (avadhi) to bethe object in itself which exists before us. There too weapprehend the mere object as qualified by the negation ofthe snake y for the negation implies the object mistaken.

Objection : Take the statement, Tradhanam nasti'(there is no prakriti), where the pradliana' is taken to be the


Vivaranam 127

cause of the word ; and where it means the three constitu-ent 'gunas'. In this negative judgement we are not appre-hending any other object as qualified by the negation of thepradhana or of the three gunas ; for the pradhana cannot. be said to be adhyasta on any other endty.

Reply •: When we negate the pradhana as being thecause of the world, something which is the cause is thereas the basis of this negation.

Another explanation of the negative judgement ispossible. In all erroneous cognitons the 'alambana' is thewitnessing consciousness; and this has been found by usearlier. And even in the negation of the alleged 'niradhi-shthana niravadhika bhrama1, we have this consciousnessas the 'adhishtana" for error and as the 'avadhi' for nega-tion. When we negate the êsondraka7 that which is nega-ted is the reality of the kesondraka and not the reality-ofour apprehension ('bodha7); and this 'bodha' implies theâkshin5 as the ^vadhF.

Objection : When there is the negation of theobject, there is also the negation of that knowledge. Sowith the negation of the error, there must be also the nega-tion of the^sakshi caitanya' which makes the object appearthus. As sucn ^sakshin" cannot be the locus.

Reply : This conclusion is impossible since thatwhich is negated is only the 'kesondraka' appearance of the^sakshin" and not the sakhini itself. The 'sakshin' is notnegated since it is also the sakshin of the negation andsince it is ulso the cause of further erroneous cognitions.It remains as the 'adhishthana' ;or 'avadhi\


1J5 Panchapadika

Negation, then, involves or implies the reality of theâvadhi*. Without the âvadhi' there can be no knowledgeof negation. And this âvadhf itself is not therefore ne-gated. This "sakshin" or 'avadhi9 is not negated since itis not internally differentiated. Such an 'avadhi' is that,consciousness which is 'kutastha' and 'approkshaika rasa\

There is then a locus for all erroneous cognitions. Insuch a case even the âdhyasta' cannot be 'sunya^. It isnot an unreal (asat) entity, for an unreal entiity is not capa-ble of appearing (pratibhasa) immediately and^directly. If wedeny the mere appearance as such, there is no error. Sucha denial would be as meaningless as the statement, thesunya does not appear". If it does not appear, how can we§ay it is sunya ? If it appears, it is no longer sunya.

Objection ; All that is adhyasta is sunya or unrealeven according to your view.

Reply ; Who said that ? We have often repeatedthat it is of the nature of avidya which is beginninglesss andwhich is 'anirvacamya". It is distinct from the .sunya ofthe Buddhists. And if we say that the silver is 'asat' weonly mean that it is different from 'sat', and not that it isunreal.

ObJectaon : During the erroneous cognition theerror may have the nature of 'anirvacaniyatva9. But whenthere arises^the negative judgement., we s*ay 'this is not sil-ver'. This negation implies the sunyatva of silver. Ifwhen true knowledge arises, avidya is seen to be unreal(mrupakhya4 asat); and hence why cannot we speak of it as'asaf.


Vivaranam 129

Reply : All the theories agree that even though th.eobject (viz., silver) exists during the cognition, it is non-existent after the negative judgement arises. We acceptthis much and you can say that it is 'asaf.

Objection : The object may he ^sunya' after its'vinasa' (destruction) has taken place. But an object co-gnised as existent during erroJ, cannot become sur»ya. Itexists in some other place4

Reply : We have then to ask - Does the 'badhakajnana" (cognition of negation) itself make us apprehend thereality of silver at some other place ? Or does it mean thatit i^ impossible to negate it here ? It cannot be the former,for the ^badhakajnana* negates only that silver which istaken to exist in a specific place and at a specific time. Itdoes not imply its existence elsewhere, for we do not havethe apprehension that 'that is silver' after this negation. Wedo not have the apprehension that the silver is at some otherplace and at some other time ; or that it is in 'buddhi'. Asentence enables us to apprehend only that meaning which itis capable of conveying. The negative judgment 'this is no1silver' does not have the power to convey the meaning tha^tthe silver exists elsewhere. And this latter meaning is notthe meaning of the negative judgment. Thus, one takes therope that is far away to be a snake. And an elder who isnear by tells him that 'this is not a snake'. This sentenceonly conveys the absence of the snake here, not its existenceelsewhere ; because this sentence does not have this powerto give such an apprehension.

Objection : 'An pbject like silver is apprehended.We cannot deny its existence here if we do not assume its17)


130 Panchapadhika

existence elsewhere. Thus through arthapatti (implication)we can say that the negative judgment is capable of imply-ing the existence of silver elsewhere.

Reply ; No. Even arthapatti will not help us in deri-ving such an implication. If the person who is putting forthis a Mimamsaka, he accepts anyatha khyati or akhyati; andin both such an interpretation is an impossibility.

Aryathakhyati rejects samsarga (relation) and yet it iscognised as external. In either case negation is possibleonly if the object negated exists immediately. And yet it isnegated. As regards Akhyati ; there is the exist of the Rit-viks from the yajnasala in Jyotishtoma, holding one others'kaccha' (cloth). If the 'pratiharta' loses hold of it, there isordained 'sarvadakshina' to complete the sacrifice. If the ud-gatri loses hold of it, it is ordained that the sacrifice is to becompleted without 'dakshina\ If both lose hold of it, weshould normally take up the 'sarvasva daksina'; but it is de-cided that the sacrifice should be completed without 'da-kshina\ The second 'viccheda' functions as the 'badha' offhe former- Here only the second case is ordained.

We cannot say that pravritti itself is prevented in thecase of the former ; for the prevention of pravritti is not acase of 'badha\ Further take the case of a person havinghis 'pravritti' with reference to a sacrifice. He cognises the'pratibandha* from the king or from the thieves ; and the'pravritti' is prevented. Yet there is no badha, so far as the'yagadibuddhF is concerned. Such an individual may perform the sacrifice at any time. In spite of the 'pravritty anu-papatti' with reference to the Yaga, we find the possibilityof pravritti.


Vivaranam - 1311

The same conclusion arises even if we take a normalexperience. We apprehend an object in a particular place ;

and in this adhishthana (ground) we negate it later on. Wedo not assume the existence of the object in another similarupadhi. Take the sentence 'the broken or destroyed pot isnot here\ The broken or destroyed pot is negated in thisapprehended place ; and we cannot assume the existence ofthis pot in some other placed Thus an object which is neg-ated in the apprehended here and now cannot be said tohave its existence in the unapprehended there and then.

Objection ; Then how do you apprehend the totallyor absolutely non-existent ?

Reply : What we apprehend is having apprehendedonly 'anirvaccaniya mithya vastu sadbhava' "(existence ofthe nonreal which is inexplicable). And this is arrivedat from our pratiti.

Objects on : There was silver before, audit is notthere now. These ^facts tell us that the negation ^has be-come possible because of the difference in the time of theapprehensions.

Reply : No. What is said to be not existing in allthe three tenses is only the empirically real silver. Withreference to such a silver we say that such a silver, whichdoes not have its adhishthaana there (which is nimpa"-dhika) is not there. The negation refers to the empi-rical silver and not to the praatibhaasika (apparent)silver. From the negation of the jempirical silver we get.at the apprehended silver through implication's being


132 Panchapadika

the 'mithyaa rajata\ Hence after the negation we areable to refer to the apprehended content as 'mithyavarajatam abhaat'.

Instead of this, if we were to admit the difference intime, it ought to be the real silver. The immediate app-rehension of 'this is no snake' refers only to the 'abhaava'of the snake and not to its existence else where. For, theapprehension settles down to the 'this* and we say 'this isa rope*. Hence we speak only of the apprehended 'adhis-thaana'.

The cognition of the this as a rope negates the snake.This arises from the sense-contact. The same knowledgemight arise al so from the sentence 'this is no shake'. Inboth cases we are left with the 'adhishtnana' and not withthe snake that exists elsewhere. Hence there can be no'adhyasa' which has no 'adhishtana'.

If so, let the defnitioh be only 'paratra purva drish-taâbhasah (seeing outside what was seen earlier), forsmriti rupatva (form or nature of memory) seems to be in-consistent with the definition.

Yes, the knowledge of an object seen before has'smrititva' (quality of memory) only, and not smritiru-patva'(form of memory). But we cannot speak ofadhyasafor the Smriti vishaya9 (object of memory). So let thedefinition be only 'paratra smriti rupavabhasah\ Then wemean by it that an object having 'smriti rupa' is apprehen-ded elsewhere. 'Smriti rupatva' qualifies 'paravabhasa\If there is no 'purva drishtatva' we cannot attribute"sjoiriti rupatva'.


Vivaranam 133

Yes, the expression 'purvadrishta (seen earlier) isemployed for the sake of clarity (Padmapada).

Brroneous cognition needs a locus with which we havethe contact ofk the eye. Then We can drop 'smriti rupa'from the definition. Does the wdrd 'smriti rupa' meanthat the erroneous cognition arises from the samskara ?Or that it involves the ^sambheda' (fusion) of the pastexperience with the present one ? Or that which hassimilarity with memory ?

When there is a doubt like this, the author of the Tikaproceeds to make clear that it means only 'samskara janya-tvam\ As such he says thai it is the appearance (avabhasa)of something that was seen (drishta) earlier. It is not theappearance of the earlier perception (darsana). The otherapprehended is the 'sajatiya' (similar to) the object seenearlier ; and this makes us accept it to be ^nirvacaniyarajata". If it is said to be a case of 'bhranti' (illusion)onlywe reply that we have the appearance of a real object hav-ing the ^mithya vastu sambheda' (fusion with the unreal)*Otherwise many cognitions which are not erroneous wouldbecome erroneous. This is the logical argument given sofar. However adhyasa is also ôkanubhava siddha (factof experience). It does not mean that the logical argumentis useless.

Sankara refers to our experience in the world and thisexperience goes to prove the validity of adhyasa. And hehas given the definition of the svarupa (nature) of adhyasawhich is 'loka siddha\ Logical argument can only supportthis fact of experience ; as such it is not necessary to multi-ply the arguments.


134 Panchapadika

Samkara gives two illustrations. The first is: shuktikaappears like silver% and the second is ; 'one moon appearsas two'.

Objection ; The first sentence does not represent theerroneous cognition, for we apprehend 'this silver' only,We are not then aware of it as shukti appearing like thesilver. This sentence does not represent even a negationfor in the negative judgment 'We do not say that ^his is notlike silver'. It is not the shukti but the silver that appears;

as such the words 'shuktika' and 'rajatavat' (like silver) inthe sentence are faulty.

Reply s With reference to the 'badhakajnana' (cog-nition of negation), it is said that shukti appeal's like silver;

and this presents the definition of adhyasa. Either referenceto the object of the 'badhaka jnana' or the implication ofthe 'badhaka jnana' establishes adhyasa and makes out theapprehended content to be 'mithya rajata\ This object be-ing mithya it is employed with the suffix 'vat' as ^rajatavat'.Thus this sentence is expressed keeping in mind both thelakshana' and the 'lakshya9 of adhyasa (difinition and theobject).

The true knowledge which arises later on reveals thatthe this is the shukti which is real. With reference to thisreal shukti Samkara has employed shuktika in the example,The shukti has the svarupa (form) of the non-silver withwhich we have the contact $ and since it appeared as havingthe 'mithyarajata sambheda', he has employed 'rajatavat\Due to the temporary doshas and from the later negationwe are able to comprehand the silver as mithya. When wespeak of the 'mithyarajata sambheda^ with the shukti, we


Vivaranam 135

employ ttie word mithya to describe or define the apprehen-ded silver, not to exclude the other silver. We refer to this'silver as mithya not by recognising its difference from thereal silver,

Objection : If the silver is mithya, since it is pre-dicated of the this, the this too ought to be .mithya. Andwhen the this is mithya, we have "nir adhishthana bhrama\

Reply : The silver is not the object of the (asampra-yukta) sense contact ; and the appearance (avabhasa) of thethisness does not belong to the silver,

Objection : If the silver doe's not have the contactwith the eye, how can we say that it is immediately cogni-sed ?

RepSy : But the silver is cognised as being in the thiswith which we have the contact. Those who have thesamskara are able to cognise the silver immediately be-cause of some defect or the other. And-it is the senseorgan having the defect that gives rise to this knowledge.It is an immediate experience arising in the perceptual one»

Thus in the example of the shutika we find the silverto be the anatma (not-self) of the this with which we havethe sense-contact.

Consciousness which is 'niranjana" has the 'pratibha-sa' as the I; and it is that element (amsa) which is the not-this; The this is the not-self which is 'cidavabhasya''(illumined or manifested by consciousness). Even thoughthere is no "Yusmad arthatva9 (being an object) ; still in


136 Pîichapadika

so far as there is 'cidavabhasyatva' we get "the" Yusmadartha' which is the âhamkara' wd which is adhyasta onconsciousness. This is the implication of the first example.The second example implies the ^hedavabhasa^ (appea-rance of difference) between the self and the Absolute; andthis is the 'anatma rupo bhedavabh^sah^.

Objection ; Âhamkaradi samghata1 is adhyasta onthe self which is ^dvitiya caitanya prakasatman', (non-dual, self-luminous consciousness). This self is the percipi-ent and to explain the adhyasa here we require threefactors. First, in every adhyasa we have a locus which isdistinct from the adhyasta; and so we require an adhish-thana. Secondly, there should be a 'pramana jnana'which can give us valid knowledge of the adhishthana»Thirdly we need a percipient. Here we have to say thatthe self is all these three factors.

This implies a good deal. There is one dosha belong-ing to the locus, another attached, to the percipient, and athird possessed by the 'prama karana" (instrument of know.ledge). Then all these doshas must be said to be in theself.

This is not true, for the self is pure. ConsciousnessIs the knowledge that makes us apprehend the adhyasa andthe 'vishaya'; and this consciousness is not somethingwhich comes into existence now or hereafter. If then Lself is adhyasta on the self, we cannot get that knowledgewhich requires t)ie three causes, - viz., samskara, sense-contact with the object ^nd the doshas; and these causesare essential in all erroneous cognitions. The adhishthanain every adhyasa has a general (s^manya) nature and a spe*cific element out of which only the former is cognised.


Vivaranam 137

The self then ought to be the adhishthana whose genera^nature alone is cognised and not the specific nature. Bu^such a thing is impossible in the case of the self. Andfinally the adhishthana must exist external to the percipient.All difficulties make the anatmadhyasa on the self impos-sible, Hence the objector asks;

The object exists external to the percipient in everyadhyasa. Here we have the 'karana dosha\ the doshas Itk^timira (darkness) attached to the sense-organs. Due tothese doshas we apprehend only one 'amsa' of the objectand we are prevented from cognising the other 'amsa".Such a thing is not possibig here. The self is not broughtabout by any cause other than itself; and this rules out the(amsavabhasa5 (non-appearance) due to the dosha of thecause; This is impossible with regard to consciousness,which is 'niramsa9 (partless) and 'svayam jyothi' (seif"luminous). But is it not a fact that there is the anava-basha of Brahma svarupa ? No, for if this were true?this 'anavabhasa' would not give rise to the 'anavabhasaând 'viparyasa' of the self. When the shukti is not appre--bended, do we have the non-apprehension or ^viparyasa*of the pillar ?

But the self is not different from Brahman, for it issaid 'anena jivena atmana anupravisya\ And hence thisnon-apprehension may be said to belong only to the self.

If this position were accepted then it is absolutelyimpossible to have avidya in the self. The self is of thenature of vidya. And the text 'tasya bhasa sarvam idam<goes to show that everything is made manifest only by the

consciousness which is the self (Padmapada).18)


138 Panchapadika

In the case of a normal erroneous cognition, we appre-hend the general nature of the object and we have the non-apprehension of its specific nature. Likewise we cannotinfer the sa,me process as regards the self by cognising itsgeneral nature of existence and by the non-apprehension o fits specific nature as constituted by 'cif and 'ananda'. Wecannot do so because the self is not ^karanantara ayatta'(brought about by other causes), and because it is devoid ofparts. Whether the self is 'madhyama parimana9 or 'anu'or 'ananta' it is 'nir amsa' (without parts).

Objection ; It may be 'niramsa'. But so isâkasa^ which does fully manifest its nature.

Reply ; Such a thing is impossible for the self beca-use it is 'svayam jyotib'. Such an entity has 'avabhasa'completely as long as it exists. It is fully luminous. Such•are the passages 'atrayam purusah svayam jyotih', 'atmai-vasyajyotih^ etc.

Objection : By 'jyotih' we cannot mean the mere^prakasaguna" (quality called light) since that would makethe self something that has a property (ûna9). Hence weshould say that 'jyotih' is a substance like 'prakasaguna'There is a pot and the knowledge of a pot, and the know-ledge of a pot. The relation between these two is 'gunanishtha9 (having quality as its locus) because it is 'jnananishtha9. In the absence of the guna these two cannot berelated and so we speak of jnana as being the guna. Like-wise jyotih may be taken to be a ^rakasavad dravyam\(substance like light). This 'prakasa' is the 'janya' (pro-duct) of the self; and from the knowledge of this'janya')


Vivaranam 139

(viz. prakasa), we speak of the self as having the prakasaguna'; and hence it is called jyotih" (luminous).

Reply : This is impossible. There is 'anyanimittaprakasa samsarga9 (relation with light caused by another)for all entitles. And to show that such a thing is impossi-ble in the case of the self, it is expllcity said that it is 'sva^yamjyotih'. And the word 'eva' in the second passageclearly states that the self itself is its own jyotih.

Objection : Why can^t we say that there is no 'kara-kantara apeksha' (related to another agent) here; and thatas such the self creates knowledge in itself by itself, whencethe word ^svayanf is an adjective ?

Reply : No; for the substantive is jyotih itselfwhence it does not stand in need of a 'karakantara'.

Further, knowledge is not something that newly comesinto existence; and when we reject jnana 'janma' (comingof knowledge into existence), there can be no 'karakapeksa'(reflexive relation).

Objection : The knowledge of the object is seen tocome into existence, to arise from the object. As such wedo find that there is 'jnana janma'.

Reply ; No. We speak of the 'prakasa guna' of theself because of the 'prakasa' itself. This 'prakasa9 onlyreveals that the substance has come into existence^ Takeeg. the 'pradipa' (lamp) which is said to have 'prakasa\The'pradipa' is its 'asraya' and the upadhi ; and in this up-adhi we find the substance coming into existence. We donot find the prakasa coming into existence m the pradipa ;


140 Panchapadika

l)ut we only see the pradipa coming into existence since iti^ manifested by the prakasa. From this we have to con-clude that the word jyotih does not mean that a prakasagumC i.s born in the self.

The argument is : Anything that has an asrayopadhi,

(conditioned by the locus) is not born'in its asrayopadhihvcausc it is prakasa itself ; and the 'pradipa prakasa' is the

illustration,

There is the ^jnana parinama (evolutionary process of

Iruwicdge) in the antahkarana, and this is generally knownJS iritis jnana/ (psvchosis). Even when there is this vritti-jii^su there is no 'prakasa gunodaya' ; for the vritti jnanai11. nut rciilly jnana, though we speak of it as jnana. The.whihkan«ui is a substance like 'prakasa' ; the vritti jnanai „ .111 c^'^lutc of this antahkarana. Just as clay is evolvedmlu the IVtnits of pot etc., so does antahkarana have thet^^Siiliun into the fprm of knowledge. Both the antahka-s mvi ;uid the pî are 'jadu' ; but one is seen to have the'pKiUs,i guna^ ami the other not. This is because the anta-hl 4t.y'i»i i^ "by nature a ^prakasa guna vad dravya\

Ultcnwe^pcak of vishaya jnana (knowledge of the^jrUt, dpcs the word jnana mean ^svarupa jnana' or vritti'?\*" d^ we Itiui 's^'ampa jnana' to be that which

» îtirs existence. So it may be said that we do find?l'Mt ttw vntii ctirncs into existence in the antahkarana. But11 p* that hrisig^ abcnit the ârthaprakasa^ (manifesta-i.^n u|' thy i^bji^'t) for the knowcr ; and this jnana has its.*• T4Y4 «t llw sclf< if we caxn make such a distinction onlyh • ihr i^f tfr»weniciwc. And when the word jnana isIM slic vritli. it is purely a conventional (aupaca-

?.^ 4 I, 4tl4 fi^l »i T€:ll


Vivaranam 141

Nor can jnana, be a substance having the self as itsâsraya". If jnana has'prakasa guna\ it means that theself has this property ; and in such a case the self cannot be^svayam jyotih" (self-luminous).

Objection: The Trakasa' has its âsrayopadhi" inthe antakarana, and it is not born in this upadhi. Then asthe 'jada prakasa guna' it may not come into being ; but itcan come into being as 'cit prakasa guna'.

Reply : No. Take the mirror in which is reflectedthe face. The prakasa is already there whence the reflectionbecomes possible. Ii reflects the face when the face is pre-sent and does not reflect it when the face is not there. Andwhen the mirror is covered with dust etc., there is no destru-ction of the 'prakasaguna' but only the prevention of theprakasa guna9 from appearing. Now, the self has its 'asra-vopadhi' which it illumines, and in which it does not comeinto being. And what we say is the îrodhana nirakarana'(negation of the disappearance) of the vidyamana prakasa(illumination that is present) only. When the dust is rubbedoff, the mirror is again able to reflect.

Objection : But the prakasa guna seems to comeinto existence only when there is the pradipa.

Reply ; In the case of the pradipa that which comesinto existence is the pradipa itself and not the prakasa guna.

The self is spoken of as 'prajnana ghana9 (integralknowledge) and it can be 'prajnana ghana' only when it iscompletely ^rajnana9 alone. This expression tells us thatthe self is caitanya jyotih (effulgence that is consciousness)


142 Panchapadika

and not 'jada jyotih". Likewise we have passages 'viJna-nam anandam\ 'prajnanam anandam brahma' etc.

Objection : 'In vijnanam brahma' we have only'jnatr abedha9 (non-difference from knower) and not'bodha abheda' (non-difference from knowledge). Byjnana we should mean 'bhavartha' and not ^natritva*(knower-ness). Jnana means knowledge and not theknower.

Reply : 'Bhavartha9 is "kriyatmaka9 (having thenature of an activity) and knowledge is not an act but anexistent state.

Further, it is easier and better to accept "ananya nimi-tta prakasatva (uncaused luminosity) for the self. The pra"kasa is not something which comes into being from out-side (agantuka), because it has no prior non-existence.There is no pramana to prove that prakasa guna comes tothe self from some vhere.

Objection ; There is an element in the nature ofBrahman which is not cognised or apprehended; and thisis a fact of experience - ie.» there is the 'anavabhasa' (non-appsarance) of Brahma svarupa.

RepBy ; Then just as in the case of the shukti therewill be the 'anavabhasz' and 'viparyaya' (opposite) forBrahman only. There is no valid means to show that theself is identical with Brahman, yet the 'anavabhasa' and'viparyaya' cannot be for the self.

Objection : When two substances have no causarelation, they may both have the 'samanadhikaraya' (ap-


Vivaranam 143

position) in the same substance as in 'so yam devadattah'(this is that Devadatta). Likewise, since there is only onesubstance, the 'anavabhasa' and îparyaya" will belongonly to the self,

Reply : Then due to ^naiia prakasa virodha' (nega-tion of luminosity of knowledge) and due to the absenceoftheâsrayavishayabheda' (difference of the locus andits object). Brahmam cannot be the asraya of ajnana.

So far the Purvapaksa is stated and explained.

Reply ; At first Padmapada proceeds to show the^ avidya karana dosha samsarga1 (relation of the causal de-fect of avidya for consciousness. This consciousness refersto 'advitiyadhishthana brahmatman' (the ground or locuswhich is the non-dualistic Brahman-self). It is avidyathat prevents us from having a knowledge of the adhish-thana. "There is a dosha even here and it is of the natureof 'agrahana avidya' (avidya that does not apprehened)which conceals (acchadaka) the prakasa. We come toknow this from the sruti and from arthapatti (impli-cation)."

We have earlier esl-ablished ajnana through^'perceptionînference and arthapatti; and now we proceed to explainthe same from sruti and arthapatti.

There are surti passages like "anritena hi pratyudhah*and ^.anisaya socati muhyamanah". Now in deep sleepthere can be no mithyajnana ; and even though the bhramasamskaras (impressions of illusion) exist, they are not ableto prevent a right cognition. A temporary non-apprehen-


AiTT . Panchapadika

^»ion is not opposed to an apprehension that is ^svatah sid-iiha' ^sclf existent). And the 'svarupa caitanya' itself givesthe 'hrahma svarupavabhasa"1. Yet Brahman is not cogni-sed as Bnihan, That which prevents the avabhasa of suchy. Bruhman is here called 'anrita^This 'anrita' is the ^mithyaVil^tu' which is the condition preventing the âvabhasa\Siacli a condition is distnict from themithyajnana, from theîiisl^t'ni of the erroneous cognitions and from non-appre-liensi^n.

(n the second passage quoted above we find that 'Isva-

mU* (CM»od-lu>od) is ^vabhavasiddha'. And yet the indivrci^gnisc^ himself as 'anisvara'. Such a fact is due tol5ic iti"*it"»i|^^"chcnsson of Isvaratva. This Isvaratva is some-tjiin^ tiiul cmncs and goes. And the non-apprehension ex-piEcv<^ ilsclf ai sorrow which is to be traced to 'moha'.1'U-, 's'lu'tlui" IN the same as ajnana.

We can also refer to 'Na tarn vidatha ya ima jajana.yn^linîkam antaram badhuva/niharena pravrita jal-

p)*i fc'Aîtlrlpa ukthA sasas caranti". This 'nihara' i& synon"^ ti in,i % wit Ii lamas (darkness) and ajnana. From this it i^cu4ait tliat nihara (frost) which has enveloped the self istin: îyw ^f n^t apprehending Brahmam and is also the<< ttic "jalpyatvady adhyasa' (super imposition ofAuc to prattling).

llic t^xt - Âvidyayam antare vartamana nany-,iu:hrrw wduyantc^ explains that avidya is the cause oft:hr ^'-4'cv^ rupabrahma aparijnana' (Non-apprehension of

llw (Irîitii.ini-Ni^'aiEidofthe 'kriya^karakadhyasa' (suuper

t»C agent and act).


Vivaranam 145

Similar texts are "ajnanenavritamjnanamtena muhya-nti" and so on.

Artbapatti also gives the same conclusion. We knowthat there is 'bandha nivritti' (cessation of bondage) onlywhen there is the knowlepge of Brahman, and yet Brahmanis not known earlier. This must be due to a cause whichis related to adhyasa. Thus we assume avidya because ofthe 'phala sruty anupapatti\ Or we can arrive at the sameconclusion from the 'vidhananupapatti5 since there is acommand that Brahman should be apprehended. This ispossible only if the §elf does not know Brahman earlier.There must be a cause forthe'anavabhasa' of Brahma svarupa;

and such an 'adhyasa hetu9 must have the self as its asraya.

Ajnana is apprehended by the Sakshin. That which isapprehended must be valid ; but these pramanas are onlyintended to show that jnana is not an abhava (negative ent-ity) and hence they are not useless.

Objection; But the self is said to be not differentfrom Brahman. Then ajnana may be posited in Bra-hman.

Reply; Does it mean that this contention is basedon the identity of the self with Brahman ? We have threealternatives-

i) Is there asraya vishaya bhedanupattF (incompati-bility of the difference between the locus and its object) be-cause of the identity ? Or

19)


146 Panchapadika

ii) Does it mean that âvidyasrayatva' (being the locusof avidya) is inconsistant with the nature of Brahman, viz.consciousness ? Or

iii) Does it mean that if there is avidya, Brahmancannot be sarvajna ?

i) To begin with the first alternative. Ajnana doesnot require an asraya which is distinct from its ^vishaya'. Lhas its asraya in a place which it also envelopes. It fulfillstwo functions at a single stroke. It is like darkness whichconceals or hides its own asraya and which thus has a two-fold function. It realises these functiofis in so far as it is'akriyatmaka' (non-action) and is an âvarana9.

The pot is 'mrinnishtha' (having its locus in clay) be-cause its upadana is clay. The clay is its asraya ; and yetit exists at a place which is its asraya. Likewise darknesshas its asraya in its upadana ; and it can still have anotherasraya which it envelopes. It does not manifest these two.So is ajnana. Knowledge involves two distinct factors-anasraya (locus) and a vishaya (object). But like knowledgeajnana does not require these two as distinct from one ano-^ther. But there seem to be these two factors. Thus theword 'agaman.i' (not-going) conveys the meaning of ^thitf(state). It involves the reference to an object and also toan action. But the action being absent there is in realityonly one reference and not two.

Like darkness, ajnana envelopes its own avarana andit is not inconsistant with its identity with its own asraya.

ii) Nor is ajnana inconsistent with the 'cit prakasa'which is its asraya. It is the knowledge (samvedana) as


Vivaranam 147

the 'cit prakasa" that illumines or apprehends this ajnana.Even ajnana is rendered possible by being 'sakshi bhasya\Hence there is no 'cid asrayatva virodha" for ajnana.

In all the three stages (jagrat, svapna and sushupti)objects are cognised by the self, and there is the knowledgearising from the objects. There is the avabhasakatva ofthe self and this is not inconsistant with its ajnana samban-dha. Such a self can be ajnanasraya (locus of ajnana).

Further, prakasa itself is not opposed to ajnana ; forit is not there in ' ajnana vishaya jnana9. Since the self is'svayam prakasa' we do not find any 'jnana samsarga viro-dha' also. Svaprakasa can have a samsarga (relation) withajnana. There cannot be any samsarga only with the obje-cts which are illumined not by the self but by somethingelse (vishayanam para prakasyanam).

To show that there is no 'jnanasamsarga virodha\ ano-ther argument is given from the standpoint of samvedana.Samvedana or knowledge is of the nature of atma svarupa,.and we find that ajnana has its asraya in this jnana.

iii) Brahman is sarvajna and is identical with the self.Yet it is the self which is the asraya of ajnana. For the-syamatva (blackness) etc., which are adhyasta on the reflec-tion are not seen in the' original bimba. Further there i8no virodha between the purity and the ajnana of the self-Hence even though the self is identical with Brahman, it isnot inconsistent to say that the former is the asraya of avi-dya and that the latter is sarvajna. Moreover, the identityitself implies that avidya is there.


148 panchapadika

Hence we assume in the self that avidya which concealsthe 'brahma svarupa prakasa'. Ultimately the self has bra-hmasvarupa. Still the self does not have the real avabo-dha (awareness). In the absence of avidya, there ought tobe not only svarupa abheda but also, the avabodha. Andifthisa'âbodha (apprehension or knowledge) is alreadythere, texts like 'tattvam asF which teach this identity wouldbe meaningless.

The self is identical with Brahman ; and it is svayamprakasa and sarvajna. Yet there is the anavabhasa (non-manifestation) of Brahman. To explain this we assumethe avidya which is its 'acchadika\ If there is no such avi-dya, we have to admit the difference between the self andBrahman, and 'jadyatva' (unconsciousness) and încijjna-

tva' (non-omniscience) to the self. In such a case all thetexts teaching avidya and identity would become uselessand faulty. Such texts comply the words "lamas, anrita,nihara, ajnana, avritatva' etc. These words propound apositive entity called ajnana which causes the "anavabhasa-dhyasa\ and the denial of avidya would amount to inter-preting ajnana as only jnanabhava (negation of kaowledge).

If the self and Brahman are identical, whence arisesthe distinction between the two, which distinction attributes'avidyasrayatva' to the one and 'sarvajnatva' to the other5 ?Thrfee vi^ws are propounded to answer the question, i) Thatthe self is delimited by antahkarana whence arises the diffe-rence (view of Bhamati); ii) That it is due to 'atireka'which is a property that achieves identity - in - difference(theory of Bhaskara) ; and iii) That it is due to the 'amsa-msibhava (jpart and whole relation) which is natural andnot artificial (opinion of Yadava Prakasa). To reject all


Vivaranam 149

these views, Padmapada states that "Brahman is the onereality which makes the many selves possible, each self be-ing that which is conditioned (avacchinna) by avidya $ andthis avidya is ânadi siddha'.

That which envelopes the self is ajnana that is in theself; and this ajnana is the upadana for the 'jiva brahmavibhaga adhyasa' (distinction of Brahmam and self). Assuch ajnana is the cause that delimits or conditions theself. It is the upadana even for the 'avaccheda^ which isthe ^ratibhasika adhyasa'. In the absence of this ajnana,we cannot explain the appearance of duality (dvaidhibhava)for that which is in reality 'niravayava'. Further there arethe doshas like those of the doer and enjoy er which areattributed to the self: and we have shown earlier that thesedoshas are beginningless like the relationship of the seedto its ankura (plant); and the upadana for this too isajnaaa which is therefore said to be 'anadi s;ddha\ Forthe beginningless process of the adhyasa, viz., that of thedisiinction between the self and Brahman, the cause is onlythe beginningless avidya.

i) It cannot be the antahkarana. If the self is con-ditioned by the antahkarana, the 'avacheda' cannot betorn off in reality. The 'avacchaeda' (antahkarana) is only'vibhramamatra9 (illusory). Even its upadana is no otherthan ajnana. When the true knowledge coires, the antah-karana stands rejected, and as such it is only a case of'avidyadhyasa^. The antahkarana becomes the avacchedakaonly when it is conditioned by its own cause, viz.,ajnana.

The antahkarana is real, and it has a beginning. Butsuch an entity cannot be the upadhi for the 'anady avacc-


150 Panchapadika

hfida9 (the self). In deep sleep the antahkarana is absentand we ought to say that the self is unconditioned at thattime. These are some of the objections against the firstview.

Objection ; Yet in deep sleep the antahkarana isin the 'sukshmavastha' (subtle state) and as such can con-dition, the self-Reply s Does ^sukshmata' mean the absence of its-parts ? In such a case, it ceases to exist since that whichhas parts has ceased to have parts, or^ does it mean the de-crease in its parts ?* If so, this would differ from thatwhich has all its parts, and this would not bring aboutthose things which it could otherwise bring.

Objection : It exists potentially in a causal form.

Reply ; Does this mean that only the cause- (ajnana)remains ? Or does the cause remain along with its effect(antahkarana) ? In the former case there is no antah-karana. In the latter it does not differ from the usualantahkarana'

Objection : The antahkarana remains in the formof a cause having a *sakti' and being aided by the 'karyasamskara5 "Impressions of products-Reply ; The samskara cannot be the ^vacchedo^-padana' whence in deep sleep every one ought to be libe-rated. Hence the self isnot conditioned by the antah-karana.

ii) We cannot assume even "atireka" also as bringingabout the distinction between the self and Brahman.


Vivaranam 15 li

Objection z Ajnana cannot explain how this dis-tinction arises. Now, there is avidya for the self as regasdsBrahman. Even before avidya is there, there ought to bethe distinction between the self and Brahmam, Such adifficulty does not arise if we accept atireka,

Reply : Let us admit that there is atireka. Thiswould involve the questions 'whose^ and -why"; and thismeans that the atireka arises only after the distinction hasset in. The ^dharmipratiyogibhava' is dependent on dif-ference, One can be the 'dharmi9 and the other can beits j^pratiyognf (opposite) only if they differ. They pre-suppose difference and yet it is difference which makesthem cctoe into existence. This difficulty is common bothto atireka and to ajnana. The ^jiva brahmabhava' puruppo"ses ajnana and also brings about ajnana.

iii) There cannot be a difference based on 'amsamsi-bhava^ since Brahmam is devoid of parts (niramsa).

Hence we conclude that avidya alone is the cause ofthe bhedadhyasa (superimposition of difference). What isthat to which avidya is related so that it can be a cause ofdifference ? We ask by way of reply : what is that to whichthe mirror is related so that it can be a cause of the îmbabheda' ? The mirror is related to the face only ; and like-wise ajnana is related only to the 'cit svarupa' whence itbrings out the 'jiva brahma vyavahara bhedha'.

But then ajnana is related only to the 'cit svarupa1.Yet it gives up its attachment to the Brahma svarupa anddevelops a partiality only to the self. The mirror bringsabout a distinction between the face and its relation, as the


152 Panchapadlka

pot brings about a difference between the akasa outside itand that inside it. Yet they give up their attachment to theface and the akasa (that is oimtsid.e), and show their partia-lity only to the reflection and the 'ghatakasa' respectively.

What is the asraya of avidya ? It can not have as itsasraya that svarupa which is qualified by the antahkaranabecause there is no pramana to prove it.

Objection : There is the apprehension (pratibhasa)like 'I am ignorant'. Since ignorance cannot be attributedto another ignorance, we have the experience to say thatthere is here a 'visishta asraya' (specific locus).

Reply : Take the experience <! experience'. If weaccept the contention of the objector, then even the caitanyaprakasa would have to find a ^visishtasraya'. The 'prati-bhasa' alone cannot be the criterion. Bxperience is cit pia-kasa and a 'visishtasraya" cannot be cit prakasa.

Objection : But consider 'ayo dahati' (cron is bur-ning), Burning is a property of fire ; but it is treated as th.eproperty of the iron here. Because of the fire there is themutual 'sambandhavabhasa' (apperance of the relation) bet-ween the iron and the burning. Likewise experience andantahkarana are related to the same self ; a& &uch that whichbelongs to the self is to be attributed to the antahkarana.But the antahkarana is apprehended by experience. Hencethere is no avabhasa for the antahkarana.

Reply z In this way ajnana and antahkarana too have?their relation to the same self. Then the apprehension'âham âjuah5 (I am ignorant) cannot belong to the


Vivaranam 153

antahkarana for the antahkarana is conditioned by ajnana.Hence the asraya of ajnana is the self and this is corrobo-rated by the apprehension. Further since the antahkarana isthe karya (product) of ajnana;, it cannot be ajnanasraya(locus of ajnana)for that would involve the fallacy of "anyo-•nyasrayatva (mutual dependence). Further, if avidya is re-lated only to the antahkarana it should cease in deep sleep ;

whereas avidya which is related to the self is there in deepasleep also.

Objection s It is inconsistent to speak of mere sva-

rupa caitanya (consciousness per se) as the asraya. Hencewe should assume a 'visishtasraya' (specific locus).

Reply : But even this is related to the svarupa cai-tanya. And if an unconscious entity like the antahkaraaawere to be the asraya of ajnana, it would have to be theasraya of the erroneous cognition and of the true knowledgeas well.

Objection : If the svarupa caitanya is taken to beits asraya, is it not inconsistent with the nature of Brahman?

Reply : Yes, But instead of assuming two asrayas(viz., antahkarana and the self), it is better to assume onlyone asraya which is already êstablished. If the asraya isthe antahkarana, he who is bound is not the person libera-ted (mukta).

Bhaskara argues that if there is ajnana, is it there onlyfor the antahkarana. We have to ask him whether the self is20)


^54 Panchapadika

sarvajna (omniscient) or 'kincijjna'? The self is 'kincijjna';

and as such it does not know something at some time orother. There is the 'vishayanavabodha' (non-awareness ofthe object) for the self. Ajnana is here assumed to have itsasraya in the self.

Objection : Âgrahana' (non-apprehension) andmithyajnana (erroneous cognition) may have the self as theirasraya ; but the positive entity (called ajnana has only theantahkarana as its asraya.

Reply : What is this ? If it is different from jnana,it is only ajnana ; and we too accept that the 'kacakama-ladi'defects are forms of ajnana. Ajnana cannot be thatwhich is opposed to jnana ; for according to you, jnana andajnana have different asrayas and the same vishayi (subject);

and yet we do not see that they are opposed to one another.

Reply : There is no pramana to prove these differ-ent asrayas. Further t?ke a person who is in .deep sleep.His antahkarana which is the instrument of cognition hasits 'laya' (involution) then. From the absence of anyaction on the part of this person, another infers so muchabout his antahkarana etc. This inference ought to dispelthe ajnana which is in his antahkarana; and this is notseen.

Objection : The kacadi doshas are the cauê of theerroneous cognition. These doshas have their asraya inthe instrument of cognition. Likewise, can't we say thatajnana too is 'karanasraya5 (its cause as its locus) ?

Reply ; Then even the eye would become theasraya.


Vivaranam 155

Objection ; But the eye and other sense organshave a beginning. As such they cannot be the ^sraya forthe beginningless ajnana.

Reply : You should not forget that the antahkaranatoo has a beginning.

Objection : Accepting 'satkarya vada" (evolutionarytheory) we can say that the antahkarana has no beginning.

Reply : The same is the case with the sense organslike the eye.

Hence the antahkarana cannot be the asraya of thebeginningless ajnana. Both for those who have realizedknowledge and who haven't; for both these conscious per-sons only there is stated 'avritatva' by the words anrita,nihara etc.. As such ajnana is not 'antahkaranasraya'. Itis 'caitanyasraya'.

"Such a Brahman is expressed by the sruti, smriti andthe scholars of Nyaya". The sruti texts are like "anyadyushmakam antaram babhuva, niharena pravrita jalpyaca..'" etc. Here we find ajnana to be the cause for thevyavahitatva (distinction) between the self and Brahman.

There is the surti passage - *vibheda janaka jnanenasam atyantikam gate/atu mano brahmano bhedam asan-tam kah karishyati".

That there is a beginningless entity called ajnanawhich is distinct from Brahman is conveyed by the surtipassage " "prakrtim purusam caiva viddhy anadi ubhavapi". That ayidya is anadi siddha is conveyed by the


156 Panchapadika

word prakriti. Such is also the case in the sruti-mayamtu prakritim vidyat.

Even though the svarupa of Brahman is different fromthat of the 'mayavacchinna rupa9, the self does not knowthat its real nature is that of Brahman, because of theajnana* Thus we also read - ânadi mayaya supto yadajivah prabuddhyate/ajam anidram asvapnam advaitambudhyate sada.9'

Thus we have established that the locus of avidya isself which is svayam prakasa. Now, we begin with theobjection that the svayam prakasa Brahman cannot be theavidya vishaya (object of avidya).

Objection ; When other pramanas cannot establishthe svarupanavabhasa' of Brahman through avidya, youcannot establish avidya only through the sruti and througharthapatti.

Reply ; Take the cognition : 'I do not know thatwhich you said'. Here we find that there is avabhasa^forthat which excludes ajnana. The that which excludes^theajnana has also the pratibhasa (appearance).

Objection : There we apprehend the general nature(samanyakara) only. That which is excluded is the un-known (anavagata) 'viseshakara9 (specific form).

Reply ; If the viseshakara is not known it cannothave any avabhasa; and that which has no avabhasa cannotbe apprehended as the excluded one.

Objection ; Now even that which is apprehended

(has 'avabhasa') cannot be apprehended as the excludedone.


Vivaranam 157

Reply s This anupapatti (incompatibility) does notaffect ajnana. Ajnana is nothing but a pratibhasa. Itsanupapatti is itself an ornament. It is well known that thereis the pratibhasa. It is nothing but an appearance.

So Padmapada asiss : When the object is apprehended,how does the anupapatti arise for the âvidya vishaya' ?What is that pramana which conflicts ^with sruti and artha-patti that have established ajnana ? The objector repliesthat arthapatti itself can disprove it. "When Brahman issvayam jyotih and niramsa", there cannot be any *svarupa~navabhasa' of Brahman.

An object is that which is immediately and directlyapprehended. Such an 'aparoksha prakasamanata3 meansthe non-difference of the object from samvit or knowledge.

The self is ^hasamana' (always manifest) and yet it isnot apprehended as being distinct from the body. The selfas separate from the body is not cognised. But that whichhas bhasamana is always 'adhigata9. Such a thing is notseen here.

Now does the difference from the body mean the non-difference (svarupa abheda) with the atma prakasa which issvayam jyotih ? Or does it mean the non-difference in sofar as its property (dharma) is concerned ?

If difference is a property, how can we have âparok-shatva' only by having the knowledge of the 'dharmi^ ? Inthe immediate experience of the 'dharma'etc., we do notAnd the non-apprehension of the difference. We do expe-rience it or apprehend it immediately.


158 PanchapadiKa

Hence Padmapada says that "the enJoyer has the Îcar-yakarana sanghatadhyasa^ (super imposition of the causajaggregate) whence he is not able to cognise the self as dis-tinct from the self which is svayam Jyotih^. To this the;

objection is ; The enjoyer is not svayam jyotih ; but is oneapprehended as the âham pratyaya^ (object of I). Padma-pada states that be will explain later on how the enJoyer is-svayam jyotih.

The self, then is apprehended not as united to the bodybut as distinct from the "body.

This position is objected to. The self is not apprehen-ded as distinct from the body because we do not have the;

^heda jnana samagri9 (the knowledge of difference). Wehave the self and the body. To cognise the difference, werequire not the knowledge of the self and of the body, but a.third knowledge which alone comprehends- difference. Inhaving the knowledge of the padartha we aie also havingthe knowledge of difference. As such when I say 'aham*I have the knowledge of the 'atma padartha'; and thisknowledge itself gives us the knowledge of difference. Thisitself is the required pramana. Prior to this third know-ledge there can be no apprehension of difference, and thenthe two terms being intermixed there can be no knowledge:

of the dharmi and its pratiyogin. And in the absence ofthis knowledge there can be no knowledge of difference. AsPadmapada puts the objection : How is it that the enjoyerwho is the svayam jyotih does not have the prakasa as be-ing distinct from or as excluding the 'karya karana san-ghata' ?

The reply : Bverywhere the cause for the non- appre-hension of difference is only the 'samsargadhyasa' (rela-


Vivaraaam 159

tional super-imposition). The self is distinct from the body.Then to explain the 'dehatma buddhi' (apprehension of thebody as the I or self), we may have to adopt either ^dhya-tma9 or 'gaunatva\ To take the first alternative. In every-adhyasa, that which is not cognised or apprehended or app-rehended is the difference ; and the absence of the appre-hension of difference must be accepted. Such a âmsarga-<3hyasa' is the condition for the non" apprehension of diffe-rence, In 'aham manusyah' (I am a man) the apprehensionof identity between the two persons is then really mithya.To this one might say that it is not mithya, but only âuna*{metaphorical), ^Padartha pratyaksa9 itself gives cognitionof difference ; and the 's-amanadhikaranya' (being in appo-:sitiny) of the two terms constitutes only a 'gaunavabhasa{indirect appearance). Sankara himself would later onexplain how this is not true,

Now the 'gaunavadF raises an objection.

Objection; If the Tin 'aham manusyatr* has no^samanadhikarana' (similar Icci^s) with the body, then itwould mean that there is a self apart from the body ; forthere is no such 'pratyaya' as the 'F for another who doesnot apprehend like that. Even agama (revealed testimony)and inference are not capable of disproving it since it is aperceptual experience. Any pramanah has validity only ifit does not contradict the perceptual experience.

But it might be argued that as in the case of the per-ception of two moons, that which is perceptually cognisedis mithya. As such agama (revealed testimony) and infere-nce alone have validity and that which is negated is the per-ceptual condition. Where the perceptual cognition is based


160 Panchapadika

on the absence of any discrimination, there let inferenceetc., establish its invalidity at once and let the perceptualexperience come to naught. But where the cognitions arefully supported by discrimination and the like, there infe-rence etc., cannot make out the perceptual cognition to bemithya' That a perceptual cognition to be îthya' canbe made out only by examining the strength or otherwiseof the fully developed and substantiated cognitions. Assuch it is not inference etc., that can establish the mithyatvaof perception.

Hence the objector asks : "Wherefrom does mithyatvaarise ?" We might reply that since there is the ^nyathava-gama' (apprehension in another manner) we -ergue that mit-hyatva is established through agama or inference. Thenthe objector proceeds to argue thus: "Your argument wouldinvoive the fallacy of 'anyonyasrayata^. Only when agamaand inference function we have the mithyatva of the perce-ptual cognition ; only when there is this ^mithyatva', agamaand inference function. Hence the atmavadins should acc-ept that the ahamkara is only that which is distinct fromthe body. If there is the 'tadatmya' between the body andthe aham, the 'atma siddhi' would not have any validity.As such the "manushyabhimana7 in 'aham manushyah5 isonly 'gauna' or metaphonical or conventional,

Now the reply follows :

Does ahankara have as its Vishaya the self whioh isdistxinct fiom the body etc ? or the self which is distinctfrom the prathibasa ? Take the first alternative. Padma-pada answers : "Even though ^he ^vishaya' of thisâhankarais that enjoyer who is distinct from tbe^body etc- still we


Vivaranam 1611

are not experiencing such an enjoyer. As such the pro-perties of the body etc. are adhyasta on this enjoyer". Theprathibhasa of the distinction between the self and thebody is inconsistent with or opposed to adhyasa; and assuch there arises the gaunatva for the 'samanadhikaran-ya\ It is said that when the viseshas (particular entities)are opposed to one another, their viseshas (qualities) toobecome matually contradictory. But even when the garlandand the snake are excluded, still we have - the adhy-asa of the form 'this is a snake\ Hence mere differencecannot make the two terms mutually opposed. 'Aham' andmanushyah5 may differ from one another and yet we maynot be consciously aware of this difference.

Objection : We cognise only the 'samanyamsa'(general aspect) and since we do not apprehend the vises-hamsa (specific aspect) there arises the 'avabhasa' of'anya samsarga' relation with anothee. Now the self iscognised in its 'visesha rapa' as conseiouness. How canthere be an adhyasa ?

Reply : Consciousness illumines the other not as themere 'atma dharma" (property of the self) which excludesthe ahankara It necessarily requires the ahankara toillumine the other. Hence even though it is 'pratiyamana1(apprehensible), there arises adhyasa. "Even though thereis the 'svarupa avabasa' we do not experience its differ-ence from other objects; and hence it has its avabhasa ashaving its integration with other objects. This is similarto the case of the letter 6^ which is one letter and yet shortand other differences are integrated with it".

21)


162 Panchapadika

Now lefc us take the second alternative. Here theobjector argues that the object of the âham pratyaya' isthe self which is distinguished or separated from the pra-tibhasa. Just as 'rasa9 (taste) is totally different from'gandha' (smell), the ahankara appears (avabhasa) as fun-damentally or essentially different from the body etc.

RepSy : If there is such an 'avabhasa', there shouldnot be different opinions regarding its sadbhava (existence)and then there is no necessity for any enquiry to establish

it

Then it might be argued that there is 'gaunatva onlyafter the enquiry.

Now with the aid of logical reasoning we find that theself is distinct from the objects; and even after the enquirywe have the 'samanadhikaranya9 whence we say 'ahammanushyah'. If there is only 'gaunatva' (metaphonicalexpression) here, it would mean that prior to this enquirytoo it was a 'gauna' expression.

But the objector says that there is this gaunatva onlyafter the enquiry and not before the enquiry. Jijaasa(enquiry) means bringing out the logical arguments to bearon a problem. Now 'yukti' (logical reasoning) cannot sepa-rately bring out a different knowledge. Its function is toenquire into the already existent vishaya of the ahampratyaya. The 'aham pratyaya vishaya' (object of the termT) is already existent an distnict from the body etc. Thisis known after the enquiry. After the enquiry the 'I' i§taken to be distinct. As such the gaunatva is there in ex-pressions like the âhani manushyah' only after theenquiry.


Vivaranam 163

Reply : Even after the enquiry we do not get the'aham pratyaya vishaya' as distinct from the body etc. Butalways we get at the 'aham pratyaya' as the 'svarupamatra vishaya9 (object of the mere form). We get at theself as such, the self in itself. And it is the logical reason-ing alone which gives us the knowledge that is distinct.from the body etc. The knowledge derived from logica^reasoning is mediate and it cannot be contradictory of theaparoksha bhrama (immediate or direct illusion). Henceadhyasa remains as before till we have the imediate ex-perience of this distinction.

Padmapada says that "it is impossible to argue thafcthere is gaunatvabhimana only after the enquiry. Just as in'hrasvo akarah' (the letter 'a' is short) we donot have anygaunatva, so in 'aham manushyah'. Even though ^kara" isone it stands for hrasvatva, dirghatva (being long) and 'plu-tatva9 of 'akara'. Now we say that there is no 'gaunatva'in 'hrasvo akarah' because we experience it as 'hrasva^ justas we experience the silver in 'this is silver'. This experi-ence makes it a case of adhyasa.

From logical reasoning if we accept that ^kara^ is ex-cluded from 'hiasvatva' etc., how can we explain the expe-rience of the 'akara' as being short ? We have no apprehen-tion or knowledge that the 'hrasva' (shortness) is excludedFrom the 'akara' ; from this we cannot say that there is noexperience of the adhyasa. When there is the apprehensionthat ^kara' is excluded from 'hrasva', then there is thepossibility of apprehending that seme other thing also isexcluded from 'hrasva'.

Is akaro hrasvah the same as ^this is silver' in so faras both appear to involve adhyasa ? In one single ^kara'


164 Panchapadika

we have the integration of 'hrasva' etc. 'Akara' being aword is real or external; and 'hrasvatva' etc., is only a pro-perty of sound. Thus from grammar we know that akarais necessarily the shorts syllable. But 'hrasvata' cannot ex-clude the 'akara' as such. So the objection is : "we canhave the experience of 'akara' as such when we have thenecessary logical understanding of its nature. But we donot have the experience of'hrasvatva' etc., as mere 'hras-vatva* etc., though these are distinct properties.'1' 'Akara*excludes 'hrasvatva', but 'hrasvatva' does not exclude the'akara9. There is adhyasa in akaro hrasvah. On the otherhand, in 'this is silver the this excludes the silver and thesilver excludes the this. Then there cannot be adhyasathere.

The reply : Two things differ from one another. Nowthey differ exactly in the same way. A's difference fromB is identical with B's difference from A,. Now, if A i§said to differ from B, it implies necessarily that B differsfrom A. Just as 'akara' excludes 'hrasvatva9, so can 'hras-vatva' exclude the 'akara\

Logical reasoning reveals clearly and conclusively thatthe entities or terms have their own specific and uniquenatures ; and when they are apprehended as identical, thisapprehension is not accepted to be gauna. This seems tobe the great stroke of a magician. To this objection. Pad-mapada says that this is really magic since all this is theproduct of avidya.

When we have the knowledge of difference, adhyasa isdispelled ; and yet we employ expressions like 'aham manu.shyah\ Since we have the knowledge of difference here, ifis argued that such expressions are not cases of erroneouscognitions, but 'gauna9 expressions.


Viyaranam 165

When we have the discriminating knowledge, is adhy-asa contradicted by the mere âham pratyaya' ? Or by logi-cal reasoning ? It cannot be the former. So Padmapadasays : "The 'ah am pratyaya' has its existence in the bodybecause of the beginningless avidya. And yet it has in rea-lity its locus in the self and this is different from the body ;

and this is not prevented by the body. The body does notbring about any 'pratibandha' (obstacle) for the self in hav-ing its own separate and distinct existence in itself". Theself exists in the body ; it acts through the antahkarana .and the vishaya or the object of the aham pratyaya (aham-kara) is the self. Hence the dependence of the aham prat-yaya on the self is not opposed to its ^dehadi vishayatva*(body etc., being the objects).

Objection : Logical reasoning makes out the self tobe distinct from the body ; and prior to this logical reason-ing that which we apprehend must be the self as distinctfrom the body.

Reply : We have said earlier that the aham pratyayacan be dependent on the self and also on the body, for theseare not inconsistent with one another. From this it followsthat we may enquire into the object with the aid of logicalreasoning ; and we will come to know what these entitiesare. Even with the aid of logical reasoning we cannot getanything more than that already apprehended. Logical rea-soning will only tell us that the self is distinct from thebody. But it cannot make us experience the self as distinctfrom the body. Even if there is a different knowledge nearby» perceptual cognition does not involve the awareness ofthis different khowledge which is not contained in it. The


166 Pancfiapadhifca

the perceptual cognition. Even îf it is integrated it is notan immediate knowledge^ but only one that is mediated bylogical reasoning ; hence the aparok&hadhyasa cannot bedifferent from the earlier stage-

Therefore there is no difference between the ahampratyaya of the earlier stage and that of the present. Theapprenhension 'aham manushyah/ can never be ^ gaunacognition. The self which is svayam jyotih does notappear (anavabhasa) as distinct from the ^karya karanasanghata; and we have the apprehension of the adhyasa inthe form 'aham manushyah'. Even though the self i&identical with Brahman, there is the anavabhasa of Bra-hmasvarupa. The prakasa is enveloped or concealed be-cause of a darkness; and that there is this darkness oravidyais given to us by the sruti and by arthapattLFrom this cause or condition we do determine the 'aham"karadbyasa\ ' And since It is beginningless, we have^parva drishtatva' and 'smruti rupatva\ (prior experienceand similarity with the form of memory).

Objection : In âham manushyah' there is theadhyasa of the body on the self. This is a perceptualcognition. Can the knowledge of the difference betweenthe two be a valid one without negating, the identity of thetwo ?

Reply : Mere inference and agama cannot establishthe difference between the two- That there is onlyone moon has arisen after we have negated the twomoons. A similar negation of adhyasa can arise onlywhen agama and inference are strengthened by the 'ahampratyaya' which cooperates with logical reasoning. Only


Vivaranam 167

such pramanas as are based on the evidence given by theâham pratyaya' can establish the distinction,

The self is ^svayam prakasa" and yet due to avidya itis not cognised or experienced as such; and the self thusbecomes the adhishthana for avidya. This would enable^paratra paravabhasah' (the other appearing in the ex-ternal).

Thus we have consciousness which illumines theself, and the self is without a second. There is the avidyadosha here; and the antahkarana would constitute the kara-na dosha. And since avidya is beginningless there arisesa samskara* Thus we have all the three factors required foradhyasa.

Objection : Inspite of the presence of the threefactors there cannot be adhyasa here. There can be nosamsarga for this consciousness which is the adhishtana,and we therefore have the knowledge of this adhishtanaand also the knowledge of something else. For, the self isnot an object and consciousness is external. We do havethe apprehension of the adhishtana because it is the sub-ject, and we have the knowledge of the object. Adhyasarequires only one knowledge arising from the entities in sofar as they are apprehended as 'samsrishta'. But here thesamsarga itself is impossible. Hence there is no adhyasa.

Reply s The self may not be an object. Yet there is theapprehension ofthearopya and there is no other^knowledge'Consequently it constitutes the adhishthana. We do not?have the experience of the enjoyer distinctly or separatelyand we have a single experience in which is integrated theconsciousness as enjoyer. Thus there is the 'anyonya sam-bhedha' which renders it a case of adhyasa. Atmaicatanya


168 Panchapadika

itself manifests the integration of the self and the not-selfAnd even though it does not come into existence in its pureform, it appears as if it comes into existence because o^the specific 'vishayoparagaâttachment to the objeci). Thus'aham manushyah' is a case of error. Since it is an errone"ous cognition, the 'vishaya' (object) and the 'vishayF (sub-ject) are able to appear in the same pratyaya as an integra-ted whole. Thus we have adhyasa here ; and this is theknowledge which manifests the non-self in the self ; andthis erroneous cognition arises from three factors, viz.sense-contact, samskara and dosha (defect).

AHANKARA :

Padmapada next proceeds to give the import of thatpart of the commentry beginning with 'katham punah pra-tyagatmani...' This part deals with the "sambhavana (possi-bility) of adhyasa. There was a question earlier, ô ay amadhyaso nama\ The 'kirn' implies both a question regardingthe definition, and a doubt regarding the possibility of adh-yasa, Thinking that the question was really raised by thedoubter, the definition has been given. Then since it isalso doubted Sankara proceeds, to answer the doubt regar-ding its possibility. Sankara states the doubt thus- "Kat-ham punah pratyagatmany avisaye adhyaso vishaya taddharmanam ? The definition of adhyasa given earlier is notpossible in the case of the self. For, everyone cognises anobject in: the place of another object which is immediatelybefore him. Since the pratyagatman (self) is distinct fromthe 'yushmat pratyaya' (object) you maintain that it is notan object. When the adhishtana is not an object, can therebe ana adhyasa ? Is it cognised ? Can it be possible ?

The adhishthana is always on the same level with thatwhich is adhyasta on it so far as both are the objects cog-


Vivaranam 169

nised by the same sense organs and intellect. Since this isabsent here, there can be no adhyasa. This is the importof the 'akshepa' (objection).

The reply : What is required is that in one vijnana(cog,nition) there should be the avabhasa of two vijnanas, andthese two should be integrated into one. This much aloneis necessary for adhyasa. It is not necessary that two enti-ties should appear as one object. With this in mind, San-kara replies : 'Na tavad ayam ekantena avishayah asmatpratyaya vishayatvat', it is the object of 'asmat pratyaya'.

The objector takes 'asmat pratyaya' to mean the know-ledge which is atma vishaya. So the objector argues : "Thecidatman is the subject. How can it become an object ?An object is something other than the subject and it isalways referred to or cognised as the ^this'. Can such anentity overcome its nature by a strange process and becomethe subject which never is the 'this' ? In a percepitual cog-nition the subject cannot be the same as the object; therecannot be one entity which is both the subject and theobject.

Then we might say that there are two e^ments in thesubject and that one can be the subject while the other canbe the object.

To this the objector replies : "The self is devoid ofparts ; how can you attribute two mutually exclusive partsto such a self ?"

Reply : Take for example the sun. Its rediance isspread in all directions. In order to have a specific(unique)22)


170 Panchapadika

manifestation of this radiance, we hold a mirror against it ;

and the radiance is concentrated and radiated.

Now the sun is like the atma caitanya and like the mir-ror there is the antahkarana. In order that the atma cait-anya may become clear and distinct with a specific form^there is adhyasta on the self the antahkarana which is a^bhasvara dravya', (a shining substance). This antahka-rana is meant by the 'asmat pratyaya".

But in an adhyasa like this is silver, we have the thisand the silver : two distinct entities. Likewise, are we tosay that 'aham' means two different forms or entities ? Inanswering this question, Padmapada says that "ahankara(antahkarana) has implicitly in ii the this and the not-this9',

Take the cognition, 'Iron is burning'. The burning isa property of the fire and is cognised in the iron, i.e., ithas 'dvai rupya avabhasa' (appearance of two). Likewisein 'aham upalabhe9 we have this 'dvai rupya avabhasa' for'aham\ The 'upalabhritva' is attributed to the self throughthe ^tahkarana'. That which has actually the 'upalabdhi'is the antahkarana, but it really refers to the self. Whenthere is the integration or attachment (uparaga) with theâsadharana kriya' such a self appears as qualified by ano-ther object.

As antahkarana it appears as having sorrow and asundergoing changes ; but as the self it has the form of 'pre-maspada9 (love) and is the percipuent. In all the objectslike ahankara etc., it is manifest as consciousness which isimmanent; and as excluding the other objects, it is manifestas ahankara. This is a fact of common experience, and


Vivaranam 171

the same entity appears as having two forms. It is saidthat it is 'sarvaloka sakshi' ; and let those .who argue exa-niine,their own experience carefully and say whether thisis a fact or no.

Objection from Prabhakara EVSSmansa

The self is the asraya for the knowledge of the object*In 'aham janami' (( know) we find that the ahankara ap-pears as having its asraya in knowledge. Then how canthe 'aham' be the this ? The experience or cognition of'aham' shows plainly that it is untouched by, that it hasnothing to do with, the this.

Objection to this objection from Advaita : In 'ayodahati' it is well known that iron is not the agent havingthe action viz., burning. Likewiae even though it is notthe agent (karta) there is the ahankara -vhich has the co-gnition (or which cognises).

The Prabhakara replies : Quite apart from the ironwe find the fire whose natural property is to burn. Thefire is the asraya for the act of burning. Likewise we donot find an entity called the self as distinct from the ahan-kara, because apart from the ahamkara we cannot have thejnana kriya. Hence the ahankara itself is the self.

According to the Sankhy a'system, there is the appear-ance (avabhasa) of the reflection of consciouness on theantahkarana which js unconscious (acidatman). Just in-front of it there is its original 'bimba', for the reflectionof the face is possible only where there is the face in frontof the mirror. From this they infer the self to be of thenature of the 'bimba* or the original for the reflection ia


172 Panchapapika

According to the Nyaya and Vaisesldka systems, de-sire and other 'gunas' are the 'visesha gunas' of a sub-stance which is distinct from the Mahabhutas. In theseelements desire etc., are not found; and since these gunasare apprehended or cognised only by the mind, they arecalled 'visesha gunas'. There are no 'visesha gunas' in theelements, or in the 'dik' or in 'kala' (space and time) or inthe mind. And by a procees of elimination it is inferredthat there is a distinct substance having the gunas like de-sire etc. Such a substance is the self.

According to the Sautrantika school of Buddhism,there is the appearance of the reflection of the objects inthe 'samvedana', and this requires its 'bimba' near by.The bimba is reflected in soumething other than itself. Andfrom the reflected face in the mirror, we infer the face isoutside the mirror. From the redness in the crystal we in-fer a red object is near by. Hence objects are always in-ferred*

It is with reference to these three views that the Pra-bhakara maintains that ^he subject (pramata), the object(prameya) and the means of cognition (pramana) are allimmediate (aparoksha)'.

If these systems say.that though the self is immediatelyapprehended, we require inference to present it clearly, wehave no quarrel with them. But if they say that the exis-tence of the self can only be inferred, then this conflictswith the immediacy of the self, just as it conflicts also withthe immediacy of the objects.

The Sautrantika argues that the objects are only infer-red. If the objects are apprehended directly in the infer-


Vivaranam 173

ential cognition, they can likewise be cognised even in per-ception, That which is an immediate and direct object forinferential cognition can be an immediate object in percep-tion with greater plausibility and truth. But if there is noapprehension of the object (which is bimba bhata) in infe-rence, then you cannot say that the objects are inferred ;

and there is no need for them to take recourse to inference.Inference here is opposed to the avabhasa of the objectswhich are 'aparoksha vyavahara yogya' (capable of beingcognised directly).

The vijnan avadinargues that the object is essentially ofthe form of vijnana, and that there is the immediacy of thevijnana. Since there is no difference between the vijnanawhich is the object and the vijnana which cognises it, thereis the ^parokshavabhasa9 (immediacy) of the object.

It is to reject such an orgument that the Prabhakar^says : "there is the immediacy of the object in so far as theobject is the object for a subject in a cognition". There isthe experience, "I am seeing this". It is not due to its non-difference from vijnana; there is the immediacy of theobject. The self has an immediate silver which is cognisedas distinct from me and from my cognition. If it is saidthat the external silver is, vijnana itself, then like the exter -nal silver, it cannot have negation. Hence without anymediation we have the immediacy of the object; and thisimmediacy is the same as the cognition that requires thesense contact with the object.

According to the Vartikakara and the Nyaya-Vaisesh-ika systems, there is a perceptual cognition arising from the'samyoga' (contact) between the self and the mind ; and this


174 Panchapadika

perceptual cognition apprehends the self as immediate. TheNyaya-Vaiseshika systems observe that the self is united tothe mind. There is 'samyukta samavaya' (conjnct inhere-nce) relationship here. This relationship is the conditionor cause giving rise to a distinct or new knowledge. Such aknowledge makes 'pramiti' immediate. But accor-ding to the Vartikakara, the pramiti or means of cog-nition is 'prameyagata\ The eye comes into contact withan object and with such an object that there is the relation-ship of identity-in-difference for knowledge. Due to thisrelation of 'tadatmya' there arises a distinct or new know--ledge as the object of the ^pramiti'. And from this is esta-blished the immediacy of the pramiti.

It is with reference to these views that the Prabhakarastates that 'the subject and the pramiti are purely immediateonly ; they are immediate in yet another way from theimmediacy of the object.

There is no ^pramana9 by which we can say that be-cause of a new knowledge arising from the mind the self isimmediate.

The objector may argue that in the presence of themind there is not the apprehension of the self and in itsabsence in deep sleep there is no such apprehension. Assuch it might be said that agreement and difference estab-lish the Nyaya contention.

But the actual experience of the objects goes againstthis contention. Our 'anubhava sambandha' (experience)with the objects itself proves the immediacy of the objects.In the same manner there is the immediacy of the self expe-


Vivaranam 175

rienced by us. In such a case it is unnecessary to assumea new knowledge and a new function of the mind to esta-blish it. The self is the asraya for the knowledge of theobject; and we need not assume a ^Jnanantara' (anothercognition). As such we conclude that there is the immedi-acy of the self without the mediation of the objects.

The Nyaya contends that the samyukta samavaya isthe cause of the 'jnanantara9. We cannot say that the'experi-ence of the self or of the object is immediate through jnana.nfara because of this relationship. Now, perception refersto or involves the reference to an object here and now. Insuch a case the Nyaya theory would require that there shouldbe two experiences at the same time.

Let us assume that6 samyukta samavaya sambandha' orthe relationship of 'samyukta tadatmya' gives us the appre-hension or experience. In such a case along with the imme-diacy of the knowledge there ought to be the immediacy ofthe 'parimana' of the self and of the âsa' of the object aswell. Experience cannot be apprehended (gamyah) by ano-ther knowledge, for that would involve the violation of its'sva prakasatva'.

There are some (Bhatta Mimamsakas) who hold thatthe 'prakatya9 (manifestation) which is in the object is also'svaprakasa'. In this theory it is impossible to maintainthe very emergence of this 'prakatya\ The experience ofthe object cannot be said to arise from the "atra vyapara'.And many reasons can be adduced. An activity can bedue to 'parispands' or to /parinama\ The self is 'vibhiT/all-pervasive) and as such cannot have any 'parispanda,


^ Panchapadika

like the pot. It cannot undergo any change for the pro-duct of the change is dependent on the act which brings itabout; and the act is seen to merge into the effect. Butthe activity of the self is not seen to merge into the object.And if knowledge is the 'asraya' of the object, the objectswould have to become conscious entities.

It cannot also be argued that the objects have thepower to give rise to their knowledge ; and since knowledgehas its asraya in the self 3 the self is conscious. In such acase the mind too would be conscious for it too gives riseto knowledge. If the objects are "svaprakasa5 and have theproperty of 'prakatya', take the cognition, this is known byme. Here is the avabhasa of a relation between me andthis. The object is apprehended by me, or is made knownby me. If the object is 'svaprakasa' such a cognition isimpossible ; and the Bhatta Mimansa cannot even infer the'jnana kriya' in the self. When experience does not haveany relationship with the self but only with the objects, the'parinama kriya' will be in the self and its ^hala' will bein the experience. In the absence of this 'ekadhikarana(identical locus) we cannot have Jnananumiti (inferentialcognition).

Hence 'prarnata' and 'pramitp have no immediacy inthe sense of 'karmatva'. They are immediate in a diffe.rent way.

Objection : It is not proper to assume 'svayam pra"kasatva' for both the subject and the 'pramitf. It is betterto accept only the immediacy of the self, and not of know-ledge also ; and it is better to accept the *sva prakasatvaôf the self only. If the self has 'svaprakasatva', it wouldmake every activity possible including knowledge.


Vivaranam 177

Reply ; The Prabhakara replies that our experienceproves the 'svaprakasatva' of the pramiti ; and because ofthis everything else is illuminated. If experience is devoidof 'svaprakasatva9 there can be no experience. Even if theself is devoid of 'sva prakasatva9, it does not cease to be aself, since it is the 'asraya9 of knowledge. But if the 'pra-miti' is devoid of 'svaprakasa9 it cannot cognise or appre-hend the objects.

Another way to establish this contention is to focusour attention on. the 'pramana phala\ Only after the per-ceptual "contact we have the 'hanady npa lampha' etc,Because of this we are able to say that perceptual contacthas a 'phala' or results in a valid experience. The "pramanaphala' is the ^pramiti9 or knowledge. Suppose there isthe 'catushtaya saunikarsha' and there can yet be the ab~sence of the experience of the objects. In such a case wecan have neither the 'han^' (loss) nor the 'upadana^ (gain).As such experience itself is the 'phala'. When there isthe experience proper, it is not logical to think of some-thing else as being the 'pramana phala'.

It has been said that knowledge is tke 'pramanaphala" and this is doubted by ^he Buddhists. Sinceknowledge (samvedana) has the specific form of the obiect,we are abife to speak of the pratnanatva of the 'samvit'.Tte'phala'of this prslfflaha is dfthe form of the "vishayasphurana\ SamvedanA has the ^ramanatva' in so far asit has a form similar to that of the object. This 'pramanaphala' is the apprehension (upalabdhi) of the objects.

23)


178 ' Panchapadika

To prevent such a conclusion, the Prabhakara obser-ves : The pramana is the act of the subject, having its'phala linga'; and it is always inferred. Pramana, accord-ing to this school, involves the 'sannikarsha' (contact) offour entities; these four are the object, the sense organ,the mind and the self. We do not have a perceptual co-gnition of this "catushtaya sannikasha'. But from ourvalid perceptual cognitions, we infer that these four werepresent in that cognition. The phala linga spoken of isthe apprehention of form etc. From this 'upalabdhi9 weinfer the presence of the four entities.

Take the cognition 'aham idam janami' (T know this.)The 'T represents the experiencing self and the this standsfor the experienced not-self, ânami" is the experience ofknowledge. The objector argues that to reject the ^karma-taya aparokshatva9 of the pramata and the pramiti is tocontradict or go against experience. But we have to re-member the distinction we have made out between thethree. Now, if the experience 'having the not-self as itsobject were to be the asraya to make the 'atma vyavahara'possible, we need not assume a separate jnan'B. There isno scope lor assuming a jnana in the subject. As such thePrabhakara states : "The jnana vyapara (act of knowing)of the subject refers to the object and not to the self. Theself is the condition of the experience of the objects; andas such it is seen as the I both in the phala or experienceand in the object. The I is the condition or cause of theexperience of the objects."

Objection to the Prabhakara theory from the Bhattastand point - ~


Vivaranam £79

That which appears (avabhasate) always appears as theobjects of knowledge; But in the cognitions of the objectsthe self too necessartly appears. If this is accepted the selfwould appear to be the object, not to be a more 'asraya'.So the Bhafta argues that "the I is not the cause or con-dition for the experience of the objects. It is different fiomthis position. The 'aham' is only 'atma matra vishayah'.The 'aham' is nothing but the self.

Now perceptual knowledge arises from the object ; andwe have to accept 'karma karakatva* for the object. ThePrabhakara argues that there is the immediate apprehensionof the self. In such a case the self that apprehends mustbe the subject of the aparehended self which is the object.In the same act how can one and the same thing be boththe subject and the object ? The subject and the object aremutually exclusive entities. Further, of the subject and theobject in the knowledge situation, the latter is more impor-tant and the former is subordinate. Thus when the sameentity appears as two, these two forms are opposed to oneanother in their nature also.

So the Bhatta Mimansaka argues : "The self has twoforms. As having the form of a substance, the self becomesan object; and as the knowing form, it is the subject. Thusthe aham pratyaya is constituted by the two forms of th^subject and the object; and the self, then, is both the cog-niser and the cognised. Hence the self has the form of thethis and also the form of the not-this. The 'prameyamsa'isof the form of the this,, while the 'pramatramsa" is ofthe form of the^non-tbis".

Reply of the Prabhakara to this objection :


180 Panchapadika

The self is said to have 'amsas' (parts). The 'samanya-msa' is of the from of the object. It is a substance and nota subject; and yet it is common both to the object and tothe subject. But since it is an amsa making the self an obj-ect, it cannot be treated as the self. The 'viseshamsa' issaid to be of the form of the subject ; but the self is devoidof any parts. Hence there cannot be any distinction of thesubject and the object in the self itself.

If the self were to undergo any change, it ought to beâvayava^ (having parts). But the self being 'niravayava*(having no parts) it cannot change itself into the subject andthe object at the same time.

Further, does the apprehending (gr^h^k^ rupa) self everhave the nature of the object ? Or no ? If it does not havethe nature of the object, it cannot be the apprehending selfsince the Bhatta does not accept the self to be 'svayam pra?"kasa1' and does not recognise the self to be the ^.sraya ofknowledge. If it can have the nature of the object, the re-ply is : ^The object is of the form of the 'this9 and is alwaysthe other, not the I; and then it would be the not-self^.

Thus from a consideration of knowledge alone we canestablish the immediacy of the subject, object and^ramjtf.And the ^ham' is the asraya of knowledge and thus it toobecomes immediate. Consequently ahankara cannot be theîdam amsa' (this).

Experience is the phala (product) of 'catushtayia sa^ni-karsha' with tte objects anid it is 'syay^m pr^kpâ'.. Theobject is apprehended as the this ; ^jid the apprehendingentity is revealed as the not-this by experience. And this


Vivaranam 181

experience enables us to infer the pramana (catushtaya san-nikarsha). Hence we cannot take out ahankara to be the'idam amsa\

Reply of Advaita to the Prabhakara

The purport of the reply is to distinguish the self fromahankara. Towards this end Padmapada first proceeds toestablish that the self is 'svayam prakasa\ And he esta-blishes this through a criticism of the Prabhakara view.The prabbakara view m^y me^n three possible things andall are impossible. These three alternatives are : i) Theself is âitanya prakasa' and experience is 'jada prakasa';

ii) Both are âitanya prakasa^ ; and in) the self is 'jadasvarupa' while experience is 'cajtanya prakasa'.

(i) The first alternative is impossible. If experienceis ^jada svarupa' (noL-seHtient), we will have to admit tha^there is the non-appearance (anavabhasa) of everything.*Jada prakasa' means that though it is not 'sva prakasa" itcan reveal or illumine the objects because of some otherfactor.

Objection ; Does knowledge reveal that which isnot known ? or th^t which is known ? The eye revealsthat which is not revealed: and you cannot then make outthe rioyi-appearance of everything.

Reply ; No. The eye reveals or illumines the objects;

but it is not svayam prakasa. The eye has the prakasaonly to reveal the objects and not to reveal itself. Hereinit differs from knowledge which reveals the objects im-mediately and in so doing also reveals itself. Know-ledge cannot have ânother knowledge (samvedana) to illu-mine it, for this would lead to a regrees. As such itJs


182 Panchapadika

sva prakasa. It therefore differs from the sense organslike the eye. We can say that experience reveals theobjects like a 'pradipa' (lamp) which also reveals itself.

Objection : No such distinction can be made outbetween the eye and the 'pradipa', for both reveal theobjects only by giving rise to the experience of theobjects.

Reply : This is a faulty argument for there is a dist-inction between the eye and the 'padipa9, Both theseagain differ from knowledge. Knowledge gives us theapprenhension of the objects while it dispels ignorance,The 'pradipa aloka' is different from this jnana, in so faras the former has the praka&a only to dispel darkness' Thealoka is different from experience and its prakasa candispel darkness without giving rise to knowledge. Butknowledge has prakasa which not only dispels ignorancebut also gives the knowledge of the objects. The eye doesnot and cannot fulfil any of these functions, since it hasneither the nature ofjnana nor that of the aloka.

Hence experience does not require any similar experi-ence to illumine it or reveal it. While it has prakasa it isalso the condition or cause that brings about the "prakasadivyavahara9 in' the object. Just like the 'pradipaloka', itbrings about the 'prakasadi vyavahara' in the objectimmediately.

Objection : The ^pradipa" is illumined by the âloka^which is of the same nature as the former. In the sameway can't we say that there is a 's^jatiya prakasa5 (illu-mination of a like nature) for the eye because of whichthe eye is able to reveal the pot ?


Vivaranam 183

Reply : This is impossible because the eye itself isnot a prakasa, but only a property of prakasa.

Does the 'aloka' require the illumination of the. eye('cakshusha prakasa) so that there might arise that prakasawhich is opposed to darkness ? or does it require the 'caks-husha prakasa' so thatthere^might arise that'jn ana prakasa'which, is opposed to ignorance ?

The first alternative is impossible since the eye is onlya prakasa guna. As regards the second alternative weshould note that the 'pradipa' is illumined by the knowle-dge which is distinct from it. It does not require a similar'aloka'.

Hence just as the "pradipa" which is screened cannotillumine the objects, so also experience, which is devoid of"prakasa', cannot illumine or reveal objects. And every-thing would remain unrevealed or unilluminated. Consequ-ently we cannot admit that experience is 'jada prakasa'. -

Objection : Even though experience is 'jada sva-rupa\ yet objects are made intelligible by the svaprakasa ofthe subject. From this we can argue that 'pramatri caita-nya' reveals itself and the object. Pramana is a consciousentity ; and because of this strength the subject is able tomake us aware of the object as the this and of the subjectas the not-this. He does this like a lamp that reveals itselfand also others. Hence the 'anavabhasa' of the world doesnot arise.9

Reply ; Experience is said to bring about the atta-chment (uparaga) of the objects to caitanya. Such a rela-


184 Panchapadika

tionship between the self and the object is brought aboutby experience. Then experience itself would be a'buddhiparinama (evoSute of the intellect). This is opposed to thePrabhakara view, bnt is acceptable io us. It is possible thsfexperience too has svaprakasa. But the ^cidatma prakasa9cannot be dependent on the 'jadanubhava/ 'The self isconsciousness and svayain prakasa ; and to say that such aself illumines itself as being dependent oh the objects is in-conceivable. Now how does the dipa (lamp) illumineitself ? If it requires another dipa to illumine it, it leads usto a regress. If the pramata is like the dipa we would haveto face this regress.

ii) The second alternative make<» out that the self andexperience are both 'caitanya prakasa'. Now if both aresva prakasa one does not involve any reference to the other.They will have no relationship at all like two distinct per-sons. Nor can we apprehend the relation of the self to thesamvit. If the self manifests itself by itself why should itrefer to the objects or relate itself to the objects ?

Objection : My knowledge of another person is notsvayam prakasa for that other person. This knowledge isthe form or property of consciousness. Likewise the selfhas the 'caitanyaguna' (Samvedana) and yet is not svayamI-rakasa. Though the self is of the nature of consciousness,it is not svayam prakasa.

Reply : What is the cause of this distinction ? If theself is of the nature of co'hsciousriess, how can it be svayamparakasa ? And how can the experience of the objects makeit immediate ? If the self is dependant on the experience ofê objects, the experience too vnll have the "prakasa5 by"being dependent on something other ttian itself.


Vivaranam 185

It might be argued that my knowledge of another per-son is not immediate for that person. It is only a mediatedknowledge for him. -And such a mediacy is not there inexperience. In such a case the prakasa of the self cannotbe mediated by experience, since experience is directly rela-ted to the self. Just as one dipa does not require anotherdipa to illumine it, similarly self and experience do not re-quire one another if both are sva prakasa.

iii) The third alternative makes out experience to besva prakasa and the self to be 'jada svarupa' This too can-not be accepted.

According to the Bhattas, 'samvedana' is only aârma'for knowledge is in the objects as 'prakatya' or as 'Jnatata"whence we know the objects. If knowledge is a ^karma' oran object, it is impossible to cognise it, for cognition can-not function without knowledge. Nor can we have the ex-perience and the awareness of the objects.

The Sankhya treats samvedana as a substance. Thenit ought to be an atom, or an infinite entity, or one thathas only 'madhyama parimana'. If it has only9 anu pari-mana\ then we will be aware of only an 'anu parimana*(atomic magnitude) in the object $ for if the light of theglow-worm alone is shed on the pot, the whole pot is notrevealed. If it is an infinite entity, since its asrayais theself, there should be the avabhasa of the self everywhere. Ifit has âdhyama parimana" (the magnitutude of th,e con-tainer), then knowledge would be an entity having parts $and this would make knowledge dependent on these partsand not on the self.

24)


186 Panchapadika

The Nyaya and the Prabhakara systems take samvedanato be the property of the self. Due to the necessary rela-tionship between the guna (quality) and the gunin (sub-stance) the self itself will have the prakasa guna ; and thenit might be said that just like the pr.dipa, the self revealsitself while revealing the objects. But we have said earlierthat the prakasa guna is never born, but only the mediumthat reveals it. This guna is not born in its 'asrayopadhi'like the prakasa of the sun. Thus we would be forced toadmit that the self itself is svayam prakasa. Therefore Pad-mapada says- Êven if the Prabhakara does not like it, theconclusion is unavoidable that the self alone is svayam pra"kasa (self - luminous)*'.

Objection : Jnana is svaprakasa and knowledge hasits asraya in the self which is of 'madhyama parimana'.Then as the asraya of knowledge, the self too may be takento be svaprakasa. The pot has its asraya in its own avaya-vas, and yet the pot is on the ground. The pot is onlydependent on the clay and not on the ground. Likewisesvaprakasatva is in knowledge and knowledge is in the selfThus svaprakasatva is not dependent on the self. Hence i'cannot be made out that âitanya prakasa^ is 'svaprakasa'?

Reply : There is no way to establish such aconten.tion. It is impossible to argue thai caitanya prakasa is notsvaprakasa. Just as we have the cognition 'it is illuminedby the pradipa\ we have also the cognition like 'this isknown by me\ This experience proves that the self itself is*cit prakasa'. Otherwise this statement would have to beon a par with the sentence'this is illumined by the firewood-

The self is not distinct from experience. Now, know-ledge (samvedana) does not reveal the difference 'between


Vivaranam 1.87

these two. That which is dependant on experience becomesthe not-self since it is similar to an object. We have toaccept that the single, unchanging, immanent self alone i8experience. So Padmapada states : "If experience arisesfrom a pramana, then such an experience is one which isinternally differentiated ; and each specific internal differen-tiation will have to reveal or illumine every object distinctlyand separately".

Instead of assuming many experiences and their uni-versal, it is better to accept that there is a single experiencecalled the self, for this alone is real. 'Just as there is asingle 'gotva' (cowness) running through all the cows, wehave an 'anubhavatva' (experience-hood) common to allexperiences or running through all experiences'. Experi-ence, then, is not one which is internally differentiated. Wedistinguish the experience of blue from that of yellow: andthis distinction is dependent upon the objects that enterinto experience. These objects do not create internaldifferentiation, in the experience, but only make us havethe experience in a specific form.

Objection ; When I have the apprehension ofblue^the apprehension of [yellow has ceased to be there. Thereis the 'sthitF (state) of one experience and the distinctionof another experience. As such we should accept a differ-ence in the dharmi and say that there are many experien-ces. The destruction and otherwise of experiences go toestablish the specific differentiations in experience.

/Reply : If so, because of these differentiations only

we have the presence and absence of experiences. In thismanner it will involve he vicious circle.


188 Panchapadika

Objection : The required means is near and by anew apprehension has arisen. But since two apprehensionscannot coexist, the previous one is destroyed.

Reply 2 No, this would involve the fallacy of ^n-yonyasrayata^ (mutual dependence). The samvit is said tobe born; and it is born only when there is the samvit.Consequently you cannot have even one samvit. Insteadof this it is easier and better to assume that the samve-dana^ is already] there; and it requires only 'sadhana'(means) which brings about the uparaga of the objects forthe experience. It is unnecersary to assume {[that everyexperience arises afresh from the uparaga of the objects.

The Buddhists argue that though experiences differfrom one another, this difference is not cognised becauseof the defects like extreme similarity. There is a flamewhich appears as one even though it is brought about bythe individual flames of the sticks put in it. Likewise we

are not cognising the differences between the various'samvits9.

This theory also involves the same fallacy as above.We assume similarity only when we cognise the difference;

•and we can establish difference only when we cognise simi-larity.* When the "samvif is prakasamana, its differencestoo must be illumined or revealed. Likewise, it is notproper to say that the internal differences in'citprakasa.are not revealed. Only when there are these differencesyou can say that in the absence of the'bheda pra? asa9'(appearance of difference) there is an erroneous cognitionbrought about by similarity.


Vivaranam 189

You cannot also bring in the case of the self whoseform is that of Brahman and who is svayam jyotih; andyou cannot say that just as the Brahman-hood (brahma-rupatva) of the self is not revealed or illumined, so is thedifference in the experiences. In the case of the self thereis the sufficient cause for such a revelation. But it is the^vidya pratibandha' that is responsible for the absence ofthe prakasa. In the case of experience there is no suchpratibandha and the differences amongst experiences, ifthey are real, ought to be manifested.

Objection : We can prove the reality of these dif-ferences on the basis of the inference called 'samanyatodrishta'. The major premise is : Due to similarity theavabhasa of the differences amongst the samvits they areprevented from emerging. The main reason is - becausethey are cognised or known by the intellect of the sthay1prakasa (abiding effulgence); and the illustration is thatof the flame.

Objection : Then how can there be the experience ofthe objects for the atma caitanya which is eternal ?

RepSy ; That there are differences is opposed to ex-perience and also to logical reasoning. No inference canestablish the reality of a non-existent. Experienee is oneand is of the same form in all experiences; and if differe-nce is real it ought to be revealed.

Reply : The self is of the nature of conscious-ness. The various different objects which enter into thisconsciousness delimit it: and thus these seem to appearas different experiences. The selfând other words convey themeaning of the 'avivakshitopadhi (undetermined condition-ing). The trees are in a forest. The trees are in a parti-cular place and they are given a common name, forest.


190 Panchapadika

And each tree differs from the other and also from the

forest. And yet it is only a tree and is also constitutive ofthe forest,

Ahamkaranubhava (Experience of the Eg.o.).

Objection: There is the experience of the objectsfor the atxna caitanya which[i& -svayam prakasamana . Yetthe experience of the objects alone gives rise to the 'drash-stri paramrsa as the 'aham'. Prom this we are forced toconclude that the self it&elf is the ahannkara. The self isthe cause or condition for the experience of the objects.Such a self is the ahankara which is of the nature of thenot-this. The self can be considered to be the perceiveronly because of the experience of the objects. Here theobjector does not consider the svarupavabhasa, If we donot so consider the self as the perceiver, then there willhave to be the *'cmmatra avabhasa' (manifestation of con-sciousness alone) which i& devoid of 'drashtradi vibhaga9(differentiations "of the seer, seen etc. Since the latter isnot apprehended, we have to take the self to be the perci-pient; and}the percipient involves the objects and makesus hold to the identity of the self with the ahankara.

RepSy : In deep sleep there is the avabhasa of theself and not of the ahankara. If they are identical, theahankara must be apprehendedîn deep sleep.

Objection : The cause of the experience of the ob-jects is the ahankara as the percipient. Since the objectsare absent in deep sleep, you con9! have the apprehensionof the self as the 'ahankara\

Reply : The cause of the experience of the objectsis not the self or the ahankara, but the 'avabhasa' of the


Vivaranam 191

objects; for it is not svaprakasaka but only 'jada\ Hencewe cannot have the ârnmarsa' of the conscious self aris-ing from the experience of the objects. Thus it is said;

^When the blae is felt in consciousness, there is ^he exist-ence of the blue; and this cannot be taken to give rise tothe apprehension of the percipient as the ahankara. Theknowledge of the blue arises from the this and not fromthe percipient. The perceiving individual is not mereahankara. In 'aham' that whcch is revealed is the self.

Objection ; Now in deep sleep there is the absenceof the percipient. Yet haw do you refer ro that percipientas 'aham' ?

Reply : "In deep sleep there are no objects andthere cannot be the cognition- 'idam janamF (I know this).There is no reference to the objects and to the experience aswell. As such there may not be any reference to ahankara.But what is there to prevent the reference being made to theself, and not to ahankara ? To be a percipient I must haveobjects ; and if the percipient is conveyed by 'aham', thenahankara will be only the not-self, since it is absent in deepsleep, Ahankara involves the objects and is destructible ;

and it cannot be identical with the self. By 'aham' we meanthat which does not involve the objects. If the ahankara isthe self, there ought to be the 'aham ullekha' in deep sleep.But since such a thing is not there, ahankara is the not-self.

Objection : The form of the percipient is that 'bho-ktritva' (being an enjoyer) which excludes all relationshipwith the objects. Ahankara is that consciousness which is^nirvikalpaka' (non-determinate). Such a consciousness is(bhasate) there in deep sleep.


192 Panchape.dika

If we include the word'katham' (how) in this objeotion, the passage would mean : That the presence of theobjects would make the ahankara the not - self. This isopposed to experience The that which is being experien-ced as excluding the not-self cannot be treated as being thenot-self. But in deep sleep there is no experience of theobjects ; and hence there does not arise the question of theexperience of the ahankara.

Padmapada states the objection thus : By aham thatwhich is revealed is the nature of the enjoyer- And in theabsence of the objects in deep sleep, how can there be the'pratibhasa' of the ahankara ?

Repgy ; This identification of the self with ahankara,is impossible ; for in view of the absence of the objects indeep sleep, it is not ahankara that is in deep sleep. Whenthe 'upadhi visesha" relation with objects is removed, wehave only the^ consciousness which is the meaning of'aham^Then we should always have the 'aham pratiti\

Objection : Even the objectless 'svarupa7 may beconveyed by âham*, since the 'ahanf is present also in theexperience of the objects.

Reply: In the former the objects aie not involved^while in the latter the objects are necessary. The two aredissimilar. You can argue that the same consciouness isspoken of as the ahankara when objects are present. Theconsideration of the objects would establish the ahankaraand not the objectless consciousness. Consciousness by it-self exists without the objects. Then to treat the ahankarawhich is attached to the objects and which requires the obj^


Vivaranam 193

ectcs, as the self that exists in deep sleep, is contrary'to ex-perience. The self that appears in deep sleep is that whichis unrelated to objects and which has no experience of obje-cts ; and since there is nothing to be perceived, there is the'svarupa siddhi9. The self is 'sarvatmakatva^ (universalconsciousness) whence it has nothing to exclude from itself.And only when there is the attachment of the objects to the*aham\ there is the awareness of the objects that are distinctfrom the 'aham\

If it is said that the ahankara is in deep sleep withoutrequiring objects and that there is this awareness, then weought to remember it, just as we do remember the ahan-kara of yesterday. There is the abhimana of the ahankarayesterday ; and even though there is no rule that we shouldremember all that was experienced, yet since the nature ofahankara is to remember, there should be the memory ofthe ahankara in deep sleep.

Objection ; The eternal consciousness is beyonddestruction ; and abankara being this consciousness, wecannot have the samskara necessary for memory. Samskaraarises after an experience is over ; and such a thing is impo-ssible here. Hence there is no memory of ahankara.

Reply ; In such a case even the ahankara of yester-day cannot be remembered.

Objection ; How can you establish the 'ahankarasmriti' on your own view ? For ahankara, according toyou, is said to be illumined by the sakshi caitanya,

25)


194 Panchapadika

Reply : It is only the antahkarana as conditioned bythe ^ham vritti9 that becomes the object for consciousness.This psychosis has a beginning and an end. Then it canhave the samskaras of previous experiences from whichthere arises memory. And the antahkarana is conditionedby such a memory. But the antahkarana in turn conditionsthe ^smrity anubhava' (rai shi caitanya). In this way we ex-plain the memory of ahankara.

Objection : Now, in deep sleep there is the experi-ence of happiness (sukha), and this happiness always has itsleaning towards its asraya which is the ahankara. Whycan^t we then say that even in .deep sleep there is the expe-rience of antahkarana ? After we get up from sleep I saythat I slept happily. Herein we refer to an experience ofhappiness in deep sleep. Since such an experience necess-arily implies the aham, there is the 'aham ullekha9 in deepsleep".

Reply : If happiness was experienced, we should notethat happiness arises from objects. And there will be the"aham ullekha' arising only from the experience of the obj-ects. In deep sleep there cannot be the experience of something other than itself by the self. Then thef can be thememory arising from the samskara of the experience ofhappiness. We refer to that state as one of 'sukha' andby this we only mean the absence of ^duhkha9.

Objection : ^When you enquire into the nature andmeaning of 'sukha', you give up the primary and essentialpositive meaning of 'sukha'; and instead of this you aretaking its opposite to interpret ûkha^ to mean . 'duhkhaabhava\ You can take recourse to such secondary ineani-


Vivaranam 195

ngs (lakshana) only if it is verbal knowledge that is to bodetermined. When 'sukhavamarsa' is a fact of experienceyou cannot resort to ^lakshana'.

Reply : Since there is no way to find out that thereis an experience of sukha and since that state can be descri-bed only in a negative way» we treat 'sukha' to mean onlythe absence of 'duhkha\ A s in the waking state, so indream too we have the experience of 'duhkha'. Since suchan experience is not found in deep sleep we refer to it as'sukha'. We are able to say that there is no 'duhkha' be-cause in deep sleep the sense organs cease to function.

Objection : Why cannot we assume the primarymeaning of'sukha' because of the power implicit in the'paramarsa' ?

Reply : "If there is the memory of deep sleep andalso of its object viz., sukha, we should remember it as hay-ing the 'uparaga' (attachment) of the specific objects. Bu^such a memory is not there. And even when we describe ifwe only say- (! slept well; and nothing was done (cetitam)by me ? This statement too proves that the object of refe-rence is the absence of unhappiness.

Objection ; But we can also prove the experience ofhappiness in deep sleep from the fact that one gets up fromsleep and feels himself light and refreshed ; and ^this makesus infer the experience of happiness.

Reply ; This is false. If the sukha is directly expe-rienced, it does not re quire an inference to establish it,


196 Panchapadika

Objection : Then how is it that one feels himselflight and refreshed as he wakes up, while another does notfeel so ?

Reply ; During the waking state our sense-organsget tired ; and this is overcome by stopping their activity.Such a stopping of the activity of the sense organs is deepsleep. There too if there is complete cessation of the acti-vity, we feel light and refreshed as we get up. If there isno &uch complete cessation we feel otherwise when weget up.

From this we conclude that even as the enj'oyer theaham is not remembered in deep sleep.

Objection ; If the self is experienced as the enjoyer?it ought to be remembered.

Reply : It is not a rule that all that was experiencedshould be remembered. When the self is being remembe-red^ that aspect of it being the ahankara, what needs to beremembered is the ahankara only and not the self.

Prakasatman's objection against Padmapada's conten-tion that in deep sleep we have the absence of unhappiness.

Even if we admit that there is 'duhkhabhava', it is notpossible to experience such an entity. And there can be nomemory of such an entity because it is a negative entity.There can be the experience of the 'svarupananda' which isfundamental, and not any other sukha.

Objection : But since that 'svarupananda sukha' isenveloped by avidya, it cannot have any prafcasa.


Vivaranam 197

Reply : The 'sukhamsa' of the witnessing conscious-ness is never enveloped by avidya, for avidya itself is'sakshibhasya'. It is 'prakasamana*.

Objection: How is it this sukha is not revealedduring the waking state ?

Reply : It is revealed as having the nature of 'paramapremaspadatva\ But it is not illumined or revealed clearlyjust like the light of the pradipa which is being blown by afierce wind ; it is îthya jnana vikshipta'. Since there isno such preventing force in deep sleep, it is manifestedbetter.

Objection : When one gets up he refers to the abs-ence of unhappiness in deep sleep. Since there is no know-ledge of the 'pratiyogF, there cannot be any experience. Ifso, how does he refer to it ?

Reply ; That which was experienced is only sukha ;

and when he gets up he remembers it. We arrive at theabsence of duhkha through arthapatti; for, if sukha wasexperienced, there was no duhkha. The absence of duhkhais not remembered, but only inferred or assumed. Likewiseone who gets up refers to the absence of knowledge sincethat which was experienced is its opposite, viz., ajnana.Since we cannot argue that it is remembered, we infer orassume the experience of jnanabhava.

Objection : During the waking state too we experi-ence ajnana. How can this ajnana be the opposite ofknowledge ?


*^ rancnapacliKa

Reply : In deep sleep there is the experience of thatajnana which is qualified (determined) by the specific stateof sleep- This ajnana is seen to be opposed to the know-ledge of pot etc. y that we have in the waking state. Theknowledge of the pot is opposed to the knowledge of thecloth, when we are having the latter,

Objection : Since we do not have the memory ofthe various knowledges in deep sleep, we may infer thaithere is the absence of knowledge. Thereby you need notassume the experience of 'ajnana' which is opposed to^jnana'.

An object which is beyond this world cannot be seenand therefore cannot be remembered ; likewise there is noexperience ofjnana in deep sleep because it is not remem-bered.

Reply ; Even when there is the knowledge of such atranscendental object, there need rot be a memory of it.There was the absence of the elephant in the morning. ButI can infer the^gajabhava'through arthapatti by taking intoconsideration, the objects that make the presence of the ele-phant there inconsistent. I now remember the objects whichmake its presence incompatible with them. I do not arriveat the conclusion merely from the 'anudaya' (non-emerging)of the memory of the elephant: Therefore I arrive through'arthapattF at the 'jnanabhava' and the ^duhkhabhava' fromthe incompitibility of the presence of the specific ajnanaand of the experience of sukha respectively.

Objection : We have the experience of ajnana, theexperience of sukha, and the witnessing consciousness. We


Vivaranam 199

are said to remember all these three when we get up. Butto remember there must be a samskara which presupposesthe destruction of the previous experience. In every expe-rience there is the 'sakshi caitanya' which has no destru-ction. Then how is there the memory of these three forone when he gets up from sleep ?

Reply : Consciousness in itself is eternal, but as con-ditioned it is not eternal. Thus memory becomes possible.Ajnana evolves itself into the form of that which witnessesits own happiness. In this evolved ajnana, there arises the'caitanyabhasa9. From this we have the 'ajnanadi visesha-nubhava'.

Ajnana conditions consciousness and assumes a variety

of forms. Of these forms we have the ajnananubhava, suk"hanubhava and sakshi. These differ from one another sincethey are the various stages or forms of the evolving ajnana.Thus arises the difference between one 'caitanyabhasa' (cai-tanya vritti) and another. Such vrittis have a beginingand end and they are destroyed. They give rise to samskara'and this in its turn gives rise to memory. And the memoryappears in the forms of ajnana sukha and sakshi caitanya.

Now it is a rule that samskara has as its asraya in thatwhich has given rise to it. Such an entity is the self as con-ditioned by ajnana. It has its asraya in this ajnana, andnot in the antahkarana,

Thus there is always the possibility of experiencingthe 'ajnana sukha' in deep sleep. Consequently Padma^pada's argument in favour of 'dahkhabhava5 is faulty andinconsistent.


zuu fanctiapadika

Formal reply to this objection by Prakasatman him-self is now given;

This should not be construed as a mistake on the partof Padmapada for he is giving the reply not from the stand-point of his own system, but from that of the Nyaya system.

So far we have established that consciousness which issvayam prakasa is distinct from ahankara. The ahampra-tyaya, whose object is the self, is not at all different fromthe blue that is the object of cognition. Nor can the âham-ullekha' arise only from the experience of the objects. Thisdistinction between the self and the ahankara as maintainedby Sankara has its basis also in the Upanishads. This dis-tinction has its basis in the agamas also.

In the passage-^Sa evadhastat sa evoparishtat...", wefiind 'Sarvatmakatva' attributed to the 'Bhuma Brahman7.Then in âthato ahankaradesah*. We find ahankara treatedas 'sarvatmaka'. And later on in "athata atmadesah" wefind that the self is explicitly distinguished from ahankara.

Objection 2 There are'passages where the 'sarvat-makatva^ is attributed to the self, while in others it is attri-buted, to Brahman. This has been done only to establishthe identity of the self and Brahman. Likewise we can saythat the ^sarvatmakatva* referred to earlier is intended onlyto identify the ahankara with the self.

Reply : No. When one is distinct and different fromthe other, both cannot be treated as 'sarvatmaka'. Such 1sthe case with the self and the ahankara. But the self andBrahman are apprehended as different from one another ;

and the texts go to remove this error and establish their


Vivaranam 201

identity. As regards the ahankara, it is already apprehen-ded as being identical with the self ; and the texts are inten-ded to establish their difference. Since Brahman is no^taken to be immediate, the texts aim at establishing theimmediacy of Brahman. To achive this easily, they firstidentify the ahankara with the self ; and later on ignore ifor reject it. Thereby they are able to establish the iden-tity of the self with Brahman.

It is not only the sruthi that establishes the differencebetween the self and the ahankara, but also the smriti asin passages like" "mahabhutany ahankarah...".

i) What is the upadana of tahankara ? ii) What is itsinstrumental cause ? iii) What is its svarupa ? iv) What isits parimana ? v) What is its karya ? vi) Why does it notappear in deep sleep ?

i) The upadana is referred to in the texts as the âvya-kritha namarupa, avidya, m'aya, prakriti, agrahana, avyakta,tamas, karana, laya, sakti, mahasupti, nidra, akshara,akasa. Consciousness is in itself and by itself the form ofBrahman. Avidya prevents the appearence of this Brahmanand brings about the jiva. It is the strange wall whichhears or manifests itself in ^bhrantf, 'karma' and the sa^-skaras of previous experiences. In deep sleep it renîns asmere 'vikshepa samskara' by concealing or enveloping theprakasa. Such a beginningless avrdya is the material causeof ahankara.

ii) Paramesvara is the ground ; and this ground func-tions as the instrumental cause whence avidya evolves itselfinto a specific form called ahankara,

26)


202 Panchapadika

iii) The vijnana sakti 'and the kriya sakti of Isvaraconstitute the asraya of this ahankara;and this is its svarupa

iv) Its karya or product is seen in making us treat itas both the doer the enjoyer.

v) It gets its illumination (jyothih) by its integrationwith the kutastha caitanya which constitutes its pramanaThis ahankara has svayam prakasa and is immediate. Be-cause of this integration of the ahankara with the primalfoundational consciousness, 'consciousness is wrongly trea-ted as the enjoyer even though it is the not-this and eventhough it is the only self.

vi) In deep sleep all the evolutes of avidya have theirlaya (devolution) into avidya, whence ahankara ceases to beahankara. It remains in its 'karanarupa' (causeal statefviz, that of avidya. Where there is the devolution of the'linga sarira' (astral body) which is the product of ajnana,there we have deep sleep.

Objection : But even in deep sleep there is 'prana9which is the 'kriya' of ahankara. Then how can there bethe devolution of ahankara ?

Reply : We cannot attribute the nature of ahankaraalone to 'prana9. Trana' has an existence distinct fromthat of ahankara and in order there might be the five-foldactivity we only say that there is the fciyas sakti9 for ahan-kara ; for the prana vritti is dependent on the mind.

Objection ; But if the 'prana vyapara' is dependenton ahankara, in the absence of the later, the former tooshould cease.


Vivaranam 203

Reply : An alternative explanation is therefore given,We have said that there is a ^kriya sakti9 and a 'vijnanasakti' in ahankara. And we can say that there is the devo-lution of only the latter in deep sleep ; and since the formerremains there is prana. This can be argued out since thereare ainsas in antahkarana.

Or we can argue from the standpoint of drishti srishti(creative experience). In the dreams the objects seen arecreated. Extending this principle we may say that there isthe devolution in so far as the person having deep sleep 1sconcerned. That the person in deep sleep has 'prana' is thecognition of another who is not in deep sleep.

Now arises an objection from the Sankhya : It hasbeen admitted that the material cause for antahkarana etc.?is the unconscious maya. When there is the 'ahankara nir-bhasa', does it mean the 'aham pratyaya' or the 'sakshin ?Avidya which is not implicitly involved in aham pratyaya isonly a nimitta, and hence it cannot be the former. Andsince the sakshin in 'prajnana ghana^ it cannot involve avi-dya in itself. Avidya can bt said to be in the sakshin inone of the three ways- a) Avidya can be its sakti ; b) Avi-dya can have its asraya in it $ c) Avidya can be that whichis adhyasta on it. All these are impossible. And hencethis 'pradhana' is 'svatantra' (independent) and it evolvesby itself in three ways- Viz. dharma, lakshana, and avastha.The ^harma' (avayavi) parinama takes the form of thewhole world that is'kary a' beginning with 'mahaf. The^lakshana' parinama brings about the temporal distinctionsfor the evo lutes of the previous order. The unborn evoluteis born and later it is no more. Here we have the 'anagata


2(^ Panchapadika

lakshana' (unborn), 'vartamana' (present) lakshana, and'atita (future) lakshana. The avastha parinama. compre-hends the positive, comparative and superlative degrees andthe old and the new forms. The unconscious 'pradhana*can explain every thing and then we need not accept aconscious entity as the material cause.

Reply ; This view is to be rejected; for ahankara.being an evolute of prakrti it ought to be apprehended asthe 'this'. The self as the enjoyer is freed from the ^hankriti samsarga\ Ahankriti means the sakshin. There isthe appearance of consciousness as integrated with the not-self. This is as w^ have seen, neither a. case of akhyati,nor of anyathakhyati, nor of atma khyati. We have seenthat there is an ayidya having its asraya in consciousness.This avidya distorts the real and brings about the appea-rance of the integration with the mithya vastu. Such anappearance is a case of anirvapaniya khyati. If this inte-gration is not accepted consciousness and the unconsciousshould appear distinctly and separately, and not as a singleentity.

There is another objection from the Nyaya : When theself, the sense-organs and the objects are together therearises now and then some knowledge of the objects. Thereis the power here to give riss to knowledge. Further the'jnanadf vritti' which have their ground in the self haveto come in an order successively. That instrument whichgives that ability and facilitates this succession is the mindwhich should be assumed. There is nothing called antah"karana as distinct from the mind. Knowledge, happinessand unhappiness, desire, effect, and the like are said to beîjnana kriya vrittis" of antahkarana. The ground of these


Vivaranam 205

vrittis is 'he antahkaraaa, Just as the ground or locus forthe fire is the piece of iron, just as the mirror is the âsraya'for the face, just as the water in a glass is the medium ofreflection for the moon. Svch an antahkarana is taken tobe conditioning or delimiting the self. It is considered tobe that which brings <ibout the adhyasa on the self. Suchan entity which is distinct from the mind is nowhere to befound, you cannot take ihe antahkarana to be non-differ-ent fiom the buddhi also. For Akshapada's aphorismclearly states that buddhi is a synonym of 'upalabdhi' andjnana. You cannot also say that the buddhi knows (janati)while the self comprehends (upalabhate); for the admissionof a differen between Snows' and comprehends9 wouldcompelese to accept two distinct entities having these twofunctions. Hence there is no antahkarana,

Reply : The intellect separates the evolved ahankarafrom consciousness which is the not-self and the Vedantinsspeak of ahankara under the names of antahkarana, manaSsbuddhi, and aham pratyaya, for they accept the "vijnanasakti visesha^ in this consideration. When they acceptthe parispanda sakti the same evolved form is treated as^prana'.

There is the sruti passage " "Budher gunenalma gu-nena caiva aragramatro hy avaropi drishteh". HereBuddhi is taken to be a substance since it has the nature ofevolving. Again in the Sruti text - "yada pancaiva liyantejanani manasa saha, buddhis ca nengate tatra param, atma"nam asnute^. Here again Buddhi is the asraya of ^ceshta*and is thus conprehenned to be a substance,

In "Vijnanam yajnam tanute" we find a separate anddistinct mention of the self which is 'anandamaya". This


Panchapadika

means vijnana is synomynous with buddhi. And buddhias the âsraya' of "kriya9 is again taken to be a substance.

Again we read "vijnanena va rigvedam vijanati mornasa hy eva pasyati"\ The word 'manas' is expressed hereonly to emphasise the means of apprehension. And manasthen is identical with vijnana. Manas has the vrittis likekarma, sankalpa and vicikitsa.

Hence sruti and reason establish that the antahkara-na has.the vijnana sakti and kriya, and that it is also des-cribed as manas, buddhi etc.

Take again the sruti passages " ^BuddherFgunenatmagunena caiva", ^sa dhih svapno bhautva imam lokam sam-carati", "vijnana mayah" and ^manomayah". Herewe find manas or buddhi as that which delimits or condi-tions the self and as that which makes us take its attributesto be those of the self.

In the sruti passage - "Kasminv aham utkrante utk-anto bhavishyami". We find that 'prana' which is theûpadhi' of 'utrkantf etc., is only an 'amsa' of the 'antah-karana. But we cannot treat both 'prana' and the ântah-karana' as the two upadbis; for that is inconsistent. Theantah^ arana then is the only upadhi" (the conditioningprinciple)

It cannot be argued that all the passages given aboveare only 'arthavadas' (laudatory) and that therefore they donot lay down any principles. For we have the self whichis devoid of parts, which is all-pervasive or every where,which is asanga (non-relational) and which is uncondi-tioned like the sky. Such a self cannot be treated as having


Vivaranam 207

the 'utkrantyadi gamena\ This movement being incon-sistent with the nature of the self, we argue through artha-patti to establish that the antahkarana or ahankara is theupaphi, that it conditions the self due to avidya.

Objection : Why can't we say that the 'Vijnanasakti' and 'kriya parinama sakti9 belong only to the self.

Reply : Any parinama is inconsistent with the natureof the self, for the self is devoid of parts, is all-pervasive,and is asanga. Further the appearances are made possi-ble only when the evolved antahkarana is near by. AndPadmapada says that "due to its paraga with the antah-karana the self is falsely treated as the ahankarta, just asthe crystal is taken to be red because of the 'uparaga,with the 'japakusuma' which is near by."

Padmapada states the question. "How do you accountfor the mithyatva of the redness in the crystal ?" Thecrystal is apprehended as red. Redness is not cognised asseparate from the crystal. There is the samsarga betweenthe redness and the crystal. This is explained differentlyin different theories.

Akhyata ; There is the appearance of the false read-ness in the crystal. But the redness that is cognised be-longs to or comes from the japakusuma. And it does notappear as distinct from the crystal. The absence of thisdistinction between the two brings about this erroneouscognition.

Reply s The rays of light emanating from the eyecatch the crystal; and if these rays approach the Japa-kusuma flower, they will cognise the redness as belonging


208 Panchapadika

to that flower only. The nature of the eye is to cognisethe form along with its properties. We never see that theeye apprehends only the form or only the property,

.You can not say that since there is a defect in the senseorgan there is no contact with the flower and that thereforethe erroneous cognition has arisen. The property of an.object is necessarily connected with the object. When theproperty is apprehended, the object also is apprehended,You cannot cognise the mere redness and not the flowerhaving this redness, if the redness belongs only to the flower^

Anyathakhyati : Only the mere form of the flower isreflected and it appears as the nature of the crystal.

Reply : We nowhere see that only the form can bereflected and not its asraya also. It is not the bare abstrac^form of the flower that can be reflected, but the flower agsuch in all ics concreteness. Otherwise we should apprehendand say that we cognise redness in the crystal, or that theredness of the flower being undistinguished from the crystalappears as having the nature of the crystal. If there is aconcomittant relation between the 'prabha9 of the flowerand of the crystal, the crystal should appear as red. In sucha case there would be the 'samsarga' between the crystaland the redness ; for the crystal which is not in itself red,appears as red. This redness is mithya because of the sam-sarga between the two whence we cognise only one entityas the red crystal.

Akhyati : We can argue that it is only the prabha ofthe flower that appears as red, and not the crystal,


Vivaranam 209

Reply : We cognise the crystal and the crystal haswhiteness. This whiteness is integrally and internally rela»fed to the crystal $ and its manifestation is not prevented byany thing. Thus even the whiteness must appear in the cry-stal.

Objection : But there is the red 'prabha' comingfrom the flower and this is opposed to the whiteness. Thewhiteness is removed, rejected, suppressed or prevented.

Reply : If the whiteness is suppressed or preventedit means that the internal quality is no more there $ and inthe absence of the quality the object is also not there. Howcan you cognise a formless object ?

Objection : The substance may be devoid of a form ;

yet there is the prabha which is the 'rupF (that which hasthe form)and since there is the samyoga with such a prabhathe object is cognised, and cognition has become possible.

Reply : This is impossible ; for the wind which isformless comes into contact with objects having a form.Then the wind too would have to be cognised by the eye.

Objects on : Redness has arisen when the whitenesshas been removed or suppressed. The crystal has again aform and thus the eye was able to cognise it.

Reply ; Redness has not arisen because of the prabha.The prabha is there even after we overcome the error and ifthe redness is due to the prabha, the crystal should appearred even then.

27)


2i0 Panchapadika

So far we have assumed the existence of the prabha.The prabha of the 'padmaraga' and other genes is withouta ground. But it is apprehended when we cognise them.On the other hand redness is in the crystal and is cognisedas such. It has a ground.

The redness cognised in the crystal is conditioned bythe flower which is near by. Likewise there is the uparagaof the ahankara in the self. Since the self is conditionedby the ahankara we treat the self as the agent etc. Thusthe self and the antahkarana so interpenetrate into oneanother that they are welded into a single unity. This iscalled a knot; and ahankara is spoken of as the ^granthi'(knot)".

Objection : 'Kartritva' (agent-hood) is a propertyof ahankara. Is there only a superimposition of this pro-perty on the self ? Or does there arise anew. but false, pro-perty in the self ? If it is the former, the illustration of thered crystal will be of no use, and there will be the admiss-ion of anyatha khyati. If it is the latter there will be a trugkatritva besides a false kartritva, and both these will haveto appear.

Repiy : It is not a property of the ahankara alonethat 'is superimposed on the self. That which is superims-posed is the ahankara along with its properties. Henc^there is mithyatva and we do not have anyathakhyati. Fur-ther the example is taken only to imply that in the presenceof one object, there appears a mithya dharma in another.Only this much is to be taken from the example. Or, we canaccept that there are two Kartritvas. But since there is onlyone dharmi, there is no apprehension of the difference bet-ween these two kartritvas.


Vivaranam 211

Objection : In "Bhidyate hridaya granthih' we findthat the 'hridayagranthi' in the self is the cause of all 'ana-rtha'. Then how do you attribute this 'an^rtha9 only to theahankara which is to be broken ?

Reply : Ahankara and the self are integrated (or wel-ded) into a unity or knot.

Objection ; The self has the uparaga of the ahan-kara. Just as the crystal which is uparakta reveals the pro-perty of the flower in it. So must the self reveal the pro-perties of the ahankara in itself.

Rep By : Ahankara which has the uparaga with the selfis an unconscious entity. There cannot be the sakshad-bhava (immediacy) of the uparaga. The unconscious andconsciousness are the conditions or a causes for the appea-rance (avabhasakatva) and the non-appearance. It is notthe 'uparaktatva' and 'anuparakta' that can be treated asthe conditions or causes of appearance.

Objection ; Even consciousaess does not have themanovyapara of the 'uparakta ahankara vishaya'. Con-sciousness does not have any activity with reference to theobjects. Then it becomes the same as ahankara.

Reply : There is the uparaga for consciousness andconsciousness illumines the ahankara. The vishaya vyaparabelongs directly to ahankara and indirectly to conscious-ness. Ahankara functions because it is illumined by cons-ciousness. Ahankara is immediately connected with orrelated to consciousness. And due to this samsarga cons-ciousness is the 'pratibhasa hetu9 (cause of appearance) andnot the 'jnana vyapara\


212 Panchapadika

Objection : Then ahankara does not seem to requirethe mediation of the vijnana sakti and kriya sakti that con-stitute the sakshi svarupa. In such a case, how can therebe the 'jdam amsata' for ahankara ?

Reply ; Ahankara is cidbhasya or illumined by cons-cipusness and it acquires be nature of an object (idamamsata). The not-thisness is the form of consciousness andthe object of consciousness constitutes the tbisness. Thisdoes not require the mediation of Jnana and kriya.

Because of the uparaga of ahankara, the self which isnot-this is falsely taken to be ahankarta. The self istaken to acquire the nature of ahankara; and such a selfhas the 'vyapara^ of the ahankara only. In terms of thisvyapara there .arises the illumination [(prakasa, pariccbeda)of the ahankarta; and this ahankarta alone is the objecthaving the nature of the this.

The body, sense organs and the objects are cognisedas the this because they are apprehended through themediation of the antahkarana vritti (psychosis) and sincethere is no such mediation in the case of the ahankara itappears as the not-this.

Objection ; But is not ahankara mediated by ajna-na ? for ajnana brings about the ahankara. In view ofthis mediation how can you maintain the absence of the'idamtavabhasa' for the ahankara ?

Reply ; It is only because of ajnana there is the in-tegration of consciousness and ahankara into one. Sinceconsciousness and ahankara are distinct, some are unableto accept the view that the ahankara has the nature of the


Vivaranam 213

this. Since there is only the mediation of ajnana, theahankara appears as the not'this; and people are not will-ing to see any distinction here.

Objection: If the ahankara has really the natureand meaning of the object, then it is not proper for theahankara not to reveal iiself as an object,

Reply ^ The ahankara reveals itself as an object andit is proper to treat it so. But we have facts of experiencewhich show that we behave otherwise even when we knowthe facts. The whole process of the tree beginning withthe ankura {plant) aad ending in the fruit is the result ob-tained from the series "of the evolution from the changesthat took place in the clay. Yet you do not speak of thetree as ^mrinmaya^ as we do speak of the pot or the 'val-mika' (anthitl.)

«^

Objection : Yes, in the case of the tree we musthave the ^rinmaya vyavahara\ But when we come toexamine ahankara, we do speak of it as the this. Thenthis example does not fit in here.

Reply : Even the wise are not intoleamt of such ausage,

Hence let those who doubt this nature of ahankataexamine it carefully from their own experiences and findout whether what we stated is true.

The form of ahankara is the this which is integratedto the not-this or consciousness. So far it is establishedand the illustration of the red crystal was also given to showthat the not-self is superimposed on the self,


214 PanchapadikaBimba - Pratibimba Vada (Theory of Reflection):

Yet Padmapada gives the illustration of the reflectionsfalling in the mirrer and in water. These illustrations goto show that the ânidamamsa^ (the aspect of the not-this)of the ahankarta is the reflection of Brahman, and that thereflection i& not something different from the Bimba (origi-nal) of Brahman, but is the same as Brahman. The reflec-tion appears to be different (distinct) from Brahman and italso appears as distorting the original. Only this- much isfalse.

Objection : But distortion and difference are factsof direct experience in this case. How can you say thatthey are identical ?

Reply : There is the recognition that both have the

identical features. The features of Devadatta when he i&outside the house are found to be the same as those whenhe is inside. Thus there arises the recognition. Likewisethere is the recognition of this identity bet veen the originaland the reflection.

Objection ; In direct perception there is the aware-ness of difference. How can this be negated by mere re-cognition ?

Reply: If the reflection is different from the originalthere cannot arise any recognition.

Since we have the awareness of both identity and diffe-rents, there arises the doubt as to what negates which ; andthe difference is negated because it lacks logical support.


Vivaranam 215

Objection ; Since there is a difference you can arguethat there is a mirror near the original face and that the^vayavas" (parts) of the mirror have evolved themselvesinto the form of another person. In any other way therecannot arise a different person. It cannot be the impressionof a stamp even, since the reflection is a strange evolutehaving features opposite from those of the original. Thereis no ^samslesha' (fusion) too which is necessary for such an. impression. As such we say that the reflection is evolvedfrom the avayavas of the mirror.

Rep By : In such a case we should have to . say thatreflection is evolved in the mirror in the presence of theoriginal near by ; and when the original is removed, thereflection should remain as it is. ^You can't say that thereflection is always there since i£ appears only when we lookinto the mirror. For, hold the mirror crosswise and youwon't see the reflection as you found it earlier.

Objection ; When the instrumental cause is remo-ved, its effect also is gone. The Vaishikas argue that'dvitva^(two-ness) arises because of the âpaksha buddhi\ and whenthe latter is lost, the former too disappeares. Likewisewhen there is the contact with the hand you can stretch aclosed mat (which is curling) ; and when the contact is notêre, the mat is closed. Likewise the face is only the inst"rumental cause of the reflection.

Reply : The facts are otherwise. The mat has beenclosed many a time previously and there has arisen in it acertain samskara which is the instrumental cause of itsclosing. When the iron is melted by the fire, it passes intothe state of a solid only when an object opposed to the


216 Panchapadika

melted iron has arisen. Ii is such an object that functionsas the instrumental cause. The example from the Vaises-hikas is faulty,, since number coexists with the object and isnot created,

Objection : When there arises a now product thatcomes from the samskara, you argue that there is the desti-notion of the previous product and not the destruction ofthe instrumental cause. How is this possible ?

Reply ; If you go on strectching it frequently to putan end to its closing, it will not close even when thpre is orthere is no contact with the hand. It there is the absenceof the stretching because of the absence of the ^nimitta'ythen in the^ absence of the samskara also it must close it-self.

Objection ; Consider here the case of the mirrorwhich is pure and clear. There is a samskara arising fromthe 'samsthana*. Because of the strength of the samskara,there arises a 'viruddha kaarya' (contrary effect). Thenthere is the absence of the reflection.

Reply s If so take a mirror which has just then comeinto existence. The continued long presence of the objectbefore it gives rise to samskara of the *bimba parinama\Even then the removal of the original would result in theremoval of the reflection.

Objection: The rays of the sun have fallen on thekamala and they have given rise to a samskara called its%vikasa parinama" (change into flowering). Yet whenthe rays of the sun are removed, \ve find the blosommingtoo disappearing. Likewise the reflection, which has been


Vivaranam 217

there for a long time. disappears when the original isremoved.

Reply : No. In the case of the blosomming, ofth^kamala we should note there was a time when it was onlyin the form of a bud inspite of the rays of the sun fall-ing on it. Its first blosomming was brought about by theearthly and watery elements that are in it-Objection ; It is not these elements that have madeit blossom. It is only the instrumental cause, viz., the raysof the sun.

* Reply : No. When these elements are no more inthe flower, it becomes old and it does not close even inthe absence of the sun.

Objection : But even here the instrumental casse isthe removal of the instrumental cause itself, and not theearthly and watery parts.

Reply ; But when these parts are in a state of decay,the' flower does not close even when the sun has set.

Objection : Then why can't we assume a 'parinamahetu'in the case of the mirror for the effect of a contraryface?

Reply ; We do not find such a parinamahetu in thecase of the mirror. When there is the proximity of theBimba the mirror reveals the form of the face; and thisrequires carving which is not found. Further the reflec-

28)


218 Panchapadika

ction is not amenable to touch. If it is said that the partsof the mirror mediate the reflection and hence we cannottouchit, then we cannot have a preceptual cognition of thereflection. Further we commonly say that'there is no differ-ent person in the mirror since there is no cause that canbring about such a person. This different person is as non-existent as the horns of a hare.

Objection : Then as in the cognition of the falsesilver we have mithyatva hare, and as such there is no iden-tity of face. Let it not be a different face; but it cannotbe the identical face. Recognition too idoes not make outthe identity here; for the 'suktirajata" which has only a^mithyarupa' appears as having the form of the real silver.There is the recognition of real silver even in the erroneouscognition; and this does not make the two identical.

Reply : No. In the case of the silver, we take ifto be 'mithyarajata' since there is the sublation. Such asublation is not found in ihe case of th9 reflection. Thesublation does not involve any,recogntion of identitybetween the true and the false. Here we do not have the>ublation )f the form 'this is not a face'. It cannot take»ome such form as 'this face here is not mine' for there is•ecognition. If it is the face of a person other than mine,;ven then I cannot sablate it. Further, when the mirrors removed, the reflection is lost. But this is not a case>f sublation; for if it were a case of sublation it would in-olve the sublation of the mirror itself.

Objection : Now, we never cognise our own facialvayavas, and hence there is no perceptual experience ofur own faces by ourselves.


Vivaranam 219

Reply : No. We do cognise some of these avayavas;

and just an we cognise a part or aspect of an object and fee^that we cognised the object completely, so do we feel aboutour own faces.

Objection : Take "Tat tvam asi". This is intendedto sublate the 'tvam padartha' (thou) for no liberation ispossible if the samsarin is not destroyed. As such this isnot a correct illustration : From the sentence 'tat tvam asPwe do find sublation in such cases.

Reply : Here we should note that ^so yam devadattah'(This is that Devadatta) refers only to 'taadaatmya' (iden-tity) and not to the parartha badha because there is no'samaanaadhikaranya5 "between the .self and Brahman. Tl^words 'tat' and 'tvam' convey the 'Brahmasvarupa9 whichis the Bimba for the self which is the reflection. If thiswere not the meaning, the sentence would have been 'Natvam asi^ (you are not) and not 'tat tvam asi', as in the caseof 'na rajatam astP. Further even the sastraic text êkshetadityam aadityam .nastam yantam kadacana, noparaktamno vaanstham no madhyam nabhaso gatanfgoes to showthat the identity of the Bimbarupaa is ultimately real. Bystating 'no vaaristham' this passage maintains the identityof the sun with the sun's reflection in water.

The Akhyati vadin (Prabhakara) says : The reflectionwhich is in the irirror does not appear as different from theoriginal. But the Bimba itself appears (prakasa) as undis-tinguished from the mirror. It is not that the rays of theeye falling on the mirror apprehend (or cognise) the Bimbaalone as existing in a different place. But the rays of theeye fall on the mirror and are sent back and they cognisethe Bimba only as existing in the aakasa.


220 Panchapadika

Reply : It is a fact that there appears the reflectionin an object that is in front of us and it appears as 'pr^ty,ang mukha\ As if it has entered into the mirror, it is cog.nised by us. We find as if we are seeing another person.The face does not appear as it is but as if it were another.When this is the fact of experience there is'no use in con-tradicting it or rejecting it.

Objection ; An object having a specific form is refl-ected completely in the mirror. We no-where see that aspecific object can exist completely and as it is in two diffe-rent places at the same time. How then can a specificfinite entity appear at two different places with an .identicalnature, and yet how can both be real ?

Reply : We only say that there is only one face exis.ting at only one place. Such a face appears as two at twodifferent places because of illusion (bhrama)' We do no.*,say that the Mcchedaavabhaasa' (appearance of differenceîs real, but we only say that the identity is real.

Objection': Then what is this that we have ? Oneobject alone existing at only one place is appearing diffe-rently as two and as existing at two places ? What is thisdifference ?

Reply z This difference (vicchada) is brought aboutby maya".

Objection ; But how can even Maya bring thingsthat are inconsistent with the pramanas ?

Reply ; There is nothing impossible in Maya ; forMaya is skilled in manifesting the impossible or the incon-ceivable.


Vivaranam 221

Objection ; How is the appearance of "viccheda^brought by avidya,? The tree, which is seen to have its bra-nches upwards, is cognised in the water as having its bran-ches downwards. And we do not find any ajnana in suchan appearance.

Reply : We have said earlier that the cause of adhya-asa is not the ajnana which is said to envelop the objects,for ajnana is not vishayaavaraka. In all these cases wherewe have ûpaadhika bhrama9 (conditioned illusion) it isonly the upaadhi that functions as the sufficient cause forthe evolution of ^tmavidya'. In ôpaadhika bhrama' youmay cognise the ground, and yet this cognition is not oppo-sed to adhyasa. The cognition of the ground will dispel orsublate only the 'nirupadhika bhrama" (unconditioned illu-sion),

Objecton : In ^sopaadhika bhrama^ we have the^heda kartritvadhyasa (superixxiposition of a differentagent). Here we can and do have the knowledge of theground and this is the true knowledge. Yet this true know-ledge does not dispel adhyasa. But adhyasa is dispelledonly when the upaadhi is dispelled. And the appearanceof difference etc, ought to remain as it is even when there isthe true knowledge. There is the knowledge or apprehen-sion of the identity of the bimba. There is the reflectionand also the difference of this reflection from the original;

and there are mithyavabhaasas (false appearences). Noweven when there is the apprehension of the identity withBrahman, the distinctness and difference cannot vanish^

Before a final reply can be given to this objection;, there


222 Panchapadika

Objection; If the self is only a reflection, we can-not understand the nature of the original since it is a refle-ction only ; The reflection ofDevadatta does not compre-hend the nature ofDevadatta,

Reply ; But in the case of Devadatfa that which igreflected is only the 'acetamamsa'' (non-sentient aspect).Since the reflection is an unconscious entity it is unable tocomprehend it; for example, the pot does not comprehendits own reflection. '

Objection s But there are the atheistic materialistsaccording to whom the body itself is the conscious entity,

RepSy F: If it is the 'sacetanaamsa9 that is reflectedwe find that the properties like 'syamatva' which are not inthe original but in the unconscious mirror are seen in thereflection since the reflection has a necessary relation withthe mirror. |These properties come to the reflection be^cause of the mirror which is unconscious and with whichtheie is the relation to the reflection. This is the answer ifwe accept the materialists contention- In any other view,we have to attribute these new properties of the reflection tothe naturally unconscious entity called the body with whichthere is a relation for the conscious element of Devadatta •As such the reflection being 'acetana' (unconscious), can-not know that it is identical with the Bimba. There i§another argument to show that the reflection of Devadattais 'acetana'. It is our experience that the movement ispossible in the reflection if there is no corresponding move-ment in the original. If the reflection has at some mo-ment some consciousness, it should show movement withoutrequiring such a movement in. the original,


Vivaranam 223

Objection : It is not possible to suppress the âjna-tva' (ignorance) of the self by [merely accepting that Brah-man is 'sarVt jna5 (omnicient) while the self is 'ajna" or 'kin-cijjna'; for Brahman too cannot be said to be 'sarvajna'.The argument is thus stated for the objection. It is the faceof Devadatta that is reflected, and Devadatta can find outwhether it is his reflection ôr not by his movements. So,the 'asraya' of 'tattvajnana9 as well as the 'aasraya' of theprevious doubt is Devadatta himself. Likewise Brahmanalone ought to be the 'asraya" for both 'ajnana' and 'tattva-jnana^.

Reply : Trae knowledge can arise only in that per-son who has no bhranti (illusion) either with reference tohimself or with reference to others; and the true knowledgecan dispel his own ignorance only. If I am in error, trueknowledge dispels only my ignorance. Tattvajnana doesnot arise, from the bimbatva, bat from dispelling theerror. This error is the result of ajnana and ajnana is thecondition that brings the salt into existence.

Objection ; Does Brahman know that the nature ofthe reflection as being that of the self ? or no ? if itdoes not know, he ceases to be ârvajna'. If it knowsit will see itself to be the 'samsaarin* (self).

Reply : "'When Devadatta knows his reflection tobe identical with himself, he does not take the reflectionalong with the objects that have crept into it. He findshis reflection as being smaller. Ye he is not worried aboutthese defects for he knows that it is his and that it is essen-tially non-different from him. Likewise Brahman sees inhimself the self as his reflection and sees the samsara inthe self; yet this is only a defect that has crept with the


224 Panchapadika

reflection, and it does not belong to him. This is whatthe true knowledge of identity gives. True knowledge andâmsara" are as different from one another as white andblack; and one cannot be the other.

Objection : Even when there is the awareness ofidentity, the 'vicchedda vibhrama' does not disappear^Tattvajnana cannot dispel ths 'bheda bhrama', for it is tokhowledge of identity similar to that between the bimbaand its reflection.

Reply ; Yes, it is true in our empirical experience,,The 'viccheda vibhrama^ is not |brought by the reflection.but by the ûpaadhi' which is brought by ajnana; and thisajnana is dispelled by knowledge. By more knowledgealone there cannot be the dispelling 'or disappeasance ofthe reflections for the cause of reflection is the mirrorwhich is real.

Objection ; Then there is the 'Upadhijaadya' atta-ched to the self; as such the self cannot be the 'asraya' for'bhrantF and for true knowledge. If the self is the asrayafor these, he ceases to be a reflection.

Reply : But the self^ is similar to a reflection andis immediately apprehended by all of us as "cidruupa^. Heis not completely overcome by the *antahkarana jaadya.

There is the 'smriti text - "Ruupam rupam prati ruupobabhuva",, and Badarayana^s apoerism - "Ekahsa bahu-dha caiva drisyate jala candravat"; and Badarayana's apho-rism-"Asha eva copama jala suryakadivat". These passagesalso establish the self to be the reflection of Brahma justas there is the reflection of aakaasa which is without a form


Vivaranam 225

-as its reflection in water along with the clouds and stars,so can there be the reflection of Brahman. Even in alittle pot of water we do find the reflection of a great ex-panse of the sky. And it is impossible to say that onlythat aakaasa - which is in the water is seen as 'abhraadibimba yuktah\ Hence Brahman is the Bimba and the selfis its reflection and also 'cidrupa'. This is arrived atfrom the sastras and from direct experience. As such itis not possible to reject it.

Objection : Why can't we say that like the 'ghata-akasa\ the self in conditioned (avacchinna) by the upaa-dhi?

Reply : No. The self is that consciousness which issaid to be conditioned by the upadhi; and Brahmanis the consciousness while there are only various conscious-nesses here. Brahman should have to be outside the sphereof the conditioned. In the sphere of the conditionedBrahman is conditioned as the self completely (sarvat-mana). And if Brahman is outside of the conditioned, heis no longer the unconditioned. He cannot be every where,nor can he be the ^sarvaniyanta9, (controlling object) forthe unconditioned cannot be there where the conditionedis, since that would bring about an unnecessary redupli-cation.

The avacchedvaadin might argue that the ^padhyavacchinnatva3 is intended only to explain how the manyforms or appearances come to exist, and that this has not-hing to do with Brahman that is outside.

29)


^26 Panchapadika

To this the reply is - Brahman is said to be the causeetc. of the world, and to be the (sarvaniyantaa' (all contro-lling). In passages like "y^ vijnanat ..." we hear thatBrahman who is distinct fro n the self appears as the vari -ous modifications in the proximity of the self. On the other-hand, if we accept the 'pratibimba vada9, we find that thereis the natural akaasa in the water and in such a water wefind the 'pratibimbaakaasa9. Consequently the same origi-nal is there both in the water and outside it ; but we treatit as due to error. And even though the self is a reflection,Brahman can be the 'niyanta9 etc. Thus this is a bettertheory.

The self is 'cidruupa9 (form of consciousness) and thecause for this reflection is ajnana which is dispelled by trueknowledge arising from 'sravana5. Thus the self is theasraya for the false and the true knowledge as well. Thisself thinks itself to be having the form of the ahankaraÎt does think that it has that form which Brahman, who issimilar to a Bimba, has. Even the 'upaadhi svaruupa9appears as only a case of error. True knowledge dispelsthis 'upaadhF and then there is an end to the 'vicchedaava-bhaasa^/' Hence when there is the experience of Bra-hman, there is the removal or distruction of mithya-atva.

Objection : AJnana has been said to be the upaadhithat conditions the self. Then how is it that you say theupaadhi of the self is ahankaara ?

Reply : There is no inconsistency here. Those thatcondition consciousness are many and they condition it i ivarious wdys and in varying degrees. It is only our conve-


Vivaranam 227

nience and purpose that determine which of these we shouldtake up. Thus the one pure consciousness which is 'nirvi-kalpaka' gets into a relation with avidya ; and in deep sleepit becomes 'ishadvikalpa vyavahara alambana*' This avidyabrings the antahkarana ; and when the self is conditionednot directly by avidya but by the antahkarana in the dreamstate, then it becomes 'sthuulatama vyavaharalambanam*(ground or locus for the activity of the gross body). Whenthis antahkarana gets into an intimate relation with thegross body in the waking state, it becomes 'sthulatma vyva-haralambanam. For these three stages the immediate uparadhis are respectively ajnana, antahkarana and the body.These do not create any differences or distinctions in theultimate principle. From the difference in the upaadhis,you cannot conclude that there is a different self for eachupaadhi. Each succeeding ^conditioning entity conditionsthat which is already conditioned by the previous entity. Ifthere is no such relation between the upaadhis, you willarrive at the difference in the selves.

Objection : Ajnaana is the material cause of thegross body and it is also "uparakta9 by the samskara of thesubtle body. This subtle body is absent in deep sleep. Thenhow can such an ajnana condition the self in deep sleep ?The distinction between the self and Brahman is due tobhranti, and there is no such bhranti in deep sleep. Andif you argue that the distinction is assumed as 'arthagata^(as being in the two objects)because of the'bhranty ajnana% 'then the 'vibhaga' is a product of ajnana. Now there is adevolution of all the products of ajnana in deep sleep. Assuch the distinction must be absent in deep sleep. In theabsence of the distinction, the 'avidya ahankarya' will have


228 Panchapadika

to be in Brahman. But if this distinction is not due toam ana, then the distinction will have to be beginningless.And there cannot be any 'avidya nimittatva\

Reply: To avoid the 'avidya samskarya" (modifiedby nesceience) for Brahman, we assume that the distinctionbetween the self and Brahman exists even in deep sleep.

Objection ; Then it must be a distinction arisingfrom (or based upon) the nature of the two objects, and notfrom ajnana.

Reply : Yes. In all cases of distinction exceptingthat involved in deep sleep, the distinction is only a case oferror and has its ûpadana' in avidya.

Objection : Then that distinction which is based onthe nature of the two objects cannot have avidya as its upa-dana, for it is beginningless and is not erroneous.

Reply : Yes. Even though it is beginninglesss, wesay that all distinction is dependent on avidya. The rela-tion of the self to avidya does not have avidya as its upa-dana ; but it is dependent on, is determined by avidya. Be-fore this relation has arisen, there cannot be an independentexistence of the self. Because of this inconsistency we speakof the self and of the relation of the self to avidya as beingdetermined by avidya. There is no "avidyo padanata^ forthe 'atmavidya sambandha' (relation with avidya) for thebeginningless ajnana can only bring the relation of the selfto avidya.

Objection : How is the distinction of the self fromBrahman dependant on avidya, or determined by avidya ?


Vivaranam 229

Reply : Consciousness is qualified by the beginning.less avidya and appears as the beginningless selves by re-maining as the asraya (locus) for the temporary yet beginh-mngless difference. It is only a temporary or unreal diffe-rence and not an actual one because of the identity of thatconsciousness with the self Hence this distinction has itsâsraya^ in the ânaady avidya visishtam caitanyam^(conscio"usness modified by the beginningless avidya). This distinc-tion acquires an 'uparaga' (relationship) with the svarupaalso, and as such it becomes specifically âvidya tantra\Thus we speak of the distinction as ' avidya krita^ (broughtby avidya). Those that are dependent on avidya are likethe'avidya sambandha'itself both ânirvachaniya" and be-ginningless ; and this is not inconsistent with them,

It is the specific or qualified mirror and the specific o3"qualified pot that gives rise to the appearance of an unrealdifference between the face and the akaasa on the one handand their reflections on the other. There is [no 'svarupatobheda\ Hence we conclude that difference is dependant onthe upadhi,

The self, then, as the reflection appears to be distinctfrom Brahman because of the functioning of the beginning-less avidya. From this avidya there arise other upadhislike ahankara. And in so far as these belong loathe samereflection, they are all treated as upadhis.

Now the Bhedabhadavaadin (Bhaskara) argues thatsince the reflection is an unreal entity, the self cannot bethe reflection of Brahman.

We have to reply that the reflection of the face andthat of the xit svarupa' are not unreal entities or fictions.


230 Panchapadiks

Even though we admit that the difference and the ^vfpar-yasa' here are unreal, there is no harm in so far as the faceand consciousness are concerned. By implicity rejectingthe ^mithyaamsa9 we apprehend the 'bimbatmata7 for theface and for the 'cit svarupa'. Bondage and liberation , how-ever, are not for the mithyamas. but for the 'svarupa' of theself. So that there may not be any avidya samkarya forBrahman, we have shown that the self differs from Brah-man, because of the upadhi which only the self has. As-such Bhaskara errs profoundly in not understanding thestandpoint of others and in maintaining the unreality ofthe reflection.

ILLUSTRATIONS ;

Ahankara functions as the upadhi and brings thedistinction between the self and Brahman- This is thepurport of the illustrations given for Bimba Pratibimbavaada - the reflection of the sun in the water, or of theface in the mirror.

That ahamkara functioning as the upadhi brings theânatmadhyasa9, is the purport of the illustration of thecrystal appearing red. These adhyasas require the 'upa-dhi',.

Then why is the illustration of the snake appearing inthe rope given ? In the adhyasa illustrated by the previousexamples we have real upadhi really in the form of themirror of of the ahankafa. But in the case oftheanat-madhyasa too do We require such as upadhi near by ? Theself is consciousness and what is adhayasta on it is differentfrom consciousness- To show that the adhyasa here does


Vivaranam 231

ing in the rope is ôften given, Kartritvaadhyasa hasahankara as its upadhi. And this is the consequence of a"nirupaadhika adhyasa', It is to explain this that such anillustration is given.

Objection ; But every where adhyasa requires anupadhi which is different from both the ground and theconsequent. It cannot be without an upadhi. 3 In the caseof the cognition of the snake the snake may not be nearby. But formerly we had such experiences and now thereare the samakaras of those experiences and these samskaa-ras constitute the upadhi",

Reply ; So much of an upadhi that is brought aboutonly by the samskaras of the previous experience is foundin the case of the self also. What is denied is only ^thafupadhi which exists independently. The samskara of theprevious experience alone cannot be said to be the cause oferror. There is no rule stating that the ^purva bhrantisamskara' is not the cause. Here too we have the aham-karta and the samskaras to which this ahankara gives rise.The relation between these two is as beginningless as thatbetween the seed and the plant. This causal relation be-gets a samskara which is the cause of the erroneous cog-nition.

So far there illustrations have been able to establishthe 'sopadhika' and 'nirupadhika' forms of adhyasa.What then is the purpose of the ^ghatakasa^ illustration ?It aims at explaining ^to us that the ground which is con-sciousness is 'asanga9 (non-relational) Reality. Tneredness which is a property of the flower has a syntheticunity with the crystal which is a substance. The crystal is


232 Panchapadika

a 'savayava'(having parts) substance and it can have theproperty of redness. Yet there is the 'asambhed avabhaasaof the red. This appearance is aided by, 'anirvachani-yatva* (inexplecablity). Yet this appearance is taken asif the crystal is related to the red colour. In the case ofthe rope we have the cognition of the snake; and this snakeis neither sambhinna^ (fused) nor âsambhina' (not fi sed)in the rope. Thus these illustrations are not able to ex-plain the 'asangatva'(non-relational) nature of the self asconveyed by the srutis 'asango nahi sajjate\ and ^sngohy ay am purusah*' As such the 'ghatakasa' illustration isgiven. In the case of the 'ghatakasa' we find that it is onlythe consideration of the upadhi that gives us distinctionslike difference, form and effect; and these are seen as theinternal differentiations of the upadhi (or brought aboutby the upaadhi).

Objection : If the illustrations alone are capableof establishing the 'avikaritva' (changelessness), 'eâtva'(oneness) and 'asangatva" of the self, then the 'agama,is of no farther use. It is better not to touch it.

RapEy : Sruti, nyaya and experience establish theself and determine its nature, and these illustrations areonly intended to ward off the doubts that arise in the en-quiry.' They make us comprehend the truths. They donot give us the immediate experience of Reality. Examp-les alone are not capable of establishing the truth; andthere is also the possibility of counter examples. Argumentfrom analoga is the weakest one.

Pure Consciousness is the Ground ;

Sankara's statement 'asmafpratyaya vishayatvat^ isdirected towards establishing the adhyasa on the self. So


Vivaranam 233

far we have established the "asmat pratyaya* (I, self) andthe adhyasa to which it gives rise to. Now the meaning ofîshaya' (object) is given.

Pure consciousness is of the nature of the not-thisand as such is not an object, yet it makes the 'vyavahara^(activity) possible in the ahankara : for ahankara conditionsconsciousness. As such accepting the 'gaunivritti'(secondary idea) we say that consciousness is the object forthe 'asmat pratyaya\ and this object is also seen to be^vaharayogya' in so far as it appears as ahankara.

Objection : The 'anatmadhyasa' (superimposittonof the not-self) is only 'savikalpaka' (determinate,delimited(finite) adhyasa ; and as such the ground should also befinite or determined. Hence the unlimited or unconditionedconsciousness alone cannot be the ground. How can therebe ahankara adhyasa which is that of a finite entity ? Nowthere is adhyasa only when there is ^vyavahara yogyatva';

and there is vyavahara yogyatva only when there is adhyasa.This involves the fallacy of mutual dependence.

Reply ; The 'savikalpadhyasa' is seen to have a nir-

vikalpa (non-determined) entity as its ground. We cansay that the ajnanadhyasa has made the ground a savikalpaone for the ahankara or the 'purvahankaradhyasa (super-imposition of the prior ego) has made the ground a svikalpaone. As such for the later ahankaradhyasa, the ground canbe the cidavabhasa. Beginninglessness explains the adhyasasatisfactorily.

30)


234 Panchapadika

Conciousness as the subject. Doer Enjoyer.

Objection : The self is beyond change, is pure con-sciousness, is undefiled blise and asanga. Such a self can-not be the pramata (knower) for a pramana involves pra-miti (knowledge) ; and pramiti requires 'pramana kriyaparinama' (activity of the meaning of knowledge). Thisis impossible in the case of that consciousness. If one isiôt a pramata, he can be neither the doer nor the enjoy er.The vyvahara which is of the nature of samsarga implies thegroups - pramata - pramana " prameya, Karta - Karma -Kriya, and bhokta - Bhoga - bhoktavya, The vyavahara isimpossible in the case of the self. The ahankara being un-conscious cannot be the asraya of these. As such there canbe no vyavahara at all.

Further, the prakasa (effulgence) of consciousness isnatural and inherent in it; as such it itself can illumine theobjects. Since it is sarvagata (all-pervamive), it shouldillumine everything. This would lead to avyavastha (impo-ssibility of any distinctions). Hence we should accept theview that the self is "capable of undergoing transforma-tions or changes,

Other objections and an examination of these objec-tions follows :

Objection : These difficulties do not arise if we holdto the all-pervasive character of the self. Knowledge maybe an act or a property ; and if knowledge aris:s from the'catushtaya sannikarsha' (coming together of the four) thisknowledge would have to arise as having a 'samavaya' (in-herent) relation with the self since it can not have any 'pra-lesasrayatva' (locus) in view of the self being 'niravayava\


Vivaranam 235

Then knowledge is related to the self which is. its ground ;

and the self is all-pervasive. Such a self will then have acontact with all finite objects or substances. Consequentlyall should have the knowledge^that?. illumines all objects1The pradipa has an act and also a 'prakasa guna', and theseare related to the lamp which is their ground. As such a- corresponding illumination is cognised in the object. Whycan't we say that there is only an 'adrishta sambandha'(mysteriouls relation) because of which knowledge does notillumine all objects but only the one concerned ?

No, for the lamp is so seen to manifest all the objectsthat have a relation with the light. This is the nature ofthe objects, and we find no rule that can go against this.ûkha^ and 'duhkha' are taken to be 'adrishtavishayas'whence we do not recognise objects like thorn etc. as capa-ble of giving rise to that 'duhkha' (sorrow).

Then, the object gives rise to knowledge and knowledgemay be said to illumine or manifest only this object andnot all.

No. Even the sense organ like the eye has a part ingiving rise to the cognition, and knowledge should also illu-mine the eye. Since even that which has not given rise toknowledge appears as the object, we cannot say that know-ledge illumines only that object which has given rise to it.The 'prakaasa guna' oftheyamp, for instance, is seen to illu-mine or manifest even the ^janaka vishaya' (non-existent)which is related to it.

If knowledge is a property, it cannot illumine to obj-ect which has brought it. The same difficulty is there even


236 Panchapadika

if knowledge is an act. The arrow may not have any knowntarget; but when once it is discharged it is sure to hit thatperson who acquires a relation with its âsraya9.

Well, the self is 'niravayava' (partless) and as such itcan have a contact with all.

If so, it can illumine or manifest nothing. Kriya andguna cannot have any samsarga with any object other thantheir own 'asraya^ They cannotjalso have any 'samsarga'even with their own asraya'; and in the absence of the^samsarga9, they can bring nothing to light. As such theself cannot be niravayava.

Then the objector proceeds to make out" his position byarguing that knowledge has the 'samavaya9 relation onlywith the 'pradesa' (place) of the self which is conditionedby the body. It does not have this relation with the wholeself. Then the self would be âavayava' and it cannot ill-umine or manifest an object that is not immediate anddirect. Since the ^prakasa9 which has its ground in the selfhas no 'samsarga' with the object, it can be said thatkriya, guna etc., do not have the /asrayatilanghana' (over-coming or passing beyond their own asraya). There cannot be the illumination or manifestation due to the relationwith the 'anasrayatva pradesa9, for that would involve themanifestation of everything.

But is it not a fact that an 'abhicaarakarma' (witch-craft) has its asraya in a person from whom it proceedând it then proceeds to create the evil in another personwho has no relation with the former ? It appears to havea relation with one who is not related to its 'asrayatmapradesa\ Why can't we accept the same process here?


Vivaranana 237

No. We do see that the harm is created in anotherand as such we have to admit an ^drishta sambandha^between these two places. But this only makes us inferthat the relation here is effected by the presiding spirit, or"by god, or by some 'saktf {power). The object :*s said tobe manifested by the relation of the sense organ with theobject, of the mind with the sense organ, and of the selfwith the mind. But this manifestation of the object doesnot arise from the knowledge which has its gound in theperson; for even if another object is related to this object,that another object is seen to be manifested. Furtherprior to the emergence of the knowledge arising from the'catushtaya sannikaJsa% we cannot say that is exists andthe knowledge that has arisen has no relation with theobjects. Consequently this knowledge can not determinethe existance of the object,

All these defects arise whether the self is aauparinaama ^(atomic) or Meha parimai.a' (medium magnitude)"Hence no one is able to establish the possibility of 'prama^nadi vyavehara',

Advaitic Theory of Perception :

To a certain extent only Advaita can establish the dis-tinction of subject, object, means of cognition etc.

There is the 'antahkarana' which is the idam amsa (th?this-aspect) of the ahankara. This' antahkarana undergoesan evolutionary process (parinana vyapara) which is spokenof as jnana because it is the 'antahkarana vrittF (spistemicact)» The antahkarana is a substance having parts 6s<avayavas^ and it has the nature of prakasa. It is that


238 Panchapadika

unseen thing which cooperates with the sence organs etc,,and which evolves itself far and wide like a long ray oflight; for it is commonly seen that 'tejas' (light) movesquickly 10 a very great dislance in space. It has a quickspatial and temporal movement.

This ^parinama vyapara' of the antahhakara has a

transitive reference. It has an object and proceeds towardsit. In so doing it brings out something sepciflc to the selfwhich is its ground; for every act functions asacaissand brings a change or modification in its own asraya orground. This 'parinama' brings a specific state called the^kartrikarma sambandha% (subject-act relation). The actconveyed by 'prapnoti5 (obtains) referes to a specific stateof the doer with reference to the object obtained. This isknown in the case of the 'antahkarana parinama' as therelation between the knower and the known.

Due to its own 'parinama' let the antahkarana have a

relation with the object. But how does the 'vishaya visesha-vabhasa' (apppearance of a specific object) arise for theself ? The reply is as follows :

The 'manifesting medium of consciousness in onlythat antahkarana which is'vishaya viseshasambandha9. Theantahkarana has a relationship with the specific object. Theantahkarana brings about this relation to consciousness.

Since it is every where enveloped by avidya, the natureof consciousness is unmanifested (anabhivyakta svabhavam).Yet since the antahkarana is the medium that conditionsconsciousness, consciouness is manifested or revealed thro-ugh it. Whatever be the specific modifications that the


Vivaranam 239

antahkarana undergoes, consciousness alons is revealedthrough all of them. The ball .of iron when it is aflameassumes a variety of forms and all these forms are also theforms of the fire. As such, consciousness, as conditionedby the antahkarana which is already 'samsrishta5 (fused)"with the objects, assumes that form into which this antah-karana has evolved itself.

Let the consciousness which is conditioned by the ^pra-matri rupa" appear as the pramata (knower). But how doesthis consciousness become that which is conditioned bythe object ? The answer is- There is the 'parinama vya-para' which is the essential or most important act of theantahkarana, This action has a transitive reference. Itrefers to an object which is not apprently a conscious ent-tity. Due to the 'parinama samsarga9 the unconsciousnature (Jadyatva) of the object stands rejected or transfor-med. The object becomes capable of giving up its exclu-sive nature for it is enveloped by the activity of the antah-karana. This is possible because the functioning of theantahkarana is a transformation (vivarta) of consciousness.Just as the antahkarana makes itself capable of manifestingconsciousness^ so does it make its related object too capableof manifesting the same consciousness.

Objection : Because there is the difference in theâvacchedaka' (the manifesting medium), there arises thedifference in the ît prak^sa\ Then how does the ^sam-sarga' with the "prainatrirupavabhasa' (appearance of theknower) arise for the experience which is conditioned bythe objects ? If there is no 'samsarga' at all, how can wesay that 'this is known by me' ? How can \ve have theknowledge that manifests the samsarga between the subject


240 Panc6apadi£a

and the object ? In other words, what is the 'pramana vya-vastly ? And how does it arise in view of the differencesbetween one experience and another ? The apprehension ofonly one relation between the subject and the object-cannot bring the manifestation of the objects or of theknowledge of the objects.

Reply : 'The antahkarana vritti' involves or bring5the subject • object relation. Herein the immediate cons-ciousness as "conditioned by the 'pramatravastha visesha"(specific state of the knower) is identical with that immedi-acy of the object. Such an identity is of the nature ofimmediacy and this is manifested by the antahkarana vrtn.The vrtti parinama (evolution of the epistemic "act) has thesamsarga (relation) with both the subject and the object.

When there is a 'vyanjaka bheda' (difference in themedium or conditioning) there will be a 'vyangya bheda*(difference in the conditioned). But here such a thing isnot possible since the same 'parinama vritti' as having thesamsrishti (fusion) with both the subject and the object,has become the vyanjaka (manifesting form). The mani-festing medium is the same for both ; but that which ismanifested appears differently in different parts.

Objection : If the 'caitanyaabhivyaktf (manifesta-tion of consciousness) is the same in both, then is the expe-rience as conditioned by the pot the subject ? Or is the sub-ject that experiences or consciousness which is conditionedby the antahkarana ? Whatever it is, both are identical.

Reply : The antahkarana is the upaadhi that eon-ditions the self. The vritt is its specific state in which we


Vivaranam 241

have the conditioned consciousness. This specific statecharacterizes the 'pramata' (the subject). Tramaatrita*being a subject, is of the nature of the doer alone, and notof the object, Since the antahkarana is here the doer, wespeak of the subject as the consciousness which is condi-tioned by the antahkarana.

Objection z If there is an identical consciousness,the subject alone will have to constitute the evperience orthe complete cognition. Is this not inconsistant ?

Reply ; No. Cognition involves that consciousnesswhich is conditioned or manifested by the object; and thus\ve have the cognition with the experience of such an objectsThus the subject is the consciousness as conditioned by theantahkarana, and the 'phala' is the consciousness as con-ditioned by she object.

Objection : The vritti has its asraya in the antah-karana, while the cognition has the samavaya (in-herence)relation with the self. Thus there are two differ-ent groundsfor both. Further, they have different objects also. Thevritti refers to the object pot, while the cognition refersto the antahkarana. Thus kriya (vritti) andphala (cognition) have different grounds' and different objects. Isthis not inconsistent ?

RepBy : No. Antahkarana and self are not two dif-ferententies; for the adhyasa between these -two givesrise only to a common idenltcal ground. And since the pottoo is only a medium manifesting consciousness, there isonly a common identical object for both the .vritti and thecognition.

31)


242 Panchapadika

Objection : The samkhya system says that themeaning is in the intellect and that the purusha knows thismeaning. Now according to your position, the meaningis consciousness, is in consciousness, and consciousnssscomprehends it.

Reply : The samkhya contention is only this - Themeaning is first in the intellect, and later on the self com-prehends it having become identical with the intellect.

Thus we have seen that even though the self is all-per-vasive its prakasa is enveloped by avidya. This self is con-ditioned by the upadhi called the antahkarana. The vrittiof this antahkarana constitutes the medium through whichconsciousness is revealed. In so far as this medium in-volves the objects that manifest consciousness, it is withreference to the objects that we speak of the self as beingthe subject.

Objection : What is ^bhivyakti' (manifestation) ?

Reply : It is only the removal of the 'avarana' (en-velope), not anything that brightens or adds to the 'sva-rupa\ It is only the removal of that which prevents theillumination of the real, or it is only the dispelling of theajnana that has enveloped the conditioned self.

Objection ; Now there is the sruti text - "hrir dhir-bhir ityetat sarvam manahva". Here we hear of the upadhihaving the nature of parinama. What is its pramaana ?Is manas (mind) too an evolute ? •

Reply ; 'Manas' is that which has the 'jnana pari-nama'; and this 'vyavahara' is the buddhi'. Since buddhi


Vivaranam 243

and manas are identical, we are able to speak of the ^pan-namavati buddhih1 (intellect transforms or changes).

Thus it is the upadhi which brings about the 'vyava-stha bheda'. Now if it s;is argued - that all objects asobjects are on the same level in so far as they are allequally well illumined by consciousness; and that thereforeeverything must be maiifested or illumined at the sametime then this argument comes from one who does notknow the nature of the upadhi and who does not knowwhat it involves.

The subject is ^svayam jyotih" (self luminous); whenthere is a relation with .the objects for this subject therearises an experience; and this experience is an immediateone and is îdentical for all. The kartradi karakas giverise to the 'jnanakriyaa' |only when they function together -The kartrikaraka (doer-ship) requires a specific objec^(karma karaka) for [a cognition. As such the ^cognitionand the vritti have their ground only in the subject, andnot elsewhere. That karmakaraka which gives us thevrittijnana is the one related to the kartrikaraka. Theexperience, then, has its ground in the object.

Objection: If consciousness is manifested also inthe 'karmakaraka', then we]have to note that the object isan object for all subjects. As such it should appear forall subjects.

Reply : "Karmakaraka give us the 'cognition onlywhen it functions together with the kartrikaraka. As suchthis gives rise to the immediacy of the subject only, just asthe previous agrument gives rise to the immediacy of the


244 Panchapadika

object. ^Sah graamam gacchati", Here'grama'(village)is the object and it is realised by the person who moves. Itreferes to the person as being the one immediately involvedhere.

The îshaya caitanya' (object as consciouness) is mani-fested only as being identical with that 'pramatri caitanyawhich is related to the object concerned. It is not identi-cal with any other 'pramaatri caitanya' which is not involvedp the cognition. As such all cannot have the same cogni-tion when only one has it.

Objection ; The lamp has prakasa and it has sam-sarga with all objects; and it manifests them all. Likewisesince consciouness is *svayam prakaasa' and all pervasive,it has samsarga with all objects; and it should manifest orillumine all. In such a case how can you assume ahan-kaara to be the upadhi for that consciousness ?

Reply : In so far as the individual is concerned, it isthe 'antahkarana parinama vritti that brings about a rela-tion of samasrishti]between the subject and the object. Theobject is necessarily implied by the vritti; and antahkaranaconditions consciousness. Even though consciousness hascontact with all objects, it can illmine only those withwhich the vritti is connected; and because of the vritti therearises the cognition. When the vritti is absent the cogni-tion is impossible even if there is the 'vishay oparaga'(attachment to the object) for conciousness.

Objection : Prakasamarata is attibuted only to the'samsarga' of the 'prakasa'. It is the prakaas a tl^^llummes the objects on which it falls. It does not illu-


Vivaranam 245

mme other objects because consciousness being "asanga*(non-relational) does not have any relation with them. Ifthis is given as the explanation, then we have to say, thatconsciousness bein^g 'asanga' cannot have any relation withthe antahkarana; and that such an upadhi cannot iIliL.mine anything.

Reply : Let it be so. The self that is conditioned bythe antahkarana is like the reflection; and it illuminesthose objects which are 'samsrishta' with it. Brahman, onthe otherhand, is like the Bimba; and since it is all-pervasive, It can illumine every thing. The sarvadarsitva•(all-seeingness) of Brahmam does not come to the self also,just as the purity of the face does not come to the reflectionAnd the kincijjnatva" of the self does not belong to Bra-hman, just like the darkness of the reflection. Thus we canexplain everything,

Objection ; This is not convincing. Now, cons-ciousness as conditioned by the object is the Brahma caita-nya; and this cannot be attributed to (or cannot be in) theself that is conditioned by ahankaara; just as the ^sarva-jnatva' (all-knowingness) of Brahman is not found in theself. Then there cannot be any 'vishayaavabhasa' for theself.

Reply : But between the antahkarana which is theupadhi of the self and the object there is a mutual syntac -tical relation. And even though consciousness is conditLoned by both these, the t vo are mutually samsrishta. Assuch the self can have the "vishayavabhasa",

Objection s In such a case, we have to note that theantahkarana is always samsarishta with Brahman who isall-pervasive. The antahkarana is the upadhi. The iden-


246 Panchapadika

tity of the jiva and Brahma caitanya is manifested in theupadhi. As such the sarvjnatva of Brahman which hasthe illumination for the self is eternal. The self then wil^cease to be the conditioned mode of consciousness.

Reply : Then we shall argue from another standpoint.The self is conditioned by avidya.

Objection: Consciousness is all - pervasive ; andthen it cannot even illumine or reveal itself. When 'cai-tanya prakasa" is in itself 'aprakasamana', it cannot revealany object ; for the lamp that is devoid of light does notmanifest any object. Further, we can place one finger beforeour eye and prevent the rays of the sun falling on it. Like-wise that which conditions consciousness obstructs or pre-vents the prakasa of the all-pervading consciousness.

Reply : Due to the uparaga (attachment) of the an-tahkarana, the avarana is overcome ; and consciousnesswhich is manifested or revealed therein is able to manifest alittle.

Objection : Even this is faulty. The antahkaranais the product of avidya. How can an effect overcome ordispel its cause, since cause and effect have only the mutualrelation of co-operation. Thus you cannot establish the'kincijjnatva' of the self from the 'ahankaropadhF.

Final Reply : That avidya is the upadhi of the selfis quite proper. The all-pervasive self being 'asanga' can-not have 'samyoga9 with all. Only -a conditioned consci-ousness can have the relation with some. Further, prakasacan illumine or manifest only that object with which there


Vivaranam 247

is the ^samyoga"*. Moreover, Brahman being the ^sarvopa^dana* (cause of all) makes manifest the whole world as non»different from itself, just as it manifests to the self as iden-tical with itself. The self cannot do this because it is notthe upadana of the world,

Objection ; But Brahman is all-pervasive and un-related to any object being asanga. How does this 'asam-srishta^ (non-relational) consciousness acquire a samsargarelation with antahkarana ?

Reply : Three possible explanations are given. Theyare respectively (1) ciduparaganta vritti (attached to cons.ciousness), (2) abhedartha (non-different) vrttih, and(3) avaranabhibhavartha (enveloping) vrttih\

1) 'Gotva* is a (cowness) generic universal. Eventhough lions and other animals which are different from thecow are near by, the ôtva' is not manifested by the horseetc because the horse has no relation wilh 'gotva^. It is thenature of *gotva' to be manifested only by those amimalsthat have the dewlap etc., for 'gotva' has a necessary andnatural relation only with such animals.

2) There is the pradipa prabha (light the lamp). Theray of light spreads to the air, ether, rasa, gandha etc.Yet because of its nature, it does not manifest these. Itmanifests only those forms with which it has a samsarga.Likewise it is the specific nature of consciousness to haveits samsarga with the antahkarana only and not with any-thing else.

c) Thorns etc, by themselves do not burn. But whenthe ball of fire has its samsarga with them, they begin to


248 'Panchapadika

burn. The iron ball is like the ahankara, while the fire o!^he bail is like the self. It is such a self that illuminesthose objects that are not capable of revealing themselves.Hence it is proper to treat ahankara as the upadhi.

2) We may argue that the self has an upadhi. Beingconditioned by the upadhi, the self is 'paricchinna'; andhence it cannot illumine every thing. That which bringsthis conditioning is the antahkarana which has vritti. Thisvntti effects a samsarga with the objects whence arises themanifestation of the 'vishaya caitanya'. 'Jivacaitanyata'i^ not opposed to this. There will be an eternal illumina-tion of all the objects as in the case of Brahman only whenthe antahkarana vriui undergoes a modification in the formof Brahman. Till such a vritti can have the samsarga,only a few objects are revealed. It is not the samsarga ofthe real antahkarana that bringes this manifestation, ^ sincethat would have to reveal also th's dharmas of this antah-karana, That antahkarana whose vritti has evolved itselfinto the form of the self, only such an antakarana canovercome the self. If this were not true, the experienceof deep sleep would have to be false. Hence we concludethat the g^paricchinnatva' of the self does not bring themanifestation of all objects.

3) The self is enveloped by ajnana; and even thoughit is svay? m prakasa, it is unable to manifest all the obje-cts. And when there is the upasarga with the antahkarana,there disappears the 'avarana'. Manif 9 station arises thereonly; and that object is illumineted with which there is theHamsarga for the antahkarana. Ajnana envelopes the selfand produces the antahkarana, and this antahkarana candispel the avarana because of the vritti. That an effect


Vivaranam 249

can put an end to the normal act of its cause is seen in thecases of the serpent and the tree cominglto appear respecti-vely from cowdng and clay. Thus we can establish the'pramatritvaadi vyavastha' for the self.

Vijnana Yada :

We have said that the object is a transformation(vivaria) of consciousness. Eventhough consciousness isnot different from the object, it is of the only form ofthe object; it is of the only form of ^ham avabhasa' (appe-arance of the I). How does it differ from vijnanavada?

Vishayaa paroksha (immediacy of the object) andvishaya paroksha are admitted; and an identity has beenarrived at between pramata, pramiti and prameya in termsof conscriouness* If the 'niladi vishaya9 (object like blue^too were of the nature of immediacy, it means that we havethe 'nilatmika samvit^ (consciousness as blue). The cogni-tion or consciousness of the blue will be the consciousnessitself. This amounts to the Buddhist position.

The Vijnanavadixi0 argue that since vijnana is momen-tary there ai ises difference. And this difference gives usthe cognition of the object which is said to have the 'artha-kriya samanhy a'^(pragmatic ability) and because of this'samathya', the object is only sunya (void).

The Vedantins argue that due to the 'samvedana^(consciousness as experience) which is advitiya (non-dual)there arises the non-difference between the subject and theobject. Yet difference too is there; and this gives us thecognition of the object which has the 'arthakriya sama-

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250 Panchapadika

rthya'; and because of the 'samarthya' the 'sthayitva' (stea-diness) of the object is not subject to negation or sublationtWhere as there is 'badhita sthayitva" (negative steadiness;)in the other view, here we have 'abadhita sthayitva'. Fur-ther, from the standpoint of the 'samvedana' difference isabsent. Yet an 'aropita bheda' (imputed difference) isaccepted, whence this doctrine cannot be confused withthe Mimaamsaka position.

To distinguish the Vedantic position from that of theBuddhists, Padmapaada argues : There is the avabhasa ofthe blue and that of the yellow as excluding one another.In so far as both are immediate cognitions, the immediacyproper is identical in both. One immedicy is not exclusiveof another immediacy; but^the object felt in one immediacyis exclusive of the object felt in the other. We have the'samvid eka rupavagama'. The samvit for both is one andthe same.1'

The samvid (consciousness) is the continuant in allapprehensions and as such may be said to be identical inall of them. But there is the 'bheda pratitF (awareness ofdifference) also in so far as there are two or more than twoapprehensions. Then how can there be the samvid aikyam(oneness of consciousness)? Let there be 'ekarupata'because of the recognition of identity. But there is alsothe awareness or apprehension of difference, since one is a'ghata (pot) samivf while the other is a 'pata (cloth)samvit9.

The 'avabhasa' of difference is not na+ural to theimmediacy of the samvit. The difference brought by the'paropadhi' does not negate or sublate the 'svarapa pra-tyabhijna'.


Vivaranam 2511

Objection : Even if there is the identity of samvitswhy can't there be the non-difference of objects? Whycan't there be the non-difference of the 'samvedya' (known)with the 'samvit' ?

Reply : There cannot be a real identity because ofthe upadhi bheda. If there is a total difference, thereought to be the 'avabhasa' of the "vyavritta svabhavata'(excluded nature) also. But that is not found.

It has been said that the 'anuvritta* (continuant) samvitis not non-different from the 'vyavritta -'(excluded object)since it is the nature of the continuant to imply differents,just as in the case of the akasa which continues to be in thepot etc. Now, the author ^proceeds to show^that the diffe-rence between the object and the samvit is also perceptuallyarrived at.

According to the Buddhists, vijnana is momentary. Assuch the object and its 'samvit' cannot coexist. When theyspeak of 'nilatmaka samvit' (consciousness of the nature ofblue) we should take them to mean only 'nilam' (blue).

Even the Buddhists admit that the 'pratyag avabhasa(awareness of the self) which is immediate and which exclu-des the object, is different from the 'nilatmaka samvif.

It is well known that âham nilam pasyamF (I see theblue) is an immediate apprehension. The îshaya samvit'and the 'vishayi samvit4 cannot be at the same moment. So,they admit that the 'aham ullekha' is different from the^nila^ The blue is the apprehended while the I is tha( whichapprehends. This difference, then, is immediate. The'pratyag avabhasa' is only the 'aham samvedana\ and it


252 Panchapadika

differs from the 'parag avabhasa' which is the object. Thepratyag avabhasa 'is to be found only in the 'svarupa'-i.e.,in the ^ham samvedana^ We apprehend it as being diff,erent from the blue. Not only should we accept it "as diff-erent, but we also experience it. We apprehend the blueas the this, as that which excludes the subject, as the appr<ehended. Thus we have two entities that exclude oneanother and stand in the relation of the apprenheded andthe apprehending.

The Vijnanavadin observes : Both are ^svarupamafia nishtha'; and as such how can there be subject-object relation here? If the blue appears as unrelated tothe samvit, it cannot appear in its 'samvedana*. Since thesamvit is said to have the form of the blue, it may besaid that the blue appears in its samvedana. In the absenceof any relation it is impossible to have the form of theblue. But if it can have the form of the blue, why cannotthe samvedana reveal all objects? You cannot also arguethat the blue appears as related to the samvit, for there isno specific relationship here.

The Buddhist might argue that there is a causal rela-tion (Janya janakata sambandha) here. Isjthis relationone of mere 'janakatva^ (causing to come into being) or of'vishayataya janakatva^ (using an object to come intobeing). It cannot be the former for that would involvethe coming into existence of all samvits. The sense organtoo is essential for the samvit, and as such it too wouldbecome an object. Hence we have to say that there is arelation of identity which is natural but uncommon; anddue to this relation, the blue appears in the vijnana.


Vivaranani 253

Further, when the ^bhedavabhasa' too is immediate,how can you suppress it or reject it relying only on logicalreasoning"? How is it that in 'idam aham Janami' (I knowthis) we have the awareness of the 'grahya grahakata9 (gra-sped and grasping) in ?

The Vijnanavadm replies that these three are not app-rehended in one samvit, but they are three successive sam-vits ; and that they are mutually exclusive,

But if they are successive samvits, when there is thesecond samvit, there cannot be the avabhasa for the first,These three are together apprehended immediately. Theidea of succession, then, is inconsistent with the immediateapprehension,

The VijnanavadilK This apprehension has arisesfrom the vasana or samskara that has come from the previ-ous samvits, And these three are so united jthat we have adistinct and new apprehension- Here we do not have theawareness of the relation,

At first there is the vijnan-a arising from 'aham^ (I)Then there comes the vijnana of the object as 'idam5 (this)These vijnanas alone are the vasanas. The "'Sajatiiya jnana^(cognate cognition) of the previous moment is the 'vasana\for the 'sajatiya jnana^ of this moment There is no otherthing called samskara except this. The two previous vasa*nas which are together get into a relation witn janami(know) which also gives forth a vasana. In accordance withthese three vasanas functioning together as the cause» therearises one single vij'nana which has three forms in it,


254 Panchapadika

Vedantm : This whole ^prakriya' (procedure) is com-pletely inconsistent with experience. We never find theprstyayas like the mere 'aham', or like the mere 'idam\ orlike the mere 'janami\ Even at the very outset the prat-yaya is one synthetic unit of the form 'aham idam janamF ;

and this is 'katrikarmanubhavatmaka9. As such we shouldaccept that which is a fact of experience. And we shouldadmit that the object blue which is 'arthakriya samartha\is distinct from the vijnana 'aham".

Vijnanavadin : Yes. We do not say, because of th0experience, the blue is noa-.Uffereat from the 's^mv;-dana\ But because the 'pratibhasa' of the blue cannot beexplained satisfactorily through vijnana, we speak of thatnon-difference. Now vijnana and the object are "sthayains^(fixed ones) and not momentary ones. And the uncJinmonbut mutual relation which is the cause of the act would giverise to an uncon mon 'vishayavabhasa'. If the object andthe vijnana are not momentary, their relationship would beuncommon- Such a mutual relation gives rise to the expe-riencing act. As such the vi&hayabvabhasa too would haveto be uncommon.

Suppose the object and the vijnana are only momen-tary. A momentary entity cannot have any 'agantufcasambandha' (relation with an outside intruder)- Then itcannot have even a natural abheda (non» different) samban-dha. Then that which has no necessary relation with con-sciousness cannot have any ^ratibhasa'-

Hetice the Vijnanavadin argues that fion- difference isestablished or arrived at because otherwise the 'vishayapratibhasa' is impossible. -"Since this theory accepts the


Vivaranam 255

momentariness of cognitions, in the absence of identity bet-ween the subject and the object, there will be 'kriyanupa-pattF ('mpossibility of the act).

If the vijnana and the object are not momentary, thepermanent subject will have the knowing relation with thepermanent object only ; and then because of the act ofknowing there will be the immediacy of the blue etc ; sincethis is not acceptable, we deny this contention and say thatvijnana and aham (i) are only momentary.

Vedantin : Does perception establish the momentarLness of vijnana ? Or is it inference which establishes it ? Ifit is the former, the jnana that is there now in [this momentexcludes from itself that which is not in this moment; andit should give us the knowledge of this exclusion also.There is the îlajnana* which gives us the knowledge ofof the exclusion of the non-blue. Hence by pratyaksha orimmediate experience is meant that vijnana which existsonly in this present moment. Such a perceptual cognitioncannot give us the 'vljnana bhedavabhasa' (awareness of thecognition of difference). If we accept the momentarinessof vijnana, then the aham would have to be different atevery different moment; for every moment has its own par-ticular samvit or aham. Whether such a difference is foundor not, let them examine their own experiences and say.

Vijnana vadin : The apprehension of difference isthere. But the âmsamvif of this moment is so greatlysimilar to that of the other moment, that the difference isnot clearly revealed. The difference is distinct from thesamvit and it can be apprehended by another jnana. Bat


256 Panchapadika

because of the defect called extreme similarity it is not cle-arly cognised-

Vedantin : The *aham samvit' of the previous momentis different from that of this moment. That they are diffe"rent is to be apprehended by another samvid. But one sam»vit can not be an object of another samvit; and as suchthe difference cannot be apprehended. If one âmvit' canbe an object of another 'samvit', w? will have in the cog-nition of difference (bheda samvedana) three factors- viz.first samvit, second samvit, and the difference betweenthese tv/o. Are these three factors assumed , to be there inthe 'bheda samvedana1 ? Or are they non-different fromthat cognition of difference ?

If may be argued that the *samvit svarupa^ itself is

difference and that the samvedana itself is thatjnana. ^Sam-vid bheda5 (difference of consciousness) and 'samvid bodha*(awareness of consciousness) are, identical.

Vedantin : Then as along as the 'samvidbheda' is notcognised or apprehended» so long will the 'samvid bodha''remain unintelligible and ununderstood. Nothing can beknown.

Further when the 'aikya pratibhasa9 (awareness of iden-tity) between the I of the past moment and the I of the pre-sent moment is there, it is inconsistent with pramana <oassume a relation of similarity between the two. Whentwo different objects are mistaken to be identical with oneanother, then you can assume similarity and no pramanavôuld come in the way. When the two do not differ fromcne another, there does not arise any question of similarity „


Vivaranam 257

Assuming similarity where there is the apprehension ofidentity, is useless and is opposed to all pramanas.

Vijnanavadin : But since the âikyavabhasa^ is -due tosome error (vyamoha), the assuming of similarity is notopposed to any pramana. When two objects are^different,they can be mistaken to be one and the same, only if theyare similar. Such an arthapatti (implication) compells usto assume similarity. Thus we establish similarity.

Vedantin : Here is the fallacy of mutual dependencyYou can establish 'aikya bhrama9 only by assuming simi-larity ; and you can make out similarity only by assuming'aikya bharma\ One involves the other.

Vijnanavadin : 'Aikya partibhasa9 cannot have selfvalidity. If there is similarity there is no 'aikyatavabhasa^;

and if there is "aikyatavabhasa' (awareness of identity),there is no similarity. The apprehension of identity depe-nds on the absence of similarity ; and the latter dependson the former. Thus the same fallacy occurs here also.

Vedantin : The 'aikyapratibhasa' is not dependent onsimilarity or on the absence of similarity. It has selfvalidity.

Vijnanavadin : Then even similarity has self-validity.

Vedantin : If this were so, similarity too would have'pramanya'1 (validity); on the contrary, it is âpramanyapurvika' when we have aikya bhrama; this implies thattwo different entities are assumed to be similar. This

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258 Panchapadika

assumption alone makes the false cognition of identitypossible. On the other hand, the aikyavabhasa is a factof experience and as such it does not stand in need of anyproof/ That this experience is there is well attested byrecognition*

The Buddhists proceed to criticise pratyabhijna. Whatis this pratyabhijna or recognition with the help of whichyou seek to maintain the identity of the samvit and thusthe identity of the continuant ?

V : There is the samskara arising from the previousexperience. This samskara cooperates with the presentexperience where we have the sense contact with the object.From this arises a single cognition which involves the rela-tion of two moments of time and which is a perceptualcognition.

B : Such a recognition might be found in so far asthe cognitions of the objects are considered. It is notapplicable in the case of the self. According to you theself is of the nature of vijnana and is sthayin; and beingsvaprakasa, it cannot be an object for another knowledge.Only when it is an object in a cognition and when such acognition is destroyed, can it give rise to a samskara.Such a samskara is absent; for the svarupa of jnana is be-yond destruction. And that which is not destroyed cannotgive rise to a samskara. Further, there is no pramitikaranain the case of this self which is svayam prakasa. As suchrecognition cannot establish the identity of the self of thepast moment with that of the present moment.

V : Then the ^svarupa jnana samskara* may be takento be the cause of the recognition.


Vivaranam 259

B ; No. the self is like the pradipa which illuminesonly those that are before it at that moment. Neither theobjects of the past, nor those of the future can be illuminedby it As such the 'svarupajnana' cannot effect an iden-tity between two moments of the self. Moreover, in 'soham' (I am he) we have two different forms 'sah/ (he) and^ham' - and these are two different objects. The differ-ence in the objects brings about a difference in the cogni-tions. And this difference cannot make out any identitylike that presupposed in recognition. Hence the 'atma-ikyapratiti' (apprehension of the identity of the self) is anerroneous cognition.

Adviatin's repEy to this contention :

V : We apply pratyabhijnana only in the case of theself that is conditioned by the antahkarana; we do notapply it in the case of the pure consciousness. The sthayi-tva (permanence) of this pure consciouness is known to usonly from the sastra.

During the 'samsaravastha' (state of finite life) it isalways conditioned by the antahkarana and this form doesnot disappear. Pratyabhijna helps us in making out the stha-yitva of this self only. The antahkarana of this selfevolves itself into an ^hamkara vritti' which alone makesthe manifestation of the conditioned self possible. The'aham vritti9 has given rise to the experience of the condi-tioned self at the previous time. This vritti has given riseto a samskara which is in the antahkarana. Such an an"tabkarana is the cause of the present 'atmabhivyakti9. Assuch it affects an identity between the conditioned selves ofthe two moments. The awareness of this identity is therecognition of identity.


260 Panchapadika

B : Both in the previous experience and in the presentexperience, the self is not revealed as the object. Howcan such a self be the object in recognition ?

V : There is no such defect here. 'Samvedana9 is^svayam prakasa' and it cannot then be an object in another^samvedana'. Yet at a later time it can be the object ofmemory that has arisen from its own samskara. Likewisethe self may not be an object in one experience ; but it canbecome an object in recognition.

B : But the self being 'svayam prakasa' cannot become an object.

V : It can become an object in so far as it is condi-tioned by space, time, and antalikarana. Take dharmawhich can be known only through agama (scripture). Evensuch a dharma has the specific nature of yielding its fruitsin the present. From the consequences that have arisen inthe present we come to know of its existence and nature.Dharma which is not an object of cognition becomes anobject through its consequences.

B : In recognition the same self is both the subjectand the object at the same time. Is this not inconsistent ?

V : But all those who accept the self to be distinctfrom the body, do have this inconsistency. The self be-comes an object in the inferential cognitions aimed at esta-blishing the self.

B : This is not so. In inference the object doe netshave janakatva (karakatva). It is the mere form of the self


Vivaranam 261

alone that is the object, while it is the real self that is thesubject. In perception, however, the object has janakatva-it gives us the knowledge of itself. As such in a perceptualexperience there would have to be an object and this wo aidmake the self both the subject and the object at the sametime in recognition.

V : As conditioned by the antahkarana, the self is tobe treated as the knower. As conditioned by the past andthe present moments, the self is the object known. Becauseof this difference in the upadhi, there is no inconsistency inthe position we have advanced. The recognition involvedin 'so ham" is a fact of experience ; and it should be expla-ined some how or other. As such we assume the differencein the upadhis to account for it* And this experience i§not opposed to facts, nor is it a case of error,

You can not argue that there is a difference of form in^so ham" giving rise to a difference in the objects and thusto a difference in the two cognitions. You argue thsf'vijnana is momentary. Here vijnana is one cognition?while Momentary* is another and a different cognitionThere are two different entities here and two different cog-nitions. As a result, vijnana would cease to be momentary.

B : It is true. We only speak of, the momentarinesof vijnana for the sake of convenience. We do not say tha^;

it is real,

V : We too speak of sthayitva etc. in vijnana onlyfrom the standpoint of the upadhis. They are not real inan ultimate sense. But there is this much of differencewhen time and other upadhis are there, we are able to arrive


262 Panchapadflka

at 'sthayitva' and other 'vikalpa pratyayasy through the ex-perience of identity involved in ^so hanf. They are notcases of error aBd they have the 'artha kriya samarthya"-Such is not the case with momentariness etc. accpted by you,.

Here arises a dispute with the Prabbakaras for whomthe self is the ground of knowledge and not the object. Theyargue that recognition does not establish the self to beanobject, but only as the asraya (ground, locus).

Vedantin : In recognition the Fself of the pa&t mo-ment is related to the self of the present moment. Cog-nition being momentary, recognition would find it difficultto bring into it two moments ; and the self cannot becomethe ground for such a recognition. By becoming the groundfor a momentary cognition, the self cannot be 'sthayF.

Prabhakara : I am remembering now the samvedana ofthe past moment. Since any knowledge must have a groundythe ground of this remembered knowledge is that self a&qualified by the past moment. And the ground for the pre-sent remembered knowledge is the self of the present mom-ent. Thus the two moments are there and they qualify thesame self.

V : The act of remembering would establish the pre-sent self, while the past experience would do the .same forthe past self, like two perceptual experiences. How can youestablish that the same self is related to both these mome-nts ? You cannot say that this it is established by the twosamvits-of the past and of the present; for when we recog-nise the pot we do not bring in two perceptual experiences?but only one single act of recognition. The two samvits


Vivaranaro, 263

are not capable of effecting a relation between the twomoments.

The two samvits cannot also establish the self to be onthe same ground. Each samvit by itself can establish onlythe self of that moment ; and we cannot say that both havethe same ground. Nor can the two samvits toghether esta-blish it ; for since both are not together present, each canestablish the self of that particular moment only. The selfas qualified by its samvit does not happen to be the groundof the other samvit.

P : The two samvits of the two moments having theself of two moments as their grounds, give rise to a thirdsamvit; and the object of this third samvit is that selfwhich is identical in the other two samvits.

V : That the self is the object and not the ground inrecognition is the very thing we are establishing.

Furhter, we have to accept that the self can be the obj,ect of recognition, and not its ground. Take'the cognitionânubhutam maya% (It was experienced by me). There wasan experience in the past., and I now remember that experi-ence as mine. In this act there is the memory of the expe-rience as belonging to the self. The previous samvit asqualifying its ground is remembered. This is a ^visishtasmarana' (specific remembering) in which the self also isapprehended. We arrive at the self as having had the pre-vious experience in the present memory cognition. In thepresent specific (visishta) memory we have the memory of theself as qualified by the past experience. We do not havethe memory of the past experience as detached from theself. This is a. fact of experience.


264 Panchapadijka

Now, from the cognition of the present, I can have theknowledge that there will be rain in the furture; and eventhough there is no rainbow, the former proceeds to act inthe field so that the future rain may be of use to him. The'prakasa manatva' (apprehension) of the clouds now is thecause of the act. Through jnana we are able to compre-hend the rain that will come later. Likewise there wasonly the samvedana in the past and now I remember it ismy own past experience. Even though the past experienceis not present now as the present experience, it is cognisedthrough the 'prakasamanatva' of the self.

The self may be the ground of the past samvedana; butin the present memory cognition we have the past sam-vedana of the self. As such that self which may be theground becomes the object in this present memory cogni-tion. The sel^ which is the ground of the rememberedsamvedana and that which was there at the time of thatsamvedana, such a self now becomes an object in my pre-sent memory cognition.

The Prabhakara may argue that only that samvedanais made the object by the present memory; and that as thatsamvedana is remembered, it brings its ground even nowas its ground.

This is false. In the present memory cognition thatsamvedana is not present as this savedana. An absent sa-»mvedana cannot establish its ground now; for any samve-dana can establish only that ground which was present onlywhen that sam edana was there. It is only that samvedanawhich is 'svayam prakasamana' and it is only such a sam-vedana that can establish its asraya (ground). But thesamvedana comprehended in the memory is only the object


Vivaranam 265

in the memory cognition; and as such it is paraprakasya(revealed by the other)* Such an entity that is illumined bysomething other than itself, can not be a sadhaka (meansto prove) for the self. Otherwise, dharma etc. which areillumined by agama etc. (which are distinct from dharmaetc*), would have to be the sadhakas for establishing theirground. This is absurd.

Hence we have to conclude that the self which was inthe past cognition becomes an object only in the presentmemory cognition*

So far we have shown that perception cannot establishthe moementariness of vijnana; and that perception cannotp,it an end to the aikyavabhaasa of the self.

The Vijnanavadin next attempts at establishing themomeutariness of vijnana inferentially. The inferentialargument may be stated thus ;

Destruction is noticed in the last moment of the object,This last moment is proceeded by a moment which musthave the power to produce this destruction. In this wayall the proceeding moments must have the same nature.Thus each moment is distinct from the other and has itsrelation with the proceeding arid succeeding moments. Andwe therefore have a similarity between these moments,

The immediately preceeding moment of the actual des-truction has existence ; and this moment is called the lastmoment There is the distruction immediately after thismoment has come into existence. During this last momenta

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266 Panchapadika

the existence of the pot is conditioned by this last momentThe existence of the pot as conditioned by the momentgearlier to this moment is distinct from the former existence.This latter existence is referred to as its *adi' (beginning)Even in these moments each moment finds its destruction inthe immediately succeeding moment. The destruction inthe succeeding moment is copervasive with the existence ofthis moment. In this the earlier moments are similar tothe last moment. From this inference mome;.tariness isestablished. And the identity between the moments is basedonly on their similarity with one another.

To this, Padmapada gives a counter-inference whichmay be rendered thus :

Existence is noticed in the first moment. Existence cangive rise only to existence. As such even at the end we caninfer the existence of the pot.

'The first moment' means the moment which conditionsthe existence of the pot; the 'end' means those momentswhich condition its destruction. As such even after thedestruction of the pot, we may infer the existence of the po^during those moments. We may infer that the existenceof the pot is copervasive with those moments of the pot(when the pot is no more). All the moments have the nat-ure of time. The first moments are the times as conditionedby its existence. The same may hold good of the last mom-ent also.

The Buddhist argues that when the pot is no more,thereis the experience of its negation or absence ; and as suchthe Vedantin's inference runs counter to experience.


Vivaranam 267

To this the Vedantin replies that since we experiencethe existence of the object in the earlier moments, the Budd-hist contention too runs contrary to experience as embodiedin recognition.

The Vedantin^s inference flouts experience, while theBuddhist's flouts recognition. Bat experience is strongerthan the other» Abhijnx or perceptual experience can be a^badhaka' for this inferential cognition ; but there can beno such 'badhya badhakata9 between inference and recog-nition.

To this, the Vedantin's reply is that there is no diffe-rence at all between the two. In the 'jvalapratyabhiJDa'(recognition of the flame) we find inference functioning asthe 'badhaka9 for the recognition. The 'kshayanubhava'(experience of destruction) does not arise immediately buonly mediately since it involves the apprehension of boththe 'dharmin' and its "pratiyogin^ (contradictory). Whetherit is abhijna or pratyabhijna, both are cases of perceptualcognition. Any one of these can be a badhaka for inferenceand this we find in the case of the cognition of two moons.Hence both the inferences are on the same level. Consequ-ently wo cannot establish 'kshanikatva' (momentariness) orsattva (existence) from any of these two inferences.

Arthaknyakarlta and Sattva :

The Buddhist then proceeds to establish the momenla-riness from the doctrine of "artha kriya karitva' (pragmaticactivity), 'Arthakriya kari' means that which gives rise(makes possible) an act. The inference given is :

That which is not momentary is not 'artha knyakarF ;

e.g. the horn of a hare. To state this inference, he first


268 Panchapadika

proceeds to show that ^rthakriyakaritva" is incompatiblewith then nature of a 'sthayin'. This argument is statedthus by Padmapada :

You want the 'aham ullekha' to be a 'sthayin'. TheI for you is not a fleeting and changing entity. Does thisI give rise to an 'artha kriya' ? Or no ? If it does not giverise to one, it partakes of the nature of non-existence, andis therefore not at all real. But if it does give rise to one,it is no longer the unchanging ^sthayin5; for the ^thayin^does not admit of arthakriya karitva.

On this the Vedantin raises an objection : If an objectwere to give rise to another, then something must set theobject in motion. This something is to be related to theobject. Such a relation is possible only when the objecthas unchanging existence. If it is momentary, nothing canbe related to it; and then nothing can come out of it. Assuch only a 'sthayin' has the 'arthkriya yoga'.

The Buddhist denies such a 'yogyatva' (properiety). Heargues : Does the sthayin give rise to ^thakriya' successi-vely ? Or simultaneously ? Successively means producingmany karyas (effects) one after the other in a series.Simultaneously means producing all the karyas at oneand the same moment.

Now let us take ihe first alternative. Since there is nodifference between any two moments, why does not the pre-vious moment give rise to that which the succeeding mom-ent produces ? If it is capable of giving rise to many 'kar-yas', it should produce them all at the same moment sinceit is the sufficient cause and since one cause can produce aplurality of effects.


Vivaranam ôy

Then consider the second alternative. If it can prod-uce in a single moment all that it produces through out itslife, then immediately after that moment it would cease toexist. It would be unreal since it has nothing more to do.

In the former alternative we do not find any causewhich would make it give rise to its karyas only at a latertime. And if it is not an agent at a later time, it is no lon-ger real then. Hence any entity which is 'artha kriya kari'does not become a ^sthayin5 only because of this. Conse-quently the 'ahamullekha' differs from moment to moment,whence the âikyavabhasa^ (apprehension of identity) is theresult of the similarity between those moments.

The Vedantin now proceeds to reply to this exami-nation. The sthayin, on this view, may produce all its kar-yas in a single moment; and then it may keep quiet. Yetit does not become a non-existent entity. ^Sattva7' cannotbe defined as that which has the ability to give rise to anârtha kriya'. So the Vedantin asks : What is this 'artha-kriya' in the absence of which an entity is said to becomenon-existent ?

The Buddhist replies that it is the ability of an objectto give rise to the knowledge of itself.

V : This kind of sttva may be found in the case ofexternal objects. But it is not applicable in the case of vij-nana, If vijnana were to be a ^sattva^ it should be an obj-ect in another vijnana. Vijnana cannot be said to arisefrom its own vijnana. Each samvit is 'svaprakasa', and asuch i< is not capable of giving 'svavishaya jnana5 (objectof its own cognition). Hence it will have to be 'asat'non-existent).


2W Panchapadika

6 : There calmot be a subject-object relation "betweenhe jnanas of one 'jnana santana'1 (series). Yet my jnana;an be an object for the cognition of another person. Thust will be 'purusbantara juana janaka^ (able to cause thecnowledge of another person). Hence there is 'artha kriya9or the samvits.

V : Even this is not possible; for jnana cannot beognised by the sense-organs. My jnana is not immediateor anothei. It can only be inferred.

B : Then my knowledge is the object inferred. Asuch the jnana belonging to one 'Jnana santana9 can giveise to the jnana belonging to another jnana santana.

V : This too is not possible since the inferential cog-ition is based on â perceptual cognitisn; and perceptualignition is absent here.

B : Yet all the samvedanas are the objects for theiana of an all-knower. Thus they can be objects that givese to the knowledge of themselves. This is possible be-mse the sarvajna (ominiscient) has the immediate appre-snsion of all objects.

V : Such an immediacy which does not exclude theîjnana upaplavas9 (fluctuations in knowledge) is not3ssible : i.e., the jnana of the all-knower would have to^ identical with the objects and the objects which are ourana are all imperfect. That would bring about an iden-y between his jnana and our 'samsaara samvit' (finite con-iousness). This would impute all our difficulties to:ahman. Since the samvit is non-different from the object,


Vivaranam 271

the 'sarvajna jnana' would be polluted by the 'samsarasamvit'.

- B. Even though the jnana of the Allknower is 'upara-kta' (aitached) with mi jnana, it does not corrupt orpollute the 'sarvajaa jnana* since it is negated (badiuta) bytrue knowledge.

V. Now such a negation for the 'samsara samvit' isnot possible in the ^sarvajna jnana' at the same moment,The 'samsara samvit' will be there at one moment, and thenegation will arise at the next moment. Till the negationhas arisen, there is the corruption of the 'sarvajna jnana'.This 'samara samvit' cannot be negated by the next jnana,for the letter cannot have the former as its object. To havethe former as its object, it should continue to exist beyondits moment. Even if it becomes an object, there would bean identity between the 'badhita (negated) samvit' and'badhaka (negating) samvit

We cannot also say that without any of the upaplavas(flucuations) there will be the uparaga of the^samsaravijnanas' in the jnana of the all-knower; for in such a casethe samsara samvit' is no longer the object. The all-knowerwould be incaple of apprehending the world by 'upaplavas'.and his teaching would then be out of place.

B : Then I shall advance another definition. Anha-kriyaa need not mean giving rise to the knowledge of itself.It only means giving rise to another moment which is cog-nate with it (sajatiya).

V : Then what would happen to the last moment ?Will not the last moment be non-existent (asattva) ? Therâre the.vijnanas of the form T changing from moment to


272 Panclifipad&a

tnoment. These constitute one 'jnana santana'. Here W6assume the relationship of the knower - known-knowing,along with a 'sthayin'. Due to these, our vijnanas are ren-dered impure by the 'ragadidoshas' and by the objects.Now there are the samskaras of the nature of the vijrianaarising from the proceeding bbgiiate dbjects. From thesesamskaras, there arise the later vijnanas. When we know(bhavana) that all this is momentary, there is dispelled the^thayaitva kalpana ? When we come to know (bhavana) theparticular, there is destroyed that assumption (kalpana)which involves the substance, quality, sound, act, adjunct(viseshana)and vishaya (object).When all this is known to bedubkha there disappear the ûkha duhkha upaplavas bro-ught by the 'ragadi dosha pravritti' ? The contemplationof this as the 'sunya' (void) puts and end to the 'vishay3'upaplava'?

Thus there are four different bhavanas haying four act-ions that put an end to the corresponding different samska-ras. In this way the four types of upaplavas are sloweddown. Then there arises a vijnana which is free from all'upaplavas^ And this arises in the moment that immedia-tely succeeds the last moment of the upalavas. The mo-ment that has the jnana which is free from all upapfavasîs preceeded by that moment where the upalavas are onlyslowed down. This moment comes at the end of the ^sam-sara jnana santana' (series of finite cognitions) and thus it iscalled the last moment.

This last moment does not give rise to any other mom-ent where the upaplavas can be seen. As such this lastmoment would be 'asaf. Consequently all the proceedingmoments too would have-to partaka of the nature of non-existence<


Vivaranam 273

B : The last moment may not give rise to a momenthaving its cognate jna'ia. But it brings as its object thejnana of the all-knower.

V : Giving rise to the jnana of the all-knower doesnot make it 'arthavattva'. For, if it gives rise to that jnana,it is no longer the last moment. And when there is no lastmoment, there can be no liberation. 'Ekasantanata9 meansthat there is a causal relation between two entities having asimilar nature. And if the last moment gives rise to thejnana of the all-knower, then both these must have anidentical or similar nature. Such a causal relation wouldmake the last moment impossible ; and if there were to beliberation, there should be a last moment.

B : There is a moment giving rise to the jnana of theall-knower. There two jnana santanas are similar and havea similar nature. And since that moment is giving rise tothe jnana of the all-knower, we have the ^santanaikya"(identity of the series). This identity itself may be tai< en tobe the liberation,

V : Then this moment is not giving rise to that jnanaas its object. One samvit cannot be the object of anothersamvit, smce as samvits they do not differ from one ano-ther. Just as one pradipa as light does not differ from ano-ther pradipa as light, so too two samvits cannot differ fromone another.

One samvit cannot be the object of another samvit.One samvit cannot have the immediate experience of ano-ther. Somebody else's samvit can only infer my samvit;

35)


^-i^ Panchapadika

Or it might be said that the samvedana is iniiand direct. What is inferred is not another's samthe relation of the samvit to another body-ie., f^tsuch a samvit in him or for him because his body isring thus. As such samvit is never an object fpramana.

As having the nature of the samvit, the two sam1non-different. One samvit does not differ from £samvit, in so far as both are samvits. If the 'dhaisamvit, and if its "pratiyogin" (contradictory) also is sthere are no two samvits but only one samvit.

Of these two, if only one is samvit and the onot, even then there will be only one samvit. Ancthere cannot be a subject-object relation between thevits.

Moreover, does the ârthakriya karitva' of anact as the cause to establish the existence (sattva)cause of the entity ? Or is it only a 'pratiti nimitt;

strument or cause of apprehension) ?

Take the first alternative according to which an cis supposed to have existence if it is 'arthakriyakari' -gives rise to something. The emergence of thewould establish the existence of its cause. But the <has come into existence long before its effect. Does iexist if it has not produced an effect ? Till it hasduced an effect, is it existent ? The horn of the harenot exist and it does not produce any effect. It is noabsence of the effect that makes the horn of the hareexistent. But it is its non-existence that does not alkto give rise to any effect.


Vivaraftam 275

So, one may fall back on the second alternative andsay that only the apprehension (pratiti) of the existence ofthe cause is rendered possible by the 'arthakriya karitvaôf the effect. Then the effect has 'arthakriya karitva'; itgives us the apprehension of its cause. Any thing can beapprehended only by the knowledge of its effect. To havethe knowledge of this effect, we require its effect; and inthis way we are led to a regress. As such we cannot havethe apprehension of ^satta' at any time. The whole worldremains unapprehended. It would remain a void.

Buddhist : 'Arthakriya" is no other than an effect.An object gives us knowledge and this is the effect andknowledge is 'svayam siddha9 (self-proved) since it doesnot require any thing else to be known. This knowledgemakes us know that the object exists. As such there is nopratity anavastha (regress in apprehension).

Vedantin : Jnana is the effect and it is said to bethe cause that determines the existence of the object, andsince these jnanas are 'svayam siddha" that which gives usthe jnana is self;, and not the 'artha kriya' ? Further jnanaand its object being identical on the Buddhist view, we can-not say that the Parana bhuta jnana' (causel cognition)is dependant on'^the illumination of the 'karya bhuta jnana*;

for all jnana is self-luminous.

B : Let this be so. Jnana is illumined by it self. Itcan by itself be its own 'arthakriya'.

V : This is a tautology; and it admits in essence that"arthakriya karitva' cannot establish the sattva of theobject. Sattva is not dependent on 'artha kriya'. It isnatural and inherent for the object. The existence of the


276 Panchapadika

unchanging object continues to remain unchecked even ifit gives rise to its effect once and keeps quiet for the restof the time.

Likewise the existence of the object remains uncheckedeven if it produces its effects in succession. The objectionraised by the Buddhist earlier on this was : if the sthayinreveals its arthakriya (pragmatic effect) in succession,why should it reveal thus only at some specific moments ?Since it is an unchanging endty, there is no difference bet-9 ween any two of its moments. Then why can't it revealall its future effects also in the present moment only.

Here we have to consider one important factor. Thecause has the power to give rise to its effect. But it can-not do so unless the factors that co-operate (sahakari) withit are near by in a specific 'manner. It is capable of pro-ducing the effect only when its latent power is awakenedby the cooperating factors or conditions. Because of thisit is wrong to say that there is no difference between anytwo of its moments.

B : If the cause has the power, it does not stand inneed of the co-operating factors.

V : Then even that which does not have the powerscannot be benefited by those factors. The cooperatingfactors are useless for a non-cause. And this would leadus to consider that there is no need for any ^sahakari inthe world. But we do see in'the world that only a potentcause takes the aid of these factors! and the denial of theaid of these factors amounts to a denial of the facts pre-sented by experience.


Vivaranam 277

B : Only those objects that are powerless do requirethe aid of these factors in giving rise to a potent cause.This is not opposed to experience. In order to become thecause, the non-cause requires these factors.

V : These factors are powerless to produce the effect.Yet when they cooperate with the cause, there arises theeffect. Till they cooperate, the cause is in reality a non-cause. Now are these factors powerful to make the non-cause a cause ? or not ? Are these factors the .cause ofthe non-cause ? or not ? If the non-cause becomes acause, it does not require them. If it does not become acause, they are useless. If these factors constitute thecause for the non-cause, then the non-cause would be aneffect and not a cause. If they do not constitute the cause,they require other factors in a regress.

You should not say that a cause does not require theaid of cooperating factors, for this is a fact of experience.

' B : The effect is not now there. It is almost non-existent. Such a non-existent entity cannot have an existvent entity as its cause. Then why can't you say that anycause can bring it into existence ? The cause too has nospecific relation with the now non-existent effect. Thencan't it be the cause of all effects ? When there is this'avyavastha' (confusion) how are you 'able to make outthe mere distinction between cause and effect. If you' say that there is tim relation because of the agreementand difference that exists in between them, there is such arelation aho between the cooperating factors and theeffect.

V : The cause is always a cause and it has the power.When the effect is there we are somehow or other able to


280 Panchapadika

BUDDHSST POSITION s

Since these cooperating factors are of use only to theeffect, they are required only for the effect. They are notof any use to the cause whence the cause does not requirethem or involve them. Even that momentary entity calledthe cause does not require them ; for the effect arises whenthese factors are there, and it does not arise if they are notthere. Likewise even if the c'ause is an unchanging entity,there is the âpeksha' of the cooperating factors only forthe effect. This can be arrived at through agreement anddifference. Even then it is inconsistent to speak of 'krama-janana" (successive emergence). The main cause is said tobe unchanging. If this were to give the effects in a succe-ssive series, the cooperating factors too are to be in a succe-ssive series. In such a case are thege factors directly thecause of the effect ? Dees ihe effect arise only when theyare present near by (when they are in proximity) ?

In some form or other and to some extent the co-ope-rating factors are always present. As such the unchangingcause must always produce the effects. This is absurd, andthus the first alternative falls.

Take the second alternative which states that only thepresence or proximity (sannidhana) of these factors is requ-*ired. Both the 'sahakarin' and its proximity are required-'In such a case, since the proximity too is always there?there cannot be a 'kramajanma^ (emergence of successiveseries). There need not be a further 'apeksha9 for the pro-ximity, when it is already present.

If the 'sahakari sambandha' is natural there ought tobe tlie "karyajanma7 (emergence of effect) always. If it is


Vivaranam 281

not natural, there is another difficulty. Is the relation bet-ween the cause and its sahakarin brought about by themeie sahakarin? Or by anything else? It cannot be theformer, for that would involve 'sada karya prasanga' (eter-nal emergence of effect). Nor can it be the latter since thatsomething else also is always there. Farther, if the relationis brought by something else, this something else wouldrequire another as its cause; and thus a regress is inevitable*

The vedantin might argue that there is the 'karya sata-tya prasanga' (ever-present effect) even for the Buddhist.The momentary entity called the cause has the power tobring forth the effect. Such a cause necessarily invoh^the sahakari. Then should it also not produce its effectsalways ? The 'sattakshana' is the actual cause ; and such amoment is always there.

Is there the birth of the effect in the ^sattakshana^(moment of its being) ? Or in the next moment ? But thecause is admitted to be that moment immediately precee-ding the moment of the effect. As such the Buddhist doesnot accept the first: alternative. Even though there is no'karana satta" in the next moment, still there can be theeffect; for there is no difference between the two moments.

With reference to the effect, the cause audits sahakarin

are necessarily and inevitably in the preseeding moment.This sahakarin has its purpose (function) with reference tothe cause. And in the next moment there is the effect. Assuch there does not arise the contingency of 'sadakaryajanana' (always producing the effect).

36)


^82 Panchapadika

That moment which is the necessary cause has no exis-tence prior to this moment or next to this moment. Assuch neither the proceeding moment nor the succeeding mo-ment can give rise to an effect.

Vedantin's Reply :

There is an impossibility or illogicality in the Budd-hist's argument. 'Agnikshana' (fire-moment) gives rise tothe ûma kshana5 (smoke-moment). Do we apprehend acausal£ relation between these two moments only ? Or dowe apprehend the causal relation between the 'agni kshanajnana santana' (series of fire cognitions) and the dhurnakshana santana ?

Now it is impossible to understand that âgnisvalak-shana' is the cause of the 'dhuma svalakshana". Svalaksh-ana is that which is identical with itself while excludingothers from it. To establish a causal relation we shouldapprehend the two together. But we apprehend fire in onemoment, and smoke in another. The first moment is destro-yed when we are in the second moment. There cannot beestablished any necessary relationship between an absentmoment and a present moment. The two moments cannotbe apprehended together.

As such one may have to say that through the methodof agreement and difference, he can establish a relation bet-ween the 'agnisantana' and 'dhumasantana'. Therein onemay say that the 'agnisvalakshanas' are the causes of the^dhuma svalaksbanas'. One should assume such a generalnecessary relation.


Vivaranam 283

Now there is no difference between any one agnisval-akshana' and any other. Then why can't there be the eme-rgence of smoke even from that 'agnisvalakshana^ which isin the coal.

The Buddhist might reply that there is no ^kashtha9(stick, wood) which is the sahakarin."

Then Is the cause only the absence of the 'kashtha sva-lakshana* for the absence of the ^sannihita svalakshana*(proximate particular) ? It cannot be the former for the'kashtha svalakshana' is formed in its own santana (series).Then you have to argue that there is required a relationbetween the 'agnisvalakshana" and the 'kashtha svalakshna',

Then, is this relation between the two brought aboutby themselves ? Or by anything else ? If the two santanasare not momentary- i.e., if they are real and unchanging(nitya) then the relation between the two also must be alw-ays present. • If it is brought by something else, then theBuddhist's position is not far removed from that of ours.

Even if the cause is real and unchanging, the proximityof the sahakarin is there only at a specific time ândnot always. The ^samyoga" (conjunction) between thecause and the sahakarin is not always there. And the pro-ximity is not always formed. As such there is no sadaka"rya janaha\

B : Only when there is the promixmty of the sahaka-rin there is the birth of the effect. This is a necessary andinvariable rule. Yet such a necessary relation between the


ranctiapadika

'upakarya9 and the 'upakaraka' does not exist in the caseof the 'dhumasantana' and 'kashtha santana\

V : If there is such a necessary relation between thesahakarin and the effect, how can the effect not requie thesahakarin ? To say that there is an invariable concomitantrelation between the sahakarin and the effect, and to sayalso that there is no ^pakaryopakaraka sambandha.' bet-ween the two, is to contradict oneself in the same breath.

B : The concommitant relation is arrived at throughagreement and difference. This is a , necessary 'rule9 (niy-ama). That between the ^pakarya' (effect) and 'upaka-raka" (sahakarin) is a relation. Where is the vyapti (con-co^r.mitance) between that rule and this relation?There may be a concommitant relation between the sahaka"rin and the effect. But this needs the one as a 'upakaraka'and the other as an 'upakarya'.

V : That these two are identical is seen in the relationbetween the cause and the effect. Whenever there is a'vyapti niyama", it implies that one of the terms or objectsnecessarily involves the other; and if it does not involvethe other, it is not a 'Vyapti niyama\ If there is no 'upa-karyopkaara sambandha', there cannot be a necessary con-commitant relation between the two- eg. between waterand smoke there is no such 'niyama^

B : We see that there is a causal ralation between th^âgnisvalakshana' and 'dhumasvalakshana'. But here wedo not find any cancommitant relation '(vyaptiniyama^)between the ^gnisantana' and 'dhumasantana'. Supposewe do find such a 'niyama^ then the two relations are-dentical. Then what will happen is this : the âgnisvala-


Vivaranam 285

kshanas' are the causes of the 'dhumasvalakshanas'. Smokerequires the 'kashtha svalakshanas' also. When there isthe 'kashtha samyoga" with the fire, we have the smokeând in the absence of that'samyoga\ there is no smoke.So the âshtha' is the co-operating (sahakarin) cause hav-ing an ânvaya vyatireka niyama' (principle of agreementand difference) with the smoke. The relation of'upakarya5and 'upakaraka' is of âpekshaa lakshana\ Both that îy-ama' and this ^sambandha^ ought to be^ found in the case ofthe 'karya karana svalakshanas' only. In any other generalnecessary relation (samanya upadhau 'samaanya vyaptan)ythe causal relation cannot be found.

There may be a causal relation etc., between the âgnis-valakshanas' and the '•'dhumasvalakshanas', and there mayalso be the ^pakary opakaaraka' relation between tLe<kashtha samyoga^ and the smoke. But in the relationbetween the "agnisantanas9 and the 'dhuma santanas\ sucha thing is impossible. Hence there is no ^vyaptiniyama3which makes the 'sahakaryapeksha' possible. The 'vyapti-myama', between the two ântaaas^ (series) does not postu-late the relation of the 'sahakrin' (cooperating factor) tothe 'dhumasantana\

V : But the 'vyaptiniyama' is a logical or necessarydeduction from the causal relation. And those who want aparticular effect do take recourse to a specific cause; anda specific cause is that which gives rise to an effect onlywhen it has a 'sahakarin^. We find^ the vyavahara (acti-vity) only with reference to the 'samanya upadhi', . The'Samaanya upadhi' is that 'sahakarin' which brings theeffect into existence. The 'sahakarin' is thus taken to bethe cause.


286 Panchapadika

If there is a causal relation between'7 the ^vata-l<shanas\ one who is in need of curd need not take recourseto milk, for there is no identity between the two. Milk byitself does not give curd. Nor can we say that the 'dugdhasantana9 (milk -series) can give rise to 'dadhi&antana' (curd-series). Curd requires a sahakarin for the milk.

B : Let there be the 'janyajanakata yogya niyama' (ap-propriate cause and effect-relation) in so far as the *sam-yopadhi9 is concerened. What does it imply ?

V ; If the cause is only a momentary entity/ it cannotinvolve any sahakarin; nor can it involve any effect. Howdo you get the 'yyapti niyama' ? The cause is a momentyits sahakarin another. The two cannot coexist. Wheneither is present, the other is not. When the effect is pre-sent, the other is not. As such you cannot have any ^ya-pti jnana9.

B : The cause does not require the sahakarin for it-self; for the cause is that which has the power in it to bringabout the effect. Each preceeding moment is seen to give^rise to each succeeding moment. This is the relation ofcause and effect. Even the effect does not require thesahakarin because it is brought only by the effect. Whenth6 cause has the sufficient power,, it will perforce bringabout the effect; and then the ruê that the sahakarin mustbe nearbyis rendered useless.

V :' From the agni svalakshana there arises the smokebecause there is the ^kashtha samsarga^ nearby. Then whycan't you say that the sahakarin too has a hand in th&emergence of the effect ?


Vivaranam 287

B : No. The agnisvalakshana is capable of givingrise to smoke. It has this power (ability) even before thereis the ^kashtha samyoga' for the fire. But when there is no^kashthasamsarga, the âgnisvalakshana' is said to be a non-cause for the effect. This ^vyatireka', (relation by diffe-rence or negation) too must be seen. But we cannot arguemerely from the 'anvaya' and establish the 'sahakari'. Tosay that the âshtha samsarga' alone c?'n make the ^gnLsvalakshana' the cause of smoke, we require both ânvaya9and ^vytireka^ Merely from 'Vyatireka^ we cannot establishit. And since we have not seen the 'kashtha samsarga-bhava^ (absence of a conjnction with wood) giving rise tothe 'dhumaabhava^ (absence of smoke), we cannot take thesahakarin to be essential either for the cause or for theeffect. Hence we can only say that the presence of thesahakqrin in the emergence of the effect is purely acciden-tal (kakataliya).

V : Let the ^sahakarya apeksha' be not there. Andthen why should there be a cause ? Let it also be unnece-ssary. Then there is an end to all causal relations andactions.

Whether the cause is an unchanging entity or a mome-ntary one, there is the same 'sahakari sannidhana krama'in both the views. And as a result, that which is taken tobe the cause is also the same in both views.

The cause is 'svayamjanaka (self ^creative); it produ-ces the effect, for it has in itself the necessary power toproduce the effect. And such a cause may be but mome-ntary. The sahakarin is of no use at all for the Paranagvarupa9. Yet in order that there might arise an effect


288 Panchapadifca

there is the "sahakaryapeksha' for the cause. Or there fethe 'sahakarya apekshaa* only for the effect because it isonly the 'karana samgri constituted by the cooperating-factors that produce the effect. This sahakarin is neces-sarily involved in the emergence of the effect. The sameaccount holds good of our view also, where the cause isnot momentary, but an unchanging entity.

From one âgnisvalakshana'we have fire on the ground^,sfnoke above it, ashes below, and the knowledge of the firefor the individual. Here the 'kashthadi sahakara' is foundfor the fire. One 'agnikshana' gives rise to another 'agni-kshana'. When moisture is the sahakarin, there is foundsmoke. Ashes arise from the 'indhana sahakara' (coopera-tion of fire-wood), and the sense contact being the Sahara-rin, there arises the 'svavishayajnana9. Thus the differencein the sahakarins involved by the 'desabheda', makes oneentity give rise to many effects. Thus, when 'kala bheda'brings about a difference in the sahakarins, we have diffe-rent effects emerging from the cause.

Hence, even though there is the non "difference betweenthe object and 'ahamsamvedana' from an empirical and re-lative standpoint we have to construe facts as they a^'e, asthey appear. Our apprehension shows that the object isdifferent from the'advitiy a samvedana'. This object is a'sthayin' (abiding) and it has 'artha kriya samarthya' (prga-mafic potency). Thus there is a great difference betweenour view and that of the Buddhists-

The ahamkarta (subject) cognises the object as havingthe same form ; and even though it is a sthayin, it is "arthakriyakari\ Thus simply because we admit the immediacy


Vivaranam 289

of the blue, you should not take us to be 'expounding aBuddhist doctrine. The ahankarta is the percipient selfwho is distinct from the not-self. That this ahankarta isthe unchanging 'ekarupah' (one) has been established fromexperience and from pure logical reasoning as well.

The Advaita Siddhanta is free from all Buddhistic con-ceptions. On the other hand, traces of Buddhism appearonly in the theories of those who have attacked Advaita. ;

Thus the Prabhakara agrees with the Carvaka and Buddhist

systems in rejecting the validity of mantra, arthavada, iti- [

hasa, andpurana ; in rejecting devata, svarga, isvara and

moksha ; and in accepting the momentariness of the cogni- i

lions and of the pramanas. The Bhatta agrees with Car- i

vaka and Buddhist system? in accepting identity indifference

and in rejecting the validity of mantra etc. The Bheda-

bheda of Bhaskara agrees with Buddhism in rejecting the ^

knowledge of Brahman, in degrading the sanyasins, and in

making a farce of bondage and liberation.

The Bhedabhedavadin puts a series of questions to show jthat there is no difference between Buddhism and Advaita.

Obj : You and the Buddhist agree in holding that the fworld is 'kalpita', (artificially constructed) in vijnana. ?

Ved : Yes. But you and he agree in saying that the |world is 'pratibhasya' (manifested) by vijnana. j

Obj : Though it is 'pratibhasya' by vijnana, we admit |the distinction between the true and the false. |

37) • !•


290 Panchapadika

Ved : Here too we admit the mithyatva of the worldAnd yet in this world we too maintain the distinction bet-ween 'sattva'. (being) and 'asattva* (non-being) brought by'artha kriya samrthya\

Obj : But you can maintain the distinctions not asultimately real, but as 'kalpita5.

Ved : Even if you admit the distinction between thetrue and the false, it is only as 'pratibhasya'.,

Obj : But such a distinction is seen.

Ved : Why can't there be seen such a distinction evenin my view also ?

Obj : No one would say that the pot etc., are false.

Ved : Even a ^pratibhasya satyatva' would make thepot etc, unreal. But on my view the distinction is sounder.'Arthakriya karitva' makes the pot etc. real; and the abse-nce of this ^samarthya9 makes the erroneous silver false.And we do see that the act of maya (magic) gives us delightor hatred. You cannot take these to be mere cognitionsdevoid of an objective existence. For we hear of the battlebetween gods and Denons where weapons are employed.These weapons are real and are not mere cognitions. Theygive rise to actions etc.,

Immediacy asid Mediacy :

Obj : Since the object is the medium for the revela-tion (manifestation) of consciousness, you admit the imme-diacy of the object. Then there should be such an imme-


Vivaranam 291

diacy of the object even in inference and other pramanas.But we do not find this immediacy there.

Reply : The antahkarana vrit ti (epistemic act) comesinto contact wieht the object and assumes the form of theobject. Then the object becomes the medium that manifestsconsciousness. The yogyatva (propriety) is not found inthe objects of inference etc ; for the objects here are notpresent before us. As such the object there is neither a kar"aka (causative) nor a vyaniaka (manifesting one); it does notgive the cognition of itself because of the absence of thecontact with the vritti; and it does not therefore manifestconsciousness. These two properties are found only in thepresent objects and not in those objects which are not pre-sent here and now. As such they are not immediate obje-cts. These objects do not have their vyapara in giving us aknowledge of themselves. This vyapara consists of the pro-perties of 'karakatva' and 'vyanjakatva' referred to above.

When the pot comes into a contact with fire we see red-ness. But if the pot is not present, fire will not reveal thatredness. Similar is the case with the object in inference.

Objection : There was rain in the past. And I saythat the rain is present now as the-past rain or as the futurerain (atitavrishti, or anagata vrishti).

Reply s But rain cannot be both 'atita' (past) and^vartamana^ (present) at the same moment. As atita it doesnot have any 'anvaya5 with a present object. It appearsonly as the 'abhava pratiyogF (contradictory of its absence).It is never vartamana if it was only in the past.


zyz Fanchapadika

Further the "atitavrishti9 (past rain) cannot have anyrelation with the present 'kriya' and 'guna'.' It is only the^vartamana ghata' (present pot) that has the ârtamanalauhitya9 (present redness). Thus in infrence the object isneither a karaka nor a vyanjaka.

In perception, however, the sense contacts the property;

and we have the cognition of this property only when thesubstance begins functioning.

Objection ; If the object is not immediate in infer-ence, and if such an object cannot be a karaka or a vyanj-aka, how can our vijnana have the vishayakara (form of theobject) in inference ?

Reply : We have the sense contact with the 'linga'(hetu or reason). And the specific relation brought by thisfunctions as the cause in giving us the 'visisht aikartha jna-na9- (a specific uni'ary cognition).

Objection ; If it is "atita', then it is an object. Andwhen it can have ^vishayatva", why can't it have the 'kara-katva' also ?

Reply : No. An object is not an object if it doesnot give rise to a knowledge of itself. The object in infer-ence is an object only in so far as it removes the ignorancewe have of it This absence of ignorance which this objectgives, is not its property. Nor can we say that the 'vishayavyapara3 is to give us the ^vijnanakara'. Vijnanakara* be-longs only to jnana and to none else. When we say 'vrish-timjanati9 (He knows about the rain) as an inferntial cogni-tion, the verb to know has an object. But this object here


Vivâranam 293

is not the object having the nature of the object of immedi-ate apprehension. It is an object only in sofar as our igno-rance of it is dispelled by it. But if is a direct object ofcognition, it would require sense contact etc. and thutwould be an immediate object.

Immediacy of the self :

Having explained the nature and meaning of ^smaspratyaya vishaya', Padmapada now proceeds to explain thetext and to state the relation between the ego and Brahman

This 'ahankara granthP is conveyed by the expression'asmat pratyaya'. This is a 'pratyaya"* (apprehension). Theantahkarana or ahankara is like a mirror in which we havethe reflection called the self. Herein we find the interpene.tration of the ahankara and consciousness which is the notthis. This antahkarana is the manifesting medium of thatconsciousness. For such an ego Brahman appears as if i.is an object. It is only an "aupacarika" (metaphorical)usage to speak of Brahman as its object. Such a self isseen as the I in jagrat (working) and svapana (dream), whilein sushupti (deep sleep) the I or the ahankara remains in its'samskara rupa'. Consequently the illumination of the selfis obstructed by the 'agrahana avidya' (non-apprehendingnescience)which is uparakta by the^samskara'. He does knowthe 'gatagata9 (past and future) and is spoken of in the textsas 'samsari, jivah, vijnanaghanah, vijnanatma, prajnah>sariri, sarirah^ atma, samprasadah, purushah, pratyagatma,bhokta, kshetrajna.


294 Panchapadika

Objection ; The sruti describes the self as havinorelation with many upadhis Kke^the body and the 'kshetra'How is it you speak of ahankara alone as the upadhi? *

Reply : The self is the 'ajnanopadhp. This is Wrakta' (affects) by the ahankara' and its 'samskara'. Duringthe three stages, such a self acquires many an external upa-dhi; and the many upadhis described refer to this aspectonly. When he is said to have the 'gatagatacarana', ifonly means that having this one upadhi he comes to acquiremany other upadhis.

To show that for this 'savikalpaka adhyasa' (determi-nate superimposition) there is a ground which is 'savikal-paka'; the explanation is given in ^smat pratyaya vishaya-tvat\ Now Padmapada is going to show that there can bea 'savikalpaka adhyasa" even when the gound is 'nirvika-Ipaka9 (non-relational or non-determinate).

The self is 'adhyasarha9 not merely because it is theobject for the 'asmat pratyaya; but because it is also imm-ediate. For, the pratyagatman (our self) is experienced byus immediately and directly.

Objection ; But the self is always something that is

to be inferred. How can you speak of its immediacy ?

Reply : If I do not have an immediate experience ofmy self, whdt is the difference between my experience andthe knowledge of my experience possessed by another PWhenI say 'mayedam viditam' (this is known by me), I recognisea subject in me and an object for me. This subject-objectrelation cannot be apprehended by me if the self is onlyinferentially cognised.


Vivaranam 295

Objection: Your self is the ground for the jnanaarising from your experience. This is all the differencebetween your cognition and somebody else's cognition ofyours,

Reply: In the absence of the experiencing self, theother person cannot have any knowledge of the relation bet.ween my experience and myself (or between my knowledgeand myself). If the absence of the ânubhavasambandha*(relation of experience) is common both ^to me and to theo1her, he cannot have an inferential cognition of the groundof the knowledge. If there is no relation between the selfand the 'ghatanubhava' (cognition of the pot), then the^hetujnananumana9 (inference of the cause) cannot arise.

Objection : Let there be the self as the ground ofthe 'vishayanubhava'.

Reply : The âmvedya jnana' or the knowledge ofthe object cannot establish the self; for the self would ceaseto be the subject of the experience by becoming an object.Further it would make experience itself impossible. If theobject and the self were to be the objects of experience,there would be two objects arising at the same time; andthis is an impossibility. The self cannot be an object ofany samvit other than its ôwn; it is not a 'samvitkarma'.

Objection ; Samvit may not establish that the self isits object. But it can establish the self as -its own upadhi.

Since the samvit establishes the existence of the self, thebelf is its upadhi or viseshana' (unimportant).


296 Panchapadika

Rep By : Does upadhi mean the ground (asraya) orthe object (vishaya), ôr one of these two ? Upadhi cannotmean the ground. If the self is the ground for the samvând if the samvit gives us a knowledge of the ground, thenit cannot give us a knowledge of the object since the objecîs not a ground at all. The samvit will have to illumin6or reveal only the self and not the object.

Samvit (consciousness) cannot give us a knowledge ofthe self if the self were to be an object; for, the self as onobject would cease to be the self, and the objects wouldcease to be objects.

Nor can we say that upadhi is asraya vishayatvam.What is meant by a 'vishaya' ?

Objection : It is that which is capable of givingrise to the 'vyavahara' (activity) set in motion by the sam-vit.

Reply : Then the self too would become an object.

Objection: The object then may be that which isdistinct from the ground and at the same time that whichexcludes the samvit.

Reply : Then the eye too would become the objectalong with that which it is said to cognise.

Objection s It is different from the ground; and yetit is that which is capable of giving rise to the 'vyavahara9set in motion by that very ground.

Reply : Then what will happen is this; the relationbetween the samvit and its ground would have to be an


Vivaranam 297

object. You cannot say that there is no such relationship;

for you admit that there is a âmavaya' (relation of inher-ence) between the samvit and the self, because of whichthere is no immediacy of the self.

Objection s The object is that which is 'karmakaraka' (causing an act).

Reply s Then an object which is not present (atita)ceases to be an object, whence you can not admiFinference..The object cannot be merely that which is cognised becauseof the sense contact with it*

Objection: Let the self be arrived at as being theobject (karma) of the samvit.

RepSy : This is impossible. The object is in onemoment and the cognition in another. The relation bet-ween the two is not comprehended in any moment. Assuch my knowledge of myself (as object) would not be dif-ferent from another's knowledge of the same. That theself is the object of the samvit is established by the cog-nition other than that in which we cognise the object. Doesthis 'jnanantara' (different cognition) coexist with theexperience of the object ? or does it come at a later time ?If it comes at a later time, we have said already that it isimpossible to know the relation between the samvit andthe self.

These two cognitious being different in having diffe-rent objects, how can they together arise at the same mo-ment ? Can any person have a forward step and also abackward step at the same time ?

38)


298 Panchapadika

That which is 'niravayava' (part-less) cannot havetwo 'parinamas' (changes) at the same time in oneplace or in two different places.

Objection : Two 'parispandas' (movements) areimpossible at the same time for one object, when the objectis said to change in its entirety. But there can be a 'pan-nama' (change).

Reply : This is not possible. On the other hand,there can be two 'parispandas' at the same time, if theyhave different origins : eg. He goes singing. Going isaccomplished by theêgs and the other by the vocal chords.Even two "parinamas" can be there for one object,, if onlywe recognise that they come at different times : eg. youthand old age come at different times.

There cannot be the parinama of one part only sincethe self is devoid of parts. Hence the self is immediate inso far as it is 'svaprakarsa'. This pratyagatma is 'svayamsiddha' (self-existent foundational consciousness); andthrough its own inherent power, it becomes âdhyasa yo"gya9 since it is immediate.

Objection : But fie ground and the adhyasta arecognised by the same sense organ. Mere immediacy is ofno avail here, if the ground and the adhyasta are not saidto be cognised by the same sense organ. We do not seeany adhyasa or a pure immediacy. In any adhyasa thereis the contact of the eye with the ground which is immedi-ate.


Vivaraftam 299

Bepty 2 There is no such rule that an object can beadhyasta only on another immediate and direct object. Theakasa is not a case of 'pratyaksha prama' and yet surface,colur et. are imputed to it. Thus says Sankara : theakasa is ^paroksha^ or it mav be said to be a perceptualcognition which does not require the sense-contacts

The Vaiseshika and the Nyaya argue that sabda is a'visesha gdna\ (particular quality). It is apprehended onlyby one external sense organ; and yet as unlike the case ofsmell, it is apprehended as excluding its substance. It isnot a general or common property like others. It does iôtcoexist with any of the other gunas like touch and form.Since it is cognised by an external sence organ, it is diffe-rent from dik (space), kala (time) and manas (mind) whosespecific property it cannot be., Hence sabda is the visesha-guna of a substance which is other than the four elements?Space, time, mind and self. That which has the propertyof sound is the akasa* This akasa is inferentially cognised.Buddhists and carvakas infer akasa through 'anupalabdhi(non- apprehsion) and maintan that it is the mere negation(abhava) of a murta dravya (distinct substence).

Since a bhavantara is no other than an âbhava^ (nega-tion, non-existence), there is an akasa which is merely theabhava, of a murtadravya; and this is established throughânupalabdhi9. Thus the Prabhakaras argue.

But the Vartikakara argues that akasa is cognised dir-ectly by the eye.

If the eye can cognise it, it must have a form; and assuch it must be something that can be touched. The eye


300 Panchapadika

can cognise only a substance which has the qualities of form(or shape) and touch. Further in arriving at the inferentialcognition of akasa we have a 'hetu9 (or linga) in anupala-bdhi; and this does not allo v us to accept a sense contactwith the akasa as possible. Hence akasa is only apratyakshasiddha' (proved by non-perception)

Or we may argue that there is an immediate cognitionofakasa, and that this cognition is called 'apratyakasha,because it does not involve the contact of any of the exter-nal sence organs. Then it is immediate as known or app-rehended by the sakshin or as apprehended by the meremind.

Those who do not see the truth attribute 'mdinya^(colour etc.) to the sky and speak of its surface as beingsimilar to the 'indra ..nila tamala patra' (dark blue leaf).It is blue like the indranila (blue sapphire). The blue ofother objects is apprehended as the nature of akasa.

Thus Sankara winds up the 'sambhavana' (possibility)ofadhyasa wit'i the words 'even aviruddhah...'. In theapprehended upadhi we are rejecting the object cognised.And this object along with the knowledge of such an objectis spoken of as avidya ?

Objection : It has been declared that the cause of'anartha', (misfortune called bondage) is dispelled by Bra-hma vidya; and so far we are told that avidya is the causeof anartha. Then it ought to be stated that this avidyaalone is the cause oftheanarthaslike'kartrilva'. Thenwhy is the commentator expounding adhyasa ?


Vivaranam 3011

Reply : To answer such doubts. Sankara says thatthis adhyasa whose nature has been given so far is taken tobe avidya by the pandits (wise men) who are well versed inthe pramanas.

We do not merely say that the anartha hetu (cause ofbondage) is avidya because all this has avidya as its mate-rial cause and consequently the [anartha too is avidya. r.Wedo not rely only on agreement and difference betweenavidya and anartha (adhyasa). It is called avidya becauseit is opposed to vidya, which âlonc can dispel it. Whenwe are able to have a discrinminatory knowledge, we cometo understand the real nature of the objects; and this iscalled vidya. When the snake that is adhyasta is dispelled,the snake disappears and we have the knowledge that it is arope. This vijnana is called vidya by the wise in philo-sophy.

Objection : First describe avidya and then showthat it can be and ^'s dispelled by real knowledge (jnana).Thereby you can show the dispelling of adhyasa. Whenthis is a smipler method, why should you diescribe adhyasa?

Reply : We desire the dispelling of anartha. Andsince the anartha is dispelled by vidya, whai is to be doneis to describe how anartha has the nature of avidya.Suppose instead []of describing adhyasa, Sankara spoke ofavidya. This avidya would mean that which envelopes orconceals, for this is its nature. It does not mean the appe-arence of an object as having a nature other than its own;

and such an appearence is the cûse of anartha. HenceSankara first speaks of slich an adhyasa or appearance, and


3-&5 Pancliapadiid

later on speaks of it as avidya because it is dispelled byvidya< This is the proper method-Suppose the anartha is described as having the natureof avidya. Its ground is the self and its object is Brahman.Either in the self or in its object we do not find the 'gunas5and the 'doshas' (defects) that can be said to arise from avi-dya. As such knowledge can bring about the nivritti(cessation) of all anarthas. So anartha is more importantfrom our standpoint.

Thus the consequence of this enquiry is : there issomething adhyasta on the self. Such a self is not stainedor touched even to the slightest extent by the doshas andgunas brought out by the adhyasa. This sentence of San-kara shows that anartha is not ultimately real. If the ana-rtha is real, then the declared assertion would be futile andmeaningless. The assertion was that knowledge alone candispel the anartha.

Avidyadhyasa does not in relaity bring any gunas anddoshas to the self. Due to adhyasa there is the evolutionof the self and the self as the ground of the adhyasa is freefrom doshas and gunas. Now the ^vabhasa' (manifesta-tion) of the eternal consciousness is obstructed by thebeginningless Avidyadhyasa'. Because of^this anaditva(beginninglessness) there^ can be no adhyasa parinama forthe self, The self is not evolved out of the 'avidyadhyasa\

But can we say that the self is evolved out of theahankaradhyasa" ? Now if avidyaa is the ground of suchan 'agantuka adhyasa' (accidental superimposition) thenthere is no need on the part of'the self to have any know-


Vivaranam 303

ledge; for the self is free and undefiled by the adhyasa.On the other hand, the self is the ground for avidya andalso for the product of avidya. Then a lone knowledgewould have a value for the bound self. And the a phoristhas made by implication the asesrtion that bondage is des-troyed by jnana.

Summarsing the salient features explained so far,Padmapada introduces the purport of the next part,The commentary ending with "naisargiko yam loka vyava-harah" has established that there is an adhyasa called avi-dya; and it is shown that the self and the not-self appearingas one is avidya or adhyasa. To prove this, Sankara hasgiven its definition and has shown how it is possible andconceivable. Again he proceeds to show with the aid of fur-ther arguments acceptable to all, how the pramanas canestablish it finally. With this desire he states-'tam etamavidya khyam ... moksha parani\ Ouc vyvahara isthree - fold- pramata (knower), pramana (means of know-ing) and pramaya (object); this is the activity of the sub-ject); b) Karta (doer), karma (act) and karya (object ofactivity). This is the activity of the doer or agent. And c)bhokta (enjoyer), bhoga (enjoying) and bhogya (object).This is the activity of the enjoyer. This three-fold activityis based on the aham adhyasa and the mamadhyasa. Ôuractivity is immediately related (puraskritya, purah saratvam)to this adhyasa. Adhyasa is an immediate or perceptualexperience since it is •sakshi pramana siddha (establishedby the witnessing consciousness).

ObjectSon : Now all the sastras deal with commandsand prohibitions only. Why should Sankara say that mok-sha too is dealt with in them ?


304 Panchapadika

Reply ; That there is an entity which does not invo-lve commands and prohibitions is accepted by us. We saythat there are texts dealing only with the svarupa (nature)of reality. Such are the texts on moksha. Hence mokshais separately mentioned.

Objection : How them are the pramanas and sas-tras to be accepted as âvidya vad vishayanP (objects char-ecteriscd by avidya) ? What pramana will help us in decla-ring th^t the three-fold activity has avidya as its materialcause ? The avidya you have described so far may appeareven in the case of the self. But this alone does not esta-blish that it is possible or real. You have to show it withthe aid of the pramanas. Moreover, the pramanas dependon the pramata (subject); and the subject is their ground.The subject cannot be one having avidya, for the pramanasare useles for such a subject. When the subject does nd^have avidya, you cannot attribute avidyatva to him or tothe pramanas,

Or another line of argument may be advanced. Theintegration of the ahankara with the self is the work ofavJidyadhyc.sa. If this avidya is the material cause for thesubject, you cannot establish the validity of the pramanas.How are the 'pratyaksha adipramanas' (perception andother valid means of knowledge) and sastras to be acceptedas 'avidya vadvishayani' ? If there is 'avidyavad vishayatva'for these, the defects of the ground would creep into theseand stain them. As such they will not have any validity.

Reply : If I do not treat the body as the land thesense organs as mine, I cannot become a pramata (subject);

and this would make the 'pramana pravrittF inconsistent


Vivaranam 305

for me. This sentence of Sankara summarises the maindoctine ; and this is elaborated in the following sentences.

That the three fold activity has adhyasa as its 'upa-dana' can be shown through 'arthapattF (implication) and'vyatireka' (negative) inference. There is a negative con-committance of the form : wherever there is found the abs-ence of adhyasa, in all of them there is also found the abs-ence of activity. This meaning is in Sankara's commentaryand Padmapada now proceeds to explain it.

The 'aham abimana' (egocentric attitude) and the'mamabhimana' (the mine-attitude) are absent in deepsleep ; and we do not find pramatritva in the person havingdeep sleep. The word body does not convey the meaningof only the body, but of a living person having a head andlimbs ; for the mere body is not apprehended as the I.When we say 'manushyoham' (I am a man) or 'devo ham' (Iam a god) we refer to ourselves as being individuals of acertain character having life and consciousness. And thisis every one's experience. The three fold activity then can-not be established, for the body which is corne:ted withour existence, or for the sense organs which are necessarilyfound in the body. It is attributed to the living body or tothe conscious body of a person. Here alone we can findthe'dehabhimana' (aham) and the îndriyadya bhimana*(mama). If the 'mamabhimana' were not to be confined tothe sense organs and limbs only, even the servant wouldhave to become necessary for my pramatritva.

Devadatta has the waking state and the dream state.He is the agent having as his 'karanas' (instruments, means)39)


306 Panchapadika

the body, sense-organs and limbs ; and these constitute the'aham mamadhyasa^ on whose basis there is the activity ofthe subject in those two states. And this has arisen forDevadatta because he has those states which are differentfrom sushupti. If there is a time or state that does notmake him appear as a subject, then that state is not diffe-rent from sushupti. This is the inference establishing pra-matritva etc. Earlier we have noticed perception establi-shing the same.

Anhapatti too establishes it. The three-fold activity isnot possible in the absence of adhyasopadana, for whenadhyasa is absent we do not find activity, as eg. in sushupti.This is arthapatti.

The 'kartrikarana bhava5 (idea of agent) between thebody etc. and the subject is based on the relation between' the two. There is here no such relation as that between themaster and his servant. The former relation is 'samanyavyapati' (ordinary concommittance), while the latter is ^vya"pak-a visesha5. While the former is present we are alsoaware of the absence of the latter. Thus the knowledgearising from these two is one of arthapatti which is the pra-mana (means of knowledge) for establishing pramatritva.

Objection : • But in both the relations it is the living

or conscious body (svattadhna vyavasthita manushya avay"avi) that brings about the activity.' Then how can you rej-ect the second relation here ? What is wanted in activity isthe 'kartrikarana sambandha' only and not their'tadatmya'.As such arthapatti here is not valid as stated.

Reply : Since the other relations are not valid here,we have to accept only the tadatmya sambandha. Which


Vivaranam . 307

are we take of the following : 1) ^svasvamita sambandab(ownership), 2) 'viniyojya viniyojakat-a sambandhah(doing), 3) samyogah -(conjuction), 4) samavayah (inh-erence), 5) 'bhoktri bhogyata (enjoyer), 6) 'svakaramara-bhyatvam\ /) 'svendriyadhishtheyatvam3, or any other.

1) The first is impossible because it does not makeone a pramata (knower), as eg. the master in deep sleep isnot a pramata for the servant; and there is no 'svattvenasambandha^ between them. The 'pramatritva' is 'pramakartritva9 and this involves the sense organs which are notactive in deep sleep. When the other karakas are not fun-ctioning, the ^ramakartritva' cannot function.

2) Objection : Then one might say that the bodyetc., function when there is the desire. Body etc. obey thedesire, act in accordance with desire. And since this desireis absent in deep sleep, there is no pramatritva then. Thereis the relation betwen the self and the 'karya karana sangh-ata' (body, sense organs etc.) brought by desire or consci-ous willing. This mutual relation makes the body etc. actin accordance with the wishes of the self. When the meredesire brings this 'viniyojya viniyojaka sambandha", thenthe entire activity of 'kriya karaka phala', which is of thenature of pramatritva (knower-hood) etc. would belong tothe self. It is noi adhyasa that brings this activity. Thatthis activity has its origins in such a relation is seen incases like (! have the desire to get up, and so I get up andalso sit\ Experience alone is the pramana here.

But the servants also are seen to act in accordance withthe desire of the master. Then there should be the activityon the part of the servant when the master has the desire.


wvv Panchapadika

And in the absence of the servant there may have to be theabsence of pramatrtlva.

This is a faulty objection since the desire of one is me-diated by the activity of another body. The activity of thebody eic. should have an immediate or direct relation withthe body. We do not have such a relation between themaster and his servant, for there is no ^mukhyabhimana'(feeling of priority) for the body of the servant*

Reply : If the relation ;is merely that of 'icchamm-dhanayogyata*, we have it in deep sleep whence thereought to be an activity even then. If is is 'icchanuvidfa-iyamanatva sambandhah', this is absent in deep sleep undas srch there can be pramatritva. Nor c?n you say thatthis relation is seen to be the source of all activity ; for^hen you accept the 'svaprakasa" of the samvit, you cannotspeak like this. The s^mvit (consciousness) 'manushychanr(I aro a ir an) is our own in:mediate experience, and we donot reject it or contradict it. Here we do find that we have€)VT ^noukhyabhimana' for the body. You cannot say thatthis is a gauna (ancillary) e^peiessicn, for it contradictsyour experience.

Because of the contact with the upadhi, there arissethe desire and this can't be rejected. Even desire has its ori-gin in adhyasa. Even desire is a 'parinama visesha' of adh-yasa. How can such a change be predicated of the selfwhich is beyond change or evolution ? Antahkarana whichis an evolute of adhyasa has the mutual interpenetration•with the ahankarta whence desire is attributed to the self.• This is a fact of experience also. I have the desire to get upa-nd so I get up and sit. This getting up etc. is an activity


Vivaranam 309

of the body which has an interpenetration through theahankara with the self.

3, 4) One cannot also argue that the relation of 'sam-yoga" or 'samvaya' between the self and the not-self is thecause of all activity, for this relation is found even in deepsleep where there is no activity.

5, 6, 7) 'Bhoktribhogyata', 'svakarmarabhyatva', and^vendriyadhishtheyatva' - these relations presuppose theirorigin in 'bhogadhyasa (superimposition of enjoying) ; andthey are also seen in the bodily activities of the servantsetc.

Objection : But in the case of the servants, it igtheir body which mediates bhogyatva. Hence we have tosay that the original relation is one of 'bhgoyatva' whichdoes not require any such mediation.

Reply :" If this relationship has the propriety (yogyata)to enyoy, it is present even in deep sleep.

Objection: It is not'bhoga yogyatva5 (propriety toenjoy), but 'bhojyamanatva*, (enjoying) which too does notrequire any mediation.

Reply : This is impossible without a prior and diffe..rent relation. If there is no prior relation of the body tothe self, I cannot conceive of a bhoga sambandha for thisbody. Now the self is immediately present in all spaces andin all bodies. As such there ought to be 1he 'bhogaevery where. Hence this relation is other than and posterior to the adhyasa relation.


310 Panchapadika

Thus by the method of residues, we find arthapattiand anumana establishing that adhyasa is the original rela-tion that is the cause of all activity. If you do not accept'avidyadhyasa', you cannot speak of the "pramatritva^ forthe self which is by native 'asanga' (non-relational) and'avikari' (unchanging).

Objection : The self is present in all bodies andthere is no difference on this count between the variousbodies. Then, how can you say that there is the adhyasaniyama for the self only in this body? How can you speakof the living body of this person only asbeing the subjec tetc. ?

Reply s The 'avidyadhyasa' is beginningless; and assuch the distinctions between the selves too is begianingless,The subtle body which is the evolute of adhyasa is attachedto such a self whence arises 'pramatritvadi niyama' for theself. The gross body too is the product of the same avidya,Now that which is begun by the subtle body is taken upby ihe gross body; or because of the close connection bet-ween the subtle and the gross bodies, the gross body acqa-iries this 'adhyasa niyama^

Objection : But it is only the pramata that is theground of activity. It is not adhyasa.

RepSy ; No. The 'pramatritva' itself is the result of'adhyasa'. Then the mere presence of the 'pramatritvasakti'is the cause in all 'pramana pravritti (activity of theknowner); yet ^this 'sakti' is the product of the play ofaidya. As such we argue the avidya vad vishayatva forramanas.


Vivaranam 311

Objectaors : Ahankaara is said to be the product ofadhyasa; and there is the ahankara with the self. This isthe meterial cause giving rise to activity. But this is vitia-ted by the defect called avidya. Consequently the prama-nas cannot have any validity. They cannot give rise tovalid cognitions.

Reply : The knowledge of truth that is notsublatedby any pramana — ie. the knowledge that is given only byagama cannot be given ^by any OIIQ of thepramanas.The knowledge given by the pramanas may be contra-dicted by the knowledge of truth given "by the agama;

but in so far as it makes the activity and experience in theempirical world possible, such a 'pramana jnana9 is notsubject to sublation. They give the knowledge of theobjects correctly within the empirical famework. Theâpekshavishaya' of these pramanas does not fall outside ofthe empirical world. By their own inherent power theygive us the right cognition of the objects; and these 'nira-eksha pramanas? do not get contradicted in the empiricalframework. As such their vaidity and their 'avidyavadvishayatVH' are not inconsistent.

Perception establishes the vyavaharangata (subsidiary,,to activity) of the pramana?; and that the pramatritvadivyavahara has its origins in adhya-sa, is established by per-ception, inference and arthapatti. Thus we get at then-validity (pramanyam) and at their 'avidyavad vishayatvam\This is vidhimukhopadarsita' - 'vidhF isthat which givesthe knowledge that this is like this; it is a perceptualknowledge. And 'vidhi mukha' means that which takes


312 Panchapadika

the'aid of perception, inference etc. Hence the validityand the 'avidya vad vishayatva', proved by these pramanascannot be rejected as being impossible.

Sabda (verbal testimoney) may be unreal (mithya).But it is seen to give rise to an act in the form of pittingan end to avidya. Sabda and other pramanas have the'arthakriya samarthya' which is of the nature of dispellingavidya and of giving the apprehension or experience ofBrahman, Because of this ability they have their validityand this is not inconsistent with their mithyatva. A pra"mana might have its basis in avidya, but it can become ameans of dispelling that very avidya.

Objection ; Then, the validity of sabda etc. is de-termined by their 'arthakriya samarthya'. This wouldmean that they have a validity brought by something otherthan themselves.

Reply : Jnana has 'svatah pramanya'. And weshow that the pramanas have the 'arthakriya samrthyaônly to dispel the do-ibts regarding their invalidity. Thisis not inconsistent with their 'svatah pramaanya' (self vali-dity).

In Mimaansa there is the svatah pramaanya for jnana;

and the ^vishaya svarupa'ârthataihatva) is attributed toknowledge, since, only knowledge gives the vishaya sva-rupa. Likewise only by apprehending the object canwe determine the'artha1 kriya samarthya'. If this is-notaccepted by the Mimansaka, then his jnana too would haveparatah pramanya because it is dependent on 'prakatya"'k.jnatata) which is in the object.


Vivaranam 313

Objectaon ; Even the knowledge of Brahman is afa]se knowledge, for this knowledge arises from 'ajnana9which is its ûpadana*. As such it cannot dispel avidya.

Reply : If by false knowledge is meant 'svarupamithyatva' (or the falsify of the epistemic act), it is acce-ptable to us. In so far as jnana is vritti jnana even theakhandakara vritti' (internally unified cognition) cannotclaim to be ultimately real. We accept the 'svarupa mi"thyatva of knowledge; and we reject 'mithyatva for theobject of knowledge. The vritti Jnana may be fake; butyou cannot say that it cannot put an end to avidya. Thedream cognitions are false; but the falsity of the objectsof these cognitions is made known to us by the absence ofthe 'arthakriyakaritva samarthya" in them.

The vritti jnana maybe false; but its object is notfalse since it has no sublation, since it remains uncontra-dicted. Brahma jnana does not have any 'visbaya mith"yatva9 since there is the ânupalabhya mana badha\

Objection ; But a counter inference too can begiven. Brahman is mithya or false since it is comprehen-ded by that knowledge which has 'ajnana' as its upa-dana. The world is false for the same reason. Likewisethe silver is false because the cognition is false. Jnana"dhyasa presupposes 'vishayadhyasa9. Of these two onecannot be false while the other is true.

RepBy s The world is false because it is sublated Oynegated, not because it is comprehended by the knowledgewhose 'upadana' is ajnana.

40)


314 Panchapadika

Objection : But when the cognition arises from thedefect in the sense organ, then both the cognition and theobject are false. And here the defect is adhyasa whichalone is said to make one a pramata.

Reply 2 No. It is only an ^gantuka dosha' (adven-titious defect) that can be a cause in declaring the falsity ofthe object; but if the defect is natural (naisargika) it can-not make the object false, since this ^naisargika dosha* isthe very basis of all apprehension.

A defect is called a defect only if it comes after the'pramana karanas" are there. Such a defect is 'agantuka',that which arises in the middle. It is not there prior to thepramata and his sense organs.

But a defect which is there as the very basis or source(karana) of the pramana, is not a defect like the ordinarydefects. It is the cause of the 'pramatritva9 and as such is'naisargika' or natural.

Eg. âca^ ^kamala* etc. are 'doshas9 and give rise toerroneous cognitions. But these very defects can become abasis for inferring the sins etc. committed by the percipient.In such a case we find that a defect can be a cause for esta-blishing a valid knowledge. To the subject proper it is adefect; but to another it is a valid cause for a valid infe-rence.

Now, avidya is a defect in so far as it prevents or obs-tructs the 'avabhasa' (manifestations) of Brahman. It isillumined by the ^prakasa9 (light) of Brahman and it prese-nts adistored appearance of that very Brahman. But the app-


Vivaranam "315

earences it brings are 'vyavahara yogya'. Since avidyapresents a distorted appearance of Brahman and since it isthe cause of such an appearance, avidya is said to be a 'nai-sargika dosha\

To show how only an 'agantuka dosha' is taken to bea defect, and how the 'naisargika dosha' is not consideredto be a defect, Padmapada giv°s an illustration. The sor-row or unhappiness arising from hunger and thirst is alwa-rys with us ; or when there is the nausea brought by thedigestive system, we have the 'annapana nisfapanda\ Thesecases are not considered by us to be cases of disease. Butwhen there is a slight rise in the temperature, eventhoughit is there only for a very shore lime ; or when there is aslight cold and cough brought by phlhegm—in these cases wehave the thought that they are diseases. The first is a natu.ral ailment and is therefore not called a disease. The sec-ond is a temporary ailment and is therefore called a dise-ase. The same is the case with avidya which is a naturaldefect; while the 'kacadi doshas' being temporary aliments,are called defects.

Objection : But Sahara has declared that the merepresence of a defect would make both the cognition and theobject false. For he declared- "Yasya ca dushtam kara-nam, yasra ca mithyeti pratyayah, sa eva asamicinah praty-ayo nanyah".

Rep!y : This sentence was given by Sahara only with».reference to the non-natural defects. For, the word defects(dosha) is normally and generally taken to mean only anagantuka dosha. It is only with this meaning that wehave to interprect Sahara's sentence.


316 Panchapadika

Objection ; The activity of the unwise might haveits basis or origin in adhyasa ; But such an origin cannotbe ascribed to the activity of the wise.

Reply : It is to ward off such a contention that San"kara declared the non-difference in the activity of men andthat of animals. This illustration shows that our activityoriginates in adhyasa. ^During the activity of pramatrifcvaetc the animals etc. show activity, inaction and indifference;

and it is well known that they have the âham abhimana^(ego-centric attitude) in their ârya karana sanghata (can-sal complex) only. Now from the activity we infer adhy—asa. In this inference, activity is shown as being that ofthe wise also» "Human beings have the same behaviour asthat of the animals. By birth they are more rational thananimals, and have the ability to understand the truths givenby the sastras". It is in such persons that we fiind themiddle term (hetu) of the inference, viz, activity. The adfa-yasa has having the 'hetu' is inferred. "Even though theyare more rational, they act like animals in so far as theyhave the 'atmabhimana9 for their bodies". Then the infer-ence would be -

The activity of the wise is conditioned by adhyasa ;

Because it has the nature of activity ;

as, for example, the activity of animals.

The example is 'sadhya vikala9 (unproven major). Asuch what is required is that even this illustration can establish the validity of adhyasa.


Vivaranam 317

Objection : ^You argue that there is the "ahamka-Tanubandha' in the body etc., even for the animals. Youspeak of it as if it is thus known. How do you establishthis for the animals ?"

RepSy : When there are two objects and when thedifference between them is not cognised through perceptionor inference of agama, then by a process of elimination weget at adhyasa. It is only the wise minds that are skilledin inference and agama (revealed wisdom) that can arriveat the self as being distinct from the 'body. They alone arecapable of arriving at it because they are also skilled inperceptual activity etc. If they can understand the self asbeing distinct from the body without the aid of perception,inference and agama, these pramanas would be rendereduseless. In the absence of the pramana vicara (enquiryinto the means of knowledge) no sucb distinction can beapprehended,

Objection : Even those who do not have the ânu-managama vicara (enquiiy into inferential and verbal kno-wledge) do have certain actions which presuppose an 'adri-shtartha' (invisible purpose) for their souls. These personshave the activities based upon a distinction between theboby and the self. "Cowherds, women and others do nothave any knowledge of the pramanas; and ^yct they doaccept that they have an unchanging self which, exists evenafter their death, and that this self is the enjoyer of thefruits of their actions*. The distinction here is apprehen-ded perceptually.

Reply : There is no such apprehension here, buf


^18 PanchapacKka

wise). Their activity is based on what the elders said. Ifthey have the knowledge of distinction arrived at perce -ptually, they would have apprehended the pratyagatman.Thus when they are asked *who has the relation with theother world ?\ they reply that they do not know it defini •tedly and that they heard of it in the world. Hence it ha8been wisely said 'pasvadinan caprasiddho aviveka purvakahpratyakshadi vyavaharah. That samanya darsanad vyutpa-îmatam api purushanam pratyakshadi vyavaharas tatkalah samana iti". Even the activity of the wise is similarto that of the animals during the time of that activity; andthat time is the time where adhyasa is found. This muchat best is common to the activity of the wise and of theanimals.

Perception and other pramanas have the eye etc. astheir means. The means are "'not devoid of a ground; andsuch a ground is the body. Thus for perception etc.,, thebody is necessary.

Objection ; Let adhyasa be • the cause of activity.Yet just as in the case of 'rajatadbyasa' the silver is onlyan instrumental cause» likewise even for activity we maytake adjhyasa to be only an instrumental cause. Themere self is the material cause. By the mere self wemean the 'anadhyasta< atma bhava' (idea of the non-superimposed self).

Repfiy : Sankara states" 'Na tenanadhyasta atma bha^vana asangasya avikarinas caitanyaika rasasy atmanah pra-matrtivam upapadyate'. Here we are told that experienceâlone makes out the âvidya vad vishayatva' of the pramanas


Vivaranam 319

After teaching this Sankara has explained the similaritybetween the activity of the animals and that of men. In'rajatadhyasa' the ground is only the object, and not thepramata who is the ground of natural activity. Even tho-ugh it is a pramata that has this 'rajatadyasa', still it is thesole factor that determines the pramatritva. Even in theabsence of this adhyasa we have activity. As such, the silveris the instrumental cause of the activity in rajatadhyasa.This does not hold good of the normal activity which hasits ground in the pramata; and it is only the normal activitythat determines the pramatritva (krower-ness) of a person.Further, in deep sleep we find that there is no activity ofthe mere self. And in deep sleep tLere is present the upa-dana (meterial cause) viz., avidya. Even if mithyajaana isnot directly and completely the upadana, the upadana isthat product of •avidya which has interpenetration with theself.

Having established avidya as the basis of all ouractivity, Sankara proceeds to declare that the sastra inits turn, teaches something with reference to the self asapprehended generally. Here one'may say that the acti-vity ordained by the sastra is not based on adhyasa. Toput an end to such a false belief, he declares that sastratoo is *avidyavad vishaya' when he said - 'sastriye tu vya-vahare yadyapi buddhipurvakari na viditva atmanah paraloka sambandham adhikriyate'.

The sastra proclaims an adrishta (unseen) object as thegoal to be realised through an act. There cannot be anyactivity regarding a sacrifice etc. One does not knowbow he will enjoy the consequences in the world to come.There should be the knowledge of the self's relation to theother world. Otherwise no activity is possible. Taking


320 Panchapadika

this contention - as a convenient one, the Carvaka nowraises an objection^

Objection ; The injunction is a codana (instigation)and it commands tha,t an act should be done for a specificend. The self that will have a relation with another body,cannot be had from the ^phala codana^ - instigation causedby an idea of the result. Why does the ^hala codana*not involve or imply such a self ? If this question is askedyyou have to reply whether it is the 'pasvadi phala codana'(result of obtaining cattle as the instigator of the svarga-di phala codana' that implies this self. It cannot be theformer - One performs the 'karinyadF rites and as a con-sequence may obtain animals even in this life. It cannotalso be the latter. When we speak of svarga (heaven) asthe end, you cannot prove that svarga is a different worldYou can only say that it stands for happiness; and thisdoes not make out the relation of the self to another bodynecessary or essential. Either way you cannot get at sucha self.

The same result would follow even in ^naiyyamikacodana, (instigation of an absolute law) and âimittikacodana' (instigation under specific conditions). When thephala codana itself is unable to imply a distinct 'bhokta',these codanas are completely weak in implying it. Such'phala' is directly experienced as 'sukha-prapti, and 'dukhanivrittr. The Bhatta cannot speak of the 'phala' ifor'naiyyamika codana'. Even the 'prayascitta codana' doesnot involve such a self since this act has a direct resulhere and now in so far as the defect is said to be removed.And it is possible to experience here itself the 'doshaphala' viz., sorrow.


PANCHAPADIKA VIVARANAMofPBAKASATMA YATI

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322 Panchapadika

purely from codana he wants a self which should be differ-ent from the body. For, Sahara establishes the self onlyfrom codana because his purpose was only 'karma nir-naya'. If the codana does not involve a self distinct fromthe body, it is futile to establish such a self. And Sahara'spurpose was the 'nirnaya' (determination) of only theSadhivakyartha9 (meaning of the injunction). As such hecinnot establish a distinct self on the basis of the vali-dity of the mantra etc.

Reply ; Sabara*s work was the enquiry into the nat-ure of the vidhis (injunctions). Even he has established sucha self purely because the self is implied in the vidhivakyas

Objection ; -If the self is implied by the vidhis, thenthere ought to be an aphorisn on the self. This is anape-kshita (not intended) and asutrita (not given in an apho-rism).

Reply : There is an aphorism âdar ay anas/a anape..kshatvaf. This aphorism gives the need for establishingthe self. And through the validity of mantra etc., it is also^parmparya sutrita9. The first aphorism is athato dharmjijnasa where we have the pratijna (declaration of the aim-that this system would enquire into the nature and mean-ing of the vidhis. Later in the 'autpattika sutra* is establi-shed the 'apaursheyatva' (revealed nature) of the vedaswhich necessarily implied the validity 'svatah pramanya' ofthe Vedas. Since the Vedas include also the ^mantra' por-tion, their validity also is implicitly givsn in aphorismsThus even the 'svarupa vakyas' become self-valid.


Vivaranam 323

And the atma vicara given by 'Sahara is based on thevalidity of the existent object (bhuta artha); and it is notbased on the codana samarthya.

Objection ; How do you come to know this ?

Reply ; It is from Sabara^s own words— ^Codanahi bhutam, bhavantam, bhavisyantam, suksmam, vyavanhitam, viprakrishtam ity evam jatiyaka'-i artham saknotyavagamayitum". Codana gives us a knowledge of allthese. Bat codana being an act, it cannot directly givethe knowledge of these. Hence we ought to say that this'bodhakatva' is through the êshabhuta mantras' etc. Assuch Sahara undertook the atmavicara on the basis of thevalidity -of mantra etCy

Objection : According to you, the validity of the'svampa nishtha vakyas' (statements of facts) would beamplied by the 'autpattika sutra\ Their 'pramanya' tooought to have been discussed there by Jaimini.

Reply s Through Sabda we get the 'svarupa avagama'(apprehension of the nature). Is this svarupavagama validin the case of the self which is codana sesha bhuta' ? orin the case of an independent self ? Is it 'akhandartha' or'samsrishtartha' ? These questions cannot be touched byJaimini and Sahara, even though Jaimini has implied thevalidity of the vedantic texts in that aphorism. Yet thepurpose on hand was only the -vidhivakyartha nirupana"(determining the import of injunctions) for Jaimini. Thesequestions about the 'svarupavagama' are of no use here andhence they are left out in ^dharmajijnasa'.


32fl Panchapadika

You cannot argue that even though Jaiminiis busywit^h the enquiry into Dharma he ought to discuss the nat-ure of the self because it is implied by the VidhivakyasFor, such an enquiry would be futile here.

Objection : How do you say that it is futile here,since Dharma ,too requires a self which ought to be di&tinctfrom the body.

Reply : It is not mere dharma that requires such aself. It is only the 'phala' (result) which wants that selfand Jaimini is not concerned with the 'phala vicara'-

Objection ; But there is "phalapeksba" even fordharma. 'Dharmopadesa' cannot be ^nishphala" (useless),and the phala is inevitable at some time in the future. Sucha phala is impossible in the absence of a distinct self. Assuch an enquiry into the nature of the self. is necessary.

RepSy z Since this has been done in Uttara Mima- ,msa by Badarayana, it was not undertaken by Jaimini.

Objection : But Badarayana's enquiry refers onlyto Brahman and not to the 'codanaphala'.

Reply ; Jaimini *s enquiry establishes svarga whichis enjoyed by another body. This 'svarga bhoga' necessita-tes an enjoyer who should be different from the 'Karya -karana sanghata* (gross body).

Objection : Since we are able to establish the selthrough, the ^vakya paryalocana', it is not necessary forBadharayana to undertake this enquiry into the self.


Vivaranam 325

Reply : Brahman or self is an existent and existingentity. That can he established only hy a different pram-ana. Mere vakya cannot establish it or its nature.

Objection ; If such a distinct self is 'pramanantarayogya' (to be established by another means of knowledge),it means that no pramaha can establish it. Then why can'tyou take the body alone 'to be the self ?

Reply ; ^Pramanantara yogyatva' only means that apramana like sabda can give an etroneous cognition. Theself is the object of experience and experieace alone canfinally establish it. On the other hand an unreal or aninconsistent object may be given by sabda as hi 'Silah pla"vanti' (the rocks are flowing) which lacks validity. Becauseof this possibility of 'apramanya', Badarayana had toundertake a separate enquiry to have the 'virodha paxiharaphala* ^result by resolving contradictions),

Objection ; Then even without the 'virodha parih-ara\ there can be established the validity (pramanya),

Reply : Even if the self as distinct from the body isabsent, then too we hear of the validity of the phalacod-anas. Then will arise the 'paramarsa sanka' (doubt) aboutthe validity. There is the 'pramanya^ of the existant obje-cts like svarga. And when this validity is found, you cannot establish the validity for the ^haladi codanas' in theabsence of a distinct self which excludes the body. Assuch Sankara says-^Sastriye tu vyavahare.,.,, adhikriyate".

Objection : In the Devatadhikarana both Jaiminiand Sahara have explicitly stated that there is no 'mantradi


Fanchapadika

pramanya' as far as the devatas are concerned. Then howcan you accept that validity which is only implied else-where ?

Reply: In that adhikarana (topic) the aim is adifferent one. Ifthedevata has a form like ourselves itought to be bodily present at the sacrifice when it is invok-ed. If it is not apprehended as being present, there willarise 'karmanusthana lopa' (lapse in the performance of therite). To ward off such undesirable consequences there weare given to understand that the devata has no shaps etc*The adhikarana does not make out any 'apramanya' for thedevatas. Moreover, the non-vidhis,like the "arthavadalingas' (laudatory statements) too are quoted in the 12chapters ofJaimini as being texts having a 'pramanya'.

It is only such a self which is distinct from the bodythat is required in the 'sastriya vyavahara' outlined byPurva mimamsa. So Sankara says - "Tathapi na vedantavedyam..." Here we have (i) 'kartranvaya^syntactical rela-tion with the doer) - of the form - 'mayedam anustheyam*(this is to be performed by me); ii) 'adbikaranvay a»(relation with the proper agent) of the form-^madabhilash-ita sadhanam idam (this is the means of realising mydesire); and (iii) 'bhpktranvaya' (relation with the enjoyer)of the form-'mamayam niyogah* (tips is my duty). Thesethree are rejected or negated in the real nature of the self.The self is an 'asamsarin\ has nothing to do with *adhik-ara% and is not a 'bhokta'.

"The 'Sastriya vayavahara' does not require the 'asam-saryatmatvanf as its 'adhikarin' (proper subject), becausesuch a self is useless here and is also not an 'adhikari'. By'asanayadyatitam' is meant that 'atma tattva" which is free


Vivaranam 327

from the wheel of life. Hunger and thirst overtake theliving and cause them unhappiness and restlessness; andwhen they are quenched they feel happy. But the self iseternally free from these. It is free from all differences ofcaste etc Prior to the having of such vijnana or self-know-ledge, whatsoever activity is ordained for us by the sastrathat activity would render that sastra to be 'avidyavadvishayatva" only. The activity ordained by the sastra isbased on the conception of the I which is the product ofavidya* Prior to the realization of the meaning of senten-ces like 'TattvamasF (that thou art), all the activity that isordained by sastra, is only of the nature of avidya. Itdoes not cease to have such a nature.

Objection : How can the knowledge of the self asthat which is distinct from Lhe body, coexist with adhyasa ?

Reply : The knowledge is a mediate one while adhy_asa is immediate. An immediacy can be sublated only byanother immediacy. Some others explain the doubt bypointing to the coexistence of the knowledge of one moonwith the cognition of two moons.

Others would argue this : The subtle body is theproduct of atma avidya. Now the product is different fromand is also identical with the cause. Such a subtle body isalways seen to have a samsarga with the gross body, likethe fire in the ball of iron. Thus here we find that the gross. body is different from and yet is identical with its cause,This explanation may be taken up.

In any way it is only immediacy that can put an end toadhyasa. Hence Sankara has declared that the pramanasand the sastra are of the nature of avidya.

Here ends the Pramana Bhasya.


^28 Panchapadika

It is not only perception, inference and implicationthat establish adhyasa; but there is also agama (scripturaltestimony). The agama provides inj actions for the adhLkarin; whom it explicitly called Brahmana etc. and whomit describes in term'^ of his age, asrama etc. In so doingit accepts the '•cetanacetan adhysa' as the basis of the acti-vity it ordains. la 'Brahmano yajeta' (that Brahmana is toperform the sacrifice) we have the 'anatmadhyasa*. on theself. *Ashta varsham brahmanam upanayita' involves 'var-nadhyasa' (superimposition of caste) and 'vayo1 dhyasa\Likewise there are inj actions invoiving the adhyasas ofasrama, avastha (state), jivana (profession) and the like-

Thus having shown the 'sadbhava"*. (posibility)» defi-nition, and 'pramana9 of adhyasa, Sankara recalls thedefinition in the words — 'at asmins tad buddbih^What hthe 'Yushmad artha"? and in what 'ayushmad artha* is thereadhyasa ? In presenting this wisely and rationally Sankarastates that the 'Yushmadartha^ is the atadartha^ the not-thaiwhich is adhyasta on consciousness which is the not-this. .Theapprehension of the not-this as this is called adhyasa. Herewe have the Yushmad arthavabhasa' which we take to bethe^ "asmad arthava bhasa\ This is the 'itaretar adhyasa'(super-imosition of one on another.)

This is illustrated next.

, The order in which these adhyasas are stated and ex-plained in Panchapadika have a peculiar order. Therewe have to note that the proceeding adhyasa presupposes-the succeeding one as its base. Finally the ultimate groundis said to be the self. This self is said to be the integration


Vivaranam 329

self is said to be the integration of the self and the not-selfinto one single unity, and it is not the pure 'aharnpratyaya'.

Objection : Is the body also 'adhyasta', and is itnot the adhyasa of the dharmas ?

Reply ; Even the dharmin too is adhyasta. Sincethe dhar as have no inherent relation to the body, it isnut the mere body that is adhyasta. As such the word'dharma' too is employed by Sankara.

The sastriya vyavahara does not take the mere bodyinto consideration, but the dharmas that belong to it.Hence the dharmadbyasa (superimposition of quality) ismore important here than the 'dharmyadhyasa^. (super-imposition of the qualified.

ObJectOBt : In 'aham dand^ (I have a stick) we finda cbnjuctive relation. Likewise in âham kamF (I am inlove) too we have the same relation. Thus kama andother dharmas of the antahkarana, which are apprehendedas having this relation^ cannot be adhyasta.

Reply z No. The antahkarana is that aspect of the'aham pratyayin' called the 'vijnana saktf. Its propertiesare kama and the like. When the antahkarana is adhya-sta, these properties cannot escape. These properties arepresent when the antahkarana is present; and they areabsent when it is absent, as in deep sleep. This agreementand difference shows that as the properties of antahkaranathey are adhyasta.

42)


330 Panchapadika

Obj *„ ctiora ; But these are the properties of the self.They are active through the antahkarana which is itskarana. As such they are present or absent when theirkarana is present or absent.

RepSy ; No. That which is 'karya' (caused) is depen-dent on its cause (karana); and there is no rule that theeffect is dependent on the cause. Instead of assuming a'karana', it is easier and better to assume an 'upadana'.Moreover there are 'karanas' like the eye etc., and these °donot allow us to accept the antahkarana as their karana(instruments) but as their upadana (material cause).

Objection ; But in 'aham kamF which is a directexperience, we do find ths self to be the upadana.

RepBy ; If the relation between the ^ham'(I) andthe danda (stick) exists also between the 'aham" and 'kama'(love), and if the 'aham' is said to be the upadana, thenthere ought to be the relation of 'tadatmya'. As such weought to say 'aham kamah' (I am love). Hence reasoningand imference through agreement and difference compel usto treat the 'antahkarana' as the 'upadana' for 'kama' andother 'dharmas'. 'Antahkarana' means 'ahamkara', ttieâham pratyayin'. Because it has the 'pratyayas' called'kama' etc., it is called 'pratyayin'. This antahkaranais 'adhyasta' on the 'pratyagatman' who is 'asesha SVA-pracara sakshin* (all prevasive witnessing consciousness).

The self is the sakshin for the 'ahamkara granthiwhich is the source of the wheel 'of life, and which evolvesitself into 'kama, samkalpa, kartritva9 etc. The sakshinis non-relational (asangi) and -avikari'; and it is 'hanopa-


Vivaranam 331

dana sunyah' (devoid of receiving or giving). It illuminesthe antahkarana without being mediated by any.

Objection ; How then does the all-pervasive selfbecome as if it were internal ?

RepSy ; Consciousness is spread m the body. Andat the time of citta samadhana (reflection etc) ^we feel asif it is inward?.

Objection s Antahkarana cannot be 'sakshivedya^(known by the witness-consciousness). Now the self, senseorgans and the object are present together; there does notarise the knowledge of the object. The presence of afourth term is required for knowledge. Thus that whichmakes knowledge possible, when these three are present, isthe antahkarana or jaana (mind). Thus the mind is knownthrough arthapatti.

RepSy : No, we can arrive at the mind in a differentway. Instead of assuming an entity called ihe mind havingthe ability to give knowledge, it is better to ascribe thisability to the self.

Objection : Then we can establish the mind infer"rentially thus; when all the objects are in the proximity cfthe self there arises the 'kramakarya' or knowledge throughthe objects,, sense organs etc; and this requires the commonor 'sadhararia' cause for the agent. When many objects arein the proximity of the agent there arises only the knowle-dge of the object.

When many objects are present before Devadatxa he>s able to cut a piece of wood only when be has an axe.


332 Fanchapadika

Reply ; This involves the fallacy of anaikantikata-The mind functions by having a Samyoga' with the senseorgan concerned. This samyoga is present in ?he activityof the sense organ; and the krama here does not stand inneed of any other cause. When the mind has 'kramenasamyoga' (gradual conjunction) with the sense organ, we donot notice any other necessary cause. You cannot say thatthere is a necessary cause in the form of 'adrishta'; forwhen the fruit is falling from the tree, the fruit has a sam-yoga with theâkasadesa', and there is no adrishta karanain the 'krama'. You cannot say that in the case of thefruit its heaviness is the necessary cause; for, when the eyehas the contact with the object, there is krama (gradualorder) present. Adrishta karana is not to be had there;

and a necessary cause is never an 'adrishta karana' in suchcases.

Objection: A better inference can be given thus—knowledge is 'the visesha guna that arises in the object,when there is the 'dravyantara samyoga'. This Samyoga'of another substance, without having any inherent relation,is the cause required.

For, the knowledge that has arisen comes from a real(nitya) substance.

The redness in the atom arises when the atom has thesamyoga with fire. This fire is the mind, the atom is theobject, and the redness is the cognition or knowledge.Hence the 'dravyantara* which has the samyoga with theobject is the mind.

Reply ; When the self has the samyoga with thebody and sense organs, we have that non-inhering cause


Vivaranam 333

which gives knowledge. Thus arises the fallacy of establi-shing that which is already known or established (siddhasadhanata). You cannot establish the mind from an exami-nation of dream cognitions; for even in dreams there is thesamyoga with the body which can fulfil the same function.

Nor can you establish the mind perceptually. If it isa perceptual entity, it ought to have 'anu parimana' (atomicmagnitude^; and then like the atom it cannot be cognisedby any one of the sense organs. If it has 'ananta parimana'(infinite magnitude), the whole world should have to becognised at the same time in a moment. Even if it has^madhyama parimana' (medium magnitude) it cannot becognised by the sense organs; for when all the sense organsare absent in the dream state, we do find that the mind ispresent.

We cannot say that there is no 'pratiti' or awarenessof the mind; for we have the experiences like 'mam manonyatra gatanf (my mind is elsewhere). 'Thus by the methodof residues we have to accept the 'sakshivedyatva' for themind. And that there is such a mind is established only byagama, and not by inference and arthapatti.

Objection: That there is the superimposition forthe self in the antahkaranz etc. has been shown. This isimpossible. The itaretaradhyasa' means that the self issuperimposed on the aatahkarana, and that the antahka-rana on the self. If both are superimposed, both will haveto be nrthya (illusory). If both are the grounds, onecannot appear as the other. If the 'this' is superimposedon the self, the self like the mother of pearl should no thave any illumination (prakasa). But here you admit that


334 Panchapadiia

there is the illumination cF consciousness in ahankara. Ifthere is the superimposition for consciousness in ahankaraetc., then the world ought not to be revealed as having itsbasis in ahankara.

RepSy : In every case of superimposition (adhyasa)cue object has the 'samanyavabhasa" (general appearance7while the other has the 'viseshavabhasa' (specific appeara*nce). Here we have the conscious and the unconsciousentities. The 'viseshavabhasa' of these two makes us

•understand that there is the 'itaretaradhyasa' of these two;

for in supsrimposilioa it is only the specific appearancethat is superimposed. But both cannot be false. The-conscious entity cannot have any svarupadhyasa in theunconscious, for then the latter would no longer be theunconscious. So consciousness is a case of adhyasa in so

•far as it is fused (samsrishta) with the other. The sanmrga.(conjimction) proper alone is a case of adhyasa here.

Even though there is the viseshavabhasa, it can be the-ground since the visesha is not apprehended as the 'adhish-thana dharma/, (property of the locus), but as the propertyof another ground. Hence to reject the conclusions raisedby the objector, Sankara based his argument on experienc—"Tarn ca pratyagatmanam... antahkaranadish vadhyasyati"

Objection : When both the "cif and the 'Jada' areappearing as the general and particular (samanya viseshat-mana), there cannot be any adhyasa. On the other handthere is only Samanadhikaranya (apposition) whence theexpressions like ^ham kami (I am in loveâre gauna (meta-phonical) expressions.


Vivaranam 335

Reply : No. Our experience tells us that it is not agauna expression. Our experience does not show thatthere is a ^prithag avabhasa5 (separate appearance) of thesetwo entities.

Objection : In ântahkaranadishu^ we find the word.âdi' extending the scope of adhyasa, This isîmpossible anThe antahkarzna is superimposed on pure pratyagatm,and this antahkarana is the product of caitanyadhyasa. Inall other cases, they are adhyasta on the antahkarana1Thus did Sankara say in the beginning— âd viparyayenavishayinas tad dharmanani ca... yuktam'.jThere are no dhar-mas of consciousness that can be superimposed on somethingelse.

Reply s For the caitanyadhyasa we have antahka^rana as the upadhi. Yet consciousness alone is revealed as^vishayavacchinna' (conditioned by objects); and the anta^.

•hkarana is the conditioning medium of consciousness.Thus when Sankara speaks of antahkarana in the passagereferred to has be the ^pratibhasa^ (momentary appearance)in his mind. Where the antahkarana with the body etc isadhyasta, it is not as the mere mind but as, the consciousmind. In so obtaining an adhyasa, the mind makes thebody become a subject, agent etc., and it remains concealedandunfound. L is only the (cidrupa^ (form of conscious-ness) that is fouiad everywhere in all adhyasa. When thebody appears as the subject, there is no samanadhikaranya,for the body makes the self become the subject etc. In allthe adhyasas of the body etc., it is only the mind that isunique in conditioning consciousness. Sometimes for theconsciousness the 'upadbi is required, ând at other times

*he upadhi is not required.


336 Panchapadika

Objection; Even though ahankara is the other, isexternal to consciousness, there is the appearance of cons-ciousness in ahankara (caitanya vat sambandha), it is cont-rary to experience to say that there is no pratibhasa forthe mind in the body etc.

Reply : It is imosuble for the atheist to maintain the'atmatva bhrama' in the .body; and he cannot hold the^pratibhasa' of the mind in the body. Those who imaginethat the 'cidrupa' is the immanent continuant (anusyuta) inthe intellect etc, are only trying to establish the ahankart-ritva' in the intellect, etc., are only tiying to establish theahankartritva"' in the 11 tellect, mind, sense organs, orbody. That which they accept 'they consider to be eonsLous. In 'aham manushyah' etc. consciousness is attribiufed to the body etc. This is possible because of a falseidentification of the body etc with the ahankara grahthr.It is only the apprehension of mere conscioJsness tha-makes possible the 'atmatva vibhrama' in all entitles, lik®the body ect,

For the, atheist, however, the aham (I) as the bodystands for consciousness. In such a case, consciousness isadhyasta on the mind; and this specific consciousness isadhyasta on the body. Then this specific consciousnessbeing now consciousness, there cannot arise any atmatva"bhrama. Ahankara being non-different from. consciousnesthe mind would have to be the self; and we ought to havesuch an apprehension.

All except the Samkhya argue that the self-has thethe power (sakti) whereby it becomes the doer and theenjoyer, and adhyasa is said to b^ the cause of only theactivity for such a self. Mithyajnana gives rise to love?


Vivaranam 337

hatred etc., and thus is the cause of activity. But the acti-vity of the self conceived as being the agent and the en-joy er, is the cause of all evil (afiartha). As such we cain-not say that the mithyajnana is the cause for the activityof such a self. This adhyasa is a fact of common experi*"ence.

Thus by implication we arrive at the subject matterand purpose from the first aphorism. To establish thesfetwo, Sankara has shown that the "abrahma svarupatva' ofthe self is of the nature of adhyasa. Destroying the caus6of such an 'anartha' is the purpose.

Objection; What is. wanted is the destruction of'anartha', and not its cause.

Reply : It is only when the cause that brings it isdestroyed, there is total or complete elimination or destru-ction of "anartha".

Objection ; This adhyasa is said to be beginning"less. If so, how can it be destroyed ?

Reply ; That it is destroyed we have the âstra"pramanya* (scriptural testimony).

Objection : But it is contrary to experience. Eventhough the 'aham pratyaya* (I-principle) is distinct from'manushyatva' ybeing human) etc., still the 'manushyatvadyadhyasa' is beginningless. As such it cannot be dispelled.

Reply : It is not 'anaditva' or begintiinglessness thatis the cause of the destruction or non-destruction of the

43)


^8 Panchapadika

ihyasa. On the other hand, the cause is the proximityr otherwise of that which contradicts it. That knowledgehich arises from the apprehension of 'brahma svarupa'iven by sentences like 'tattvam asi' - such a knowledgeone can dispel adhyasa.

We see in the world that the beginningless 'praga-hava^ (prior non-existence) is destroyed when an object)mes into existence. The Buddhists admit that the beginn-igless vasana santanas (series of impressions) are destro-;d by the four-fold 'tattva bhavana\ The Naiyayikas ad-.it that there is dispelled the beginningless flow of mithya-.ana, and that even the blackness of the atom is dispelled.tie Samkhyas recognise that the beginningless non-h discri-ination is destroyed by discrimination. The Mimamsa-is say that the beginningless 'pragabhava' of the 'dharmaLttva jnana' too is destroyed.

Objection : In all these cases, the beginningless,bhava' (non-existence) is only a negative entity. But)ur adhyasa is a positive entity like the self. As such itin not be destroyed.

Reply: But this ajnana (nescience) is of the nature' ineplic ability. Hence even though it is beginninglesscan be dispelled by jnana. There is a specific necessarylation of contradiction between ajnana and jnana, where-jnana is the stronger.

L

Objection: The destruction of the pot means tharemains not in the form of clay, but that it remains in5 'kapalady avastha\ (in the state of potsherds). It rem.ns in its causal form. The kapala avastha' is its 'karana*mavayiny' (inheres in its causal state). Butjajnana is un-


Vivaranam 339

caused and it cannot have such a 'karana samavayinyuttaravastha5 (posterior to the causal inheranoe). Hence itcannot be destroyed.

HepSy ; If destruction means that the object goes tothe state immediately succeeding its upadana karana; thenthe qualification-viz. 'samavayikarana* (inhering cause) isuseless. As such one has to admit that J'Brahma svarupa-bhivyakir (manifestation of Brahman) is the same as 'avi-dya hivritti\ Further if the qualification 'samavayikarana*is retained then there cannot be the dispelling or destruc-tion of the blackness of the atom and of the 'pragabhava*(prior non-existence) as well.

Objections Ajnana is different from abhava, likethe self. Hence it can be dispelled.

Reply ; A counter inference can be given : Ajnanais different from ^sat', like the 'pragabhava'. Hence itcan be dispelled.

Objection : Which is the better inference of thetwo ?

Reply : The second inference is the better since itbrings out plainly how jnana sublates or contradicts ajnana,

Objection : Then, even when we know that the selfis different from the body, the adhyasa does not seem todisappear.

RepSy s Adhyasa disappears not because there is theknowledge of distinction, but because there is the appre-hension of Brahman arising from the knowledge of Brah-man conveyed by the Mahavakyas (conclusive scripturalstatements).


340 Panchapadika

Objection; There is the knowledge of the self asbeing distinct from the body. There is the apprehensionof Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman. How do yousay that only the later brings about the sublation ofadhyasa ?

Reply : Ajnana that has concealed Brahma rupa ofconsciousness and thus brought about the apparently finitejelf, is the beginningless avidya; and it is the cause of the^hankaradi vikshepa (diffusion of the ego etc.) Now|?rahma Jnana reveals Brahman while destroying this avi-dya. It is not the absence of the knowledge of the distin-ction between the self and the body, that is the cause ofSip.msara. But the real cause is the non-apprehension ;<ofBrahman. That this is the cause we have shown throughsruthi and through arthapattL As such ajnana (or avidya)i^ dispelled by 'taftva jnana9 (knowledge of the real).

Objection : Jnana can dispel only ajnana. Howcan it dispel adhyasa ?

Reply : Ajnana is the cause and its product is theadhyasa which makes the self appear as the agent, subjectetc. Now, when the cause is destroyed, the cause disapp-ears along -with its products or effects.

Objection ; Now the 'aham pratyaya9 also is essen-tially of the nature of Brahman. How is it that does not4ispel ajnana?

Reply ; Because it does not appear, or it does notmanifest itself, as having the nature of Brahman. The'ahampratyaya' is beginningless and coexists only with thebeginningless 'karyakarana'. Here we do not find any


Vivaranam 341

relation of contradiction between the 'abam pratyaya^ andthe body etc.. As such mere svarupa viveka (knowledgeof discrimination) cannot put an end to adhyasa.

Objection ; Adhyasa may not be dispelled by theknowledge that the self is different from the body etc.-Yet there arises a knowledge from the enquiry and th^jknowledge, which is adventitious (agantuka), may be takento put an end to adhyasa.

Reply : If the jananantara arising from the enquiryis inferential it is a mediate knowledge and hence is of nouse here. If enquiry means only logical reasoning (tarka),it is no longer a 'pramana jnana\

Prayoj^na Bhashya :

Objection : The purpose of the sastra is not thedispelling of the evil (anartha); but it is the realization ofthe incomparable Brahmananda. Brahman is spoken of inthe srutis as being 'niratisayanandam' (absolute beatitude).And Brahma vidya is the means of realising Brahman. Thismeaning is gathered from passages like - "sa yo ha vai tatparamaa brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati'. Hence the pur-pose ought to be declared as the realization of ^niratisayasukha59.

Reply : It is true that it is said that the realization ofthis is the fruit of Brahma vidya which arises from thesastra. In the same way, it is also said that the dispellingof evil too is the fruit of the same. We have passages like^tarati sokam atma vit\ and 'Jushtam yada pasyanty^nisam asya mahimanam eti, vita sokam it\ Here we hearof the destruction of the very origin or source of evil.Can't this be a 'prayojana (purpose) ?


342 Panchapadi&a

Objection ; Then the complete or entire "phala9should be mentioned, not only a part of ^t» Since boththese results are termed in the sruti and since both are de-sired by us, let both be the prayojanas.

1 Reply : The realization of bliss is implied in thesubject matter; and when we say that 'brahmatmaikatva9 isthe subject matter, we imply the realization of bliss. Nowthe 'prayojana' can be only that which is desired; and whatis desired here is ânartha hetu nivritti" (cessationôf thec;ause of evil) which results when we realize the bliss calledBrahman. Anandavapti is only 'artha siddha' and as suchit does not merit a separate mentioning.

The Brahma svarupata prapti is of the nature of bliss.md it is accepted as constituting the subject matter.

Objection; Let the subject matter be the identity)f Brahmam and the self. Bat let the realization of bliss>e stated as the 'prayojana',

RepSy ; No. The realization of bliss does not fall)utside of realisation of identity of Brahmam and the self,:f it f.dls outside, the realization of bliss can be statedseparately. The 'Brahmatmata9 itself is the 'ananda^raptf.

ObjeetSon ; Even the âvastha nivritti9 can be taken,is subject matter of the sastra.

RepBy : No. The avastha is dispelled along with its:ause. This dispelling or destruction falls outside of the.ubject matter, viz 'Brahmatma rupa\ The subject matters the identify of Brahman and the self, while the 'phala9irises from the realization of this identity.


Vivaranam 343

Objection s Then the subject matter ofths sastraitself-viz., Brahmatmaikatva-3 this itself is 'anartha nivri"tti\ As such the destruction of evil need not be taken asthe 'pray oj ana'.

Reply : But in ^tattvam asP we do not find the âna-rtha nivrittF as being the subject-matter.

Objection ; This sentence might not give that mea-ning. But read along with others in that context, that me-aning would come out. In all the vedantic passages, thenature of Brahman is spoken of as that of the self. In sodoing the anartha' is prespupposed to be overpoweringthe self. The plain meaning of the sentence refers to therealizing of something positive. Yet Brahman that ispropounded is the Brahman who is free from ânartha'.As such 'anartha* nivritti' too is the subject-matter.

iRepSy : The esntence is not there to expound thenature or meaning of Brahman, but it is there only to ex-pound the identity of the self with Brahman.

Objection : This is not so. ^The text begins with^sad eva somya9 and ends with 'tat satyam sa âtma'. Herewe find that the passage rejects 'sa prapancatva' and pro-claims the ^nishpraparcatva'of Brahman. This Brahmamis the meaning of the word 'tat' in the sentence 'tattvamasi\ Since Brahman is transcendental, the passage firstexplains the meaning of Brahman; and then at the end itdeclares that such a Brahman is identical with the self.

Reply : The ^nishprapancatva (non-transmigration)of Brahman is the subject matter. How can this subject

matter be thejsame as the dispelling of the 'anartha' whichis there for the self.


344 Panchapadika

Objection z ^The 'tvam padartha9 (thou) has thesamsarga with such a 'tat padartha' (that) referred to.While rejecting such a samsarga, the passage declares thatthis is the 'anartha hetu% called agrahana (non-apprehen-sion) and anyatha grahana (apprehending otherwise). Toestablish the identity, this sentence rejects the cause of'anartha'.

Reply ; Ultimately, the subject matter is the nish-prapancatva of Brahman. It is not the rejection of the prati-bhasa of avidya, or of the products of avidya. From theapprehension or realization of 'nishprapanca brahmatmata9we derive by implication both the 'avidya nirasa' and the'avidya karya nirasa'" Sach an implied meaning or dedu-ction cannot constitute the very subject-matter. For, ifthe 'avidya pratibhasa' and the âvidya karya pratibhasa9were to be absent, then what is required is that whichcan put an end to this ^rati bhasa\ And this cannot be.presented by the sastra. "If 'Brahmatmavagati and avi-dya nivritti are simultaneous, this simultaneity does notarise from the activity of the word. As such you cannottreat the 'avidya nivritti' separately as the subjectmatter^.

Objection : In the erroneous cognition we have the'pratibhasa' of avidya and of its product, and this is nega-ted later on. Yet the sentence 'this is silver' cannot betaken to refer to the non-existent silver. Likewise, the sen-tence like Tat tvam asi' might imply the 'nivritti' (cessa-tion) of adhyasa which is the 'nishprapancatva\ Yet thereare other sentences like 'asthulam ananu'; and in these wefind 'saprapancatva' directly and they are actually predi-cated of Brahman.


Vivaranam 345

Rep!y : That the world is adhyasta on Brahman andthat Brahman is related to the world - do we apprehendthrough perception ? or through agama ? it cannot be aperceptual knowledge since Brahman is not an object ofperception.

Yet, one may say, there is the apprehension of theworld which makes us hold that it is relating to Brahmam.But any relation is a relation between^'wo factors or terms.. When one of the terms is not apprehended, the relation it-self cannot be apprehended.

Objection ; In the contexts that proclaim ^nish-prapancatva', we read passages'like 'Idam sarvam yad ayamatma'; and these sentences go to show that the world app-ars as being adhyasta on Brahman.

Reply : Yes/there is the mere appearance (pratibhasa)*But such passages are not offered to'those that speak of'nishprancatva'. That Brahman is the all-pervasive selfwe recognise when we find that therein is the power (sama-rthya) of being the upadana dharama for' everything. Theprapanea sambandha is obtained from the causal law; andtexts like 'Idam sarvam' should not be construed as givingus the knowledge of this causal relation. Hence ti.esetexts are not opposed to the nishprapanca vakyas. Furtherthere are certain texts negating certain things in Brahman?and what these things are, we get from the texto bearing onsaprapancaiva. Because of this 'ekavakyata' they cannotbecome badhaka (contradiction) for the nishprapancava-kyas.

44)


346 Panchapadika

Further the saprapancavakyas' make Brahman theupadana for everything; and this does not establish the^sarvatmabhava' (omniscience) of Brahman. As such thesetezts are not able to declare the 'sarvatmata' of Brahan.They are only supplementary.

Texts like 'Idam sarvanf, have 'ekavakyata' with the^nishedha vakyas (prohibitions). They cannot give an inde-pendent meaning. If they can independently convey ameaning, we would have the 'saprapancatva' (worldliness)for Brahman. This' would be devoid of any ^purpose orvalue because only the 'nishprapanca vakyas' have a•purpose. When 'ekavakyta' (unified import) is possible, itis a fallacy to^split the passages; and when one is said tohave a purpose or .value, its contradictory cannot have anypurpose or value.

'The nishprapanca vakyas have a purpose or value.We do find that the purushartha of the conscious self indeep sleep is nishprapancata. Even the sruti corroboratesthis by saying 'asabdam asparsam arupam avyayam nicayyatarn mrutyamukhat pramucyate'. Moreover, we do findthat 'saprapancata^ for the conscious self is the cause ofevil; we do not also hear of any purpose for it. Hence weshould read these texts along with the negative ones as con-stituting 'ekavakyata', so that they are not 'nirarthaka'. (meaningless).

Objection: The prapancavakyas may not be capa.'bleof giving us the cognition or. knowledge. But they dohave the ^tat pratitijanakatva\ The former is their anu-vadakatva, while the latter is the pramiti. Ths later being. the stronger, it can be a badhaka for the former.


Vivaranam 347

Reply; But in so far as it is a âdhaka', it is itsown badhaka. It negates iiself.

Objection : Though there is no prapancatva, it isfirst propounded, and now you say that it is negated or rej-ected. This is a useless procedure. For, instead of gettinginto the mind and then washing the fact, it is better to bâway from the mind.

Reply : Only by arguing out that there must be anupadana for the whole universe, we are "able to arrive a^Brahman. This Brahman constitutes^the 'advitiya purushTartha9 (supreme end of life). To establish it we have madethe anuvada of the prapancatva; and then we negate it.

Objection ; But the 'sarvopadanatva' itself impliesthe âprapancata pramitii'.

Reply : No. Saprapancatva is arrived at throughthe ability of srutarthapatti (verbal implication) and thisstands negated by the immediate utterances of the sruti.Sruti is stronger than arthapatti.

Objection ; Then we do not arrive at the saprapan-cata through the concept of sarvopadanata.

Reply : It is .not so* Till the negation comes, theerroneous silver has its 'pratibhasa'. Likesise »there wouldcontinue the appearance of "saprapancata^ (externality) der-ived from the 'sarvopadanatva samarthya', till its negat-ion is realized. For, an immediate apprehension can be neg-ated only by another immediate "apprehension; it is not theunapprehended, nor is it the 'pramill' that can be negated.


348 Panchapadika

In the upasana portions Brahman is referred to 'in^saprapanca vakyas'. But Brahman should not be under-stood or apprehended as being of the nature of 'saprapan-catva\ Between those passages that speak of 'nishprapan-catva' and those that refer to ^saprapancatva9, the latter arethe weaker. And the vakyas referred to are in the contextofupasana, whence they cannot contradict the negativesentences. For the upasana vakyas refer only to the aro-pita rupa. And the Brahman spoken of by the upasananeed not be real. Moreover this Brahman may be takento be the 'aropita rupa" of the real Brahman. The 'srutivakyas' (statements of creation) are intended only to esta-blish the realization of the advitiya Brahman, because theyare 'nishedhya para vakyas\ They are to be construed inharamony with the purport of the negative passages.

Hence the 'nishprapanca brahmatva pramiti' cannothave any contradiction froiii the verbal or empirical cogn-ition.

Objection ; The identity of the Brahman and theself is the meaning of the mahavakyas. In the cognition ofthe meaning of the sentences the object cognised is thisidentity. As such the self becomes the object. Otherwisethe identity cannot be apprehended as an object. But wecannot have the self as the object since the identity of theself who is a samsarm (relational) with Brahman who isasamsrain (non-relattional) is an impossiblity. Then. howcan there be the cognition of the 'nishprapanca vakyartha' ?

Reply ; Does it mean that it is impossible for theobj.ect refered to by the ^vam pada' (Thou) to be identicalwith Brahman ? or Does it mean that there is the impo-


Vivaranam 349

ssibility for the 'tvam pada vacya* to be thus identical ? Itcannot be the former since 'samsaritva' (being in bondage(etc., cannot be predicated, of the 'tvam pada lakshya (indi-cated by thou). We do accept the latter.

Now, the self is spoken of as being the agent etc(1) Is kartritva etc., inferentially apprehended ? (2) or per-ceptually cognised ? (3) or apprehended through any otherpramana ? (i) Kartritva (being a doer) etc. is not inferen-tionally cognised since it is directly, perceptually appre-hended. (2) The pratyagatman is not an object that canbe directly cognised by the external sense organs; as suchthere can be no "bahyendriya pratyakshatva". If it is saidthat the kartritva etc. is cognised through 'manasa pratya-ksha' (mental cognition), what is the pramana ?

Objection : We have the agreement and difference-when the mind is present, the self is taken to be in bondage.When it is absent in deep sleep, this bondage is not cogni"sed (anupalabdhi).

Reply : No This bondage can be established otherwisebetter. That the self is the cause of the existence of theârtritvadi prapanca* can be established by agreement anddifference. It is only the 'sattakarna' because there is nokartritva in its absence. Moreover, in deep sleep there isthe 'anavabhasa.^ (non-appearance) for the kartritva etc.Is this due to the absence of the mind then,or is it becausekartritva etc., itself is absent.

Objection ; If something L to be apprehended. Thekarana (means) is necessary; and the Jkarana is absent mdeep sleep.


50 'Fanchapadika

Reply : No. For, any ^pratibhaa' is due to the imme-[iate illumination of atmacaitanya, and not due to any;arana.

Objection : The Buddhists and the Prabhakarairgue that the •Kartritva', 'bhoktritva', love, hatred, happi-iess, sorrow etc., are there in the self as self-luminous orelf-revea ing (svayam^prakasah).

Rep By = Are they separate substances along with the>elf ? If so, you should admit that there are many subst-mces having ^svaprakasa'. It is better to admit only thesva prakas&tva' (self-luminosity) of the self whence othersire revealved. Nor can they be treated as the qualities of;he self, for, if they are 'sva prakasa\ you would have to;ay that one prakasa guna (property of illumination) givesise to other "prakasa gunas'. And this is absurd. You:annot also say that they alone are the 'prakasa guna^; for[he ^prakasa guna/ as in the case of the sun, does not comeinto existence in its own 'asrayopadhi' (ground).

You cannot also assume 'svaprakasatva' (self-lumino-sity) for ^kartriiva' etc. because their 'satta' involves it. For^they can have the 'prakasa' since they have the 'samsarga'with the eternal or real self.

(3) 'Kartritva (agent-hood) etc., cannot be cognised byany other pramana There is no immediacy of the/bondagefor us; and even if there is, you need not assume any otherpramana save the self. Otherwise it would come intoconflict with the agama that teaches 'nishprapancata' (non-woridliness). Moreover, the passage 'Indro mayabhih../clearly shows that there is a'rnithya karaaa^ viz. ajnanafor the bondage etc.


Vivaranam -î.

Hence there is no pramana to show that there is the^rapanca sambandha' for Brahman. It is apprehendedonly by the sakshin, because it is sakshi siddha* Wecannot sa^ that the world is ultimately real; for, even afalse or unreal object is apprehended by the sakshin.Hence the nishprapanca brhmatma pramitih* cannot becontradicted or negatived by the ^saprapanca pramiti\

The world then appears because it is of the nature ofavidya. The 'pratibhasa' (momentary appearance) of avidyaand its products has its ultimate meaning only in gettingitself negaged by the immediate texts. The 'tattva bodha*(apprehension of the real) arises while it negates the avidy-ashyasa' and 'avidya karyadhyasa\ They do not comeone after another, but simultaneous by,

Objection: If'anartha nivrtitti'is not the subjectmatter, how can it be derived from the 'vishaya vagatisamarthya' (ability from apprehending the object) ?

Reply : (i) Do you mean "anartha mirasa' ? Or(ii) the 'anartha nirasa pratibhasa' ?

(i) If you mean only 'anartha nirasa^ (negation ofevil), the explanntation is as follows :

When an object is erroneously apprehended, youcannot determine its real nature without rejecting or subla-ting (nirasa) it. The sentence that 'this is sukti5 conveys thereal nature of the object only while it rejects the 'ataddharma" apprehended before. The prior apprehension iscontradicted by the'tattvabhasa (apprehension of truth) andit is also of th^ nature of avidya being a product of avidya.


352 Panchapadika

Consequently the negation of the prior apprehension isnecessarily implied in the 'tattvabhasa'.

Objection ; Silver which is the object cognisedpreviously, stands ^rejected by the cognition 'this is notsilver'. But here we have 'aham brahmasmi (I am Brah-man) which is only vastu svarupa nishtha vijnana' (know-ledge determined by the object). It does not negate theworld. It only tells something about Brahman or me, andnothing about the world. "How can there be the "vipar-yasa nirasa' here, when we do not have any negation andany word that stands for the negated ?

Rep By ; There are two jnanas that can contradict or

negate a 'viparyasa' - (a) the positive knowledge of anotherentity which is real like the sukti and the self; and by thenegative knowledge of any entity which is not really there,but is only adhyasta. It is the latter knowledge where wehave the 'adhyasa nirasa" that negation should be expli-citly expressed. No such thing is required in the formerknowledge; for the knowledge of ihe object implicitly andnecessarily implies the rejection of the other. And thereis no need for an open rejection of the other.

The 'saprapancata jnana* is the bhava jnana (positive);

and its 'virodhi bhavantara jnana' (contradictary knowledge)is the knowledge of identity. The latter puts an end -tothe adhyasa: for, it is itseif capable of negating the formerimplicity.

Objection z Any activity can go to fulfil only thatfor which it is intended, that to which it refers. It cannotgo to establish something else even by implication. No wordcan siva two copm+irms «f fh^ cowA +;,^^ A^ —-i-


Vivaranam 355

verb can imply a .manifold substances, peities etc.. This is-ail the function of anuvada.

Through the smtarthapatti alone we can have theapprehension of ^ rthantara' (different meaning).

Objection : But just like the verb we do apprehendthe 'vacyatva' of the substance and the deity. How are .these to be taken as the meaning of 'yajati' through anupa-patti ? Why can't we say that there is only 'yajaty abhid-hcyaiva' (primary meaning) ?

Reply : A mere verb can convey only the meaning ofthat which it directly signifies. It can't give up its meaningand directly convey the others. We have to admit the^nantariyakata siddhi* for the substance and deity.

Objection : The meaning of the sentence is thepadartha reffered to; while the sublation of the viparyasa(contradictory) is not arrived at from the meaning of thesentence since it is not the padartha. Then the apprehen-sion of the sublation can be 'nantariyaka'. But where thenegation is immediately conveyed, the affirmative knowle-dge is not directly conveyed by the sentence. In such a caseyou cannot admit the 'nantariyakata' for the knowledgeof the sublation. In the present context of the self, we findthat bondage is dispelled by immediacy (aparoksha jnana)"Knowledge refers to both directly, and not to one alone.Hence you cannot speak of the 'nantariyakata siddhF forthe other.

Reply: In 'paroksha badha' (Indirect negation) wefind that the knowledge of the ground is the cause of both


352 Panchapadika

Consequently the negation of the prior apprehension isnecessarily implied in the 'tattvabhasa9.

Objection : Silver which is the object cognisedpreviously, stands ^rejected by the cognition 'this is notsilver5. But here we have 'aham brahmasmi (I am Brah-man) which is only vastu svarupa nishtha vijnana' (know-ledge determined by the object). It does not negate theworld. It only tells something about Brahman or me, andnothing about the world. "How can there be the 'vipar-yasa nirasa' here, when we do not have any negation andany word that stands for the negated ?

Rep By : There are two jnanas that can contradict or

negate a Mparyasa' - (a) the positive knowledge of anotherentity which is real like the sukti and the self; and by thenegative knowledge of any entity which is not really there»but is only adhyasta. It is the latter knowledge where wehave the 'adhyasa nirasa' that negation should be expli-citly expressed. No such thing is required in the formerknowledge; for the knowledge of ihe object implicitly andnecessarily implies the rejection of the other. And ihereis no need for an open rejection of the other.

The 'saprapancata jnana* is the bhava jnana (positive);

and its 'virodhi bhavantara jnana* (contradictary knowledge)is the knowledge of identity. The latter puts an end -tothe adhyasa: for, it is itseif capable of negating the formerimplicity.

Objection z Any activity can go to fulfil only thatfor which it is intended, that to which it refers. It cannotgo to establish something else even by implication. No wordcan giva two cognitions at the same time. As such we


Vivaranam 353

should say that the îparyasa nirasa' (negation of thecontradictory) alone can put an end to the saprapancata.You cannot bring in a 'bhavantara visbaya' (a differentpositive entity) as implying the rejection of adhyasa.

Reply : No. Take the balance. One of the pans israised by the hand; and this automatically takes the otherpan down. The activity of the hand is not drected to thelowering of the pan. And yet that act which raises on6pan also brings down the other. The same is the relationbetween the knowledge of identity and the sublation ofprapancatva. Here we have the 'nantariyakata siddhi\

Objection : Let the rejection or sublation Jnirasa)of the silver and of the bondage arise simultaneously with(nantariyaka) the knowledge of the sukti and of the iden-tity of the self with Brahman. But how do we know thatthere is this sublation ? How can rhere be the apprehen-sion of this sublation ?

Reply ; Even that too is ^nantariyaka'. The selfhas the Jnana vyapara with regard to that which it hasotherwise apprehended. This jnana is brought 'about bythe word that signifies the truth about it. As the sublationarises, so is the apprehension of truth. The cognitions areapprehended in the order Brahmaham, ,aham Brahma,(I am Brahma) and 'naham karta, (I am not a doer) whenthe meaning is understood as 'Brahman'; then the ântra-riyaka sbodiha^'bf the form - If I am Brahman, I am nota doer. The same procedure or explanation holds goodof 'nedam rajatam' also.

45)


354 Panchapadika

Objection ; Why can't the same sentence give twomeanings ?

Reply ; No. For, 'lyam suktih, (this is the mother ofpearl) is a complete sentence which does not have any fur-ther syntatical relation. This is therefore a more importantsentence, while the negative sentence like •nedam rajatam'(this is not silver) is only an 'anuvada'. It is the anuvada(explanatory statement) in so far as it is 'nantariyaka sid-dha9 from the knowledge of the affirmative sentence. Thatthere is the ^nantariya pratibhasa* of an 'arthantara jnana'from an 'arthantara jnana' is generally accepted. TheMimamsaka admits that the verb is enough to ^constitute asentence; and from the knyajnana (cognition of the verb)we are able to apprehend the sadhanas (mean^) required.Yet there are other words constituting the 'itikartavyata'(ancillary activities). They are employed so that otherobjects are not to be taken up. These other words are onlyanuvadakas. Thus they say that t he injunction of 'yajafpv. sacrifices) can and does give the substance, deity and actall in one. Others interpret yajna to mean the substancedeity and tyaga.

Since the verb expresses the act which is the meaningof the sentence, the verb is taken to constitute a sentenceby itself. From the 'kriya janana samarthya" (cognition ofthe act) itself all the means implied by the act are appre •hendcd; and we do apdrehended that they have the relationwith the verb. Then the words are intended only to excludethose that are not mentioned by them. Thus in spite ofthe apprehension of a unified meaning, these 'anuvadaka'


Vivaranam 355

verb can imply a.manifold substances, peities etc,. This isail the function of anuvada.

Through the srutarthapatti alone we can have theapprehension of ^ rthantara3 (different meaning).

Objection : But just like the verb we do apprehendthe "vacyatva' of the substance and the deity. How arethese to be taken as the meaning of 'yajati9 through anupa-patti ? Why can't we say that there is only âjaty abhid-hcyaiva' (primary meaning) ?

Rep8y : A mere verb can convey only the meaning ofthat which it directly signifies. It can^t give up its meaningand directly convey the others. We have to admit the'nantariyakata siddhF for the substance and deity.

Objection : The meaning of the sentence is the-padartha reffered to; while the sublafcion of the viparyasa(contradictory) is not arrived at from the meaning of thesentence since it is not the padartha. Then the apprehen-sion of the sublation can be 'nantariyaka^ Bat where thenegation is immediately conveyed, the affirmative knowle-dge is not directly conveyed by the sentence. In such a caseyou cannot admit the 'nantariyakata' for the knowledgeof the sublation. In the present context of the self, we findthat bondage is dispelled by immediacy (aparoksha jnana)-Knowledge refers to both directly, and not to one alone.Hence you cannot speak of the 'nantariyakata siddhF forthe other.

Reply : In 'paroksha badha9 (Indirect negation) wefind that the knowledge of the ground is the cause of both.


356 Panchapadika

the sublation of error and the 'nirasa pratibhasa\ Thesame holds good of 'pratyaksha badha' also (perceptualnegation).

Take for example the ^rajatabhava" (absence of silver)It is not apprehended through 'anupalabdhi', for the silveris apprehended directly as the this. Nor does the cogni-tion of 'rajata bhava' arise from the sense contact, for therecan be no contact of the eye with an absent object. Boththe silver and its absence are not capable of being cogoisedby the eye.

Thus the saprapancatva is -asabdm (non-verbal) and itis âvidya vilayanf. Hence Sankara separately and distin-ctly refers to it in 'asyaaaartha hetoh prahanaya...'.

Objection z If the purpose of Bhrama vidya is thesublation or rejection of the 'anartha', it is not the 'vedan-tarambha phala\ The Vedanta refers only to Vidya andnot to avidya. Then why should Sankara say— 'asyanarthahetoh prahanaya sarve vedanta arabhyante' ?

Reply : The dative in 'prahanaya' takes the *vidyasamarthya siddhi' into consi delation. Only through vidyathat the av'dya is destroyed. It does not mean that theVedantas are to be begun for the destruction of the cause ofevil* It means that the Vedants brings about this result atthe same time.

Objection : , Then the purpose of Brahma vidy.i be,ing only the vidya, the purpose of the sastra cannot be thesublation of evil.


Vivaranam. 357

Reply : Between 'sukha prapti' (realisation of bliss)and duhkha nivritti^ccssation of sorrow), it is the latter thatis desired by us. As such the meaning of the sastra wouldculminate in the 'anarthanlvrird'.

Objection : Sankara says — 'vidya pratipattaye'.What is this 'pratipattaye' ? When we have the knowledgeof an object, the object is other than the knower; and sowe may have to state separately that the object is to beobtained or possessed. But there is no such thing here.Vidya has its ground in the knower, and it arises by revea-aling the object to him.

Reply : The knowledge and the apprehension thereofare possessed by the knower at one and the same time^The way in which objects are possessd is not found in thecase of vidya. When we say apti (possession) we meanthe immediacy of the object and of the cognition or know-ledge. Bat in the case of vidya it is otherwise.

Even if vidya has arisen it may not have any pratis-htha" - (it may not be firmly rooted in its immediacy). Forthis vidya has the object that gives room for asambhavana(doubt) and "viparita (contrary) bhavana\ By vidya ismeant that valid cognition (pramanajnana) which arisesfrom the word wherein there is the co-operation of sakti,tatparya and vicara. The pratishtha it is to have onlymeans that it should have the 'aparokshya' with its ownobject. Such an immediacy is prevented by 'asambhavana'(impossibility) and Mparita bhavana". The former is tti&impossibility of having (hat concentration which can bringabout the 'brahmatata bhava\ The latter is the dominationof the'sariradhyasa* etc. When we overcome these twowe have the vidya pratipatti (apprehension of knowledge).


358 Panchapadika

Objection : The Vedanta is said to be the caus'e ofthe 'aparoksha pra.nia' (immediate experience). How canthere be the 'apradtatva' for Brahma vidya ? We havetwo types oPCittadosha' viz. âsambhavana' and 'Viparitabhavana9. Then v/e cannot have any 'aparoksha niscaya'.

Reply : But consider the example. Take the 'ardra.mariciphala'. We may have seen it in its dried up state.This wet one is at a distance; and we have no samskara(impression) of any previous cognition of this object. Onthe other hand there may be a 'viparita samskara1 present-Then even though the object is immediately present we areunable to determine it. There does not arise the real'aparoksha niscaya9, which is free from error and doublyLikewise true knowledge arisess as if it is not 'pratishthita'.For iis 'svarupa. pratishtha' it takes the aid oftarka.

Objection : How can that which is not determinedby pramana, be determined by tarka (logic) ?

Reply : Tarka is only the ânugrahaka9 (subsidiary)to the pramanas. It is only an auxiliary to all the prama-nas. It is present in all oftham as an aid. And it is wellknown that when the sahakarins (auxiliaries) are present,we obtain the require! result.

Objection : Iftarks too is a valid means, how canyou have two pramanas to have the ârtha niscaya'? If it isnot a valid means of cognition, its aid is unnecessary andeven faulty. So, what is tarka ?

Reply ; Tarka means expedient reasoning.

Objection! : But yukti (expedient reasoning) is onlya synonym of tarka.


Vivaranam 359

Reply : Even though tarka is not a prairana, it isa sahakarin because it is a necessary feature or element inall. Tarka is the principle whose nature is to distinguishthe possibility and the impossibility of the truth conveyedby the pramana, sakti, and vishaya. It is the principle thatfinds out the possibility or otherwise of their truth;: and itis not of a îscaya rupa* (form of determining).

Pramanya vicara as established in Purva Mimamsa;

(1) The samkhyas argue that both the validity andnonvalidity of cognitions is internal or self-dependent,

(2) The Nyaya argues that both validty and non-validity are external or dependent on something else.

(3) To the Buddhists, validity is external or depend-ent on something.else, while non-validity is internal.

(4) To the Vedavadins only the validity is internal,

while non-validity is ex'ernal.

(1) Tile first view is untenable because it involvesa self-contradiction. The same cognition would have to beboth true and false.

Objection : Due to the difference in the, ^nanasamagri vyaktis\ we can distinguish validity from invali-dity, If the jnanasamagri is not aided by any defect, itgives a valid cognition; otherwise we have an invalidcognition.

RepSy : Yes, this explains how the valid and theinvalid cognitions arise. But as apprehensions they do notdiffer from one another, the same cognition would have to


369 Panchapadika

be both resulting in the absence of any activity. Further,if the distinction between the valid and the invalid is imm-ediately or'directly apprehended, this problem itself cannotarise. Whether there is difference or absence of confusedmixing between the pramana vyakti and the apramanavyakti, there cannot be any distinction between the activi-ties. The pramana jnana and the apramana jnana aredirectly the causes of activity. As such they should beknown if we accept that both are 'svatah' (self-valid).

(2) The second view also is faulty. Only when thereis knowledge6 you can discuss their validity or non-validity,This knowledge is devoid of any such distinction; and sucha knowledge cannot be apprehended. There is no knowle-dge which is neither valid nor non-vaUd-

i) Is validity known externally ? ii) or is it notknown ? In the former alternative ia) is it knownthrough 'karanaguna jnana'' ? or ib) through 'arthakriyasamvada jnana9 ?

It cannot be (ia)- If it is apprehended to be validbecause it arises from the 'karana guna'y then to establishthe validi'.y of the 'guna janyatva jnana' we require anothersuch 'ganajanyatva Jnana'. In this way we are led to aregress. If the validity of the 'guna jnana' is not establis-hed, there cannot be any activity; otherwise even withoutthis 'gunajnana, the first jnana must lead to activity.

Does validity arise as per the emergance of know-ledge ? or along with knowledge ? It cannot be the for-mer, since jnana being momentary, it does not exist when


Vivaranam 361

The pratibhasa is the same whether it is true or untrueknowledge. And prior to the understanding or apprehen-sion arising from the 'caksur adiguna', there is no deter-mination of validity and as such there can be no activity.

Now, validity is said to arise from the contact of the'sense organs and the like (caksur adiguna jnana). Thevalidity of the latter requires another such and thus weface regress.

In so far as the ^pratibhasa' is concerned, the trueknowledge is not different from the false one. As such youcannot say that the 'guna janyatva* is 'svatah' (internallyvalid).

Objection : In the absence of the guna there is noknowledge, and there is knowledge when the guca is pre-sent. Thus by agreement and difference we can make outthe validity of cognition on something external to it.

Reply : No, this concomittance refers only to theabsence of the defects which obstruct validity. There canbe found in the sense organs no other property save thatwhich removes the defect,

Nor can you say that knowledge and its validity arisetogether at the same moment; one is the cause of the other,and the cause must always preceed the effect m time. Theycannot coexist.

It cannot be (ib). 'Artha kriya samavada jnana' cannotdetermine or establish the validity, for that would lead toregress etc. To establish the validity of, this ârtha kriya

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362 Panchapadika

jnana^ we should know whether the validity of this 'arthafaiya jnana^ is external ? or internal ? If it is external,it leads to a regress. It cannot be internal also.

Objection : By 'sadhana' we mean the 'arthakriyaKari vastu'; and by 'phala' we mean the 'artha kriya\ Nowârtha Kriya samvada' gives rise to the validity of the co-gnition of the object (vastu jnanas), and not to the cogni-tion of purpose (phala jnana\ because there is furtherârthakriya9 or 'phala'. Hence there can be no regress.

Reply ; If the purpose (phala) has self-validity, whynot admit the same for the 'vastiT also? Iftirs is notaccepted, the validity of the 'sadhana jnana' must bedependent on the 'artha kriya'. And the validity of theârtha kriya* will have to be determined by the 'sadhanajnana\ To recognise the validity of one, we have to as-sume the validity of another. And when validity is esta-blished, there arises activity; and when activity is there,validity is established. This is the fallacy of mutual de-pendence.

We cannot say that activity arises to determine vali-dity; for all cognitions are free from ambiguity or doubt.

Objection : Activity need not arise in all cases onlyto determine validity. It may so arise only in certain cases.In examining silver we proceed through 'nirikshana''dahaaa', ^chedana" and "nigliarshaaa7 and thus establish itto be silver.

RepSy : 'In such cases, we hav^ to say that only oneof these gives rise to the cognition, and that the others areintended to reject the obstruction to the cognition. When


Vivaranam 363

the first cognition arises, if there are'doubts etc., preventinga correct knowledge, then the latter cognitr'ons are required*

(3) The Buddhist view also is faulty. We have onlythe 'jnanotpatthmatra prayukta artha vyavahara'. Cogni-tion as such results in the knowledge of the object. 'Arthaniscaya' (deici mining the object to be such and such) aadvalidity are not dependent on anything other than cognition-Because of the cause which is aided by the defect, therearises non-validity. And since this is subject to negation?non-validity is not self-dependent.

Non-validity, the objector may argue, cannot be saidto arise from something external to the cognition proper;

for, non-validity is only of the nature of the prior negationof validity.

This is a faulty argument, non-validity is not the mereabsence of negation of validity. Âjnana', ^samsaya^ (doubt)and 'mithyatva* are the three forms of non-validity; and allthese are positive.

Objection ; How can non-validity be external forthe self-valid (svatath pramanasya) ?

RepSy : Heat is the nature of fire; and coldness isimopssible, or inconsistent -with fire. Yet when the obstru-ction from a defect is strong as in the case of the gem,there can be coldness. It is not at all inconsistent. Allcognition or knowledge is seen to give rise to activity be-cause of the self-validity of cognition. This activity wouldcontinue till the defect is apprehended. Hence validity and


364 PanchapA dika

its apprehension do not have any reflective nature or other-wise; and without this apeksha, jnana has self validity andis the cause of 'niscaya vyavahara',

Mahavakyasya aparokshya Prayojakatvam :

Objection : Now if this self-valid knowledge requ-ires the aid of logic, how can there be •the determinationof meaning ? The very fact that 'tarka' is necessary as anaid to the pramanas, is opposed to the self validity of thepramanas.

Reply : No, the self validity of the pramanas is notlost, since each pramana by its owa inherent power candetermine the nature of the object.

Objection ; Then what is the use of reasoning ?

Reply : When there is a doubt regarding the impo-ssibility of the object, the'anubhava phala" does not arise.Then tarka comes in to show that it is possible and therebyremoves the obstacle. Pramana alone brings froth the'arthaparokhsya niscaya*, and tarka dispels the obstaclesthat obstruct this 'niscaya*. Tarka is not the cause of. ârtha nirnaya".

Objection : Let this hold good so far as externalobjects are concerned. It cannot hold good in the case ofthe self, for there can be no obstacles for the self-humino-• sity of the self.

Reply: Consider the example, That thou art. Here


Vivaranam 365

self does not consider himself immediately to be of thenature of Brahman; on the other hand, he takes himself tobe other than Brahman. As such, even when jnana hasarisen, he does not have the determinate experience of theBrahmatmama bhava. Then comes 'tarka' and removesthe obstacles. If the obstacles are not removed by tarka,he cannot have the immediacy-he cannot realize .the iden.tity with Brahman.

In normal empirical experience we have the immediacyof the object in three ways —

i) The object as. non-different from consciousness,

ii) Without being mediated by anything else, if theobject can give rise to its samvit; it is another formof immediacy.

iii) When there is the contact for the object with thesense organ which is 'pramana karana* there is athird form. If these three are absent we have theinferential and other cognitions where the object ismediated.

The samvits are reflected in the evolutions of themind, the form of the not-self. For these samvite the upa-dana is the Brahman who is like the 'Bimba\ As suchBrahman is the upadana for all samvits. And this wouldmake out that Brahman is non-different from samvit.

It is the nature of the word to give rise to the media-ted apprehension. Yet it can and does give the knowledgeof immediacy to the self which is immediate and self rev-ealing. Now there isJa consciousness arising from the ver-


366 Panchapadika

bal testimony and having the form of Brahman. This sam-vit is different from Brahman, or it arises from Brahman.As such at first Brahman too is apprehended immediately.

Objection : If this is the case, is not the mananadividhana (reflection etc.) useless ?

Reply: No. This Brahman appears as if it is theother through some 'bhranti' (error) which is brought bythe mind. Two defects aid the mind is having this errorand they are the inability to concentrate and the 'viparyasasamskara'. Thus the self is (pratibadha) bound (orlimited)'

To enable the realization of higher immediacy thereare ordained yajna, sama, nididhyasana etc. Thereby themind becomes 'aparokshya niscaya nimittam\

Yajna and others put an end to the obstacles of defe-cts. Sama and others eliminate the defect of a contradic-tory activity: the activity directed towards the not-self.

'Manana' (reflection) shows an object. There arises a'guna^ of the nature of concentration in this object; andthat guna itself is a pradipa. As this lamp becomes lumi-nous it becomes capable of removing (or dispelling) theobstacles; and thus it reveals the subtlest Brahman. ThisBrahman is the 'atma vishaya nididhyasana' - the object ofcontemplation by the self. As this contemplation is inten-sified there ârises a property which is of the nature of deepconcentration. .

As the obstacles that have brought about the illusionof mediate apprehension (Parokshyavibbrama) are removed,


Vivaranam 367

the mind becomes the cause of 'aparoksh pratyaya'1 (imm-ediacy) through sabda alone. The mind is able to give the"aparokshniseaya'. It is also generally found that whenthe mind is iuteirely concentrating, it is able to find eventhe subtlest and slightest entity.

Here we land that the mind is the sahakarin; and in theTika this position is ascribed to ^tarka9. Ihe ability to dis-pel or put an end to the obstacles is the nature of tarkatoo; and as such this 'tarka* is the same as the minddescribed above. In other words, 'tarka^ conveys the mea-ning to the mirror of the mind.

Tarka puts an end to the impossibility (asambhavanaand to contrary possibility (viparita bhavana); and such aârka1 is the 'prathama jnana sadhana' (primary means ofknowledge),

The mind then gives the immediacy of Brahmaathrough sabda; further in "Tarn tvaupanishadam, wefind the derivative form (taddhita) which states that reali-zation of Brahman. And only an immediacy (aparokshava-gati) can be spoken of as being the true realisation.

The Vedantas then give rise to the immediate expert.ence (aparoksh pramiti) with regard to Brahman; andtarka comes in only to remove the obstacles.

Obj«; ction : But it is the nature of the word to giveonly a mediate apprehension; and the Vedantas take theaid of tarka, they become the cause of the âparokshpramiti. Sabda first of all gives th^ knowledge of Brahmanas the other. And when there is the aid from the mirror


368 Panchapadika

ofthemind-which was described earlier-, there arisesa second knowledge which is immediate. The taddhita inthe passage noted above shows that sabda and other thingshave their power of application (vmiyoga samarlhya) inimmediate appreheasion. As sach mere tarka would notdo. The contact of the eye with the obiect first givesa perceptual knowledge; and when the samskara of thisexperience aids us we are latter able to have recognition-You cannot say that the mediate knowledge about the;

'svaprakasa'^Brahman is an erroneous one; for, even thoughthe samved3.na of. another is 'svayam prakasa' still it ismediately apprehended through inference.

RepSy ; Whether we accept the contention of theobjector or hold to our own, the result is the same. Theword'pratip^tti* (apprehension) does not conflict with'vidya9. In both the views, immediacy is obtained througha 'prayatna5 (effort) on the part of the mind. Hence it isbut proper to use the word '•pratipatti.' Before tarka hasfread the mind from all obstacis, vidya might havearisen from the Mahavakyas. Still it appears as if it isnot obtained (anavapteva).

What then are the sahakarins with the help of whichthe âbda pramana' gives us immediacy ? To this Padma-pada replies—The avapti prakara (mode of apprehension)has been shown in the Vedantas and it refers directly tothe 'annbhava phala'. Here we come across 'Sravana9,'manana" and 'nididhyasana5. And this schoot of Vivaranatakes 'sravana', to be the 'angin' (princepal one) and theothers to be its 'angas9 (subsidiaries).


Vivaranam 369

Sravana vidhi :

Objection : How can you make ^manana' and'middhyasana9 to be the 'angas' of 'sravana'? Sabda(word) has sakti and tatparya. Such a Vedanta sabda give^the knowledge of Brahman and sravana gives the apprehe-nsion of Brahman. This apprehension is awakened in theself. Then arisen 'manana' ^which brings the consideration(paryalocana) of those 'upapattis (arguments) that arenecessary for the contemplation (sambhavaoa) of the objectSabda pramana and yukti sambhavana 'thus establish ordetermine the object. Yet, to have the absolute concentra-tion of the mind on this one object there arises 'nididhya-sana\ Thus 'sravana' and ^manana' go to help ^nididhy-âsana' which alone can be the 'angin' since it alone directlybrings about that immediate experience.

Reply : Even here you admit that the knowledge ofBrahman arises from the word which has 'sakti' and 'tatpa-rya\ The word then first gives the knowledge of Brahmanas the other; and when the mind is purified by the othertwo samskaras, there is said to arise the immediate experi-ence. This may be immediately proceeded by nididhyasana*Yet the 'aparoksha jnana^ has arisen directly from theapprehension of the word. As such we have to say that'sravana' is the most important, is the 'angin'; and that theother two are required as bringing ab»ut the 'phala' orexperience proper. They aid in the realisation of the'phala'. They are 'phalopakari angas/

Objection ; Even in the emergence ofthe^paro-ksha phala', why cannot the other two be theângas of nidi-

47)


£70 Panchapadika

dhyasana; for all the three are (practically) identical iubeing 'sannipaty opakarakas". In 'Darsa puma masa' wehave the angas all of which are equally important (samajlpradhana). The same will hold in the present case also.

9

Reply : The word is 'Sakti tatparya visishta' (quali-fiecTby the power of giving an import). When such a wordis heard, the word is immediately the cause of apprehend-ing the object. In this apprehension the word does notrequire the mediation by anything else. For any pramanagives only the immediate apprehension of its object. Now,^manana' and enididhyasana" purify the mind; and in so faras they give rise to the intense power of concentrationthey function as the cause of the experience of Brahman.Sabda, then, is urimediated (avyavahita^ as far as the'phala"is concerned. If this unmediated apprehension, is preventted or delayed, the other two come in as its 'angas9.

When the sabda alone at first gives that knowledgewhich is the 'phala' of the Immediate experience, there areStill the 'bhranti vikshepa samskaras' (impressions causinga plurality of illusions) in the mind. Because of these'doshas' we erroneously apprehend the aparokshanubhavaphala" (immediate experience) as the ^parokshanubhavaphala' (mediate one). Then 'manana' and 'nididhyasana''are required to put an end to these 'doshas' that preventthat immediate experience. Thereby they go .to confirm the*aparokshaphala\ Consequently they are the 'phalopakar-yangas* of sabdapramana'.

You cannot say that ni(}idhyasana alone without thesabda karana^ can give that immediate experience; for ithas no validity (pramanya).


Vivaranam 371

Objection : Immediacy is of the nature ôfBrah-mata arrived at from the apprehension "of the word.Through this we can establish the 'pramanya' of nididhya-sana.

Reply ; No. Already knowledge has arisen fromone pramana and we have arrived at the 'vishaya sadbhavaând then we are asked to admit another pramana which isdependent on this. It is better to accept only one having ,the power to give immediate experience. If two pramanasare to be accepted^ jnana would not have self-validity. Ifsabda alone is accepted it would have self-validity. Henceit is proper to treat, 'manana' and 'nididhyasana9 as the'phalopakarya angas' for 'sravana".

JIVANMUKTI :

Objection ; Even Brahmaparoksha jnaria cannotbring about the dispelling or destruction of 'anartha'; foreven when it is there we find the continuance (anuvritti) of'samsara^. This is incompatible as soon as there is thatimmediacy, the body must be left behind.

Reply : But we have shown that 'tattva jnana' isdifferent from the knowledge that the self is different fromthe body.

Objection: It is true. Yet there is no differencefrom the standpoint of 'phala'. Whether there is 'tattvajnana' (apprehension of truth) or vyatireka jnana (contraryknowledge), in both we find the continuous presence of the'ahankara granthi' and its consequences.


372 Panchapadika

Reply : No. From the method of agreement anddifference and from the 'sastra' we do find that adhyasa.along with its origins is removed by 'tattvaparoksha'. In-spite of the 'vyatireka jnana' the samsara (bondage or fini-tude) would continue because 'avidya' has not ceased tobe. But when the ^tattvaparoksha' (immediacy of truth orreal) arises the entire avidya dosha is removed. Can'tsuch an 'aparoksha jnana" remove the products of aividyaalso ?

Objection: The apprehension of the self as beingdifferent from the body etc. is opposed to adhyasa; and yetit does not put an end to adhyasa. On this analogy wecan infer that even though 'tattvavabhodha' is opposed toadhyasa, it cannot dispel adhyasa.

Reply ; But will the 'brahmatmavagama/ (experienceofBhrahman as ths self) arise for the self without at thesame time sublating or negating the 'brahmatmanavagama5(apprehension of Brahman as other than the self)

Objection : The ^parokshavagama" arises for oneexisting with his body and sense-organs. And since thebody etc., constitute the adhyasa, that apprehension mustinvolve the liberation of the self from the b3dy completely.Brahmajnana removes the 'agrahana' or adhyasa. Andsince the 'ahankara granthi' is only the product of adhyasait should csiss to be at that very moment.

Reply : No. Even though 'tattvajnana' can put anend to the activity of avidya, still there can be the conti-nuance (anuvritti) of avidya for some time. Even afterthe 'agrahana' is removed there is present its samskara


Vivaranam ^ / ^

(impression) for some time as in the case of the fear whichcontinues. The fear is dispelled when the true know? edgeof the rope comes; and yet the samskara of the fear con-tinuous and shows shivering etc.. Likewise through sam-skara avidya too continues to be for some time; and thusis the cause for the 'ahankara granthi.

Objection : There can be a samskara only for anact (kriya) or for knowledge (jnana) and none forajnana orfor its product.

Reply : No. We do find the samskara of the gandha(latent impression) also; and this is not an act, nor a cog-nition. Further, during 'pralaya' we accept that allentities remain in the form of their samskaras. Everywhere samskara is inferred to remain when that whichgives rise to it comes to an end. Moreover, avidya andits products are not taken to be the absence of knowledge,but to be 'bhanti jnana\ Even ajnana is ^sakshibhasya';

and it has thus the jnanabhasa" whence it can give rise to asamskara.

Objection : But a samskara is only the cause ofmemory. How can this give rise to the immediate appre-hension of the appearance of quality ?

Reply : We reply that avidya and its products bringthe dosha for consciousness. The defect that is in the causeof 'aparokshavabhasa' is the cause of 'aproksha bhrama7and when the self is the ground of avidya, it can be theground of this samskara also.

Now avidya is the upadana for all its products saveits samskara. And just as the self is not the upadana of


374 Panchapadika

avidya, it is also not the upadg-na of avidya samskara. Yetit is the 'asrayopadhi' for both avidya and its samskara.

Gradually will the samskaras disappear as there takesplace the anusandhana of true knowledge. Till this arisesthe samskara remains for some time and there takes placethe 'videha mukti' (liberation after the body is dissolved).This is not at all opposed to our doctrine.

One might'interpret Samskara9 to mean'avidya lesaton the analogy of 'tamo lesa'.

Saguna Brahmopasana (Personal God)

Objection : All the Vedantas are not begun onlyfor the sake of 'such a vidya. Some of the texts aim at'krama mukti9, 'aisvarya', 'abhyudaya\ 'karma samriddhi^There are the upasana (worship) portions in the texts. How'are they to be explained ?

Reply: 'The main puport of the Vedantic texts iswith reference to the apprehension of the 'nirviseshaBrahman'. The passages bearing on 'sagunopasana' comeonly by the way and are 'prasangika' (incidental). 'Bra-hman is the object of the upasana. In order to show tha.this Brahman is 'nishprap mcaka' and that this Brahman isthe real nature or form of the self, there should be givenat the outset that Brahman is the creator etc. of^jthe entireuniverse. Thus at the outset Brahman is declared to be'sarvatmaka', 'sarvajna' and 'sarva sakti".

Objection: If Brahman is established and propou-

n/'t^rl QO 'r^flT^c'oolô * 1-i/îir Aâ.c\ IiA. I».A/»/*——-. •i.'L - -1-*- ^ /»


Vivaranam 375

sbnal worship (sagunopasana) ? And how does the worldget it self related to be dependent on him ? For it is onlysuch a saguna Brahman that makes worship possible.

Reply z According to the maximâdhyaropa apavadabhyam nishprapancam prapancyate\ the world etc is'adhyasopita' and this also makes possible the latter subia-tion. As such we speak of Brahman as 'apakrtasesha pra-paneam' (negation of all finitude).

In the 'saprapancatva' state itself, without sublating Orrejecting it in Brahman, upasana has nbeen ordained. Inthis. Brahman is conceived under various conditioningmedia so that he can be worshipped, whereby one mayrealize the object he aims at.

Objection ; Now, if the same Brahman is the obj-ect here, it might also require the same competant pursuer"In 'Darsa purnamasa' we have the 'ap pranayana"1 with the'camasa^. But the adhikarin of the yoga may have alsothe desire for cattle in which case the 'camasa' is to berejected and the "godohana vidhana^ (procedure of milking)is to be accepted. Here we find that the, adhikarin for the'appramayana^ is already qualified (adhikrita) in 'Darsapurnamasa'. And he cannot take the âmasa^, but only»the 'godohana vidhana". Likewise the adhikarin for therealization of îrvisesha Brahman* (nori-determitate Bra-hman) will have necessarily to be the adhikarin for theûpasana vidhis' also. Only a person seeking liberation(mumukshu) would have to be an adhikarin for the upa,sanas^


376 Panchapadika

Reply : Now the 'appranayana* is already ordain'edin 'Darsapurnamasa" and the adhikarin would have to do itnecessarily. It is not ordained^by-the 'godohana vidhana'but by the ^rakriti'-viz., the sacrifise. The 'appranayana'is 'praptoddesya'. Likewise those desirous of cattle also arethere. But here what is ordained is that if the adhikarinfor the sacrifice is also desirous of cattle, he should followthe 'godohana vidhana' ?

On the other hand, whether one is a mumukshu or nothe can arrive at the upasana of 'saprapanca' Brahmanthrough the sabda. The upasana vidhana- has no specificadhikaria in mind; and it is the sams for both the 'miimu-kshu' and the non-mumkshu. It may be of use to the'mumukshu' also. Bat the 'mumakshu' is not given as the'adhikarin' here.

The upasana vidhana, then, is based on the 'saprapa-nca' Brahman. It is only an 'asritya vidhanam\

The ultimate import of the Vedantas then is withreference to NirVisesha Brahman.

Objection : But there are also abrahmopasanasin the Vedantas like the upasana of prana etc. What about"these ?

Reply : Even they aim at the realisation of karya' Brahman; and thus would lead gradually to muktL Thesutrakara (aphorist) himself would say this much in theaphorism: 'Karyatyaye tadadhyakshena sahitah paramabhidh'mat\


Vivaranam 377

All the Vedantas are directed to the apprehension orexperience of brahmatmyaikyavagatva either directly, orgradually, on the purification of the 'antahkarana'.

MUMUKSHOH PRAVRITTI (The activity of theseeker of Lioration)

The 'vishaya' and the 'prayojana* of the Vedanta giveus the 'vishaya' and the 'prayojana1 of the enquiry or vicarasastra. So Sankara-^Yatha cayam arthah^sarvesham......

pradarsayisyamah^. The purport of the Bhasya is stated.

That is the meaning of the Vedantas, Sankara proc-eeds to show in the 'Sariraka Mimansa'; Sankara explainsthe import of the vedantas after the fourth sutra onwards.'Saririka' is that which is of the nature of the body. Thatwhich is in the 'saariraka' is the self. And the work dealingwith the nature of that self is the 'Sariraka Mimansa.

The Vedantas and the vicara. sastra deal with thenature of the self, the 'sariraka'. The Vedantas have comewith reference to the âtva' of the self; and they culminatein 'Brahma rupata'. To show this Mimansa is undertaken.This Mimansa is begun with reference to that 'jiva tattva'.and such is designated as 'Sariraka Mimansa'.

Objection : But the plain meaning of the firstaphorisn is only 'vicara kartavyata' (something to beenquired into).

Reply : Padmapada has answered the doubt raisedby this question previously. Even though 'vishaya' and'prayojana' are not given by Badarayana here, still they

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378 Panchapadika

are taken by implication because Vedanta and its enquirypresuppose them. So Padmapada - The plain and directmeaning of the aphorism is that one having the desire toget liberated must undertake (kanvaya) the enquiry intoBrahma jnana. Yet, by implication we find that 'mokshaîs the ^prayojana' of Brahma jnana.

Objection : How is this implication derived fromthe plain meaning of the aphorism ?

Reply ; First there is the desire for the purush-artha. Afcer this desu'e team ana) has arisen we proceed in aparticular direction with reference to something desired.The something desired and the means of realizing it areimplicitly implied in the 'pravritt.

Since there can be no 'pravritti' or activity here .in thecase of Brahmin, we have to take 'pravritti' to mean'pravritti vishaya ishta sadhanata'. And this itself, we say-is the 'vidhi' (injuction).

VIDHI VICARA (enquiry in the injunction).

The meaning of the optative suffix is the 'ishtasadha?nata'3 ^pravritti' or activity is the same as 'bhavana"(means of realising the desired). Ishtasadhanata9 alone isthe meaning of the 'lin' (optative mood). Then how canBrahma jnana be the msans of realising 'moksha'? Theoptative suffix and other words indicate the 'pravritti9which is the means of realising the desired object. This'ishtasadhanata' is the meaning of the root and it has thepower where by it involves a relation to the specific 'adhi-karin' and to the specific phla. The act conveyed by theroot is only general or universal; and it becomes intelli-


Vi varan am 379

gible only when it gives a specific cognition where in it isrelated to a particular doer or agent, and to a particularobject to be realized.

Now, the îcara' or enquiry is apprehended throughthe 'ishta sadhaaata" in a general or universal manner. Andits ability or power establishes jnana. Through this jnanawe arrive at moksha as being the specific 'phala\ and foraspecific adhikarin. Assuch the 'mokshasadhana' can beBrahma jnana.

This is objected to by the Prabhakra who says that'linartha'cannot be'ishta sadhanatva1. One who desiresa purushartha is ordained to act in a particu^r way. This'filyoga' (command) makes the'dhatvartha' (meaning of'the verb) mean the 'purushartha sadhanatva\ Lin etc.,give us the 'niyoga' or the command to act; and this in-volves the person and the object. Thus sacrifice (yaga),the object (vishaya), and the 'svargakami. (one desirous ofheaven) as the person (niyogi) are implied. Now, if 'heyaga cannot be a 'sadhana9 (means) for the desired 'svarga',then the ^svargakamin niyoga vishayat\ a would be impos-sible or inconsistent. Hence through the 'niyoga samar-thya' that has been understood from the 'liii' etc. We findthat the 'yaga^ and 'svarga' are related to one another asthe object to be realised (sadhya) and the means of realiz-ation (sadhanata). As such from the 'myoga samanhya'it is better to assume that the ordained 'vicara' or enquiryto be the means of realizing Moksha. It is unnecessary toassume the 'ishta sadhanatva vidhi samarthya*.

The reply to this argument: There is no 'anupapatti'(inconststancy) or impossibilisy in our contention. If there


380 Panchapadika

is no relation between the 'phala" and the 'dhatvartha9,what is the impossibility ?

(i) Is iyhe 'niyoga svarupa' (the act as such) that isimpossible ? or

(ii) Is there the impossibility of the initiating an acti-vity (pravartakatva) ? (or)

(iii) Is it the 'phala kami yaga'(sacrifice to realise adesire) that is impossible ?

(i) It cannot be the first. Even without the relationbetween the 'phala' and the 'dhatv artha', we have the'niyoga' in *svarga kamah. 'Sikatha bhakshsayef (onedesirous of heaven should eat sand). Here and in 'naiyya-mika niyoga' we have actions arising even when the rela-tion is absent.

(ii) It cannot be the second; for, even when the rek-tion is absent, we do have the pravartakatva'. Doss the^niyoga' give rise to the act when the 'phalakamans' isinvolved (apekshita) ? or when it is not involved ? In theformer case, the 'kamana' itself would have the 'pravarta.katva9. Desire (kamana) alone would be the cause of theactivity; and the cause would not be the 'niyoga\ For, the'kamana' inva- iably, necessarily, and immediately preceedsthe act. If the 'kamana' is not required (na apeksyate) bythe 'niyoga', then the 'dhatvartha' has no relation with the^hala'.

(iii) It cannot be the third; for, even when the rela-tion is absent, we do have the 'phala kami yaga*. When

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Vivaranam 381

the Prabhakara establishes the relation between the 'phala"and the 'dhatv artha', does he mean (a) that it is impossi-ble to take the kamana as only the 'adhikari viseshana' ?(qualification of a competent agent), or (b)that it is impos-sible to have a 'viseshana' (qualification) to be realized(sadhya)?

Now, (a) is untenable. We have 'yavajjivam agni"hotram juhuyat' (Throughout life one is to wordhip firewith oblations). Here jivana is not a sadhya9, but an'adhikariviseshana^. The 'phalakamana' here qualifiesonly the adhikarin.

Then (b) also is untenable. You cannot say that"sadhyasya viseshanatvam^ is impossible. What is the me-aning of the word 'sadhya* ? When you take ^varga*" to be'yaga9 sadhya, (can be realised by a sacrifice), you wouldcommit the fallacy •of nutual dependence, if the 'phalakamitva" does not qualify the sadhya; for, once you havethe 'sadhya sadhana sambandha9. you can make 'svarga' tobe 'yaga sadhya'. Yaga would require svarga, and svargawould require yaga. As such, the Prabhakara cannot makeout the 'sadbyavta' to be 'siddhavat' (as if proven).

Arguing from another angle - Do we apprehend the'sadhyata' from the word ^svarga kama' (desirous of hea-ven), or from the meaning ? It cannot be the former, forit is not specifically mentioned. For 'svarga kama' meansthat all those who do not desire 'svarga' are excluded.The viseshana here is intended to exclude otherpossible agents (adhikarins), and not to mention the'sadhyata'. It refers only to the required specific doerand not to the object of the desire. It cannot be the latteralso, for there is no pramana to show that the 'sadhyata'


382 Panchapadika

is apprehended from the ireaning. Even through jivana isriot a 'sadhya' (in 'yavajjivam agnihotram juhnyaf), yet ifis a viseshana for the adhikarin. Likewise, there can be theviseshatva for svarga etc.. which are not 'sadhya'.

So far we have argued after accepting that "svarga* isonly an "adhikari viseshana^ and n3ta 'sadhya'. Now,.we have to point out that 'kamana' also is a 'siddha sva-ropa7 (an existent) for it is already there; and this is the^viseshana'of the 'adhikarin'. And'svarga' is only the'viseshana' of 'kamana\

'Svarga' can have only a relation vîth the 'adhikarin'through 'kamana' - it has a parampara sambhandha. Evenif it is the 'viseshana' of the 'adiiilcarin', you cannot havethe relation between the *phala' and the 'dhatavartha'.

Take the following :-Adhyetukaoxo bhakshyam caret;

parastri kamah prayasclttam kuryat;

grama kamo bhunkshva.

O.ie who is having his studies (adhyayana) is to bog hisfood. The begging, is not the 'sadbya' for 'adhyayana'.Yei:, for t ie act of begging, the proper 'adhikarin' is onewho is studying. Likewise 'svarga' is not the 'sadriya9for the sacrifice. Yet it can and does involve the 'adbi-kari viseshanatva' for ths act of sacrificing (yaga niyoga).It n'êd not be the 'sadhya'but to have the ace p, wa re-quire S. Thus there is no 'phala dhatv artha sambandha'here.

Satrictly speaking, even kamana cannot be the qualiCLcation of the agent (adhikari visheshana). Take the caseof 'darsapurna nasa" for tlie 'svurga kama\ When there


Vivaranam 383

is no relation between the niyoga (act) and theperson (doer), we have 'ayaga'; and when there is arelation b&tweea an svarga kami and the act (niyoga),w^ have 'anyayoga^. Now is the 'svarga kamana' givbn toexclude the 'ayoga' ? or to exclude the 'anya yoga' ? Bothare impossible.

The word 'svarga kama* cannot be the 'vyavachedaka!(factor of distinction) for the 'asamyoga' (non-conjunction)between the 'darsapaurna masa niyoga9 and the person forthe relation with the doer is already established by the'nitya vidhi' (categorical imperative),

Nor can it be a 'vyavachedaka* for the relation betweenthis 'niyoga* and some other person who does not desire'svarga9; for, that would conflict she ^nitya vidhi' viz., the'darsapurunamsa vidhi\

One may argue that the word 'svarga kama" may notbe a 'vyavachedaka for the ayoga or for the anyayoga sofar as ihe 'nitya vidhis^ are concerned. But »t may be avyavachedaka' in the 'kamya vidhis\ ^ ',,

Even this is not possible. You cannot bring in thedifference between the 'nitya' and 'sukamya' vidhis, as far asthe 'niyoga' is concerned. The 'niyoga" of the 'darsapurnamasa' enbraces all its 'angas"; and the 'niyoga1 here is'avisishta* (unspecified). There is the same 'niyoga9.

If there is no difference between the two 'niyogaa', howh the difference between the 'nitya' and 'kamya' vidhis tobe explained ? When a 'kami9 (one having a desire) per-forms the rite, it is a kamya vidhi; and when-a jivanadi-visishta adhikarin' performs it, we have a ^nitya vidhf.

49)


$84 Panchapadika

rhis is all the difference. It is a difference due to thelifference between the 'adhikarms'.

Thus the word ^svarga kama* does not offer the âdhi-carhf, but only the 'phala'. From ^maitravarunah praish-rat^ we set the 'praisyanu vada'; and this brings the 'dandalambandha', whence we have 'dandi praishan anv?ha\rhe 'dandi' comes as a 'viseshana only. Likewise the wordstvarga' is not 'visishta purusha para' (related to a particulartgent), but only 'viseshana para\ As such the word 'svargai:ama' refers only to the 'phala\ And by implication thesvarga kama" becomes an 'adhikarin'.

Objection : Let this be so. But how is the "niyoga"

lot the meaning of the sentence ?

^

Reply : The 'phala vacara' has its syntactical relationvith the 'sadhana vacane', and not with the 'niyoga'. When<re say 'ishta sadhanata\ one asks whose 'ishta9 (desire^ its. Then we get that it is the 'ishta9 of the 'svarga kama".^rom ^this we apprehend svarga and ask : What is thesadhana' ? rhe answer is given in 'lin' etc. Thus we arelible to explain it without assuming the 'niyoga'. Hence theishta sadhana' zione is the 'lin adi Sabdartha' and this ishe injunction; for 'lin arthatva' is no other than the 'ishta•adhanatva' which is ^kriti yogya' (appropriate for theict.)STATEMENT OF ANOTHER OBJECTION

But thc-re is another school of Mimansa which accepts:he 'dhatv artha phala sambandha' through arthapatti. In;he absence of this 'sambandha^they argue, it is impossible:o have a specific 'adhikarin' and the 'anvaya' (syntacticalrelation). To facilitate these, we have to assume thatsambandha, they argue thus ?


Vivaranam 385

If the vishaya and the dorr are absent there can be no"niyoga a bbidhana* (mention of the injuction). As such weshould say that the ^niyoga' which is ordained is one thaiinvolves both the object and the doer. Thus, one is therealised and the other is the realizer-'paraspara nirvartyamrvartakata lakshana sambandha siddhf. Otherwise therewill be the ^nupapatti' of not having a specific 'adhikarin'and the ânvaya^.

If there is no'kartri karmanvaya"—ie., if there is no"nirvartya nirvartakata lakshana sambandha1, the result isas follows: We recognise the ^niyoga" through ^riti sad-hyata\ It does not directly have the ^riti sadhyatva\ Agsuch we have to say that when there is the ^yaga nivrittithere is the îyoga nivritti'. You cannot argue that in theabsence of the 'anushthata^ there is the ^yaga nivritti'; andthat thus there is the îrvarlya nirvartskata lakshana anv-aya5 between the sacrifice and the doer,

Can there be the 'phala viseshanavaya' when there isthe syntactical relation between the object (vishaya) and thedoer ? Yes. The 'tatv artha' has its 'anvaya' with 'svaigakama'; and as such we should say that there is the anvayawith svarga. Otherwise there can be no visishtanyaya.

Even when we have the relation between the phala andthe 'dhatv artha', how can we have 'sadhya sadhanata' 9The answer : The two are not ^sama pradhana5 as in ^dar-


386 Panchapadika

sapaurna masa'; for, here one is desired and the other isnot so desired. Therefore, the ânvaya" would have to be'guna pradhana bhavana'. Therein *avarga" being thedesired is âdhya'and since 'yaga' is of the nature of anact, it is a 'sadhana,. Thus we get the ^sadhya sadhanabhava9.

Reply to this Objection ;

That the impossibility of 'visishtanvaya' (specific rela"tion) necessitates the acceptance of 'viseshanvaya' is afaulty and needless argument. The injunctions relating'to 'jivana', 'dohataha' parastic kaawa etc. have the 'vise-shanks' with which we find the 'anvaya for the 'yaga'. Isthis ^tigatayaa anvaya9 ? Or another ? If it is the former,the maxim 'prakrtivadvikriti Icastavya would tell us thatthere must the 'atidesa (induction) for it in the 'vikriti'.The vikriti, there wouldhave to be performed throughoutthe life. And the 'yavaj jiva anusthana* is opposed to^kartvyatva' ; for jwe would get in the vikritis, in comm-ands like 'yavajjivan caryam' nirvapet.

If, on the other hand we are to take it as 'uddesyat-vena anvaya^, even jivana5 too would have to be 'karmasadhya'- Jivana' is 'karmantara adhina' and it cannot bethe 'sadhya' for the-present act.

In this view also, it is impossible to have the 'dhatvartha phala sambandha\ And we cannot accept the înady


Vivaranam 387

arthatva' of fered by this view. The word ^svarga kama'has its aavaya with the 'phala9. The ^linnadi padas* expreshthe injunction which is the means of realizing the 'preyas'.With such a general ^lia or pada^ does the word 'svarga-kama' have its anvitabhidhana^ ? ^vargakama5' is a viseshapada' (specific expression) while the ^lin' etc., is a ^samanyapada9 (general expression).

Objection : The relation between the ^yaga' and^svarga' is arrived at fro"r ^sabda'. In this sabda bodhawe do not find the culminatson (paryavasana) of the 'linad

bodhits samanya'; and to say that because of this aparya-vasana samarthya we should recognise Mseshanvay' is notproper.

Reply: 'Lin'etc., give the knowledge of the meansnecessary for the realization of sreyas. It is the 'samanyasadhana' that is apprehended by 'tin' etc,, It involvas an"akanksha' and the 'nkankshitartha' (necessarily relatedmeaning) is given by the word 'svarga kama\ Whensuch a thing takes place, the 'lin6 becomes ^radhana'. Andthe 'aparyavasana samarthya'' of the 4m' eta would makeus recognise or accept the 'phala visesha% We thus assumethat the word 'svarga kama' is 'phala visesha para'; forthe 'padantara latpayya* is dependent upon, or determinedby, the 'vidhy akanksha'. Hence from the ^vidhi samarthya'we speak of the 'phala sauibandha'.


388 Panchapadika

Objection : If the meaning of the 'Inf is 'ishta^dhanata', how can you explain the instrumental case in^yotistomena^ etc.. For the 'Im9 yis said to express the'karanala' for the sacrifice. When the "karama karaka' isnot expressed (anabhihita) by 'lin', 'krit', 'taddhita' ane^samasa', then only ^the instrumental case is valid. Here'tin' expresses the 'karana' in which case the instrumental is'jyotishtomena^ is not valid grammatically.

Reply: There is no such invalidity. Yaga givesonly the 'samanyabhidhana', while the word 'jyotishtomena' gives the 'viseshabhidhana'. For the ^viseshabhidh-ana9 we do require the instrumental case there. ^Lin' exp-ress only the ^ravya tyaga rupa paga samanya gatam karar-natvam\ And the 'karanatva' which is 'yaga visesha gatnm"is expressed by ^jyotishtomena^

Objection : Now, 'vishyaa' is that which is notexpounded by anything other than this. And in the apho-rism we do not find anything that expounds th e 'vishthsaya".So, how do we have the îshaya pratipattf (vishayasiddhi) ?

Reply : Brahman cannot be known by any otherpramana save by this sastra. As such by implication we

get the 'vishaya nirdesa' (indicatian of the aim orobject.)


Vivaranam 389

When the question - from what or whence do we havethe Brahma jnana which is "mokshasadhana" -, whenthis question airses, we reply that by implication only thissastra can give it. Thus Sankara has shown BrahmaJna.nato be the vishaya^ of this sastra. After the desire fo,.liberation has arisen, this enquiry into Brahma jnanashould be undertaken. In rhis form of upadesa we aregiven both the ^vishaya' and 'prayojana' of the Vedantas.Yet Sankara has shown the implication of the first apho-risih and explained that which is presupposed is the verybasis of this implication. Thus he explained the avidya-tmaka bandha. And to fulfil his pratijna. he proceeds toexplain all this in the sutras that follow. And in order toimterpret the sutra^ he next gives the reason for firsttaking up the 'prayojana' and 'vishaya' in the words —^Vedanta mimamsa sastrasya vyacikhyasitasya idam adim-mam sutram - adhato brahma jijnasa' .

Objection ; From the ^samanya lakshana' itselfwe come to know the 'vishaya'; and we leain of the^rayojana' from the fourth chapter. Then how do yousay that these two are indicated or suggested by the firstaphorism ?

Reply : 'When Sankara speaks of it as 'adimamsutram', he means that it is the beginning of the sastra.As such, at the very beginning both the 'vishaya' and^rayojana' must be indicated by way of 'pravrtty angata\

Objection ; But is it improper to derive many ameaning from one sentence of the aphorism ?


390 Panchapadika

Reply ; No, for it is a 'sutra^. Any meaning thatis utprekshita' by the 'sabda samarthya' or by the strengthof its meaning, all that is the meaning of the aphorism.And all this 'artha kalapa' is understood and desired fromthe inherent power or strength of the aphorism. Thus,because it is the beginning of the sastra, because it is thefirst aphorism]we are"able to derive from it the 'vishaya'and"prayojana9 and he is able to explain that which makes the'vishaya' and the 'y-rayojana9 possible. The bondage ofthe self is called avidya; and it is implied by the vishaya'and 'prayojana''. Having exhibited all this, Sankara pro-ceeds to show the *sutra Samarthya" for all this. Accord-ingly, he now begins tos comment on the aphorism wordby word.9^

Here ends a the first Varnaka in Panchapadika andin Panchapadika Vivaranam.

Panchapadika Vivaranam of Prakasatma Yati

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